psychopathy and explosions of old age

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Del Wolf Thiessen Supporting Data, April, 2014
PSYCHOPATHY AND EXPLOSIONS OF OLD AGE
With care and skill, and cunning art,
She parried Time’s malicious dart,
and kept the years at bay,
Till passion entered in her heart
And aged her in a day
Ella Wheeler Wilcox, U.S. poet (1850 – 1919)
The nucleus of this discussion came from my recent book, Psychopaths Rising:
Unholy Links to Civilization and Destruction (Agave Publishers, 2014). It’s about
psychopaths and what it means to get old in a dangerous world. Necessarily, the two
are closely related.
But the fact is that this is a story that might have been told by Carl Jung long
before the rise of molecular genetics and evolutionary psychology. Jung understood that
the fundamental nature of man is built on common structures and imperative functions,
speaking to us of ancient rites, religious feelings, sensuous lusts, and fears of death.
These and other fundamental traits of nature are the common threads that tie us to the
genesis of the past and the optimism for the future. To Jung, individual differences exist
only at the most superficial level. They tell us little of our barbaric and titanic battless for
life. To the degree that psychoanalytic insights are relevant, I will suggest how Jung’s
thinking converges on my demographic and contingent view of psychopathy and global
increases in aging.
What we see displayed over and over, even in the most deviant or debilitated
human mind are the common stock of evolution. Baring deep damage we invariably
show our ancient specie’s type. Carl Jung measured our path between birth and death
in terms of inviolable archetypes (broad evolved strategies of adaptive strategies) that
ordinarily unify our survival and reproductive drives. We see the human touch of our
primitive consciousness 30,000 or more years ago with animals painted on the walls of
France’s Lascaux Cave. And today we see the same mental processes on the walls of
the world’s greatest art museums and cathedrals. There is no mistaking the similarities.
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Lascaux Cave Horse
While I see incredible individual genetic variations among humans, fixed in my
mind by the Austrian monk, Gregor Mendel, and generations of molecular biologists, I
remain committed to an old fashion typology reflected best by the stunning nucleotide
code of the body’s DNA illuminated, finally, by James Watson and Francis Crick in
1953. These rogue investigators gave us the true picture of the invariant code that
spells out all human structures and function. Many of the individual differences we see
among our kinships are like the chaff that is separated from husks of grains during
harvesting. Metaphorically, these differences may in fact be related, or not, to survival
and reproduction, but there they are, I believe, not to reflect our species-specific traits
but to support and insure that the deeper archetypes are universally and preferentially
ordered.
THE DARKNESS AND LIGHT OF CREATIVE PROCESSES
Light thickens, and the crow
Makes wing to the rocky wood:
Good things of day begin to droop and drowse;
While night’s black agents to their preys do rouse
William Shakespeare: Macbeth: Act 3, Scene 2
My story tells of changes in thinking about the deviant mind – a multifaceted mind
that sometimes heralds tyranny and evil, but also is a strange-cast mind that can propel
cultural innovation and individual success. I offer explanations for changes in the nature
of the deviant mind, and illustrate (1) how these variations ride the surf of demographic
influences that impart momentum to cyclical social expressions, and (2) how changes in
population structure influence public sentiment and, infrequently, government policies.
My credentials are academic, but I am also an American citizen journalist of the
deviant and creative mind, where, often no one is there to speak for the Machiavellian
leader who may with wisdom and dedication contribute to society well beyond the
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stereotypes that portray him or her as an outcast from the normal workings of a
compassionate society. I consider myself a journalist sans formal training, an observer
and student of the mind. My closest affiliation for a supporting institution is the
Department of Psychology, University of Texas at Austin, where I taught for 31 years
until my retirement in 2001.
I am also an advocate for the elderly man and woman who, for no reason of
theirs, are shunned by government and ignored by those who could benefit from their
accumulated knowledge and experience. Instead, they are relegated to the dustbin of
history and given no voice at all. As an academic scholar and researcher, and as a
journalist, I attempt to give both the Machiavellian personality and the aged their special
recognition, and in a more general way show what is in store for our global cultures if
we continue to bury the wise among us long before they are dead.
The broad discourse on psychopathy in my book, Psychopaths Rising draws the
relations among genes and natural selection, neural and hormonal processes,
demographic shifts in populations, historical trends, and literary influences on the
cultural characteristics of notable men and women. I mine ideas and evaluate research
hypotheses that are generally accepted as supported by historians and scientists, while
other notions put forth are definitely controversial, jarring, and may alter the social
framework of the understanding of the deviant mind.
What’s important to recognize in the discussion of Psychopaths Rising, and in
this reiteration, is that there are strong and inverse relations between features of society
that lead to increases in the frequency of psychopathy and those social conditions that
decrease the tides of psychopathic acts. In youthful populations (with especially high
ratio of young males) vitality, innovation, and optimism are united to drive populations to
greater competition, higher aggression, and more robust responses to local and global
challenges. They are the founding rocks of empires and are in many cases
psychopathic. In retrospect this association is intuitive, but retrospective absorption is
insufficient to draw out the implications or galvanize public and political attention.
