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1NC Shell
PC key to block attempts to derail the Iran deal; key to the future of negotiations
Jordain Carney June 25, 2015, 07:01 pm Iran hardliners push sanctions ahead of nuke talks deadline
http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/senate/246225-iran-hard-lines-push-sanctions-ahead-of-nuketalks-deadline
Sens. Mark Kirk (R-Ill.) and Bob Menendez (D-N.J.) are pushing a 10-year extension for an Iran sanctions
bill days ahead of a deadline to finalize a long-term deal on the country's nuclear program. ¶ The two
senators, who have been at the forefront of a push to increase sanctions against the Iranian
government, want to extend the Iran Sanctions Act, currently set to expire at the end of next year,
through 2026. ¶ ¶ The move comes as officials from the United States, Iran and five other countries face a
June 30 deadline to lock down a final agreement that would limit Iran's nuclear program in exchange for
sanctions relief. ¶ ¶ The legislation is the latest sign of increasing skepticism from lawmakers, particularly
Republicans, who are lining up against a potential deal ahead of the deadline. ¶ ¶ The sanctions legislation
targets Iran's nuclear and missile programs, as well as human rights violations and support for terrorism.
The administration has argued that Iran's backing of terrorist groups or human rights abuses should be
separate from the ongoing nuclear talks.¶ ¶ Thursday's legislation is the second time the senators have
pushed the measure. They also tried to get it in the National Defense Authorization Act. Including the
Iran sanctions proposal would have complicated an already tricky path to passage for the annual policy
bill that faces a veto threat from the White House. ¶ ¶ Menendez suggested the administration should
back the legislation if it is serious about its pledge to snap back sanctions if Iran violates a final deal. ¶ ¶ “If
a deal is reached with Iran, it is critical that should Iran violate the terms of an agreement, severe
penalties will follow and a forceful snapback of sanctions will occur,” the New Jersey Democrat said. “It
stands to reason that if negotiators are serious about snapback, then they should support the
immediate extension of the Iran Sanctions Act to ensure there is no question for Iran about the
consequences of non-compliance."¶ ¶ Kirk added the administration must support the legislation if it "is
serious about maintaining terrorism sanctions against Iran no matter what." ¶ ¶ The proposal also
requires the Obama administration to tell Congress whether any money received through sanctions
relief has gone toward supporting terrorism, creating nuclear weapons or missiles, or into the personal
bank accounts of Iranian officials. ¶ ¶ Supporters of an agreement have pushed back against the KirkMenendez effort, with the National Iranian American Council arguing the measure would "short-circuit
Congressional consideration of sanctions relief in a final nuclear agreement and risk complicating
ongoing nuclear negotiations with Iran and derailing negotiations as they reach their endgame."
Plan cost capital – FAA drone regulations are controversial
Troy Rule, Nov 19 2014 http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-rule-drone-regulation-faa20141120-story.html
This new ruling is particularly troubling because the FAA still hasn't found a federal regulatory scheme
capable of effectively integrating drones into the nation's airspace. A June audit report revealed that the
agency was “significantly behind schedule” in meeting congressionally imposed deadlines for its
development of civilian drone regulations. Frustrated at the FAA's snail-like pace, companies such as
Amazon and Google have begun exporting their drone research activities to other countries. Small
drones are not built for lengthy interstate flights at altitudes where conventional airplanes fly, so why
should a federal agency be the chief regulator of these devices? Rather than seeking to expand its
regulatory jurisdiction all the way down to the ground, the FAA should advocate for itself a more limited
role in a collaborative federal, state and local regulatory scheme tailored to the unique attributes of
drone technologies
The alternative to the deal is Middle East conflict and Iranian nukes
Economist 4/2 (2015, "Is this a good deal?" http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-andafrica/21638915-better-alternativesand-long-way-gooddeal?zid=308&ah=e21d923f9b263c5548d5615da3d30f4d)
FOR years Iran has lied about its nuclear plans. The Islamic Republic insists that it wants peace, but it has built secret, bomb-proof facilities for enriching uranium and, most outsiders conclude,
begun work on designs for nuclear weapons. At the same time, it has spouted anti-Semitism and sponsored terrorists and militias in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip. It is fighting directly or by proxy
despite Iran’s transgressions, this week’s progress towards
an agreement to limit its nuclear programme is still welcome. The declaration that emerged on April
2nd, after marathon negotiations between Iran and six world powers in Lausanne, was surprisingly
comprehensive. Iran will curb its programme and open it to inspection in exchange for a gradual lifting
of sanctions. Speaking at the White House, President Barack Obama called it a good deal that will make
the United States, its allies and the world safer. However, the details remain to be thrashed out by the
end of June. The president warned that this process could still fail—and hardliners in both Tehran and
in Syria, Iraq and now Yemen, often supporting vicious sectarian clients. And yet,
Washington will do their damnedest to see that it does. Failure would be a grave loss . This agreement
offers the best chance of containing Iran’s nuclear ambitions. And it also offers the faint promise of leading
the Middle East away from the violence that has been engulfing it. Must try harder The best reason for wanting
the next three months to produce a deal is that the alternatives are so unattractive. Military action to
destroy Iran’s programme would have only a temporary effect. Air raids cannot annihilate know-how,
but they would redouble the mullahs’ determination to get hold of a weapon, further radicalise
Muslims, and add to the mayhem in a part of the world that is already in flames. Then there are
sanctions. Some people, such as Israel’s prime minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, argue that Iran is too
malign to be left with anything but a symbolic ability to enrich uranium. He recommends redoubling
sanctions and holding out until Iran is forced to concede to the world’s demands. But there is a
contradiction here. On the one hand, Iran is so bent on destruction that it cannot be treated as a normal
negotiating partner; on the other it is so pliant than more sanctions will make it give up a nuclear
programme that it has defended, at great cost, for many years. Besides, waiting for Iran to make
concessions does not have a good record. In 2003 the Bush administration ignored tentative Iranian
signals that it was ready to talk. Since then, the mullahs have enhanced their expertise and increased
their count of centrifuges from 164 to 19,000 or so. As Mr Obama argues, this second option very
quickly leads back to either war or negotiations—and on worse terms. By contrast the deal that has
come out of Lausanne is at least attainable. Iran will cut its capacity to enrich by two-thirds compared
with today for a minimum of ten years; it will radically shrink its stockpile of enriched uranium for a
minimum of 15; and it will permanently cut off the route to a bomb placed on plutonium. Iran will also
submit itself to intrusive inspections throughout the nuclear supply chain. In exchange, the outside
world will lift economic sanctions and agree to Iran’s right to enrich uranium. That compromise contains
a prize worth having. Verification makes it easier to catch Iran cheating. And if the country is indeed
caught working on a bomb, sanctions would snap back into place. Most important of all, the world
would also have a year to muster a response—compared with a few months today. The region burns
The harder argument is whether the gains from a nuclear deal will come at the expense of regional
stability. Israel and America’s Sunni allies contend that the Obama administration is going easy on Iran.
Some say that this is in order to secure a deal. Others think that the nuclear diplomacy is part of a grand
plan to turn Iran into a strategic partner of America to help it manage the Middle East. That would count
as an act of betrayal made all the worse by the threats that Iran habitually makes against them. The
coming months may indeed deepen the hatreds that are raging from the Mediterranean to the Arabian
Sea. You could imagine Iranian leaders stepping up their meddling in the region—to show, perhaps, that
supping with the Great Satan has not made them soft. It is no accident that the Sunni monarchies have
been turning away from America: backing an army coup against the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt,
attacking fighters in Libya without forewarning America and, rushing into Yemen to take on Iranianfunded Houthis. But before blaming this mess on Mr Obama’s nuclear diplomacy, consider two
arguments. First, the catastrophe in the Middle East has its own, murderous dynamic that is quite
separate from the nuclear deal. Iran has set out ruthlessly to exert control over neighbouring Iraq, to
protect its links to Hizbullah in Lebanon and to shore up Bashar Assad in Syria. Deal or no deal, this
meddling is driven by a desire to support fellow Shias, to exert regional influence and to keep
conflagrations far away from its own borders. There is no sign that, as yet, sanctions or the talks have
made much of a difference. Second, the idea that America is being treacherous does not add up. Blame Mr Obama for standing back when the uprising in Syria was
still peaceful, and again when Mr Assad gassed his own people. But the time is long gone when America alone could manage the conflict
devouring the Middle East. Today regional mayhem is tugging the United States every which way. In the cross-currents of a sectarian war, America is working against
Iranian-backed forces in Yemen and Syria, and with them in the war against Islamic State. That is not treachery, but pragmatism born out regional collapse. The fallout of a deal Amid the chaos,
a nuclear could deal actually help--by enabling America and Iran to develop a pragmatic relationship.
Overseeing an agreement would not be easy. Iran would chafe; there would be rows and disputes. But nuclear diplomacy could force America and Iran
to work together after 35 years of enmity that thrust America firmly into the Sunni camp. At worst relations with Iran would
remain dysfunctional; but at best America would for the first time in decades find itself in a position to
mediate between Sunni and Shia. That matters, because Iran and its Sunni rivals must themselves rein in their proxies and
militias so that local people can begin to put their communities back together. Such a process would get a
further boost if a deal brought change within Iran. Most Iranians are young and disillusioned with their
leaders. They want normal, prosperous lives. In non-stop wrangling between factions in Tehran, a deal could strengthen Hassan Rohani, who has
staked his presidency on it and who is thought to favour engagement with the world. In a deal’s decade-long first phase, Iran is likely to see a
new supreme leader. Nobody knows who will take over—it may even be Mr Rohani himself—but the new leader is more likely to work with the
West if America and Iran are no longer riven by mutual hatred. A thaw between Iran and America is not guaranteed, obviously. The
possibility of wholesale moderation within Iranian politics is even more remote. But neither does a nuclear deal depend on such things to be successful or to be worth having. On the contrary,
success relies on the routine of inspections and the slow accumulation of confidence; and the deal will be measured chiefly
on whether it puts a bomb out of reach. Everything else is a bonus. Some people think that any deal must be wrong because
it turns Iran from an international pariah into a partner. But that world view leads inexorably toward war—and an Iranian
bomb. Well-founded mistrust of Iran is a reason to be vigilant, but in the real world the most important diplomacy takes place between
enemies. The exhausted negotiators in Lausanne took a valuable step this week. They must finish their work.
Impact is nuclear war
Hobson, professor of physics at University of Arkansas, 3/31/2015
(Art, “Commentary: Absent agreement, Iran, U.S., Israel on path to war,”
http://www.nwaonline.com/news/2015/mar/31/commentary-absent-agreement-iran-u-s-is/?opinion)
One of history's greatest tragedies was the nuclear bomb dropped on Hiroshima, Japan, in August 1945,
a calamity compounded three days later by a second bomb exploded over Nagasaki. It was, like most
tragedy, made virtually inevitable by foregoing blunders: revengeful treatment of Germany following
World War I, U.S. failure to join World War II when it began in 1939, thoughtless responses to Japanese
aggression in Asia during the 1930s, and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. Since 1945,
nuclear weapons have remained humankind's greatest single immediate threat .
If we don't want to repeat the mistakes that led to Hiroshima, we had better treat the Iranian nuclear
question rationally, realistically, and without childish bravado. U.S. Sen. Tom Cotton's recent letter to
Iran, and Prime Minister Netanyahu's recent speech to Congress, were not serious. Netanyahu argued
that a nuclear agreement with Iran would be a bad deal and should be rejected. Cotton suggested to
Iran that a future U.S. president could revoke the agreement.
None of the agreement's opponents appear to have thought through the consequences of following
their leads. Iran, having no further reason for restraint and every incentive for aggression, will move
quickly toward a bomb; Israel will urge action to prevent a bomb and will pressure the U.S. to join it in
threatening Iran; and we could easily be drawn into war -- a blunder that would dwarf even our foolish
adventure into Iraq beginning in 2003.
The realistic fact is that, absent an agreement, the U nited S tates, Iran and Israel are on the road to
war, possibly a nuclear war
UQ / PC key
Iran deal key to peaceful curbs on Iran’s nuclear program, Obama pc necessary for
complete final compromise.
KRISTINA PETERSON and CAROL E. LEE¶ June 26, 2015 8:16 p.m. ET¶ 53 COMMENTS
http://www.wsj.com/articles/congress-is-shaping-up-as-a-tough-sell-on-iran-deal-1435363781¶
WASHINGTON—President Barack Obama, who narrowly eked out congressional approval of his trade
agenda this week, again faces a skeptical Congress as his administration attempts to reach a final
agreement to curb Iran’s nuclear program.¶ Lawmakers are expressing concerns over lingering
unresolved issues, such as how much access inspectors will have to Iran’s facilities, as negotiators
approach a month’s end deadline for a final agreement.¶ Mr. Obama is primarily focused on trying to
gain as much congressional support for a deal as he can, since lawmakers last month passed legislation
enabling them to review and vote on any final agreement. However, the administration would be able
to implement its deal so long as a veto-proof majority in Congress isn’t opposed to it.¶ Both Democrats
and Republicans said this week their support for a deal would hinge on how negotiators resolve
remaining sticking points, particularly how international inspectors will be able to verify Iran’s
compliance with any new requirements.¶ “There needs to be immediate access anywhere so that if the
Iranians cheat, we can detect it,” said Rep. Eliot Engel of New York, the top Democrat on the House
Foreign Affairs Committee. “If that’s not going to be the case—as we hear some rumors—then that’s
problematic for me.”¶ Earlier this week, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei appeared to back
away from commitments his negotiators made in April to restrain parts of Iran’s nuclear program and to
allow international inspections of the country’s military sites. He also opposed Western demands that
international sanctions be removed in stages, rather than all at once after a deal is reached.¶ The cleric’s
words triggered alarm on Capitol Hill, though U.S. and European officials said they believed Mr.
Khamenei’s comments were intended to extract more concessions from the Obama administration and
its negotiating partners.¶ House Speaker John Boehner (R., Ohio) sharply criticized the White House.
“The president has handed Iran concession after concession,” Mr. Boehner said Thursday. “Giving Iran
more flexibility will not lead to a good deal. It will only lead to more concessions for a regime that has no
intention of giving up its desire for a nuclear weapon.Ӧ Sen. Lindsey Graham (R., S.C.) said on the Senate
floor Thursday that the U.S. should halt its negotiations until Iran agrees to a gradual lifting of sanctions
and unfettered inspections at Iranian military sites, including an accounting of past activity.¶ Reflecting a
congressional desire to make sure the U.S. can apply pressure on Iran if it reneges on any deal, Sens.
Mark Kirk (R., Ill.) and Bob Menendez (D., N.J.) introduced legislation Thursday extending for 10 more
years sanctions on Iran set to expire next year.¶ “If a deal is reached with Iran, it is critical that should
Iran violate the terms of an agreement, severe penalties will follow and a forceful snapback of sanctions
will occur,” Mr. Menendez said in a statement. “For me, the trend lines of the Iran talks are deeply
worrying.Ӧ The White House has been regularly briefing lawmakers about the talks with Iran and five
other world powers, and some on Capitol Hill said they were comfortable with their progress and wary
of what the alternatives would be.¶ “I’ve been very supportive of the direction the White House has
been going,” said Rep.Jan Schakowsky of Illinois, a Democrat. “Let’s give diplomacy a chance.”¶ But many
lawmakers noted the administration’s outreach on Iran had ebbed recently, as the battle over Mr.
Obama’s trade agenda dominated Capitol Hill.¶ “This has been a real near-death experience with trade,
and it finally looks like we’re going to survive, and then we’ll turn our attention to the next crisis,” said
Rep. Gerry Connolly (D., Va.), who said his primary concern is the strength of the inspections regime.¶ At
a security conference in Washington Friday, Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinkensaid a deal with
Iran would include “exceptional constraints” on Iran’s nuclear program as well as intrusive transparency
measures and inspections.¶ The White House is anticipating lawmakers will ramp up criticism in coming
days and has sought to try to minimize the political firestorm. But White House spokesman Eric Schultz
disputed on Friday the notion that administration officials had scaled back updates to Congress because
of the focus on passing trade legislation.officials have stressed in recent days that any lawmaker with
questions about the talks would receive a briefing from an administration official. This week, Treasury
officials briefed lawmakers on Capitol Hill on Iranian sanctions, and some House Democrats met with
administration officials at the White House on Thursday, according to a lawmaker present at the
meeting.¶ “I don’t know that there’s any sort of regular meeting schedule that’s been established, but I
know it is not at all uncommon for members of Congress who are interested in this issue to get a phone
call from somebody at the State Department or somebody in the intelligence community, or even
somebody at the White House to give them an update on where things stand,” White House press
secretary Josh Earnest said Thursday.¶ The legislation enacted last month prevents Mr. Obama from
waiving sanctions for 30 days while they review a final deal and potentially vote to disapprove it. If
lawmakers reject a deal, Mr. Obama would then narrowly focus on stopping an override of his veto
authority.¶ Senior administration officials say they expect the June 30 deadline to slip a few days, as did
the March 31 deadline for a framework. Privately, administration officials don’t rule out a longer
extension, but Mr. Earnest said this week that “at this point, we’re not planning any sort of longer-term
extension.”
PC key to hold off additional sanctions and pressure on Iran
Ari Yashar First Publish: 6/26/2015, 10:56 AM
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/197312#.VY8UPPlVhBc
In a bipartisan move Senators Mark Kirk (R-IL) and Robert Menendez (D-NJ) on Thursday revived
legislation that has long been stalled by US President Barack Obama's administration, and which seeks
to impose and extend sanctions on Iran for over ten more years.¶ Iran has been demanding that
sanctions against it be lifted immediately with the signing of a nuclear deal ahead of a June 30 deadline
for talks, but the Washington Free Beacon reports Friday that the Obama administration has been
fighting Congress's attempts to impose new sanctions and is even lobbying legislators to block the
moves.¶ In their effort Thursday, Mendendez and Kirk submitted a bill to renew the Iran Sanctions Act
of 1996 which is due to expire next year. The move would harm Iran's ability to fund its nuclear program
as well as global terrorism through groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas.¶ It would allow stringent
sanctions to "snap back" the minute Iran is caught breaching any nuclear agreement, and would require
the Obama administration to file reports to Congress revealing whether the billions of dollars in
sanctions relief already given to Iran have been used for terrorism, the country's nuclear and missile
programs, human rights violations, or went to the pockets of senior Iranian officials.¶ "Congress passed
the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 to drain Iran’s financial support for Hezbollah, Hamas, and terrorist
threats to the United States and Israel and block funds for building nuclear weapons and ballistic
missiles,” Kirk told the Washington Free Beacon.¶
PC key to sustaining the Iran deal and preventing veto override.
Richard Baehr 6-28 http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_opinion.php?id=12999
After a veto by the president, the numbers become more difficult for opponents. Opponents of the
agreement will need to get to 67 votes in the Senate and 290 in the House, in each case 2/3 of
members, to override the veto. In the Senate, this means 13 Democrats would have to join 54
Republicans (assuming they all vote to override the veto), or over one quarter of the Democratic
members. In the House, the opponents would need to add at least 43 Democrats to the 247 Republicans
(assuming they all vote to override the veto) or a bit less than one fourth. It is likely that the biggest
obstacle that will be faced by opponents of the agreement will be in the House and not the Senate. Just
before the Corker-Menendez bill was passed, the White House ended its opposition to it, which made
the bill easier to pass, but also signaled that the administration was confident it could beat back
opponents of the bill when the votes on the deal came before Congress. Supporters of the White House,
better described as Obama loyalists who will follow his lead on pretty much everything, provided a
signal of their own strength just as the Corker-Menendez legislation was passed. A letter sent around by
Illinois Congresswoman Jan Schakowsky, one of the most left-wing members of the House and an ardent
supporter of J Street, contained signatures of 146 Democratic voting members of the House applauding
the administration’s preliminary agreement with Iran and endorsing diplomacy going forward (meaning
no new sanctions, no military action, and of course, whatever concessions the White House feels are
necessary to bring a final deal home). The 146 number for signatures on the letter is significant. If 146
Democrats in the House in the end refused to vote to override a presidential veto of a rejection of the
deal by the House and Senate, then opponents would be left short of the 2/3 vote of House members
they need. There are 188 Democrats in the House, and this would leave 42 Democrats in the House who
could vote to override a veto, which combined with 247 Republicans, would get opponents to 289, one
vote short of the 290, or 2/3 level needed for an override. It is highly likely that the Schakowsky letter
was designed to signal that the group in Congress that always has Obama’s back will do so again -- Israel
and our other former allies in the region be damned. Of course, this is not to say that the 42 Democrats
who did not sign can all be counted on to be certain votes for a veto override of a president of their own
party. Most of the votes by these Democrats will need to be secured by lobbying efforts (which the
American Israel Public Affairs Committee, among others, now seems to be preparing to do). A review of
the 146 names on the Schakowsky letter suggests a few of them could be picked off by opponents,
especially those who are vulnerable in the 2016 election cycle, or are located in districts that are not
dominated by Democrats. But most are either minority group members, and very loyal to the president,
or from far-left districts where there is no real pressure from constituents to fight the president on the
Iran deal. In many cases among Democrats in these districts, there is a fair amount of hostility to Israel
and its supporters.
Obama will need to hold off increasing pressure for sanctions
Jennifer Rubin June 26 Iran sanctions back on the table
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/wp/2015/06/26/iran-sanctions-back-on-the-table/
In a joint statement Sens. Mark Kirk (R-Ill.) and Robert Menendez (D-N.J.) announced a bill to extend
existing Iran sanctions (the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996) due to expire in 2016.¶ In extensive comments
Menendez explained the need for the legislation and rebuked the administration’s parade of
concessions to Iran. “If a deal is reached with Iran, it is critical that should Iran violate the terms of an
agreement, severe penalties will follow and a forceful snapback of sanctions will occur,” he said. “For
me, the trend lines of the Iran talks are deeply worrying, our red lines have turned into green lights,
leaving snapback as one of the few tools available to demand Iranian compliance with an agreement.
The Iran Sanctions Act, which authorizes a majority of the sanctions in place on Iran, expires next year.
Absent renewal we would be unilaterally lifting sanctions on Iran and hence unilaterally disarming.” He
continued, “It stands to reason that if negotiators are serious about snapback, then they should support
the immediate extension of the Iran Sanctions Act to ensure there is no question for Iran about the
consequences of non-compliance.Ӧ In addition, the bill would require the administration to report to
Congress on the extent to which sanctions relief facilitated the ability of Iran to support terrorism and
the Syrian regime, contribute to nuclear bomb and missile proliferation as well as human rights
violations, and/or enrich any senior Iranian official’s finances. As Menendez said, because “Iran is the
foremost sponsor of regional terrorism, any sanctions relief must be monitored closely, and this
legislation ensures that regular reports will be provided to Congress to confirm that Iranian-backed
terrorist organizations like Hamas, Hezbollah or the murderous Assad regime in Syria aren’t the
beneficiaries of newly accessed Iranian funds.” (One wonders why we would do a nuclear deal with
them at all, but that’s a separate argument.) He deemed this a “clarifying action” and urged his
colleagues to move ahead with legislation.¶ ¶ This measure is separate and about from new sanctions
legislation, the Nuclear Weapons Free Iran Act of 2015, which passed 18-4 in the Senate Banking
Committee in January. After that vote, 12 Democrats pledged to vote for the bill on the floor, but only
after the March 30 deadline for a framework agreement. The framework has proved illusory as the
Iranians publicly disputed agreement had been reached on key parts and criticism has erupted over
concessions to Iran. The deadline for a final deal is Tuesday, meaning the new sanctions bill is likely to
come back in play in the event a deal is not reached by the time Congress returns from its 4th of July
recess on July 7.¶ The 2015 Kirk-Menendez bill would ramp up and enhance sanctions, according to a
summary of the bill, to “close loopholes in existing petroleum sanctions, enhance sanctions on Iran’s oil
trade and financial transactions, and impose further sanctions on Iran’s senior government officials,
family members and other individuals for weapons of mass destruction proliferation, terrorism
sponsorship and other illicit activities, and on Iran’s shipbuilding, automotive, construction, engineering
and mining sectors.Ӧ And then today Menendez sent a letter to Secretary of State John Kerry
denouncing the possibility of more concessions: “Ayatollah Khamenei made a speech on Iranian state
television in which he stated that ‘All financial and economic sanctions imposed by the U.N. Security
Council, the U.S. Congress or the U.S. government should be lifted immediately when we sign a nuclear
agreement,’ that ‘inspection of our military sites is out of the question and is one of our red lines,’ and
that freezing Iranian research and development ‘for a long time, like 10 or 12 years, is not acceptable.
Only days before, the Iranian parliament voted to ban access to military sites, documents and scientists
as part of any future deal with the P5+1 countries.” He told Kerry, “These demands are unacceptable –
they presuppose that the government of Iran will act in good faith, when it has shown itself in the past
to be an untrustworthy negotiating partner. If Iranian negotiators intend to adhere to the provisions
demanded by Ayatollah Khamenei and Iran’s parliament, I urge you to suspend the current negotiations
with Iran.” He added, “A deal that allows sanctions to be lifted before Iran’s government meets their
obligations, without intrusive inspections to safeguard against a continued covert nuclear program, and
that leaves Iran as a threshold nuclear state, is a bad deal that threatens the national security of America
and our allies, and must be rejected.”
PC key
Obama PC key to closing Iran deal
Press TV, 6-27 http://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2015/06/27/417778/Iran-Vienna-Zarif-Kerry-P51
Bagherzadeh: I would think that both sides want this to close as rapidly as possible. I was thinking that
Mr. Obama has had two very good news items this past few days, he wants to add this additional one as
part of his success in foreign policy, probably the biggest success story of his presidency.
He wants this, his team want this, and I would think that they want to make sure that this closes as soon
as possible before the US Congress starts drifting towards more sanctions or additional new laws against
this case.
Obama focused on gaining Congressional support for Iran deal
JAY SOLOMON and LAURENCE NORMAN June 27, 2015 12:05 p.m. ET
http://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-nuclear-talks-under-way-in-vienna-1435420911
Mr. Obama is primarily focused on trying to gain as much congressional support for a deal as he can,
since lawmakers last month passed legislation enabling them to review and vote on any final agreement.
However, the administration would be able to implement its deal so long as a veto-proof majority in
Congress isn’t opposed to it. If no deal is completed by July 9, Congress would get an extra month to
review the agreement before the U.S. could suspend any sanctions.
With the diplomacy is moving slowly, there are growing expectations that talks will drift past the June 30
deadline, although western officials have said a major extension of the negotiations is out of the
question.
PC High
Obama is on a pc high – best week of his presidency
Brad Knickerbocker, Staff writer JUNE 27, 2015
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2015/0627/Obama-s-best-week-likely-to-advance-his-legacyvideo
Years from now, as he thinks back over his presidency, Barack Obama is likely to remember this as one
of his best weeks. Maybe the best week.¶ A trade bill passed in a Republican-led Congress. Massively
important Supreme Court decisions on the Affordable Care Act and same-sex marriage. A healing eulogy
for slain black church members, toward the end of which – astonishingly, to many of the thousands who
listened at the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina, and the
millions who watched on live TV or later on YouTube – the president led those assembled in the singing
of “Amazing Grace.”¶ Much of Obama’s presidency has been a grind, during which he’s been criticized
from both political directions.¶ The right never liked him in the first place, and as Senate Majority Leader
Mitch McConnell famously said during Obama’s first term, Republicans’ main priority was – not
cooperating to fix a damaged economy the new president had inherited from a Republican
administration – but working to see that Obama was not reelected. The left – enamored by Sen.
Elizabeth Warren and other liberals – thought he hewed too much to the political center. The tea party
(especially its racist element), the powerful National Rifle Association, “birthers,” and others mocked
and reviled him.¶ But by Friday night, at least, the impression – or at least the imagery – had changed as
the White House was bathed in rainbow lighting, a celebration of Obama’s recent political wins as well
as the US Supreme Court’s legalizing same-sex marriage for all Americans no matter where they lived.
New series of victories boosting Obama’s influence now
Carrie Dann, 6-27 http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/obama-america-week-historybooks-n382841
Two weeks ago, after Democrats in the House appeared to have stopped the trade deal President
Barack Obama has been pushing for months, it looked like the president was rapidly moving toward
lame-duck status, with even his own party ignoring his wishes.¶ Many expected the Supreme Court to
gut his signature health care law.¶ This week — not so much.¶ Instead, the president won a series of
huge victories that not only will boost him in the short term, but help cement his legacy as the driver of
a series of changes that pushed the country in a more liberal direction.¶ The Supreme Court ruled
Obama's way in three landmark cases.
Obama pushing Iran deal
Obama shifting focus to Iran deal
David Jackson, 6-28 http://www.usatoday.com/story/theoval/2015/06/28/obama-iran-nuclear-dealhealth-care-gay-marriage-free-trade-charleston/29423255/
Following perhaps the most momentous week of his tenure, President Obama looks to what could be
another major event next month: The Iran nuclear deal. Obama -- coming off major victories on free
trade, health care, and gay marriage, as well as a much-praised eulogy on the Charleston church killings - has set a Tuesday deadline for completion of an Iran nuclear agreement, though there are definite
signs that the deadline will slip. "Given the dates, and that we have some work to do ... the parties are
planning to remain in Vienna beyond June 30 to continue working," a U.S. official told the Associated
Press about the ongoing talks. The administration is putting out the word that July 9 is the "real"
deadline for a deal in which the U.S. and allies would reduce sanctions on Iran if it agrees to give up the
means to make nuclear weapons. The July 9 date would give Congress time to review the agreement
before its August recess. Further evidence that Tuesday's deadline will slip came Sunday as Iran's foreign
minister prepared to leave talks in Vienna for consultations back in Tehran. The Obama administration
enters the final stages of the Iran talks following a string of remarkable victories within the past week.
First, Congress cleared the way for a major free trade agreement with Asia, a deal that some thought
dead in the water earlier in the month. Then the Supreme Court handed down landmark decisions on
items of high importance to the Obama administration, its health care law and the right of gay marriage.
The president capped the week with a moving eulogy on the Charleston church shootings, urging
Americans to confront long-festering problems of gun control and racial prejudice. Now, on to Iran -though the proposed agreement has fierce critics in Israel and the U.S. Congress who believe it will
actually pave the way for Iran to secure nuclear weapons. It will be a busy few weeks.
A2: PC Theory False
Political capital theory is true – newest data proves that presidents have significant
legislative influence
Beckman 10 – Professor of Political Science
(Matthew N. Beckman, Professor of Political Science @ UC-Irvine, 2010, “Pushing the Agenda:
Presidential Leadership in U.S. Lawmaking, 1953-2004,” pg. 2-3)
Developing presidential coalition building as a generalizable class of strategies is itself instructive, a way
of bringing clarity to presidential– congressional dynamics that have previously appeared idiosyncratic, if
not irrational. However, the study’s biggest payoff comes not from identifying presidents’ legislative
strategies but rather from discerning their substantive effects. In realizing how presidents target
congressional processes upstream (how bills get to the floor, if they do) to influence downstream policy
outcomes (what passes or does not), we see that standard tests of presidential influence have missed
most of it. Using original data and new analyses that account for the interrelationship between
prevoting and voting stages of the legislative process, I find that presidents’ legislative influence is real,
often substantial, and, to date, greatly underestimated.
Political capital theory is true – modern presidents have unique capabilities – it’s finite
Beckmann and Kumar 11
(Matt, Professor of Political Science, and Vimal, How presidents push, when presidents win: A model of
positive presidential power in US lawmaking, Journal of Theoretical Politics 2011 23: 3)
Fortunately for contemporary presidents, today’s White House affords its occupants an unrivaled supply
of persuasive carrots and sticks. Beyond the office’s unique visibility and prestige, among both citizens
and their representatives in Congress, presidents may also sway lawmakers by using their discretion in
budgeting and/or rulemaking, unique fundraising and campaigning capacity, control over executive and
judicial nominations, veto power, or numerous other options under the chief executive’s control. Plainly,
when it comes to the arm-twisting, brow-beating, and horse-trading that so often characterizes
legislative battles, modern presidents are uniquely well equipped for the fight In the following we employ the omnibus
concept of ‘presidential political capital’ to capture this conception of presidents’ positive power as persuasive bargaining. 1 Specifi cally, we define presidents’
political capital as the class of tactics White House officials employ to induce changes in lawmakers’ behavior. 2 Importantly, this conception of presidents’ positive
power as persuasive bargaining not only meshes with previous scholarship on lobbying (see, e.g., Austen-Smith and Wright (1994), Groseclose and Snyder (1996),
Krehbiel (1998: ch. 7), and Snyder (1991)), but also presidential practice. 3 For example, Goodwin recounts how President Lyndon Johnson routinely allocated
‘rewards’ to ‘cooperative’ members: The rewards themselves (and the withholding of rewards) . . . might be something as unobtrusive as receiving an invitation to
join the President in a walk around the White House grounds, knowing that pictures of the event would be sent to hometown newspapers . . . [or something as
pointed as] public works projects, military bases, educational research grants, poverty projects, appointments of local men to national commissions, the granting of
pardons, and more. (Goodwin, 1991: 237) Of course ,
presidential political capital is a scarce commodity with a floating
value. Even a favorably situated president enjoys only a finite supply of political capital; he can only
promise or pressure so much. What is more, this capital ebbs and flows as realities and/or perceptions
change. So, similarly to Edwards (1989), we believe presidents’ bargaining resources cannot
fundamentally alter legislators’ predispositions, but rather operate ‘at the margins’ of US lawmaking,
however important those margins may be (see also Bond and Fleisher (1990), Peterson (1990), Kingdon
(1989), Jones (1994), and Rudalevige (2002)). Indeed, our aim is to explicate those margins and show
how presidents may systematically influence them.
Even if pundits exaggerate the president’s influence, it still is salient
Beckman 10 – Professor of Political Science
(Matthew N. Beckman, Professor of Political Science @ UC-Irvine, 2010, “Pushing the Agenda:
Presidential Leadership in U.S. Lawmaking, 1953-2004,” pg. 17)
Even though Washington correspondents surely overestimate a sitting president's potential sway in
Congress, more than a kernel of truth remains. Modern presidents do enjoy tremendous persuasive
assets: unmatched public visibility; unequaled professional staff, unrivaled historical prestige,
unparalleled fundraising capacity. And buttressing these persuasive power sources are others, including
a president’s considerable discretion over federal appointments, bureaucratic rules, legislative vetoes,
and presidential trinkets.9 So even with their limitations duly noted, presidents clearly still enjoy an
impressive bounty in the grist of political persuasion - one they can (and do) draw on to help build
winning coalitions on Capitol Hill.
A2 Winners win
Winners don’t win – productivity and agenda success are INVERSELY related in
polarized environments
Masket 12/19/14 (Seth, Assoc Prof of PoliSci @ University of Denver, “Unpopularity and Productivity
are Related” http://www.mischiefsoffaction.com/)
But policy accomplishments don't really help a president much in terms of popularity. LBJ wasn't
popular because he signed Medicare or the Civil Rights Act. It works the other way around; he was
able to pass those in part because he was popular in 1964-65, thanks to a very strong economy and
public goodwill in the wake of the Kennedy assassination. Notably, all his Great Society legislation
didn't help him out once the public got annoyed by the Vietnam War; his party lost many seats in
1966 and he chose to resign rather than face the voters' wrath in 1968.¶ Beyond that, to the extent
productivity and popularity may be related today, they may run in the opposite direction. In a
polarized political environment, a president's achievements are likely to generate as least as many
enemies as friends. Take health care reform , Obama's signature accomplishment. No Democrat
could credibly run for president in 2008 (or for many years before that) without health care reform
being a top priority. That was the nature of the Democratic coalition for decades. Conversely, the
Republican coalition had been organized for decades around preventing Democrats from enacting
health care reform. Obama's efforts were bound to produce substantial pushback, just as Clinton's
did twenty years ago. The passage of health care reform indeed exacerbated Democratic
congressional losses in 2010, and may well have handed Republicans the House of
Representatives.¶ This doesn't mean that it was wrong for Democrats to pass health care reform or
for Obama to do any of the things he's recently done. It just means that actually being productive
will engender resistance . Obama is unpopular at least in part because he's been effective.
Not true for Obama
Klein 10/10/14 (Ezra, former political columnist @ Wash Post, “Obama ditched a key campaign
promise. And it saved his presidency.,” http://www.vox.com/2014/10/10/6953889/paul-krugmanobama-historic-success
Obama spent his first two years keeping many of his policy promises by sacrificing his central political
promise. That wasn't how it felt to the administration at the time. They thought that success would build momentum;
that change would beget change. Obama talked of the "muscle memory" Congress would rediscover as
it passed big bills; he hoped that achievements would replenish
his
political capital rather than drain it.¶
In this, the Obama administration was wrong , and perhaps naive. They overestimated their ability to
convert the raw exercise of political power into more political power. It was a mistake, but not a very postpartisan one. And,
as a theory, it was the one they needed to build their legacy — a legacy, at this point, that even their early critics admire.
A2 Winners win
Eberly 13 - assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at St. Mary's College of Maryland
Todd, “The presidential power trap,” Baltimore Sun, 1/21/13, Lexis
Only by solving the problem of political capital is a president likely to avoid a power trap.
Presidents in recent years from have been unable to prevent their political capital eroding.
When it did, their power assertions often got them into further political trouble . Through leveraging public
support, presidents have at times been able to overcome contemporary leadership challenges by adopting as their own issues that the public already supports. Bill Clinton's centrist "triangulation" and George W.
Bush's careful issue selection early in his presidency allowed them to secure important policy changes — in Mr. Clinton's case, welfare reform and budget balance, in Mr. Bush's tax cuts and education reform —
that at the time received popular approval.¶ However,
short-term legislative strategies may win policy success for a president
but do not serve as an antidote to declining political capital over time, as the difficult final
years of both the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush presidencies demonstrate. None of Barack
Obama's recent predecessors solved the political capital problem or avoided the power trap. It
is the central political challenge confronted by modern presidents and one that will likely
weigh heavily on the current president's mind today as he takes his second oath of office.
