BARNARD COLLEGE OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
PALESTINE’S SACRED STRUGGLE: THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL TOURIST
GUIDES TO THE HARAM AL-SHARIF
A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE
FACULTY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF RELIGION
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
BACHELOR OF THE ARTS
BY JENNIFER KOSHNER
NEW YORK, NEW YORK
SPRING 2015
This thesis is dedicated to the memory of the victims of terror perpetrated in the name of
defending the Temple Mount.
May their memory be a blessing.
1
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements…………………………………………………………………………........iii
Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………. 1
Chapter 1
Theoretical Conceptions of Sacred Space…………………………………….………….. 8
Chapter 2
A Muslim Palestinian reimaging of the Haram al-Sharif: Pre-1948…..……………..… 16
Chapter 3
The Jordanian narrative of the Palestinian Haram al-Sharif: 1948-1967…………..…... 30
Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………… 46
Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………………. 49
Glossary of Terms………………………………………………………………………………. 54
2
Acknowledgements
I wish to express my deepest gratitude towards two individuals without whom this thesis
would not have come to fruition. I would like to thank Professor Gale Kenny and Professor
Najam Haider for their guidance throughout the writing process. For their wisdom,
encouragement, and support, I am sincerely grateful. Professor Kenny enhanced my approach to
this study by broadening my intellectual horizons and framing my analysis within theoretical
understandings of sacred space. Professor Haider deepened my understanding of the social and
political realities of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict throughout history by questioning my many
presumptions, and motivated me to pursue my academic passions in the years leading up to this
thesis. Additionally, I would like to thank the Alan Segal Memorial Fund for their generosity,
without their support this thesis would not have been possible.
1
iii
Introduction
“Har Habayit Beyadeinu!” “The Temple Mount is in our hands!” Lieutenant General
Mordechai Gur’s famous proclamation on June 7, 1967 that Israel had conquered the Temple
Mount realized the worst fears of Palestinians.1 The Temple Mount, referred to in Arabic as alHaram al-Sharif, had become emblematic of the Palestinian struggle against Zionist forces
before the creation of the State of Israel in 1948. In the following two decades the Haram alSharif, as the last vestige of Arab sovereignty in historic Palestine, was heralded as a national
symbol of Palestinians. Though venerated as a sacred space for centuries, the Haram al-Sharif
was elevated in significance during the twentieth century, becoming central to Palestinian
nationalist thought. This evolution was catalyzed by two Muslim councils responsible for
administering the Haram al-Sharif as a religious sacred space: the Palestinian Supreme Muslim
Council from 1921-1948, and the Jordanian Supreme Awqaf Council from 1951-1967.
During their tenure the Supreme Muslim Council and the Supreme Awqaf Council
published an international tourist booklet in which they reimagined the history and emphasized
the significance of the Haram al-Sharif. The narrative of the Haram al-Sharif communicated in
the guidebooks was an attempt by the Councils to advance their own political agendas, which
were influenced by the historical context in which the Councils functioned. Although these
Councils did not represent the dominant opinion of the Palestinian community at the time, they
would have a significant influence on how the Haram al-Sharif would come to be perceived
historically. How then is the political and national significance accorded to the Haram al-Sharif
to be understood? Answering this question first requires a familiarity with the Zionist and
Palestinian nationalist movements which emerged in Mandatory Palestine.
1
Yossi Klein Halevi, Like Dreamers: The Story of the Israeli Paratroopers Who Reunited Jerusalem and Divided a
Nation, (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2013), 337.
1
Nationalist Movements and the Temple Mount
In the last century, religious nationalism has become central to the formation of modern
nation-states, especially in Israel and Palestine.2 Controlling and maintaining holy territory, like
the Temple Mount, is an important aspect of the “modern phenomenon of ‘religious
nationalism.’”3 Roger Friedland argues that religious nationalism is “a particular form of
collective representation,” wherein “religion is the basis of political judgment and identity.”4
Religious nationalists, therefore, interpret religiously imbued texts, ideas, and spaces within a
political framework. The first politicization of the Holy Land in religious nationalist terms
during the modern period came with the advent of Zionism, an ideology that accepts Jews as a
distinct people who are divinely bequeathed with ownership of the Holy Land
Zionism first emerged in France in the late nineteenth century, decades before the conflict
over Palestine began. Its roots were in the failure of Jewish communities to assimilate into
Western European society, in the intensification of anti-Semitism bred over centuries, and in the
upsurge of nationalism.5 Convinced that the problem of Jews was purely national, Theodore
Herzl, in 1896, suggested that Jews leave the diaspora, acquire land, and exercise sovereignty in
a state of their own creation, in Palestine.6 Twenty years of lobbying and hard work won the
Zionists official British support for their cause, which was promised in the Balfour Declaration.
If Palestine was to be the embodiment of God’s promise to the chosen people, the Balfour
Declaration was proof of God’s word. With the support of the British, the fledgling Zionist
movement became a serious contender in the future of the Middle East. Within Mandatory
Roger Friedland, “Religious Nationalism and the Problem of Collective Representation,” Annual Review of
Sociology Vol. 27 (2001): 129.
3
Marshall J. Breger, Yitzhak Reiter, and Leonard Hammer, eds., Sacred Space in Israel and Palestine: Religion and
Politics (London and New York: Routledge, 2012), 1.
4
Friedland, “Religious Nationalism,” 126, 139.
5
Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2000), 2.
6
Ibid. Herzl’s ideology was not universally accepted by world Jewry. This is most notable among Sephardi
(Middle Eastern, North African, Spanish, and Persian Jews) Jewish populations.
2
2
Palestine, multiple movements that opposed the religiously inspired Zionism existed. Foremost
among them, expressed in a diversity of political movements, only some of which are religious
in nature, was Palestinian nationalism.
Palestinian nationalism is built around Palestinian identity, a unique self-conception of
the Palestinian nation that can only be fully understood in the context of other histories and
narratives.7 This is partially because Palestinian identity has always been fused with “a sense of
identity on so many other levels, whether Islamic or Christian, Ottoman or Arab, local or
universal, or family and tribal.”8 It is also partially because the Palestinian narrative historically
has intersected with “other powerful narratives, religious and national,” sometimes drawing from
them and at other times clashing with them.9 Edward Said writes in the afterword to
Orientalism, “the development and maintenance of every culture require the existence of
another, different and competing alter ego. The construction of identity… involves the
construction of opposites and ‘others’ whose actuality is always subject to the continuous
interpretation and reinterpretation of their differences from ‘us.’”10
Although Palestinian national identity was undoubtedly forged against the threat of
Zionism, it was also “ushered into its own independent existence” resulting from the disarray of
the Arab nationalist movement.11 The Arabs of the Fertile Crescent had only ever been
“accustomed to an imperial identity and existence during which political allegiance belonged to
a ‘universal’ Islamic state.” 12 As such the Arabs could not immediately develop a sense of
national identity after the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire in 1918. Therefore separate
7
Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2010), 9.
8
Ibid., 6.
9
Ibid.
10
Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1992), 331-332.
11
Muhammad Muslih, The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), x.
12
Ibid., 3.
3
Arab territorial nationalities emerged. A strong national sentiment, however, did not take firm
root among the majority of Palestine’s Christian and Muslim inhabitants until the early twentieth
century, when Zionist land purchases and immigration registered as a threat to the native Arab
population.13 Their fears were especially pronounced by increasing Zionist activity in the holy
city of Jerusalem. Only then did the “rivalry for control of Jerusalem between Islam and
Christianity-a rivalry that began in the seventh century with the city’s conquest by Muslim
armies from Byzantium,” abate, with Christian and Muslim Palestinians forming a fully-fledged
Arab opposition against Zionism.14 The conflicts between Palestine’s Arabs and the Zionists
were most pronounced over the ancient city of Jerusalem.
Jerusalem became a central unifying symbol common throughout most Palestinian
narratives, Christian and Muslim. Because of its status as the “geographical, spiritual, political,
and administrative center of Palestine,” it was the site of “the most extreme instances of the
various local parties’ attempts to assert physical control over the country, and to obtain
validation” for their claims.15 These struggles were most pronounced over the Haram al-Sharif.
The issue of political and religious sovereignty over the Haram al-Sharif, however, was not of
concern to all Arabs who opposed Zionism. Indeed there was no single united movement against
Zionism. Rather four distinct trends of Arab opposition emerged: “opposition on the ground that
the Jews were not loyal Ottoman subjects, Palestinian patriotism, Arabism, and Islam.”16 In the
course of this thesis I will analyze the evolution of the Haram al-Sharif as a sacred space within
the Islamist Palestinian opposition.
13
Ibid., 79.
Khalidi, Palestinian Identity, 16.
15
Ibid., 14.
16
Muslih, Palestinian Nationalism, 79.
14
4
The Haram al-Sharif as a Case Study
Historically the Temple Mount was revered as a holy site by many religions and
venerated by many civilizations, yet during the twentieth century it was assigned additional
significance and identified as the national symbol of Palestine. For example, posters frequently
plastered in the streets of Palestine feature the Haram al-Sharif’s Dome of the Rock prominently
in the foreground, and Palestinians cite threats to the Haram al-Sharif’s Aqsa Mosque as a
justification for resistance against Israeli occupation. The point of this thesis, however, is not to
argue that the Haram al-Sharif is the most significant religio-national symbol of Palestinians.
