Families and Family
Policy in European
Context
Professor Gray Swicegood
Family and Population Studies, CeSO KU Leuven
University of Illinois
Overview
How to consider families:
• Family structure:
Residential arrangements of population at different points in the
life course (e.g. couples, single parent, intergenerational)
• Family Dynamics:
Transitions between family-defining statuses (union formation,
becoming a parent, divorce, death of a spouse)
• Family as Experienced:
Impact of family structure and dynamics on
individual outcomes (e.g. quality of relationships,
subjective wellbeing, educational outcomes for
children, division of labor in the household)
• Family systems (theory)
Combines elements of structure and dynamics
(perhaps better suited for in depth analysis of a single country or comparing a few)
The Life Course Perspective:
Connecting micro, meso and macro levels of analysis
Family Formation
Unions: Cohabition Marriage, Remarriage
Parenthood (Fertility)
Family Dissolution
Separation and Divorce
These status transitions create new roles and relations for
individuals and are the proximate determinants of changing family
structure. The life course perspective clarifies the interrelationship
of structure and process.
What is “Life Course”?
•
“As a concept it refers to the age-graded life patterns embedded in social
institutions and subject to historical change. The life course consist of interlocking
trajectories or pathways across the lifespan that are marked by sequences of social
transitions.” Elder’s (1992) definition makes clear the centrality of time
to the life course perspective. Time here is viewed in three different
dimensions.
Age
Social Time
Historical Time
Age can be indexed in terms of chronological
passage of time of from some defining event.
Social time refers to the socially defined
statuses that constituent the life course.
Historical time refers to the general social,
cultural, technological and economic
conditions within which individual life
courses are played out.
The Life Course Paradigm (Elder, 1992)
•
Interconnections between fateful historical
events and the individual biography.
•
One important impact of social change can
be to widen gaps between generations in
terms of shared values and behaviors.
•
The life course paradigm favors a framing
statement that views the socio-cultural
environment as the point of departure. ...life
course studies place greater emphasis on the
social pathways of human lives, their
sequence of events, transitions and social
roles.
Example of Interconnections:
Impact of the Depressions
Basic Concepts of the Life Course
• Cohort: Group of persons who were born at the same
historical time and who experience particular social changes
within a given culture in the same sequence and at the same
age
• Transition: Change in roles and statuses that presents a
distinct departure from prior roles and statuses
• Trajectory: Long-term pattern of stability and change, which
usually involves multiple transitions
• Life Event: Significant occurrence involving a relatively
abrupt change that may produce serious and long-lasting
effects
• Turning Point: Life event that produces a lasting shift in the
life course trajectory
Basic Concepts of the Life Course
•
Transition: Change in roles and statuses that
presents a distinct departure from prior roles and
statuses
–
•
Life is full of transitions: starting school, entering puberty,
leaving school, getting a first job, leaving home, retiring and
so on.
Trajectory: Long-term pattern of stability and
change, which usually involves multiple transitions
–
Trajectories involve a longer view of long-term patterns of
stability and change in a person’s life, involving multiple
transitions (Elder & Johnson 2003, George 2003).
Key Life Course Events and Status Transitions across
Domains.
Intimate Relationships/Family
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Puberty
Sexual Activity
Leaving Parental Household
Parenthood
Cohabitation
Marriage
Divorce
Remarriage
Widowhood
Life course transitions (cont.)
• Education
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Entries and Exits
Preschool/Kindergarten
Primary School
Secondary School
College/Technical/Training Programs
Advanced graduate training
Later Return to Schooling
Life Course Transitions (cont.)
Work
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
First Job
First Job Following School
Unemployment
Underemployment
Over Employment
Retirement
Post-retirement return to work
• (careers vs. jobs)
Life course transitions: Additional
Domains for consideration
• Home Ownership
• Community/Neighborhood
• Avocational Organizations and Networks
• Spiritual Domain
Mayer: Institutions and the life course.
•
Institutions can shape life course trajectories is a variety of ways. Institutions
are and outcome in part of public policy and in turn shape that policy.
