Local Governance and COIN
In Eastern Afghanistan 2004-2008
Robert Kemp
Summary:
This paper examines local governance – defined as governance at the
provincial, district and municipal levels – in the area of Afghanistan covered
by Regional Command – East, during 2004 -2008, and how local
governance related to counter insurgency strategy and operations. It also
looks at how the administration of local governance evolved at the national
level, particularly with the establishment of the Independent Directorate for
Local Governance in 2007, and how changes in the national laws for local
governance might have an impact on counter insurgency.
In most basic terms, the counterinsurgency strategy in the U.S. led RC –
East had three mains components (commonly referred to as “pillars”):
security, development assistance, and governance. Of these, security
efforts, mostly the building up of the Afghan National Army, the Afghan
National Police, and active measures against various insurgent groups,
received by far the most effort and resources. Basic development, the
building up of roads, schools, health clinics, irrigation systems, and the
institutions to support them, also received considerable effort, mostly
through USAID and Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP)
projects.
The third pillar, local governance, also made progress during this time
frame, but did not receive the level of resources as the other two pillars. In
part this was the result of the basic imbalance between civilian and military
capacity in RC – East during this time, with the military vastly
overshadowing the civilian presence, both U.S. and international, including
the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA). In part
this reflected a limited Afghan ability to absorb assistance, as many of the
local government institutions had atrophied over the years of war, and there
were few trained civil servants. This was also the result of the prioritization
of the fight against the Taliban and other insurgent groups, with the logic
that the establishment of adequate security is a precursor to civil
institutions taking root.
Building the institutions of local governance was inherently a slow process
in Afghanistan. This was particularly true in RC – East, where decades of
war had reduced the pool of civil servants through migration, mostly to
Pakistan. An already weak education system had been decimated, making
it difficult to produce trained local leaders, and decades of war had taken a
toll of potential leadership. Added to this was the lack of infrastructure; in
2004, while most governors could rely to some extent on physical
compounds to govern out of, they still lacked basic equipment and staff; at
the district level, conditions were worse.
Overview:
RC - East
Regional Command – East is the American-led military area covering an
area along the border with Pakistan, from Pakitka province in the west to
Nuristan in the east, then north to the Hindu Kush mountain range. In 2004
only one brigade, supported by a logistical aviation hub at Bagram Air
Base, covered the thirteen provinces of RC – E. By 2008, three brigades
were assigned to the area, and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)
were present in all provinces (although one PRT covered both Kapisa and
Parwan Provinces).
Overview of Local Governance Structure
On paper, the general structure of local governance was defined; in
practice it was often ad-hoc and varied considerably between provinces,
and within provinces. At the same time, the relationship between the
central government in Kabul and the provinces was not always clearly
defined, and often depended on personal relationships.
At the top of the local political hierarchy was the provincial government,
headed by the Governor, who was appointed directly by Kabul for an openended term. Parallel to this were the line ministries, with provincial
representatives reporting back to Kabul. The district governors (also
referred to by U.S. forces as sub-governors) were the bottom rung of local
governance, and the only layer the majority of Afghans came into contact
with. Municipal government was in many ways the most ill-defined,
covering both urban and rural areas of varying sizes.
Elections in the fall of 2005 chose members of the Provincial Councils as
well as members of the Wolesi Jirga (the lower house); members of the
Meshrano Jirga (upper house) were indirectly elected.
Critical Role of Governors 2004-2008
While local Afghan politics is complex, with many formal and informal
players, the governor was in most cases the most important political actor
in a province. He (Governor Sarobi in Bamyan Province, was the only
female governor) was directly appointed by President Karzai, and to some
extent was his "envoy" in the province. However, the governor's power was
variable, depending on access to funding, influence with tribes and
business groups, lineage (family history often carried weight), his role in the
fight against the Soviets, ties into the Kabul government, as well as
speaking and leadership abilities.
Governors were the chief political contacts for Coalition military and political
officers during 2004-2008 (Note – throughout this paper the term “Coalition”
refers to both civilian and military officers). As such, they had a key role in
the success (or failure) of counterinsurgency efforts at the provincial level.