Sequencing – unpopular policies ruin the agenda– Obama’s entire first term proves
Hirsh, 2/7 --- Chief correspondent (2/7/2013, Michael, “There’s No Such Thing as Political Capital; The
idea of political capital—or mandates, or momentum—is so poorly defined that presidents and pundits
often get it wrong,” http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-politicalcapital-20130207))
.¶ THE REAL LIMITS ON POWER¶ Presidents are limited in what they can do by time and attention span,
of course, just as much as they are by electoral balances in the House and Senate. But this, too, has
nothing to do with political capital. Another well-worn meme of recent years was that Obama used up
too much political capital passing the health care law in his first term. But the real problem was that
the plan was unpopular , the economy was bad, and the president didn’t realize that the national
mood (yes, again, the national mood) was at a tipping point against big-government intervention, with
the tea-party revolt about to burst on the scene. For Americans in 2009 and 2010—haunted by too
many rounds of layoffs, appalled by the Wall Street bailout, aghast at the amount of federal spending
that never seemed to find its way into their pockets—government-imposed health care coverage was
simply an intervention too far. So was the idea of another economic stimulus. Cue the tea party and
what ensued: two titanic fights over the debt ceiling. Obama, like Bush, had settled on pushing an
issue that was out of sync with the country’s mood .¶ Unlike Bush, Obama did ultimately get his idea
passed. But the bigger political problem with health care reform was that it distracted the
government’s attention from other issues that people cared about more urgently, such as the need to
jump-start the economy and financial reform. Various congressional staffers told me at the time that
their bosses didn’t really have the time to understand how the Wall Street lobby was riddling the DoddFrank financial-reform legislation with loopholes. Health care was sucking all the oxygen out of the
room, the aides said.
Deal possible
Agreement possible – all major players are optimistic despite issues.
JAY SOLOMON and LAURENCE NORMAN June 27, 2015 12:05 p.m. ET
http://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-nuclear-talks-under-way-in-vienna-1435420911
VIENNA—The U.S., Iran and world powers began what is expected to be a final round of nuclear talks on
Saturday in Austria’s capital, with diplomats voicing optimism that a landmark agreement could be
reached while recognizing serious issues still needed to be resolved.¶ The negotiating parties have cited
a June 30 deadline for completing more than 18 months of diplomacy that is aimed at curbing Iran’s
nuclear capabilities in exchange for a lifting of economic sanctions.¶ But senior officials involved in the
Vienna talks said on Saturday they anticipated the diplomatic process would likely need to be extended
beyond next Tuesday, due to the complexity of issues involved in the negotiations.¶ U.S. Secretary of
State John Kerry met with his Iranian counterpart, Javad Zarif, for 90 minutes Saturday morning, and the
two diplomats held a second negotiating session in the afternoon of about an hour. French Foreign
Minister Laurent Fabius also arrived in Vienna on Saturday and was scheduled to meet Mr. Kerry in the
evening.¶ “I think that everybody would like to see an agreement, but we have to work through some
difficult issues,” Mr. Zarif said at the start of his meeting with the U.S. Secretary of State.¶ Mr. Kerry said:
“We’re determined to do everything we can in order to be able to make this important milestone, but
that depends on a lot of things and we’re going to work on them.”¶ The chief American diplomat arrived
in Vienna on crutches after breaking his leg in a biking accident earlier this month in Switzerland. He was
joined on the U.S. side by Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz and Undersecretary of State Wendy Sherman.¶
The agreement is meant to block any smooth Iranian path to nuclear weapons by committing Tehran to
tight inspections and concrete measures to wind back Iran’s nuclear program for 10-15 years. In
exchange, tight international sanctions on Iran’s finance, energy and commercial sectors will be phased
out over time. The Vienna talks build on a framework accord reached between Iran and six world
powers in Lausanne on April 2.
Iran will allow access to its facilities and verification will be possible
Anastasia Levchenko Diehard' on Access to Non-Nuclear Facilities 6-27 Read more:
http://sputniknews.com/politics/20150627/1023929444.html#ixzz3eIjux21y
Iran is likely to allow conventional access to its military facilities under the Additional Protocol with the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the director for nonproliferation policy at the nonpartisan
Arms Control Association told Sputnik Saturday.¶ VIENNA (Sputnik),— Supreme Leader of Iran Ayatollah
Ali Khamenei said last that international inspections of the country’s military sites should be shunned,
which appeared to contradict a framework agreement between Tehran and international mediators
reached in April.¶ ¶ On Sunday, the Iranian parliament approved a draft legislation banning such
inspections as part of the nuclear deal.¶ ¶ "I think it is important to look closely at what the supreme
leader said: he said there should be no unconventional access to military sites. I think that access under
the Additional Protocol is very conventional. Many countries around the world have the Additional
Protocol in place, and the IAEA has access to military sites in other countries," Kelsey Davenport told
Sputnik.¶ ¶ Tehran and the P5+1 group of world powers — Russia, the United States, China, France,
Britain and Germany — have to agree on a final comprehensive deal that will secure the peaceful nature
of Iran's nuclear program until Tuesday's deadline.¶ ¶ French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius arrives at
Palais Coburg where closed-door nuclear talks with Iran take place in Vienna, Austria, Saturday, June 27,
2015¶ Under April's framework deal, Tehran agreed to implement the Additional Protocol with the IAEA,
which would provide the watchdog with more access to Iran’s nuclear sites.¶ The so-called Additional
Protocol to Tehran’s agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) provides for the
best compromise in terms of international inspection of Iran's nuclear sites, the representative for the
Arms Control Association advocacy group said.¶ ¶ "I think that is a good compromise, no country would
allow card-blanche access to their military sites or anywhere anytime inspections, like some critics of the
deal are calling for," Kelsey Davenport said.¶ ¶ She added that the cooperation between Iran and the IAEA
was crucial and would help clear past concerns.¶ ¶ "Resolving these concerns helps strengthen the nonproliferation regime at large," Davenport said.
Sanction concerns won’t hold back deal – framework already exists to handle these
overhyped concerns
Trita Parsi Finessing the Iran-Sanction Issue June 28, 2015
https://consortiumnews.com/2015/06/28/finessing-the-iran-sanction-issue/
Contrary to public posturing on the timing and pace of sanctions relief, a framework for handling this
critical matter of the nuclear deal has been resolved, according to Iranian sources. Iranian officials have
on numerous occasions insisted that sanctions relief must come immediately upon the signing of an
agreement. This has been at direct odds with the position of the U.S. government and its allies, who
insist that relief only can come after Iran has taken numerous steps limiting its nuclear activities. Iran's
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei sitting next to President Hassan Rouhani and addressing the cabinet.
Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei sitting next to President Hassan Rouhani and addressing the
cabinet. As oftentimes is the case in diplomacy, the solution was found in a combination of a play with
words and practical measures. This is exactly what the diplomats did to reconcile the Iranian insistence
on front-loaded sanctions relief and the Western position of relief being provided only after the
International Atomic Energy Agency has verified Iranian steps to curtail its nuclear program. According
to Iranian sources, the agreement is divided into three phases. The initial phase – called “adoption of
agreement” – takes place as the two sides agree on a final deal. This phase will kick in over the next few
days – if a deal is reached. The next phase – the operationalization of the agreement – will begin once
the domestic political processes of various parties have conclusively approved the agreement. This
phase has been added primarily as a result of the U.S. Congress passing the Corker bill, in which the
American legislature gave itself the right to review and vote on the nuclear deal. The timing of the
second phase is directly related to the duration of the Congressional review process. If the two sides
come to an agreement prior to July 10, the review process is set at 30 calendar days, in addition to 22
calendar days for Congress to pass a resolution to accept or reject the deal and for the President to use
his veto, if need be. If the two sides fail to reach a deal by July 10, the Congressional review process
increases to 60 calendar days. While other states in the negotiations may also initiate some form of
internal review and approval process, none of them are expected to take as long as the Congressional
review. As such, the U.S. Congress has significantly delayed the implementation of a presumptive deal.
Once the deal has survived the Congressional review – whether through a resolution of affirmation or
the failure to pass a resolution of rejection – the Iranians will begin implementing the first steps of their
commitments. This is phase III.
New environment of optimism in US-Iran relations – deal will happen.
Associated Press Saturday - June 27, 2015 Effort under way to beat Tuesday deadline for nuclear
agreement http://triblive.com/usworld/world/8644791-74/nuclear-agreement-iran#axzz3eJTnX2AH
VIENNA — The top American and Iranian diplomats faced each other across a square table in a 19th
century Viennese palace, the room austerely decorated and the atmosphere calm as they started the
final push for a generation-defining nuclear agreement Saturday.¶ Against a Tuesday deadline for a deal,
their declarations of optimism and pledges of diligence sounded routine.¶ Two years into high-pressure
gatherings, a sense of predictability has emerged in the negotiations between Secretary of State John
Kerry and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif.¶ Neither is letting the pressure show even as
they and other global powers are at the cusp of an agreement that could redefine security in the Middle
East and beyond for decades to come.¶ A short while ago, a snapshot alone of the two enemies engaged
in discussions on nuclear and other matters would have been a bombshell felt in capitals around the
world. Now it's hard to imagine the tentative U.S.-Iranian rapprochement ending anytime soon.¶ It's
become the new normal.
Major players hopeful for deal that will overcome all the differences.
Irish Times, 6-27 http://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/middle-east/john-kerry-hopeful-ofsuccessful-outcome-to-iran-talks-1.2265518
Senior US and Iranian officials said hard work was still needed as they met in Vienna on Saturday for
what could be their final negotiations to bridge significant differences on an agreement to curb Iran’s
nuclear programme.¶ With a self-imposed deadline approaching on Tuesday, both sides emphasised that
major obstacles remained to finalising a deal under which Iran would cut back its nuclear programme in
exchange for relief from economic sanctions.¶ “We have a lot of hard work to do. We have some very
tough issues,” US Secretary of State John Kerry said, according to a state department draft transcript.¶ I
agree. Maybe not on the issues. But on the fact that we need to work really hard in order to be able to
make progress and move forward,” Iranian foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif was cited as saying
in the transcript.¶ Nonetheless, Mr Kerry also said he was “hopeful” of a successful outcome. His
meeting with Mr Zarif ended after 90 minutes.¶ The main differences are on the pace and timing of
sanctions relief for Iran in return for its steps to restrain its nuclear programme and on the nature of
monitoring mechanisms to ensure Tehran does not cheat on any agreement.
Agreement possible – focus necessary for compromise
Martin Matishak - 06/27/15 10:12 AM EDT http://thehill.com/policy/defense/246365-kerry-verytough-issues-to-face-as-clock-ticks-on-iran-deal
Secretary of State John Kerry said “very tough issues” remain as international negotiators hold what
could be their final round of talks to get a deal over Iran’s nuclear program.¶ Speaking to reporters in
Vienna on Saturday, Kerry said both sides are “hopeful” to reach an agreement.¶ “We have a lot of hard
work to do. We have some very tough issues, and I think we all look forward to getting down to the final
effort here to see whether or not a deal is possible,” Kerry said. ¶ “I think that everybody would like to
see an agreement, but we have to work through some difficult issues,” he added.¶ Kerry’s Iranian
counterpart, Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, struck a similar note.¶ “I agree maybe not on the
issues, but on the fact that we need to work really hard in order to be able to make progress and move
forward,” he said.¶ “We’re determined to do everything we can in order to be able to make this
important milestone, but that depends on a lot of things and we’re going to work on them,” according
to Zarif.¶ Iran and Western powers have given themselves until Tuesday to strike a bargain that would
curb Tehran’s nuclear effort in exchange for sanctions relief.¶ Last month, the president signed into law
a bill that gives Congress 30 days to disapprove any final deal, during which he could not lift
congressional sanctions on Iran. If Congress votes to reject the deal, the administration would have 12
days to veto the resolution of disapproval. Congress would then have 10 extra days to try to override the
veto.¶ Several GOP senators have voiced strong opposition to any potential long-term deal in recent
weeks.¶ Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) recently sent letter to
President Obama, calling the reported concessions that the administration has made to Iran as part of
the talks "breathtaking.Ӧ On Thursday, Sens. Robert Menendez (D-N.J.) and Mark Kirk (R-Ill.) introduced
legislation that would extend an Iran sanctions bill, currently set to expire next year, through 2026.
Deal solves prolif
Deal best chance to resolve proliferation – experts agree
REBECCA SHIMONI STOIL June 27, 2015, 4:01 am http://www.timesofisrael.com/top-us-officialhails-unprecedented-possibility-of-reaching-iran-deal/
Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken heralded the “unprecedented inspections” currently
underway in Iran under the interim nuclear agreement, and challenged opponents of a nuclear deal to
come up with a better alternative to any comprehensive agreement reached by the P5+1 member states
during a Friday afternoon keynote speech.¶ We have negotiated, of course, an interim agreement with
Iran that froze and in some places rolled back its nuclear program with unprecedented inspections, with
the possibility of a comprehensive solution now before us,” Blinken told the audience at the Center for
New American Security’s annual conference.¶ Blinken, who served as the administration’s point man for
Iran talks before a number of Congressional hearings, gave a broad overview of the US’s positions and
challenges worldwide, ranging from the world’s growing refugee population to the administration’s
efforts to pivot foreign policy towards east Asia.¶ Less than a week before the deadline to reach a
comprehensive agreement, Blinken also sought to calm concerns regarding key aspects of the
impending deal.¶ Blinken reiterated administration assertions that “the deal we’re working towards will
close each of Iran’s four pathways toward fissile material” – the uranium enrichment at Natanz and
Fordo, the plutonium plant at Arak, and any covert path that Tehran could pursue toward acquiring
fissile material.¶ Arguing that “many [concerns about the deal] are based much more on myth than on
fact,” Blinken said that the US demands that a deal “must include monitoring and intrusive transparency
measures.Ӧ He dismissed warnings that the deal contains a sunset clause Рthat Iran will be free to
pursue a full-scale industrial uranium enrichment program after a decade of intense monitoring.¶ “The
deal will not expire,” he said, reiterating a point he made in early June during the annual meeting of the
American Jewish Committee. “There will not be a so-called sunset.” Blinken cited as proof the fact that
even after the most stringent terms of a deal expire, Iran will still be required to meet the obligations of
the NPT and other anti-proliferation regimes.¶ The deal, he said, would allow for transparency, and the
US will only agree to a deal that guarantees the International Atomic Energy Agency access to relevant
sites.¶ Blinken also delivered warnings against the idea that the US should walk away from a “bad deal”
and leave in its stead the interim terms of the Joint Plan of Action. The idea was floated as recently as
during a Thursday Senate hearing as a halfway point between signing on to a comprehensive deal and
withdrawing completely from talks.¶ Blinken said that if that happened, the Joint Plan of Action would
“sunset immediately,” allowing Iran to “speed towards an industrial-scale program with tens of
thousands of centrifuges with no inspections and no visibility into its program.”¶ “Just like the Joint Plan
of Action, any agreement will be subject to legitimate scrutiny,” Blinken assured the audience. “We will
not agree to any deal that will not withstand that scrutiny.” At the same time, he challenged critics of
the agreement with an obligation to propose a better alternative.¶ “It is a fantasy to believe that Iran will
simply capitulate to our demands if we just ratchet up the sanctions,” Blinken warned. He reiterated
administration cautions that if the US followed the path suggested by Senators Robert Menendez and
Mark Kirk in threatening Iran with additional sanctions should talks fail, America’s international partners
in the sanctions regime would blame America for the talks’ failure.¶ “The United States – not Iran –
could be isolated and the sanctions regime could collapse,” he suggested.
Flietz is about old agreements – this has the most robust inspections ever – makes breakout
so long – the risk of breakout is neglegable
Jeffrey Lewis, Arms Control Wonk, Monterrey Institute Nuclear Professor, 4/2/15, A Skeptic’s Guide to
the Iran Nuclear Deal, foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/02/a-skeptics-guide-to-the-iran-nuclear-deal-2/
K, I admit it. I
thought this framework was going to suck. Actually, it’s not bad. My main concern all along was that
the P5+1 countries (technically the E3/EU+3; congratulations if you know the difference) were too focused on “breakout
time” — imposing arbitrary limits on Iran’s centrifuge program to ensure that if Iran used its known nuclear infrastructure, it would take at
least a year to build a bomb. The bigger worry about Iran’s nuke program, I always thought, was unknown
nuclear infrastructure, such as any hidden centrifuge sites. To my surprise, the deal — at least as it is described in the
fact sheet released by the White House — manages to impose measures to guard against breakout, while also
providing for a number of measures that help substantially with the problem of covert facilities. All in all,
it’s a pretty comprehensive framework for managing the problem. It’s certainly worth lifting some
sanctions, though a crucial detail is how quickly that will happen and whether sanctions can be reimposed if things go pear-shaped. But
there are still reasons to be cautious. First, all we have at the moment area White House-released fact sheet and a couple of ambiguous news
conferences in Lausanne, Switzerland, and the White House Rose Garden. (Javad Zarif, Iran’s foreign minister and lead negotiator, is already
complaining about the White House’s fact sheet.) There is, after all, a reason one writes these things down. The parties will need a few more
months to work out the details of the actual agreement in order to implement the “framework” that was announced Thursday, April 2. Those
negotiations will be crucial because the kind of language in the statements and fact sheet — which probably seem pretty detailed to a casual
observer — doesn’t provide the sort of clarity that a final agreement will need in order to work. (Ask me about long-range missiles of any kind
sometime.) Second, getting
a deal on paper is only the first step. The parties have agreed to do all sorts of things. This may shock
you, but sometimes parties have trouble delivering on such promises. Agreements aren’t self-implementing, so a major test
will be how the parties deal with the inevitable challenges that human beings pose to implementing even a beautifully written final agreement.
That’s not a reason to reject agreements, just a caution about being realistic. Finally, please keep in mind that this deal makes it marginally less
likely that Iran will build a nuclear weapon. That’s great. But it doesn’t solve the problem of Iran’s missile program or Tehran’s less-thanstabilizing role in the Middle East. Expectations for any written agreement should be modest. I wouldn’t let myself get swept up in loose talk
about a new relationship with Tehran. We’re agreeing to not kill each other, for the moment, over this one thing. In my business, that’s pretty
good! Still, the details are pretty interesting. The big-ticket item for the U.S. national security community will be the “breakout” timeline. I am
not going to do a calculation, but the important parameters are about 5,000
centrifuges enriching to less than 3.7 percent
and a reduction in the existing stockpile of low-enriched uranium to 300 kilograms. The fact sheet claims this extends
the breakout timeline from two to three months to more than a year. I don’t see any reason to doubt the administration’s math, but I just don’t
think the breakout timeline matters. So I will just step aside and let other people who are invested in this argument fight it out. The
provisions against covert sites — what my friend James Acton calls “sneak-out” and what I worry about most — look very
strong. The fact sheet asserts that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will have continuous access to the
facilities that produce Iran’s centrifuge rotors and bellows for 20 years . The agreement also provides
access to Iran’s uranium mines and mills, as well as a dedicated procurement channel for any goods destined
for Iran’s nuclear program. Iran will return to the Additional Protocol and modified Code 3.1 of the subsidiary arrangements —
these are improvements to the safeguards agreement and subsidiary arrangements that Iran has with the IAEA. They are an important part of
verifying any agreement. And
it seems Iran has agreed to certain measures to address the so-called “possible military
dimensions” of the nuclear program — all the intelligence, such as the infamous “laptop of death,” that suggests Iran had a covert bomb
program until 2003. Iran also agreed to limit enrichment to a single site at Natanz. Again, the details will matter here. The
E3/EU+3 would be well advised to make sure the agreement includes a nice map of the Natanz facility — lest we find secret centrifuge halls in a
Natanz “annex” down the road. The advantage of limiting work to a single site is that, should the U.S. intelligence community catch Iran
building a centrifuge site elsewhere (again), Tehran won’t be able to make any tendentious legal excuses. Finally, there are reasonable limits on
Tehran’s program to develop new generations of centrifuges. These measures can’t guarantee that Iran doesn’t have a parallel, secret program.
That’s still going to depend on the capabilities of the U.S. intelligence community. But they do force Iran
to ensure that any
parallel program is fully parallel, from uranium mines through centrifuge workshops to the proverbial underground mountain lair.
That’s an imposition, and if secrecy breaks down at any point along that chain, the whole endeavor is compromised. The
fact sheet really does assert what looks to be an impressive monitoring regime. Last but not least, the
agreement seems to deal adequately with Iran’s enrichment plant at Fordow and its heavy-water reactor at Arak. Fordow — the
covert enrichment site under a mountain and revealed in 2009 — will be converted into non-nuclear isotope separation. An earlier story
indicated that a small number of centrifuges at Fordow would separate “stable” isotopes — “stable” here means non-radioactive. The nuclear
fuel company Urenco has a side business that sells stable isotopes, so it’s not a crazy idea. It’s a little hard to tell from the fact sheet, but that
seems to be what has happened. The IAEA will still have access to the site to make sure that it’s only used for non-nuclear purposes. The heavywater reactor at Arak, meanwhile, will apparently be redesigned so that it “will not produce weapons grade plutonium.” There are real benefits
to redesigning the reactor to produce less plutonium, though the fact sheet isn’t clear about the nature of the redesign. Iran also committed to
ship the spent fuel from the reactor out of the country and to refrain “indefinitely” from reprocessing or reprocessing-related research. The
terms “reprocessing” and “reprocessing research” are not defined, but if the goal is to make Arak no scarier than, say, the light-water reactor at
Bushehr, they’ve succeeded.
Very easy to snap back in sanctions – solves all their arguments
Fred Kaplan, Slate, 4/2/15, The Deal of a Lifetime,
www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/2015/04/iranian_nuclear_deal_is_a_breakthro
ugh_why_the_agreement_is_the_best_option.single.html
The Iranian nuclear deal reached in Switzerland on Thursday is a significant breakthrough. Uncertainties remain, inherently so, as it’s merely a
“political framework” for a formal deal to be completed and signed by June 30. But this
framework turns out to be far more
detailed, quantitative, and restrictive than anyone had expected. It might not lead to a deal as good as the outline
suggests; it might not lead to a deal at all. But anyone who denounces this framework—anyone who argues that we
should pull out of the talks, impose more sanctions, or bomb Iran because it’s better to have no deal than to have this
one—is not a serious person or is pursuing a parochial agenda. If this deal is fully implemented, Iran will be unable to
build a nuclear bomb by enriching uranium or by reprocessing plutonium for at least 10 years. Some of the restrictions imposed by this deal
would last 15 years. The international inspections of certain aspects of Iran’s nuclear program would stay in place for 25 years. As for the
economic sanctions against Iran, they would be lifted not upon the deal’s signing, as the Iranians initially demanded, but only after the
inspectors have verified that Iran has fulfilled all of its commitments in the deal. These commitments include reducing the number of Iran’s
installed centrifuges by two-thirds (from about 19,000 to 6,104, with only 5,060 allowed to enrich uranium); reducing its stockpile of enriched
uranium by 97 percent (from 10,000 kilograms to 300 kilograms); to remove all advanced centrifuges (those that can enrich uranium at a much
faster rate) and to place them in internationally monitored storage; to destroy the core of the Arak heavy-water reactor (which could produce a
plutonium bomb), ship all its spent fuel out of the country, and forgo additional reprocessing; among other things. If the Iranians honor these
terms, they will not be able to build a bomb for at least a decade, maybe longer. Still, there are two questions that a final deal would have to
answer concretely. First, it’s not clear when the sanctions would be lifted. An official summary of the framework states, at one point, “Iran will
receive sanctions relief, if it verifiably abides by its commitments.” Elsewhere, it says that all U.N. Security Council resolutions on Iran nuclear
issues “will be lifted simultaneous with the completion, by Iran, of nuclear-related actions addressing all key concerns.” But this leaves open the
question of timing. Some of these “commitments” are to be carried out through the duration of the deal, yet certainly there’s no suggestion
that the sanctions will remain in place for a decade. Are the relevant commitments those that involve the reduction or dismantlement of
nuclear equipment? If so, will the sanctions be lifted in phases or all at once when the cuts and shutdowns are complete? The framework also
states that sanctions can be “snapped back” into place if, at any point, Iran violates any part of the deal. But as
everyone knows, it’s much harder to reimpose sanctions than it is to lift them, especially at the U.N. Security Council, where Russia and China
(which signed on to the sanctions reluctantly and want to see them lifted as soon as possible) have veto power. So everything else about this
deal has to be solid. (However, it’s worth noting, the framework states that sanctions relating to Iran’s ballistic missiles, violations of human
rights, and support of terrorism will still be in place. So if the nuclear sanctions do need to be “snapped back,” they could be piled on top of
these sanctions; a mechanism for freezing funds would still exist.) Second, the
deal would have to let international
inspectors not only monitor Iranian nuclear facilities continuously, but also to look inside any other
“suspect” facilities—in other words, facilities not on the official list that the inspectors have reason to believe
might be harboring prohibited activity. Verification has been the most nettlesome aspect of all arms control accords throughout
history, for two reasons. First, no deal can be absolutely verifiable; this is why accords usually set a standard of “adequately verifiable” (a bit of
a finesse, but there’s no honest alternative). Second, even in the most trusted relations (and relations with Iran are far from that), there is a fine
line between authorized inspection and disingenuous espionage—which is to say that Iran (or any other military power) might have
understandable, even legitimate reasons for wanting to keep foreigners out of certain areas. So why should the P5+1 nations—the five
permanent members of the U.N. Security Council (the United States, Great Britain, France, Russia, and China) plus Germany—pursue this deal,
despite the uncertainties? The main reason is that it is a profoundly good deal; there
has never been a nuclear deal, with any
country, that is so comprehensively restrictive. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu urged the U.S. Congress to demand
“a better deal,” but his definition of such a deal—one that bans uranium enrichment, dismantles all its facilities, and insists on a drastic change
in Iran’s foreign policy—is unattainable, and, more to the point, he knows it.
Deal spurs stability and resolves Middle East proliferation and conflict.
Erin Poll, NIAC, June 10 Iran Deal Can Help Disentangle Regional Conflicts
http://www.niacouncil.org/iran-deal-can-help-disentangle-regional-conflicts/
One of the biggest concerns from the West is that a nuclear deal with Iran could “spark a proliferation
cascade in the region,” Fitzpatrick noted, starting with Saudi Arabia. However, if Saudi Arabia does
choose to seek nuclear weapons, he said, it will find it very difficult to procure the technology. Pakistan,
the most likely supplier, “has no strategic interest in sharing weapons technology with the Saudis” as
they would not want to be sanctioned for transferring nuclear technology. In fact, Fitzpatrick noted, a
nuclear deal may convince the Saudi king of the need for rapprochement with Iran, as proxy conflicts
become more costly and oil prices drop. King Salman told Obama that he was optimistic that the Iran
deal would “reinforce the stability and security of the region and the world.” Fitzpatrick insisted that,
contrary to popular assumptions, without restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program, Saudi Arabia would feel
compelled to attain nuclear capabilities to counter Iran’s own.¶ “For the last 20 years, the United States
and Iran have done everything they could to either contain Iran or, in the case of the Iranians,
undermine the United States in the region, and they have spent a tremendous amount of resources and
political capital to do so,” according to Parsi. Easing the tensions between the US and Iran, will allow the
US to invest more resources elsewhere. Additionally, the US will be able to have a more honest
discussion with the Saudis if it has a counterbalance in Iran. These steps will facilitate the US’s plan to
reorient itself towards East Asia, Fitzpatrick concluded.
Iran deal best chance, need to get it done -- experts
Fisher 4/2 -- content director @ Vox (Max, 2015, "This is an astonishingly good Iran deal,"
http://www.vox.com/2015/4/2/8337347/iran-deal-good)
Aaron Stein was studying nuclear non-proliferation at Middlebury University's Monterey graduate program, the students would sometimes construct what they thought would be
the best possible nuclear inspection and monitoring regimes. Years later, Stein is now a Middle East and nuclear proliferation expert with the Royal
United Services Institute. And he says that the Iran nuclear framework agreement, announced on Thursday, look an awful lot like those
When
ideal hypotheticals
he'd put together in grad school. "When I was doing my non-proliferation training at Monterey,
this is the type of inspection
regime that we would dream up in our heads, " he said. "We would hope that this would be the way to actually verify all enrichment programs, but
thought that would never be feasible." "
If these are the parameters by which the [final agreement] will be signed, then this is an excellent deal ,"
Stein concluded. The framework nuclear deal establishes only the very basics; negotiators will continue to meet to try to turn them into a complete, detailed agreement by the end of June. Still,
the terms in the framework, unveiled to the world after a series of late- and all-night sessions, are re markably detailed, and almost
astoundingly favorable to the United States. Like many observers, I doubted in recent months that Iran and world powers would ever reach this stage;
the setbacks and delays had simply been too many. Now, here we are, and the terms are far better than expected. There are a number of details left to be worked out, including one very big
unresolved issue that could potentially sink everything. This is not over. But if
this framework does indeed become a full nuclear deal in July, it would be a huge
success and a great deal. Iran gives up the bulk of its nuclear program in these terms The framework deal requires Iran to surrender some crucial
components of its nuclear program, in part or even in whole. Here are the highlights: Iran will give up about 14,000 of its 20,000 centrifuges Iran will give
up all but its most rudimentary, outdated centrifuges: its first-generation IR-1s, knock-offs of 1970s European models, are all it gets to keep. It will not be
allowed to build or develop newer models. Iran will give up 97 percent of its enriched uranium: it will hold on to only 300 kilograms of its 10,000
kilogram stockpile in its current form. Iran will destroy or export the core of its plutonium plant at Arak, and replace it with a new core than cannot produce
weapons-grade plutonium. It will ship out all spent nuclear fuel. Iran would simply not have much of its nuclear program left after all this. A shorthand that people sometimes use to evaluate the
size of Iran's nuclear program is its "breakout time." If Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei woke up tomorrow morning and decided to kick out all of the inspectors and set his entire
nuclear program toward building a nuclear warhead — to "break out" to a bomb — right now it would take him two or three months.
Under the terms of the
framework, his program would be so much smaller that it would take him an entire year to build a single nuclear warhead.
These terms are not abject surrender. Iran is allowed to keep a small nuclear program, and it won some concessions of its own. For example, what little uranium enrichment is allowed will be
done at Iran's facility at Natanz — a hardened, reinforced-concrete structure that was once used for covert enrichment and that the US had hoped to close. Iran will also be allowed to do some
research at another hardened facility the US had wanted to close, at Fordow, though the research is restricted and will be barred from using fissile material. These are not big concessions, and
when you look at many of the specifics laid out in the framework, the hard numbers and
those all tend to be quite favorable to the United States. The core issue that the framework really nails Even though the
they matter mostly for their symbolic value, but it's something. Still,
timetables and the detailed proscriptions,
agreement is only a framework, the summary released on Thursday goes into striking detail on an issue that was always going to be among the most crucial: inspections. Whatever number of
centrifuges Iran has or doesn't have, whatever amount of uranium it's allowed to keep or forced to give up, none of it matters unless inspectors have enough authority to hold Tehran to its end of
the deal — and to convince the Iranians that they could never get away with cheating. To say that the US got favorable terms here would be quite an understatement;
it comes to inspections,
"
the Iranians, when
practically gave away the farm. " I would give it an A ," Stein said of the framework. When I asked why:
Because of the inspections and transparency ." There are two reasons that inspections are so important. The first is that super-stringent
inspections are a deterrent: if the Iranians know that any deviation is going to be quickly caught, they have much less incentive to try to cheat, and much
more incentive to uphold their side of the deal. The second is that, if Iran were to try a build a nuclear weapon now, it likely wouldn't use the material that's
already known to the world and being monitored. Rather, the Iranians would secretly manufacture some off-the-books centrifuges, secretly mine some off-the-books uranium, and squirrel it all
away to a new, secret underground facility somewhere. That would be the only way for Iran to build up enough of an arsenal such that, by the time the world found out, it would be too late to do
Really robust inspections would be the best way stop that from happening. They would prevent Iran from sneaking off
centrifuges or siphoning away uranium that could be used to build an off-the-grid nuclear weapons program, without the world finding
out. The inspections issue has not gotten much political attention. When I spoke to Jeffrey Lewis, the director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at Middlebury's Monterey Institute of
anything about it.
International Studies, on Tuesday before the framework was announced, he seemed worried that negotiators would not focus on it much. Rather, overwhelming political focus in Washington and
Tehran on issues like Iran's number of allowed centrifuges seemed likely to push inspections from the top priorities. Lewis suggested that a top item on his wish-list would be inspections so
robust that inspectors don't just get to visit enrichment sites like Natanz and Fordow, but also centrifuge factories. That, he said, "would be a big achievement." Sure enough, come Thursday,
Lewis got his wish, and then some: centrifuge factory inspections is one of the terms in the framework, and it's pretty robust.
For the next 20 years, inspectors would have "continuous surveillance at Iran's centrifuge rotors and bellows
production and storage facilities." "I was shocked to read that they got them to agree to let us walk around their centrifuge production facilities. That's amazing," Stein
said. It's not just centrifuge factories.
Inspectors will have access to all parts of Iran's nuclear supply chain , including
its uranium mines and the mills where it processes uranium ore. Inspectors will also not just monitor but be required
to pre-approve all sales to Iran of nuclear-related equipment. This provision also applies to something called "dual-use" materials, which means
any equipment that could be used toward a nuclear program. "The inspections and transparency on the rotors, and the bellows, and the uranium mines is more than I ever thought would be in this
agreement," Stein added. Other favorable items buried in the terms Stein pointed out two details in the framework that I'd missed, both of which appeared to be pretty significant concessions by
the Iranians. First,
Iran has finally agreed to comply by a rule known as Modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to Iran's
Iran has to notify inspectors immediately on its decision to build
Safeguards Agreement, shorthanded as Modified Code 3.1. It says that
any new facility where it plans to do nuclear work — long before construction starts . Iran in the past has either rejected
this rule or stated that it would only notify inspectors a few months before introducing nuclear material at a facility — a "cover your ass" move in case the world caught them building a new
nuclear site.
Tehran's promise to comply may signal that it intends to stop building such covert facilities.
Second, Stein reads the framework as including Iran's ballistic missile program — something that critics of the deal warned would be left out. Indeed, even many supporters of the negotiations
have said that it would be unlikely that American negotiators could get the deal to cover ballistic missiles or other conventional weapons programs; it would simply be asking for too much in one
agreement. "It looks like
they were able to expand the scope beyond just nuclear issues," Stein said. He pointed to a line in the section that
explains that the UN Security Council would replace its old resolutions imposing sanctions on the nuclear program with a new resolution that incorporated the finalized deal. The line reads,
"
Important restrictions on conventional arms and ballistic missiles, as well as provisions that allow for related cargo inspections and asset
will also be incorporated by this new resolution." "The way I read that is that they address the ballistic missile issue, that that will remain in the new UN Security Council
freezes,
resolution," Stein said. "So you're going to keep the restrictions on ballistic missiles that are already present." The giant gaping hole in the framework terms Still, this is just a framework deal on
the basic terms; it covers a lot, but not everything. And there is one really important topic that is referenced only vaguely: how and when the world will lift its economic sanctions on Iran. This
has been a major sticking point throughout negotiations. Iran demands that all sanctions be lifted right away; their country needs a functioning economy, they say, and if they're complying with
all of the restrictions as of day-one then they shouldn't have to endure crippling sanctions on day-two. But the US and others worry, with good reason, that if they lift all sanctions immediately
then Iran will have far less incentive to follow through on its commitments, as it would be very difficult to re-impose those sanctions. And Iran has cheated on such agreements before. This is a
really difficult issue; each side has to trust, to some degree, that the other side will uphold its end of the deal. And someone has to go first. After decades of enmity, that's hard. The terms in the
framework do not come near solving this issue. Iran and the world powers, apparently failing to find a solution, have largely punted. "I read the fact sheet as confirming that they are still far apart
on scheduling sanctions relief," Lewis said in an email. "Still a very large devil — a Great Satan if you will — in the details." What the terms do say is that the US, Europe, and UN Security
Council will remove their sanctions after Iran fulfills its end of the deal. But it is still very unclear how exactly that gets determined, when that happens, or whether it means the sanctions are
lifted all at once, or over time. The terms do suggest that the IAEA will have "teeth," as Stein put it, in punishing Iran if they conclude that the Iranians are not upholding their commitments. And
if Iran breaks its end of the bargain, the sanctions will in theory "snap back." Russia, though, opposes putting any sort of automatic enforcement mechanism into UN Security Council sanctions.
So it's not clear if "snap back" means that sanctions will automatically trigger back into place (unlikely) or if the US would have to try to coral the necessary votes to bring them back manually
(very difficult). This was always perhaps the hardest issue. It remains the hardest issue. That the negotiators could not find anything more detailed to say is concerning. This, so far, is about the
, it's a very strong framework," Jeffrey Lewis said when I asked him what he thought. "As a framework it's very good,"
tweeted Mark Fitzpatrick, the director of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Program at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. He added, "A sharp critic
best we could ask for "Really
of Iran and skeptic of the talks told me after the announcement that it seemed to be heavily tilted in favour of the
West ." The Arms Control Association issued a statement saying that the "historic" agreement "promises to
lead to one of the most
consequential and
far-reaching nuclear nonproliferation achievements in recent
decades ." Everyone is very careful to note that this is a provisional framework. It could fall apart before it becomes a full, final deal. The negotiators, between now and the end-of-June
deadline, could get bogged down in details like sanctions relief. It will be hard and it could fail. But we do have something substantial and important in this framework.
The terms
in the agreement are just about the best that we could hope for — even better , in some ways, than many
had thought possible . The concessions from Iran are painful and many; the concessions by the US minor and
few; the details surprisingly robust. President Obama is framing the deal, somewhat defensively, as the best alternative to war. Indeed it is that. But it is also
the start of what
could become a substantial and long-term curb to Iran's nuclear program , a major step
toward reducing the hostility between Iran and the West, and thus a potentially transformative change for the
region.
Deters acquisition, no future prolif
George Perkovich, Carnegie Endowment VP, 4/2/15, The Benefits of Mutual Distrust,
www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/04/iran-nuclear-deal-116635_Page2.html#.VR3i80b6Iio
If this assessment is correct, it is possible to devise an arrangement that will satisfy Iran’s needs for a peaceful nuclear energy program and the
international community’s requirement that Iran not acquire nuclear weapons. A
sound deal, in short, would have to convince Iran
that the risks of cheating and the cost of non-compliance are too high. Rather than “trust but verify,” as
Ronald Reagan defined his approach to nuclear arms control, the logic with Iran should be “distrust, verify, and deter.”
The benefits Iran hopes to accrue from sanctions relief can themselves augment deterrence of cheating. To the extent that Iranian businesses
and citizens welcome the economic improvements that follow, they will hold their government responsible if it acts in ways that cause
sanctions to be snapped back on. While the Iranian internal security apparatus remains repressive, it is sensitive to popular discord, which can
be expressed even in constrained presidential elections. For
all of the imperfections of the comprehensive deal whose details must
Iranian leaders to accept it augment their
incentives to uphold it. These leaders distrust the United States at least as much as the United States distrusts them. They
now be completed, the compromises that are being made to persuade
have struggled to retain leverage in the negotiated arrangements to deter the U.S. and its partners from reneging on our side of the bargain.