•
“From the perspective of sociology, then, life courses are considered not as
life histories of persons as individuals but as patterned dynamic expressions
of social structure. These dynamics operate in populations or subsets of
populations, are governed intentionally or unintentionally by institutions, and
are the intentional or unintentional outcomes of the behavior of actors.
Patterns of life courses are, however, not only products of societies and a
part and parcel of social structure but also important mechanisms for
generating social structures as the aggregate outcome of individual steps
throughout the life course. One transparent example of these processes is
evident in the fact that the age and cohort structure of a population is the
highly consequential result of a multitude of fertility behaviors and decisions.
Likewise, the employment structure is the outcome of a multitude of
individual employment trajectories.”
•
“It is, therefore, the so-called welfare mix (i.e., the relative importance and
manner of interconnectedness of economic markets, the family, and the state
across historical time and across contemporary societies) that sociologists
see as the major determinant of life course patterns (Esping-Andersen,
1999).”
Household types across Europe
• Households vs. Families (see handout)
• The distribution of HH types varies widely. For Nordic countries in the
top panel substantial %’s of HH’s are single person under age 65.
Substantial number of single person HH headed by older adults are
also observed. Greatest contrasts are with the South were especially
the first type of single person HH is less likely.
• Single parent HH’s are relatively rare but do range widely from 1% in
Greece to 7% in Ireland.
• Mean HH size over individuals ranges from 2.7 in Denmark to 3.8 in
Poland. Single person HH’s are so rare in Denmark that the average
HH size across HH’s is only 2 persons.
Cohabitation and Marriage across Europe
Great variation across the European continent that in
some cases dates back centuries.
Contemporary differences remain substantial but union
formation via cohabitation has been increasing in recent
decades even in countries where it was relative rare in
the past.
Regional differences in union formation and dissolution
Marriage
rate
Age @
marriage
Crude
divorce
rate
Net
Divorce
rate
Cohabitation
rate FSS
Cohabitati
on rate
ESS
In union
age 24
Western
0.61
26.4
2.24
9.51
58.1
43.3
70.8
Northern
0.55
27.9
2.36
11.99
81.4
84.4
77.3
Southern
0.69
25.9
0.84
3.77
17.6
21.6
57.4
S.Eastern
0.68
23.6
0.74
3.83
-
-
77.3
Central
0.73
22.3
2.93
12.84
19.8
33.6
80.6
See handout for variable description and country specific values.
Source: Kalmijn, Matthijs. 2007. “Explaining Cross-National Differences in Marriage Cohabitation and
Divorce in Europe, 1990-2000.” Population Studies 61: 243-63.
Cohabitation in Europe: A partnership transition?
Cohabitation: Cross-national variation in the incidence of, duration in, and route of
exit from
(A)
Marginal
(B)
Prelude to
Marriage
Cohabitation
“exists as a
Cohabitation is not
prereproductive
prevalent and is
phase for adults.
discouraged by
Unions tend to be
public attitudes
brief and nonand policies.
reproductive, but
end in marriage”
(C)
Stage in Marriage
Process
(D)
Alternative to
Singleness
(E)
Alternative to
Marriage
Cohabitation “is a
discrete
Cohabitation
component of the
“exists as a
family system.
transitory phase in
Adult cohabitation
reproduction.
“Cohabitation is
is prevalent, and for
Unions tend to be primarily for brief,
longer duration
longer, and
non-reproductive
than in (C). A low
children more likely unions that end in
proportion lead to
to be born into a
separation instead
marriage; there is
cohabitation than of marriage”
more exposure to
in (B), but with
cohabitation during
short duration of
childhood than in
exposure”
(C) and for longer
duration"
(F)
Indistinguishable
from Marriage
“Little social
distinction between
cohabitation and
marriage. Children
more likely than in
(E) to experience
the marriage of
their parents,
because
cohabitation is not
seen as an
alternative to
marriage”
Source: Heuveline and Timberlake (2004)
Different meanings of cohabitation by country
Cohabitation is not prevalent and
is likely discouraged by public
attitudes and policies.
Exists as a pre-reproductive phase for
young adults. Brief and nonreproductive unions, but end in
marriage.
Transitory phase in reproduction.
Longer unions and children are more
likely to be born into a cohabitation
than in (B), but with short duration of
exposure.