Conversely, support of Coalition officers was often critical to the success
(and to some extent, the survival) of governors. In RC - East, Coalition
officers met almost daily with governors to discuss events, coordinate
development projects, review security efforts, plan for upcoming VIP visits,
review policy guidance from Kabul, or look at potential points of friction in
local society.
U.S. forces had success with several governors in RC - East, notably
Mangal (as Governor of both Paktika and Laghman), Jamal in Khost,
Wahidi in Konar, and Taniwal in Pakita (until his assassination by the
Taliban). In general, these governors established reputations for honesty,
strong leadership, the ability to work well with the local tribes, physical
courage, and ties to Karzai. Through their popular support in the
community, they opened opportunities for PRTs and maneuver units to
engage more with the people, flow additional development funding into
communities, and push back against insurgents (particularly those from
outside of the province.) These Governors depended heavily on the U.S. to
provide security and development assistance, while U.S. forces depended
on the Governors to manage the complex politics of these provinces.
Given the internal divisions in many Afghan provinces, governors play an
important role in resolving or reducing tribal or ethnic disputes. For
example, Ghazni Province includes Pashtuns, Hazaras, Tajiks and, during
warmer months, nomadic Kuchis. These ethnic differences have historically
led to considerable friction, which a skilled governor can help minimize.
Tribal and sub-tribal disputes (often over land or historic grievances) are
also potential flashpoints, and have been used by the Taliban to their
tactical advantage, both in the 1990s as they took over much of the
country, and now.
Some governors were important in smoothing the inevitable friction when
foreigners interacted with Afghan society. These problems ranged from the
benign, such as cultural misunderstandings, to the important, such as crops
and property damaged in raids, to the critical, when air strikes mistakenly
killed civilians. These public relations efforts require the Governors to walk
a fine line, between getting the truth out (the Taliban had become expert at
distorting the truth regarding coalition attacks) and not appearing as being
biased in favor of outsiders.
In a larger sense, governors played a critical role in strategic
communications. Given the cultural complexities, the difficulty of learning
Afghan languages, the deep-seated suspicions towards outsiders, and
Taliban disinformation campaigns, this was a difficult area for the Coalition.
Very low literacy rates, and the isolation of many rural communities made
this task even harder. However, many of the Governors were very
impressive public speakers (the traditional, and still important means of
communication), and presented the provincial and national government's
views, and supported Coalition efforts. Increasingly available radio
networks helped the government connect with the population. In addition,
large shuras presented opportunities -- for example, in 2007 hundreds of
tribal elders attended a shura in Paktika Province, giving Governor
Khpalwak a chance to reach, directly or indirectly, much of the province.
Governors also played an important role communicating with decision
makers and populations in ISAF countries. For example, the U.S. Embassy
sponsored several successful trips of delegations of governors to the U.S.
and Europe, where they presented the "ground truth" of their provinces,
including the repressive and violent nature of the Taliban insurgency. This
was especially important in Europe, where public support for ISAF efforts in
Afghanistan was often shaky. Some governors were also very effective in
briefing visiting officials, including U.S. congressional delegations.
Several governors played an important part in the 2005 parliament and
provincial council elections, not only helping to organize the elections, but
explaining to a population largely unfamiliar with elections and democracy
(the 2004 presidential election aside) what the elections were about, why
they needed to participate, and what to expect from their representatives
after the elections. As Afghanistan looks to future rounds of elections the
governors should be called on to play this role again.
Coalition Support to Governors
PRTs and Brigade commands and battalions helped governors in
overcoming some obstacles inherent in Afghanistan. For example, Brigade
commands hosted regional governor's conferences that brought together
Governors, their staff, Kabul officials and provincial security officials to
discuss security and development issues. These conferences were useful
in comparing notes, increasing communications between Governors, and
developing regional policies and projects. They were also good
opportunities for press briefings. Some PRTs took the lead in arranging for
Governors to travel to Kabul, to meet not only with GoA officials but also
donor agencies (such as the World Bank and NGOs) and Embassies.