It appears that in older populations (low ratio of young males) energy is lost,
scientific and technological advances lag, and social inertia prevails. One can, in a
probabilistic way, count on these reciprocal relations to occur in a cyclical way.
Everything cycles. It is either “empire building” with substantial numbers of psychopaths
on the upswing, or “social and economic contraction,” with psychopaths dissolving into
stoic oldsters on the down leg. Most of the cyclic force in expanding populations is
instrumented by males, but under the strong influence of females; there are at least 3
male psychopaths for every female psychopath, which is the reason that I emphasize
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the quantitative and sometimes qualitative differences between male and female
sociobiology.
The cyclic nature of demographic change, as I view it, is seen in the figure below.
Most populations rise, stabilize for a time, and then decline, reflecting population
changes and suggesting the duality of human behaviors on the upswing and the
downfall.
As I see it, the hope of stabilizing population parameters, which might be
desirable at times, while not impossible, is at least extremely difficult. We may still
revolutionize the characteristics of populations that vacillate up and down within larger
cycles of change, by allocating attention and resources in ways that modify the extent
and consequences of population increases and decreases, including psychopathy and
incapacities of aging.
The unfortunate and dangerous circumstances today are that there is little
national motivation to understand the long term consequences of psychopathic violence
or the social impact of a nation that will inevitably become swollen with old and retired
men and women. The health industry is almost alone in sounding the alarm but political
ears are deaf.
Psychopathic motivations and human innovation are often correlated in the form
of the Machiavellian personality – part psychopathic, part genius. The common path of
the two is not unusual, as we see a similar and well-traveled path among our brightest
intellectuals, business leaders, great artists, writers, and performers, superb athletes,
and able political leaders. Like psychopathic personalities, they all want what they want
when they want it, and the public be damned. Without them, indeed we would be
damned.
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Here is the inevitable generalization. Without the force of narcissism, social
indifference and obsessive attention (characteristics of Machiavellian personalities), we
might still be living in grass huts, as Camille Paglia once said. We lose through
devastation when “all that is Caesar’s” must also be ours, and where none of the rest
has great meaning. But we nevertheless stand to gain through the creative processes of
self-centered imagination by our brothers and sisters.
A major insight that my research generated was to see the importance of saving
the accumulative value of men and women who reach an old age and feel abandoned
by family, friends, and country. It is apparently true that both psychopathy and the
inertia of aging are mirror images of demographic shifts in the proportion of males in a
population – when there are proportionately more young males, the higher relative
number of Machiavellian types command the greater attention; with fewer young males
the communal energy is lost with fewer competitors and the mounting tide of old people
dampens population growth and innovation. To understand one side of this is to
understand the other, as one might do by looking through a telescope from both ends.
Following retirement I realized that my older age need not be wasted in remorse
or inactivity. I believe that this mood is shared by millions of elderly folks, but is
suppressed in most, as if we have become irresponsible infants again and have to be
told what we can do and what we cannot do. This is simply ill advised as a national and
international “attitude,” even though it may happen by default; we face a reality that
cannot be sustained fiscally, intellectually, or morally. With a growing appreciation of the
potential in our aging cohorts, we may be able to help others take advantage of the
productive and satisfying possibilities that are associated with new vigor and
determination at all auspicious ages.
EXPLANATION FOR SENSATION SEEKERS AND THE INCREASE IN VIOLENCE
Byron! He would be all forgotten today
if he had lived to be a florid old gentleman
with iron-grey whiskers, writing very long,
very able letters to The Times about the
Repeal of the Corn Laws.
Max Beerbohm (1872 – 1956)
Genes, evolution, and specialized determinants of psychopathy are compelling
as explanations for major aspects of human behavior . Yet, when the integrated picture
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is studied we see the overwhelming influence of demographic and experiential factors.
There is always a rock-hard biological explanation for the potential of psychopathic
behavior, biased in the male direction because of competitive survival and reproductive
pressures, but its expression is often a matter of culture and how demographic changes
distribute the trends of aging. The “population pyramid” may in fact contribute more to
our understanding of instances of short-term behaviors in populations than individual
mechanisms preset by our biological history.
Fast growth young people,
Slow growth old people.
Slow growth young people,
Fast growth old people.
Christian Mesquida and Neil Weiner center their attention on male warlike
aggression and show a widespread relation between conflict behaviors and national
male age ratio (MAR), defined as the number of men aged 15 to 29 years of age,
relative to males aged 30 and older. In their investigations conflicts including wars
between nations, civil wars, and other forms of aggressive behavior are higher in
frequency among populations that have a higher ratio of younger to older males.
Using the male ratio as an index of potential conflict is consistent with the data
showing that young males, and generally not females or older males, determine
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aggressive acts. It is also consistent with the findings that it is more often young males
who are risk takers, psychopaths, street protesters, terrorists, and the movers of cultural
reform. They may be influenced by females who chose or reject them as mates, and are
often guided by older leaders who see opportunities in youthful ferment and who can
tap that unrest to build monuments to themselves or the ideologies they represent.