Cohabitation primarily for brief,
non-reproductive unions that end in
separation instead of marriage.
Adulthood cohabitation, and for
longer duration than in (C). Low
proportion leading to marriage, more
exposure to cohabitation during
childhood than in (C), and for longer
duration.
Little social distinction between
cohabitation and marriage. Children
are more likely than in (E) to
experience the marriage of parents,
because cohabitation is not seen as
an alternative to marriage.
Source: Heuveline and Timberlake (2004).
Childbearing across Europe.
• Dimensions of childbearing.
– Transition to parenthood (age at first birth)
– Quantum of fertility (transition to higher parities and completed
family size)
– Aggregate period fertility
• Total period fertility rate= average number of children a
women would have if she had births at the prevailing
age-specific fertility rates. A hypothetical measure for a
synthetic cohort.
– Family context (union status of parents)
Fertility trends from Balter, 2006
European Fertility over Time: Engine of population aging
Fertility Trends across Europe
• Following a post-WW II baby boom of varying magnitudes
most European countries experienced fertility declines from
the 1960 onward, with particularly sharp declines for some
countries during the 1990’s.
• By 2000 almost every country in Europe was below the
replacement level fertility of approximately 2.1
• EX. Italy 1.26, Germany 1.38, Belgium 1.67, Netherlands,
1.72, Ireland 1.89, France 1.89
• There had begun already at this time a concern over low
fertility. Why?
From 1980-20003 the TFR in the EU-25 fell from 1.88 to 1.48. This was lead by
very sharp declines in Southern Europe then followed by steep drops in the new
member states from Eastern and Central Europe.
However, “Fertility as measured by the period total fertility rate (TFR) rose in the
large majority of European countries between 1998 and 2008. This trend
represents an unexpected reversal from the historically unprecedented low levels
reached by most countries in the 1990s or early 2000s. Increases from these
minimum levels have exceeded 0.2 births per woman in 19 European countries.”
Bongaarts and Sobatka, 2012.
Your handout shows this pattern of childbearing recuperation in country specific
detail.
Recuperation from the micro-level implies recovery from a delay and indeed to
understand period changes in fertility across Europe we need to consider the shift
towards later ages at childbearing which pushes births in to later years.
How to explain fertility decline/low tfr’s demographically ?
• Postponement:
• Increasing length of the first birth interval.
• Postponement opens the possibility that priorities will shift to non-familial
aspirations and activities.
• “Confronting demographic change: a new solidarity
between generations” issued
• in 2005 by the European Commission indeed recognises
the role of the postponement of childbearing in shaping
completed fertility, one of the basic trends that are
targeted by European policy-makers: “The baby-boomer
generation has had fewer children than previous
generations, as a result of many factors: difficulties in
finding a job, the lack and cost of housing, the older age
of parents at the birth of their first child, different study,
working life and family life
• choices” (Commission of the European Communities
2005, p. 3).
•
Childlessness: delayed / foregone
• One trend accompanying fertility decline is the increase in the
proportion of women having no children. This may be an
intentional outcome, an unintended one or somewhere in
between but it has important implications for family structure.
Handout: % of women ages 33-37 without children
• The range of variation is impressive. 7.1% in Lithuania to 34.2%
for Italy.
• The correlation between the level of childlessness and the TFR is
clear but not perfect. (e.g. Finland has a level of childlessness of
30.9 but a TFR of 1.8.
Trends in nonmarital childbearing
• More socially progressive countries, such as Sweden, have led the
way in nontraditional forms of family formation.
•
But young parents in many other countries adopted similar
lifestyles. In 2011, 40 percent of births in the European Union
took place outside of traditional marriage.
•
There are eight EU member countries where half or more of
births are nonmarital: Belgium, Bulgaria, Estonia, France, Iceland,
Slovenia, Norway, and Sweden. Iceland has the world's highest
proportion at 65 percent.
• The import of nonmarital childbearing almost certainly varies
according to the nature of cohabitation in the society.
Living arrangements of children:
Handout household type in which children live,
2007.
• The % of children not living with at least one
parent is rather small in all countries but still
ranges from .03 in the Netherlands to 3.3 in
Latvia (a factor of 10).