These helped the governors understand better the often complex world of
international assistance, while giving donors more input from the field.
Coalition efforts helped governors succeed in other ways. Governors often
took credit for coalition-funded development projects, increasing their
stature. Particularly in more dangerous provinces, military assets, including
convoys and helicopters, were used to provide mobility for government
officials. The PRTs helped fund staff for some governors, and provided
training on basic administrative tasks. The Provincial Coordination Centers,
established as “911” numbers of a sort, gave citizens a point of contact for
security forces - a service that has boosted the positive perception of some
governors. PRT officers, in particular, acted as neutral advisors - giving
governors advice they might not get from locals with personal agendas while also giving some governors warnings when corruption, favoritism or
bad policy decisions might undercut their credibility with the local
population.
Governors as a COIN Liability
Being an Afghan governor during this time frame was a daunting task,
given the dire poverty, lack of infrastructure, fractured societies, and active
insurgencies that many faced. Some were not up to the task – the governor
of Ghazni, newly appointed in the spring of 2008, had difficulties running
that large, ethnically divided and sometimes violent province, and was soon
replaced. COIN efforts in Ghazni suffered as a result, due to the weak
administration under this governor as well as the lack of continuity as
governors were shuffled. A recurring problem was the long-term absence of
many governors from their provinces, as they spent weeks or months in
Kabul or overseas (one RC – East governor was relieved for this reason in
early 2008). This was particularly problematic since they often did not
delegate authority to their deputies, causing provincial administration to
grind to a halt. Other governors suffered from lack of legitimacy caused by
a variety of reasons – a particularly bloody role in previous fighting in
Afghanistan’s wars, the perception of favoring one group over another, lack
of resources to provide basic services, or lack of support from Kabul.
High levels of corruption on the part of some governors were one of the
biggest obstacles to long-term Coalition success in RC – East, undercutting
counterinsurgency efforts, in some cases severely. For example, in Konar
in 2004 - 2005 the Governor, along with some provincial security chiefs,
were perceived by the local population as being corrupt, misappropriating
government funds and engaging in smuggling of timber and gemstones.
During the same timeframe, the governor of Khost was seen by the locals
as enriching himself through the sale of publicly owned land. These
governors decreased the legitimacy of the Afghan government, and
provided openings for the Taliban to increase its influence. At the same
time, they almost certainly lessened the credibility of the Coalition forces
who worked with them, whose security and development efforts were seen
as supporting corrupt officials.
Corruption of Afghan officials was a central, recurring theme in
conversations with locals during this time period. Afghans expected
Coalition forces to be able to end corruption among provincial officials, and
were not at all understanding when this did not happen, assuming at best a
lack of will to counter corrupt officials, at worst an acceptance of corruption.
In fact, both State and DoD officers confronted provincial officials with
charges of corruption when they had compelling evidence, which may have
modified behavior in some cases. At the same time, mullahs, business
groups and later provincial councils would publicly and privately accuse
provincial officials of corruption. Not all of the corruption at the provincial
level was destined for official’s pockets – some governors appeared to use
illegal tolls on highways and border crossings to fund projects, and the dayto-day running of their governments.
Lack of Human Resources
As with other sectors of government, Afghanistan lacks human capital to fill
governor slots adequately, and Kabul had to scramble to find good
candidates willing to work in difficult and dangerous provinces. In some
cases, governors had to stay on longer than they wished, to the point of
exhaustion - several governors told the author they wanted to leave their
posts, but had been asked to stay on by President Karzai. This situation
was made worse by weak or absent staff to support the governors, and the
lack of facilities or security for families to accompany the governors. In
addition, many governors had conflicts or rivalries with other officials in the
province, some of whom reported directly to superiors in Kabul, not to the
governor.