This would be an exaggerated claim that fails to take into account the religious and political
diversity of the Palestinian nation. Instead I will examine several editions of an international
tourist guidebook published by the Muslim religious authorities that patronized the Haram alSharif from 1921 until 1967. In the course of A Brief Guide to al-Haram al-Sharif, published
from 1925 until 1937, the Palestinian Supreme Muslim Council argued that though Jews had
historic connections to the Haram al-Sharif, they were mitigated by the modern associations of
the site with Islam. The historical narrative championed by the Supreme Awqaf Council, in A
Brief Guide to the Dome of the Rock and al-Haram al-Sharif, which was published from 19561967, was meant to legitimize the Jordanian regime’s sovereignty over historic Palestine and its
people by erasing a Palestinian national identity. I argue that an analysis of the evolution of
these historical narratives demonstrates a shift in political agenda that influenced polemical
arguments made within the guides. The narratives promoted within these tourist’s guidebooks
would have a significant influence on Palestinian society, ultimately determining the character of
the modern Palestinian narrative.
5
Although there exists a wealth of scholarly work on Israeli-Palestinian history and
politics from the late 1880s until the modern day, no comprehensive studies on the evolution of
the Haram al-Sharif within the Palestinian narrative exist. The absence of such a study is
strange given the centrality of the Haram al-Sharif within the Palestinian national narrative.
Since 1967 the Haram al-Sharif has percolated all aspects of Palestinian society and has
repeatedly been emphasized as the single most important issue to Palestinians in peace
negotiations. My evaluation of this transformation will center on an analysis of the historical
narratives of the Haram al-Sharif published by the Palestinian Supreme Muslim Council and the
Jordanian Supreme Awqaf Council in their international tourist guides to the site. This enables a
deeper understanding of the elevation of the Haram al-Sharif within the Palestinian national
narrative and helps to illuminate how historical forces influenced the perception of the Haram.
My thesis is therefore concerned with the social and political climate of these four decades, and
the way in which it determined the national agendas of the Palestinian leadership and the
Jordanian government, as reflected in the guidebooks.
I turn in my first chapter to a discussion of the various theoretical frameworks that I will
employ throughout my analysis. These help to clarify how social and political pressures
influence religious and nationalist conceptions of a sacred space. In the second chapter I analyze
the historical narrative presented by the Supreme Muslim Council in A Brief Guide to al-Haram
al-Sharif in the context of Mandatory Palestine. By evaluating the social and political pressures
experienced by the Supreme Muslim Council, particularly the rapid influx of Zionist immigrants
to Palestine, I explain how the Haram al-Sharif was transformed into a symbol of the Palestinian
struggle, advancing the political agenda of the Supreme Muslim Council’s Hajj Amin alHusayni. My third chapter builds on the historical model of the Supreme Muslim Council,
6
analyzing the various departures of the Supreme Awqaf Council from their predecessor’s
version. These departures clarify Jordanian political aims, and how they used the Haram alSharif to legitimize their rule. Both close analyses demonstrate that in the case of Haram alSharif, the site was coopted to advance the political agendas of religious authorities and that the
subsequent narratives they promoted would have a lasting impact on the significance according
to the sacred space by Palestinians.
7
Chapter 1
Theoretical Conceptions of Sacred Space
Nestled in the Judean hills of modern-day Israel is one of the oldest cities in recorded
history. Considered a holy site to the three great Abrahamic faiths of Judaism, Christianity, and
Islam, the old city of Jerusalem is steeped in historical significance and religious symbolism. To
walk the streets of the ancient city is, to believing individuals, to trace the paths of biblical
figures like Abraham, David, Solomon, and Jesus in the place where God’s presence resides on
earth. To others, to visit Jerusalem is to see one of the most ancient and well-preserved physical
manifestations of human belief in the divine. This is no more apparent than in the heart of
Jerusalem, at the Temple Mount. Used as a focal point of religious activity for thousands of
years, the Temple Mount has long been viewed as a place of holiness and sanctity. What,
though, does it mean that the Temple Mount is a sacred place, that Jerusalem is a holy city?
Answering this question requires understanding how sacred space is ritualized, reimagined, and
contested.
The sacred character of the Temple Mount has been enhanced through its location at the
nexus of human ritual practice and social life. For centuries it has been the object of
institutionalized ritual pilgrimage and etiological myth, identified as “a special place… from
which profane life is excluded.”17 French sociologist Emile Durkheim argued that all religious
systems divide the world between two categories, the sacred and the profane.18 “Profane”
objects are considered mundane and without any communal rituals to elevate them. This makes
them the concern of the individual. In contrast that which is “sacred” facilitates the unity of a
17
Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, trans. K. Fields (New York: The Free Press, 1995),
312.
18
Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, trans. C. Cosman (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2001), 36.
8
collective by constituting “a centre of organization around which a group of beliefs and rites”
gravitates.19 This duality, Durkheim theorized, leads to a hierarchy in which the sacred is
considered to be superior to the profane, and is venerated as such. Durkheim believed that this
distinction between “sacred” and “profane" in religious life could be applied to geographical
properties to distinguish a space as sacred.20 The Temple Mount has historically functioned in
this capacity, and has therefore been uniquely distinguished from the landscape of the holy land.
The sacred element of the Temple Mount has been further emphasized through its
identification as the geographical manifestation of divine presence on earth, where the human
and the divine meet. The absence of such a divine presence and higher order effectively
constitutes a chaos that Romanian scholar Mircea Eliade deemed profane space. These areas
“without structure of consistency, amorphous” and homogenous, Eliade theorized, exist as a
default whereas sacred space must be actively created.21 The construction of sacred space
occurs through a hierophany, which Eliade defined as a manifestation of the sacred, as
experienced through the senses.22 The experience of the sacred, through the hierophany,
fractures the continuity of profane space thereby revealing “an absolute reality, opposed to the
non-reality of the vast surrounding space.”23 These spaces, which acquire an element of
sacredness, reverse the chaos of profane areas, transforming them into grounded loci of cosmic
order. Eliade argued further that the creation of sacred space facilitates human existence,
enabling them “to live in a real sense” by acquiring “orientation in the chaos of homogeneity.”24
19
Ibid., 40.
Marshall J. Breger, Yitzhak Reiter, and Leonard Hammer, eds., Holy Places in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
(London and New York: Routledge, 2010), 2.
21
Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane, trans. W. R. Task (London and New York: Harper & Row Publishers,
1959), 20.
22
Ibid., 11.
23
Ibid., 21.
24
Ibid., 23.
20
9
Durkheim’s and Eliade’s theories form the foundational work for all analyses of sacred
space, explaining the religious meaning ascribed by primitive religious peoples to holy sites; yet,
these theories do not account for the political aspects of sacred space that are relevant in later
historical periods and in a modern context. The patronage of the Haram al-Sharif by Palestinian
Muslims, for example, was a distinctly political act that symbolically mitigated the threats to
their national sovereignty by Zionist forces. In this way the Temple Mount was ascribed with
political significance that became as important, if not more, than its ritual function. Dutch
theologian Gerardus Van der Leeuw briefly explored this politicized aspect of sacred space,
arguing that a space becomes sacred through appropriation, possession, and ownership. The
designation of a space as “sacred,” he suggested, can be seen as a politically motivated action,
where the purpose of that action is the “conquest of the space.”25
The modern conquest of the Temple Mount by Palestinian and Jordanian Muslim
authorities in the twentieth century had it roots in a long history of reinterpreting and
appropriating religious sacred spaces. Throughout the centuries, as empires have risen and
fallen, victors have established their “new political order as the natural successor of the old by
appropriating religious centers associated with the vanquished.”26 In patronizing principal sacred
places, these new powers legitimized their right to rule and reordered the social hierarchy.27 This
practice was essential to the endurance of many empires, especially the Umayyad Caliphate, a
Muslim dynasty that spread out from Mecca to conquer most of the Middle East and North
Africa.
25
D. Chidester and E.T. Linenthal, eds., American Sacred Space (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 6.
Margaret Cormack eds., Muslims and Others in Sacred Space (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2013), 9.
27
Ibid., 8.
26
10
Throughout their reign from 661 to 750 CE, the Umayyad dynasty appropriated sacred
spaces that had a history of significance to other religious communities for political gain,
expanding their religious associations to include Islam. The usage of “physical symbols of
political and religious power… was part of the early Islamic process of identity formation.” 28 By
adding to the history of sacred spaces, the new religion gained legitimacy as heir “to the biblical
prophetic tradition.”29 Thus the Umayyads began a campaign of sponsoring newly conquered
“pre-Islamic biblical sites as a component of their program to articulate an Islamically dominant
sacred topography,” most famously, the Great Mosque of Damascus and the Dome of the Rock
on the Temple Mount.30 In the pre-modern world, the relationship of a ruler to a sacred location
was a symbol that “held broader theological implications about one’s standing in this world and
the next.”31 Custody of a holy space was indicative of divinely granted power and an established
right to rule. Consequently many sites viewed as sacred, with a long history of religious
veneration, were converted by the Umayyads into Muslim shrines and mosques.