The underground research and development facility at Fordow, for example, is retained as insurance against military attack. The likely phasing
of disclosure of past activities with possible military dimensions is meant to bide time to see if sanctions relief will be delivered as promised.
Rather than being inherently bad for the U.S., the
leverage Iran retains gives their leaders reason to think the U.S.
will not renege on a deal. Recent history demonstrates that Iran is deterrable. Iran began its secret quest for enrichment capability in
1985 during the war with Iraq. Saddam Hussein’s forces were attacking Iranian cities with ballistic missiles armed with chemical weapons. The
United States and France rebuffed Iranian efforts to mobilize the UN Security Council to make Iraq stop. Iranian leaders then began looking for
a nuclear option to ensure that their country would “never again” face such a threat. Throughout the 1990s the United States and others
reasonably sought to block most of Iran’s nuclear initiatives, as they also sought to verifiably eliminate all of Iraq’s weapons of mass
destruction. While Iranians quietly welcomed the efforts in Iraq, they noticed the Bush Administration’s increasingly dire warnings that Iraq had
WMDs and would use them. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 removed the perceived Iraqi threat. At the same time, intelligence exposed that Iran
was secretly building facilities to enable it to enrich uranium and produce plutonium, for which there was no realistic civilian requirement. The
International Atomic Energy Agency began investigating and uncovered a long list of Iranian violations of requirements to report sensitive
nuclear activities. The threat of possible U.S. intervention from Iraq into Iran also loomed. At this point, according to the U.S. intelligence
community, “Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program… primarily in response to increasing international scrutiny and pressure resulting
from exposure of Iran’s previously undeclared nuclear work.” Negotiations ensued in 2003 and continued on and off until today. Since early
2014, the Joint Plan of Action that Iran implemented has essentially frozen its fuel-cycle program. Throughout, Iranian leaders have assiduously
sought to preserve space for an ambitious nuclear energy program, relenting only where the terms of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
clearly require and when international pressure, including economic sanctions, made it too painful to press for more. The NPT clearly proscribes
acquiring nuclear weapons, but it does not define precisely which enabling activities and capabilities are forbidden. Iran’s performance since
2003 suggests, but does not prove, that its interests can be served without nuclear weapons. Saudi Arabia is a leading source of Sunni
resistance to Iran, in terms of ideology and funding. But as long as Saudi Arabia does not have nuclear weapons, Iran will retain a significant
power advantage over it. If making and keeping a nuclear deal reduces the likelihood of a Saudi bomb, Iran will be better off. And Iran does not
need nuclear weapons to fight the Islamic State and other Sunni militias in Iraq. A
robust nuclear arsenal might make Iran
more secure vis a vis Israel and the United States, but the problem is that getting from today’s capability to a
robust nuclear arsenal would risk a war with one or both. Implementing a nuclear deal – and retaining the leverage of
the capabilities it allows – practically removes the threat of Israeli and American military attack. And, by relieving Iran’s
international isolation and earning it kudos from many countries, a nuclear deal would enhance Iran’s
standing for condemning Israel’s own nuclear arsenal and occupation policies. The latter possibilities will not be welcome in Israel and the
U.S., but this only buttresses the assessment that Iran would have an interest in upholding a nuclear deal. To reinforce this Iranian calculation,
the details of a comprehensive agreement should combine deterrence and positive incentives. On the deterrence side, verification is vital.
Iranian leaders should conclude that efforts to cheat will be detected with enough time to allow military
interdiction before Iran could acquire nuclear weapons. The primary risk is in the domain of uranium enrichment. Here,
Iran’s activities must be monitored from mining of ore all the way through the enrichment process, as the U.S. fact sheet released April 2 says it
will. All of Iran’s facilities and activities involved in producing centrifuges must be monitored, as well as all operations of centrifuges, from
research and development to larger-scale production of low-enriched uranium for reactor fuel. A satisfactory agreement also should prohibit
research and development activities whose purposes are closely associated with nuclear weaponization. Even if Iran will not resolve the IAEA’s
ongoing questions about past activities with possible military dimensions until the later stages of an agreed arrangement, Iran should conduct
no new activities of this sort. To verify this, Iran will have to agree to procedures for international inspections of any facilities reasonably
suspected of conducting work related to nuclear weaponization. Such arrangements would correct a shortcoming of the 1968 NPT and serve as
an important precedent to be applied to all non-nuclear-weapon states. Deterrence
of cheating will be further enhanced by
the process designed for relieving sanctions on Iran. In the initial years of an agreement, Iran’s performance of its obligations
should be reciprocated by waivers of U.S. and other sanctions, rather than the removal of the underlying legal authorities behind them. This
way, if Iran fails to perform, sanctions can be “snapped-back” into place quickly by ending waivers. A final
comprehensive nuclear agreement should be codified in a UN Security Council resolution, under Chapter VII, as it now appears has been agreed
in Switzerland. The U.S. and other Security Council members can augment deterrence by explaining that violation of such a resolution may be
punished by force. The U.S. Congress could affirm that it would support the use of force in the event Iran materially breeched the agreement.
None of this is to gainsay the violence Iran’s protégés and its Revolutionary Guard forces perpetrate in neighboring countries. Nor is it to accept
the theocratic repressiveness of Iranian politics and governance. The U.S., Israel and Iran’s Arab neighbors will continue to contest Iranian
assertiveness, as Iran will in reverse. Washington will continue to press for democratization and protection of human rights in Iran, just as Iran
will denounce Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians and Washington’s complicity with it. A nuclear deal will limit the dangers of this competition
by significantly reducing the risks of nuclear proliferation and war, and providing an opportunity to test whether diplomatic agreements can be
maintained. If
the proposed deal can be completed as now planned, at the end of its duration, near 2030, a major
threat to international peace and security and the global nuclear order will have been abated. At that time,
Iran will have been restored to good standing under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, bound by its now clarified terms.
Iran’s first-generation revolutionary leaders will have passed from the scene. Then, if new Iranian
leaders somehow concluded that they wanted to try again to move towards nuclear weapons, as Prime
Minister Netanyahu and others warn, they should expect an immediate and decisive international campaign to
stop them.
Deal is best chance to resolve prolif – provisions solve most counter args
Lewis 4/2 -- director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies (Jeffrey, "A Skeptic’s Guide to the Iran Nuclear Deal,"
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/02/a-skeptics-guide-to-the-iran-nuclear-deal2/?utm_content=bufferca754&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer)
OK, I admit it. I thought this framework was going to suck. Actually, it’s not bad. My main concern all along was that the P5+1 countries (technically the E3/EU+3; congratulations if you know
the difference) were too focused on “breakout time” — imposing arbitrary limits on Iran’s centrifuge program to ensure that if Iran used its known nuclear infrastructure, it would take at least a
the deal —
manages to impose measures to guard against breakout, while
year to build a bomb. The bigger worry about Iran’s nuke program, I always thought, was unknown nuclear infrastructure, such as any hidden centrifuge sites. To my surprise,
at least as it is described in the fact sheet released by the White House —
also providing for a number of measures that help substantially with the problem of covert facilities. All
in all, it’s a pretty comprehensive framework for managing the problem . It’s certainly worth lifting some sanctions, though
a crucial detail is how quickly that will happen and whether sanctions can be reimposed if things go pear-shaped. But there are still reasons to be cautious. First, all we have at the moment area
White House-released fact sheet and a couple of ambiguous news conferences in Lausanne, Switzerland, and the White House Rose Garden. (Javad Zarif, Iran’s foreign minister and lead
The parties will need a few more
months to work out the details of the actual agreement in order to implement the “framework” that was announced
negotiator, is already complaining about the White House’s fact sheet.) There is, after all, a reason one writes these things down.
Thursday, April 2. Those negotiations will be crucial because the kind of language in the statements and fact sheet — which probably seem pretty detailed to a casual observer — doesn’t provide
the sort of clarity that a final agreement will need in order to work. (Ask me about long-range missiles of any kind sometime.) Second,
getting a deal on paper is only
the first step. The parties have agreed to do all sorts of things. This may shock you, but sometimes parties have trouble delivering on such promises. Agreements aren’t selfimplementing, so a major test will be how the parties deal with the inevitable challenges that human beings pose to implementing even a beautifully written final agreement.
not a reason to reject agreements, just a caution about being realistic.
That’s
Finally, please keep in mind that this deal makes it
marginally less likely that Iran will build a nuclear weapon. That’s great. But it doesn’t solve the problem of Iran’s missile program or Tehran’s less-than-stabilizing role in the Middle East.
Expectations for any written agreement should be modest. I wouldn’t let myself get swept up in loose talk about a new relationship with Tehran.
We’re agreeing to not kill each other, for the moment, over this one thing. In my business, that’s pretty good! Still, the details are
pretty interesting. The big-ticket item for the U.S. national security community will be the “breakout” timeline. I am not going to do a calculation, but the important parameters are about 5,000
centrifuges enriching to less than 3.7 percent and a reduction in the existing stockpile of low-enriched uranium to 300 kilograms. The fact sheet claims this extends the breakout timeline from two
to three months to more than a year. I don’t see any reason to doubt the administration’s math, but I just don’t think the breakout timeline matters. So I will just step aside and let other people
The provisions against covert sites — what my friend James Acton calls “sneak-out” and what I worry about most —
look very strong. The fact sheet asserts that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will have continuous access to the facilities
that produce Iran’s centrifuge rotors and bellows for 20 years. The agreement also provides access to Iran’s
uranium mines and mills, as well as a dedicated procurement channel for any goods destined for Iran’s nuclear program. Iran will return to the
Additional Protocol and modified Code 3.1 of the subsidiary arrangements — these are improvements to the safeguards agreement and
subsidiary arrangements that Iran has with the IAEA. They are an important part of verifying any agreement. And it seems Iran has agreed to certain measures to
address the so-called “possible military dimensions” of the nuclear program — all the intelligence, such as the infamous “laptop of death,” that
suggests Iran had a covert bomb program until 2003. Iran also agreed to limit enrichment to a single site at Natanz. Again, the details will
who are invested in this argument fight it out.
matter here. The E3/EU+3 would be well advised to make sure the agreement includes a nice map of the Natanz facility — lest we find secret centrifuge halls in a Natanz “annex” down the road.
The advantage of limiting work to a single site is that, should the U.S. intelligence community catch Iran building a centrifuge site elsewhere (again),
Tehran won’t be able
to make any tendentious legal excuses . Finally, there are reasonable limits on Tehran’s program to develop
new generations of centrifuges. These measures can’t guarantee that Iran doesn’t have a parallel, secret program. That’s still going to depend on the capabilities of the
U.S. intelligence community. But they do force Iran to ensure that any parallel program is fully parallel, from uranium mines through centrifuge workshops to the proverbial underground
mountain lair. That’s an imposition, and if secrecy breaks down at any point along that chain, the whole endeavor is compromised. The fact sheet really does assert what looks to be an impressive
the agreement seems to deal adequately with Iran’s enrichment plant at Fordow and
its heavy-water reactor at Arak. Fordow — the covert enrichment site under a mountain and revealed in 2009 — will be converted into non-nuclear isotope separation.
monitoring regime. Last but not least,
An earlier story indicated that a small number of centrifuges at Fordow would separate “stable” isotopes — “stable” here means non-radioactive. The nuclear fuel company Urenco has a side
business that sells stable isotopes, so it’s not a crazy idea. It’s a little hard to tell from the fact sheet, but that seems to be what has happened. The IAEA will still have access to the site to make
sure that it’s only used for non-nuclear purposes. The heavy-water reactor at Arak, meanwhile, will apparently be redesigned so that it “will not produce weapons grade plutonium.” There are real
benefits to redesigning the reactor to produce less plutonium, though the fact sheet isn’t clear about the nature of the redesign. Iran also committed to ship the spent fuel from the reactor out of the
country and to refrain “indefinitely” from reprocessing or reprocessing-related research. The terms “reprocessing” and “reprocessing research” are not defined, but if the goal is to make Arak no
scarier than, say, the light-water reactor at Bushehr, they’ve succeeded. What Iran gets out of all this, of course, is sanctions relief. The fact sheet is vague about which U.S., EU, and U.N.
sanctions will be removed by tying relief to certain “key” steps or the resolution of “key” concerns. The fact sheet also makes use of the term “snap back” to indicate that sanctions could be
reimposed. Snap back? I’d like to know what sort of elastic we’re dealing with here. This seems to still be an area of disagreement. Almost immediately, Zarif tweeted, “The solutions are good
for all, as they stand. There is no need to spin using ‘fact sheets’ so early on.” Then Zarif followed with two more tweets indicating that sanctions relief would be immediate, even though the fact
sheet says no such thing. This suggests to me that the two sides are still apart on the fundamental question of how quickly sanctions will get lifted. It seems there remains a devil — a Great Satan,
even — in the details to be worked out. At the same time,
Zarif expressed his commitment to start drafting the agreement. The
negotiators clearly still have a lot of work ahead of them. But the purpose of a “framework” agreement is to establish that both the P5+1 and the Iranians
are close enough to spend the next months hammering out the details. They will spend the next few months trying to fashion the
framework into a proper international agreement that can be printed on nice paper and signed by the negotiators. I suspect the conditions for sanctions
relief will prove to be the most difficult aspect of these talks. Time will tell if they can succeed, but
the initial descriptions are
far more
promising
than I
expected.
No spillover prolif
Edward-Isaac Dovere, Politico, 3/31/15, The price of Barack Obama’s Iran muddle,
www.politico.com/story/2015/03/barack-obamas-iran-muddle-116561.html
President Barack Obama needs a win in the Middle East. Instead, he’s getting a muddle. International negotiators in
Switzerland ran up against their deadline for the Iran nuclear talks — and then kept on running, insisting that there’s enough reason to believe
that maybe they’ll get far enough on Wednesday, or maybe a couple of days after that. How many, they won’t say. What happens if that’s not
enough, no one seems to fully know. Obama’s been talking about getting an Iran deal since he first ran for president in 2008 and taking heat for
it from the beginning. In year seven of his presidency, it has emerged as a key lingering piece of the transformational foreign policy he wants as
his legacy and become central to dealings across a region where every week brings a new crumbling country, each with a new kaleidoscope of
shifting alliances to deal with. Obama’s decision to back down from the threat of strikes on Syria in 2013 is still seen as revealing Obama’s
unwillingness to fight by many of the same regional leaders who fear he’s willing to give away too much to get an agreement now. An
Iran
deal, in the White House’s view, simultaneously has no direct connection to the rest of the trouble in the Middle East and is inextricably
tied to everything the administration is facing. That includes a fractured relationship with the Israeli
prime minister who, along with the Saudis, is strongly opposed to the Iran talks; the United States and Saudi Arabia backing the
rebels in Syria while Iran backs Bashar Assad; the Houthis in Yemen against Al Qaeda while the Saudis attack; all
while Americans and Iranians align to fight off Islamic State in Iraq. “If a deal happens, even in overtime,
that is a meaningful contribution to Middle East security. Period. There is uncertainty about Iran’s longterm trajectory and its interests in places like Yemen, Syria and Iraq. The region as a whole is concerned about
Iran, and rightfully so. But like it or not, Iran gets a vote in what happens,” said former State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley. “The
negotiations have established a credible channel for the U.S. and Iran to manage areas of overlapping
interests and areas of conflicting interests.”
Iran says yes and it solves prolif- most qualified experts agree- Iranian hardliners are in
check
Robins-Early 4/2 (Nick Robins-Early, Interviewing Ariane Tabatabai, an assistant professor at
Georgetown University and frequent writer on Iran's nuclear program, “Is The Iran Nuclear Framework
Agreement A Good Deal?”, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/02/iran-nucleardeal_n_6996244.html, April 2, 2015)
After months of exhausting negotiations, the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany agreed on Thursday to a framework
deal with Iran that would limit its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. The controversial deal had been the subject of international debate.
Proponents of the negotiations declared the talks a rare opportunity to bolster nuclear non- proliferation and
take Western powers off a course that would end in conflict with Iran.
Critics of the deal, which include Israel's Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and United States Republicans, were vocal that a bad deal would merely appease Iran while doing nothing to stop it from an end goal
of nuclear armament. The WorldPost
professor of
security
spoke with nuclear proliferation expert Ariane Tabatabai , an assistant
studies at Georgetown
University
and
a
columnist for the Bulletin of Atomic Nuclear
Sciences , for her take on the agreement. What is your general assessment of the framework deal? I think it’s a really good
deal for both sides . Both sides get what they’ve been pursuing this entire time, which for the P5 +1 means it
will scale back Iran's enrichment program considerably –- essentially by two-thirds. It also gives assurance Iran
is not going to be building any new facilities for enrichment, and it's going to mean that the Arak heavy water reactor is going
to be rebuilt to produce less plutonium. I think it’s a really good deal for both sides. Iran is not going to build any more heavy water
reactors for the next 15 years. It’s not going to be doing any reprocessing, which means that plutonium wouldn’t be usable
for a nuclear weapon. One of the sites that the arms control community has been worried about is going to be converted and used for research purposes; no
enrichment will be done there. That’s at Fordo? That’s Fordo, yes. Then in terms of monitoring, which is a very big part of this, there’s
going to be a lot
more monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). All of this should give a breakout time of about one year,
which would allow the international community to detect Iran trying to get a bomb. In exchange, Iran gets proliferation-related
sanction relief, which it has been wanting, and it will get some assistance from the international community for research and
development. Both sides are gaining a lot of what they’ve been wanting to gain, and both sides have made concessions. In my mind it’s a very good deal for
both sides. What potential spoilers are there that could derail a final deal being signed?
The biggest spoiler
here in Washington
is Congress .
I’m expecting any second now they will come out and say this is a terrible agreement and the world has given Iran a nuclear weapon. Certainly people in the region - the Saudis, the Israelis -- will support those claims. The biggest spoiler here in Washington is Congress. My
the negotiating parties move forward is going to be how
biggest concern in the next three months as
to make sure that critics don’t interfere with the process, and don’t derail it
altogether. How might Iranian hardliners respond to the agreement? Iranian
reason behind this is that the Supreme
negotiations
a bit of
in the past few months. The
Leader has been coming out periodically with resonating endorsements of the
and the negotiating team,
hardliners have lost
hardliners have been fairly quiet
and has framed the entire effort in terms of national security.
So the
ground , but that’s possible in the context of Iranian politics where the Supreme Leader can come out and back a
process. I think the hardliners might come out with some criticism in the next few months, but I don’t think anything substantial enough to derail the process from
the Iranian side. Is the IAEA a strong enough institution to successfully act as a monitor of this deal? Yes, but the problem is going to be financing. This is a really
resource-intensive project. This is two decades of monitoring a number of facilities, and it’s going to need a number of people and equipment. It’s going to be a
resource-intensive process, but that’s something that world powers are signing up for, as they'll need to. In terms of the capacity, though
, I have no
doubts the IAEA will be able to uphold its part in the process.
Diplomacy is comparatively more likely to avoid war even if imperfect
Johns, 1/22/15 - Johns serves on the Council for a Livable World Advisory Board and is a former deputy
assistant defense secretary (John, “Avoid new sanctions now and keep Iran’s nuclear program in check”
The Hill, http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/homeland-security/230271-avoid-new-sanctions-nowand-keep-irans-nuclear-program)
While the politics, slogans and sound bites usually rule the day in Washington, the president reminded
Congress that he doesn’t have to run for office again. Instead, his diplomatic efforts with six world
powers and Iran are in pursuit of a historic opportunity to increase our national and global security
without yet another war. In spite of steady diplomatic progress to deny Iran a nuclear weapon, some
hardliners in Congress are seeking to scuttle any deal. Indeed, Republicans—and a few Democrats—
have said they wish to pass a new sanctions bill in the coming weeks while the talks are ongoing – a risky
move that experts say will most likely derail this delicate diplomatic process.
From the facts on the ground perspective, considerable progress has been made over the past year in
rolling back Iran’s nuclear program. To begin with, the interim agreement froze the program in place.
Since then, Iran’s nuclear stockpile has been sharply reduced. Iran has agreed to an internationally
monitored cap on the enrichment of uranium. Nuclear sites that were previously off-limits are now
subject to international inspections and the frequency of inspections have been increased overall.
The diplomatic record has similarly demonstrated results. In addition to the historic interim agreement,
in September 2013, presidents Obama and Rouhani had the first direct conversation between US and
Iranian heads of state in 35 years. And for almost an entire year, the US and its allies have remained
united with Russia and China in pursuing a diplomatic outcome while enforcing strict economic
sanctions on Iran – despite the fact that these countries often have differing perspectives and
international agendas.
The bottom line is that Iran is significantly further away from a nuclear weapon today than it was one
year ago. What’s more, these results reflect a surprising turnabout from the preceding decade in which
Iran’s capabilities grew steadily while the major powers were divided on how to respond.
Granted, the election of Rouhani has made an enormous difference. His predecessor Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad staked his political career on confrontation with the West, but Ahmadinejad’s policies
brought nothing but ruin to the Iranian economy. In response, Rouhani ran on a platform committed to
improving relations with the West and won in a landslide.
Though these are all very positive developments, we still have a long way to go. Decades of hostility and
mistrust won’t change overnight. We’d be fools not to proceed with great caution and make sure that
every aspect of any agreement is fully verifiable.
However, those who want to torpedo the critical progress that has been made are using tough talk that
simply doesn’t line up with the facts.
To begin with, there are those who are demanding another round of sanctions despite the fact that
neither our allies, nor our own negotiating team, nor the Russians or Chinese, support such a move.
Indeed, another round of sanctions would most likely split the international coalition that has been
critical to success and principally benefit the Iranian hardliners who are most vocally opposed to
Rouhani’s overtures to the West. Even more fancifully, some have argued that the US should be
prepared to “force” China and Russia to support further sanctions. This may sound tough, but it is
utterly implausible.
Even more unrealistic are those agitating for military strikes. Serious national security professionals
understand that only a negotiated outcome is realistic. Michael Hayden, the former CIA director and
NSA chief, noted that in the Bush administration, “The consensus was that [attacking Iran] would
guarantee that which we are trying to prevent — an Iran that will spare nothing to build a nuclear
weapon.”
As the president said last night, “There are no guarantees that negotiations will succeed, and I keep all
options on the table to prevent a nuclear Iran. But new sanctions passed by this Congress, at this
moment in time, will all but guarantee that diplomacy fails–alienating America from its allies; and
ensuring that Iran starts up its nuclear program again.”
We must prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. The best chance at doing so is to support the
president’s challenging, but necessary, diplomatic talks that continue to make steady progress and yield
verifiable results.
Having started negotiations, the United States should finish them. Reaching a deal will not only restrain
the Iranian nuclear program, but could help restrain others in the future . As frustrating as it is, Congress is
going to have to summon the patience to let diplomacy work. Applying additional sanctions may feel
cathartic for congressmen like Sen. Rubio, but only a deal can end the Iranian nuclear program.
Negotiated solution key to solve Iran proliferation
Joel Rubin 10-24 Iran’s diplomatic thaw with the West
http://thejewishchronicle.net/view/full_story/23914219/article-Iran-s-diplomatic-thaw-with-the-West-?instance=secondary_stories_right_column
Now that Iran has made a clear decision to engage seriously in diplomatic negotiations with the West
over its nuclear program, its intentions should be tested. Members of Congress should be open to
seizing this opportunity by making strategic decisions on sanctions policy. The economic sanctions
against Iran that are in place have damaged the Iranian economy. A credible military threat — with
more than 40,000 American troops in the Persian Gulf — stands on alert. International inspectors are
closely monitoring Iran’s every nuclear move. Iran has not yet made a decision to build a bomb, does not
have enough medium-enriched uranium to convert to weapons grade material for one bomb and has
neither a workable nuclear warhead nor a means to deliver it at long ranges. If Iran were to make a dash
for a bomb, the U.S. intelligence community estimates that it would take roughly one to two years to do
so. Congress, with its power to authorize sanctions relief, plays a crucial role in deciding whether a deal
will be achieved. This gives Congress the opportunity to be a partner in what could potentially be a
stunning success in advancing our country’s security interests without firing a shot. Consider the
alternative: If the administration negotiates a deal that Congress blocks, then Congress becomes a
spoiler and Iran will most likely continue to accelerate its nuclear program. Then lawmakers would be
left with a stark choice: either acquiesce to an unconstrained Iranian nuclear program and a potential
Iranian bomb or endorse the use of force to attempt to stop it. Most military experts rate the odds of a
successful bombing campaign low and worry that failed strikes would push Iran to get the bomb
outright. Iran and the United States need a political solution to this conflict. Now is the time to test the
Iranians at the negotiating table, not push them away.
Deal stops prolif and iran strike
Stephens, 11/14/13 – columnist for the Financial Times (Phillip, Financial Times, “The four big truths
that are shaping the Iran talks” http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/af170df6-4d1c-11e3-bf3200144feabdc0.html#axzz2kkvx15JT
The first of these is that Tehran’s acquisition of a bomb would be more than dangerous for the Middle
East and for wider international security. It would most likely set off a nuclear arms race that would see
Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt signing up to the nuclear club. The nuclear non-proliferation treaty
would be shattered. A future regional conflict could draw Israel into launching a pre-emptive nuclear
strike. This is not a region obviously susceptible to cold war disciplines of deterrence.
The second ineluctable reality is that Iran has mastered the nuclear cycle. How far it is from building a
bomb remains a subject of debate. Different intelligence agencies give different answers. These depend
in part on what the spooks actually know and in part on what their political masters want others to hear.
The progress of an Iranian warhead programme is one of the known unknowns that have often wreaked
havoc in this part of the world.
Israel points to an imminent threat. European agencies are more relaxed, suggesting Tehran is still two
years or so away from a weapon. Western diplomats broadly agree that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has not
taken a definitive decision to step over the line. What Iran has been seeking is what diplomats call a
breakout capability – the capacity to dash to a bomb before the international community could
effectively mobilise against it.
The third fact – and this one is hard for many to swallow – is that neither a negotiated settlement nor
the air strikes long favoured by Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, can offer the rest of the
world a watertight insurance policy.
It should be possible to construct a deal that acts as a plausible restraint – and extends the timeframe
for any breakout – but no amount of restrictions or intrusive monitoring can offer a certain guarantee
against Tehran’s future intentions.
By the same token, bombing Iran’s nuclear sites could certainly delay the programme, perhaps for a
couple of years. But, assuming that even the hawkish Mr Netanyahu is not proposing permanent war
against Iran, air strikes would not end it.
You cannot bomb knowledge and technical expertise. To try would be to empower those in Tehran who
say the regime will be safe only when, like North Korea, it has a weapon. So when Barack Obama says
the US will never allow Iran to get the bomb he is indulging in, albeit understandable, wishful thinking.
The best the international community can hope for is that, in return for a relaxation of sanctions, Iran
will make a judgment that it is better off sticking with a threshold capability. To put this another way, if
Tehran does step back from the nuclear brink it will be because of its own calculation of the balance of
advantage.
The fourth element in this dynamic is that Iran now has a leadership that, faced with the severe and
growing pain inflicted by sanctions, is prepared to talk. There is nothing to say that Hassan Rouhani, the
president, is any less hard-headed than previous Iranian leaders, but he does seem ready to weigh the
options.
Seen from this vantage point – and in spite of the inconclusive outcome – Geneva can be counted a
modest success. Iran and the US broke the habit of more than 30 years and sat down to talk to each
other. Know your enemy is a first rule of diplomacy – and of intelligence. John Kerry has his detractors
but, unlike his predecessor Hillary Clinton, the US secretary of state understands that serious diplomacy
demands a willingness to take risks.
The Geneva talks illuminated the shape of an interim agreement. Iran will not surrender the right it
asserts to uranium enrichment, but will lower the level of enrichment from 20 per cent to 3 or 4 per
cent. It will suspend work on its heavy water reactor in Arak – a potential source of plutonium –
negotiate about the disposal of some of its existing stocks of enriched uranium, and accept intrusive
international inspections. A debate between the six powers about the strength and credibility of such
pledges is inevitable, as is an argument with Tehran about the speed and scope of a run down of
sanctions.
2NC / 1NR Impact Overview
Iran prolif = Extinction
Toon, chair – Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences – Colorado University, 4/19/’7
(Owen B, climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/acp-7-1973-2007.pdf)
To an increasing extent, people are congregating in the world’s great urban centers, creating megacities
with populations exceeding 10 million individuals. At the same time, advanced technology has designed
nuclear explosives of such small size they can be easily transported in a car, small plane or boat to the
heart of a city. We demonstrate here that a single detonation in the 15 kiloton range can produce urban
fatalities approaching one million in some cases, and casualties exceeding one million. Thousands of
small weapons still exist in the arsenals of the U.S. and Russia, and there are at least six other countries
with substantial nuclear weapons inventories. In all, thirty-three countries control sufficient amounts of
highly enriched uranium or plutonium to assemble nuclear explosives. A conflict between any of these
countries involving 50-100 weapons with yields of 15 kt has the potential to create fatalities rivaling
those of the Second World War. Moreover, even a single surface nuclear explosion, or an air burst in
rainy conditions, in a city center is likely to cause the entire metropolitan area to be abandoned at least
for decades owing to infrastructure damage and radioactive contamination. As the aftermath of
hurricane Katrina in Louisiana suggests, the economic consequences of even a localized nuclear
catastrophe would most likely have severe national and international economic consequences. Striking
effects result even from relatively small nuclear attacks because low yield detonations are most
effective against city centers where business and social activity as well as population are concentrated.
Rogue nations and terrorists would be most likely to strike there. Accordingly, an organized attack on
the U.S. by a small nuclear state, or terrorists supported by such a state, could generate casualties
comparable to those once predicted for a full-scale nuclear “counterforce” exchange in a superpower
conflict. Remarkably, the estimated quantities of smoke generated by attacks totaling about one
megaton of nuclear explosives could lead to significant global climate perturbations (Robock et al.,
2007). While we did not extend our casualty and damage predictions to include potential medical, social
or economic impacts following the initial explosions, such analyses have been performed in the past for
large-scale nuclear war scenarios (Harwell and Hutchinson, 1985). Such a study should be carried out as
well for the present scenarios and physical outcomes.
Most probable
James A. Russell, Senior Lecturer, National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, ‘9 (Spring)
“Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East” IFRI,
Proliferation Papers, #26, http://www.ifri.org/downloads/PP26_Russell_2009.pdf
Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors: (1) asymmetric interests in the
bargaining framework that can introduce unpredictable behavior from actors; (2) the presence of nonstate actors that introduce unpredictability into relationships between the antagonists; (3) incompatible
assumptions about the structure of the deterrent relationship that makes the bargaining framework
strategically unstable; (4) perceptions by Israel and the United States that its window of opportunity for
military action is closing, which could prompt a preventive attack; (5) the prospect that Iran’s response
to pre-emptive attacks could involve unconventional weapons, which could prompt escalation by Israel
and/or the United States; (6) the lack of a communications framework to build trust and cooperation
among framework participants. These systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework all
suggest that escalation by any the parties could happen either on purpose or as a result of
miscalculation or the pressures of wartime circumstance. Given these factors, it is disturbingly easy to
imagine scenarios under which a conflict could quickly escalate in which the regional antagonists would consider
the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. It would be a mistake to believe the nuclear taboo can
somehow magically keep nuclear weapons from being used in the context of an unstable strategic framework.
Systemic asymmetries between actors in fact suggest a certain increase in the probability of war – a war in
which escalation could happen quickly and from a variety of participants. Once such a war starts, events
would likely develop a momentum all their own and decision-making would consequently be shaped in unpredictable ways. The
international community must take this possibility seriously, and muster every tool at its disposal to
prevent such an outcome, which would be an unprecedented disaster for the peoples of the region, with
substantial risk for the entire world.
Escalates - global nuclear war – proximity of players and regional conditions make it
the worst war
Edelman, distinguished fellow – Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, ‘11
(Eric S, “The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran,” Foreign Affairs, January/February)
The reports of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States and the
Commission on the Prevention Of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, as well as
other analyses, have highlighted the risk that a nuclear-armed Iran could trigger additional nuclear
proliferation in the Middle East, even if Israel does not declare its own nuclear arsenal. Notably, Algeria,
Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia,Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates— all signatories to the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (npt)—have recently announced or initiated nuclear energy programs.
Although some of these states have legitimate economic rationales for pursuing nuclear power and
although the low-enriched fuel used for power reactors cannot be used in nuclear weapons, these
moves have been widely interpreted as hedges against a nuclear-armed Iran. The npt does not bar
states from developing the sensitive technology required to produce nuclear fuel on their own, that is,
the capability to enrich natural uranium and separate plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. Yet
enrichment and reprocessing can also be used to accumulate weapons-grade enriched uranium and
plutonium—the very loophole that Iran has apparently exploited in pursuing a nuclear weapons
capability. Developing nuclear weapons remains a slow, expensive, and di⁄cult process, even for states
with considerable economic resources, and especially if other nations try to constrain aspiring nuclear
states’ access to critical materials and technology. Without external support, it is unlikely that any of
these aspirants could develop a nuclear weapons capability within a decade.¶ There is, however, at least
one state that could receive significant outside support: Saudi Arabia. And if it did, proliferation could
accelerate throughout the region. Iran and Saudi Arabia have long been geopolitical and ideological
rivals. Riyadh would face tremendous pressure to respond in some form to a nuclear-armed Iran, not
only to deter Iranian coercion and subversion but also to preserve its sense that Saudi Arabia is the
leading nation in the Muslim world. The Saudi government is already pursuing a nuclear power
capability, which could be the first step along a slow road to nuclear weapons development. And
concerns persist that it might be able to accelerate its progress by exploiting its close ties to Pakistan.
During the 1980s, in response to the use of missiles during the Iran-Iraq War and their growing
proliferation throughout the region, Saudi Arabia acquired several dozen css-2 intermediate-range
ballistic missiles from China. The Pakistani government reportedly brokered the deal, and it may have
also oªered to sell Saudi Arabia nuclear warheads for the css-2s, which are not accurate enough to
deliver conventional warheads eªectively. There are still rumors that Riyadh and Islamabad have had
discussions involving nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, or security guarantees. This “Islamabad
option” could develop in one of several diªerent ways. Pakistan could sell operational nuclear weapons
and delivery systems to Saudi Arabia, or it could provide the Saudis with the infrastructure, material,
and technical support they need to produce nuclear weapons themselves within a matter of years, as
opposed to a decade or longer. Not only has Pakistan provided such support in the past, but it is
currently building two more heavy-water reactors for plutonium production and a second chemical
reprocessing facility to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. In other words, it might accumulate
more fissile material than it needs to maintain even a substantially expanded arsenal of its own.
Alternatively, Pakistan might oªer an extended deterrent guarantee to Saudi Arabia and deploy nuclear
weapons, delivery systems, and troops on Saudi territory, a practice that the United States has
employed for decades with its allies. This arrangement could be particularly appealing to both Saudi
Arabia and Pakistan. It would allow the Saudis to argue that they are not violating the npt since they
would not be acquiring their own nuclear weapons. And an extended deterrent from Pakistan might be
preferable to one from the United States because stationing foreign Muslim forces on Saudi territory
would not trigger the kind of popular opposition that would accompany the deployment of U.S. troops.
Pakistan, for its part, would gain financial benefits and international clout by deploying nuclear weapons
in Saudi Arabia, as well as strategic depth against its chief rival, India. The Islamabad option raises a host
of difficult issues, perhaps the most worrisome being how India would respond. Would it target
Pakistan’s weapons in Saudi Arabia with its own conventional or nuclear weapons? How would this
expanded nuclear competition influence stability during a crisis in either the Middle East or South Asia?
Regardless of India’s reaction, any decision by the Saudi government to seek out nuclear weapons, by
whatever means, would be highly destabilizing. It would increase the incentives of other nations in the
Middle East to pursue nuclear weapons of their own. And it could increase their ability to do so by
eroding the remaining barriers to nuclear proliferation: each additional state that acquires nuclear
weapons weakens the nonproliferation regime, even if its particular method of acquisition only
circumvents, rather than violates, the NPT.¶ n-player competition¶ Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear
weapons, the Middle East would count three nuclear-armed states, and perhaps more before long. It is
unclear how such an n-player competition would unfold because most analyses of nuclear deterrence
are based on the U.S.- Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. It seems likely, however, that the interaction
among three or more nuclear-armed powers would be more prone to miscalculation and escalation than a
bipolar competition. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union only needed to
concern themselves with an attack from the other. Multipolar systems are generally considered to be
less stable than bipolar systems because coalitions can shift quickly, upsetting the balance of power and
creating incentives for an attack. More important, emerging nuclear powers in the Middle East might
not take the costly steps necessary to preserve regional stability and avoid a nuclear exchange. For
nuclear-armed states, the bedrock of deterrence is the knowledge that each side has a secure secondstrike capability, so that no state can launch an attack with the expectation that it can wipe out its
opponents’ forces and avoid a devastating retaliation. However, emerging nuclear powers might not
invest in expensive but survivable capabilities such as hardened missile silos or submarinebased nuclear
forces. Given this likely vulnerability, the close proximity of states in the Middle East, and the very short
flight times of ballistic missiles in the region, any new nuclear powers might be compelled to “launch on
warning” of an attack or even, during a crisis, to use their nuclear forces preemptively. Their
governments might also delegate launch authority to lower-level commanders, heightening the
possibility of miscalculation and escalation. Moreover, if early warning systems were not integrated into
robust command-and-control systems, the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch would increase
further still. And without sophisticated early warning systems, a nuclear attack might be unattributable
or attributed incorrectly. That is, assuming that the leadership of a targeted state survived a first strike,
it might not be able to accurately determine which nation was responsible. And this uncertainty, when
combined with the pressure to respond quickly,would create a significant risk that it would retaliate
against the wrong party, potentially triggering a regional nuclear war.
Impact Ext - Iran proliferation = nuclear war
War with Iran risks nuclear world war III.
Reuveny 10 - Professor of political economy @ Indiana University [Dr. Rafael Reuveny (PhD in Economics and Political Science from the
University of Indiana), “Guest Opinion: Unilateral strike on Iran could trigger world depression,” McClatchy Newspaper, Aug 9, 2010, pg.
http://www.indiana.edu/~spea/news/speaking_out/reuveny_on_unilateral_strike_Iran.shtml
BLOOMINGTON, Ind. -- A unilateral Israeli strike
on Iran’s nuclear facilities would likely have dire consequences, including a
regional war , global economic collapse and a major power clash .