Without the restless energy of many young males, leaders do not dare send “armies”
against entrenched enemies or enormous economic challenges. There is victory only
with population growth, increases in MAR, and small ageing cohorts.
The overall correlation between extreme conflict behaviors and male age ratio in
153 countries is around 0.76. Conflict behaviors range from individual increases in
aggression to warlike responses in coordinated activities. A correlation of this
magnitude in the social sciences is unusual and should certainly guide our thinking and
any social planning.
Demographic shifts in MAR not only help explain variations in life and death
issues, but they lay bare the variations in motivations and behaviors of individuals. What
individuals think and do most often reflect the Zeitgeist of population changes. Thus,
individual behaviors to a large degree will follow the social changes that are written
demographically. The extent of influence is much wider than merely agonistic
motivations, and include all those acts that add innovative solutions for cultural success.
The following table gives us the projections of future actions of individuals living
in large populations. They express the probability that internal conflicts, murder, war,
revolutions, and terror will envelop a nation and perhaps bring down nations, empires,
and even civilizations. There are potential masses of psychopaths living under volatile
population conditions. The table gives the median age of males in different countries,
and thus the level of potential risk of violence. For example, Uganda, with a male
median age of 14.9, thus a country of young males, is more likely to engage in violent
behaviors in the future than Japan with a male median age of 42.9, a nation of old
males. The United States has a fairly high age for males, associated with relatively low
risk for violence, but that is changing in some regions because of migratory shifts
toward more young males.
RISK OF VIOLENCE FOR WORLD COUNTRIES:
MEDIAN AGE FOR MALES *
________________________________________________________________
TEN HIGHEST RISK
TEN LOWEST RISK
SPECIAL INTEREST
COUNTRIES
COUNTRIES
COUNTRIES
Country
Age
Country
Age
Country
Age
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Uganda
Niger
Mali
Yemen
Congo Rep.
Chad
Burundi
Bukina Faso
Ethiopia
Malawi
14.9
15.0
15.8
16.8
16.3
15.5
16.6
16.6
16.5
17.2
Greece
Finland
Austria
Guernsey
Hong Kong
Jersey
Germany
Italy
Japan
Monaco
High risk age:
Low risk age:
Medium risk age:
14.9 – 16.5
41.1 – 48.0
16.6 – 41.0
41.1
40.7
41.5
41.8
42.4
42.5
42.3
43.0
42.9
48.0
World
28.4
United States36.8
China
36.8
United Emir. 30.2
Israel
29.3
Iran
27.6
Panama
27.2
Mexico
26.7
India
25.9
Libya
24.2
Egypt
24.0
Jordan
21.8
Saudi Arabia 21.6
Syria
21.5
Pakistan
21.2
Kenya
18.8
Afghanistan 18.0
Spain
40.1
* “Median” age is the age where 50% of the male population is below that number, and
where 50% of the male population is higher than that number. Generally a “median
score” correlates positively with an “average score.”
Young-male hotspots include Paraguay, Venezuela, Southern Sudan, and Brazil.
Almost no one considers the fact that most group confrontations – Islamic provocations,
political assaults, urban riots, military incursions, protests against losses of government
welfare, overthrow of governments, and general terrorism are perpetuated by young
males with high testosterone (and other brain chemicals) -- surplus males not chosen by
marriage-age females, or males in poverty, males without hope for the future, except,
perhaps, by adopting more aggressive short-term mating styles, and with the young
seeking some sort of personal transformation. We might properly refer to MAR as a
measure of population testosterone, dopamine and risk taking, and as an index of
gravitational pull from possible spiritual greatness.
Ordinarily, the birth ratio of males to females is about 100 males for every 104
females, but with higher male mortality rates, the ratio often reverses itself. Worldwide, it
isn’t merely migration across national borders that alters population levels of males, but
differential sex abortions may add to the ratio of young males and change the frequency
and nature of psychopathic behaviors. Mara Hvistendahl, a correspondent for Science
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magazine, argues that widespread abortions of girls in favor of boys, along with heavy
female genocide, tend to increase population instability, increase poverty, heighten
male-male competition, and lead to higher levels of crime, wars, and deviant behaviors.
Historically, examples of high sex ratios (male verses female numbers) go back
as far as the fourth century BCE in Athens, a particularly bloody time in Greek history. In
the American West the sex ratio in Mississippi was 125 males to 100 females; in
California that ratio was 186 to 100, in Nevada it was 320 to 100, and in western
Kansas it reached 786 to 100. The Wild West may have been wild in large measure
because of these skewed distributions of rough sensation seeking young males. A
greater proportion of females would have gone a long way in decreasing the
aggressiveness of males and increasing the social stability of the culture. But at the
same time we must acknowledge that the reduced ratio of males may have curbed the
exploration and settling of western lands.
Today there are a number of countries where males are prized for their abilities
to contribute to agrarian conditions and differential abortion is practiced. In India the
current male to female ratio is 112 to 100, In China that ratio is 121 to 100, in Azerbaijan
the ratio is 115 to 100, in Georgia it is 118 to 100, and in Armenia that ratio approaches
120 to 100. Ms. Hvistendahl argues that over the past three decades 163 million girls
have been denied existence because of differential killing or abortions, no doubt
affecting sensation seeking, aggression, and psychopathic behaviors among males.