The Great Mosque of Damascus, like the Dome of the Rock, was built by the Umayyads
in order to incorporate “a sacred landscape marked by holy sites into their own religious
practice,” while publicly demonstrating Umayyad authority and Islamic superiority to
Christianity.32 The Great Mosque was previously a church associated with John the Baptist,
rumored to be the burial ground of his holy head.33 In the century before the construction of the
Great Mosque, Christian cultic worship of the saint’s relics developed in the church. After the
conquest of Byzantine Damascus by Umayyad caliph al-Walīd ibn ‘Abd al-Malik in the early
28
Nancy Khalek, Damascus after the Muslim Conquest: Text and Image in Early Islam (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2011), 94.
29
Ibid., 85.
30
Ibid., 122.
31
Ibid., 92.
32
Ibid., 94.
33
Ibid., 86.
11
eighth century, the site’s existing sacred character was appropriated and the church was
rededicated as a Muslim shrine to John the Baptist.34 The transition of the shrine from Christian
to Muslim ownership was intended to demonstrate the supersession of the biblical prophetic
tradition by Islam, a tactic later employed by the Muslim Palestinians who patronized the
Temple Mount.35 The relics of the Baptist became a theological and dogmatic symbol for the
Umayyad caliph, where their presence “added significantly to the preeminence of the
building.”36 Umayyad caliph al-Walīd’s patronage of the site thus acknowledged that
“veneration of the Baptist was an important part of the sacred landscape of Byzantine
Damascus,” while affirming Umayyad political and religious authority over the city.37 By
constructing a magnificent mosque and adding onto the established religious significance of the
site, al-Walīd conquered the physical spaces of Damascus and earned the loyalty of its citizens.
The Great Mosque in Damascus was explicitly linked to the Dome of the Rock in its
symbolism and political rationale, where both mosques were constructed for the purpose of
communicating political hegemony by building on the existing religious history of sacred
spaces.38 The Dome of the Rock was constructed by Umayyad caliph ‘Abd al-Malik atop an
older sanctuary, for the primary purpose of cementing Umayyad sovereignty and answering
Christian and Jewish detractors by “making Jerusalem visually Islamic.”39 Through refashioning
the physical character of the ancient site of Mount Moriah, ‘Abd al-Malik signaled that
“Christian prophecy was voided and the Jewish mount rehabilitated... [as] a sanctuary dedicated
34
Ibid., 48.
Ibid., 85.
36
Ibid., 98.
37
Ibid., 93.
38
Ibid., 112. The Temple Mount is believed by Jews and Muslims to be the site of the ancient Mount Moriah,
where Abraham nearly sacrificed his son at the command of God.
39
Chase F. Robinson, ‘Abd al-Malik (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2005), 7. The Temple Mount in Jerusalem
was also chosen for this display of Umayyad strength by ‘Abd al-Malīk because the holy cities of Mecca and
Medina were controlled by a rival power, Ibn al-Zubayr. For further detail of this topic, see Oleg Grabar and Said
Nuseibeh, The Dome of the Rock (New York: Rizzoli, 1996), 47.
35
12
to the victorious faith:” Islam.40 The Haram al-Sharif was thus transformed into a religious and
political symbol, embodying the idea that Islam was “the continuation and final statement of the
faith of the People of the Book,” and the Umayyads were the natural successors of Jewish and
Christian ownership of Jerusalem.41 By incorporating existing sacred character into a new
narrative and building anew on the Haram al-Sharif, “the Muslims committed a political act:
taking possession for the new faith of one of the most sacred spots on earth and altering the
pattern imposed on that spot.”42
In more recent history, the sacred character of the Temple Mount has been influenced by
social and political pressures on the religious bodies that patronize the site. Van der Leeuw
proposed that in addition to conquest and appropriation, a politics of exclusion is an important
component of creating sacred space. Although sacred places function as locations for navigating
and negotiating human relationships, particular individuals can be “left out, kept out, or forced
out.”43 The narratives of the Haram al-Sharif as a sacred space, published by Palestinian and
Jordanian Muslim authorities in A Brief Guide to al-Haram al-Sharif and A Brief Guide to the
Dome of the Rock and al-Haram al-Sharif, for example, were defined by the exclusion of certain
religious and national identities. The sanctity of the space is thus “certified by maintaining and
reinforcing boundaries that [keep] certain persons outside the sacred place.”44 The failure to
enforce the exclusion of these people, therefore, threatens the fundamental integrity of the sacred
space.
American scholars David Chidester and Edward Linenthal explore the impact of these
pressures on the perception of holy places in a modern context. Chidester and Linenthal ground
Oleg Grabar, “The Umayyad Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem,” Ars Orientalis 3 (1959): 57.
Ibid., 56.
42
Ibid., 42.
43
Chidester, and Linenthal, American Sacred Space, 8.
44
Ibid.
40
41
13
their theory in an understanding that sacred space exists not only in the heavenly realm, but also
in the context of mundane reality. They claim that “sacred space is inevitably entangled with the
entrepreneurial, the social, the political, and other ‘profane’ forces.”45 Building on the
theoretical foundations established by Durkheim, Eliade, and Van der Leuuw, Chidester and
Linenthal identify sacred space as ritual space subject to interpretation, in which are anchored
“relations of meaning and power that are at stake in the formation of a larger social reality.”46
Inevitably, they claim, sacred spaces also become contested places. Drawing on Foucault, they
explain this to be because control over sacred spaces indicates power, where the ownership of
symbolic sacred capital is used to demonstrate and reinforce power relations.47 Thus sacred
spaces are subject to the politics of power struggles between rulers and subjects, exclusion,
inclusion, and ownership.
Jerusalem is a site of tremendous religious and political controversy that has become
particularly pronounced in the last century. Historically the city was conquered and
reconquered, its religious symbolism expanded and reinterpreted to suit the political needs of its
new custodians. Chidester and Linenthal suggest that in a modern context, as their meaning is
recast, “ancient sacred places become potent counter-sites of political resistance.”48 This, they
argue, is because sacred spaces are often “experienced as most sacred by those who perceive
[them] at risk of being desecrated” by economic, social, and political forces or of seizure by
some other entity that is liable to defile them.49 Jerusalem, specifically the Haram al-Sharif, is a
clear example of this trend.
45
Ibid., 17.
Ibid., 9, 12, 15, 17.
47
Ibid., 16.
48
Ibid., 3.
49
Ibid., 17; Breger, Reiter, and Hammer, Holy Places, 3.
46
14
In the course of the following chapters I will utilize the existing theory of sacred space to
analyze the international tourist guides published during the patronage of the Haram al-Sharif by
Palestinian and Jordanian Muslim authorities during the twentieth century. While scholars like
Durkheim and Eliade evaluate sacred space in a religious and social context, Van der Leuuw,
Chidester, and Linenthal explore the politicization of sacred space. All of these scholars focus
on the sacred element of space itself, and analyze how this character is formed and influenced.
My close analysis of international tourist guides A Brief Guide to al-Haram al-Sharif and A Brief
Guide to the Dome of the Rock and al-Haram al-Sharif, however, will enrich scholarly
understandings of sacred space in the modern context by exploring how the sacred aspect of
space can be coopted and used to influence and change contemporary politics. In the following
chapter, I will trace how Hajj Amin al-Husayni and the Supreme Muslim Council re-envisioned
the Haram al-Sharif within A Brief Guide to al-Haram al-Sharif, thereby acting in a significant
role and influencing the course of history.
15
Chapter 2
A Muslim Palestinian reimaging of the Haram al-Sharif: Pre-1948
The creation of the Supreme Muslim Council and the appointment of Hajj Amin alHusayni, the Mufti of Jerusalem, as its president by the British was a landmark event in the
history of Palestine. Under the Supreme Muslim Council, the Haram al-Sharif, a place of
profound religious significance for Muslims around the globe, became a symbol of solidarity
with the Palestinian cause and an outlet of protest for Palestinian Muslims. I analyze the
Supreme Muslim Council’s A Brief Guide to al-Haram al-Sharif in the context of Mandatory
Palestine, to understand how these religious authorities reimagined a religious sacred space in
order to support their own agenda and further the Palestinian national cause. A cursory
examination of the guidebooks suggests that the historical narrative promoted by the Supreme
Muslim Council therein is emblematic of the greater struggle occurring at the time among
Palestinian Arabs to free Palestine from British and Zionist influence, and to reassert their
historical birthright to the land. I argue that the purpose of the Supreme Muslim Council’s
particular representation of the Haram in A Brief Guide to al-Haram al-Sharif was twofold:
convincing international visitors to Jerusalem of the site’s distinctly Muslim character while
refuting Zionist claims to the site, and further reinforcing the centrality of the Haram al-Sharif
within Palestine.