District Governance:
Beneath the provincial level of governance are the districts, headed by a
district governor (also called sub-governors by U.S. forces). These district
governors were by law appointed by Kabul, but in fact were often appointed
by the provincial governors. In RC – East, district governance was quite
variable, from being fairly effective to almost non-existent, and in most
cases struggled with inadequate funding and staffing. The district level was
important in that this was the only official presence that many Afghans
come in contact with, and determined the perceptions of government in
what is still largely a rural country. In most cases, the district centers also
counted a district police chief. Representatives of some line ministries, and
judicial authorities were also present in some districts.
The duties of district governors often seemed reactive to what was
happening in the district, as opposed to having a set list of jobs to
accomplish. According to Lister and Nixon1, the district governor's
1
“The Place of the Province in Afghanistan's Subnational Governance”, 2008, Sarah Lister and Hamish Nixon
responsibilities often included "dispute resolution and other problem solving
activities depending on relations with the provincial authorities, local
customary and informal power-holders.”
Security and District Governance
During 2004 – 2008, not only the availability of resources but also the level
of security and insurgent threat determined the effectiveness of districtlevel governance. Security was also a major factor in the ability of the
Coalition to provide support for district governance; within RC – East, the
ability of insurgents to hinder district governance ranged from negligible in
Bamian to very significant in Nuristan, Konar, Khost and Paktika provinces.
The Coalition reacted to security conditions at the district level with a
variety of responses. In 2004, the 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment
under Lt. Colonel Walter Piatt carried out an effective program in Paktika
Province, deploying groups of soldiers, usually led by captains, to district
centers for weeks at a time. This provided enough security for the nascent
district governments to begin to take root, gave the officers an opportunity
to mentor and work with Afghan officials, and provided U.S. forces a good
picture of what was happening on the ground. This program worked in part
because the insurgent groups were only just becoming organized in
Paktika (in contrast, when UK forces in Helmand Province deployed to
district centers they quickly became pinned by Taliban forces, and faced
considerable logistical challenges). However, the Bermel district of Paktika,
across from Pakistan’s South Waziristan Agency, suffered from constant
attacks; the district government had twice been overrun by insurgents. To
counter this, the U.S. 1st battalion of the 508th Infantry Regiment based in
Paktika Province in 2005 established a firebase that also served as the
district center2
The security situation in Khost Province gradually deteriorated during 2004
– 2008 as insurgent groups, particularly the Haqqani Network, increased
their capabilities. In 2004-2005, the CAT-A team from the PRT and
company commanders from the maneuver battalion based in Khost
supported district officials by visiting their compounds during day-long
(check)
2
See “Civil-Military Cooperation as a Function of Security, Eastern Afghanistan, 2004-2005” Robert Kemp, Pg. 3242, “Campaigning”, Summer 2008
www.jfsc.ndu.edu/schools_programs/jcws/Publications/Campaigning_Journal_Summer_2008.pdf
patrols. By 2007, the security situation dictated that most of the district
centers be fortified, and guarded by soldiers and police. In parts of Konar
and Nuristan Provinces, particularly the Pesh, Korangal, and Waygal
valleys, localized insurgencies were strong, and hindered the growth of
local governance; even firebases were threatened, as shown by the attack
on Wanat in July of 2008 that left several U.S. and Afghan soldiers dead.
Conversely, overall security in Nangarhar province improved between 2004
-8, to where Afghan security forces had taken over much of the
responsibility for the province. District-level governance was expanded as a
result, in part due to the efforts of the Jalalabad PRT and in 2007-8, of the
Special Troops Battalion, which manned FOBs and Patrol Bases in several
of the districts.
Shortcomings and Suggestions for District Efforts
While State Department political officers posted to the PRTs and the
Brigade commands visited the district centers, during this period their
limited numbers meant that most effort went to provincial-level government.
More civilian focus at the district level would bear fruit (as of 2009, the U.S.
Embassy in Kabul was working on posting officers at the district level).
Elections of district governors have not been held, despite having been
under consideration several times. During the 2005 provincial elections, the
sense of the international community was that holding district level
elections as well made the mechanics of the elections overly complicated.
During the period this paper considers, appointment as district governors
were sometimes handed out as favors; reportedly those appointed could
then enrich themselves, particularly in districts with smuggling routes.