Certainly, the demographic bulge of males distorts the expression of male and female
behaviors.
In a critical issue of Science dealing with the young and the restless, Jack
Goldstone, a political scientist at George Mason University in Arlington, Virginia,
summarizes the usual importance of demographic changes.
In the end, Goldstone says, demography has
turned out to be a better tool for analysis than any
alternatives – and the youth bulge theory works
more than it fails. “ In terms of broad probabilities,”
he says, “demography tells you almost everything
you ought to know.”
Science, vol. 333, July 29, 2011
The dynamic nature of MAR can change risk levels dramatically, especially at
“ports of entry” for migratory groups. Demographer Steve Murdock at Rice University in
Houston, Texas, indicates that the population of Hispanic males coming from Mexico is
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reshaping the age population pyramid of Texas. Between 2000 and 2040 the public
school enrollment will show a 15 percent decline in Anglo children, while Hispanic
children will show an increase of 213 percent. Murdock says that “It’s basically over for
Anglos.” The same projections apply to vast areas of California and Arizona.
Newly minted citizens and younger illegal males are rising rapidly in the United
States. In data released by the Census Bureau, last year the U.S. population rose to
304.3 million, and the number of newly naturalized citizens climbed 3.5 percent to 16
million. The number of non-citizens grew 1.4 percent to 21.6 million. Those born in the
U.S., classified as native citizens, comprised the largest group, 88 percent of the total,
but rose at the slowest rate of 0.7 percent to 266.7 million.
Texas is a leading indicator of problems associated with uncontrolled
immigration. The danger is not in the transformation of ethnic distribution but the fact
that soon 30 percent of the state’s labor force will not even have a high school degree
and the average household income will be $6,500 lower than it was in the year 2000.
The population shift toward younger age of males, a lower education level, and a fall in
income, magnify the probability for violent demonstrations, increased crime, and an
increased burden on our economic system. The numbers tell the story of social and
economic change happening in regional areas of the United States. The demographic
change in young males, especially, is the strongest indicator of political agitation or
decreases in human services. These higher numbers, nevertheless, suggest new vigor
in future generations as the MAR is magnified, at least to the degree that the proportion
of old individuals is reduced.
FACTS OF GETTING OLDER
It’s hard to believe that when you die
the universe just stops, but it does for
you and everyone else who dies. How
many times can that happen?
Anonymous
The psychopathic effects of high MAR are evident in many cultures today, but
are expected to fall as populations age. Ageing is an inevitable consequence of widespread decreases in reproductive rates and increases in longevity.
The decrease in “rogue male” conflicts is related to expected demographic
increases in the proportion of older males that will occur in the next several years.
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MAR’s have been falling around the world as life expectancy increases. Historically the
world average MAR was about 84 (percent) in 1980, 77 in 1990, 62 in 2008, and is
predicted to be 56 in 2018 and 47 in 2020. Males and females are aging and decreasing
in conflict activities. The Greek and other European populations, with their current
political disruptions, will probably not continue to be confrontational even with increasing
austerity dictating public policies.
In about five years the number of individuals 65 years and older around the world
will outnumber children under five years of age. This aging cohort is projected to grow
from 524 million in 2010 to nearly 1.5 billion in 2050. The proportion of the world
population over 80 years is rising quickly as well, and more people reach the age of
100.
The medical costs of aging are unfortunately rising faster than expected
(http://www.nia.nih.gov/research/publication/global-health-and-aging). At least 25-30
percent of those over 85 years have dementia. Financial losses due to disabilities, heart
disease, stroke, and diabetes will double by 2015 in most countries. The number of
cancer victims in aging populations is expected to reach 27 million by 2030. It has been
estimated by OECD (Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development) that the
over-65 cohort accounts for about 50 percent of healthcare spending. The per capita
healthcare costs are up to five times higher than for those people under 65. These
community costs will no doubt increase in amounts as the demographic curve continues
to bend toward older and older cohorts.
The demographic and family changes are equally staggering, as there will be
fewer offspring and younger males and females to care for the growing needs of older
citizens. The psychological and economic consequences of these and other age related
problems are enormous and continue to add to the collective burden of our cultures.
Old age was often venerated in small tribes and communities – groups that are
vulnerable and can profit by community history of elders who, with their long-term
perspective and wisdom, might tip the balance between extinction and survival. Today
the situation has changed. Technology and affluence have diminished the value of
elders, as does the sheer impact of extreme numbers of aging individuals. Baring wars
and starvation, the major crisis we face in the future is the disproportionate increase in
old age.
In today’s populations the precious history and moral persuasion once carried by
old members of the group are widely available through written and digital channels that
easily transcend generations, language barriers, changing circumstances, and
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civilizations. Single old people with only bits and pieces of local and cultural information
no longer provide reliable transfer of critical information across generations. Situations
move too fast for that. Venerable aging is largely replaced by more technologically
sophisticated young males and females who not only have unexcelled access to
knowledge and wealth, but also carry longevity in their loins. The wisdom of the old men
and women may still be greater, but it may not seem as predictive of the future as it
once did.