This chapter explores the historical narrative of the Haram al-Sharif promoted by the
Supreme Muslim Council within A Brief Guide to al-Haram al-Sharif, and how it was influenced
by the Palestinian struggle and the political agenda of the Supreme Muslim Council’s President
Hajj Amin al-Husayni. The first part examines the historical context in which the Supreme
Muslim Council was established. The second part evaluates how attempts by Hajj Amin al16
Husayni to further his personal and national ambitions, and by the Supreme Muslim Council to
realize Palestinian national aims, influenced the content within A Brief Guide to al-Haram alSharif. The final part explores how a growing Zionist presence in Palestine further informed the
claims made within A Brief Guide to al-Haram al-Sharif.
The Supreme Muslim Council in Mandatory Palestine
The Supreme Muslim Council was created by the British in 1921 against the backdrop of
the social and political chaos that consumed the British Mandate for Palestine. Frequent clashes
between Zionists and Palestinian Arabs and controversial policies had destabilized the British
mandate from its onset. The mandate had been established and based upon the terms of the
Balfour Declaration, institutionalizing a clear bias in favor of the Zionists.50 In the Declaration,
Britain’s Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour in 1917 wrote, “His Majesty’s Government view with
favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their
best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object.”51 By patronizing Zionist endeavors
under the terms of the mandate, the British distinctly and purposefully neglected Palestine’s
Arabs, who constituted more than 90 percent of the country.52 Furthermore the mandatory
government ignored the religious and social diversity of Palestinian communities, treating
Palestine’s Arab population as if it were uniformly Muslim.
The reality, however, was that the Muslim and Christian populations of Palestine were
united, to a degree, by a common national bond. Even before the years of World War I, Muslim
and Christian Arabs had begun to identify with their country, calling themselves “Palestinians.”
50
Eugene Rogan, The Arabs: A History (New York: Basic Books, 2009), 197. Avi Shlaim, Collusion Across the
Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionist Movement, and the Partition of Palestine (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1988), 3.
51
Avi Shlaim, Israel and Palestine: Reappraisals, Revisions, Refutations (New York: Verso, 2009), 4.
52
Philip Mattar, The Mufti of Jerusalem: Al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni and the Palestinian National Movement, (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 21.
17
The constant influx of Zionist Jews, their dramatic population growth, and their increasing
influence catalyzed by the Balfour Declaration alarmed both Palestine’s Christians and Muslims,
and influenced how they perceived their national identity. Yet their Palestinian character was
defined by more than an opposition to the “other.” It was also characterized by a profound
religious connection to Palestine as a holy land. Although Muslims and Christians had different
conceptions of what made Palestine a sacred territory, “they shared a similar general idea of the
country as a unit, and as being special and holy.”53 This shared view of Palestine promoted a
common pride and local patriotism among many Muslim and Christian Palestinians. Feeling
increasingly threatened as they watched their stake in their homeland rapidly shrinking, they
began to organize themselves as a distinctly Palestinian body in protest.
Rashid Khalidi, a prominent scholar of Palestinian history, notes that historically the
British sought to exploit societal divisions within “colonized societies in order to rule them more
effectively.”54 Therefore in governing Mandatory Palestine, the British strategically overlooked
the Arab Christian population, treating all Palestinians as Muslims, in order to promote
immediate imperial interests. This enabled the British to portray the relationship between
European Zionist Jews and Palestine’s Arabs “as one of medieval religious hatred rather than
modern political conflict.”55 Laura Robson, a scholar of Middle Eastern history, argues that in
this way the British legitimized their rule, since they could claim that they acted as a necessary
mediator “among warring parties in a Palestine hidebound by primitive religious feeling.”56
In order to pacify the volatile populations of Zionist Jews and Palestinian Arabs, the
British established administrative entities for each population within the mandatory system. The
53
Khalidi, Palestinian Identity, 150.
Ibid., 189; A.J. Christopher, “’Divide and Rule’: The Impress of British Separation Policies,” Area Vol. 20
(1988): 233.
55
Laura Robson, Colonialism and Christianity in Mandate Palestine (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2011), 159.
56
Ibid.
54
18
British strategically granted this concession of control over religious affairs in an effort to
maintain their authority by distinguishing and differentiating between Palestine’s peoples. But
because the British disregarded the religious diversity of Palestinians, the “Palestinian” council
was a solely Muslim body. The Supreme Muslim Council and its twin, the Jewish Agency, were
described by the British as parallels to the mandatory government.57 Both were identified as
religious authorities, where the concession of religious power to Palestine’s Jews and Muslims
was meant to reassure the collective population of Palestine that they had a significant role in the
administration of their own individual communities.
The Mufti’s Agenda and the Supreme Muslim Council
From its formation until the late 1930s, the Supreme Muslim Council expanded its
activities beyond the administration of Muslim religious affairs under the direction of Hajj Amin
al-Husayni. Al-Husayni was a young, politicized, and progressive member of an aristocratic
Jerusalem family, who rose to prominence within Mandatory Palestine.58 Though appointed by
the British as Mufti of Jerusalem and president of the Supreme Muslim Council, al-Husayni
became a prominent national leader in Palestine, deeply involved in the Islamic Arab opposition
to Zionist presence. A powerful man within the political landscape of Palestine, al-Husayni used
his positions to further his personal and national political ambitions. Al-Husayni constantly
sought additional political power for himself, but he was also deeply committed to realizing the
national ambitions of Palestinians. Capitalizing on his role as the Mufti of Jerusalem and the
president of the Supreme Muslim Council, al-Husayni presented himself as the national leader of
the Palestinians in order to legitimize the authority of the Supreme Muslim Council and garner
support for the Palestinian national cause.
57
Uri M. Kupferschmidt, The Supreme Muslim Council: Islam under the British mandate for Palestine (New York:
E.J. Brill, 1987), 2. Shlaim, Israel and Palestine, 16.
58
Mattar, The Mufti, 24.
19
Hajj Amin al-Husayni’s chief instrument for achieving these aims was the Haram alSharif, a sacred site with nationally recognized significance. Under the direction of al-Husayni,
the Supreme Muslim Council dramatically updated the management of the site, redefining how it
was to be perceived on an international scale. The restorations to the Haram attracted
international tourists who frequented the Haram in greater numbers, prompting al-Husayni and
the Council to exploit this foreign attention for their own means. They capitalized on the
Haram’s attraction, charging admission to the site for all non-Muslims in order to better finance
the administration of the Haram.59 They also began to publish a small tourists’ booklet,
available for purchase by visitors to Jerusalem, which they used to redefine the significance and
symbolism of the Haram al-Sharif within Mandatory Palestine.60
Between the years of 1924 and 1948, under the direction of Hajj Amin al-Husayni, the
Supreme Muslim Council created and published A Brief Guide to al-Haram al-Sharif, which
they issued only four times. The first two versions of the guidebook were printed in 1924 and
1925. The Supreme Muslim Council later reprinted the booklet in 1930, and issued the final
edition in 1935.61 Each copy of A Brief Guide to al-Haram al-Sharif was identical in substance
and content. It is curious that though the booklet was printed in specific years, as the political
landscape of Palestine constantly evolved, the material in A Brief Guide to al-Haram al-Sharif
did not. It seems then that the Supreme Muslim Council was repeatedly confronted with
responding to unchanging significant pressures during this period, explaining the uniform nature
59
Yitzhak Reiter, Islamic Institutions in Jerusalem: Palestinian Muslim Organization under Jordanian and Israel
Rule, (Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1977), 89.
60
Material knowledge of how many guides were actually published by the Supreme Muslim Council and how
widely they were circulated is not available.
61
Subsequent editions of this publication were printed in 1954, 1955, 1960, 1961, 1962, 1964, 1965, and 1966 by
the Jordanian Supreme Awqaf Council.
20
of the guidebooks.62 Critical evaluation of the political and social climate of Palestine during
this time clarifies the challenges to which Hajj Amin al-Husayni and the Supreme Muslim
Council responded, and how A Brief Guide to al-Haram al-Sharif was authored as a response to
the various threats of British governance and Zionist presence.
Throughout the years of escalating tension, Hajj Amin al-Husayni struggled to
convincingly establish himself as a national leader of all Palestinians. To a world audience
poorly versed in the nuanced demographic makeup of Palestine, the Mufti could easily appear as
the national leader of Palestinians, being presented so in countless foreign papers. He was
recognized not only as the “Grand Mufti of Palestine” but he was considered to be “the most
important Arab leader” in the British’s mandate.63 Within Palestine, however, his station was
more dubious. To Palestinian Arabs familiar with the politics of their country, his influence was
limited to the religious sphere. As Mufti of Jerusalem and president of the Supreme Muslim
Council, al-Husayni was confined by religious roles that prevented him, and the Supreme
Muslim Council, from legitimately representing both Muslim and Christian Palestinians. In
order to legitimize his rule and that of the Council, he presented himself as the chief defender of
the Islamic holy places, a station with historical sovereign significance in Arab societies, by
connecting himself to a genealogy of Arab rulers who patronized the Haram al-Sharif.64
The narrative of the Haram al-Sharif put forth in A Brief Guide to al-Haram al-Sharif
distinguished legitimate rulers to be those who acted as earnest caretakers of the Haram alSharif. The guidebook states that when the Caliph ‘Umar first occupied Jerusalem in 637 CE,
finding “little more than desolation and rubbish,” “one of his first acts was to repair” the Haram
62
Although there is no evidence to explain why the Supreme Muslim Council published the guidebooks in the
specific years that it did, an interesting mental exercise would be to try and discern why the guidebooks were
published only in certain years. Perhaps there are specific correlations with historical events?