Mechanisms must be put in place to adequately fund and resource district
governance. At the same time, civil servants need to be trained to
administer this layer of government – the Indian Government’s initiative to
train 500 Afghan civil servants, begun in 2008, was a good beginning.
Additional Institutions of Local Governance
Two other important layers of local governance were the provincial councils
and the municipalities, although Coalition forces worked with these less
overall than with the governors and the district governors. Provincial
councils were elected in September of 2005, during elections that also
chose members of parliament. The first task of the councils was to pick one
of their members for the Meshrano Jirga. Beyond this task, the job of the
Councils was less defined; involvement in development planning,
environmental protection and appraisal of provincial government seemed to
be common themes3. At the same time, their limited funding hindered their
ability to be effective.
Independent Directorate for Local Governance
Local Governance Moves to IDLG
The Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG ) was
established in August 2007 by Presidential Decree, and given a mandate
"to consolidate and stabilize, achieve development and equitable economic
growth and to achieve improvements in service delivery through just,
democratic processes and institutions of governance at sub national level
thus improving the quality of life of Afghan citizens."4 The Ministry of Interior
(MoI) had previously been responsible for sub-national governance, but
acquired a reputation for corruption and inefficiency. IDLG inherited more
than 10,000 employees nationwide of variable quality and abilities;
however, IDLG's core staff - those formulating and implementing national
policy - appeared to number less than 100 in the spring of 2008.
The establishment of IDLG was a fundamental shift in how local
governance was administered by Kabul, and had immediate implications
for COIN strategy in RC - East. IDLG took a much more vigorous approach
to managing local governance than the MoI had. At the same time, IDLG
officers began to assert themselves as the supervisors of the local officials,
and demanded a say in how relations between PRTs, battalions and
brigade staffs and local government were carried out, and asking that
Kabul at least be informed of Coalition interactions with provincial officials.
With considerable support from President Karzai and the international
community, IDLG began an ambitious program to overhaul governance at
the provincial, district and municipal levels. It also began increasing IDLG's
capacity at the Kabul level, and improving coordination with other
3
4
AREU, “Subnational State Building in Afghanistan”, April 2008, Hamish Nixon, Pg. 20
(ANDS website, Strategy Paper on Launching of the IDLG, www.ands.gov.af).
ministries, some of which also had a considerable stake in local
governance. An important step forward for IDLG was the development of
the "Five Year Strategic Work Plan", inaugurated in April of 2008. This
outlined general goals, including the main areas of policy development,
institution building, and broader governance, and was nested within the
overarching Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS). This Work
plan, a coherent and fairly realistic document conceived with support from
international advisors, not only laid out a blueprint for local governance, but
described areas where donors could provide financial and technical
assistance.
IDLG Faces Longstanding Governance Challenges
As with all previous Afghan governments, IDLG faced the difficult task of
extending its writ to the provinces. This was a daunting task, given the size
of Afghanistan and its rugged terrain, harsh winters, and a lack of
transportation infrastructure. These challenges were coupled with limited
resources, several governors who acted very independently, the necessity
of balancing complex political situations at both the national and local
levels, and the need for a busy President Karzai to often become involved
in decision making at the local-governance level. Added to this were very
real security considerations for ground travel in parts of the country.
A major hurdle for IDLG was the lack of trained civil servants, a result of
decades of war, the migration of a significant percentage of the population
to other countries, and an education system that, by 2001, was almost nonexistent. Some of the best governors were those that had returned from
overseas, but the significant security risks, hardship and low pay kept
others away, a situation even more evident at the district and municipal
levels.
In IDLG's favor was the remarkably rapid expansion of cell phone coverage
to many parts of the country, and the availability of internet service in cities,
allowing IDLG to be in almost constant communications with many
governors. The increased cell phone networks also began to provide more
oversight of district governors. At the same time, commercial air travel was
gradually becoming available for cities such as Herat, while the Afghan
military's air wing began flying to more places, allowing IDLG officers to
visit the provinces more easily.