By default, the old, with fragile capacity and without social prominence, no longer
possesses cultural leverage and thus faces isolation, dethronement, and abandonment.
What once was esteemed and rare suddenly becomes debased and common. That,
today, is the fate of our elders, unless we can rearrange our priorities and find ways to
strengthen the more obvious advantages and personal wisdom of senior status. I will
take up this issue in the last section of this discussion.
Retirement today and aging are more apt to bring isolation and discontent than
contentment and optimism. Colleagues and friends die or drift away, knowledge and
instruction are no longer tribal or stored in the minds of elders, nor can much of what is
known be transmitted from parent to offspring. Qualities once critical for the continuation
of small and vulnerable groups have a short life span and are more reliably obtained
and broadcast through Google search engines, electronic libraries, and tornado-like
dissemination of information in digital form.
The result is a growing cohort of frail old people whose value diminishes
exponentially following retirement. Instead of contributing to the society that spawned
them, they now consume far more than they produce and with each passing year they
stoically turn inward, fail to adjust to changing cultural diminutions, worry most about
diminishing vigor, health, and money, and wait for death.
Old age is a tangle of Disappointment, Despair,
Doubts, Dereliction, Drooping, Debt, and
Damnable Deficiency and everything else
that begins with a D.
Hilaire Belloc (1870 – 1953) in a letter
At the more proximate level, the aggregate population level of male testosterone,
according to projections, may fall 38% by 2050. It is also the case, at least in the United
States, that testosterone is decreasing among individuals regardless of MAR, another
reason to suspect that open conflict will decrease in the near future, at least among
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certain demographic groups. There will always be young males with high testosterone
and a craving for physiological highs, but there will be fewer of them in the future and
the cultures will shift emphases to accommodate older individuals and deteriorating
circumstances.
Presumably, MAR conflict activities will diminish, psychopathy will tire, fewer
males will be single, prison populations will shrink, extreme sports will lose their shine,
education may be valued more, and war, revolutions, and terrorism may become bad
memories.
The psychopath in the evening of life finds
Peace in the softness of sexless communion,
the dimming of lights, and the hushed sounds
of inability. No longer is competition a turn-on;
no more do sexual trinkets frame the mind; no
longer does isolation find its joy. The psychopath,
at last, flings aside his garments of aggression
and narcissism, and joins others in quiet
celebration. The burdensome game finally ends.
Emerging of the Dove
Del Wolf Thiessen, 2014
But these changes may not be adequate to support a viable and competitive
population. And, if fact, the old may still feel unfulfilled. A recent study by researchers at
Oregon State University, headed up by Professor Carolyn Aldwin and reported by CBS
Seattle, indicates that in a study of 1,315 men, aging is often uplifting until men pass the
age of 70 years. After 70 men begin to express significantly higher levels of
dissatisfaction with their situation (http://seattle.cbslocal.com/2014/04/15/study-menbecome-more-unhappy). At this age men are ordinarily retired and feel their mortality.
The expanded length of adolescence and the global increase in life span that we
see today will have major consequences among world populations. One thing is clear:
with increasing age comes a longer period of retirement and a decline in anti-social
behaviors and psychopathic acts, but at the personal level aging is not welcome.
Aging is also stressful and often without benefits. Obviously there is a looseness
of biological regulation that gives comfort to those who like to explain psychopathy in
terms of early and later experiences. It also opens the possibility that psychopathy is in
part learned and delivered to us as a product of culture and is therefore amenable to
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change. While anti-social behaviors reflect old genetic programs for adaptive responses
in competitive situations, we have strong reasons to believe that psychopathic
influences will expressly decrease in the long run as age distributions shift in the
direction of older individuals. .
Temporary circumstances, such as the emigration of millions of young Latinos
across borders, will alter the degree of psychopathic behaviors displayed at points of
entry. We should be concerned, as high MAR sets the necessary chaotic conditions for
the revolutionary ascension of commanding leaders to positions of power and possibly
governmental tyranny.
DOWNSIDE TO DEMOGRAPHIC DECREASES IN YOUNG MALES
I never dared be radical when young for
fear it would make me conservative when old.
Robert Frost (1874 – 1963) from Precaution (1936)
Ask Germans if they are pleased that the world demographic trend is toward
older males, lower testosterone, and peaceful living, and they will tell you that the
expectations are not pleasant. Germany is now on top of the world – the third largest
economic nation in the world, and one without excessive debt or obligations to other
countries.
The German people like their influence on other world powers and dearly cherish
their national destiny. Germany recently shocked the world by refusing to back NATO
allies in the war in Libya. Germany is flexing its strategic muscles and likes the feel of
strength and independence. Germany has evolved into a nation of business activists,
entrepreneurs, and leaders in an otherwise depressed European conglomerate. But the
future may not be a smooth road.