63
“Government is Hit by Official Inquiry in Palestine Riots.” The Washington Post. January 12, 1930, 15.
64
Tom Segev, One Palestine, (London: Abacus, 2007), 304.
21
al-Sharif.65 It detailed further that to the first patron of the Dome of the Rock, ‘Abd al-Malik,
the Haram al-Sharif ‘s “glorification seemed as obvious duty.”66 What he built in 691 CE was
described as being “of unsurpassed magnificence” and was carefully restored in 1022 CE by the
Caliph Hakem.67 Like the Muslim leaders before him, “one of [Saladin’s] first acts” after
conquering the Holy Land in 1187 CE was restoring the Haram al-Sharif by carrying out
“important embellishments” of tremendous beauty and expense.68 Similarly the Turkish sultan
Suleiman the Magnificent turned his attention to restoring the Haram al-Sharif after conquering
the area, carrying “out a wholesale renovation” during his reign from 1520-1566 CE. The
guidebook then concludes by connecting the Supreme Muslim Council to this historic custodial
lineage, stating that it was “the present concern of the authorities of the Haram to try and undo
the damage and restore” the Haram al-Sharif to its former glory.69
Hajj Amin al-Husayni’s strategic portrayal of the Supreme Muslim Council as a
continuation in the custodial genealogy of the Haram al-Sharif empowered al-Husayni and the
Supreme Muslim Council within the political landscape of Palestine. By consolidating his
religious power, although he was not directly involved in Palestinian politics or diplomacy, alHusayni was able to increase his political influence.70 A man with deep national convictions,
Hajj Amin al-Husayni used the power he derived from his positions as Mufti of Jerusalem and
president of the Supreme Muslim Council to support the Palestinian national cause, morally and
materially, from within a distinctly religious framework. Under his guidance, the Supreme
Muslim Council catalyzed an Islamic revival throughout Palestine, simultaneously awakening
65
Supreme Muslim Council, A Brief Guide to al-Haram al-Sharif, (Jerusalem: Moslem Orphanage Press, 1925), 4.
Ibid,. 6.
67
Ibid.
68
Ibid.
69
Ibid., 8.
70
Mattar, The Mufti, 30.
66
22
nationalist sentiments among Palestinian Muslims.
The Mufti inspired national pride in Palestinian Muslims by reviving the importance of
Jerusalem among Muslims and Arabs through the Supreme Muslim Council’s patronage of the
Haram al-Sharif.71 The Council assumed the task of preserving and safeguarding the Haram alSharif, carrying out extensive renovations on the site to restore to its various buildings
“something of their former harmony.”72 By evoking the former glory of the Haram al-Sharif,
the Supreme Muslim Council emphasized its illustrious history as “one of the oldest [sacred
spaces] in the world” whose “sanctity dated from the earliest (perhaps from pre-historic)
times.”73 As Durkheim suggests, designation of the “sacred” facilitates the unity of a collective.
Through emphasizing the “sacred” character of the Haram al-Sharif, the Supreme Muslim
Council rallied support for the Palestinian national cause, organizing it around the Haram alSharif.
Under ordinary circumstances the renovation of the Haram al-Sharif was deemed
praiseworthy, but under threat, it became a national imperative to restore and protect Palestine’s
most sacred site. Chidester and Linenthal argue that as a site is increasingly perceived to be
under threat, its sacred character is enhanced, making it a center of political resistance. It seems
then that as Zionist influence in Palestine and Jewish presence in Jerusalem grew, so too did the
significance of the Haram al-Sharif within Palestinian society. This trend was exploited by the
Supreme Muslim Council, which sought to garner further local and regional support for its
restoration project by issuing warnings of a Zionist takeover of Palestine, and Zionist attempts to
“regain the area of the site of the Jewish Temple.”74 The fear that these imagined threats
71
Ibid., 29.
Council, A Brief Guide, 8.
73
Ibid., 3.
74
Mattar, The Mufti, 30.
72
23
provoked had the effect of quickly and effectively focusing Arab and Muslim concern for
Palestine. The mounting anger of Arab Muslims over supposed Zionist incursions, and their
pride in the Supreme Muslim Council’s renovations, had the effect of enhancing the importance
of Jerusalem and asserting the centrality the Haram al-Sharif within Palestine.
Jewish and Zionist Immigration to Palestine
A Brief Guide to al-Haram al-Sharif was first published by the Supreme Muslim Council
in 1924, and again in 1925, following an escalation of tensions in Mandatory Palestine.75
Between 1919 and 1921 Jewish immigration to Palestine dramatically increased, as over 18,500
immigrants settled in Mandatory Palestine.76 The purchase of Arab land en masse and the
settlement of large numbers of Jews aggravated existing tensions, and the dissemination of
Zionist desires to claim Jerusalem as the capital of a future Jewish state inflamed local passions.
Major riots broke out in 1920 in Jerusalem and in 1921 in Jaffa. Following this wave of
immigration, Winston Churchill issued a White Paper in 1922, attempting to calm Arab fears that
Palestine would become a Jewish country. He insisted that Balfour’s Declaration did not suggest
that the entirety of Palestine would become a Jewish state, rather, that a Jewish home would be
founded within Palestine. Despite Churchill’s assurances, the Arabs of Palestine distrusted the
British. They continued to fight the British against the increasing influx of Zionists to Palestine.
The second edition of A Brief Guide to al-Haram al-Sharif was published in 1930
following an eruption of tensions in 1928 and an explosion of intense riots in 1929. On Yom
Kippur in 1928, Jewish worshippers at the Western Wall fell into conflict with British police.77
A temporary prayer barrier had been erected for the duration of prayers, which Muslims in the
75
Although the mandate had been assigned by the League of Nations in April of 1920, the British did not officially
assume control of Palestine until September of 1923. Thus only in 1923 was the Supreme Muslim Council able to
take official actions.
76
Rogan, The Arabs, 198.
77
“Jerusalem Police Beat Yom Kippur Worshippers.” New York Herald Tribune. September 26, 1928, 19.
24
Old City of Jerusalem fiercely protested on the grounds that “the Jews were trying to find a way
to give the wall the status of a synagogue, as a first step in taking it over.”78 Hajj Amin alHusayni capitalized on the Yom Kippur incident, and publicly accused “the Zionists of plotting
not only to take over the wall but also to destroy the mosques on the Temple Mount and rebuild
the Temple.”79 He claimed that it was part of a greater plot to seize Palestine and expel all the
Arabs. At the same time, the Supreme Muslim Council began its “public campaign on alleged
Jewish designs against… the Aqsā Mosque.”80 The immigration of 70,000 Jews to Palestine
between 1922 and 1929 only furthered the plausibility of these claims. At the same time that
Jews settled en masse in Palestine, the Jewish National Fund purchased 240,000 acres of the
Jezreel Valley, an area where many Palestinian Arabs lived. The combination of these two
pressures, and Husayni’s incitements, prompted the next cycle of violence, which erupted in
Hevron, Jaffa, Jerusalem, and Safat in 1929.81 Palestinian Arabs attacked Jews and destroyed
Jewish property, requiring heavy interference by the British police.82 The 1930 Shaw Report
placed the blame for the violence on “the Arab feeling of animosity and hostility toward the Jews
consequent upon the disappointment of their political and national aspirations and fear for their
economic future.”83 For Palestine’s Arab population, the Shaw Report claimed, the growing
population of Jewish immigrants functioned “not only as a menace to their livelihood but as a
possible overlord of the future.”84
The final edition of A Brief Guide to al-Haram al-Sharif was published in 1935 following
a brief period of calm during which time these feelings intensified as Jewish immigration from
78
Segev, One Palestine, 296.
Ibid., 303.
80
Kupferschmidt, The Supreme Muslim Council, 131.
81
Rogan, The Arabs, 198.
82
“Palestine in 1929: Administration’s Report.” The Manchester Guardian. October 11, 1930, 10.
83
Walter Shaw, Report of the Commission on the Palestine Disturbances of August, 1929 (London: H. M. Stationary
Office, 1930), 163.
84
Ibid., 151.
79
25
Europe rapidly increased. In the early 1930s, Adolf Hitler rose to power in Germany, becoming
Reich Chancellor in 1933. Immediately the persecution of untermenschen, which had been
committed privately, became national policy.85 Nazi oppression prompted a massive
immigration of Western European Jews into Palestine, which further unsettled the already shaky
status quo.86 European Jews began arriving by the thousands every year. In 1932, nearly 10,000
Jews entered Palestine, in 1933, over 30,000, and in 1934, over 42,000.87 The peak of Jewish
immigration was in 1935, when 60,000 Jewish immigrants arrived, the same number as the entire
Jewish population of Palestine in 1919.88 It became clear to Palestine’s Arabs that they were
seeing their worst fears realized.