For an Israeli campaign to succeed, it must be quick and decisive. This requires an attack that would be so overwhelming that Iran would not
dare to respond in full force.
Such an outcome is extremely unlikely since the
locations of some of Iran’s nuclear facilities are not fully known and
known facilities are buried deep underground.
All of these widely spread facilities are shielded by elaborate air defense systems constructed not only by the Iranians,
but also the Chinese and, likely, the Russians as well. By now, Iran has also built redundant command and control
systems and nuclear facilities, developed early-warning systems, acquired ballistic and cruise missiles and
upgraded and enlarged its armed forces.
Because Iran is well-prepared, a single, conventional Israeli strike — or even numerous strikes — could not destroy all of its capabilities, giving
Iran time to respond.
A regional war
Unlike Iraq, whose nuclear program Israel destroyed in 1981, Iran
has a second-strike capability comprised of a coalition
of Iranian, Syrian, Lebanese, Hezbollah, Hamas, and, perhaps, Turkish forces. Internal pressure might
compel Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority to join the assault, turning a bad situation into a regional war.
During the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, at the apex of its power, Israel was saved from defeat by President Nixon’s shipment of weapons and planes.
Today, Israel’s numerical inferiority is greater, and it faces more determined and better-equipped opponents.
Despite Israel’s touted defense systems, Iranian coalition missiles, armed forces, and terrorist
on its enemy,
attacks would likely wreak havoc
leading to a prolonged tit-for-tat .
In the absence of massive U.S. assistance, Israel’s military resources may quickly dwindle, forcing it to use its alleged nuclear weapons, as it had
reportedly almost done in 1973.
An Israeli nuclear attack would likely destroy most of Iran’s capabilities, but a crippled Iran and its coalition
could still attack neighboring
oil facilities, unleash global terrorism, plant mines in the Persian Gulf and impair maritime trade in the
Mediterranean, Red Sea and Indian Ocean.
Middle Eastern oil shipments would likely slow to a trickle as production declines due to the war and insurance
companies decide to drop their risky Middle Eastern clients. Iran and Venezuela would likely stop selling oil to the United
States and Europe.
The
world economy would head into a tailspin; international acrimony would rise; and Iraqi and Afghani citizens might
fully turn
on the United States, immediately requiring the deployment of more American troops. Russia, China,
Venezuela, and maybe Brazil and Turkey
— all of which essentially support Iran — could be tempted to form
an alliance
and openly challenge the U.S. hegemony .
Replaying Nixon’s nightmare
Russia and China might rearm
their injured
Iranian protege overnight, just as Nixon rearmed Israel, and threaten to
intervene , just as the U.S.S.R. threatened to join Egypt and Syria in 1973. President Obama’s response would
likely put U.S. forces on nuclear alert , replaying Nixon’s nightmarish scenario.
Iran proliferation = cascading regional proliferation, terrorism, economic collapse and
war. Greatest threat of extinction.
MICHAEL RAMIREZ Posted 11/15/2013 06:43 PM ET http://news.investors.com/ibd-editorialsperspective/111513-679468-if-iran-gets-bomb-others-will-want-it-too.htm
The danger that Iran poses is not just from developing a nuclear bomb. Let's set aside for a moment the
belligerent behavior of Iran and their export of terrorism, extremism and destabilization. Let's forget
about their three-stage rocket development and their funding and support of terrorists around the
world. Let's put aside the proxy wars they've waged on the U.S. and the West that have already killed
Americans and countless others. Let's even put aside their willingness to use a nuclear weapon and the
direct threat it poses to the survival of our ally, Israel. If Iran has a nuclear bomb, Saudi Arabia will have
a nuclear bomb. If the Saudis have a nuclear bomb, Egypt will have a nuclear bomb. Syria may be next,
then Iraq. And so on. The real danger lies in an accelerated nuclear arms race in a region awash in oil
money, where extremism is valued but life is not, where all things are bought and sold, where
surrogates, terrorists, extremists and their apostles of death exist without the constraints of
geographical borders or national affiliation and can be paid or brainwashed to do anything without a
direct link to the real planners of mischief. The nuclear arms race and the proliferation of nuclear
material that will result represent the largest threat to the world today. The next time you have a
terrorist attack, it will not be thousands of dead and wounded, it will be millions. And its tentacles reach
much further than the area directly attacked. Consider this: some estimates put the cost of 9/11 at over
$3 trillion. If there is a nuclear attack, that area — those houses, the buildings, the businesses — will be
uninhabitable for 50 years. There will be a military response. And the economic consequences alone will
be catastrophic. Just think: It's taken over 12 years just to rebuild the World Trade Center.
Accesses every impact
Avery, 13 --- Associate Professor, University of Copenhagen (11/6/2013, John Scales Avery, “An Attack On Iran Could Escalate Into Global
Nuclear War,” http://www.countercurrents.org/avery061113.htm)
Despite the willingness of Iran's new President, Hassan Rouhani to make all reasonable concessions to US demands, Israeli pressure groups in
Washington continue to demand an
attack on Iran. But such an attack might escalate into a global nuclear war, with
catastrophic consequences. As we approach the 100th anniversary World War I, we should remember that this colossal disaster
escalated uncontrollably from what was intended to be a minor conflict. There is a danger that an attack
on Iran would escalate into a large-scale war in the Middle East , entirely destabilizing a region
already deep in problems. The
that is
unstable government of Pakistan might be overthrown, and the revolutionary
Pakistani government might enter the war on the side of Iran, thus introducing nuclear weapons into
the conflict . Russia and China, firm allies of Iran, might also be drawn into a general war in the Middle East. Since
much of the world's oil comes from the region, such a war would certainly cause the price of oil to reach
unheard-of heights, with catastrophic effects on the global economy . In the dangerous situation that could
potentially result from an attack on Iran, there is
a risk that nuclear weapons would be used, either intentionally, or
by accident or miscalculation. Recent research has shown that besides making large areas of the world
uninhabitable through long-lasting radioactive contamination, a nuclear war would damage global
agriculture to such a extent that a global famine of previously unknown proportions would result. Thus,
nuclear war is the ultimate ecological catastrophe. It could destroy human civilization and much of the
biosphere. To risk such a war would be an unforgivable offense against the lives and future of all the
peoples of the world, US citizens included.
Nuke war
Stevens 13 (Philip Stevens, associate editor and chief political commentator for the Financial Times,
Nov 14 2013, “The four big truths that are shaping the Iran talks,” http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/af170df64d1c-11e3-bf32-00144feabdc0.html)
The who-said-what game about last weekend’s talks in Geneva has become a distraction. The
six-power negotiations with Tehran to curb Iran’s
nuclear programme may yet succeed or fail. But wrangling between the US and France on the terms of an acceptable deal should not allow the trees to obscure
the forest. The organising facts shaping the negotiations have not changed.¶ The first of these is that Tehran’s acquisition of a bomb would be more than
dangerous for the Middle East and for wider international security. It would most likely set off a nuclear arms race that
would see Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt signing up to the nuclear club . The nuclear nonproliferation treaty would be shattered. A future regional conflict could draw Israel into launching a preemptive nuclear strike. This is not a region obviously susceptible to cold war disciplines of deterrence .¶ The
second
ineluctable reality is that Iran has mastered the nuclear cycle. How far it is from building a bomb remains a subject of debate.
Different intelligence agencies give different answers. These depend in part on what the spooks actually know and in part on what their political masters want others to hear. The progress of an
Iranian warhead programme is one of the known unknowns that have often wreaked havoc in this part of the world.¶ Israel points to an imminent threat. European agencies are more relaxed,
suggesting Tehran is still two years or so away from a weapon. Western diplomats broadly agree that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has not taken a definitive decision to step over the line. What Iran
has been seeking is what diplomats call a breakout capability – the capacity to dash to a bomb before the international community could effectively mobilise against it.¶ The third fact – and this
one is hard for many to swallow – is that neither a negotiated settlement nor the air strikes long favoured by Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, can offer the rest of the world a
watertight insurance policy.¶ It should be possible to construct a deal that acts as a plausible restraint – and extends the timeframe for any breakout – but no amount of restrictions or intrusive
monitoring can offer a certain guarantee against Tehran’s future intentions.¶ By the same token,
bombing Iran’s nuclear sites could certainly delay the
programme, perhaps for a couple of years. But, assuming that even the hawkish Mr Netanyahu is not proposing permanent war against Iran, air strikes would
not end it. ¶ You cannot bomb knowledge and technical expertise. To try would be to empower those in
Tehran who say the regime will be safe only when, like North Korea, it has a weapon. So when Barack Obama says the US will never allow
Iran to get the bomb he is indulging in, albeit understandable, wishful thinking.¶
The best the international community can hope for is
that, in return for a relaxation of sanctions, Iran will make a judgment that it is better off sticking with a
threshold capability. To put this another way, if Tehran does step back from the nuclear brink it will be because of
its own calculation of the balance of advantage .¶ The fourth element in this dynamic is that Iran now has a leadership that,
faced with the severe and growing pain inflicted by sanctions, is prepared to talk . There is nothing to say that Hassan Rouhani, the
president, is any less hard-headed than previous Iranian leaders, but he does seem ready to weigh the options.
New rapid Middle East proliferation is the most likely scenario for escalation
Horowitz 2009, Michael, Department of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, “The
Spread of Nuclear Weapons and International Conflict”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 53, No. 2,
April
Learning as states gain … preferences of the adopter.
nuclear acquisition might provide information about resolve or capabilities, it
also generates uncertainty about the way an actual conflict would go—given the new risk of nuclear escalation—and
uncertainty about relative capabilities. Rapid proliferation may especially heighten uncertainty given the
Learning as states gain experience with nuclear weapons is complicated. While to some extent,
potential for reasonable states to disagree at times about the quality of the capabilities each possesses.2 What
follows is an attempt to describe the implications of inexperience and incomplete information on the behavior of nuclear states and their potential opponents over time. Since it is impossible
to detail all possible lines of argumentation and possible responses, the following discussion is necessarily incomplete. This is a first step. The acquisition of nuclear weapons increases the
confidence of adopters in their ability to impose costs in the case of a conflict and the expectations of likely costs if war occurs by potential opponents. The key questions are whether nuclear
states learn over time about how to leverage nuclear weapons and the implications of that learning, along with whether actions by nuclear states, over time, convey information that leads to
changes in the expectations of their behavior—shifts in uncertainty— on the part of potential adversaries. Learning to Leverage? When a new state acquires nuclear weapons, how does it
influence the way the state behaves and how might that change over time? Although nuclear acquisition might be orthogonal to a particular dispute, it might be related to a particular security
challenge, might signal revisionist aims with regard to an enduring dispute, or might signal the desire to reinforce the status quo. This section focuses on how acquiring nuclear weapons
influences both the new nuclear state and potential adversaries. In theory, systemwide perceptions of nuclear danger could allow new nuclear states to partially skip the early Cold War
each
new nuclear state has to resolve its own particular civil–military issues surrounding operational control and plan its
learning process concerning the risks of nuclear war and enter a proliferated world more cognizant of nuclear brinksmanship and bargaining than their predecessors. However,
national strategy in light of its new capabilities. Empirical research
by Sagan (1993), Feaver (1992), and Blair (1993)
suggests
that viewing the behavior of other states does not create the necessary tacit knowledge; there is no
substitute for experience when it comes to handling a nuclear arsenal, even if experience itself cannot totally prevent accidents.
Sagan contends that civil–military instability in many likely new proliferators and pressures generated by the requirements to handle the responsibility of
dealing with nuclear weapons will skew decision-making toward more offensive strategies (Sagan 1995). The questions surrounding
Pakistan’s nuclear command and control suggest there is no magic bullet when it comes to new nuclear powers’ making control and delegation decisions (Bowen and Wolvén 1999). Sagan and
Inexperienced operators and the bureaucratic desire to “justify”
the costs spent developing nuclear weapons, combined with organizational biases that may favor escalation to avoid decapitation—the
“use it or lose it” mind-set— may cause new nuclear states to adopt riskier launch postures, such as launch on warning,
or at least be perceived that way by other states (Blair 1993; Feaver 1992; Sagan 1995).3 Acquiring nuclear weapons could alter state preferences
and make states more likely to escalate disputes once they start, given their new capabilities.4 But their general lack of
experience at leveraging their nuclear arsenal and effectively communicating nuclear threats could mean new nuclear
states will be more likely to select adversaries poorly and to find themselves in disputes with resolved
adversaries that will reciprocate militarized challenges. The “nuclear experience” logic also suggests that more experienced nuclear states
others focus on inexperience on the part of new nuclear states as a key behavioral driver.
sahould gain knowledge over time from nuclearized interactions that helps leaders effectively identify the situations in which their nuclear arsenals are likely to make a difference. Experienced
nuclear states learn to select into cases in which their comparative advantage, nuclear weapons, is more likely to be effective, increasing the probability that an adversary will not reciprocate.
Coming from a slightly different perspective, uncertainty about the consequences of proliferation on the balance of power and the behavior of new nuclear states on the part of their potential
adversaries could also shape behavior in similar ways (Schelling 1966; Blainey 1988). While a stable and credible nuclear arsenal communicates clear information about the likely costs of
in the short term, nuclear proliferation is likely to increase uncertainty about the trajectory of a
war, the balance of power, and the preferences of the adopter.
conflict,
Iran war escalates
White, July/August 2011 (Jeffrey—defense fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
What Would War With Iran Look Like, National Interest, p. http://www.the-americaninterest.com/article-bd.cfm?piece=982)
A U.S.-Iranian war would probably not be fought by the U nited S tates and Iran alone. Each would have
partners or allies, both willing and not-so-willing. Pre-conflict commitments, longstanding relationships, the
course of operations and
other factors would place the U nited S tates and Iran at the center of more or less
structured coalitions of the marginally willing. A
Western coalition could consist of the United States and most of its
traditional allies (but very likely not Turkey, based on the evolution of Turkish politics) in addition to some Persian Gulf states, Jordan
and perhaps Egypt, depending on where its revolution takes it. Much would depend on whether U.S. leaders could persuade others to go
along, which would mean convincing them that U.S. forces could shield them from Iranian and Iranian-proxy retaliation, or at least substantially
weaken its effects. Coalition warfare would present a number of challenges to the U.S. government. Overall, it would lend legitimacy to the
action, but it would also constrict U.S. freedom of action, perhaps by limiting the scope and intensity of military operations. There would thus
be tension between the desire for a small coalition of the capable for operational and security purposes and a broader coalition that would
include marginally useful allies to maximize legitimacy. The U.S. administration would probably not welcome Israeli participation. But if Israel
were directly attacked by Iran or its allies, Washington would find it difficult to keep Israel out—as it did during the 1991 Gulf War. That would
complicate the U.S. ability to manage its coalition, although it would not necessarily break it apart. Iranian diplomacy and information
operations would seek to exploit Israeli participation to the fullest. Iran
would have its own coalition. Hizballah in particular
could act at Iran’s behest both by attacking Israel directly and by using its asymmetric and irregular warfare capabilities to expand
the conflict and complicate the maintenance of the U.S. coalition. The escalation of the Hizballah-Israel
conflict could draw in Syria and Hamas; Hamas in particular could feel compelled to respond to an Iranian
request for assistance. Some or all of these satellite actors might choose to leave Iran to its fate, especially if initial U.S. strikes seemed
devastating to the point of decisive. But their
involvement would spread the conflict to the entire eastern
Mediterranean and perhaps beyond, complicating both U.S. military operations and coalition diplomacy.
Continued Iran prolif risks preemption and massive nuclear war
Brookes 9/24/04 (Peter, Senior Fellow for the Heritage Foundation, An Iran-Israeli War?)
To many nations, especially Israel, it seems only a matter of time before Iran breaks out as a nuclear power, ratcheting up tension across the Middle
East. An Israel-Iran showdown over Tehran's outlaw nuclear-weapons program now seems increasingly imminent. Last week, for example, Israel charged that Iran was
merely "buying time" and will never abandon plans to develop nuclear weapons. It called for the U.N. Security Council "to put an end to this nightmare." Addressing reporters at the U.N., Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan
Shalom kept all options on the table by avoiding answering whether Israel would take military action against Iran if it continued to pursue nuclear weapons. Also last week, the
administration informed Congress that it was selling Israel 5,000 precisionguided "smart bombs," including 500 satellite-guided, one-ton JDAM "bunker busters" of Baghdad fame. (JDAMs are capable of penetrating six
Iran warned Israel against attacking its nuclear facilities, saying it would react "most
severely" to any Israeli military action against Iran. Then, over the weekend, Iran pointedly announced that its Shahab-3 ballistic missile was now operational. The missile can reach Israel, and Iran has 25 to
feet of concrete.) In response to the arms sale,
100 of them. Defense Minister Ali Shamkhrani crowed that Iran was now "ready to confront all regional [read: Israeli] and extra-regional [read: American] threats." OK, so you say, a little chest-beating isn't the same as
the beating of war drums. True. But bear in mind, Israel takes the threat of nuclear weapons in its neighborhood quite seriously. Just ask Saddam Hussein. In 1981, Israeli fighters conducted a low-level, 700- mile, daylight
raid through Saudi Arabian and Jordanian air space into Iraq. In a minute and a half, the fighters laid waste to the French-supplied Osiraq nuclear reactor - the centerpiece of Iraq's burgeoning nuclear-weapons program.
So what would happen if Israel decided to conduct a pre-emptive surgical strike on Iran's nuclear facilities? Some say that an Israeli attack on a Muslim country would set the Middle East ablaze in an anti-Jewish frenzy.
Possible, but not likely. Sure, all Muslim governments would vociferously condemn the Israeli strike. But most would breathe a quiet sigh of relief. No one in the Middle East (except maybe Syria) wants to see
Hezbollah,
would almost certainly target Israeli (and perhaps U.S.) interests in the region. Iran itself could decide to retaliate on Israeli
cities with missile strikes. And while Israel has a limited missile defense system, missiles raining in on Tel Aviv, a city of 3 million, could be devastating. But Israel could
threaten to respond to Iranian strikes on Israeli civilian targets with nuclear weapons.
fundamentalist, hegemonic Iran go nuclear. This is especially true for Iran's cross-Gulf rival, Saudi Arabia. No Arab country would strike back at Israel, but Iran's Lebanese terrorist proxy,
Impact Ext – Israel Module
Nuclear Iran = Israel freak out - That escalates to full scale war
Adamsky 2011, Dima Adamsky is an Assistant Professor at the Lauder School of Government,
Diplomacy, and Strategy at the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya and the author of The Culture of Military
Innovation. The scenarios discussed here are speculative and do not represent the views of any official
in the Israeli government, Foreign affairs, march – april 2011, lexis
The insecurity generated by a nuclear Iran might dwarf previous peaks of existential fear in Israel. A
nuclear Iran would likely undermine the foundations of Israeli self-confidence by crossing two "redlines"
in the Israeli strategic psyche. First, the arsenal of a single country would pose an existential threat,
conjuring memories of Nazi Germany. Focusing on Iran's ultimate destructive capability rather than its
intentions, Israeli strategists might therefore view a nuclear Iran apocalyptically. Second, many Israelis
might come to believe that the end of Israel's nuclear monopoly has terminated the country's ultimate
insurance policy, fundamentally undermining Israel's general deterrence posture. These concerns, as
Eric Edelman, Andrew Krepinevich, and Evan Montgomery assert, might lead Israeli strategists to
reexamine nuclear policies and adjust their current deterrence models.
Extinction
Moore 2009, Carole, author, activist, leader of Libertarians for Peace, “Israeli Nuclear Threats and
Blackmail”, http://www.carolmoore.net/nuclearwar/israelithreats.html
The phrase the “Samson Option” is used to describe Israel’s strategy of massive nuclear retaliation
against “enemy” nations should its existence as a Jewish state be jeopardized through military attack.
Israeli leaders created the term in the mid-1960s, inspired by the Biblical figure Samson, who destroyed
a Philistine temple, killing himself and thousands of Philistine enemies.[1][2] Israel refuses to admit
officially that it has nuclear weapons - a policy known as “nuclear ambiguity” or "nuclear opacity."[3]
This despite government officials inferring repeatedly - and occasionally admitting - the fact. And despite
Israeli nuclear whistle blower Mordechai Vanunu making public smuggled photographs of nuclear
weapons and production equipment in the 1980s.[4] Israel now may have as many as 400 atomic and
hydrogen nuclear weapons,[5][6] as well as the ability to launch them via long range missiles,
submarines and aircraft.[7] It can use them in a second strike even if its military is devastated. Originally
a strategy of last resort retaliation - even if it means Israel’s annihilation - it has developed into being a
nuclear bullying strategy to further Israel’s territorial goals through threats and blackmail. Israel has
bullied not only Arab and Muslim nations, but the United States and Russia with its Samson Option
threats. Mordechai Vanunu has alleged that Israel uses for purposes of blackmail its ability to "bombard
any city all over the world, and not only those in Europe but also those in the United States."[8] Official
policy and threats During the 1960s Israel concentrated on conventional military superiority to defend
lands confiscated in the 1948 and 1967 wars - and to convince Palestinians in Israel and the occupied
territories that they could not break free of it. However, in 1973's Yom Kippur War Israel was almost
overwhelmed by Arab forces. Prime Minister Golda Meir authorized a nuclear alert, ordering 13 atomic
bombs be prepared for missiles and aircraft. Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. Simha Dinitz threatened
“very serious conclusions" if there was not an immediate airlift of supplies.[9] This forced U.S. President
Richard Nixon to make emergency airlifts of state of the art military supplies to Israel.[10][11] Fearing
intervention by the Soviet Union, U.S. forces went on Defense Condition (DEFCON) III alert status[12],
something which could have led to full scale nuclear war in case of misinterpretation of signals or
hardware or software failures. Additionally, as Seymour Hersh documents in detail in his book The
Samson Option, from 1973 these weapons have been used to discourage the Soviet Union - now Russia from intervening militarily on behalf of Arab nations.[13] Obviously an Israeli nuclear attack on Russia by
the United States’ great ally Israel would result in Russia sending thousands of nuclear weapons towards
the U.S. and the U.S. responding in kind. Not surprisingly, no nation state has attempted to attack Israel
since 1973. A former Israeli official justified Israel’s threats. “You Americans screwed us” in not
supporting Israel in its 1956 war with Egypt. “We can still remember the smell of Auschwitz and
Treblinka. Next time we’ll take all of you with us.”[14] General Moshe Dayan, a leading promoter of
Israel’s nuclear program[15], has been quoted as saying “Israel must be like a mad dog, too dangerous
to bother.”[16] Amos Rubin, an economic adviser to former Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, said "If left
to its own Israel will have no choice but to fall back on a riskier defense which will endanger itself and
the world at large... To enable Israel to abstain from dependence on nuclear arms calls for $2 to 3 billion
per year in U.S. aid."[17] In 1977, after a right-wing coalition under Menachen Begin took power, the
Israelis began to use the Samson Option not just to deter attack but to allow Israel to “redraw the
political map of the Middle East” by expanding hundreds of thousands of Israeli settlers into the West
Bank and Gaza.[18] Then-Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon said things like "We are much more
important than (Americans) think. We can take the middle east with us whenever we go"[19] and "Arabs
may have the oil, but we have the matches."[20] He proclaimed his - and many Likud Party members' goals of transforming Jordan into a Palestinian state and “transferring” all Palestinian refugees
there.[21][22] A practice known worldwide as "ethnic cleansing." To dissuade the Soviet Union from
interfering with its plans, Prime Minister Begin immediately “gave orders to target more Soviet cities”
for potential nuclear attack. Its American spy Jonathan Pollard was caught stealing such nuclear
targeting information from the U.S. military in 1985.[23] During the next 25 years Israel became more
militarily adventurous, bombing Iraq’s under-construction Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981, invading
Lebanon to destroy Palestinian refugee camps in 1982 and to fight Hezbollah in 2006, massively
bombing civilian targets in the West Bank Jenin refugee camp in 2002 and thoughout Gaza in 2008-2009.
There are conflicting reports about whether Israel went on nuclear alert and armed missiles with nuclear
weapons during the 1991 Gulf War after Iraq shot conventionally armed scud missiles into it.[24][25] In
2002, while the United States was building for the 2003 invasion of Iraq, then Prime Minister Ariel
Sharon threatened that if Israel was attacked “Israel will react. Is it clear?”[26] Israeli defense analyst
Zeev Schiff explained: “Israel could respond with a nuclear retaliation that would eradicate Iraq as a
country.” It is believed President Bush gave Sharon the green-light to attack Baghdad in retaliation,
including with nuclear weapons, but only if attacks came before the American military invasion.[27]
Former Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres has admitted that nuclear weapons are used by Israel for
“compellent purposes” - i.e., forcing others to accept Israeli political demands.[28] In 1998 Peres was
quoted as saying, "We have built a nuclear option, not in order to have a Hiroshima, but to have an
Oslo," referring to imposing a settlement on the Palestinians.[29] In her book Israel’s Sacred Terrorism
Livia Rokach documented how Israelis have used religion to justify paramilitary and state terrorism to
create and maintain a Jewish State.[30] Two other Israeli retaliation strategies are the popularized
phrase “Wrath of God,” the alleged Israeli assassination of those it held responsible for the 1972 killings
of Israeli athletes during the Munich Olympics[31], and the “Dahiya doctrine” of destruction of civilian
areas to punish Palestinians for supporting their leaders.[32] Israeli Israel Shahak wrote in 1997: "Israel
clearly prepares itself to seek overtly a hegemony over the entire Middle East...without hesitating to use
for the purpose all means available, including nuclear ones."[33] Zeev Schiff opined in 1998 that "Offthe-cuff Israeli nuclear threats have become a problem."[34] In 2003 David Hirst noted that “The
threatening of wild, irrational violence, in response to political pressure, has been an Israeli impulse
from the very earliest days” and called Israel a candidate for “the role of 'nuclear-crazy' state.”[35]
Noam Chomsky said of the Samson Option “the craziness of the state is not because the people are
insane. Once you pick a policy of choosing expansion over security, that's what you end up getting stuck
with.”[36] Efraim Karsh calls the Samson Option the “rationality of pretended irrationality,” but warns
that seeming too irrational could encourage other nations to attack Israel in their own defense.[37]
Samson Option Supporters Two Israel supporters are frequently quoted for their explicit support of the
Samson Option. Martin Van Creveld, a professor of military history at the Hebrew University in
Jerusalem, has been quoted as saying: "Most European capitals are targets for our air force....We have
the capability to take the world down with us. And I can assure you that that will happen before Israel
goes under."[38] In 2002 the Los Angeles Times, published an opinion piece by Louisiana State
University professor David Perlmutter in which he wrote: "What would serve the Jew-hating world
better in repayment for thousands of years of massacres but a Nuclear Winter. Or invite all those tuttutting European statesmen and peace activists to join us in the ovens? For the first time in history, a
people facing extermination while the world either cackles or looks away--unlike the Armenians,
Tibetans, World War II European Jews or Rwandans--have the power to destroy the world. The ultimate
justice?"[39]
A2: Deal Causes Iran Strikes
It actually pushes them farther from their red line
Cirincione 11-25 [Joseph Cirincione is president of Ploughshares Fund, a global security foundation,
and a member of Secretary of State John Kerry's International Security Advisory Board and the Council
on Foreign Relations. He's also the author of "Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons."
Interviewed by Ezra Klein 11-25-2013 “‘If you don’t like negotiating with Iran what you’re really saying is
you want to go to war’” http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/11/25/if-you-dontlike-negotiating-with-iran-what-youre-really-saying-is-you-want-to-go-to-war/]
This addresses the major threat that Prime Minister Netanyahu warned the world about in September 2012. He
went to the dais of the U.N. General Assembly and he held up a cartoon drawing of a bomb and drew a red line across the top. He warned the
world that Iran would soon have enough uranium enriched to 20 percent and that they could quickly, in weeks or months, make a bomb.¶ His
concerns were well-founded. Iran now has about 190 kilograms of this enriched uranium. If they got to 240 kilograms, they'd be very close to a
bomb. This
deal drains the uranium from Mr. Netanyahu’s bomb. It drains the amount of 20 percent
enriched uranium [Iran has]. It makes it much less likely Iran could break out and make a bomb. And it goes
further: It stops the manufacturing of new centrifuges. It changes the inspection regime from weekly to
daily. If Iran wanted to do anything suspicious, there’s a high probability we'd know about it and could
act instantly to stop them.¶ EK: What’s the counterfactual here? Imagine this deal wasn’t struck and things simply kept on trend.
Where would this issue be going?¶ JC: If Iran hadn’t paused, in a matter of months they would cross Israel’s red line. In
perhaps a year they could’ve constructed a crude nuclear device. In another year, they could construct a warhead to put on a missile. While
we might think we had two years or so to act, Israel doesn’t look at it that way. They wanted to kill the
nuclear baby in the crib. So the alternative to this deal was war. We shouldn’t kid ourselves. There’s no sanction
regime known to man that’s been able to coerce a country into compliance. So if you don't like
negotiating with Iran, what you're really saying is you want to go to war. We should be clear-eyed about this. We
shouldn’t think there’s some better deal out there.
No Israel Strike now
Cirincione 11-25 [Joseph Cirincione is president of Ploughshares Fund, a global security foundation,
and a member of Secretary of State John Kerry's International Security Advisory Board and the Council
on Foreign Relations. He's also the author of "Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons."
Interviewed by Ezra Klein 11-25-2013 “‘If you don’t like negotiating with Iran what you’re really saying is
you want to go to war’” http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/11/25/if-you-dontlike-negotiating-with-iran-what-youre-really-saying-is-you-want-to-go-to-war/]
EK: One argument that Jeffrey Goldberg makes is that another
objective of this deal was stopping Israel from making any
sudden moves. Now that there’s a deal in place, Israel can’t simply blow up the international community’s negotiations and launch an attack. Do you
agree?¶ JC: I think it’s almost impossible for Israel to launch a military strike on Iran right now. They're
isolated. The prime minister is issuing some very tough statements but as far as I can see, he’s the only
world leader issuing them. Even Saudi Arabia, which has serious qualms about the deal, is issuing positive statements at the start.
Sanctions kill deal
Sanctions legislaton destroy negotiations- causes Iran prolif and war
Kahl 12-31 [Colin Kahl is an associate professor in the Security Studies Program in the Edmund A.
Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, where he teaches courses on international
relations, international security, the geopolitics of the Middle East, American foreign policy, and civil and
ethnic conflict. He is also a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), a
Washington, DC-based think tank. 12-31-2013 “The Danger of New Iran Sanctions” National Interest
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-danger-new-iran-sanctions-9651?page=1]
The legislation defies a request by the Obama administration and ten Senate committee chairs to stand down on sanctions while negotiations continue. It also
flies in the face of an unclassified intelligence assessment that new sanctions “would undermine the
prospects for a successful comprehensive nuclear agreement with Iran.” Proponents of the bill note that the proposed
sanctions would only come into force if Iran violates the Geneva agreement or fails to move toward a final deal, and would not kick in for months. But the White
House warns that enshrining
new economic threats in law now runs counter to the spirit of the Geneva pledge
of no new sanctions during negotiations, and risks empowering Iranian forces hoping to scuttle nuclear
talks. The legislation also defines congressionally acceptable parameters for a final deal that Iran experts
almost universally believe are unachievable, namely the requirement that Iran completely dismantle its uranium enrichment program. For
these reasons, the administration believes the bill represents a poison pill that could kill diplomacy, making a nucleararmed Iran or war more likely. Sanctions hawks disagree, arguing that the legislation will enable, not thwart, diplomatic progress. “Current
sanctions brought Iran to the negotiating table,” Senator Robert Menendez, the bill’s leading champion, contends, “and a credible threat of future sanctions will
require Iran to cooperate and act in good faith at the negotiating table.” ¶ But this logic badly misreads the historical effect of sanctions on Iranian behavior and
under-appreciates the role played by Iran’s fractious domestic politics. A
careful look at Iranian actions over the past decade suggests that
economic pressure has sometimes been effective, but only when it aligns with particular Iranian political
dynamics and policy preferences. And once domestic Iranian politics are factored in, the lesson for today’s sanctions debate is clear:
the threat of additional sanctions, at this critical juncture, could derail negotiations toward a peaceful
solution.
New sanctions prevent deal success. Failure will spur prolif and war with Iran .
Beauchamp, 11/6/14 --- B.A.s in Philosophy and Political Science from Brown University and an M.Sc
in International Relations from the London School of Economics, former editor of TP Ideas and a
reporter for ThinkProgress.org. He previously contributed to Andrew Sullivan’s The Dish at
Newsweek/Daily Beast, and has also written for Foreign Policy and Tablet magazines, now writes for Vox
(Zack, “How the new GOP majority could destroy Obama's nuclear deal with Iran,”
http://www.vox.com/2014/11/6/7164283/iran-nuclear-deal-congress, JMP)
There is one foreign policy issue on which the GOP's takeover of the Senate could have huge
ramifications, and beyond just the US: Republicans are likely to try to torpedo President Obama's
ongoing efforts to reach a nuclear deal with Iran. And they just might pull it off.
November 24 is the latest deadline for a final agreement between the United States and Iran over the
latter's nuclear program. That'll likely be extended, but it's a reminder that the negotiations could soon
come to a head. Throughout his presidency, Obama has prioritized these negotiations ; he likely
doesn't want to leave office without having made a deal.
But if Congress doesn't like the deal, or just wants to see Obama lose, it has the power to torpedo it by
imposing new sanctions on Iran. Previously, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid used procedural powers
to stop this from happening and save the nuclear talks. But Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell
may not be so kind, and he may have the votes to destroy an Iran deal. If he tries, we could see one of
the most important legislative fights of Obama's presidency.
Why Congress can bully Obama on Iran sanctions
At their most basic level, the international negotiations over Iran's nuclear program (they include several
other nations, but the US is the biggest player) are a tit-for-tat deal. If Iran agrees to place a series of
verifiable limits on its nuclear development, then the United States and the world will relax their painful
economic and diplomatic sanctions on Tehran.
"The regime of economic sanctions against Iran is arguably the most complex the United States and the
international community have ever imposed on a rogue state," the Congressional Research Service's
Dianne Rennack writes. To underscore the point, Rennack's four-page report is accompanied by a list of
every US sanction on Iran that goes on for 23 full pages.
The US's sanctions are a joint Congressional-executive production. Congress puts strict limits on Iran's
ability to export oil and do business with American companies, but it gives the president the power to
waive sanctions if he thinks it's in the American national interest. "In the collection of laws that are the
statutory basis for the U.S. economic sanctions regime on Iran," Rennack writes, "the President retains,
in varying degrees, the authority to tighten and relax restrictions."
The key point here is that Congress gave Obama that power — which means they can take it back. "You
could see a bill in place that makes it harder for the administration to suspend sanctions," Ken Sofer, the
Associate Director for National Security and International Policy at the Center for American Progress
(where I worked for a little under two years, though not with Sofer directly), says. "You could also see a
bill that says the president can't agree to a deal unless it includes the following things or [a bill] forcing a
congressional vote on any deal."
Imposing new sanctions on Iran wouldn't just stifle Obama's ability to remove existing sanctions, it
would undermine Obama's authority to negotiate with Iran at all, sending the message to Tehran that
Obama is not worth dealing with because he can't control his own foreign policy.
So if Obama wants to make a deal with Iran, he needs Congress to play ball . But it's not clear that
Mitch McConnell's Senate wants to.
Congress could easily use its authority to kill an Iran deal
To understand why the new Senate is such a big deal for congressional action on sanctions, we have to
jump back a year.
In November 2013, the Obama administration struck an interim deal with Iran called the Joint Plan of
Action (JPOA). As part of the JPOA, the US agreed to limited, temporary sanctions relief in exchange for
Iran limiting nuclear program components like uranium production.
Congressional Republicans, by and large, hate the JPOA deal. Arguing that the deal didn't place
sufficiently serious limits on Iran's nuclear growth, the House passed new sanctions on Iran in
December. (There is also a line of argument, though often less explicit, that the Iranian government
cannot be trusted with any deal at all, and that US policy should focus on coercing Iran into submission
or unseating the Iranian government entirely.) Senate Republicans, joined by more hawkish Democrats,
had the votes to pass a similar bill. But in February, Senate Majority leader Harry Reid killed new Iran
sanctions, using the Majority Leader's power to block consideration of the sanctions legislation to
prevent a vote.
McConnell blasted Reid's move. "There is no excuse for muzzling the Congress on an issue of this
importance to our own national security," he said. So now that McConnell holds the majority leader's
gavel, it will remove that procedural roadblock that stood between Obama and new Iran sanctions.
To be clear, it's far from guaranteed that Obama will be able to reach a deal with Iran at all; negotiations
could fall apart long before they reach the point of congressional involvement. But if he does reach a
deal, and Congress doesn't like the terms, then they'll be able to kill it by passing new sanctions
legislation, or preventing Obama from temporarily waiving the ones on the books.
And make no mistake — imposing new sanctions or limiting Obama's authority to waive the current
ones would kill any deal. If Iran can't expect Obama to follow through on his promises to relax sanctions,
it has zero incentive to limit its nuclear program. "If Congress adopts sanctions," Iranian Foreign Minister
Javad Zarif told Time last December, "the entire deal is dead."
Moreover, it could fracture the international movement to sanction Iran . The United States is far from
Iran's biggest trading partner, so it depends on international cooperation in order to ensure the
sanctions bite. If it looks like the US won't abide by the terms of a deal, the broad-based international
sanctions regime could collapse . Europe, particularly, might decide that going along with the sanctions
is no longer worthwhile.
"Our ability to coerce Iran is largely based on whether or not the international community thinks that we
are the ones that are being constructive and [Iranians] are the ones that being obstructive," Sofer says.
"If they don't believe that, then the international sanctions regime falls apart."
This could be one of the biggest fights of Obama's last term
It's true that Obama could veto any Congressional efforts to blow up an Iran deal with sanctions. But a
two-thirds vote could override any veto — and, according to Sofer, an override is entirely within the
realm of possibility.
"There are plenty of Democrats that will probably side with Republicans if they try to push a harder line
on Iran," Sofer says. For a variety of reasons, including deep skepticism of Iran's intentions and strong
Democratic support for Israel, whose government opposes the negotiations, Congressional Democrats
are not as open to making a deal with Iran as Obama is. Many will likely defect to the GOP side out of
principle.