Review of Governors
Beginning in late 2007 IDLG began a review of provincial governors,
removing some of the more corrupt and inefficient ones. Criteria for new
governors, according to IDLG officials, included loyalty to President Karzai,
ability to work with the local population, administrative and governance
capability, and ability to work with the Coalition. Some of the new governors
appointed by IDLG were marked improvements, particularly Wahidi in
Konar and Amin in Farah. One of Afghanistan's best governors, Mangal,
was moved to the strategically important province of Helmand. In the spring
of 2008, IDLG also began reviews of its Kabul staff, as well as mayors and
district governors.
Transfer of Authorities to the Provincial Level
IDLG, as part of an effort by several ministries to redraft local governance
laws and policies and within its own mandate, began to rationalize the laws
on local governance in early 2008. This included examining how to devolve
power from Kabul to the provinces, with the intent of giving local officials
more budgetary and policy authority. From a COIN perspective, this had
the advantage of making local government more responsive to its
constituents. In Kabul there was some resistance to passing more
budgetary authority to governors, as this could have decreased the
influence of ministries, who channel funding directly from Kabul to their
offices in the provinces.
This transfer of power could have the advantage of giving more Afghans
input into government programs and policies, of moving decision-making to
a level where it can be better adapted to local conditions (an important
consideration in a country as diverse as Afghanistan), and of increasing
perceptions that a government is in place and functioning. This devolution
may also have the benefit of better countering shadow Taliban
governments in some provinces.
However, there are compelling historical and practical reasons against
devolution of power to the provinces. In the past, some governors have
become powers unto themselves, with little accountability to Kabul. Others
have come under the direct influence of other countries, or been the
proxies of local warlords (or been local warlords themselves). As noted,
governors in some ways act as the President's envoy to a province, so
Kabul has an interest in maintaining control over them, particularly in the
run up to elections. History has also shown that Afghanistan has the
potential to come apart on ethnic/regional lines, an argument for holding
power in Kabul.
Importantly, the current constitution leaves open the option of some
devolution of power. Article 137 of the constitution says that "the
government, while preserving the principal of centralism, shall delegate
certain authorities to local authorities to local administration units, for the
purpose of expediting and promoting economic, social and cultural affairs,
and increasing the participation of people in the development of the nation."
An important factor in the long run will be the development of a civil service
cadre with enough officers available to run government effectively at the
local level. At the same time, a strong center will also need to remain in
place to hold Afghanistan together. As noted in Rotburg5 pg. 207:
"Regardless of ethnicity..many Afghan politicians and policymakers from
across the country favor a strong central state in order to curb powerful
regional figures who often receive support from outside the country, as well
as to reduce the danger of criminal influence over local government."
Funding of Provincial Government
A fundamental problem of Afghan governors was the lack of funding, both
for day-to-day running of provincial government, but also for discretionary
funding of projects or emergency response (an important consideration in
Afghanistan, with its droughts, floods, and earthquakes). IDLG approached
the international community in early 2008 to help establish a "governor's
fund" to provide money directly to governors with a reputation for honesty
and efficiency.
USG Support for IDLG Ties to Provinces
The U.S. military and PRT section (which had its own helicopter and
aircraft section) assisted IDLG by using their aircraft to make trips to the
provinces. These visits, particularly to more remote provinces such as
Badghis and Zabul, were treated as events by the provincial officials, who
5
”, The Place of the Province in Afghanistan’s Subnational Governance, Lister and Nixon pg. 207, in Robert Rotburg
(editor): “Building a New Afghanistan World Peace Foundation/Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC
rarely receive visitors from the central government. The governors would
often assemble dozens of provincial leaders, including district governors,
provincial council members, security chiefs, and tribal leaders for
roundtable discussions, then hold smaller meetings focused on
governance, security and development. These trips yielded positive results
not only for these sorts of consultations, but by demonstrating the central
government is extending its reach more to the provinces. Still, a
considerable disconnect remains between the center and the provinces,
and much work remains to be done in this area.