In writing A Brief Guide to al-Haram al-Sharif, the Supreme Muslim Council attempted
to mitigate the influence and power Zionists in Palestine had accumulated, verbalizing their
protests within A Brief Guide to al-Haram al-Sharif. All editions of the guidebooks were
published in English, suggesting that the Council sought to communicate its position to a wider
global readership outside of Palestine. In A Brief Guide to al-Haram al-Sharif the “whole of the
Haram Area” was established as “sacred to Moslems.”89 This would seem to be a direct
refutation of Zionist claims to the same space. All visitors were asked to conduct themselves
respectfully throughout the complex and “pay due regard to its sanctity,” by refraining from
behaviors offensive to Muslims.90 Throughout A Brief Guide to al-Haram al-Sharif the Supreme
Muslim Council emphasized the Islamic character of the Haram al-Sharif, despite its other
historical religious affiliations, in order to clearly establish it as an exclusively Muslim site.
85
Untermenschen, lit. sub-humans, inferior persons.
Shlaim, Israel and Palestine, 19.
87
Rogan, The Arabs, 201.
88
Rashid Khalidi, The Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood (Boston: Beacon Press, 2006),
11.
89
Council, A Brief Guide, 3.
90
Ibid.
86
26
Although noting that throughout history “Jerusalem was a holy city, to Moslems as well
as to others,” the Supreme Muslim Council sought in the course of A Brief Guide to al-Haram
al-Sharif to argue that its modern character was exclusively Muslim.91 As Van der Leeuw
suggests, a politics of exclusion is an important facet of sacred space. As such the Supreme
Muslim Council maintained that although Jewish and Christian religious connections to the
Haram al-Sharif had existed historically, but were no longer relevant. The guidebook mentioned
briefly that the Haram al-Sharif’s “identity with the site of Solomon’s Temple is beyond
dispute” and that Christians too had patronized the site, where the “Dome of the Rock was turned
into a church and an altar erected on the Rock itself.”92 But it was made clear that Jews had
forgotten Jerusalem by the time that the site was first conquered by Muslims in 637 CE who
found that it “had long since been neglected.”93 Visitors were led to infer that, therefore, Jews
had surrendered their historic rights to the site. The guidebook continued to establish Muslim
rights to the Haram al-Sharif, stating that it had been under exclusive Muslim control since the
capture of Jerusalem by Saladin in 1187, when even Christian powers had “agreed [it] should
remain in Moslem possession.”94 It was thus clear to internationals visiting the Haram al-Sharif
that these religious affiliations, and all other Jewish and Christian connections with the site,
belonged exclusively to the past.
The Supreme Muslim Council’s review of the Haram al-Sharif’s history in A Brief Guide
to al-Haram al-Sharif was used to demonstrate that the site’s past holiness in other religious
traditions enhanced its significance as a Muslim sacred space, with a longstanding history as a
Jewish and Christian holy site. As a supersessionist religion, Islam derived legitimacy early on
91
Ibid., 6.
Ibid.
93
Ibid., 4.
94
Ibid., 6.
92
27
by being explained as a continuation of God’s revelations to Jews and Christians, rather than as a
new religion.95 The Supreme Muslim Council used this same idea in chronicling the history of
the Haram al-Sharif. By briefly reviewing the history of Jewish and Christian veneration of the
Haram al-Sharif they demonstrated the verified sacred character of the space, while asserting
these associations were strictly historic. For this reason the only record the Supreme Muslim
Council explored in detail in the guidebooks was that of the Haram as a Muslim site. Therefore
each edition of A Brief Guide to al-Haram al-Sharif largely “[confined] itself to the Moslem
period” beginning with the conquest of Jerusalem by the Caliph Umar.96 Throughout the
guidebook’s historical sketch, each interaction of Muslims with the Haram al-Sharif is recorded
as an instance in which the site was renovated and glorified, clearly demonstrating the depth and
strength of their connection in contrast with that of Jews and Christians.
Conclusion
Although the Supreme Muslim Council portrayed this surge of reverence and care for the
Haram al-Sharif as a continuation of a historical trend, the social and political climate of
Palestine had a serious impact on the Council’s actions. Historically the site had fallen into
disrepair and neglect, but the realization that Jerusalem, and consequently the Haram al-Sharif,
was at risk of falling into non-Muslim hands prompted a fierce assertion of the sacredness of the
Haram al-Sharif to Palestine’s Muslims. As American scholars Chidester and Linenthal argue,
the pinnacle of a space’s sacredness is experienced when that site is perceived to be threatened.
Thus any attempts by Zionists to assert a Jewish presence at the Haram al-Sharif were seen by
al-Husayni and the Supreme Muslim Council as a serious threat, whereby Zionists sought to
95
Jews and Christians are both considered to be Ahl al-Kitaab (People of the Book). According to traditional
Islamic belief, both had received authentic revelations from God, but had erred in transmitting and performing that
with which they had been entrusted. Consequently the prophet Muhammad was sent with God’s final revelation, to
correct the errors of both religions and to return people to the true faith.
96
Council, A Brief Guide, 3.
28
undermine the rights of Muslims to the Haram al-Sharif. Just as the Council struggled against
Zionist Jews to assert their authority over the Haram al-Sharif, Palestinian Arabs fought against
Zionists to realize their historical birthright of Palestine. To al-Husayni and the Supreme
Muslim Council it was clear that if Zionists were able to take the Jerusalem and the Haram alSharif as their own, there was nothing to stop them from doing the same with Palestine. Thus the
Supreme Muslim Council’s A Brief Guide to al-Haram al-Sharif was intended to reflect their
urgent concerns to an international audience, advocating on behalf of Palestine’s Muslims for an
intervention to halt Zionist schemes.
Each edition of A Brief Guide to al-Haram al-Sharif was a response by the Supreme
Muslim Council and al-Husayni, a prominent champion of the Palestinian cause, to political and
social pressures on the Arabs of Palestine. After the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939 erupted, the
publication of the booklet was placed on hold. Al-Husayni, through his leadership in the
Supreme Muslim Council, had become the “most talked about and highly regarded Palestinian
leader” at the time.97 His support for the Arab Revolt and his opposition to British rule “led him
to a head-on collision with the mandatory government.”98 In 1937 al-Husayni was forced to flee
Palestine after repeated failed attempts by the British to imprison him.99 A Brief Guide to alHaram al-Sharif was never again republished. With al-Husayni’s removal from power, and the
imposition of some measure of control by the British, the Supreme Muslim Council ceased to be
a leading figure in Palestinian-Arab politics and faded into history.100
97
Ilan Pappe, The Rise and Fall of a Palestinian Dynasty: The Husaynis 1700-1948, (Berkeley and Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 2010), 269.
98
Ibid., 282.
99
Khalidi, The Iron Cage, 62.
100
Kupferschmidt, The Supreme Muslim, XI.
29
Chapter 3
The Jordanian Narrative of the Palestinian Haram al-Sharif: 1948-1967
The establishment of the State of Israel and the Jordanian regime’s assumption of
sovereignty over Palestinians in 1948 marked the defining moment in Palestinian national
history. Prior to 1948 the Haram al-Sharif was a contested site under Palestinian control, in a
disputed land that was predominantly Arab. After 1948 when Palestinians saw their claims for
statehood vaporize, the Haram al-Sharif became emblematic as the last vestige of Arab
sovereignty in historic Palestine, a reality exploited by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan’s
Supreme Awqaf Council. Although this period of Jordanian sovereignty had a significant
influence on Palestinian identity and politics of the Haram al-Sharif that continues to modern
times, it is understudied by scholars in contrast with other periods in the history of Israel and
Palestine.
In this chapter I will begin to fill this gap through an analysis of the Supreme Awqaf
Council’s A Brief Guide to the Dome of the Rock and al-Haram al-Sharif. A critical evaluation
of the content of the guidebooks clarifies the influence of the Hashemite regime on the politics of
the Haram al-Sharif and how they navigated the narrow path that would ensure the realization of
their strategic interests in governing East Jerusalem and the West Bank, while simultaneously
convincing Palestinians that the Jordanian government was effectively representing them in their
struggle for repatriation.101 I argue that the Supreme Awqaf Council’s particular representation
of the Haram al-Sharif in A Brief Guide to the Dome of the Rock and al-Haram al-Sharif was a
balancing act, meant to enable the Jordanian regime to authoritatively argue the grievances of the
Palestinians to an international audience without undermining the stability of the status quo.
101
Baruch Kimmerling and Joel S. Migdal, Palestinians: The Making of a People, (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1994), 190.
30
This chapter examines the historical narrative of the Haram al-Sharif promoted by the
Supreme Awqaf Council in A Brief Guide to the Dome of the Rock and al-Haram al-Sharif and
how it reflects the Kingdom’s national agenda and the political strategies employed by the
Jordanian regime. The first part explores the historical context in which the Supreme Awqaf
Council was established. The second part turns to the Jordanian regime’s systematic repression
of Palestinian nationalism and assesses how their policies influenced the content within A Brief
Guide to the Dome of the Rock and al-Haram al-Sharif. The final part examines how the
pressure to assuage Palestinian anxieties and maintain the illusion of legitimacy determined the
historical narrative presented in A Brief Guide to the Dome of the Rock and al-Haram al-Sharif.