• The % of children living in one parent
families is highest in the UK and Ireland
(more 20%) along with the Baltic countries.
Living apart together: alternative family form?
Grandparents and Grandchildren: a brief overview.
• Leaving aside the question of co-resident
extended families we can consider how
frequent grandparents and grandchildren are
potentially available in each others lives.
• With prevailing standards of mortality in
Europe most people will have the majority of
their grandparents available during their
childhood. But as they age the presence of
grandparents will erode.
Grandparents roles and agency.
Not surprising grandparents provide a significant portion of childcare in some
European countries.
One element of this arrangement is the greater amount of trust that their
offspring hold with them relative to the formal care institutions. Reciprocal
influences are likely at work since contexts where these arrangements are most
prevalent are ones with the weakest state support for formal care.
According to a recent study by Jan Van Bavel and colleagues, grandparent may
be seeking this role with implications that could reverberate back on the welfare
state. Their study reports that persons with grandchildren are more likely to
retire early than those without grandchildren controlling for other factors.
Divorce: Cross-national differences
A retreat from marriage accompanied by a rise in divorce.
• Between 1980 and 2003 the crude marriage rate fell from 6.7 to 4.8. While
the crude divorce rate increased from 1.5 to 2.0 per 1,000 in the
population. Increases in divorce can have feedback effects on marriage and
thus lead young persons to postpone or forego marriage.
• Divorce rates tend to be lower in the Southern member states and higher
in Central Europe, the north and Belgium.
• The rise in divorce has generated increasing variation in families and households.
• Increases in births outside of marriage, single parent households, step –
families are all part of this mix.
Family Policies in Europe
• What are the range of family policies in
Europe?
• Do they matter for fertility, for education, for
family as experienced?
Family policy has a diversity of aims.
•
•
•
•
•
•
Poverty reduction and income maintenance
Direct compensation for economic costs of children.
Fostering employment by reconciling work and family life.
Improving gender equity
Support for early child care development.
Raising birth rates.
:
Source
•
Oliver Thevenon: “Family Policies in OECD Countries: A Comparative
Analysis.”
Framing the Importance of Family Policy:
The low fertility issue.
• “Europe is facing a demographic challenge based on
the conjuncture of population ageing and shrinking
labour force that in the long run jeopardizes economic
growth and sustainable development. The current
situation is the outcome of three trends: i) long-term
below-replacement level period fertility (that is less than
2.05 children per woman on average), ii) increasing
longevity and iii) growing proportion of people in ages
of the late 50s and above in the labour force.”
The question of demographic sustainability
• The long-term risks are obvious both in terms of future labour
supply, economic competitiveness (as young workers are more
willing and able to adapt to new technology, labour market
restructuring or other changes in economic production) and of
the sustainability of welfare states that assume that the
productive workforce will provide the resources to shoulder the
costs of care for the aged and the disabled (McDonald and
Kippen, 2001; Lutz and others, 2003; Bongaarts 2004).
Driving forces of postponement and lower fertility and
other family related change:
• 1. Broader context of SDT: ideational change, value shifts etc.
• “…Liefbroer (2005), who documents that the transition to
parenthood is postponed among young adults who value
individual autonomy and think that having a child will negatively
influence their autonomy.”
• “They show that men who are not holding traditional attitudes
towards gender equality tend to postpone childbearing as
compared to those who do hold traditional attitudes. No such
effect is found for women.”
• 2. Rise in Female Education
– Probably both a cause and a consequence
•
• 3. Risk and Uncertainty
– Rising likelihood of divorce and indeed the fragility of unions in general,
deteriorating stability and earning power on the labor market especially
for men.
• 4. Geo-Political Structural Shifts
– (Eastern/former Soviet Europe) associated policy shifts undercutting
family support that once could be assumed albeit at a rather low level.
• 5. Work-family imbalance:
– A more proximate cause that has multi-faceted impacts on the family and
not just a fertility effect.
Structural factors that shape the tempo and quantity of
fertility
• “ Opportunity Costs of Childbearing”
In the first instance considered in economic terms :
How much potential income does a women forfeit if she drops
out of the labor force to bear and raise a child?