Germany’s population is forecast to shrink 20 percent by 2060 and in some
regions the drop may be as much as 40 percent. Birth rates have dropped despite
attempts to stimulate marriage and reproduction, and the percent of older nonproducing males and females is increasing. Small towns are in danger of disappearing
or are becoming senior citizen communities. Kühnhausen, for example, a small town on
the outskirts of the eastern city of Erfurt, is already 25 percent senior citizens.
The working age population of Germany is shrinking by more than 100,000
people a year, raising fears that there will soon be too many retirees and not enough
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working people to support them. The birth rate is exceptionally low – 1.36 children per
woman, the lowest in the European Union. According to the demographer, Harald
Wilkoszewski, “The wolf is coming back, nature is taking over, so to speak, and it’s
really literally only old people left.” I think, rather, that the demographic cycle is
reaching its inflection point, and all that follows is expected.
Peace may follow this dramatic pattern of population change, but the implications
are not sanguine. The best but shadowy view, suggested in this document, is that
significant global changes are often fraught with initial consternation and uncertainty,
only to be followed by later adjustments that minimize long-term disruptions in social
and economic motivations. We will get a glimpse of this transition as the world
population parameters shift to new levels, and where, hopefully, aging will no longer be
seen as an inevitable burden on societies.
A second look at the above table predicts the future, with a sharp drop in
economic status and world power for aging nations, including Germany, Italy, Japan,
the United States, and even China. The entire world is shifting demographically and
economically.
Jonathan V. Last, senior writer at the Weekly Standard and author of What to
Expect When No One’s Expecting: American’s Coming Demographic Disaster (Wall
Street Journal: February 2/3, 2013) points out that 97% of the world’s population now
lives in countries where the fertility is falling. Rarely is the birth replacement rate greater
than 2.1, the minimum rate to replace the population, indicating a demographic slide
toward fewer young men and women and a decrease in population number. The total
fertility rates from 2005 to 2010 for the top 10 countries by gross domestic product
(GDP) are indicated below.
1. United States 1.93
2. China 1.64
3. Japan 1.32
4. Germany 1.36
5. France 1.97
6. Brazil 1.9
7. UK 1.83
8. Italy 1.38
9. Russian Federation 1.44
10. India 2.73
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Among other things, low-fertility societies don’t show significant increases in
social and technological innovation. These societies are spending a larger fraction of
their GDP on health care and preservation of life. There are fewer young people who
are productive and add to the GDP. Germany is not alone in its concerns. Japan now
has an over-sixty five population of 25%, and by 2060 that percentage will reach nearly
40%. Neither do low-fertility groups tend to export their younger people across borders.
In Latin America the fall in fertility rates is even greater than it is for the United States.
Consequently, closing our borders to the south will probably not change the fall in illegal
immigration nor alter the long-term increase of older citizens.
Mexico has a history of sending the United States many of their “surplus” young
individuals. But for the last three years the net immigration into the U.S. may be a net
zero, a demographic observation that is not part of the calculation in our immigration
policies. This does not mean that the border is secure; it is still porous. At the moment
the decrease in illegal crossings and the return flow of migrants south who could not
find work in the United States makes it appear that the border is more or less secure
from illegal immigration. That “balance,” if it truly exists, could change very quickly.
Moreover, those who continue to cross from Mexico are probably less motivated by jobs
in the United States and more motivated by drug trafficking and other criminal activities.
Mr. Last makes this comment about the future decline in immigration rates into the
United States.
But decline isn’t about whether Democrats or
Republicans hold power; it isn’t about political
ideology at all. At its most basic, it’s about the
sustainability of human capital. Whether Barack
Obama or Mitt Romney took the oath of office
last month, we would still be declining in the most
important sense – demographically. It is what
drives everything else.
WSJ, 02-2/3-2013
Those nations with aging populations will inevitably show less sensation seeking,
less crime and overt psychopathy, but they will also lose economic and social
advantages and become less competitive internationally. A stronger future is emerging
for African nations that show increasing rates of reproduction and an increase ratio of
young, aggressive males. There is where future strategies for illegal immigration and
wars will be hatched. It is also the nest from which the world’s leaders are born.
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Explosive immigration problems are evident with thousands of African migrants
flocking to Spain’s territory in Morocco (WSJ April 4, 2014). David Román relates how
large numbers of migrants simply overpower border barriers and demand asylum. The
trend toward older more peaceful nations in the Middle East is the mirror image of the
increased MAR and aggression that is emerging from the sub-Sahara and North Africa.
The opposing demographic trends in Western and African countries may present more
definitive social predictions for the demographic models discussed in this summary.
Surprisingly, one of the fastest growing countries is Nigeria where
entrepreneurial activities are rapidly expanding (Ivan Birrell of the U.K. Daily Mail
reporting for The Wall Street Journal, April 16, 2014).
Goldman Sachs predicts that Nigeria’s economy
will be bigger than Canada’s or Italy’s by 2050 –
and not far behind Germany’s. And this is just one
of 54 countries on a large continent that is home to
six of the world’s 10 fastest-growing economies and
the youngest population on the planet. The same rapid
evolution is visible in Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya,
Mozambique or Tanzania.
…Much of Africa stands on the brink of takeoff comparable
to China’s. Those who fail to see this are likely to regret
their anachronistic attitude.