The real fight, Sofer says, will be among the Democrats — those who are willing to take the
administration's side in theory, but don't necessarily think a deal with Iran is legislative priority number
one, and maybe don't want to open themselves up to the political risk. These Democrats "can make it
harder: you can filibuster, if you're Obama you can veto — you can make it impossible for a full bill to be
passed out of Congress on Iran," Sofer says. But it'd be a really tough battle, one that would consume
a lot of energy and lobbying effort that Democrats might prefer to spend pushing on other issues.
"I'm not really sure they're going to be willing to take on a fight about an Iran sanctions bill," Sofer
concludes. "I'm not really sure that the Democrats who support [a deal] are really fully behind it enough
that they'll be willing to give up leverage on, you know, unemployment insurance or immigration status
— these bigger issues for most Democrats."
So if the new Republican Senate prioritizes destroying an Iran deal, Obama will have to fight very hard
to keep it — without necessarily being able to count on his own party for support. And the stakes are
enormous: if Iran's nuclear program isn't stopped peacefully, then the most likely outcomes are
either Iran going nuclear, or war with Iran .
The administration believes a deal with Iran is their only way to avoid this horrible choice. That's why it's
been one of the administration's top priorities since day one. It's also why this could become one of
the biggest legislative fights of Obama's last two years.
A2 Won’t meet the deadline
Tuesday’s deadline is soft – real deadline is July 9
Jonah Shepp 6-27 In Vienna, Kerry Looks to Bring Iran Deal Home
http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2015/06/27/kerry_in_vienna_for_final_iran_nuke_talks.html
Also, Tuesday's deadline for a comprehensive deal is softer than it looks. The parties have extended
their deadlines before without the process collapsing, after all. As diplomats in
Vienna explained to Reuters, the real deadline is July 9, because any deal made after that date will be
subject to 60 days of review by the US Congress, rather than 30:
Negotiators involved in the talks fear that such a lengthy delay, which would also hold up the
cancellation of United Nations nuclear-related sanctions by the U.N. Security Council, would be too long
and would create the opportunity for any deal agreed in Vienna to unravel.
A2 Former advisor letter
Letter from former advisors not meant as argument to scuttle deal
JOHN HUDSON JUNE 25, 2015 No, Obama’s Former Advisors Aren’t Trashing the Iran Deal
- 6:07 PM http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/25/ex-obama-adviser-defends-letter-drawing-red-lineson-iran-deal/
The White House insists that the five demands outlined by the group match the priorities that U.S.
negotiators are seeking in Vienna. Yet media coverage of the letter has led many to believe that
Obama’s former advisors have lost trust in the president’s negotiating team. Two signers of the letter
say that’s patently false.¶ “That’s not at all what the statement was about,” said Einhorn, a
nonproliferation expert and a co-signer of the letter.¶ “The key thing is not that there were some former
Obama officials raising questions,” he added. “The key thing is you have this diverse group coming
together on a set of reasonable and achievable recommendations.Ӧ Unlike a recently circulated set of
demands by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, Einhorn noted that the letter he signed
doesn’t include so-called “poison pills” that Iran would never conceivably agree to.¶ The bipartisan group
demands that international monitors have “timely and effective access” to any military or nonmilitary
sites needed to verify Iran’s compliance with the nuclear deal being negotiated by Tehran and six world
powers. It also calls for strict limits on the research and development of advanced centrifuges, the ability
to quickly reimpose sanctions if Iran violates the terms of a deal, and gradual, not immediate, economic
sanctions relief for Tehran.¶ Included in those demands is a preamble noting that “[m]ost of us would
have preferred a stronger agreement,” suggesting growing discontent with the handling of the talks by
Obama administration alumni. But another signer of the letter, speaking on condition of anonymity, said
that’s not the case. He said the letter meant to bring Democrats and Republicans together around a
simple set of “achievable goals” to demonstrate a bipartisan path to a deal. “If the deal is a good one,
the administration will benefit from the support of this bipartisan group,” he said. “If the deal is not a
good one, the administration will have to contend with the group. But the president has made clear that
he will only do a good deal, and I take him at his word.” When asked about the letter, a State
Department spokeswoman did not view it as an indictment of the ongoing negotiations, which face a
June 30 deadline.
Turns Case: US Hegemony
Nuclear Iran kills U.S. hegemony – emboldens enemies and weakens alliances
Takeyh and Lindsay, 10
[James M. Lindsay, Senior Vice President, Director of Studies, and Maurice R. Greenberg Chair, Ray
Takeyh, Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies “After Iran Gets the Bomb Containment and Its
Complications,” March/April 2010,
http://www.cfr.org/publication/22182/after_iran_gets_the_bomb.html]
The dangers of Iran's entry into the nuclear club are well known: emboldened by this development,
Tehran might multiply its attempts at subverting its neighbors and encouraging terrorism against the
United States and Israel; the risk of both conventional and nuclear war in the Middle East would
escalate; more states in the region might also want to become nuclear powers; the geopolitical balance in the
Middle East would be reordered; and broader efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons would be undermined. The advent of a
nuclear Iran—even one that is satisfied with having only the materials and infrastructure necessary to
assemble a bomb on short notice rather than a nuclear arsenal—would be seen as a major diplomatic
defeat for the United States. Friends and foes would openly question the U.S. government's power and
resolve to shape events in the Middle East. Friends would respond by distancing themselves from
Washington; foes would challenge U.S. policies more aggressively.
Such a scenario can be avoided, however. Even if Washington fails to prevent Iran from going nuclear, it can contain and mitigate the
consequences of Iran's nuclear defiance. It should make clear to Tehran that acquiring the bomb will not produce the benefits it anticipates but
isolate and weaken the regime. Washington will need to lay down clear "redlines" defining what it considers to be unacceptable behavior—and
be willing to use military force if Tehran crosses them. It will also need to reassure its friends and allies in the Middle East that it remains firmly
committed to preserving the balance of power in the region.
Containing a nuclear Iran would not be easy. It would require considerable diplomatic skill and political will on the part of the
United States. And it could fail. A nuclear Iran may choose to flex its muscles and test U.S. resolve. Even under
the best circumstances, the opaque nature of decision-making in Tehran could complicate Washington's
efforts to deter it. Thus, it would be far preferable if Iran stopped—or were stopped—before it became a nuclear power. Current efforts
to limit Iran's nuclear program must be pursued with vigor. Economic pressure on Tehran must be maintained. Military options to prevent Iran
from going nuclear must not be taken off the table.
Turns the case – wrecks US hegemony because it means we can’t exercise
international leverage to negotiate with anyone and have no credibility on the
international stage
Elwar, 9/19/2012 (Eliot, Op-Ed: The U.S. war against Iran could shift the balance of power, Digital
Journal, p. http://digitaljournal.com/article/333174)
From The News: The head of Iran’s powerful Revolutionary Guards warned about retaliation against the
Gulf’s strategic Strait of Hormuz, US bases in the Mideast, and Israel if his country is attacked.
According to many analysts, Iran will attack the US and Israel when the war begins. The center of gravity
will be the Strait of Hormuz. Iran will attempt to close this area to bring the global economy to its knees.
The world economy will collapse rapidly if Iran is successful. Iran may have been supplied with Russian
SUNBURN anti-ship cruise missiles. These missiles can sink any aircraft carrier . The US Navy has
no defense against these missiles. Russia probably supplied Iran with these missiles to inflict severe
damage on the US Navy when the war begins. From RENSE.COM: Tehran has an unknown number of
advanced Russian designed SS-N-22 SUNBURN missiles. When the Iranian Defense Minister Ali
Shamkhani visited Moscow in late 2001 he requested a SUNBURN missile test firing, which the Russians
arranged. Ali Shamkhani was so impressed with this advanced weapon system that he placed an order for
an undisclosed number of the SUNBURN missiles. The SUNBURN can deliver a 200-kiloton nuclear
payload (a 750-pound conventional warhead) within a range of 161.0000 km, more than twice the
EXOCET missile’s range. The SUNBURN combines a Mach 2.1 speed with a flight pattern that hugs the
deck and includes "violent end maneuvers" to elude enemy defenses. The SUNBURN missile was
specifically designed to defeat the US Aegis radar defense system. Should a US Navy Phalanx point
defense somehow manage to detect an incoming SUNBURN missile, the system has only seconds to
calculate a fire solution, which is not enough time to take out the intruding missile. While the US Phalanx
defense employs a six-barreled gun that fires 3,000 depleted-uranium rounds a minute, the gun must have
precise coordinates to destroy any attacking intruder. From RENSE.COM: The SUNBURN's combined
supersonic speed and payload size produce tremendous kinetic energy on impact, with devastating
consequences for ship and crew. A single one of these missiles can sink a large warship, but costs
considerably less than a fighter jet. Although the Navy has been phasing out the older Phalanx defense
system, its replacement, known as the Rolling Action Missile (RAM) has never been tested against the
weapon it seems destined to one day face in combat. The US Navy's only plausible defense against a
robust weapon like the SUNBURN missile is to detect the enemy's approach well ahead of time, with its
destroyers, submarines, or fighter-bombers, and defeat them long before they can get in range and launch
their deadly cargo. From HAARETZ: Former U.S. ambassador to Israel Martin Indyk recently stated that
he thinks the U.S. will go to war with Iran over its nuclear program in 2013. Speaking during a panel on
the CBS program Face the Nation, Indyk said, ‘I'm afraid that 2013 is going to be a year where we're
going to have a military confrontation with Iran.’ The former ambassador stated that ‘Iran doesn't have a
nuclear weapon,’ but added that there's not a lot of time left until it does. Regarding the recent friction
between U.S. President Barack Obama and Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu over ‘red lines’
on Iran, Indyk doesn't think ‘the difference between Netanyahu and Obama on this is that great, in terms
of the president's commitment not to allow Iran to acquire nuclear weapons.’ He added, however, that
Netanyahu's insistence on public ‘red lines’ was unreasonable. Analysis A US war against Iran comes at
the wrong time in American history. The US economy is collapsing, while food prices increase. Obama is
turning against Israel, which has been America’s only real friend in the Mideast. While America will
survive this war, it will emerge damaged from this Mideast conflict. This war could begin the end of
America’s supremacy as a superpower nation and facilitate the rise of China as the new superpower
in Asia.
Iran nuclearization kills U.S. hegemony and credibility EVEN IF their impact d is true
Daremblum 2011
Jaime, Hudson Institute Senior Fellow and directs the Center for Latin American Studies, Iran Dangerous
Now, Imagine It Nuclear, http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=8439
What would it mean if such a regime went nuclear? Let's
assume, for the sake of argument, that a nuclear-armed Iran would never
use its atomic weapons or give them to terrorists. Even under that optimistic scenario, Tehran's acquisition of
nukes would make the world an infinitely more dangerous
place.
For one thing, it
would surely spark a
wave of proliferation throughout the Greater Middle East, with the likes of Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi
Arabia - all Sunni-majority Muslim countries - going nuclear to counter the threat posed by Shiite Persian Iran. For another,
it would gravely weaken the credibility of U.S. security guarantees. After all, Washington has repeatedly said that the
Islamic Republic will not be permitted to get nukes. If Tehran demonstrated that these warnings were utterly hollow,
rival governments and rogue regimes would conclude that America is a paper tiger. Once Tehran obtained
nuclear weapons, it would have the ultimate trump card, the ultimate protection against outside attack. Feeling secure behind their
nuclear shield, the Iranians would almost certainly increase their support for global terrorism and antiAmerican dictatorships. They would no longer have to fear a U.S. or Israeli military strike. Much like nuclear-armed North
Korea today, Iran would be able to flout international law with virtual impunity. If America sought to curb Iranian
misbehavior through economic sanctions, Tehran might well respond by flexing its muscles in the Strait
of Hormuz. As political scientist Caitlin Talmadge explained in a 2008 analysis, "Iranian closure of the Strait of Hormuz tops the list of global
energy security nightmares. Roughly 90 percent of all Persian Gulf oil leaves the region on tankers that must pass
through this narrow waterway opposite the Iranian coast, and land pipelines do not provide sufficient alternative export routes.
Extended closure of the strait would remove roughly a quarter of the world's oil from the market, causing a supply shock of the type not seen
world's leading state sponsor of terrorism has the ability to
paralyze the global economy, and, if not stopped, it may soon have nuclear weapons. As a nuclear-armed Iran
since the glory days of OPEC."
Think about that: The
steadily expanded its international terror network, the Western Hemisphere would likely witness a significant jump in terrorist activity. Tehran
has established a strategic alliance with Venezuelan leader Hugo Chávez, and it has also developed warm relations with Chávez acolytes in
Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua while pursuing new arrangements with Argentina as an additional beachhead in Latin America Three years ago,
the U.S. Treasury Department accused the Venezuelan government of "employing and providing safe harbor to Hezbollah facilitators and
fundraisers." More recently, in July 2011, Peru's former military chief of staff, Gen. Francisco Contreras, told the Jerusalem Post that "Iranian
organizations" are aiding and cooperating with other terrorist groups in South America. According to Israeli intelligence, the Islamic Republic
has engaged in this provocative behavior
without nuclear weapons. Imagine how much more aggressive the Iranian dictatorship might be after
crossing the nuclear Rubicon. It is an ideologically driven theocracy intent on spreading a radical Islamist
revolution across the globe. As the Saudi plot demonstrates, no amount of conciliatory Western diplomacy can change the
has been getting uranium from both Venezuela and Bolivia.
Remember: Tehran
fundamental nature of a regime that is defined by anti-Western hatred and religious fanaticism.
Turns Case: Credibility
Iran prolif jacks US cred
Bolton, senior fellow – AEI, 4/15/’11
(John, http://www.aei.org/article/103463)
Inside Iran, we now have confirmation—thanks to disclosures this month by an Iranian opposition
group, which have been confirmed by Iranian officials—that the regime has the capability to massproduce critical components for centrifuges used to enrich uranium to weapons-grade levels. That news
proves again the inefficacy of U.N. Security Council resolutions and sanctions against a determined
adversary.
Thus Iran's weapons program proceeds full steam ahead, which only emphasizes to would-be
proliferators that persistence pays. Moammar Gadhafi surrendered his nuclear weapons program in
2003-04 because he feared becoming the next Saddam Hussein, but he is now undoubtedly cursing his
timidity. Had he made seven years of progress toward deliverable nuclear weapons, there would surely
be no NATO bombing of his military today.
An Iranian nuclear capability would undoubtedly cause Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey and perhaps others
to seek their own deliverable nuclear weapons. We would therefore see a region substantially more in
Iran's thrall and far more unstable and dangerous for Washington and its allies.
Moreover, America's failure to stop Iran's nuclear ambitions—which is certainly how it would be
perceived worldwide—would be a substantial blow to U.S. influence in general. Terrorists and their state
sponsors would see Iran's unchallenged role as terrorism's leading state sponsor and central banker, and
would wonder what they have to lose.
Independently, the imposition of sanctions will destroy relationships with key allies
and credibilty
Yochi Dreazen and John Hudson Friday, November 15, 2013 Obama Admin: More Iran Sanctions
Will Fracture Anti-Nuke Alliance
http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/11/15/obama_admin_more_iran_sanctions_will_fractur
e_anti_nuke_alliance
The Obama administration has spent weeks asking Congress to hold off on imposing new sanctions to
avoid giving Tehran a reason to walk away from the current nuclear talks. On Friday, the administration
rolled out a new rationale. They warned that the measures could harm Washington's relationships with
its key foreign allies as well. The White House's willingness to unfreeze billions of dollars in Iranian
money in exchange for Iranian concessions on its nuclear program has sparked skepticism -- and in some
cases outright anger -- on Capitol Hill. The White House has launched a full-on lobbying blitz to reassure
wavering lawmakers, and the efforts began paying off Friday as key senators who had either raised
skepticism about the wisdom of holding off new sanctions or kept silent came out in support of the
administration position. Sen. John McCain, a leading Iran hawk, told the BBC that he's skeptical of talks
with Iran but willing to give the administration a "couple of months" before supporting additional
sanctions. Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), meanwhile, said she strongly opposed putting additional
punitive measures in place against Tehran amid the delicate diplomatic negotiations. "The purpose of
sanctions was to bring Iran to the negotiating table, and they have succeeded in doing so," she said.
"Tacking new sanctions onto the defense authorization bill or any other legislation would not lead to a
better deal. It would lead to no deal at all."
Turns case: Terrorism
Nuclear Iran leads to terrorist attacks and kills heg – increased leverage and risk of
nuclear transfer
Brookes, 7
[Peter, Senior Fellow, National Security Affairs and Chung Ju-Yung Fellow for Policy Studies at the
Heritage Foundation, April 2, 2007
Iran emboldened: Tehran seeks to dominate Middle East politics,”
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Commentary/2007/04/Iran-emboldened-Tehran-seeks-todominate-Middle-East-politics]
According to the U.S. State Department, Iran continues to be the world's most active state sponsor of
terrorism. At the request of senior Iranian leadership, Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS)
and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) support Palestinian terrorist groups such as Hamas,
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade and the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine-General Command with funding, training and weapons. Hezbollah - a Lebanese Shiite terrorist
group - is a particular favorite. In fact, Iran established Hezbollah to parry Israel's 1982 invasion of
Lebanon. Tehran may fund Hezbollah to the tune of $100 million per year. Last summer, Tehran's
military support for Hezbollah was evident. Iran likely gave Hezbollah the green light to ambush an
Israeli patrol and kidnap soldiers, which ultimately kicked off the monthlong conflict. In the ensuing
days, Hezbollah indiscriminately fired as many as 10,000 Iran-supplied rockets and missiles into Israel. In
addition, many were stunned when a C-802 cruise missile struck an Israeli naval vessel off the coast of
Lebanon. While the shooter was never identified, the Chinese C-802 is in Iran's inventory. It could have
been fired by either Hezbollah or the IRGC. Today, Hezbollah, with Iranian and Syrian support, is
threatening to topple Lebanon's democratically elected government unless it is given additional cabinet
seats - potentially giving it veto power over Beirut's decisions. Iran would love to add Lebanon to Syria as
a client state in its effort to form an arc of Iranian influence across the region. Iran has made a number
of not-so-veiled threats that it would deploy its irregular forces and terrorist allies against the U.S. and
American interests, if necessary. This is likely not an idle threat. American blood is already on the hands
of Iran and its terrorist proxies as a result of the 1983 Beirut Marine barracks attack and the 1996
Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia, and in Iraq today. It is almost without question that Tehran
sees its ability to hold U.S. interests at risk across the globe - including in the U.S. - as leverage against
American military action over its nuclear program or meddling in Iraq. Perhaps the most frightening
scenario is that Iran might transfer weapons of mass destruction capability to a terrorist ally. While this
is risky behavior, it is a possibility. Iran could transfer nuclear capability to a Hezbollah-dominated
government in Lebanon, or a Hamas-led Palestinian Authority, significantly increasing the threat to
Israeli security. Osama bin Laden has not been shy about his desire for WMD or al-Qaida's readiness to
use them. The insurgency's recent use of chlorine gas in Iraq is evidence of a terrorist group's willingness
to employ WMD.
( ) Strikes end Muslim cooperation in the War on Terror
Larrabee ‘6
[Stephen,- Corporate Chair in European Security @ RAND 3-9 “Defusing the Iranian Crisis” http://www.rand.org/commentary/030906OCR.html //MGW-JV]
A military strike would unleash a wave of nationalism and unite the Iranian population
behind the current regime, ending any prospect of internal change in the near future and ensuring decades of enmity
from the Iranian middle class and youth, who are largely opposed to the current regime. It would also provoke outrage in the
Muslim world, probably making any attempt to obtain the support of moderate Muslims in the war on terror
impossible.
Moreover, the political costs would be very high.
That’s the key internal link to victory
AFP ‘5 [Agence France Presse. “Trust and Confidence of Muslims “Crucial” in Fight Against Terror” 2005. Lexis//MGW-JV]
The United States must use its "soft power" to gain the trust and confidence of Muslims worldwide if it is to
"prevail over terrorism", Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong said Friday. Opening an international security conference, Lee said one reason why many moderate
Muslims are reluctant to condemn and disown religious extremists was the "wide gap that separates the US from the Muslim world". He said the large-scale US assistance to Indonesia, the
world's biggest Muslim nation, in the aftermath of the December 26 tsunami disaster had not completely erased the resentment many Muslims feel toward the United States. "The sources of this
Muslim anger are historical and complex, but they have been accentuated in recent years by Muslim perceptions of American unilateralism and hostility to the faith," Lee told the audience, which
included US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. Lee cited a survey that found that in 2000 three quarters of Indonesians said they were "attracted" to the United States but that by 2003 the
number had fallen to just 15 percent. Lee said US help to bring relief assistance to the tsunami victims in Indonesia had touched the hearts of many Indonesians. "But this singular event has not
eliminated the antipathy that many Muslims still feel towards the US," he said. He cited demonstrations worldwide, including in Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur, following a report by the US
magazine Newsweek that US interrogators at the Guantanamo Bay detention centre had flushed a copy of the Koran down the toilet. Newsweek later withdrew the report, saying they could not
The US needs to make more use of its 'soft power' to win over international opinion,
correct misperceptions and build trust and credibility, especially in the Muslim world," Lee said. "In the long term
this is vital if the US is to prevail over terrorism, and to maintain its position of global leadership."
confirm the story with their source. "
Turns Case: Structural violence
War turns structural violence
Folk, 78 Professor of Religious and Peace Studies at Bethany College, 78 [Jerry, “Peace Educations –
Peace Studies : Towards an Integrated Approach,” Peace & Change, volume V, number 1, Spring, p. 58]
Those proponents of the positive peace approach who reject out of hand the work of researchers and educators
coming to the field from
the perspective of negative peace too easily forget that the prevention of a nuclear
confrontation of global dimensions is the prerequisite for all other peace research, education, and
action . Unless such a confrontation can be avoided there will be no world left in which to build
positive peace.
Moreover,
the blanket condemnation of all such negative peace oriented research,
education or action as a reactionary attempt to support and reinforce the status quo is doctrinaire. Conflict
theory and resolution, disarmament studies, studies of the international system and of international organizations, and integration studies are in themselves
neutral. They do not intrinsically support either the status quo or revolutionary efforts to change or overthrow it. Rather they offer a body of knowledge which can
be used for either purpose or for some purpose in between.
It is much more logical for those who understand peace as
positive peace to integrate this knowledge into their own framework and to utilize it in achieving their
own purposes. A balanced peace studies program should therefore offer the student exposure to the questions and
concerns which occupy those who view the field essentially from the point of view of negative peace.
Turns case: Environment
Any nuclear war causes turns climate
Choi, writer for LiveScience, reprinted in Yahoo! News, 3/29/2014
(Charles Q., “'Small' Nuclear War Could Trigger Catastrophic Cooling,” http://news.yahoo.com/smallnuclear-war-could-trigger-catastrophic-cooling-181056235.html)
To see what effects such a regional nuclear conflict might have on climate, scientists modeled a war
between India and Pakistan involving 100 Hiroshima-level bombs, each packing the equivalent of 15,000
tons of TNT — just a small fraction of the world's current nuclear arsenal. They simulated interactions
within and between the atmosphere, ocean, land and sea ice components of the Earth's climate system.
Scientists found the effects of such a war could be catastrophic .
"Most people would be surprised to know that even a very small regional nuclear war on the other side
of the planet could disrupt global climate for at least a decade and wipe out the ozone layer for a
decade," study lead author Michael Mills, an atmospheric scientist at the National Center for
Atmospheric Research in Colorado, told Live Science.
The researchers predicted the resulting firestorms would kick up about 5.5 million tons (5 million metric
tons) of black carbon high into the atmosphere. This ash would absorb incoming solar heat, cooling the
surface below.
Nuke War = Extinction
1.) Nuclear war causes extinction
a. George M Woodwell, PhD From Duke, Director of the Ecosystems center at the Marine Biological
Laboratory at Woods Hole Mass. , Nuclear Winter, Deterrence, and the Prevention of Nuclear War,
Edited by Sederberg, 1986 p. 20
The primary concern, I suppose, is the direct effects on people. Many of the same uncertainties that
apply to the induction of climatic changes apply as well to inferences about human mortality. The size
and characters of the war are important: Are cities the targets? The analyses from previous studies
range widely up to the recent WHO analysis that suggests a total mortality of 1.1 billion for a 10,000
MT war. No estimates in this study dealt with the effects of a climatic crisis. Systematic efforts at
estimating the additional mortality due to dark and prolonged cold in the weeks following such a war
are beyond the limits of this discussion and, when developed, any estimates will prove as tenuous as
virtually all other assumptions concerning the effects of a hypothetical war. Survivors of the immediate
effects of the weapons will emerge into a radioactive environment that is likely to be perpetually dark and
frozen with 10-20C or more of frost. On first analysis it would seem difficult to exaggerate the difficulties of
accumulating the resources required for survival under those conditions. All supplies of fresh water would be
frozen. Plants and animals, left unprotected, would be frozen and dead. Agriculture would be paralyzed
transportation, normal communications of all types, sources of fuel, power supplies, and the normal
machinery of govemment, including normal conventions established in law or in manners will have
been destroyed or suspended: under those circumstances mere survival will be a major challenge and
it is well within the realm of probability that few or none would survive in areas as large as continents,
possibly in the northern hemisphere itself.
b. We don’t need to win escalation -- five nuclear weapons destroy the planet
The Guardian, July 14, 1993
But we understand, or ought to understand, some things better now that the East-West confrontation
is no more, and our knowledge of ecology and the fragility of planetary systems has advanced One is
that the nuclear war fighting scenarios were not just optimistic but totally ludicrous We now know or
ought to know – and that “we” includes Arabs, Iranians. South Asians, Chinese, and Koreans as well as
Westerners that one nuclear weapon discharging might be enough to push an entire region, say a vulnerable
region like the Middle East, into an irreversible ecological, economic, and political decline Two or three could
thrust the world into a long term crisis, compounded by the degradation of other dangerous facilities
including nuclear power stations. Five or 10 could wreck the planet
c. Even if some people survive, civilization will collapse, causing extinction
Nick Bostrum 2002 Prof of Philosophy at Yale university
http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html - last updated April 15, 2k2
The US and Russia still have huge stockpiles of nuclear weapons. But would an all-out nuclear war
really exterminate humankind? Note that: (i) For there to be an existential risk it suffices that we can’t
be sure that it wouldn’t. (ii) The climatic effects of a large nuclear war are not well known (there is the
possibility of a nuclear winter). (iii) Future arms races between other nations cannot be ruled out and
these could lead to even greater arsenals than those present at the height of the Cold War. The
world’s supply of plutonium has been increasing steadily to about two thousand tons, some ten times
as much as remains tied up in warheads ([9], p. 26). (iv) Even if some humans survive the short-term effects
of a nuclear war, it could lead to the collapse of civilization. A human race living under stone-age conditions may
or may not be more resilient to extinction than other animal species.
2.) Nuclear war will escalate -- high alert guarantees
DR Alan Phillips Oct. 2000. http://www.peace.caInuclearwinterrevisitedhtm
With thousands of rocket-launched weapons at launch-on-warning”, any day there could be an all-out nuclear
war by accident. The fact that there are only half as many nuclear bombs as there were in the 80’s
makes no significant difference. Deaths from world-wide starvation after the war would be several times the
number from direct effects of the bombs, and the surviving fraction of the human race might then diminish and
vanish after a few generations of hunger and disease, in a radioactive environment.
Nuclear war will escalate -- Russian Dead Hand
Pavel Feigenhauer, chief defense correspondent of Segodnya Moscow limes 11-26-98
Russia also has a fully operational “dead hand” nuclear command machine. Using special communication
rockets launched high into space, this “dead hand” can issue computer-produced attack orders to Russian
nuclear submarines, bombers and surviving silo missiles if special sensors detect shock waves from nuclear
explosions on Russian territory and all Russian commanding generals have been killed or are unavailable
because all conventional command-and-control communication lines have been destroyed by surprise
enemy attack. As one top Russian general at the time in charge of Russia’s nuclear arsenal once told
me: ‘You and I could be sitting drinking vodka, Pavel. while this ‘dead hand’ machine fights a nuclear
world war on ~s own.” If all these technical gadgets and Joint operational nuclear staffs already exist,
why does Sergeyev need yet another? To economize? But, there is no talk of disbanding the general
staff itself, for it is considered a sacred cow, the backbone of Russia’s military machine. So Sergeyev’s
new united command will simply overlap existing joint operational departments, creating additional
discord, If the strategic forces of the navy, the air force and SRF are merged, then Russian nuclear
strategic and attack submarines will receive operational orders from different masters.
Links – Drones Aff
Drone regulations are controversial; new emerging tech issues, economic, and privacy
concerns lead to mixed opinions. Plan costs capital.
HENRY C. JACKSON Posted: 05/17/2013 Congress Gets Mixed Advice On Drone Regulations
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/17/congress-drone-regulations_n_3294098.html
WASHINGTON — The growing use of unmanned surveillance "eyes in the sky" aircraft raises a thicket of
privacy concerns, but Congress is getting mixed advice on what, if anything, to do about it. A future with
domestic drones may be inevitable. While civilian drone use is currently limited to government agencies
and some public universities, a law passed by Congress last year requires the Federal Aviation
Administration to allow widespread drone flights in the U.S. by 2015. According to FAA estimates, as
many as 7,500 civilian drones could be in use within five years. "Technology is great – as long as it's used
the right and proper way," Rep. Jason Chaffetz, R-Utah, said at a House Judiciary subcommittee hearing
Friday on the issues surrounding drones – which can be as small as a bird and as large as a plane.
Congress isn't alone in seeking to address the issues: Since January, drone-related legislation has been
introduced in more than 30 states, largely in response to privacy concerns. Rep. James Sensenbrenner,
R-Wis., said it was important for new standards to address the privacy issues associated with use of
drones. With Rep. Zoe Lofgren, D-Calif., and Rep. Ted Poe, R-Texas, he is sponsoring legislation that
would codify due process protections for Americans in cases involving drones and make flying armed
drones in the U.S. sky illegal. "Every advancement in crime fighting technology, from wiretaps to DNA,
has resulted in courts carving out the Constitutional limits within which the police operate,"
Sensenbrenner said. The subcommittee heard from experts who were divided on what actions Congress
should take to address the new technology. But the four witnesses all agreed that drones raised new,
often unprecedented questions about domestic surveillance. "Current law has yet to catch up to this
new technology," said Chris Calabrese, legislative counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union.
Calabrese said he supported immediate regulation of the drone industry and said his biggest concern
was the overuse of drones by police and government officials for surveillance. But Calabrese said he
doesn't want to hinder the growth of drones with the power to do good, including helping find missing
persons, assisting firefighters and addressing other emergencies. Tracey Maclin, a professor with the
Boston University School of Law, said the issues raised by drones haven't been addressed by courts
before because the technology goes beyond what humans had been capable of through aerial
surveillance. Past court rulings, "were premised on naked-eye observations – simple visual observations
from a public place," he said. Rep. Cedric Richmond, D-La., said he wanted to know when drone
technology will advance to the point where Congress will have to act on the issue. He said he was
concerned about the effect on privacy. "At what point do you think it's going to get to a point where we
have to say what a reasonable expectation of privacy is?" Richmond said. Republicans expressed similar
concerns. "It seems to me that Congress needs to set the standard, rather than wait and let the courts
set the standard," Poe said. Some experts urged caution. Gregory McNeal, an associate law professor at
Pepperdine University, said writing laws to cover drones will be difficult because the technology
continues to improve and Congress could think it's addressing key issues, only to have new ones
emerge.
Plan is controversial – few restrictions viewed as important to keep us safe
Fox News, 2013 Post 9/11 terror fighting legislation under attack Published June 12,
2013FoxNews.com
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/06/12/post-11-terror-fighting-legislation-under-attack/
Around the same time, Rep. Edward Markey introduced the Drone Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act
of 2013, which prohibits many domestic uses of drones. The topic was also on the mind of Texas Sen.
Ted Cruz who introduced legislation that would prohibit the use of drones to kill U.S. citizens living
inside the country. In May, Maine Sen. Angus King Jr., introduced the Targeted Strike Oversight Reform
Act of 2013. The act would require an independent analysis of the consideration of the use of targeted
lethal force against a particular U.S. person knowingly engaged in acts of international terrorism against
the U.S. Despite the congressional push to reign in the programs, there are some who maintain they are
important to keep the country safe and must be kept in place.
Plan costs capital – regulating drone use is a political minefield because of
constitutional rights issues and federalism concerns
Margot E. Kaminski Executive Director of the Information Society Project, Research Scholar, and
Lecturer in Law at Yale Law School Drone Federalism: Civilian Drones and the Things They Carry * May
2013 California Law Review,
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1007&context=clrcircuit
Regulating law enforcement drone use poses few countervailing dangers from legislating thoughtlessly
or in haste; such legislation would implicate Fourth Amendment rights rather than First Amendment
rights, so the worst case scenario is that such legislation might eventually be found by courts not to
protect enough privacy.15 The more interesting and difficult privacy puzzle arises from drone use by
private—not public—actors. Regulating civilian drone use will be treacherous, as such regulation
potentially threatens First Amendment rights. Because of that threat, civilian drone regulation may get
overturned, as courts sort out the scope of those First Amendment rights. Regulating civilian drone use
on the federal level thus risks being unconstitutional or, barring that, unstable
Plan costs capital – disputes between civil liberties advocates and security hawks on
drone restriction legislation
Wells Bennett, Sept 2014 http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports2/2014/09/civilian-drones-andprivacy
Remotely controlled flying robots are increasingly cheaper, and at times more capable of sustained
flight, than some manned counterparts. Many can be outfitted with imaging or other recording
equipment, itself increasingly more affordable and widely available nowadays. An airborne droid might
take in more information over a much longer period of time than a human eye or ear; and it might also
find its way to areas where other aerial platforms might not be able to go. In this way drones pose real if
manageable privacy risks. And policymakers have aimed to manage them following Congress’s call to
broaden drones’ access to the skies by late 2015. The timing raises any number of big-ticket privacy
questions. Two are recurring: which arm of the government (states or feds) ought to balance a
proliferating technology’s benefits against its privacy costs; and which drones (government or private)
will present the greatest threats to privacy. On one side of the first question are certain members of
Congress and civil liberties advocates, who have called for a robust federal approach to drones and
privacy.2 On the other are “drone federalists”: scholars3 and policymakers4 who generally oppose
enactment of a preemptive, federal drone statute, and who would in any event keep federal regulation
to a minimum or reserve it for discrete subjects only. In recent years, only states have passed legislation
meant to account for America’s drone experiment and its implications for privacy. In that sense,
momentum isn’t with the feds: the FAA, for example, pointedly refused to regulate privacy in a broad
fashion (though, as explained below, it nevertheless undertook some drone privacy work later). And
unlike some state houses, the U.S. Congress hasn’t seriously considered or passed a bill to set general
privacy standards or to regulate drones and privacy specifically.
Plan cost capital – FAA drone regulations are controversial
Troy Rule, Nov 19 2014 http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-rule-drone-regulation-faa20141120-story.html
This new ruling is particularly troubling because the FAA still hasn't found a federal regulatory scheme
capable of effectively integrating drones into the nation's airspace. A June audit report revealed that the
agency was “significantly behind schedule” in meeting congressionally imposed deadlines for its
development of civilian drone regulations. Frustrated at the FAA's snail-like pace, companies such as
Amazon and Google have begun exporting their drone research activities to other countries. Small
drones are not built for lengthy interstate flights at altitudes where conventional airplanes fly, so why
should a federal agency be the chief regulator of these devices? Rather than seeking to expand its
regulatory jurisdiction all the way down to the ground, the FAA should advocate for itself a more limited
role in a collaborative federal, state and local regulatory scheme tailored to the unique attributes of
drone technologies.
Large businesses oppose drone restrictions; which will spark Congressional battles
The Street, June 17 http://www.thestreet.com/video/13190214/amazon-to-urge-congress-forfewer-restrictions-on-us-drone-use.html
Amazon (AMZN) is set to ask Congress Wednesday for fewer restrictions on U.S. drone usage in order to
get its Prime Air service off the ground. Amazon Prime Air is designed to deliver packages up to five
pounds to customers in 30 minutes or less using small drones. Paul Misener, Amazon's vice president for
global public policy, will appear in front of the U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform to argue against current Federal Aviation Administration rules. According to his prepared
testimony, Misener explains that he disagrees with the FAA's current opinion that extending see-andavoid principles on small drones presents 'unique safety concerns' which warrant delayed consideration.
Misener plans to urge the FAA to act expeditiously, and ask that Congress provide legislative guidance
and if necessary, additional legal authority.
Courts Link to Politics
Congress reacts to judicial decisions and cost political capital
Canon and Johnson- Professors of political science, 1999 p. 116-117
(Bradley Canon- professor of political science at the University of Kentucky and Charles Johnson- dept.
head of political science at Texas A&M, judicial policies: implementation and impact)
More than any other public agency, Congress tends to be the focal point for public reaction to judicial
policies. As a political body, Congress cannot ignore any sizable or prominent group of constituents.
Some groups become especially agitated when they are unhappy with some judicial decision or
doctrine, and they make their dissatisfaction known to members of Congress. If the pressure is great
enough and is not counterbalanced by pressure from groups that support the judicial policy, Congress
will, if feasible, take action. At the very least, numerous members of Congress will score political
points by showing righteous indignation on behalf of the disaffected groups. Clashes between
Congress and the courts are virtually as old as the two branches. Marbury v. Madison (1803) was a
political finesse of a hostile Congress by the Supreme Court. Constitutional crises have been provoked
by such decisions as Dred Scott (Scott v Sandford, 1857) and several anti-New Deal decisions in the
1930s. Strained relationships just short of crises have developed from numerous other decisions. Of
course, not all differences between the courts and Congress are emotionally charged. Many of the
differences arise over mundane issues such as pension or admiralty law. Either way, almost every
year, Congress reacts to judicial decisions.
Implementation of court decisions ensures political involvement and influence.
Charles A. Johnson and Bradley C. Canon (professors political science @ Texas A&M and Univ.
Kentucky) 1999 Judicial Policies: Implementation and Impact, p. 24
President Andrew Jackson, unhappy with a Supreme Court decision, is said to have retorted: "John
Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it." His remark reminds us of a central fact of
American democracy: judicial policies do not implement themselves. In virtually all instances, courts
that formulate policies must rely on other courts or on nonjudicial actors to translate those policies
into action. Inevitably, just as making judicial policies is a political process, so too is the
implementation of the policies - the issues are essentially politics, and the actors are subject to
political pressures.
