GROUP 1: CORAL SEA AND MIDWAY IN WORLD WAR II
May 7, 1942 - Jun 6, 1942
The attack on Pearl Harbor was just Japan’s first move. Within weeks, Japanese forces had taken Singapore,
Hong, Kong, and the Netherlands' East Indies. American installations at Guam and Wake Island also fell. The
Philippines held out longer, but this crucial American outpost would also be surrendered to the Japanese.
For Americans, the Japanese advance was terrifying and formidable but somewhat illusory. American
resources had not yet been mobilized for war—and when they were, policymakers decided to concentrate first
on the war in Europe. Japan’s early success was tied, to a certain extent, to the American belief that the
Japanese were actually the weaker foe. Once Germany was defeated, Japan would and could be dealt with.
But the success of this strategy relied on certain key facts. A few critical outposts must be retained. The Allies
needed to hang on to Australia so that they could reach the Japanese from the south. And Hawaii could not be
lost. If this stepping stone to the Far East fell, American forces would have an almost impossible time reaching
the distant enemy nation.
Japan understood all this just as clearly, even more so after American planes hit Tokyo on 18 April 1942. The
Allies’ ability to hit them at home had to be reduced and therefore they set their sights on Australia and
Hawaii.
Coral Sea
To achieve the first goal, the Japanese navy resolved, in late April, to capture Port Moresby in New Guinea and
Tulagi, one of the tiny Solomon Islands. From these locations, Japanese bombers could reach Australia and
bomb the Allied nation into submission.
The Americans knew what was happening; they had much earlier broken the Japanese code. They sent two
aircraft carriers loaded with planes to preempt the Japanese attacks. They arrived too late to prevent the
invasion of Tulagi, but they were able to plant themselves in the middle of the Coral Sea in between Australia
and New Guinea. From there, the carriers would try to prevent the Japanese from landing at Port Moresby.
The Japanese matched
this move; they sent two
carriers of their own into
the Coral Sea. On 7 May,
these carriers sent 27
planes out on a risky
nighttime mission to find
and sink the American
ships. But nine were shot
down by American
Wildcats—two others
were destroyed by the
Yorktown when their
pilots mistook the
American carrier for one
of their own in the darkness and tried to land.
The next morning, the battle resumed. The opposing fleets remained separated by hundreds of miles; in fact,
this was the first naval battle in which the opposing ships never saw or fired on one another. Instead, they sent
wave after wave of aircraft to do their fighting.
By the end of the day, the opposing forces had done roughly equal damage. One American carrier was sunk—
the Lexington—74 planes were also lost. The Japanese lost a light carrier and 80 planes. But the significance
of the battle did not lie in the box score. With his decimated fighter force unable to provide adequate protection
for his remaining ships, the Japanese commander withdrew. Japan’s attempt to take Port Moresby had been
turned back. Australia remained, at least for the present, under Allied control.
Midway
Despite their setback in the Coral Sea, the Japanese navy under Admiral Yamamoto embarked in June on the
second part of their Pacific strategy—the capture of Hawaii. Before Hawaii could be taken; however, Midway
must be seized. Located about 1000 miles west of Hawaii, an attack on the American naval installation there
would achieve two things: provide a valuable stepping stone to the larger prize of Hawaii and lure
American ships into a battle that would weaken the American forces needed to defend Hawaii.
To accomplish these objectives, Admiral Yamamoto put together an enormous fleet and a complex plan. To
draw off American vessels, he ordered a largely diversionary attack against US forces in the Aleutian Islands
off the coast of Alaska. To provide warning of American ship movement, he placed subs close to the American
fleet stationed at Pearl Harbor. Then he organized his force into three groups and steamed toward Midway.
American code-breakers gave the American commander in the Pacific, Admiral Chester Nimitz, advance
forewarning of all this. He therefore positioned three carriers, jammed with 233 planes, 300 miles outside
Midway. Somehow, these carriers managed to avoid detection as the Japanese fleet sailed past toward Midway.
As a result, when Vice Admiral Nagumo launched his planes against Midway on 3 June, a large American force
lay about 150 miles behind him.
The Japanese first wave did considerable damage to the island base. But believing a second attack was
necessary, Nagumo ordered his planes armed with bombs, rather than torpedoes, to take out the airbase and
planes still on the ground. As a result, when the planes from the carrier group stationed outside Midway
attacked Nagumo’s fleet, the Japanese were not prepared to retaliate.
Still, the Americans took a terrible hit. All but four of the first 50 planes sent in the first attack waves were shot
down. But the fourth wave caught the Japanese by complete surprise, destroying three carriers. The fourth, and
last, in the Japanese battle group was destroyed the next day.
The American victory was reflected in part by the numbers. Four Japanese carriers and 332 planes were
destroyed. The US lost no carriers and only 147 planes. Strategically, Japan had failed to seize the island
crucial to its larger objective of capturing Hawaii. The United States had managed to stem the Japanese
advance and secure their Pacific outposts. Perhaps just as important, the Japanese military was dealt a
devastating blow to its morale. After Pearl Harbor it had believed itself invincible. Commanders went into
Midway confident that they would further cripple America’s Pacific defenses and neutralize the enemy that
stood between them and their goals in Asia. After Midway, the Japanese military was never quite the same.