As non-African countries move toward lower populations, smaller birthrates, and
older ages, African nations are gearing up for world domination. Most of us living today
will see happen.
Demography is the most evident tipping point for moods and actions of nations,
ethnic groups, and populations. Deep in the structure of population pyramids lays the
wide sweep of discontent and the future success or failure of commanding leaders and
the type of leadership cultures follow. As researchers we may discover the individual
mechanisms of psychopathy – and a great deal of progress can be pointed to – but we
must not lose sight of the cultural and population influences that may still be predictive
of the behavior of the guy who lives next door.
GLOBAL NEED TO ENCOURAGE POSITIVE MODELS FOR PRODUCTIVE
RETIREMENT
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E.O. Wilson reflected what may be the new mood of 85 year olds when he said
“I’m turning 85 years old. I’m going to tell it like it is. The father of Sociobiology in 1975
has done that all of his life. Now he is trying to prevent the extinction of Homo sapiens
by advocating balanced biodiversity.
I repeat what appears to be general and inverse relations among traits
associated with population expansion and population retraction. Populations increase in
size when reproductive rates are above replacement levels. It is during those times that
the male age ratio (MAR) increases. The population is young and robust. Sensation
seeking and psychopathic behaviors expand. But typically the population growth slows,
reproductive rates fall, and the population ages. MAR decreases and the momentum of
the population falls. Many lifestyle changes follow the MAR.
The “Malthusian” curve of transitions seems apparent for most populations
according to historians (e.g., Burbank & Cooper, 2010; Diamond, 2005; Niall Ferguson,
2006, 2011). Today, most Western and Asian countries show these transitions and
appear to be in decline; empires are founded and lost based on these principles. African
countries currently with high reproductive rates appear to be in initial phases of the
population cycle. They will likely be the winners in migration, innovations, and
international social and economic competitions.
Some populations seem to be stable in growth or show only short-term effects,
as reproduction and survival seem more in balance with their ecology. But those
situations may reflect brief conditions within the larger framework of demographic and
cyclical changes. If resources and their access change, which is likely for almost all
ecologies, the population is presumed by many investigators to move in accord with
those changing ecologies (see Meadows, Randers & Meadows, 2004). Short-term
variations do not necessarily mirror more general population movements.
The global view of old individuals is highly consistent among 26 cultures and
among the 3,435 college students sampled (Lökenhoff et al, 2009). Perceived
expectations about aging males and females indicate (1) declines in physical
attractiveness, the ability to perform daily tasks, and the ability to learn new things, (2)
perceived increase in respect, wisdom, and knowledge, and (3) family stability and life
satisfaction. Respondents from most cultures indicate a general negativity about the
processes of aging. Negative attitudes can inhibit rational solutions.
The consistency across cultures suggests that people (e.g., college students)
see that with age many abilities deteriorate, but that wisdom and satisfaction with life
increase. Overall, the view of the usefulness of old people’s lives decreases. Virtually no
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culture endorses any social benefits from old age. The young are no longer interested in
acquired wisdom and family values. The latter influences are somehow found in the
technology of our time.
This is the zinger in all of the work with older individuals. People don’t want to
age; they see the loss of abilities including cognitive functions, and no one who is old
ever appears to get younger, more attractive, or more productive. The prevalence of
these views worldwide under different cultural conditions indicates that negative feelings
are part of our inevitable genetic program.
Whatever we can do to ameliorate these views and actually make a difference
that will benefit the aged and society will be like walking uphill carrying a 100 pound
backpack. Still, if we want to avoid a total socioeconomic catastrophe, walking the hill
cannot be avoided. Some things can be improved among the aged, and society is likely
to benefit. The alarm is sounding.
Nicholas Eberstadt and Michael Hodin reopened the critical discussion in a
recent Wall Street Journal article, America needs to rethink “Retirement.” (March 11,
2014). They begin by stating the consequence of continued neglect of the demographic
conditions of old age:
The U.S. should adapt now or risk being less
prosperous and competitive in the 21st century
They go on to describe some measures that have improved conditions of the
aged and reflect well on general social and economic conditions, or are likely to:
1. Increasing the retirement age from 60 to 65 years could increase our GDP 10% by
the year 2025.
2. Increasing the number of workers over 65 by only 2.6% a year (UK study) could
increase the per capita output by 6% in 2037.
3. Workers in UK who moved from retirement and entitlements to work experienced
improvements in general health and mental well-being.
4. Work rates by American workers have been rising for 20 years, indicating that more
individuals are moving toward increased participation in the work force.
5. Nearly 50% of American entrepreneurs occur after 45 years of age.
6. Improvements among the old could increase by employer work flexibility, making
pensions portable, and instituting training and education. Corporations could use older
workers to expand abilities they have gained over the years.
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7. Adding older cohorts to the work pool would act to stimulate economic growth, just as
women’s rights have.
8. We should add too that older people can give younger people the benefit of their
history, their experiences, their special skills, and their inestimable wisdom.