The Supreme Awqaf Council in Jordanian-occupied Palestine
The Supreme Awqaf Council was created by the Jordanian regime in 1951 against the
backdrop of the social and political chaos of the Palestine war.102 Whereas the other Arab
countries experienced a crushing defeat and a brutal decimation of their militaries, and the
Palestinians lost all ability to determine their own national future, the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan emerged from the Arab-Israeli War in possession of East Jerusalem and the West
Bank.103 In December 1948 King ‘Abdullah officially annexed these areas, expanding his
territorial sovereignty and legitimizing his rule by making Palestine and its sacred spaces an
expansion of the Hashemite Kingdom.104 The King’s authority was affirmed in particular
through his newfound control over the Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem.105 Initially the Jordanian
government authorized the previous patrons of the Haram al-Sharif, the Supreme Muslim
I am using Rashid Khalidi’s use of the term “Palestine war” to refer to the civil war in Palestine from 1947 until
May 1948 and the 1948 Arab-Israeli war.
103
Shlaim, Collusion, 162.
104
Rotem M. Giladi and Reuven Merhav, “The Role of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in a Future PermanentStatus Settlement in Jerusalem,” in Jerusalem: A City and its Future, ed. Marshall Breger and Ora Ahimeir
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2002), 145.
105
Ibid., 140.
102
31
Council, to continue their activities as they had under British sovereignty, appointing a Jordanian
as the new Mufti of Jerusalem and president of the Supreme Muslim Council.106 But in 1951 this
policy was rescinded and the 1946 Jordanian Waqf Law was extended to cover the West Bank,
which effectively integrated the Shar’ia courts and waqf administration of East Jerusalem and
the West Bank into Jordan’s existing system.107 Thus all Islamic affairs of the newly occupied
territory were subordinated entirely to the Jordanian Ministry of Awqaf.
Throughout the tenure of the Awqaf administration and the occupation of the West Bank
and East Jerusalem by the Kingdom of Jordan, the religious and political significance embodied
by the Haram al-Sharif was steadily enhanced. Yet the evolution of the symbolism of the space
had begun already during the rule of the British, sparked by the threat of Zionist presence at the
site. As Chidester and Linenthal discuss, sacred spaces under threat often experience an
elevation in sanctity by religious individuals who feel a distinct connection to them. The
expunction of Palestine from the map of the Middle East and the declaration of Jerusalem as the
capital of Israel catalyzed a second elevation of the sanctity of Jerusalem and of the Haram alSharif among Palestinians. After the 1929 Arab Revolts, the commemoration of the isrā and
mir’aj, traditionally a minor Islamic celebration associated with the Haram al-Sharif, was
transformed into a central festival symbolic of Palestinian nationalism.108 After 1948 the holiday
was endowed with an official state character as a special day of prayer by the Jordanian regime.
Palestinians capitalized on this opportunity in order to “organize special sermons and parades in
commemoration of the event,” where the Islamic and Arab character of Jerusalem was
106
Michael Dumper, The Politics of Jerusalem Since 1967 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 167.
Reiter, Islamic Institutions, 6.
108
Lit. “The journey to Heaven.” This was the journey on which Muhammad traveled in a single night from Mecca
to al-Aqsa (lit. “the furthest place,” considered today to be Jerusalem). Lit. “The ascension to Heaven.” This was
when Muhammad ascended to Heaven after his night journey, from al-Aqsa, traditionally considered to be the site
where the Haram al-Sharif exists today.
107
32
emphasized.109 It was only under Jordanian sovereignty that the Haram al-Sharif, whose
significance was previously emphasized as an exclusively Muslim holy site, was augmented as
“a national symbol for all of Palestine.”110
The administration of the Haram al-Sharif became “a vital tool for the Hashemite
monarchy’s legitimization” and their control over the Palestinian population in East Jerusalem
and the West Bank, yet the site was poorly tended between 1948-1967 due to economic
constraints.111 During this period the tourist industry became one of the “mainstays of the East
Jerusalem economy,” with the Haram al-Sharif functioning as the premier attraction. 112 Like
their predecessors on the Supreme Muslim Council, the Awqaf administration capitalized on the
attraction of Jerusalem to generate funds for the restoration of the country’s most significant
sacred space, the Haram al-Sharif, through publishing A Brief Guide to the Dome of the Rock
and al-Haram al-Sharif.
The Awqaf administration published A Brief Guide to the Dome of the Rock and alHaram al-Sharif annually from 1956 until the end of Jordanian sovereignty over East Jerusalem
and the West Bank in 1967. This guidebook, authored by the Awqaf administration, also known
as the Supreme Awqaf Council, bore a strong resemblance to the earlier A Brief Guide to alHaram al-Sharif in both composition and purpose.113 Like the guidebooks published by the
Supreme Muslim Council, each edition of A Brief Guide to the Dome of the Rock and al-Haram
al-Sharif was published in English, which suggests that the booklets were meant to communicate
their positions to a global audience. Additionally each copy of A Brief Guide to the Dome of the
109
Yitzhak Reiter, Jerusalem and Its Role in Islamic Solidarity, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 30.
Ibid.
111
Ibid., 93, 136
112
Dumper, Politics of Jerusalem, 216.
113
The Awqaf administration referred to itself as the “Supreme Awqaf Council” in its publication, A Brief Guide to
the Dome of the Rock and al-Haram al-Sharif. For the duration of this analysis I will refer to this organization by
their chosen name.
110
33
Rock and al-Haram al-Sharif published by the Supreme Awqaf Council from 1956 until 1967
was identical in substance and content, like those published before 1948. It seems then that in
the years after 1948 in which the guidebook was published, the Supreme Awqaf Council
responded to a single constant challenge: maintaining sovereignty over historic Palestine and its
people, while preventing the actualization of their dreams of statehood.
The Supreme Awqaf Council’s A Brief Guide to The Dome of the Rock and al-Haram alSharif was based heavily on the guidebooks published by their predecessors and on a longer
book authored by Aref el-Aref titled Tārīkh Qubbat al-Sakhrah al-Musharrafah wa al-Masjid alAqsa al-Mubārak.114 El-Aref was among the most prominent Palestinian historians, and he
served as the major of Jordanian-controlled East Jerusalem from 1949 to 1955.115 He published
Tārīkh Qubbat al-Sakhrah in 1955, at the end of his term as mayor. The guidebooks were
published only a year later, and mirrored much of the layout and content of el-Aref’s book. Both
books were dedicated to ‘Abd al-Malik and were published by the Industrial Islamic Orphanage
Press in Jerusalem. The majority of both publications was dedicated to recounting a detailed
history of Jerusalem and the Haram al-Sharif through the ages, and to explaining its significance
to different peoples of varying religious faiths. It is significant that the two publications are so
similar, but noteworthy that where el-Aref’s goal was examining the historical account of the
sacred space, the Supreme Awqaf Council’s objective was exercising and legitimizing Jordanian
sovereignty over the Palestinians and the Haram al-Sharif.
Jordanian Limits on Palestinian Identity
The historical narrative advocated by the Supreme Awqaf Council in A Brief Guide to the
114
The translation of this title by Aref el-Aref is A History of the Honorable Dome of the Rock and Blessed Al-Aqsa
Mosque. I refer to the Arabic title throughout this chapter for the reason that the book is written in Arabic.
115
Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East and North Africa, ed. Philip Mattar (New York: Macmillan Reference,
2004), s.v. “Arif, Arif al- [1892-1973].”
34
Dome of the Rock and al-Haram al-Sharif, religiously and ethnically framed, reflected
institutionalized policies of the Jordanian regime that enabled the efficient governance of the
Palestinians under their sovereignty. Definitively claiming the right of representation of the
Palestinians, as well as communicating the legitimacy of the Jordanian regime, had been part of
King ‘Abdullah’s national agenda, prompting his annexation of the largest remaining piece of
Palestine. Although his ambassadorial position and his patronage of one of the world’s most
ancient sacred spaces had the effect of legitimizing his regime regionally and internationally, it
generated considerable controversy among Palestinians under Jordanian sovereignty. They felt
that Palestinian nationalism was fundamentally at odds with the national narrative the Hashemite
King promoted, and they resented the abolition of their political autonomy. Even after the
assassination of King ‘Abdullah in 1951 and the ascension of his grandson, Hussein, this
continued to be an enduring problem for the Kingdom.116 Throughout Jordanian occupation,
Palestinian nationalists continued working to achieve their aim of creating a state, a reality that
would deprive the King of the power and authority he held as the representative of the
Palestinians. Therefore the ability to effectively subdue all Palestinian national sentiment was
critical to the regime.117
Following the annexation of East Jerusalem and the West Bank, the Jordanian regime
adopted a twofold strategy to efficiently exercise sovereignty over the Palestinian population
under its control. With the King endorsed as the official representative of the Palestinians,
Palestinian nationalist activity was defined as part of the official domain of the Jordanian regime.
This enabled the Jordanian government to justify any and all suppression of unofficial nationalist
activity among Palestinians. Under this policy all Palestinian nationalist organizations were
116
Nigel Ashton, King Hussein of Jordan: A Political Life (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 18.