President takes the blame for any decision made by a Federal Government branch***
Richard Ellis (Prof. politics @ Willamette Univ.) 1994 Presidential Lightening Rods, p. 2
An American president, Laski maintains, cannot deflect blame onto subordinates. A president's
position as head of the executive branch, Laski insists, "makes him a target to be attacked by every
person or interest at all critical of his purposes. He is there in all cases, to be blamed; and there is no
one, in any real sense, who can help to bear the burden of the blame." In contrast to England, where
we blame an anonymous entity 'the Government' if things go wrong, in the United States it is the
president who is blamed. A decision of the Supreme Court is regarded as adverse to his policy; a defeat
in Congress is a blow to his prestige; the mid-term congressional elections affect his policy, for good or
ill. No one thinks of them in terms of their effect upon his cabinet.
Judicial decisions are subject to political pressures – fiating legal translation
guarantees a link.
Charles A. Johnson and Bradley C. Canon (professors political science @ Texas A&M and Univ.
Kentucky) 1999 Judicial Policies: Implementation and Impact, p. 3-4
Political actors and institutions who follow through on these decisions make the judicial policy.
Certainly, the judges who enforced desegregation in southern school districts or busing decisions
anywhere were subject to political pressures from a variety of sources. Similar pressures affected
school board decisions regarding the role of religion in schools. Even presidential politics may become
intertwined with judicial policies, as did Richard Nixon's 1968 "law and order" presidential campaign
criticizing the Supreme Court's criminal justice decisions or the explosive issue of abortion in the 1980
presidential election. Like the Congress, the Supreme Court and lower courts must rely on others to
translate policy into action. And like the processes of formulating legislative, executive, and judicial
policies, the process of translating those decisions into action is often a political one subject to a
variety of pressures from a variety of political actors in the system.
President embodies the government – all credit and blame will center on the
president.
Bruce Miroff (prof. political science @ SUNY-Albany) 2000 Presidency and the Political System, ed. M.
Nelson, p. 304
Spectacle has also been fostered by the president's rise to primacy in the American political system. A
political order originally centered on institutions has given way, especially in the public mind, to a
political order that centers on the person of the president. Theodore Lowi wrote, "Since the president
has become the embodiment of government, it seems perfectly normal for millions upon millions of
Americans to concentrate their hopes and fears directly and personally upon him."
Every significant Supreme Court action is perceived – court decisions are a part of a
larger battle for political influence.
David M. O’Brien (prof. law @ Univ. Virginia) 2000 Storm Center: The Supreme Court in American
Politics, p. xiii
The Supreme Court, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes observed, is a "storm centre" of political
controversy. The Court stands as a temple of law - an arbitrator of political disputes, an authoritative
organ of law, and an expression of the American ideal of "a government of laws, not of men." But it
remains a fundamentally political institution. Behind the marble fide, the justices compete for
influence; the Court itself is locked in a larger struggle for power in society. This book is about the
political struggles among the justices and between the Court and rival political forces in the country.
District court links – decisions cost Obama capital
District court links to politics
Ungar 1/25 (Rick Ungar, contributing writer for Forbes, “Court Slaps Down Obama On NLRB
Appointments-Decision Could Invalidate Hundreds Of Labor Decision,”
http://www.forbes.com/sites/rickungar/2013/01/25/court-slaps-down-obama-on-nlrb-appointmentsdecision-could-invalidate-hundreds-of-labor-decisions/)
The Washington DC Court of Appeals has dealt the Obama administration an embarrassing blow by
ruling that the President’s appointment of three members to the National Labor Relations Board was an
unconstitutional exercise of presidential power.¶ The matter stems back to January 4, 2012, when
President Obama appointed the new NLRB members—along with the appointment of Richard Cordray
to head up the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau—while the Senate was away on its Christmas
holiday. In making the appointments, the administration took the position that the Senate was in
recess—thereby making it proper for the President to exercise his right to make recess appointments
that are not subject to Senate confirmation.¶ However, the Court agreed with the argument put forth by
a Washington state family owned business seeking to invalidate an NLRB ruling that went against the
company. The company argued that, as the Senate was not technically in recess at the time of the
appointments, the board had not been legally constituted and that a quorum did not exist. As such, any
decision the board reached would be invalid.¶ Here’s how it all went down—¶ Senate Republicans had
been working for months to deny Obama the ability to make the three appointments to the NLRB,
effectively shutting down the board which Republicans believe favors labor in the disagreements that
come before the panel.¶ Knowing the President would take advantage of any Senate recess to appoint
his choices to the board through his constitutional power to make recess appointments—thereby
putting the NLRB back into action—Republican members of the Senate sought to technically keep the
doors open by gaveling sessions in and out every few days, even though there were no senators around
and no business was being transacted. By keeping the Senate in “pro forma” session, the result would
be to block Obama’s opportunity to make any recess appointments.¶ The President took the view that
any effort to ‘technically’ keep the Senate in session was superseded by the fact that the Senate was, in
reality, in recess.¶ The three judge Court of Appeals panel, all appointed by Republican presidents,
disagreed with the President, holding that “Either the Senate is in session, or it is in the recess. If it has
broken for three days within an ongoing session, it is not in ‘the Recess.’”¶ The court additionally held
that the president could only fill vacancies with the recess appointment procedure if the openings arise
when the Senate is in an official recess, which the court defined as the once-a-year break between
sessions of Congress.¶ While the Administration has promised to appeal the decision to the United States
Supreme Court, should the ruling be upheld, all decisions reached by the labor board since January,
2012 would be held to be invalid, creating a serious mess for the administration. Additionally, with only
one remaining member of the National Labor Relations Board duly appointed and confirmed, the panel’s
work would come to a complete halt pending appointment of new board members—appointments that
are sure to test the new Senate filibuster rules put into effect this week.¶ Needless to say, Senate
Republicans are ecstatic as demonstrated by GOP Minority Leader Mitch McConnell who said in a
statement, “The D.C. Circuit Court today reaffirmed that the Constitution is not an inconvenience but
the law of the land.” Additional Republican Senators have demanded that the Obama appointees on the
NLRB resign at once, thus putting the board out of business.
***Affirmative Answers***
Winners Win
Political capital’s irrelevant and winners win
Hirsch 2013, 2-7-13. Michael Hirsh “There’s No Such Thing as Political Capital.” chief correspondent
for National Journal. He also contributes to 2012 Decoded. Hirsh previously served as the senior editor
and national economics correspondent for Newsweek, based in its Washington bureau.
[http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207]
The point is not that “political capital” is a meaningless term. Often it is a synonym for “mandate” or “momentum” in the aftermath of a decisive
election—and just about every politician ever elected has tried to claim more of a mandate than he actually has. Certainly, Obama can say that because he was elected and Romney
wasn’t, he has a better claim on the country’s mood and direction. Many pundits still defend political capital as a useful metaphor at least. “It’s an unquantifiable but meaningful
concept,” says Norman Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute. “You can’t really look at a president and say he’s got 37 ounces of political capital. But the fact is, it’s a
concept that matters, if you have popularity and some momentum on your side.” The real problem is that the idea of political capital—or mandates, or momentum—is so poorly
defined that presidents and pundits often get it wrong. “Presidents usually over-estimate it,” says George Edwards, a presidential scholar at Texas A&M University. “The best kind
of political capital—some sense of an electoral mandate to do something—is very rare. It almost never happens. In 1964, maybe. And to some degree in 1980.” For that reason,
political capital is a concept that misleads far more than it enlightens. It is distortionary. It conveys the idea that we know more than we really do about the ever-elusive concept of
political power, and it
discounts the way unforeseen events can suddenly change everything. Instead, it
suggests, erroneously, that a political figure has a concrete amount of political capital to invest, just as someone might have real investment capital—that
a particular leader can bank his gains, and the size of his account determines what he can do at any given moment in history. Naturally, any president has
practical and electoral limits. Does he have a majority in both chambers of Congress and a cohesive coalition behind him? Obama has neither at present.
unless a surge in the economy—at the moment, still stuck—or some other great victory gives
him more momentum, it is inevitable that the closer Obama gets to the 2014 election, the less
he will be able to get done. Going into the midterms, Republicans will increasingly avoid any
And
concessions that make him (and the Democrats) stronger. But the abrupt emergence of the
immigration and gun-control issues illustrates how suddenly shifts in mood can occur and how
political interests can align in new ways just as suddenly. Indeed, the pseudo-concept of
political capital masks a larger truth about Washington that is kindergarten simple: You just don’t know what you can do until you try. Or as
Ornstein himself once wrote years ago, “
time,
Winning wins .” In theory, and in practice, depending on Obama’s handling of any particular issue, even in a polarized
he could still deliver on a lot of his second-term goals, depending on his skill and the breaks. Unforeseen
catalysts can appear, like Newtown. Epiphanies can dawn, such as when many Republican Party leaders suddenly woke up in panic to the huge disparity in the Hispanic vote.
political capital is, at best,
an empty concept, and that almost nothing in the academic literature successfully quantifies or
Some political scientists who study the elusive calculus of how to pass legislation and run successful presidencies say that
even defines it. “It can refer to a very abstract thing, like a president’s popularity, but there’s no mechanism there. That makes it kind of useless,” says Richard Bensel, a
government professor at Cornell University. Even Ornstein concedes that the calculus is far more complex than the term suggests. Winning on one issue often changes the
calculation for the next
issue; there is never any known amount of capital. “The idea here is, if an issue comes up
changes the calculus
of the other actors” Ornstein says. “If they think he’s going to win, they may change positions
to get on the winning side. It’s a bandwagon effect.”
where the conventional wisdom is that president is not going to get what he wants, and he gets it, then each time that happens, it
PC Fails and winners win
Mann and Ornstein 13 (Thomas E Mann, PhD in political science, senior fellow of governance
studies at the Brookings Institute, former professor at Princeton, JHU, Georgetown, UVirginia, and
American University, Norm Ornstein, founder of political capital theory, resident scholar at the American
Enterprise Institute, PhD from the University of Michigan, member of the Advisory Board of the Future
of American Democracy Foundation, serves on the Advisory Board of the Institute for Law and Politics at
the University of Minnesota Law School, member of the Board of Directors of the nonpartisan election
reform group Why Tuesday?, one of Foreign Policy’s Top 100 Global Thinkers of 2012, “Mann and
Ornstein: “Brighter future for politics and policy requires a different Republican Party””
http://www.salon.com/2013/09/14/mann_and_ornstein_brighter_future_for_politics_and_policy_requ
ires_a_different_republican_party/) gz
The year that has passed since this book first appeared has done nothing to make us question our
analysis of the causes of America’s dysfunctional politics. First, today’s sharply polarized and
strategically focused political parties fit poorly with a constitutional system that anticipates
collaboration as well as competition within and across separated institutions. As we initially wrote,
parliamentary-style parties in a separation-of-powers government are a formula for willful obstruction
and policy irresolution . The continuation of divided party government and the promiscuous use of the
filibuster after the 2012 election have largely frustrated the policy direction affirmed by majority
electorates and supported in polls of voters taken since the election.¶ Second, the Republican Party
continues to demonstrate that it is an insurgent force in our politics, one that aspires to rewrite the
social contract and role of government developed and affirmed over a century by both major political
parties. The old conservative GOP has been transformed into a party beholden to ideological zealots ,
one that sees little need to balance individualism with community, freedom with equality, markets with
regulation, state with national power, or policy commitments with respect for facts, evidence, science,
and a willingness to compromise.¶ These two factors— asymmetric polarization and the mismatch
between our parties and governing institutions—continue to account for the major share of our
governing problems. But the media continues, for the most part, to miss this story. A good example was
the flurry of coverage in the early months of the 113th Congress based on or at best testing the
proposition that policymaking failures could be attributed to the failures of Obama’s presidential
leadership. Bob Woodward may have started the pack journalism with his conclusion that President
Obama, unlike his predecessors Lyndon Johnson, Ronald Reagan, and Bill Clinton, “ failed to work his
will on Congress” (whatever that means). Soon the critical question to be parsed by the press was
whether elements of Obama’s personality (aloofness) or strategic decisions on how and when to engage
members of Congress, especially Republicans, accounted for the failure to reach bipartisan consensus.
Republicans were delighted to provide commentary on behalf of the affirmative: “he doesn’t call us,
meet with us, invite us to the White House, listen to our views, understand where we are coming from,
etc.” The drumbeat from the press eventually led Obama to respond. He hosted a dinner with a dozen
Republican senators at The Jefferson, lunch with Paul Ryan at the White House, and then a second
dinner with another group of Republican senators. He also made trips to Capitol Hill to meet separately
with both Republican conferences and Democratic caucuses. Initial reactions from participants were
favorable, but it wasn’t long before reporters wondered if the president’s “charm offense” was
failing .¶ The framing of this question reveals much about the state of American politics and media
commentary on dysfunctional government. Presidential leadership is contextual—shaped by our unique
constitutional arrangements and the electoral, partisan, and institutional constraints that flow from and
interact with them. Under present conditions of deep ideological polarization of the parties, rough
parity between Democrats and Republicans that fuels a strategic hyperpartisanship , and divided party
government, opportunities for bipartisan coalitions on controversial policies are severely limited.
Constraints on presidential leadership today are exacerbated by the relentlessly oppositional stance
taken by the Republicans since Obama’s initial election, their continuing embrace of Grover Norquist’s
“no new tax” pledge, and their willingness since gaining the House majority in 2011 to use a series of
manufactured crises to impose their policy preferences on the Democrats with whom they share power.
Persuasion matters if the people you are trying to persuade have any inclination to go along , or any
attachment to the concept of compromise. But if a mythical magician could create a president from
the combined DNA of FDR, LBJ, Tip O’Neill, Ronald Reagan, and Bill Clinton, the resulting superpresident would be no more successful at charming or working his will in this context.¶ Ironically,
Obama made great efforts to work cooperatively with Republicans during his first term. He learned
painfully that his public embrace of a policy virtually ensures Republican opposition and that intensive
negotiations with Republican leaders are likely to lead to a dead end. No bourbon-and-branch-waterlaced meetings with Republicans in Congress or preemptive compromises with them will induce
cooperative behavior. The scope for presidential leadership is limited, and based not on naïveté about
the opposition he faces but on a hard-headed determination to make some cooperation in the electoral
interests of enough Republicans to break the “taxes are off the table” logjam and move forward with an
economic agenda that makes sense to most nonpartisan analysts and most Americans.
Winners win – rallies public support
Scher 12/29 (2014, Bill, executive editor of LiberalOasis and RealClearPolitics contributor, “Obama's
Poll Bump Is a Message for Republicans,”
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2014/12/29/obamas_poll_bump_is_a_message_for_republic
ans_125082.html)
After a lame-duck period in which we’ve seen a Cuba thaw, a China climate deal, and an undocumented
immigrant reprieve, President Obama was awarded with his highest approval ratings in many months. His
popularity has ticked up since November, with young voters, women and—most notably—independents
accounting for the boost. “How can this be?” Republicans must be wondering. They just seized the Senate with a campaign
based on little else but attacking incumbent Democrats for voting with Obama. Why are Americans rewarding him now? It’s a
question Republicans should think long and hard about before they fully take over Congress next week. Obama’s increased
popularity is a reminder that voters did not rebuff him in November solely on ideological grounds, but
also out of frustration with a dysfunctional Washington unable to address long-standing national
problems. When Obama is seen blowing through the roadblocks, that frustration dissipates.
Successful
Republican campaigns in swing states captured the frustrated mood of the electorate. When Colorado’s Cory Gardner attacked Sen. Mark
Udall’s partisanship, he focused not on criticism of Democratic positions but on his own pledge to get things done in a bipartisan fashion.
“When my party is wrong, I’ll say it,” Gardner vowed. “When something is broken, I’ll fix it.” Similarly, North Carolina’s Thom Tillis parried
attacks on his state legislative record by assuring voters, “I worked with both parties” to raise education spending. Bipartisanship was
not sold as an end in itself, but a means to making government work. In turn, when Obama gets things
done, it doesn’t behoove Republicans to complain that he’s not being bipartisan enough. It puts
pressure on Republicans to prove they want to get things done too. If the election results were, as Republicans claim, a
message delivered to the White House, then the post-election public response is another message to Capitol Hill.
Incoming Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, who overcame being caricatured by Democrats as the face of Washington dysfunction to
win re-election, seems to grasp the public mood. In an interview with Roll Call, McConnell said he detected two separate messages from voters.
“People were mad as hell at the president,” he said. “Our new members were also hearing—and I was hearing as well—that people didn’t like
the fact that the Congress was dysfunctional. … That’s going to change.” But when McConnell talks about change, he mainly discusses tinkering
with Senate procedures. He’s mentioned having committees take the lead in shaping legislation, allowing senators to propose more floor
amendments, pursuing individual appropriations bills instead of omnibus bills and continuing resolutions. None of these changes, in and of
themselves, guarantees that Congress and the White House will become partners in functionality. Committee squabbling, “poison pill”
amendments, and general ideological inflexibility could still mean that, despite McConnell’s best intentions, the Senate remains a legislative
sinkhole. More worrisome, when McConnell talks about his policy agenda, is that he offers little to suggest he comprehends the voters’ larger
message about effective cooperation. “We certainly will have a vote on proceeding to a bill to repeal Obamacare,” he promises, as if that
wouldn’t be the epitome of grandstanding over governing. Acknowledging that Obama will never sign a repeal, he insists, “We will go at that
law … in every way that we can," including attempts to repeal the law’s linchpin, the individual mandate. This is hardly thoughtful reform
designed to make the nation’s health care system work better, but a ham-fisted attempt to mangle the law beyond recognition and send us
back to square one. Likewise, his claims about turning the appropriations process into a model of efficiency are undermined by his promise to
use the bills that keep the government open for riders that would “rein in” Obama’s regulatory powers. Specifically, McConnell wants to attach
prohibitions on the Environmental Protection Agency that would thwart, in his words, Obama’s “crusade on CO2 emissions.” In other words,
McConnell wants to stop Obama from trying to solve the problem of climate change. The first vote the new majority leader plans to schedule is
a bill to override the executive branch’s authority regarding the Keystone oil pipeline. On its face, this would be a bill designed to do something
instead of blocking something. But the choice of Keystone is a strange issue to prioritize. Plunging domestic gasoline prices hardly make
bringing Canadian tar sands oil to the world market an urgent matter. Furthermore, it’s not clear McConnell wants a bill that will become law or
another vehicle for partisan combat, since the legislation appears headed for a presidential veto. McConnell’s insistence on a freewheeling
amendment process means that the measure could become another vehicle for anti-Obama poison pills. Even if the bill stays “clean,” Obama
has repeatedly said a decision on Keystone should wait until the Nebraska Supreme Court rules on whether the state can use eminent domain
to run the pipeline through private land. Instead of beginning on an antagonistic note by trying to jam Obama, McConnell could wait until the
court rules, assess the White House response, and perhaps pursue a compromise if the president remains resistant—before embarking on
contentious legislation. Despite
their recent victory, Republicans enter 2015 with two disadvantages. Obama
has an agenda in hand that his bureaucracy has been diligently pursuing for years, while Republicans
chose not to run this year on a unified platform because their factions don’t agree on policy specifics. And
the president can act unilaterally and accomplish things, while Republicans can’t accomplish anything
without Obama’s consent or without enough Democrats to forge a veto-proof majority.
Winners win—generates capital and wrecks the opposition.
Daily Kos, 1-26 (“On Done Deals, Or, Sometimes Losing Is How You Win” 2011, google)
Right off the bat, you might be surprised how often you can win, even when you did not think you
would; the fights over DADT and Elizabeth Warren's nomination are a couple of recent examples that
come to mind. Beyond that, losing a political fight, and doing it well, helps to move the conversation
incrementally over the longer term; I would suggest that it took two political cycles before the tide
turned on the war in Iraq, and now it's beginning to look like the military's plan for "Victory In
Afghanistan Through Massive Force" is a proposition that's tougher and tougher to sell every day-even
within the White House. Conservatives know this well, and efforts to advocate for gun rights, to advance
"pro-life" policies, and to radically change the form and function of government have extended over
decades, with incremental changes often being the incremental goal ("let's create these temporary tax
cuts today...and let's try to extend them forever another day..."). Ironically, another good reason to
"fight the good fight", even in an environment where you might not see victory as possible, is one that is
very familiar to the most fervent of Obama's '08 supporters: the very fight, in and of itself, is often a way
to create political capital-even if you lose. How many of us have wished this very President would have
stood up and fought for things that he might not have thought he would get? Would you support this
President more if he had demanded that Congress pass a single-payer plan, or if he was pushing harder
to end renditions and close Guantanamo, even if Congress was blocking him? I bet you would. And it
makes sense: if you support single-payer, and you see someone out there fighting hard for the
idea...that's a good thing, and that's someone you're likely to come back and support later. It worked for
three Congressional Democrats who lost elections this fall: Feingold, Grayson, and Patrick Murphy are all
in a great position to seek support from the very people who are the most frustrated with pretty much
all the other Democrats today. Some of those supporters aren't even waiting for the future candidates;
the "Draft Feingold for President" movement goes back to at least 2004, Grayson and Murphy also have
supporters ready and willing to go. So...if it's true that if this President would fight like Bernie Sanders,
even in a losing cause, then we would treat him with the same degree of affection and respect we feel
toward Bernie Sanders...is it also true that we should, maybe, apply that lesson to ourselves? There is an
argument to be made that trying to move your opponent when you don't think you can, and in the
process showing how they appear to be either intransigent, or ignorant, or corrupt by comparison...or
just plain wrong about something...can regularly end up moving voters, instead-and that the result of
that movement is that your opponent sometimes has to move your way as well. I would submit that the
2005 effort to "reform" Social Security, when we had a Republican President, House, and Senate, went
exactly nowhere fast because being wrong did move a bunch of voters to say...well, to say that all those
Republicans were wrong. So there you go, folks: I'm here today to suggest that, even when we might not
feel we have a good chance of winning a political fight-or even a fair chance-you still have to get out and
fight the fight, if only to advance the cause for another day. It's also a great way to accrue political
capital that can be used to your advantage later-and if the resistance from the other side is perceived as
being too heavy-handed, they can suffer (OOTC:WLVTQ) from a sort of "attrition", as their own political
capital is diminished. And even if you lose, there's still a lot to be gained in the effort, although you
might not see the results until further down the road. As we said at the top of the story, there are lots of
battles left over, including what is going to happen to Social Security and the potential for reforming
Senate rules; but win or lose, it's probably a better idea to be trying to fight these fights, loudly and
logically, just as we wish the President would, then to find ourselves hanging back and doing nothing at
all today...and then voting for Jack Box for President 2012 as a way of expressing our frustration.
Winners win- even if capital is finite he can increase it
Singer, 2009 (Jonathan Singer, JD candidate at Berkeley and editor of MyDD, April 3, 2009, google)
Peter Hart gets at a key point. Some believe that political capital is finite, that it can be used up. To an
extent that's true. But it's important to note, too, that political capital can be regenerated -- and,
specifically, that when a President expends a great deal of capital on a measure that was difficult to
enact and then succeeds, he can build up more capital. Indeed, that appears to be what is happening
with Barack Obama, who went to the mat to pass the stimulus package out of the gate, got it passed
despite near-unanimous opposition of the Republicans on Capitol Hill, and is being rewarded by the
American public as a result. Take a look at the numbers. President Obama now has a 68 percent
favorable rating in the NBC-WSJ poll, his highest ever showing in the survey. Nearly half of those
surveyed (47 percent) view him very positively. Obama's Democratic Party earns a respectable 49
percent favorable rating. The Republican Party, however, is in the toilet, with its worst ever showing in
the history of the NBC-WSJ poll, 26 percent favorable. On the question of blame for the partisanship in
Washington, 56 percent place the onus on the Bush administration and another 41 percent place it on
Congressional Republicans. Yet just 24 percent blame Congressional Democrats, and a mere 11 percent
blame the Obama administration. So at this point, with President Obama seemingly benefiting from his
ambitious actions and the Republicans sinking further and further as a result of their knee-jerked
opposition to that agenda, there appears to be no reason not to push forward on anything from
universal healthcare to energy reform to ending the war in Iraq.
Capital is replenished quickly—legislative success overwhelms controversy.
Mitchell, 2009 (Lincoln Mitchell, Assistant Professor in the Practice of International Politics, Columbia
University, “Time for Obama to Start Spending Political Capital” June 18, google)
Throughout his presidential campaign, but more notably, during his presidency, President Obama has
shown himself to have an impressive ability to accumulate political capital. During his tenure in the
White House, Obama has done this by reaching out to a range of constituencies, moderating some of his
programs, pursuing middle of the road approaches on key foreign policy questions and, not
insignificantly, working to ensure that his approval rating remains quite high. Political capital is not,
however, like money, it cannot be saved up interminably while its owner waits for the right moment to
spend it. Political capital has a shelf life, and often not a very long one. If it is not used relatively quickly,
it dissipates and becomes useless to its owner. This is the moment in which Obama, who has spent the
first few months of his presidency diligently accumulating political capital, now finds himself. The next
few months will be a key time for Obama. If Obama does not spend this political capital during the next
months, it will likely be gone by the New Year anyway. Much of what President Obama has done in his
first six months or so in office has been designed to build political capital, interestingly he has sought to
build this capital from both domestic and foreign sources. He has done this by traveling extensively,
reintroducing to America to foreign audiences and by a governance style that has very cleverly
succeeded in pushing his political opponents to the fringes. This tactic was displayed during the effort to
pass the stimulus package as Republican opposition was relegated to a loud and annoying, but largely
irrelevant, distraction. Building political capital was, or should have been, a major goal of Obama's
recent speech in Cairo as well. Significantly, Obama has yet to spend any of his political capital by
meaningfully taking on any powerful interests. He declined to take Wall Street on regarding the financial
crisis, has prepared to, but not yet fully, challenged the power of the AMA or the insurance companies,
nor has he really confronted any important Democratic Party groups such as organized labor. This
strategy, however, will not be fruitful for much longer. There are now some very clear issues where
Obama should be spending political capital. The most obvious of these is health care. The battle for
health care reform will be a major defining issue, not just for the Obama presidency, but for American
society over the next decades. It is imperative that Obama push for the best and most comprehensive
health care reform possible. This will likely mean not just a bruising legislative battle, but one that will
pit powerful interests, not just angry Republican ideologues, against the President. The legislative
struggle will also pull many Democrats between the President and powerful interest groups. Obama
must make it clear that there will be an enormous political cost which Democrats who vote against the
bill will have to pay. Before any bill is voted upon, however, is perhaps an even more critical time as
pressure from insurance groups, business groups and doctors organizations will be brought to bear both
on congress, but also on the administration as it works with congress to craft the legislation. This is not
the time when the administration must focus on making friends and being liked, but on standing their
ground and getting a strong and inclusive health care reform bill. Obama will have to take a similar
approach to any other major domestic legislation as well. This is, of course, the way the presidency has
worked for decades. Obama is in an unusual situation because a similar dynamic is at work at the
international level. A major part of Obama's first six months in office have involved pursuing a foreign
policy that implicitly has sought to rebuild both the image of the US abroad, but also American political
capital. It is less clear how Obama can use this capital, but now is the time to use it. A cynical
interpretation of the choice facing Obama is that he can remain popular or he can have legislative and
other policy accomplishments, but this interpretation would be wrong. By early 2010, Obama, and his
party will, fairly or not, be increasingly judged by what they have accomplished in office, not by how
deftly they have handled political challenges. Therefore, the only way he can remain popular and get
new political capital is through converting his current political capital into concrete legislative
accomplishments. Health care will be the first and very likely most important, test.
PC not key
PC Not key
Siewert ’14 [Markus. Prof Poli Sci Goethe University (Germany). “WHEN POTUS DOES (NOT) GET
WHAT HE WANTS – A FUZZY-SET QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESS ON
THE SUBSTANCE OF LEGISLATION” August 2014, SSRN]
The fortunes of the president in the legislative arena are in large parts determined by the political context in
Congress (seminal works are Edwards 1989; Bond/Fleisher 1990; Peterson 1990). Party control
in Congress is one – if not
the main
–
single explanatory factor for the level of presidential legislative success . Presidents receive more of
what they want under the condition of unified government than under divided party control of the branches of
government mainly due to the fact that electoral incentives and policy goals overlap to a greater extent
between the president and his own party in Congress compared to the opposition party (Rudalevige 2002; Barrett 2005; Barrett/Eshbaugh-Soha 2007; Beckmann
2010). Because of that the
president should be able to draw more support for his legislative agenda from his fellow
partisans than from the other side of the aisle. Furthermore, the flow of information, the coordination of legislative tactics and strategies
and the wheeling and dealing in negotiations on both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue is much easier and smoother within
the same partisan camp than across party lines (Beckmann 2008). But not only do the numbers of co-partisans matter; so does the majority party
status itself. The majority party controls the procedural rules within both chambers of Congress – even though the
supermajoritarian and individualistic nature of the Senate limits the powers of the majority party (Aldrich/Rohde 2000; Monroe et al. 2008). The powers of
the majority party enable their leadership to steer the legislative process via the allocation of agenda space, through the
assignment to committees or via setting the rules for final votes. On the one hand, this makes the congressional leadership a strong ally to the president that can
guard the president’s legislative preferences at different stages of legislation. Under
divided government, on the other hand, the majority
leadership becomes a powerful opponent to the president that can hinder his legislative agenda in
manifold ways (Edwards/Barrett 2000; Sinclair 2013; Covington et al. 1995).¶ Another contextual factor that shapes the president’s success on the
substance of legislation is
the distribution of ideological preferences
in Congress. Over the last decades,
parties in
Congress have increasingly polarized ; this means, on the one hand, that they have become internally more
ideologically homogeneous , and on the other hand, ideologically diverged further apart
from each other (Aldrich/Rohde
2000; Theriault 2008). Both
the inter-party dimension as well as the intra-party dimension impact the
president’s position in the legislative arena. First, with congressional parties ideologically drifting apart, it is more
difficult to find common ground
on policy issues, which also
affects the president’s odds to score
on the substance
of legislation. The
wider the ideological space between the president, pivotal legislators and party leaders in Congress, the more
concessions he has to make on his legislative preferences (Rudalevige 2002; Beckmann 2010; Villalobos 2013). Second, the process of
intra-party homogenization triggers the disappearance of cross-pressured and moderate members of
Congress leading to greater unity within both parties. Especially in times of divided government moderates from the other party are
the first contact points for the White House as partners for bargaining, log-rolling and horse-trading. As a consequence if Congress and the
presidency are controlled by two different parties
the White House loses attractive targets for deal-making . On the other hand,
the internal homogenization helps his party under unified government because the caucuses consist of fewer possible dissenters (Andres 2005; Fleisher/Bond 2004;
Theriault 2003). However, the Senate’s supermajoritarian rules limit the positive effects polarized parties have on the position of the president in the legislative
arena. Regardless of unified government or divided government usually 60 votes are needed to pass a bill in the Senate. Therefore, the positive effects of polarized
parties in Congress unfold only if the majority of the president’s party approximates the filibuster threshold (Fleisher et al. 2012). Besides the partisan and
ideological setting in Congress the
president’s standing within the public is a third factor contributing to his
legislative success. Although empirical findings on the effects of public support on presidential success are mixed, the Washingtonian
political community – politicians and staffers in the White House and the Capitol, lobbyists and journalists – as well as the constituents in the country
perceive public support as a decisive element of the president’s political capital . Especially on salient issues
public approval of the president job performance serves as a cue for legislators. Theoretically, members in
Congress are reluctant to vote against a popular president shying away from electoral consequences of their opposition. On the
other side, if he ranks low in public support members in Congress are less prone to vote in accordance with him (for an overview
see Edwards 2009b). High public approval ratings unfold their effects in combination with other factors like party and ideology. High presidential approval ratings
affect first and foremost those legislators that are already inclined to support him either because they are members of the same party or they share the same
ideological orientations. Beyond that members
disposition – are
of Congress from contested districts – which likely also have a moderate ideological
receptive to presidential approval ratings (Canes-Wrone/de Marchi 2002; Bond et al. 2003; Lebo/O’Geen 2011; Edwards
2009a; Peterson 1990). Neustadt also points at the asymmetric effect of presidential support because his “popularity may not produce a Washington response but
public disapproval hardens Washington’s resistance” (Neustadt 1991: 90).
Party control, ideological proximity, and public
support constitute the institutional and political environment of the legislative arena which is largely
beyond the president’s control . Over the last years an academic consensus has emerged that party and
ideology are the single most important parameters for the president while presidential factors only
matter “at the margins” (seminal Edwards 1989; Fleisher/Bond 1990). This perspective contrasts with
numbers of journalistic and
anecdotic comments , and also with a large body of (historical) case studies which facilitate the narrative of
presidents shaping their legislative fate via their special bargaining skills.
While earlier studies focused on personal
traits or the presidents’ reputation as skilled or unskilled (Lockerbie/Borelli 1989; Fleisher/Bond 1990; Rudalevige 2002, Greenstein 2009), a new strand of empirical
research focuses on the question how presidents can strategically increase their success through their involvement during the legislative process. For example, they
demonstrate that presidents are more successful if they prioritize issues (Peterson 1990, Edwards/Barrett 2000), and if they actively lobby legislators on Capitol Hill
(Beckmann 2010; Beckmann/Kumar 2011a; Covington 1987). Additionally, presidents are more successful in the legislative arena if they go public on a given bill
(Canes-Wrone 2001; Barrett 2004; Eshbaugh-Soha 2006). However, the
necessity of presidential lobbying or going public
strategies as well as their effects on his success on the substance of legislation varies with the political
contexts . The presidents’ need to negotiate intensively with legislators or to speak out to the public is higher if he is confronted with less favorable political
conditions than if he faces a positive environment in Congress (Kernell 2007; Eshbaugh-Soha/Miles 2011). Furthermore, we can theorize that both approaches
unfold their effect in combination with high levels of public support for the president’s position (Canes-Wrone 2001).
PC is a myth
Norm Ornstein, PhD in political science and resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, 5-162013, “The Myth of Presidential Leadership” http://www.nationaljournal.com/columns/washingtoninside-out/the-myth-of-presidential-leadership-20130508
No one defined the agenda or negotiated more brilliantly than Reagan. Did he “work his will”? On
almost every major issue, he had to make major compromises with Democrats, including five straight
years with significant tax increases. But he was able to do it—as he was able to achieve a breakthrough
on tax reform—because he had key Democrats willing to work with him and find those compromises.
For Obama, we knew from the get-go that he had no Republicans willing to work with him. As Robert
Draper pointed out in his book Do Not Ask What Good We Do, key GOP leaders such as Eric Cantor and
Paul Ryan determined on inauguration eve in January 2009 that they would work to keep Obama and his
congressional Democratic allies from getting any Republican votes for any of his priorities or initiatives.
Schmoozing was not going to change that. Nor would arm-twisting. On the gun-control vote in the
Senate, the press has focused on the four apostate Democrats who voted against the Manchin-Toomey
plan, and the unwillingness of the White House to play hardball with Democrat Mark Begich of Alaska.
But even if Obama had bludgeoned Begich and his three colleagues to vote for the plan, the Democrats
would still have fallen short of the 60 votes that are now the routine hurdle in the Senate—because 41
of 45 Republicans voted no. And as Sen. Pat Toomey, R-Pa., has said, several did so just to deny Obama a
victory.
No deal
No deal – 5 major areas of dispute prevent compromise
MICHAEL CROWLEY 6/27/15 8:45 AM EDT Iran talks: 5 key things to watch
http://www.politico.com/story/2015/06/iran-nuclear-talks-geneva-john-kerry-5-things-to-watch119482.html
Five major areas of dispute still separate Iran, the U.S. and five other world powers as they struggle to
meet a June 30 deadline for an historic nuclear deal, according to officials and experts, and there is no
guarantee that a deal can be reached.¶ How much each side gives on those issues, including the pace of
sanctions relief and how sanctions might be reapplied if Iran violates a deal, will largely determine
whether a nuclear deal can be struck. Perhaps almost as important, they will also determine how a deal
will be received in places like Tehran, Jerusalem, Riyadh and by members of Congress in Washington.¶
While many of the points left undecided by an April 2 framework agreement are technical in nature, the
real obstacles to an agreement are political — as underscored by a speech from Iran’s Supreme Leader
last week setting red lines that U.S. negotiators call unacceptable.¶
Huge gaps on verification, inspection, sanctions and more prevent a deal
Trudy Rubin Be ready to say no to Iran deal Originally published June 27, 2015 at 4:03 pm
http://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/be-ready-to-say-no-to-iran-deal/
The gaps are still wide between Tehran and the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the U.N. Security
Council plus Germany) on a deal by which Iran would restrict its nuclear program in exchange for the
lifting of international sanctions.¶ Most disturbing: Iran has yet to answer questions put by international
inspectors about a suspected nuclear weapons program before 2003. Nor has Tehran agreed to
inspection measures designed to ensure that its nuclear energy program remains peaceful.¶ On the
contrary, on Tuesday, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei demanded that most sanctions on Iran be lifted as soon as
a deal is inked, before Iran dismantles any nuclear infrastructure and before international inspectors can
verify Tehran’s behavior. Khamenei also ruled out inspections of military sites, where suspect work may
have, and may yet, happen.¶ Perhaps Iran’s supreme leader is simply angling for last-minute concessions.
But if Iran won’t come clean about the past, how can it be trusted — especially if Khamenei impedes
future inspections? Better to extend the June 30 deadline, if need be, until Tehran meets these critical
concerns.
No deal – redlines, verification issues and lack of agreement among Iranian officials
Khalee Times, 6-28 Concerns over Iran nuclear deal are real
http://www.khaleejtimes.com/kt-article-display
1.asp?xfile=data/editorial/2015/June/editorial_June51.xml&section=editorial
Iran's supreme leader, apparently in an attempt to torpedo the emerging consensus in Geneva, has said
that there are certain 'red lines' and they need to be respected.¶ ¶ ¶ Hours before a final nuclear deal is
supposed to emerge between the P5+1 and Iran, pressure is building on both parties to play it safe. The
Islamic Republic’s legislators took the lead as they surprisingly passed a bill on banning access for UN
inspectors to its military sites and scientists, potentially complicating the chances for an accord with the
world powers. Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Syed Ali Khamenei, apparently in an attempt to torpedo
the emerging consensus in Geneva, has said that there are certain ‘red lines’ and they need to be
respected.¶ That in other words means instant lifting of sanctions when the deal comes into affect and at
the same time denying unfettered access to its sensitive installations. This is like putting the cart before
the horse, literally denying the room for a thaw. The Iranian legislators, who overwhelmingly approved
the bill, were just treading the Khamenei's line, inevitably dropping hints that the government of
President Hassan Rohani and the supreme leader are not on the same page.