Immediate and long term consequences:
Non-economic considerations as well.
Social and avocational interests may have to be curbed
“Work-Family Incompatibilities or Imbalances”
This concept is related to the opportunity costs but tends to
emphasize time as well as money.
To what extent are the hours and costs of market work in conflict
with aspirations for the quality and numbers of children that are
desired.
What are the institutional arrangements that shape the level of
incompatability?
Work-family balance, the lynchpin.
• Why do we care about the connections between work and family?
– Individuals face a challenge balancing two time-intensive activities of
career (work) and parenthood (family) during a time of delayed
childbearing and extended education. This challenge is faced by many
individuals, and can have serious consequences on individuals’ decisions on
family formation (childbearing), Their own wellbeing and the wellbeing of
their children. From a demographic perspective, work-family conflict is
believed to reduce aggregate fertility.
• What is happening now? What are some recent trends?
– With extended education, labor market transformation, globalization,
declining real wages in some contexts and longer work hours, different
individuals are making different decisions about work and family.
Addressing work-family imbalance
What causes family conflict?
• Time pressures
• Family burdens
• Work demands
• Multiplied by lack of financial resources or
assistance in kind.
How have states and social institutions responded?
• 1. Parental leave schemes
• 2. Publically subsidized and maintained day
care facilities
• 3. Flexible work schedules
• Considerations:
•
•
•
Non-standard work hours may have there own negative consequences.
(nights, weekends, shift work)
As men become more involved with care-giving and domestic chores they
may tend to experience more conflict.
How have states and social institutions responded?
• 1. Parental leave schemes
• 2. Publically subsidized and maintained day care
facilities
• 3. Flexible work schedules
• Considerations:
•
•
Non-standard work hours may have there own negative consequences.
(nights, weekends, shift work)
As men become more involved with care-giving and domestic chores they
may tend to experience more conflict.
Two studies of family policy:
• Stier, Haya, Noah Lewin-Epstein and Michael Bruan. “Work-family conflict in
comparative perspective: The role of social policies.” Research in Stratification and
Mobility 30: 265-279.
• Presents multi-level models of work family imbalance with policy related measures.
• Thevenon, Olivier. 2011. “Family Policy in OECD Countries: A comparative
analysis.” Population and Development Review 37(1): 57-87.
• Factor analysis categorizing family policies.
Work-family balance across countries:
Work family imbalance, OECD
What factors predict work family imbalance?
• Individual level factors
• Women have a higher work-family conflict than men.
• Older experience greater conflict than younger but the effect
flattens at older ages.
• Married less conflict than not married.
• Presence of children more imbalanced.
• Higher the number of working hours the more conflict.
• Greater job authority more conflict.
• Country level factors
• Percentage of children in day care is negatively related to
imbalance.
• Also the gender gap in perceived conflict is lower in
countries with greater job
Gender specific analyses. Women
• Policies have been more designed to reduce conflict for women.
• Level of conflict is reduced in countries with more generous
maternity/paternity leaves.
• Presence of children is associated with at greater sense of
conflict but this effect is smaller in countries with a greater
provision of day care facilities. Thus policy does matter.
• Also in countries scoring higher on the Flexibility Index the
effect of children is even greater than in countries with lower
scores. Thus suggesting the double-edged sword of nonstandard work schedules.
Gender specific analyses. Men
• Presence of children and high work demand
increase perceived conflict.
• Self-employment is associated with higher conflict
for men, but perhaps lower conflict for women.
• Country level child-care is related to imbalance in a
similar way that it is for women.
• But this effect is not different between men with and
without children.
Theveron: Input policies and investments:
Cross national investment in early childhood
Fertility recuperation in Europe
Significant amount of recuperation in many countries in Europe
in the last decade or so. Why?
• 1. We just have to get developed enough. At high levels the
Human Development Index becomes positively related to
fertility.
• 2. The low-fertility of some European societies was more a
matter of the effect of postponement on the TFR than a real
move to lower family sizes. (At least for some countries.)
• Two answers not necessarily contradictory.
