What Makes it Moral? Measuring Objectivity in Moral and Non-Moral Attitudes
Ciara K. Kidder* & Stephen L. Crites, Jr.
University of Texas at El Paso
METHOD
INTRODUCTION
Defining Moral Attitudes
• Characterized by strong convictions related to core
beliefs and vary across individuals and cultures [1]
• Proposed as theoretically and behaviorally different
from non-moral attitudes
• Behavioral
• Preference for greater physical and social distance
from attitudinally dissimilar others [2]
• In group settings, conflict resolution decreases when
the issue is morally dividing
• Theoretical
• Morality leads to greater sense of universality; belief
that one’s moral stance should apply to everyone,
regardless of location or culture [1]
• Morality leads to greater sense of objectivity; my
belief is true [4,5]
• Morality is more affectively based; violations of
morals leads to more intense emotion [5,6]
Current Study & Hypotheses
Pre-screen
• Participants completed an online survey measuring morality
and attitudes towards 17 social issues.
• Moral conviction (MC), attitude valence, and attitude
strength were recorded for each issues
• Issues were categorized as moral if MC ≥ 20
• Issues were categorized as non-moral if MC ≤ 12
• Participants were required to hold three moral and three nonmoral attitudes to complete the experiment.
Participants:
• 73 (52 Female) recruited from eligible pre-screen participants
• Average age = 21
• Similar to local population, 74% identified as Hispanic, 55%
reported Catholic affiliation, and average “slightly liberal”
political affiliation
Measures:
• Attitude, Attitude Importance, and Attitude Certainty were
measured (see supplement for complete descriptions of
measures)
• Idiosyncratic IATs consisted of practice blocks with fact or
opinion categorizations and moral and non-moral categorization.
Critical blocks consisted of mixed stimuli. *
The goal of the current study is to use an IAT to
measure associations between attitudes and
objectivity.
• Calculated the effect using the D600 Algorithm
• Significant association between objectivity and morality,
D = 0.225, SD = 0.478, 95% CI = 0.106, 0.343.
• The Fact/Moral and Opinion/Non-Moral block (M =
1064ms, SD = 357ms) had faster reaction times than the
Fact/Non-Moral and Opinion/Moral block (M = 1166ms,
SD = 363ms), Mdifference = 101ms, SD = 298ms.
H2- Morality Effects:
• Tested using a 2x2x2 Mixed ANOVA examining congruity,
morality, and block order. The dependent variable was RT.
• No significant effects of morality.
• Moral stimuli (M = 1155ms, SD = 406ms) were categorized
equally as fast as non-moral stimuli (M = 1152ms, SD =
423ms), F(1,63) = 0.004, p = 0.951).
• No significant congruity by morality interaction, F(2,63) =
0.264, p = 0.609
DISCUSSION
• Objectivity is more associated with moral than non-moral
attitudes
•IAT can be used with complex stimuli
•Follow-up study confirmed association of objectivity and
morality
•Examine this association under other paradigms such as
sequential priming
REFERENCES
H2. Morality will impact the congruity effect such
that differences between expected associations and
unexpected associations would be greater when
making judgments about moral attitudes.
Poster presented at the
Meeting of the Society for
Personality and Social Psychology.
*Author contact: ckconnally@miners.utep.edu
H1- Congruity Effect:
Limitations and Future Directions:
H1. There will be a congruity effect with faster
reaction times for expected associations (e.g.,
fact/moral) than for unexpected associations (e.g.,
fact/non-moral).
16th Annual
RESULTS
*participants also completed an IAT to measure the association
between morality and universality. Results were non-significant.
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