No deal – disagreements on inspection issue will kill success
MICHAEL CROWLEY 6/27/15 8:45 AM EDT Iran talks: 5 key things to watch
http://www.politico.com/story/2015/06/iran-nuclear-talks-geneva-john-kerry-5-things-to-watch119482.html
From the start, critics of the nuclear talks have said that Iran cannot be trusted to abide by any
agreement. U.S. officials say that’s not the issue. “There’s nothing built on trust,” Kerry said after the
first interim agreement was struck with Tehran in November 2013. “We’re not sitting here pretending
that Iran is going to suddenly turn over a new leaf.” Doing so will require that IAEA inspectors be
allowed easy access not just to Iran’s declared nuclear facilities (which are already under international
monitoring) but to other places around the country where nuclear activity is suspected, possibly
including sensitive military compounds. The April 2 Lausanne agreement said that Iran will be required
to grant IAEA inspectors access to “suspicious sites… anywhere in the country.” And just a month ago,
Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator told state TV that “Iran has agreed to grant managed access to military
sites.” Western officials are willing to assure Iran that inspections will not become fishing expeditions
that allow them to, in effect, spy on Iran’s non-nuclear military activities. But Khamenei has repeatedly
ruled out inspections on military sites altogether, including in his speech last week. On the flip side, the
statement of principles signed by former Obama officials declares that inspections “must include
military… and other sensitive facilities.” This dispute alone has the potential to prevent a deal — and a
major concession by either side could jeopardize its survival in Tehran or Washington.
No deal – Iran will not allow inspector access to verify agreement
VoA – News June 27 , 2015 http://www.bignewsnetwork.com/index.php/sid/234235217
With just days remaining until the deadline for a final agreement, major differences exist between the
two sides that have caused some officials to voice concern that the deadline will not be met.¶ The
essence of the deal is to curb Iran's activities for a decade in exchange for lifting sanctions that have
crippled the Iranian economy.¶ Iran, however, has insisted that it will not allow international inspectors
access to military sites, to interview scientists or to review documents to verify that it is complying with
the nuclear deal.¶ A few days ago, Iran's constitutional watchdog, the Guardian Council, ratified
legislation that bans access to military sites and scientists.
Deal will fail
Deal doesn’t stop Iran’s program
Daniel Henniger, WSJ, 4/1/15, Why the Iran Deal Is Irrelevant, www.wsj.com/articles/dan-henningerwhy-the-iran-deal-is-irrelevant-1427930123
By the nuclear compliance standards of Barack Obama and John Kerry, North Korea was a model state—in 1992. In 1985, North Korea joined
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In 1992 it and South Korea jointly declared the “denuclearization” of the Korean
peninsula. North Korea next signed a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Within months, the IAEA reported
“inconsistencies” in North Korea’s nuclear program. What follows is a quarter-century summary of arms negotiations with North Korea, based
on the chronology assembled by the Arms Control Association. What happens in Lausanne doesn’t matter.
No agreement is going
to stop Iran . Agreements, and a lot of talk, did not stop North Korea. After negotiations with North Korea
(shortened here to “NK”)—and after the CIA reports that NK has separated
enough plutonium for one or two nuclear
weapons—the U.S. and NK in 1994 sign the Agreed Framework in Geneva. With NK promising to eliminate its ability to
produce nuclear weapons, the Agreed Framework is hailed as a major diplomatic triumph for the Clinton presidency. Through
1996-97, the U.S. negotiates with NK over ballistic-missile proliferation. On Aug. 31, 1998, NK launches the Taepo Dong-1 missile with a range of
about 1,200 miles. The missile flies over Japan. U.S. intelligence admits “surprise” at the new third stage on the Paekdosan-1 launch vehicle.
Nonetheless, talks are held in December over a suspected underground nuclear factory. A U.S. inspection team visits the facility at Kumchang-ni
and finds no violation of the Agreed Framework. In 2000, the Clinton administration relaxes economic sanctions. Kim Jong Il tells visiting
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright he won’t test the Taepo Dong-1 long-range missile again. The seventh round of missile talks is held in
Malaysia. In 2001, new U.S. President George W. Bush commits to “comprehensive” talks. In October 2002, the U.S. says North Korea has
admitted it has had a secret program to enrich weapons-grade uranium. The State Department’s Richard Boucher calls it a “serious violation” of
the Agreed Framework. North Korea
then cuts the IAEA seals on its nuclear factories, withdraws from the NonProliferation treaty and restarts a nuclear reactor. Talks resume in Beijing in April 2003. North Korea says it possesses nuclear
weapons—but will dismantle its “nuclear facility” in return for fuel oil and food. In February 2005, NK’s foreign ministry says again that it has
produced nuclear weapons. Months later, the Koreans now say they are willing to abandon “all nuclear weapons” and rejoin the
nonproliferation treaty. A new round of talks begin. On July 4, 2006, North Korea fires seven ballistic missiles, including the new, long-range
Taepo Dong-2. The State Department calls this “provocative.” U.N. Security Council Resolution 1695 condemns the Koreans. In October, North
Korea explodes a nuclear device in an underground test. The Security Council adopts Resolution 1718. Six-party talks resume in Beijing. North
Korea says it will stop if it receives massive shipments of fuel oil. It gets the fuel oil. In March 2007, the U.S. agrees to North Korea’s primary
demand: that the U.S. unfreeze $25 million of its assets held in Banco Delta Asia in Macau. In 2008 President Bush removes NK as a state
sponsor of terrorism. In January 2009, North Korea says its stockpile of plutonium is “already weaponized.” We are now into the Obama
presidency. That April, NK launches the Unha-2 long-range ballistic missile, which the Security Council condemns. NK says it is no longer
“bound” by any agreements. On May 25, 2009, North Korea conducts its second underground nuclear test. The Security Council unanimously
passes Resolution 1874. The State Department says the U.S. wants “a bilateral discussion with North Korea.” In November 2010, NK announces
it has a 2,000-centrifuge uranium enrichment factory. In early 2012, the Obama administration offers to give 240,000 metric tons of food in
return for “strict monitoring.” Late that year, NK launches a long-range ballistic missile, which the Security Council condemns, citing violations
of Resolutions 1718 and 1874. In early 2013, a monitoring group detects activity with “explosion-like characteristics” at North Korea’s
underground test site. The Security Council passes Resolution 2094. Last November, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that North
Korea is ready to the resume six-party talks. *** Every member of the Senate should read the full 81-page chronology. North Korea proves,
irrefutably, that
the “talks” model , absent credible measures of coercion or threat, won’t work . Iran knows it has nuclear
negotiators’ immunity: No
matter how or when Iran debauches any agreement, the West, abjectly, will
request—what else?—more talks. Iran’s nuclear-bomb and ballistic-missile programs will go forward, as
North Korea’s obviously did, no matter what.
Iran deal will fail – Iran has empirically violated nuclear deals, including the current
interim deal. They are continuing with enrichment activities and can’t be trusted to
go through the terms of any agreement.
The Gazette, Nov 14 2014 EDITORIAL: Can Iran be trusted? Dealings on nuke program worrisome
Read more at http://gazette.com/editorial-can-iran-be-trusted-dealings-on-nuke-programworrisome/article/1541381#ud8fAtboHKqZpQI4.99Read more at http://gazette.com/editorial-can-iranbe-trusted-dealings-on-nuke-program-worrisome/article/1541381#ud8fAtboHKqZpQI4.99
Nearly a year into the Obama administration's nuclear negotiations with Iran, it becomes more and
more apparent that the American people are watching a bad deal unfold as it gets hatched in their
name. Several new and alarming hints have emerged in just the past few days that should make
everyone suspicious. One of them was the incredible and extremely provocative decision by Iranian
officials to tweet out - as negotiations proceeded - a nine-point plan for annihilating Israel and making
all of its Jews "return to their home countries." In the world of international relations, this sort of plan is
typically referred to as "ethnic cleansing." Meanwhile, Reuters reported Saturday that Iran stepped up
its nuclear enrichment activities while supposedly under an interim agreement not to do so. A leaked
report from the International Atomic Energy Agency said that Iran has "been feeding natural uranium
gas into a single so-called IR-5 centrifuge at a research facility" this year. This act does not signify an ebb
in that nation's nuclear ambitions - quite the contrary - and is almost certainly a violation of Iran's
interim agreement with Washington. Even so, the Obama administration has brushed it off, pointing out
that the Iranians stopped doing it right after they were caught at it. "We raised that issue with Iran as
soon as the [International Atomic Energy Agency] reported it," State Department spokeswoman Jen
Psaki said. "The Iranians have confirmed that they will not continue that activity as cited in the IAEA
report, so it's been resolved." This is reminiscent of the husband who ends his affair right after his wife
discovers it. Meanwhile, Olli Heinonen, a Finnish former deputy chief of the IAEA, has charged that Iran
might have as many as 5,000 modern IR-2 centrifuges for enriching uranium - five times what Iranian
leaders have admitted they have. Despite having promised cooperation with international nuclear
monitors, Iran has repeatedly dragged its feet on giving inspectors access to important sites and has
refused to admit one of the IAEA's inspectors, believed to be an American national. The IAEA, as
Heinonen said in a conference call Tuesday, "is the only authority that can verify compliance." In short,
Iran's behavior is not that of a regime that cares much whether it is cooperating or keeping its word.
Obama seems hell-bent on hammering out a deal with Iran - even if it means bypassing Congress to
implement. Iran's leaders, meanwhile, continue to remind the U.S. and the entire world that there is no
reason to trust them.
Deal will inevitably fail – Middle East instability decks diplomacy and no trust
Dickey 4/1/15 (Christopher, Contributor @ Daily Best, "The Iran Talks: Nuclear Schizophrenia,"
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/04/01/the-iran-talks-nuclear-schizophrenia.html)
The Iranian and American negotiators in Switzerland apparently have decided
to kick the nuclear can a little farther down
the road and hope like hell that sometime soon—at least before the end of June—they can finally hold it up like a trophy and declare
there will be peace in our time. That’s not going to happen . It’s not just that deadlines have come and gone, and come and
gone. Secretary of State John Kerry, who has met with Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif one-on-one more than he has met with any other
foreign minister in the world (even though the U.S. and Iran do not have diplomatic relations), huddled up with Zarif again on Wednesday
morning. But as of Wednesday afternoon the negotiators were still talking and still … not … quite … agreeing on what they should tell the world
about the deal they haven’t … quite … reached. The French, Russian, and Chinese ministers who had been in Lausanne over the weekend
decided to take off. And, of course, the negotiators already have made it clear that when or if they do make a statement, even if they claim
everything is going well, they won’t inflict the devilish details on the general public. Which is why, if the talks do not break down completely,
they will drag on through June in fits and starts before we know if they’ve come definitively to an end. And
whatever that ending is, it
will likely be an anticlimax. In fact, events on the ground in the Middle East have overtaken
diplomacy . When the opening of serious and substantive discussions between Iran and six of the world’s biggest powers became public in
the summer of 2013, regional peace looked like a difficult goal, but something achievable. Now, civil
wars and chaotic insurgencies
are raging in Libya, Yemen, Syria, and Iraq—and in the last three countries Iran is a major player. In 2013, the so-called Islamic
State was still regarded by the White House as the “junior varsity” in the world of international terrorism, not an existential threat to the regional
order. In 2013, Syrian President Bashar al Assad was on the defensive, and looked like he’d overplayed his hand by using chemical weapons,
risking U.S. retaliation and further international isolation. In 2013, the idea that the Saudis and other Gulf Arab states would band together to
launch a war, as they did in Yemen last month, seemed unlikely, if not inconceivable. “Iran’s most powerful officials are inaccessible, while
Iran’s most accessible officials aren’t powerful.” In 2015 the complexities of the Mideast conflicts, alliances and enmities are positively
kaleidoscopic as the players realize the enemy of their enemy is their enemy even when, sometimes, he’s their friend. And with
every
passing day there’s also a growing realization on both sides of the nuclear negotiating table that even if the
problematic questions about numbers of centrifuges, disposal of nuclear materials and the sanction-lifting calendar can finally be resolved,
neither side can be trusted to keep the deal because—crucially—neither government can trust
itself . It’s increasingly obvious that both the American and the Iranian governments have what used to be called split personalities or
popularly, if erroneously, schizophrenia. And it is no longer clear on either side of the table which personality is dominant. This was always true
to some extent. The question of who’s really in charge in Iran—who’s the go-to mullah or power player who can really deliver a deal—has
plagued American efforts to reach understandings with Tehran since the earliest days of the revolution. It led to the humiliation of the Carter
administration during the Iran hostage crisis from 1979 to 1981, and the scandalous performance of the Reagan administration in the Iran-Contra
intrigues of the mid-1980s. And on the American side the reflexive defense of Israel’s interests, as perceived by the U.S. Congress, dating back to
the Clinton administration, has torpedoed one attempt after another to find rapprochement with Iran. Today the treacherous divide between
Tehran and Washington is not just a question of moderates and hardliners. Nor is it about good-cop-bad-cop negotiating tactics. The divisions
in Tehran and in Washington are much more extreme than that: something more akin to Dr. Jekyll and
Mr. Hyde—the ineffectual apostles of sweet reason on the one hand and the monstrous advocates of confrontation and violence on the other.
One is tempted, yet again, to quote William Butler Yeats’s “The Second Coming”: “The best lack all conviction, while the worst / Are full of
passionate intensity.” Or, more prosaically, there’s Karim Sadjapour’s dictum: “A perennial challenge in dealing with Iran,” said the scholar at
the Carnegie Endowment of International Peace, “is that Iran’s most powerful officials are inaccessible, while Iran’s most accessible officials
aren’t powerful.” But Robert Louis Stevenson’s horror story and morality tale is a particularly useful paradigm for understanding the unsubtle
schisms in the political personalities of both countries. The reasonable and brilliant, but weak, Dr. Jekylls of Iran are President Hassan Rouhani
and Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, who have made it their mission to charm the West in order to get sanctions lifted and open up a place for their
country among the great nations of the modern world. At the same time, to be sure, they want to preserve as much as they can of a nuclear
program that gives them at least a theoretical deterrence against threats in their immediate neighborhood, whether from nuclear-armed Israel
nearby or nuclear-armed Pakistan next door. (It is surprising how the often crucial Pakistani variable in the nuclear equation is ignored in Western
reporting.) Those are not unreasonable goals and they are not necessarily dangerous—as long as Iran’s nuclear weapons remain theoretical and its
stake in peace is greater than its desire for war, and as long as it’s the Dr. Jekylls in charge, and not the
Mr. Hydes. But, unfortunately,
there are plenty of the latter in Iran these days, and they appear to be growing stronger all the time. The Mr.
Hydes among the mullahs are many, but they are best represented by Qasem Suleimani, the head of the Revolutionary Guards’ Quds Force. He is
leading the efforts to establish and expand Iranian power far beyond his country’s borders. The advisers Suleimani deploys and the militias they
have helped to create include Hezbollah, which holds the balance of power in the government of Lebanon and has shored up the Assad
dictatorship in Syria. The Iranian-trained-and-guided militias are playing a highly ambiguous role in Iraq, where they consider both the U.S. and
ISIS as enemies. And the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen have provoked a war that now threatens to engulf the region. If Iran were to get a
nuclear arsenal, Suleimani, backed up by the Bomb, would be able to grow still more aggressive. And there is already talk of Suleimani running
for president of Iran in 2017. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is supposed to have the final word on all this, and he has let Rouhani and Zarif try to
reach a deal with the West to end draconian sanctions crippling the country’s economy. But Khamenei’s
heart seems to be with
those like Suleimani who believe force and fear are the best way to secure Iran’s borders. In Washington,
President Barack Obama is the Dr. Jekyll character, convinced that diplomacy and negotiation are superior to war, and that dialogue supported by
an international coalition is the best way to contain whatever evil designs the Iranians might have. That Obama has been able to pull together and
hold together the coalition of negotiating partners—Britain, France, China, Russia, and Germany—is an extraordinary achievement.
Getting them to agree to impose sanctions on Iran, and then keeping them on track during the long negotiations is, in itself, a diplomatic triumph.
But that’s an academic victory and a temporary one. At the end of the day it
may not be enough to seal a worthwhile
accord . Among the Mr. Hydes in Washington are the 47 Republican senators who signed a letter to Khamenei in March telling him that no
deal coming out of the negotiations in Switzerland would be worth the paper it was written on anyway. But the most important Mr. Hyde in
Washington is Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu,
who has shown an uncanny ability to sway American
politicians, convincing them no compromise with Iran is worthwhile, and opening wide the door not only to tougher
sanctions but to a war that Israel could begin, but the United States would have to try to finish. So, the negotiators in Switzerland continue to talk
about frameworks and details because, despite all the talk of self-imposed deadlines, they are playing for time. But that’s not on their side. The
U.S. Senate will convene on April 13, and the presidential campaign of 2016 already is underway. The
political sniping and
second-guessing that will undermine negotiations at every stage will continue . John Hannah, the foreign
policy adviser to Jeb Bush, doesn’t like the outlines of an Iranian nuclear deal that he’s seen so far. “If the leaks about the emerging deal prove
true, this is a bad deal that should not go forward. It would pose unacceptably dangerous risks not only to U.S. security, but to the survival and
wellbeing of our most important Middle East allies,” Hannah told The Daily Beast. “Even while Iran has been engaged in high-stakes talks to
convince the West to lift sanctions, it’s gone on a rampage across the Middle East, asserting control over at least four Arab capitals,” Hannah
said. “It beggars the imagination to believe that a deal that leaves Iran with a large nuclear infrastructure and potentially hundreds of billions of
In Iran, the war
party is gathering its forces, ready to denounce any Rouhani accord with the Americans as a collection of
dollars worth of sanctions relief is going to make Qasem Suleimani and the Quds Force less, rather than more, aggressive.”
unacceptable compromises with a government (as represented by the U.S. Congress) that wants nothing more or less than the destruction of the
Iranian regime. All
the while, the Iranian Hydes call for the destruction of Israel. Thus on Wednesday, as the negotiators
continued their struggle for sweet reason and diplomatic solutions, Netanyahu railed against their efforts. “Yesterday an Iranian
general brazenly declared and I quote: ‘Israel’s destruction is non-negotiable,’ but evidently giving Iran’s murderous regime a clear path to the
bomb is negotiable,” said the recently reelected Netanyahu. As the talks went on, he said, “Iran is accelerating its campaign of terror, subjugation
and conquest throughout the region, most recently in Yemen.”
All of which is true enough to make a final deal all but
impossible . The Mr. Hydes are winning, and the rest of the world is losing.
Hardliners will tank it
Litwak 4-3 ["As Iranians Welcome Nuclear Deal, Khamenei’s Reaction Is Key" 4/3/15
http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2015/04/03/as-iranians-welcome-nuclear-deal-khameneis-reaction-iskey/ //]
President Rouhani clearly will have popular support. But in Iran and abroad, eyes will be trained on the
supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. It is hardly possible that the Iranian negotiating team signed
on to the framework agreement without securing his approval , article by article. But hard-liners may
well begin to dissect the understanding, fault the many concessions that Iran had to make, and seek to
undermine it. The editor of the hard-line newspaper Kayhan has written that “we gave away a saddled
horse and received only broken reins in return.” Such a statement underscores how critical Ayatollah
Khamenei’s unequivocal and public support for the agreement and the negotiating team will be
over the coming days and weeks.
Impact defense
Even if it deals fails, no war / it doesn’t escalate
Amos Yadlin Maj. Gen. (ret.) is the Director of INSS, From 2006-2010, Maj. Gen. (ret.) Yadlin served as
the IDF’s chief of Defense Intelligence. From 2004-2006, he served as the IDF attaché to the United
States. In February 2002, he earned the rank of major general and was named commander of the IDF
Military Colleges and the National Defense College, and Avner Golov, research
assistant to the Director of INSS, “If Attacked, How Would Iran Respond?,” Strategic Assessment
| Volume 16 | No. 3 | October ‘13
Assessment of the Iranian Response Strategy
There are two significant parameters for assessing an Iranian response. The first concerns the identity of
the attacker: is it an American attack, an Israeli attack without US backing, or a combined attack (American
backing for an Israeli strike would almost certainly be perceived as such a scenario by the regime in Tehran). The main Iranian interest
is in regime survival , and therefore the regime would consider whether its response would enhance the
threat against it. If the scope of the first attack had already threatened the regime, there would be fewer inhibitions about a response.
Thus with an Israeli strike, for example, the danger is that an Iranian response would drag the United States
into involvement that would threaten the regime, while in an American attack limited to nuclear targets, the concern is that
a response would lead to a counter-response that would threaten the regime. If in Tehran’s assessment the United States had decided to use its
full power in order to topple the regime, this would reduce Iran’s inhibitions, and the scope of the Iranian response could be expected to
increase. If
Tehran’s assessment is that the United States is limiting its attack to Iran’s nuclear
infrastructure and that it is likely to broaden its attack against the regime only in response to an Iranian
response, the chances would increase of Iran’s exercising restraint in order to avoid escalation that
would threaten the survival of the regime. The second parameter concerns the nature of the attack. The
greater the force and scope of the Western strike – if it included economic assets such as the oil and gas industry or
government and military assets such as government and religious buildings, headquarters, and strategic military forces – the
more pressure Tehran would face to respond with significant force in order to deter its enemies from future strikes
and restore its honor. The two parameters are connected, since an American response in the event of escalation would include a broader and
more powerful attack on regime assets as well. For this reason, it
would be a more credible and effective threat that
would encourage Iranian restraint in response to a Western attack. Against this background a scale of five possible
Iranian strategies can be posited (from the limited and measured to the very massive): a. Total military restraint: This is an extreme
scenario in which the Iranian regime chooses not to respond immediately after an attack on its facilities. Two
examples of this strategy are the lack of immediate Iraqi response following the Israel Air Force attack on the
Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981, and the absence of a Syrian response to the attack on the Deir ez-Zor nuclear reactor in 2007.13
However, there is little likelihood of Iran adopting such a strategy. In contrast to Iraq and Syria, Iran is aware that the West knows about its
nuclear program, and an attack would not be a strategic surprise. Even if the timing and nature of the attack are a surprise, Tehran has likely
prepared a response in the event of a strike. Tehran would presumably decide to use this plan, even if it were partial and restrained, to show
the strength of the regime, deter Iran’s enemies from additional actions in the future, and restore the country’s honor after the attack on its
nuclear project. In other words, there is a high level of certainty that there would be an Iranian response, and the question is about its scope. b.
Tit for tat:14 This is the classic reactive strategy because it mimics the strategy of the attacker. Iran’s
response to a strike against the country’s nuclear facilities would be an attack on Israel’s nuclear
facilities. In this scenario, a significant number of missiles would be launched from Iran and Lebanon in the
direction of Dimona or any other target in Israel perceived as “nuclear associated,” in order to convey a message of parity
between Iran and Israel, and perhaps even to damage Israel’s facilities. There is a high likelihood that this method of
operation would be chosen, independently or as part of a broader Iranian response. c. A response that is limited in scope but more
significant: A broader Iranian response would include the use of terrorist cells and a restrained launch of
missiles – one or two missiles volleys at Israel’s cities, and perhaps also Saudi and Western targets in the Gulf. Suicide missions from
the air and the sea are also possible in this limited response scenario. If the Western strike damages Iran’s nuclear
infrastructure but does not harm other regime assets, there is a high likelihood of such an Iranian
response, because the regime in Tehran will seek to balance the need to respond to an attack with the fear of
escalation that would threaten regime assets not directly connected to Iran’s military nuclear program. Again, the main
interest of the regime of the ayatollahs is to preserve their power. Therefore, it seems that they would not
carry out an action that is perceived as likely to threaten the stability of the regime. Thus, in a scenario involving
a pinpoint strike on the Iranian nuclear program, the regime would seek to respond without causing
escalation and significant American intervention in the crisis. d. The maximalist response against Israeli
targets: Despite what has been noted thus far, it is possible that Iran would seek an aggressive, maximalist response to a strike against its
military nuclear project and its national honor, while attempting to isolate Israel from the United States. It could launch dozens of missiles a day
against Israeli cities in a number of volleys spread throughout the day. The strategic purpose would be to punish Israel for the attack, paralyze
life in Israel, exact as heavy a price as possible from Israel, and increase the psychological effect of the attack on the Israeli populace. Iran would
attempt to achieve the maximum deterrent effect and deter Israel regarding a future conflict. The
regime in Tehran likely assumes
that such a response would lead to a significant Israeli response and could lead to escalation of the
conflict between the two countries – which in turn could allow another strike against the nuclear
infrastructure and a broad and comprehensive attack on Iranian economic and government assets. Such
escalation could spiral out of control and encourage American military intervention, which could
threaten the continued survival of the regime. Given this, the Iranian regime will likely refrain from such a response
against Israel as long as a Western strike focuses on the nuclear program. If the Iranian regime feels that the attack reflects an effort to
threaten its survival or that Israel and the United States are less willing to respond with force, it is liable to believe that it has less to lose from
possible escalation. This scenario, in an extreme configuration, could also include Iranian use of nonconventional weapons. However, the
operational limitations of Iranian weapons, together with Tehran’s ambition to prevent a massive Israeli
response and American intervention, would serve as deterrents regarding use of this type of weapon. Accordingly,
there seems to be limited probability that Tehran would use nonconventional weapons at the start of a future crisis resulting from an attack on
Iran, or in a scenario of conflict with Israel that does not develop into an all-out clash that clearly threatens the survival of the regime. e.
Regional escalation: Iran responds to a Western attack with full force and against all its enemies – the United
States, the Gulf states, and Israel. In such a scenario, Iran could attack Israeli and American targets in the Gulf with all of its (limited)
capabilities, including threatening to close or actually closing the Strait of Hormuz. However, an
assessment that an attack on
Iran’s military nuclear facilities would necessarily lead to a large scale, prolonged regional war is highly
questionable .15 A scenario of regional escalation would require the U nited S tates to intervene and
would significantly change the regional balance of power. Therefore, Tehran would choose such a response
only if it did not fear that such a move would lead to further significant harm to regime assets, because it would
already feel a real threat to the survival of the regime, or as a last resort in an attempt to set the entire region ablaze in order to press for
international intervention (apparently led by Russia) to achieve a ceasefire as quickly as possible, and before the regime loses a large portion of
its assets. Since
this would be a dangerous gamble, the assessment is that Iran would seek to avoid such a response, and hence
at the start of the crisis this
is a scenario with very low probability .
No Middle East war escalation
Fettweis, Asst Prof Poli Sci – Tulane, Asst Prof National Security Affairs – US Naval War College, ‘7
(Christopher, “On the Consequences of Failure in Iraq,” Survival, Vol. 49, Iss. 4, December, p. 83 – 98)
Without the US presence, a second argument goes, nothing would prevent Sunni-Shia violence from
sweeping into every country where the religious divide exists. A Sunni bloc with centres in Riyadh and
Cairo might face a Shia bloc headquartered in Tehran, both of which would face enormous pressure
from their own people to fight proxy wars across the region. In addition to intra-Muslim civil war, crossborder warfare could not be ruled out. Jordan might be the first to send troops into Iraq to secure its
own border; once the dam breaks, Iran, Turkey, Syria and Saudi Arabia might follow suit. The Middle
East has no shortage of rivalries, any of which might descend into direct conflict after a destabilising US
withdrawal. In the worst case, Iran might emerge as the regional hegemon, able to bully and blackmail
its neighbours with its new nuclear arsenal. Saudi Arabia and Egypt would soon demand suitable
deterrents of their own, and a nuclear arms race would envelop the region. Once again, however, none
of these outcomes is particularly likely.
Wider war
No matter what the outcome in Iraq, the region is not likely to devolve into chaos. Although it might seem
counter-intuitive, by most traditional measures the Middle East is very stable. Continuous,
uninterrupted governance is the norm, not the exception; most Middle East regimes have been in power
for decades. Its monarchies, from Morocco to Jordan to every Gulf state, have generally been in power
since these countries gained independence. In Egypt Hosni Mubarak has ruled for almost three decades,
and Muammar Gadhafi in Libya for almost four. The region's autocrats have been more likely to die
quiet, natural deaths than meet the hangman or post-coup firing squads. Saddam's rather unpredictable
regime, which attacked its neighbours twice, was one of the few exceptions to this pattern of stability,
and he met an end unusual for the modern Middle East. Its regimes have survived potentially
destabilising shocks before, and they would be likely to do so again.
The region actually experiences very little cross-border warfare, and even less since the end of the Cold
War. Saddam again provided an exception, as did the Israelis, with their adventures in Lebanon. Israel
fought four wars with neighbouring states in the first 25 years of its existence, but none in the 34 years
since. Vicious civil wars that once engulfed Lebanon and Algeria have gone quiet, and its ethnic conflicts
do not make the region particularly unique.
The biggest risk of an American withdrawal is intensified civil war in Iraq rather than regional
conflagration. Iraq's neighbours will likely not prove eager to fight each other to determine who gets to be
the next country to spend itself into penury propping up an unpopular puppet regime next door. As
much as the Saudis and Iranians may threaten to intervene on behalf of their co-religionists, they have
shown no eagerness to replace the counter-insurgency role that American troops play today. If the
United States, with its remarkable military and unlimited resources, could not bring about its desired
solutions in Iraq, why would any other country think it could do so?17
Common interest, not the presence of the US military, provides the ultimate foundation for stability. All
ruling regimes in the Middle East share a common (and understandable) fear of instability. It is the
interest of every actor - the Iraqis, their neighbours and the rest of the world - to see a stable,
functioning government emerge in Iraq. If the United States were to withdraw, increased regional
cooperation to address that common interest is far more likely than outright warfare.
No arms race or war
Layne 9 – Int’l Affairs Prof, Texas A&M, Visiting Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies, Cato Institute
(Christopher, America’s Middle East grand strategy after Iraq, Review of International Studies 35,
Cambridge Journals)
Of course, hard-line US neoconservatives reject this approach and argue that a nuclear-armed Iran
would have three bad consequences: there could be a nuclear arms race in the Middle East; Iran might
supply nuclear weapons to terrorists; and Tehran could use its nuclear weapons to blackmail other
states in the region, or to engage in aggression. Each of these scenarios, however, is improbable.24 A
nuclear Iran will not touch off a proliferation snowball in the Middle East. Israel, of course, already is a
nuclear power. The other three states that might be tempted to go for a nuclear weapons capability are
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. However, each of these states would be under strong pressure not to do
so, and Saudi Arabia lacks the industrial and engineering capabilities to develop nuclear weapons
indigenously. Notwithstanding the Bush administration’s hyperbolic rhetoric, Iran is not going to give
nuclear weapons to terrorists. This is not to deny Tehran’s close links to groups like Hezbollah and Hamas.
However, there are good reasons that states – even those that have ties to terrorists – draw the line at
giving them nuclear weapons (or other WMD): if the terrorists were to use these weapons against the
US or its allies, the weapons could be traced back to the donor state, which would be at risk of annihilation
by an American retaliatory strike.25 Iran’s leaders have too much at stake to run this risk. Even if one
believes the administration’s claims that rogue state leaders are indifferent to the fate of their
populations, they do care very much about the survival of their regimes, which means that they can be
deterred. For the same reason, Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons will not invest Tehran with options
to attack, or intimidate its neighbours. Israel’s security with respect to Iran is guaranteed by its own
formidable nuclear deterrent capabilities. By the same token, just as it did in Europe during the Cold
War, the US can extend its own deterrence umbrella to protect its clients in the region – Saudi Arabia,
the Gulf states, and Turkey. American security guarantees not only will dissuade Iran from acting recklessly,
but also restrain proliferation by negating the incentives for states like Saudi Arabia and Turkey to
acquire their own nuclear weapons. Given the overwhelming US advantage in both nuclear and
conventional military capabilities, Iran is not going to risk national suicide by challenging America’s security
commitments in the region. In short, while a nuclear-armed Iran hardly is desirable, neither is it
‘intolerable’, because it could be contained and deterred successfully by the US.
No impact – Iran knows war is bad
Kaye, RAND senior political scientist, 2010
(Dalia, “Dangerous But Not Omnipotent”,
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG781.pdf)
To accurately gauge the strategic challenges from Iran over a ten- to fifteen-year horizon, this
study sought to assess the motivations
of the Islamic Republic, not just its capabilities. This approach , although difficult given the complexities of the Iranian
system,
is critical in identifying potential sources of caution and pragmatism in Iran’s policy formulation .
Our exploration of Iranian strategic thinking revealed that ideology and bravado frequently mask a
preference for opportunism and realpolitik —the qualities that define “normal” state behavior.
Similarly, when we canvassed Iran’s power projection options, we identified not only the extent of the threats posed by each but also their limitations and
liabilities. In each case, we
found significant barriers and buffers to Iran’s strategic reach rooted in both the
regional geopolitics it is trying to influence and in its limited conventional military capacity,
diplomatic isolation, and past strategic missteps. Similarly, tensions between the regime and Iranian
society—segments of which have grown disenchanted with the Republic’s revolutionary ideals—can also act as a constraint on
Iranian external behavior. ¶ This leads to our conclusion that analogies to the Cold War are mistaken: The Islamic
Republic does not seek territorial aggrandizement or even, despite its rhetoric, the forcible
imposition of its revolutionary ideology onto neighboring states. Instead, it feeds off existing grievances with the
status quo, particularly in the Arab world. Traditional containment options may actually create further opportunities for Tehran to exploit, thereby amplifying
the very influence the United States is trying to mitigate. A more useful strategy, therefore, is one that exploits existing
checks on Iran’s
power and influence. These include the gap between its aspiration for asymmetric warfare capabilities
and the reality of its rather limited conventional forces , disagreements between Iran and its militant
“proxies,” and the potential for sharp criticism from Arab public opinion, which it has long sought to
exploit. In addition, we recommend a new U.S. approach to Iran that integrates elements of engagement and containment while de-escalating unilateral
U.S. pressure on Tehran and applying increased multilateral pressure against its nuclear ambitions. The analyses that informed these conclusions also yielded
the following insights for U.S. planners and strategists concerning Iran’s strategic culture, conventional military, ties to Islamist groups, and ability to influence
Arab public opinion.
No Israeli strikes. Strategic incentives and institutional checks
Zachary Keck, 11/28/13, Associate editor of The Diplomat. “Five Reasons Israel Won't Attack Iran,” The National Interest,
http://server1.nationalinterest.org/commentary/five-reasons-israel-wont-attack-iran-9469?page=2
Although not a member of the P5+1 itself, Israel has always loomed large over the negotiations concerning Iran’s nuclear
program. For example, in explaining French opposition to a possible nuclear deal earlier this month, French Foreign Minister
Laurent Fabius stated: “The security concerns of Israel and all the countries of the region have to be taken into account.”
Part of Fabius’ concern derives from the long-held fear that Israel will launch a preventive strike against
Iran to prevent it from obtaining nuclear weapons. For some, this possibility remains all too real despite the
important interim agreement the P5+1 and Iran reached this weekend. For example, when asked on ABC’s This
Week whether Israel would attack Iran while the interim deal is in place,William Kristol responded: “I don't think the prime
minister will think he is constrained by the U.S. deciding to have a six-month deal. […] six months, one year, I mean, if they're
going to break out, they're going to break out.”
Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu has done little to dispel this notion. Besides blasting the deal as a
“historic mistake,” Netanyahu said Israel “is not obliged to the agreement” and warned “the regime in Iran is
dedicated to destroying Israel and Israel has the right and obligation to defend itself with its own forces against every threat.”
Many dismiss this talk as bluster, however. Over at Bloomberg View, for instance, Jeffrey Goldberg argues that
the nuclear deal has “boxed-in Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu so comprehensively that it's
unimaginable Israel will strike Iran in the foreseeable future.” Eurasia Group's Cliff Kupchan similarly
argued: “The chance of Israeli strikes during the period of the interim agreement drops to virtually zero.”
Although the interim deal does further reduce Israel’s propensity to attack, the truth is that the likelihood of an Israeli
strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities has always been greatly exaggerated. There are at least five reasons why Israel
isn’t likely to attack Iran.
1. You Snooze, You Lose
First, if Israel was going to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities, it would have done so a long time ago. Since
getting caught off-guard at the beginning of the Yom Kippur War in 1973, Israel has generally acted proactively to thwart
security threats. On no issue has this been truer than with nuclear-weapon programs. For example, Israel bombed Saddam
Hussein’s program when it consisted of just a single nuclear reactor. According to ABC News, Israel struck
Syria’s lone nuclear reactor just months after discovering it. The IAEA had been completely in the dark about the
reactor, and took years to confirm the building was in fact housing one.
Contrast this with Israel’s policy toward Iran’s nuclear program. The uranium-enrichment facility in Natanz and the heavy-water
reactor at Arak first became public knowledge in 2002. For more than a decade now, Tel Aviv has watched as the program has
expanded into two fully operational nuclear facilities, a budding nuclear-research reactor, and countless other well-protected
and -dispersed sites. Furthermore, America’s extreme reluctance to initiate strikes on Iran was made clear to Israel at least as
far back as 2008. It would be completely at odds with how Israel operates for it to standby until the last
minute when faced with what it views as an existential threat.
2. Bombing Iran Makes an Iranian Bomb More Likely
Much like a U.S. strike, only with much less tactical impact, an Israeli air strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities would
only increase the likelihood that Iran would build the bomb. At home, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei could use the
attack to justify rescinding his fatwa against possessing a nuclear-weapons program, while using the greater domestic support
for the regime and the nuclear program to mobilize greater resources for the country’s nuclear efforts.
Israel’s attack would also give the Iranian regime a legitimate (in much of the world’s eyes) reason to
withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and kick out international inspectors. If Tehran’s
membership didn’t even prevent it from being attacked, how could it justify staying in the regime? Finally, support for
international sanctions will crumble in the aftermath of an Israeli attack, giving Iran more resources with
which to rebuild its nuclear facilities.
3. Helps Iran, Hurts Israel
Relatedly, an Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear program would be a net gain for Iran and a huge loss for Tel
Aviv. Iran could use the strike to regain its popularity with the Arab street and increase the pressure
against Arab rulers. As noted above, it would also lead to international sanctions collapsing, and an outpouring of sympathy
for Iran in many countries around the world.
Meanwhile, a strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities would leave Israel in a far worse-off position. Were Iran to respond by
attacking U.S. regional assets, this could greatly hurt Israel’s ties with the United States at both the elite
and mass levels. Indeed, a war-weary American public is adamantly opposed to its own leaders dragging it into another
conflict in the Middle East. Americans would be even more hostile to an ally taking actions that they fully understood would put
the U.S. in danger.