SDT and Fertility
Human Development Index and Fertility
Formal child care, benefits for children
• Formal child care has been one of the most crucial areas of family
policy reform in the EU, particularly in the light of the objectives set by
the Barcelona European Council 2002 to provide child care to at least
33 percent of children under three years of age and to at least 90
percent of children between three years old and the mandatory school
age by 2010 (European Union, 2002).
• Growing body of studies are reporting positive effects of high quality
public day care on child development outcomes (behavior and
achievement; cognitive and non-cognitive skills). These positive effects
don’t necessarily apply to family day care. Benefits tend to be greater for
children from less advantaged backgrounds.
• Additional positive effects are reported in the case of long term
outcomes.
What does the Nordic model look like with respect to reducing workfamily incompatibility?
The Case of Sweden.
• “Swedish family policies are not directly aimed at encouraging
childbirth. Their main goal has rather been to support women’s labourforce participation and to promote gender equality. The focus is to
strengthen individuals so that they are able to pursue their family and
occupational tracks without being too strongly dependent on other
individuals.”
• Policies are aimed at individuals and not families as such.
• They are to help individuals, men and women, have the number of
children that they want. But many say that they want more than two.
The reconciliation of family and working life of women has been
facilitated by:
(i) individual taxation, which makes it less attractive for couples to
pursue gendered segregation of work and care,
(ii) an income-replacement based parental-leave system, which gives
women incentives to establish themselves in the labour market
before considering childbirth, and
(iii) subsidized child-care, which allows women to return to work
after parental leave.
For a birth that occurred in 2005, parents get 80% of the salary for
thirteen months.
Sweden also has direct child allowances as do a number of
other European countries.
But, most social scientists believe that allowances are not
sufficient to significantly impact the fertility rates of
developed societies.
Caregiving and depression: social policy success?
Typologies of family systems in Europe?
• In an analysis of Western European family structure,
Berthoud and Iacovou (2004), proposed a spectrum
ranging from Northern/Protestant to Southern/Catholic.
• Scandinavian countries are characterised by small
households (particularly single-adult and lone-parent
households), early residential independence for young
people and extended residential independence for elderly
people; cohabitation as an alternative to marriage; and an
almost complete absence of the extended family.
• “Southern European countries are characterised by relatively
low levels of non-marital cohabitation, by extended coresidence between parents and their adult children, and by
elderly people with their adult offspring; this, together with a
much lower incidence of lone-parent families, make for much
larger household sizes.”
• Reher (1998) outlines a typology based on geography and the
familialistic legacy of the Catholic church.
‘Northern’ cluster (Scandinavia, the United Kingdom, the
Low2 Countries and [much of] Germany and Austria),
characterised by ‘weak’ family ties, early home-leaving, and a
sense of social rather than familial solidarity with elderly or
weak members of society;
‘Southern’ cluster (the Mediterranean countries, including Portugal) characterised
by ‘strong’ family ties, later home-leaving, and a more family based sense of
solidarity. He notes that Ireland is an indeterminate case, being geographically
Northern, but having much more in common with the Mediterranean countries in
terms of family structures.
In fact to explain variation in the family arrangements across Europe, it is
necessary to consider institutional (welfare state, economy) and normative factors
and to consider the interplay between the two.
• Backup slides:1
Measuring perceived work-family conflict.
• How often has each of the following happened to you during the
past three months?
1. I have come home from work too tired to do the chores which
need to be done.
• 2. It has been difficult for me to fulfill my family responsibilities
because of the amount of time I spent on my job.
• 3. I have arrived at work too tired to function well because of the
household work I had done.
• 4. I have found it difficult to concentrate at work because of my
family responsibilities.
•
• The answers ranged from 1 = several times a week to 4 = never.
Low fertility spiral/trap
• Bongaarts says that to change behavior you must act on a bigger scale.
Incentives must be much larger and that is expensive. McDonald has
hypothesize a kind of threshold effect where once fertility goes below
about 1.5, that the likelihood of recovery is rather low. Lutz is credited
with calling it the low fertility trap.
“...new social norms created by low fertility rates create a selfreinforcing negative feedback loop.”
Ideal family sizes dropped to 1.7 in Germany and Austria
30% of young Germans report that they intend to have no children
• But clearly not all countries have gotten stuck.