Conclusions:
As the U.S. Army Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual notes6
(section 6-1), “Success in counterinsurgency operations requires
establishing a legitimate government supported by the people and able to
address the fundamental causes that insurgents use to gain support.” By
the end of the timeframe examined in this paper (late summer of 2008), the
overall trend in RC – East was positive, in that a system of local
governance was slowly being constructed. However, the government had
not yet achieved legitimacy in many places, and was only beginning to
develop the capacity to address the fundamental causes that allowed the
insurgency to gain (limited) support. This capacity was supplemented by
local factors, including tribal structures, as well as the considerable
capacity brought by Coalition forces, to the point where insurgent forces
could not gain a critical mass of support in RC – East.
 In RC – East, security efforts were foremost during this time, and
received the majority of resources. While it was a subject of debate if
security, governance or development should be given the lead role, the fact
is that governance received the least emphasis of these three COIN pillars
during this period.
 The civilian component of the Coalition during this period was
numerically inadequate. While many of the political officers were dedicated,
competent and effective, there were not enough of them – and as a result
the governance pillar did not move forward as much as it could have.
6
U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual,, Section 6-1, University of Chicago Press, 2007
 The growth of government in some areas required that the Coalition
adjust its practices over time. Whereas in 2004 the PRTs and battalions
had to fill in vacuums of governance in some areas, by 2008 Afghan
officials were very much in the lead in some places, and the Coalition was
playing a reduced role in certain areas.
 While very hard to document, corruption, and the perception of
corruption, was endemic in RC – East. This was corrosive to COIN efforts,
but was difficult to counter given how ingrained it was culturally, the lack of
a functioning judicial system, and the apparent lack of will at high levels of
the GOA to confront it. On the more positive side, RC – East had only a
limited narcotics trade (with the exception of Nangarhar in some years),
which probably reduced the levels of corruption, particularly in comparison
with RC – South, where the drug trade flourished.
 The security situation in RC – East, which became markedly worse in the
spring of 2005 as insurgent groups became more effective, resulted in
NGOs having a limited footprint in border provinces. This had the result of
not only restricting flows of funds, but also limited access of experts in
governance. Coalition officers then had to fill this gap.
 One of the greatest challenges to achieving an adequate level of local
governance is the lack of trained civil servants. There is no quick fix to this,
but the establishment of regional civil service academies, coupled with
adequate pay scales, would be a positive step.
 Given the multiple, fundamental challenges to achieving adequate
government in Afghanistan, the international community must be prepared
for a protracted engagement, and design long-term programs.
 Provincial government is also important as a testing ground for the next
generation of Afghan national leadership, where leaders can gain
experience and develop their political platforms.
 Adequate local government needs to be established to counter Taliban
shadow governments. While the presence of Taliban government in RC –
East seemed minimal, particularly compared to some provinces in RC –
South, gaps in coverage invite insurgent presence.
 USG programs in support of local government development were not
always coordinated with those of the international community, and viceversa. This was in part due to the limited presence of international donors
in many of the border provinces.
 While the formal structures of local government are established and
strengthened, there will still be a need for tribal governance to fill voids in
rural areas.
 The GOA needs to increase tax revenues to support government
bureaucracies and to provide funding for services at the local level. At the
same time, mechanisms to punish the misuse of public funds need to be
established and implemented.
 As Afghan security forces are strengthened, they will need strong local
governments to partner with, not only for the immediate needs of
counterinsurgency, but for the long-term stability of the country. Otherwise,
there may be the temptation for a developed military to become involved in
the political affairs of the country.
Robert Kemp is a U.S. State Department Foreign Service Officer. He served at
the U.S. Embassy in Kabul in the spring of 2003, and was later assigned to the
Regional Command – East headquarters in Khost, Afghanistan from 2004 to 2005.
During 2007-2008 he was assigned as the political advisor to the 173rd Airborne
Brigade Combat Team, based in eastern Afghanistan, while also serving as the Deputy
Director of the PRT section. During the spring and summer of 2008, he was the action
officer for local governance at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul. The views represented in this
paper are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. State
Department or the U.S. Government.