We must also recognize that old women in America outnumber men at most age
groups, and especially at higher ages. For example, at 100 years of age the number of
centenarians is approximately 44,644 women as contrasted to 10,313 men.These
differences represent special problems that must be considered in any overall strategy
to involve old people in productive enterprises and encourage them to participate in
social and economic activities (Terrence Jeffrey:
http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/terrence-p-jeffrey/death-discrim) .
The concern for increasing age cohorts in developed nations is growing. Iran’s
supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, recently announced an extreme program to
reverse the percentage of older folks in the Iranian population, that may put a ban on
vasectomies, a tightening of abortion rules, and a movement away from the West’s
progressive laws on family planning.
These measures are suggested to double the population from 77 million to 150
million. Chances are, however, that such a punitive program would not work, and would
not be acceptable to men and women who are striving for independence and higher
levels of personal liberty. Nevertheless, countries are beginning to realize the problems
associated with increasing older members in the population and are considering ways to
elevate the percentage of working young men and women
(http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/15/iran-ban-vasectomies).
Using different strategies of reward rather than punishment to stimulate
population growth, China has recently disavowed its one-child birth policy (CNN,
November 16, 2013), and Russia is suggesting new programs for early reproduction.
The lessons of neglect and selective attention to demographic changes are coming late,
but they will come as the problems of the aged mount. We might also observe that the
dangers of cutting back the military as austerity measures will increase the global
dangers as African nations with large increases in young males become more affluent
and aggressive. The time for realistic analyses at government levels and actions to curb
the economic burden of aging populations is now.
Aside from the benefits of increasing work for older retired men and women
described by Nicholas Eberstadt and Michael Hodin, we might also expect benefits from
a changing perspective by the general public. Older people can not only improve their
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own situations, they can improve the lives of others, including younger folks who might
otherwise feel negatively about all old people.
I would like to see a wide conceptual revolution that would include the National
Institutes of Mental Health, my research base for many years. Visualize what could
follow if NIMH announced a “Decade of research into the benefits of aging.”
Conferences on aging involving older and retired individuals would gain
increased importance with the endorsement of health agencies, scientific groups, and
other concerned health workers. We need to explore how we can better integrate old
people into the mainstream of American life, rather than downgrading their existence by
ignoring their plights and resenting their burden. This goal would possibly include the
founding of learning centers, increased project involvement, better access to medical
diagnoses and treatment, and financial and personal advising. It’s good business and
an ethical stance in a darkening world. The approach is also associated with a decline
of psychopathic behaviors, a win-win situation.
The public should also be reeducated about the problems and benefits
associated with aging. Finally, we can encourage the self-worth of older folks by tapping
into their unique skills and experiences, opening for them and us the wider world of art,
literature, and history.
Clearly there are many things we should do to better the conditions under which
old people live, and we can help ourselves, the nation, and the world by extending ideas
and results to all populations that face the inevitable consequences of demographic
cycling. We no longer emphasize the archetypical structure of our personalities, but the
Jungian influence on the important characteristics of the universal mind remains a
stepping stone to socioeconomic patterns of all behaviors.
REFERENCES
Burbank, J. & Cooper, F. (2010). Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of
Differences. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Collins, D. (2001). Overabundance of rogue males. Social Contract, 12, No. 1, Fall.
Dahl, R. (2003). Beyond raging hormones: The tinderbox in the teenage brain.
Cerebrum: The Dana Forum on Brain Science, 5, No. 3, 7-22
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Demographic Trends. Decrease in adult male ratio (MFA) from 1995-2050, projected.
http://hanson.gmu.edu/worldpeace,html.
Diamond, J. (2005). Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed. New York:
Viking Penguin.
Ferguson, N. (2006). Empires with expiration dates. FP (Foreign Policy),
September/October, 2006.
Ferguson, N. (2011), Civilization: The West and the Rest. New York: The Penguin
Press.
Hvistendahl, M. (2011). Unnatural selection: Choosing boys over girls.
Public Affairs: Member of the Perseus Book Group.
Löckenhoff, C.E. (2009). Perceptions of aging across 26 cultures and their culture-level
associates. Psychology of Aging. 24 (4): 941-954.
Meadows, D., Randers, J. & Meadows, D. (2004). Limits to growth. White Water
Junction, VT: Chelsea Green Publishing Company.
Mesquida, C.G. and Wiener, N.I. (1999). Male age composition and severity of conflicts.
Politics and the Life Sciences, 18, No. 2. 113-117, September.
Murdock, S. (2011). Texas demographer: “It’s basically over for Anglos.”
Texas Politics: http://blogs.chron.com/texas
politics/archives/201102Texas_demograph.html.
Thiessen, D. (1996), Bittersweet destiny: The stormy evolution of human behavior. New
Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. Republished as paperback, 2012.
Thiessen, D. (2012). Slip-ups and the dangerous mind. Seeing through and living
beyond the psychopath. Agave Publishers LLC (CreateSpace, Amazon.com).
Thiessen, D. (2014). Psychopaths rising: Unholy Links to Civilization and Destruction.
Bastrop Tx: Agave Publishers LLC.
Wikipedia: List of countries by median age.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_median _age.
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