GROUP 2: GUADALCANAL IN WORLD WAR II
Aug 7, 1942 - Feb 9, 1943
American success in the Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway did not bring Japanese ambitions in Oceania to an
end. Beginning in July, American and Australian forces engaged in fierce battle with the Japanese for control
of New Guinea.
In August, however, the focus of these battles shifted to Guadalcanal, the largest of the Solomon
Islands. American intelligence reported that the Japanese were building an airfield there—if completed,
Japanese places could easily reach Australia and other critical military installations in Oceania such as Espiritu
Santo.
It looked as if it was going to be an easy operation. On 7 August, American forces landed on Guadalcanal,
subdued the small Japanese force, and seized the airfield. But this initial success was deceptive. The Japanese
could no more allow an American airfield in the Solomons than the Americans could tolerate a Japanese base.
Therefore, the Japanese began to redeeploy forces on Guadalcanal. Fierce
naval battles ensued as both sides tried to
strengthen their forces in the following
months. By mid October, both armies had
deployed close to 25,000 men.
The prize pursued by both armies was the
now completed airfield under American
control. Named Henderson Field, after a
flier killed at Midway, the airstrip
withstood shelling from Japanese ships, air
raids from enemy aircraft, and a major land
assault in late October.
The more concerted attempt to recapture the field, however, came in November. While Japanese destroyers
shelled the field, transports attempted to land an additional 13,000 solders. They eventually landed 4000, but in
just two days, American guns took out two battle ships, several destroyers, and a half dozen transport
ships. More important, during these battles the Americans strengthened their defenses over their transport and
supply lines. By January, American forces approached 60,000, badly outnumbering the Japanese on the island.
With a now decisive manpower advantage, American forces set out to drive the Japanese from Guadalcanal. It
would take more than a month; and 7100 American ground, sea, and air personnel would die in the
process. But by 9 February, the last Japanese soldier had been drive from the island.
The Japanese had paid dearly in their attempt to take Guadalcanal. More important strategically than their loss
of men, they had lost more the 2000 airplanes and dozens of hard-to-replace ships, including two battleships,
three heavy cruisers, and fourteen destroyers. The Americans had also lost a great deal, but in the Pacific, as in
the European theater, the Americans’ ability to replace lost machinery was proving decisive.
GROUP 3: THE PHILIPPINES/LEYTE GULF IN WORLD WAR II
Oct 20, 1944 - Feb 23, 1945
American success at Guadalcanal was a turning point in the war in the Pacific. Japanese designs on Australia
were thwarted, and the US began to actually roll back Japanese gains in the South Pacific.
During 1943, American forces not only continued this advance, they crept closer to Japan itself. In the first half
of the year, they tightened their grip on New Guinea. During the second half of the year, they secured more
territory in the Solomon Islands. They then moved north to the Gilbert, then to the Marshall, and finally to the
Mariana islands. Once these atolls were under American control, the US navy and air force were positioned to
strike Japan from several points along a sweeping arc.
In mid-1944, the United States and General Douglas MacArthur decided to add one other piece to this
defensive-turned-offensive perimeter—the Philippines. In 1942, the egocentric general had promised to
return—now American naval success had made that possible.
The battle for the Philippines involved both land and sea operations. The first wave of American ground
troops—136,000 soldiers from US Sixth Army—landed at Leyte, one of larger islands in the center of the
Philippines on 20 October. The naval battle began three days later on the 23rd.
The battle at sea was the largest of the war, in fact, the largest in history. Two-hundred thousand men and
almost 300 ships did battle over 100,000 square miles of ocean. The American fleet held advantages on the
water but an even greater advantage in the air. In the months before the battle, Americans had plastered the
Japanese air force, first in the Battle of the Philippine Sea and then in raids against Formosa, Okinawa and the
Philippines. Almost 1000 Japanese aircraft were destroyed.
Yet despite all of the technology amassed for the battle, it almost and then did turn on human mistakes at the
top. The Japanese had sent a small decoy force to the north to draw American ships away from the primary
battlefield. Vice-Admiral William Halsey
bit on the fake and dispatched several
ships to the north. Halsey eventually
realized his error and recalled the ships but
not in time. Japanese Vice-Admiral Kurita
Takeo took advantage of the opening left
by Halsey’s foolish flight to the north. He
entered the San Bernardino Straits and
headed for the now thinly protected
American ground troops being deposited
in Leyte. Had he pushed aggressively, he
might have delivered a crippling blow to
the entire landing operation. But he pulled
back. Afraid that he was sailing into a
trap, he withdrew through the straits.
By the time the sea battle of Leyte Gulf
had ended, the Japanese had lost more than
30 ships and 10,000 men. American losses
totaled only six ships and 2800 men. More
important, the American landing on Leyte was achieved and the land operation against Japanese forces could
advance.