Furthermore, the quiet but growing cooperation Israel is enjoying with Sunni Arab nations against Iran
would evaporate overnight. Even though many of the political elites in these countries would secretly support Israel’s
action, their explosive domestic situations would force them to distance themselves from Tel Aviv for an extended period of
time. Israel’s reputation would also take a further blow in Europe and Asia, neither of which would soon forgive Tel Aviv.
4. Israel’s Veto Players
Although Netanyahu may be ready to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities, he operates within a democracy
with a strong elite structure, particularly in the field of national security. It seems unlikely that he would
have enough elite support for him to seriously consider such a daring and risky operation.
For one thing, Israel has strong institutional checks on using military force. As then vice prime minister and current
defense minister Moshe Yaalon explained last year: “In the State of Israel, any process of a military operation, and any
military move, undergoes the approval of the security cabinet and in certain cases, the full cabinet… the
decision is not made by two people, nor three, nor eight.” It’s far from clear Netanyahu, a fairly divisive figure in
Israeli politics, could gain this support. In fact, Menachem Begin struggled to gain sufficient support for the
1981 attack on Iraq even though Baghdad presented a more clear and present danger to Israel than Iran
does today.
What is clearer is that Netanyahu lacks the support of much of Israel’s highly respected national security
establishment. Many former top intelligence and military officials have spoken out publicly against
Netanyahu’s hardline Iran policy, with at least one of them questioning whether Iran is actually seeking
a nuclear weapon. Another former chief of staff of the Israeli Defense Forces told The Independent that, “It is quite clear
that much if not all of the IDF [Israeli Defence Forces] leadership do not support military action at this
point…. In the past the advice of the head of the IDF and the head of Mossad had led to military action being stopped.”
5. A Deal is Better Than No Deal
Finally, Israel won’t attack Iran because it is ultimately in its interests for the US and Iran to reach an
agreement, even if it is a less than an ideal one. To begin with, an agreement is the only way to prevent Iran from
acquiring nuclear weapons short of an invasion and occupation of the country. Moreover, Israel would benefit both directly and
indirectly from a U.S.-Iranian nuclear deal and especially larger rapprochement. Israel would gain a number of direct
benefits from a larger warming of U.S.-Iranian relations, which a nuclear deal could help facilitate. Iran
currently pays no costs while benefiting significantly from its anti-Israeli tirades and actions. A rapprochement with the U.S.
would force Iranian leaders to constrain their anti-Israeli rhetoric and actions, or risk losing their new partner. While Israel and
Iran might not enjoy the same relationship they did under the Shah or the first decade of the Islamic Republic, a U.S.-allied Iran
would be much less of a burden for Israel. History is quite clear on this point: U.S. Middle Eastern allies—notable Egypt under
Sadat—have been much less hostile to the Jewish state than countries that have been U.S. adversaries.
Tel Aviv would also benefit indirectly from a U.S.-Iran nuclear deal and possible rapprochement. That’s because either of these
agreements would spark panic in Sunni Arab capitals. For the foreseeable future, then, Israel would enjoy some breathing
room, which would obtain as these governments would be preoccupied with Iran for the foreseeable future. Indeed, just the
possibility of an interim nuclear deal between the U.S. and Iran has created rumors of Saudi Arabia
seeking tighter cooperation with Israel.
For these reasons, the interim nuclear deal has made it less likely that Israel will attack Iran. That being said, the possibility of an
Israeli attack on Iran was already remote long before Iran and the P5+1 held their talks in Geneva last month.
No strike on Israel or the US – fears retaliation
McNiesh, 12 – intern at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation (Lesley, 5/24. “Nudge Iran,
but Not Off a Cliff.” http://blog.livableworld.org/story/2012/5/24/13738/3504)
Iran is highly unlikely to attack even if it could conjure up a functioning and deliverable nuclear weapon
today, because U.S. retaliation could wipe Iran off the map and Iran’s leaders care more than anything
about self-preservation. The same is true for an attack on Israel: Israel has its own nuclear deterrent as
well as a demonstrated history of striking back when attacked, even by non-state actors, such as in the
2006 Lebanon War. A military strike against Israel would also invite U.S. intervention.
Israel won’t strike – capability awareness, hardliner reinforcement, public support,
security concerns, and US alliance.
Rafizadeh 14 (Majid Rafizadeh, President of the International American Council on the Middle East,
Harvard International Relations Council, ambassador to the National Iranian American Council,
Huffington Post, “Will Israel Attack Iran's Nuclear Installation?”, 8/30/14,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/majid-rafizadeh/will-israel-attack-irans-_b_5741784.html)
Israel has previously threatened to carry out attacks against Iran's nuclear installations. Nevertheless,
the major dilemma is whether Israel would realistically attack Iran's nuclear facilities. As usual, Iranian
officials have responded strongly, with the IRGC issuing a statement, "A spy drone of the Zionist regime
(Israel) was brought down by a missile... This stealth drone was trying to approach the Natanz nuclear
zone. This act demonstrates a new adventurism by the Zionist regime... The Revolutionary Guard and
the other armed forces reserve the right to respond to this act." In case of any serious threat, the senior
cardre of the IRGC believe that it can create a "nightmare" for Israel. Considering the recent allegation,
Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh, the commander of the Aerospace Force of Iran's Islamic
Revolution Guards Corps, stated that the response from the Islamic Republic would be a "deadly
nightmare" for Israel. The timing of this incidence is intriguing as it coincides with the progress that the
Islamic Republic and the P5+1 (Russia, the United States, Britain, China, France and Germany) are
making towards the final steps of reaching a comprehensive nuclear deal. Israeli leaders believe that the
agreement will leave the Islamic Republic with the path to reach nuclear capabilities and build a nuclear
bomb. Both Iran and Israel are considered enemies, and Israel views Iran as an existential threat.
Unintended Consequences: Regional Conflagration Israel does have the military capability to strike the
Islamic Republic's nuclear installations. Nevertheless, for several reasons, it is very unlikely that Israel
will unilaterally carry out strikes against Iran's nuclear installations. First of all, Israeli leaders are
cognizant of the fact that any strikes aimed at Iran's nuclear installations will not completely thwart
Iran's nuclear program. The strikes might turn the clock a few years back and postpone the process
for Iran to become a nuclear state or build an atomic bomb, but an Israeli attack will give further
incentive to Iran to pursue its nuclear ambitions with more determination. Even several senior Israeli
security and military officials have admitted that any Israeli attack on Iran will boost Iran's
determination to build a bomb , and will endanger Israel's own survival. Second, an external Israeli
attack on Iran will rally the Iranian people behind their government for their right of nuclear
enrichment. It will also grant the hardliners firmer motive to reach the nuclear threshold with fullfledged speed . Thirdly, the Islamic Republic will likely decline to cooperate with the international
community as well as pull out of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. As a result, the unintended
repercussions and negative consequences of an Israeli attack- such as Iran becoming more determined
to accelerate its nuclear program -- do outweigh the delay that the strikes might impose on Iran's
nuclear program. While it might be easy to start a war or carry out strikes, it is almost impossible to
know where the war will head afterwards. In case Iran responds militarily, few strikes can turn the
region into a conflagration affecting many lives of ordinary civilians, the Gulf (with the price of oil
skyrocketing and price of gasoline increasing in Western countries), and impacting the security of other
regional countries including Turkey and Saudi Arabia. The war can not only endanger regional security,
but also Israel's own security , and drag in global powers including the United States and Russia.
According to polls, many Israeli citizens are against their country attacking Iran unilaterally. Finally,
although Israeli leaders believe that the Obama administration has not been firm enough in terms of
thwarting Iran's ambition to reach a nuclear threshold, Israel is in fact dependent on the United States
when it comes to dealing with Iran's nuclear program. In the case of a military response from Iran, and
considering Israel's regional security and geopolitical affairs, Israel is in need of the United States. On
the other hand, the Obama administration's foreign policies towards Iran's nuclear program have
been clear: the administration has avoided considering a military option against the Islamic Republic.
In addition, the US still contends that all diplomatic venues have not been exhausted. Considering the
aforementioned factors and realistically speaking, it will be unlikely for Israel carry out any attacks
against Iran's nuclear installations.
No Israel strike---Netanyahu’s scared
Jeffrey Goldberg 14, national correspondent for The Atlantic and a recipient of the National Magazine
Award for Reporting, “The Crisis in U.S.-Israel Relations Is Officially Here”, 10/28/14,
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/10/the-crisis-in-us-israel-relations-is-officiallyhere/382031/
“The good thing about Netanyahu
is that he’s scared to launch wars ,” the official said, expanding the definition of
what a chickenshit Israeli prime minister looks like. “The bad thing about him is that he won’t do anything to reach an
accommodation with the Palestinians or with the Sunni Arab states. The only thing he’s interested in is protecting himself
from political defeat. He’s not [Yitzhak] Rabin, he’s not [Ariel] Sharon, he’s certainly no [Menachem] Begin. He’s got no guts.”¶ I
ran this notion by another senior official who deals with the Israel file regularly. This official agreed that Netanyahu is a “chickenshit”
on matters related to the comatose peace process, but added that he’s also a “coward” on the issue of
Iran’s nuclear threat. The official said the Obama administration no longer believes that Netanyahu would launch a
preemptive strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities in order to keep the regime in Tehran from building an atomic arsenal. “ It’s too late
for him to do anything. Two, three years ago, this was a possibility. But ultimately he couldn’t bring himself to pull the
trigger. It was a combination of our pressure and his own unwillingness to do anything dramatic. Now it’s
too late.”¶ ¶ This assessment represents a momentous shift in the way the Obama administration sees Netanyahu. In 2010, and again in 2012,
administration officials were convinced that Netanyahu and his then-defense minister, the cowboyish excommando Ehud Barak, were readying a strike on Iran. To be sure, the Obama administration used the threat of an Israeli strike in a
calculated way to convince its allies (and some of its adversaries) to line up behind what turned out to be an effective sanctions regime. But the
fear inside the White House of a preemptive attack (or preventative attack, to put it more accurately) was real and palpable—as was the fear of
dissenters inside Netanyahu’s Cabinet, and at Israel Defense Forces headquarters. At U.S. Central Command headquarters in Tampa, analysts
kept careful track of weather patterns and of the waxing and waning moon over Iran, trying to predict the exact night of the coming Israeli
attack.¶ Today, there
are few such fears. “The feeling now is that Bibi’s bluffing ,” this second official said. “He’s not
Begin at Osirak,” the official added, referring to the successful 1981 Israeli Air Force raid ordered by the ex-prime minister on Iraq’s nuclear
reactor.¶ The
belief that Netanyahu’s threat to strike is now an empty one has given U.S. officials room
to breathe in their ongoing negotiations with Iran. You might think that this new understanding of Netanyahu as a hypercautious leader would make the administration somewhat grateful. Sober-minded Middle East leaders are not so easy to come by these days,
after all. But on a number of other issues, Netanyahu does not seem sufficiently sober-minded.
No strikes impact against Iran
Clemons, 10 (Steve, “stop hyperventilating: Obama will not choose war with Iran,” July 23, The
Washington Note, http://www.thewashingtonnote.com/archives/2010/07/stop_hyperventi_1/)
And others in the Obama administration also know that bombing or not bombing Iran is not
a binary proposition with neat and clean outcomes on either side. The security of
circumstances of Israel and the view that many on the Arab street will have that their own
governments may have acquiesced to Israel's security preferences without getting anything in
ending the humiliation of their Palestinian brothers puts every government in the Arab League at
risk.I think that there are many things that can yet be done to change the incentive
structure of the Iranian political leadership and either seduce or cajole its leaders into a
more internationally acceptable course -- and all of these should be tried and put on the table
before the potentially cataclysmic course of adopting the Iran War option.While there are
individuals in the Obama administration who are flirtingwith the possibility of military
action against Iran, they are fewer in number than existed in the Bush administration. They
are surrounded by a greater number of realists who are working hard to find a way to
reinvent America's global leverage and power -- and who realize that a war with Iran ends that
possibility and possibly spells an end to America presuming to be the globally predominant power
it has been.There are also political opportunists in the Obama administration -- who after a
horrible year of relations between the President and Israeli Prime Minister -- want to spin the deep
tensions over Israel-Palestine away long enough to get through the next set of 2010 elections.
There are many who worry too much that Obama's recent highly scripted, positive, buddybuddy encounter with Benjamin Netanyahu means that the United States is acquiescing to
Israel's view of Iran, of settlements, and of the world. This would be a misread of the
situation. Come December 2010, my hunch is that all of those who have recently placed
faith in a White House posture of Israel uber alles will be as disappointed in the Obama
White House as many other interest groups have been who thought that Obama would
deliver on their single issue.In this case, Obama will stick to script and offer a similar line as Ariel
Sharon once offered after being criticized by his supporters on Israel's unilateral withdrawal from
Gaza: "One has to weigh many different options in determining our nation's security needs Things
look different when sitting behind the Prime Minister's desk."This will be true for Barack Obama
as well -- who knows that there is no winning outcome for the US and its allies if he chooses
a military course with Iran, even if some of his team seem to enjoy flirting with that
option.
Deal bad
The deal shields weapons—their ev assumes full compliance which doesn’t happen
Fleitz 4/3 (Fred Fleitz, a former CIA analyst, is senior vice president for policy and programs for the
Center for Security Policy. He worked on the Iranian nuclear issue for the CIA, the State Department, and
the House Intelligence Committee. “Not a Good Deal” 4/3/15
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/416404/not-good-deal-fred-fleitz)
The details of the framework agreement as spelled out in a White House fact sheet and President Obama’s speech raise many
questions about a final deal. It is troubling that no final agreed-upon text has been released
and that Iranian and
EU officials were vague in their statements about the framework. Earlier today on National Review, Patrick Brennan wrote about tweets by Abas
Aslani, the head of an Iranian government news agency, that show how the
Iranian view of the agreement differs from the
Obama administration’s view. Aslani tweeted, for instance, that Iran will continue to develop advanced centrifuges
during the duration of the deal and “all economic sanctions by EU, US will be lifted immediately including
financial, banking, insurance, oil.” Here are my initial thoughts about the preliminary agreement, based on our knowledge of it at this hour.
Uranium Enrichment According to the White House fact sheet, Iran
will go from 9,000 operational centrifuges to 6,104. Of
these, 5,060 will enrich uranium for ten years. All centrifuges will be Iran’s first-generation IR-1 design. The remaining 10,000
operational and non-operational centrifuges will be put in storage and monitored by the IAEA. These machines will be used to replace operating
centrifuges. For 15 years, Iran has agreed not to enrich over 3.67% U-235 and not to build additional enrichment facilities. Iran also has agreed to
“reduce” its current enriched-uranium stockpile of about 10,000 kilograms (enough to fuel eight or more nuclear weapons if enriched to weaponsgrade) to 300 kilograms. President Obama said in his speech today that Iran’s enriched uranium would be “neutralized.” The U.S. fact sheet says
Iran will not use advanced centrifuge models for ten years and will develop them according to a schedule worked out under the agreement.
However, an Iranian spokesman tweeted that Iran
will continue its R&D on advanced centrifuges during the
agreement and will do “the beginning and completing process” of IR-4, IR-5, IR-6 to IR-8 centrifuges during the ten-year
span of the agreement. Iran will move most of its centrifuges out of its underground Fordow enrichment facility and will not enrich uranium there
for at least 15 years. Two-thirds of Fordow’s centrifuges will be put in storage, and the facility will be used for peaceful purposes. Comment
This agreement will allow Iran to continue uranium enrichment , an activity that the United States has refused to
agree to in nuclear-technology cooperation agreements with its friends and allies because it is so easy to use a peaceful enrichment program to
make weapons fuel. There is no practical reason for Iran to conduct uranium enrichment with 6,000 centrifuges. It would take about 200,000
centrifuges for Iran to enrich enough uranium to fuel its Bushehr power reactor. 5,000
centrifuges are far too many for other
peaceful purposes such as producing medical isotopes or fuel plates for the Tehran research reactor .
Moreover, it would be far more economical for Iran to purchase reactor fuel rods, fuel plates, and medical isotopes from other countries. The
Obama administration hopes to address the risks of Iranian uranium enrichment by having intrusive IAEA
inspections and by requiring Iran to “reduce” or “neutralize” its enriched-uranium stockpile. From the
president’s statement and the White House fact sheet, it appears that Iran is refusing to send its enriched uranium to Russia as the U.S. had
proposed. Also, the U.S. fact sheet says only that Iran’s current enriched-uranium stockpile will be reduced; it
does not say what will
happen to uranium enriched during the agreement. We also don’t know what the words “reduced” or
“neutralized” mean. The Obama administration previously claimed that the risk of Iran’s enriched-uranium stockpile had been reduced
because some of it had been converted to uranium powder. Experts later discounted this claim because this process can be reversed in about two
weeks. If Iran’s
enriched-uranium stockpile remains in the country and is only reduced to powder, Iran
will retain the capability to make eight or more nuclear weapons
in about three months. Former IAEA deputy
director Olli Heinonen recently published a chart on Iran’s nuclear “breakout” time that shows how Iran
could make enough enriched
uranium for one weapon in twelve weeks from reactor-grade uranium using 6,000 centrifuges, and how it
could do so in 16 weeks using only 1,000 centrifuges. Click here to view. The
decision to let Iran keep its previously
secret, heavily fortified Fordow enrichment facility is a major American cave . President Obama said in 2012
about this facility: “We know they don’t need to have an underground, fortified facility like Fordow in order to have a peaceful [nuclear]
program.” Bottom line
The preliminary agreement legitimizes — and even allows the advancement of —
Iran’s uranium-enrichment program . It does not appear to delay the breakout time for an Iranian
nuclear weapon. Incredibly, no enrichment equipment or facilities will be disassembled or destroyed. Given
Iran’s long history of cheating on nuclear agreements and covert nuclear activities, allowing it to do any uranium enrichment
is very dangerous. This is why Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel has said that Iran’s enrichment program has only one
purpose: to make nuclear bombs. This is reason enough for the U.S. Congress to reject this agreement and impose new sanctions until Iran
complies with U.N. Security Council resolutions requiring it to halt all uranium enrichment. Inspections and Verification President Obama said
today: “Iran will face strict limitations on its program, and Iran has also agreed to the most robust and intrusive inspections and transparency
regime ever negotiated for any nuclear program in history. So this deal is not based on trust. It’s based on unprecedented verification.” According
to Obama, “If Iran cheats, the world will know it.” The president also said, “Iran has agreed to give the IAEA access to the entire supply chain
that supports Iran’s nuclear program, from uranium mills that provide the raw materials to the centrifuge production and storage facilities that
support the program.” According to the White House fact sheet, the IAEA will have access to these facilities for 20 to 25 years. According to the
fact sheet, Iran has agreed to implement the IAEA additional protocol, which requires it to provide the IAEA with information on declared and
undeclared nuclear sites. Iran also “will be required” to give the IAEA access to possible covert sites related to uranium enrichment. The
president said “Iran’s past efforts to weaponize its program will be addressed.” The fact sheet says “Iran will implement an agreed set of
measures to address the IAEA’s concerns regarding the possible military dimensions of its program.” Comment Although
the
verification measures detailed by the president go beyond what Iran is currently subject to, Tehran has
never fully cooperated with IAEA inspectors . Moreover, this verification plan does not permit snap
inspections and unfettered access to all Iranian nuclear facilities, including military bases where Iran is
believed to have conducted nuclear-weapons work. The agreement also is vague on requiring Iran to
answer questions about past weapons-related work. Iran agreed to a twelve-step program with IAEA in late 2013 to address
these questions but has addressed only one of them. It is hard to trust the Obama administration and Iran on verification and
compliance. Iran violated the terms of the interim agreement that set up the nuclear talks, but the Obama
administration repeatedly has claimed it was in compliance. President Obama again made this false claim in his speech today. Bottom line
Verification of a final agreement must require Iran to answer all outstanding questions about weapons-related
work and allow unfettered access by the IAEA to all facilities where nuclear activities are believed to have taken place. The preliminary
agreement appears to give Iran a pass on previous nuclear-weapons work and set up a verification plan
that will not detect all weapons-related activities. Arak Heavy-Water Reactor According to the White House fact
sheet, Iran will remove the core of this reactor and install a new core so this reactor will not produce weapons-grade plutonium. This reactor will
remain a heavy-water reactor and will be operated for peaceful purposes. Iran has agreed not to reprocess the spent
fuel of this reactor to produce plutonium indefinitely, will sell its excess heavy water not needed for the redesigned reactor, and will not build
more heavy-water reactors for 15 years. Comment Heavy-water reactors are a very serious proliferation risk because they are a source of
plutonium. If this reactor remains a heavy-water reactor, it will be a plutonium source. Iran constructed this reactor in defiance of IAEA
resolutions. Allowing
Tehran to operate it undermines the credibility of the Western states who pushed these
resolutions and increases Iran’s expertise in operating and building plutonium-producing reactors. Sanctions
According to the fact sheet, U.S. and EU sanctions will be lifted after the IAEA verifies that Iran has complied with “all of its key nuclear-related
steps.” These sanctions will “snap back” if Iran fails to comply with its commitments. Previous U.N. Security Council resolutions on Iran will
mostly be lifted if Iran complies with key nuclear-related steps, including resolving possible nuclear-weapons-related activities. As stated above,
the Iranian government appears to believe all sanctions will be lifted immediately. U.S. sanctions on Iran for terrorism, human-rights abuses, and
ballistic missiles will remain in place. Comment Iranian
cheating on nuclear agreements has usually been slow and
subtle. It is unlikely to engage in any unambiguous cheating that will force the Obama administration to restore
sanctions if they are lifted. Moreover, once sanctions are lifted — especially EU and U.N. sanctions — it will be very difficult to
reimpose them. The framework seems to set fairly easy benchmarks that would allow most sanctions against
Iran to be lifted quickly. This would be a boon for the Iranian economy and would generate significantly
more funds that Iran could use to bolster its ever-increasing efforts to interfere with its neighbors and
spread its influence in the Middle East. An American Capitulation This framework appears certain to lead to a
deal that will significantly advance Iran’s uranium-enrichment program,
though agreement is supposed to
reduce the threat from Iran’s nuclear program. By
allowing Iran to improve its expertise in uranium enrichment and
plutonium production and by legitimizing its nuclear program, a deal based on this framework will
increase the risk from an Iranian nuclear weapon . Such an agreement will probably further
destabilize the Middle East and could lead to a regional nuclear-arms race. President Obama’s claim that the only
alternative to this agreement is war with Iran is false. Continuing the status quo would be a much better
outcome
than an agreement that paves the way to an Iranian nuclear bomb. The president claimed that the United States will be blamed for
the failure of diplomacy if Congress kills this deal. I believe the opposite is the case. Our
Middle East friends and allies are likely
to reject this preliminary agreement as a sell-out to the Iranian mullahs that puts their security at risk at a time when Iranian
influence is growing in the region. For the sake of American security and the security of America’s Middle East friends and allies, Congress
must do what it can to kill any nuclear agreement with Iran based on the deeply flawed framework unveiled today.
Deal causes war, Iranian nuclearization and Israeli airstrikes
Flietz, 3/1/15 --- senior fellow with the Center for Security Policy and a former CIA analyst (Fred,
“Why Obama’s Iran deal is a path to war”, New York Post, March 1, 2015,
http://nypost.com/2015/03/01/why-obamas-iran-deal-is-a-path-to-war/)
The Obama administration and its supporters insist
that, although the agreement on Iran’s nuclear program now
taking shape may not be perfect, the only alternative is war with Iran. A failure of the nuclear talks, they
also contend, would sacrifice important temporary agreements that now restrict Iran’s pursuit of
nuclear weapons. Both arguments are false. Worse, the nuclear deal that the administration is pursuing may
make war with Iran more likely . The world would be safer if the nuclear talks with Iran were stopped
now. The agreement being negotiated reportedly would last only 10 years and would leave Iran able to build multiple nuclear bombs in about
three months. Administration leaks describe a deal that lets Iran keep on enriching uranium with as many as
6,500 centrifuges and continuing to work on the Arak heavy-water reactor that will be a source of
plutonium. Such an agreement would destabilize the Middle East— launching a regional nuclear-arms
race as Iran’s Muslim rivals seek to match its capabilities, and perhaps prompting an Israeli airstrike on
Iranian nuclear facilities . Nor have the talks significantly reduced Iran’s nuclear program. Despite
President Obama’s
claims to the contrary, Iran has enriched
uranium at the same rate since the nuclear talks began early last year and increased its stockpile of
enriched uranium. It would take Iran about three months to produce fuel for its first nuclear weapon by refining its low-enriched
uranium to weapons-grade material. At the end of 2013, it had on hand enough low-grade uranium for at least seven bombs; by the end of
2014, enough for at least eight. In answer to criticism that a potential nuclear deal won’t be strong enough, Obama officials have claimed it will
be subject to stringent inspections by International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors. This argument is hard to take seriously: Iran
has
never fully cooperated with the IAEA . During the talks, it has specifically refused to cooperate with
IAEA inspectors — one of its several violations of the interim agreement that set up the talks. The
alternative to a deeply flawed nuclear deal is not war, it is continued stalemate
— more
of the slow
development of the Iranian nuclear program that has persisted despite 13 months of nuclear talks.
Stopping the talks might actually lower regional tensions by easing the fears of Israel, Saudi Arabia
and other states that a weak, short-lived nuclear agreement is coming soon — one that will end
sanctions on Tehran and all restrictions on its future nuclear activities. Congress should not be fooled by the Obama
team’s false claim that it’s either their way on the Iranian nuclear program or war with Iran. The truth is that the flawed agreement
being negotiated will make a war more likely and kicks hard-to-solve elements of Iran’s nuclear program
down the road for a future president to deal with. Far better to halt the nuclear talks and return to the
pre-2012 Western approach that required Iran to end uranium enrichment, disable its centrifuges, send
its enriched-uranium stockpile out of the country and disassemble the Arak reactor. Charles Krauthammer had it
right last week on Fox News: The Iranian nuclear talks are “simply catastrophic.” The real catastrophe will be if this foolish
agreement sparks a regional war in the Middle East.
Iran deal spurs additional proliferation – best experts agree
Josh Rogin JUN 24, 2015 1:05 PM EDT Clinton Defense Chief: Iran Deal Could Spark Proliferation
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-06-24/clinton-defense-chief-iran-deal-could-sparkproliferation
Gulf Arab powers are likely to respond to President Barack Obama’s pending nuclear deal with Iran by
developing their own nuclear programs, former Defense Secretary William Cohen said Wednesday. He
said they don’t trust either the Iranians or the United States to protect their interests.¶ “The
administration’s intent was to have a counter-proliferation program. And the irony is, it may be just the
opposite,” he told a meeting of Bloomberg reporters Wednesday morning.¶ As Secretary of State John
Kerry prepares to meet Iranian leaders for the final push toward a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran,
there’s growing angst in countries like Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Israel about
the deal, which will leave Iran with significant uranium enrichment capabilities and may not give the
international community the right to inspect all of Iran’s nuclear facilities.¶ The administration argues
that a deal with Iran will remove the need for other regional powers to pursue their own nuclear
enrichment and weapons programs. Cohen said the region doesn’t see it that way.¶ “Once you say they
are allowed to enrich, the game is pretty much up in terms of how do you sustain an inspection regime
in a country that has carried on secret programs for 17 years and is still determined to maintain as much
of that secrecy as possible,” said Cohen, who was a Republican lawmaker from Maine before serving
under President Clinton from 1997 to 2001.¶ Other regional powers are further skeptical of the
international community’s ability to enforce any deal with Iran because the Obama administration has
lost credibility in the region, according to Cohen. He said America's relationships in the region were
damaged in 2013, when President Obama backed away from striking Syria after telling Gulf allies he
would do so, even though the Assad regime had crossed his "red line" on chemical weapons.
Our strike defense is safer than emerging deal – locks in wildfire prolif and ally
backlash
Washington Post 2-5-2015 Editorial http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-emergingiran-nuclear-deal-raises-major-concerns-in-congress-and-beyond/2015/02/05/4b80fd92-abda-11e4ad71-7b9eba0f87d6_story.html The emerging Iran nuclear deal raises major concerns
AS THE Obama administration pushes to complete a nuclear accord with Iran, numerous members of Congress, former
secretaries of state and officials of allied governments are expressing concern about the contours of the
emerging deal. Though we have long supported negotiations with Iran as well as the interim agreement the United States and its allies
struck with Tehran, we share several of those concerns and believe they deserve more debate now — before negotiators present the world
with a fait accompli. The
problems raised by authorities ranging from Henry Kissinger, the country’s most senior former secretary of state,
to Sen. Timothy M. Kaine, Virginia’s junior senator, can be summed up in three points: ●First, a process that began with the goal of
eliminating Iran’s potential to produce nuclear weapons has evolved into a plan to tolerate and temporarily restrict that
capability. ●Second, in the course of the negotiations, the Obama administration has declined to counter increasingly aggressive efforts
by Iran to extend its influence across the Middle East and seems ready
to concede Tehran a place as a regional power at
the expense of Israel and other U.S. allies. ●Finally, the Obama administration is signaling that it will seek to
implement any deal it strikes with Iran — including the suspension of sanctions that were originally
imposed by Congress — without a vote by either chamber. Instead, an accord that would have far-reaching
implications for nuclear proliferation and U.S. national security would be imposed unilaterally by a president with less than two
years left in his term. The first and broadest of these problems was outlined by Mr. Kissinger in recent testimony to the Senate Armed Services
Committee. The talks, he pointed out, began as a multilateral effort headed by the European Union and backed by six U.N. Security Council
resolutions intended “to deny Iran the capability to develop a military nuclear option.” Though formally the multilateral talks continue, “these
negotiations have now become an essentially bilateral negotiation” between the United States and Iran “over the scope of that [nuclear]
capability, not its existence,” Mr. Kissinger said. Where it once aimed to eliminate Iran’s ability to enrich uranium, the administration now
appears ready to accept an infrastructure of thousands of Iranian centrifuges. It says its goal is to limit and monitor that
industrial base so that Iran could not produce the material for a warhead in less than a year. As several senators pointed out last month during
a hearing of the Foreign Relations Committee, the prospective deal would leave Iran as a nuclear-threshold state while theoretically
giving the world time to respond if Tehran chose to build a weapon. Even these limited restrictions would remain in
force for only a specified number of years, after which Iran would be free to expand its production of potential bomb materials.
Mr. Kissinger said such an arrangement would very likely prompt other countries in the region, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt
and Turkey, to match Iran’s threshold capability. “The impact . . . will be to transform the negotiations from
preventing proliferation to managing it,” he said. “We will live in a proliferated world in which everybody — even if that
agreement is maintained — will be very close to the trigger point.” A related problem is whether Iran could be prevented from
cheating on any arrangement and acquiring a bomb by stealth. Mr. Kaine (D) underlined that an attempt by the United States to negotiate the
end of North Korea’s nuclear program failed after the regime covertly expanded its facilities. With Iran, said Mr. Kaine, “a nation that has
proven to be very untrustworthy . . . the end result is more likely to be a North Korean situation” if existing infrastructure is not dismantled. The
administration at one time portrayed the nuclear negotiations as distinct from the problem of Iran’s sponsorship of terrorism, its attempts to
establish hegemony over the Arab Middle East and its declared goal of eliminating Israel. Yet while the talks have proceeded, Mr. Obama has
offered assurances to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei that the two countries have shared interests in the region, and the White House
has avoided actions Iran might perceive as hostile — such as supporting military action against the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad. For their
part, the Iranians, as Mr. Kaine put it, “are currently involved in activities to destabilize the governments of [U.S.-allied] nations as near as
Bahrain and as far away as Morocco.” A Tehran-sponsored militia recently overthrew the U.S.-backed government of Yemen. Rather than
contest the Iranian bid for regional hegemony, as has every previous U.S. administration since the 1970s, Mr. Obama
appears ready to
concede Iran a place in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and beyond — a policy that is viewed with alarm by Israel, Saudi
Arabia, Jordan and Turkey, among other allies. Former secretary of state George P. Shultz cited Iran’s regional aggression in
pronouncing himself “very uneasy” about the ongoing negotiations. “They’ve already outmaneuvered us, in my opinion,” he told the Armed
Services Committee.
Causes, doesn’t solve, regional prolif
Kenner 4/2 (David. Middle East Editor @ Foreign Policy “ Iran Deal Threatens to Upend a
Delicate Balance of Power in the Middle East ” 4/2/15 https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/02/iran-dealthreatens-to-upend-a-delicate-balance-of-power-in-the-middle-east-saudi-arabia-nucleardeal/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=Flashpoints&utm_campaign=2014_FlashPo
ints%20[Manual]%20BS%204%2F2)
From Riyadh to Jerusalem, leaders
are watching warily for signs of Tehran’s ascendance.¶ Some analysts believe efforts by
Saudi Arabia to contain the regional repercussions of the deal have already begun. In Yemen, a Saudi-led coalition has
launched airstrikes against Iranian-backed Shiite rebels, while in Syria, Saudi-backed rebels have recently made gains against the Assad regime. ¶ “The timing
of the Yemeni operation was basically to send a clear message to the Iranians, and to the United States, that the
region is going to stand against Iran’s expansionist policy,” said Mustafa Alani, director of the national security and terrorism studies
department at the Gulf Research Center.¶ The intervention in Yemen is only one example of how Saudi Arabia has played a more aggressive role in the Middle East.
Islamist rebels backed by Saudi Arabia recently captured the northern Syrian provincial capital of Idlib from the Assad regime — even as Washington moves slowly
on its plan to train and arm a Syrian rebel force.¶ “We see the beginning of a new policy, where [Saudi] interest is basically more important than U.S. objections or
with Security Council resolutions,” said Alani. “Basically, we are adopting the Iranian style and the Israeli style: When it comes to your national interest, you go
ahead and do it.Ӧ Israel, like Saudi Arabia and its allies, has also raised
a red flag about Iranian expansionism across the
Middle East. Having recently fought wars against Iranian-backed organizations Hezbollah and Hamas — while bombing Assad-allied forces in Syria — its
leaders have been hostile to an agreement that they say will only embolden Tehran. Netanyahu famously spoke in front of the U.S. Congress in March to lay out his
objections to the deal, and as the agreement neared on Thursday, he tweeted an image showing Iran’s interventions across the Arab world and called for an agreement
that “stop[s] its terrorism and aggression.”¶ Tehran’s
allies in the Middle East — from the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah to its many allies in
Baghdad — hope that Iran would be strengthened by the lifting of sanctions and its integration into the
international system. As far back as 2013, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah said, “Our side will be stronger locally, regionally, and internationally” in
the event of a nuclear deal.¶ “Obviously, [Hezbollah leaders] are rooting for a lifting of the sanctions against Iran,” said
Kamal Wazne, a Lebanese political analyst close to the party. “ They felt in the first place that these sanctions were unjust, and
the lifting of the sanctions will allow Iran to engage the international community and give it a better
position at the international arena.”¶ Among Saudi Arabia’s allies elsewhere in the Arab world, there are fears that a bad deal would
also spur a nuclear arms race in the Middle East . Egypt, for instance, has long made the case that the
region should be a nuclear-free zone — a policy meant to pressure Israel into giving up its nuclear
weapons, but which has also constrained the development of nuclear weapons programs elsewhere in the Arab world. If Arab leaders believe that
the current outlines of the deal leave Iran a path to construct a nuclear weapon, “the thinking will be,
‘why don’t we have the same status?’” said Abdel Moneim Said Aly, the director of Cairo’s al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies.
“
That will mean developing all the capabilities for uranium enrichment that Iran got.Ӧ Saudi
Arabia has long been interested in nuclear power and plans to build 16 nuclear reactors over the next two
decades. More concerning to anti-proliferation experts are reports that Riyadh itself is interested in producing fuel for nuclear
reactors. If the kingdom mastered the fuel cycle, that would give it an indigenous source of enriched
uranium that could also be repurposed for a bomb. Asked in late March whether Riyadh would rule out building or acquiring a nuclear
weapon, the Saudi ambassador to the United States, Adel al-Jubeir, said the issue was “not something we would discuss publicly.”
More – high risk the deal freaks out the rest of the region
Bowen 4/3 (Wyn Bowen is professor of non-proliferation and international security at Kings College
London. “What will be the cost of containing Iran?” The Telegraph (UK) 4/3/15, lexis)
Crucially, a
delicate dance of diplomacy has allowed both sides to present the outcome as a victory to
domestic audiences, even if the naysayers – particularly in Tehran and Washington - will remain potential thorns in the side of successful
implementation of the deal.¶ But if the
bargain.
While limiting
deal constitutes a pragmatic solution to a complex problem, it is also something of a Faustian
Tehran’s nuclear activities and providing for an intrusive inspection regime, the
deal also leaves Iran with a considerable enrichment capacity and the technical know-how to advance its
nuclear programme at speed. We have argued elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear programme is best described in
terms of nuclear hedging, a strategy based on the ability to acquire nuclear weapons relatively
quickly should Tehran decide to do so. ¶ The agreement reached in Lausanne implicitly recognises and gives
legitimacy to this strategy . In this context, the compromises that paved the way for a deal raise a whole
new set of non-proliferation challenges .¶ Regional Repercussions¶ One might think that a comprehensive agreement that
constrained Iran’s nuclear weapon potential would do much to address the fears of its neighbours. But this is not necessarily the case as the
uncertainty associated with nuclear hedging, even at a relatively low level, poses almost as many challenges as
the certainty of nuclear weapons acquisition.¶ The problem is that the value of hedging is a matter of perception.
Certainly, hedging holds some weight as a tool of coercion or deterrence, but there is no absolute truth here
and the value that Iran attributes to its position may well differ from how, say, Riyadh views the situation. What Tehran’s
neighbours will agree on is that the legitimacy given to Iranian hedging by the new deal demands a tangible response.¶ At the least, Iranian
hedging could add symbolic weight to Iran’s aspirations to regional hegemony.¶ At worst, an inflated sense
of the value of its position could embolden Iran in a conventional military sense and contribute to further
conflict in the region, potentially pitting Shia Iran against its Sunni Arab neighbours. The recent announcement of a
new joint Arab military force amidst what many describe as a proxy conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia in Yemen is of particular concern in
this regard.¶ Longer term, the
likely response to the new deal is a hedging ‘cascade’ in the Middle East . Saudi
Arabia is already investing significantly in nuclear development and, in a recent interview, former Chief of intelligence
Prince Turki al-Faisal hinted at this very scenario: ‘whatever comes out of these talks, we will want the same’ and ‘if
Iran has the ability to enrich uranium to whatever level, it's not just Saudi Arabia that's going to ask for
that’.