Resistance to the newly arrived American ground troops was not insignificant. The 16,000 Japanese troops
already deployed were quickly re-enforced by another 45,000. Difficult terrain and rough weather also
complicated American operations. Yet American numbers and fire-power were simply overwhelming. By the
end of 1944, the island had been taken.
The Japanese subsequently concentrated most of their remaining forces in the Philippines on Luzon. The
fighting that ensued during February 1945 was most vicious in the capital city of Manila—an estimated 100,000
civilians were caught in the cross fire. But the Japanese military casualties were even higher; almost 200,000
Japanese soldiers were killed trying to turn back the American force. Fewer than 8000 American were killed.
Over the six months, American troops systematically worked their way through the remaining Philippine
islands. But the real work was done by February 1945 with the liberation of Manila. The United States had retaken the Philippines and was a step closer to mounting an invasion of the Japanese islands.
GROUP 4: IWO JIMA AND OKINAWA IN WORLD WAR II
Feb 19, 1945 - Jun 21, 1945
By February 1945, the United States had turned back the Japanese advance in the Pacific and had re-taken a
sweeping arc of islands that surrounded the enemy nation. For all these gains, however, two small islands
remained crucial to an invasion of Japan: Iwo Jima and Okinawa. Located to the southeast and south of Japan,
they were only 750 miles from major military and political targets. Their capture would bring even the city of
Tokyo within the range of American B-29 bombers.
Iwo Jima was attacked first. On 19 February, marines landed at the southeastern end of the island and began
working their way toward Mt. Suribachi, a 550 foot dead volcano that the Japanese had turned into an island
fortress. For two months preceding the attack, American bombers had blasted the Japanese defenses. But the
almost daily attacks had forced the Japanese to just dig-in deeper. In addition to their concrete bunkers, they
dug caves into the mountain linked by an intricate web of tunnels.
Against these defenses, the US marines now had to advance. Subject to relentless gunfire and shelling from the
artillery planted in the mountainside, they moved by the inch not the mile. It took four days to advance 1000
yards, scale the volcano, and plant the flag captured in the iconic photograph. But this was hardly the end of the
battle. The marines still had to root out
Japanese defenses stretched across the rest of
the four-mile long island. American planes,
dropping bombs and napalm, tried to force
the Japanese from their concrete
bunkers. Yet they clung tenaciously to their
positions. In fact, they had been ordered not
to mount suicidal banzai charges that secured
their honor but exposed them to deadly fire.
Instead, they stuck to their positions, forcing
the Americans to roust them out bunker by
bunker.
The island was not fully secured until the end
of March. Almost 7000 Americans were
killed; another 18,000 were wounded. But
the Japanese casualties were horrific. Only
200 of the 21,000 soldiers deployed survived
to be taken prisoner.
Next came Okinawa. It presented a far more serious challenge. The island was within range of the land-based
planes in southern Japan but beyond range of American planes launched from the Philippines. The American
landing would, therefore, have to be covered by carrier-launched fighters—carriers that would then be
vulnerable to attack. The Japanese had also deployed more than three times the force on Okinawa than they had
committed to Iwo Jima.
On 1 April, American units landed along the central western coast of the island. Marines were sent to the north;
the army was sent to the south. The marines encountered little resistance and were able to secure this portion of
the island by the middle of April. But the army found the going more tough to the south where the Japanese
had constructed more intricate defenses. Three well-fortified lines crossed the southern tip of the island—when
the American troops managed to take
the first line; the Japanese fell back to
the second. This second line proved
particularly difficult, but then, rather
foolishly, the Japanese abandoned their
defensive position in an attempt to
drive back the Americans. The attack
was repelled and, even more critically,
cost the Japanese valuable
reserves. Soon after the ill-advised
attack, American forces were able to
overrun the second and third lines. In
late June, thousands of Japanese
soldiers committed suicide rather than
be taken prisoner.
Suicidal warfare, in fact, became
Japan’s last hope. Japanese Admiral
Seiichi Ito piloted his massive 80,000
ton battleship—the Yamato—toward
Okinawa without enough fuel for the
return trip. He would not need it. Half way to Okinawa, the ship was sunk by American fighters launched from
American carriers well beyond the range of the Yamato's guns. The kamikazes—that had made their first
appearance during the Battle of Leyte Gulf—also showed up in Okinawa in force. Close to 2000 Japanese
pilots flew a final mission for the emperor. But most of the damage they inflicted (about 35 ships) was on the
radar ships sent to provide advance warning of the kamikazes’ arrival and smaller ships sent to draw the
kamikazes’ attention away from the more valuable carriers.
The Americans paid a large price for Okinawa: 12,000 Allied dead and another 38,000 wounded. But the
Japanese lost more than 100,000 men and an island critical to the defense of Japan. The end of the battle and,
perhaps more graphically, the tactics used by the Japanese during the battle, left little doubt that the end of the
war was near.