Roger Friedland and Richard Hecht, To Rule Jerusalem (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California
Press, 2000), 247.
117
35
portrayed as subversive and as a threat to the unity of the Kingdom, and they were ruthlessly
combated through active suppression and repression.118 This prevented any public voicing of
the existence of a national Palestinian identity and thwarted the development of political
autonomy among Palestinians.119 To further eliminate all traces of Palestinian identity and exert
control over the population, the Jordanian regime implemented national policies to subsume
Palestinians into the general population. The use of the word “Palestine” was banned under
Jordanian law, and the government explained the Palestinians under its jurisdiction to be one of
many groups within the Kingdom of Jordan, thereby erasing their individual national identity.
To ensure that all opposition was strictly curtailed, King’s aides were dispatched to stifle any
differences that existed between Palestinian perspectives and that of the King.120 As the Haram
al-Sharif was recognized as the national symbol of Palestine, the Jordanian regime focused their
attentions on silencing Palestinian opposition through their administration of the sacred space.
In order to effectively argue the validity of Jordanian control over a symbolically
Palestinian site in A Brief Guide to the Dome of the Rock and al-Haram al-Sharif, the Supreme
Awqaf Council carefully avoided the question of Palestine, emphasizing the greater “Arab”
quality of the Haram al-Sharif and chronicling its history through a distinctly religious lens. In
the dedication, the Haram al-Sharif is described as the foundation of “the Arabs and Islam” and
as the object of their admiration and affections.121 This specific narrative spanned the majority
of the guidebook, yet there were also small chapters dedicated to the Crusader period in which
the Supreme Awqaf Council favorably recounted Christian patronage and reverence of the site.
The booklet is framed exclusively in terms of ethnic and religious identifications, such that the
118
Khalidi, Iron Cage, 136.
Kimmerling and Migdal, Palestinians, 190.
120
Ibid., 189-190.
121
Supreme Awqaf Council, A Brief Guide to the Dome of the Rock and al-Haram al-Sharif, (Jerusalem: Industrial
Islamic Orphanage Press, 1966).
119
36
Council referred to “Moslems” and “Islam” a total of eighteen times, and “Christians” or
“Crusaders,” which was often used as a synonym, a total of thirteen times; furthermore the
Council referenced “Arabs” or “Arabic” influence a total of twenty three times. While the
Supreme Awqaf Council mentions “Palestine” as a geographical entity eleven times, they
mention Palestinians as a national entity only once, in reference to the 1938 repairs of the Haram
al-Sharif, when “all the work was done by Palestinian laboureres [sic].”122 The omission of
Palestinian national identity and the emphasis on an overarching Islamic and Arab identity was
not accidental, it was a strategic choice made by the Supreme Awqaf Council that was a
reflection of the official stance of the Jordanian regime towards the Palestinians. By blurring the
distinction between these two Arab nationalities and emphasizing the Islamic significance of the
Haram al-Sharif, the Council effectively subsumed Palestinians into the greater Jordanian
population thereby establishing the Jordanian regime as the legitimate custodian of Palestine’s
holiest site.
Religious Associations of the Haram al-Sharif
The historical narrative promoted by the Supreme Awqaf Council in A Brief Guide to the
Dome of the Rock and al-Haram al-Sharif was defined by a politics of exclusion, as discussed by
Van der Leuuw, in which Jewish associations with the Haram al-Sharif were specifically ignored
and the Israeli government discredited, in order to refute challenges to the legitimacy of
Jordanian sovereignty. From 1948 until 1967 the Jordanian regime struggled to administer the
weakened and frustrated Palestinians absorbed by its new borders. The dissolution of Mandatory
Palestine and the displacement of several hundred thousand Palestinian Arabs and the social
122
Ibid., 77.
37
realities of the postwar period constituted a Nakba (a catastrophe) for them.123 Thousands of
refugees found themselves dispersed and divided between Israel and the Arab states, which
between them controlled the entirety of former Mandatory Palestine.124 Those Palestinians who
found themselves under the sovereignty of the Jordanian regime demanded that the King
“publicly commit himself to reunifying all of Palestine and eliminating both the Jewish state and
Zionist community that had settled the land,” requests that went directly against his strategic
interests in maintaining an alliance with Israel.125 Nevertheless the King was pressured to
respond to these complaints by Jordanian public opinion, which considered Israel their greatest
enemy, and by his desire to maintain the regional and international power and legitimacy he
derived as the champion of the Palestinians.126 The King, therefore, directed his attention to
addressing these concerns through the Supreme Awqaf Council’s administration of the Haram
al-Sharif, the national symbol of the Palestinians and a regionally treasured sacred space.
The Supreme Awqaf Council primarily focused on the historical record of the Haram alSharif within A Brief Guide to the Dome of the Rock and al-Haram al-Sharif, beginning with the
Umayyad Empire, which was established in the few decades after the birth of Islam. The
majority of the 110 pages of A Brief Guide to the Dome of the Rock and al-Haram al-Sharif are
dedicated to chronicling the history of the Haram al-Sharif and Muslim and Christian
sovereignty of the site over the centuries. Is it noteworthy that rather than choosing to describe
the history of the Haram al-Sharif only after it became a sacred site within Christianity and
Islam, they mentioned the Haram al-Sharif’s pre-history but consciously emitted any reference
Estimates of how many Palestinians were displaced vary significantly. One scholar writes that “Arab estimates
varied between 750,000 and 1,000,000. The Israelis proposed 520,000, and the British between 600,000 and
760,000.” Kimmerling and Migdal, Palestinians, 147.
124
Khalidi, Iron Cage, 124.
125
Kimmerling and Migdal, Palestinians, 190.
126
Ashton, King Hussein, 38.
123
38
to its Jewish associations. The site of the former Temples was known only as the location where
the Caliph Umar discovered the Rock, but not as Mount Moriah.127 The decision to build anew
on the site, the Council wrote, “was quite natural because of its many associations,” which they
neglect to explain.128 They described the Haram al-Sharif as “one of the oldest shrines in
Palestine,” having “remained for thirteen centuries a sacred one to the Muslim World,” with no
mention of the historical reverence Jews held for the site.129 Similarly, the Western Wall, the
pinnacle of geographical holiness to Jews, was described as important only in respect to
Muslims. The Supreme Awqaf Council wrote that people venerated the site “not only because it
[was] part of the Haram area, but because it [was] associated with the night journey of
Muhammad from Mecca to Jerusalem.”130 Finally the “lower wall,” laid by Herod the Great to
form retaining walls for a massive Temple complex that was known to be one of the wonders of
the ancient world, was described by the Supreme Awqaf Council as “ancient, evidently
Roman.”131
In A Brief Guide to the Dome of the Rock and al-Haram al-Sharif the Supreme Awqaf
Council focused on the Muslim and Christian religious history of the Haram al-Sharif,
specifically ignoring its Jewish history, in order to unify Muslim and Christian Arabs behind a
shared sacred space. Jerusalem was decisively claimed as “the religious center of the Muslims of
the Middle East,” and stated explicitly to “[have] been identified with Islam from its
beginning.”132 The Supreme Awqaf Council even went so far as to elevate Jerusalem above the
127
The Rock housed in the Dome of the Rock is believed to be the site from which Muhammad ascended to Heaven.
Awqaf Council, A Brief Guide,11
129
Ibid., 10.
130
Ibid., 81.
131
Ibid.
132
Ibid., 1.
128
39
holy city of Medina, describing it as being “second only to Mecca in the Muslim World.”133 The
Supreme Awqaf Council next examined its history as a Christian site during the Crusader period.
As it was by Muslims, the site “was highly venerated” by Christians.134 The Council explains
that so strong “was [the Christians’] love for the building that they sought in every way to protect
it,” even modeling many churches in Europe after the Aqsa Mosque, which had been converted
to a church.135 By emphasizing an exclusively Muslim and Christian history of the Haram alSharif, the Supreme Awqaf Council effectively dissolved the distinctions between Palestinians
and Jordanians, emphasizing their collective Arab identity and religious connection to the Haram
al-Sharif, while definitively demonstrating that Israeli claims to Jerusalem had no legitimacy and
effectively, that they had no right to the land that was historically Palestine.
To further reinforce Jerusalem’s status as a Palestinian city and the Haram al-Sharif as a
Muslim and Christian site, the Supreme Awqaf Council erased all Jewish associations of the
Haram al-Sharif from the historical record in A Brief Guide to the Dome of the Rock and alHaram al-Sharif. It might be argued that the Supreme Awqaf Council merely neglected to
mention the site’s historical identification with the Temples of Solomon and Herod, as the
Supreme Muslim Council had in A Brief Guide to al-Haram al-Sharif. This assertion, however,
becomes more questionable considering that the Supreme Awqaf Council’s guides mirrored Aref
el-Aref’s book so closely, and that throughout his career he maintained that “the Western Wall
was a remnant of the external wall of the Temple rebuilt by Herod.”136 In Tārīkh Qubbat alSakhrah he began his account of the site’s Jewish associations by explaining that the Haram al-
In modern religious rhetoric, Jerusalem is known as “thalath il-haramayn” [the third of the two holy places].
Traditionally, the two holiest sites in Islam are Mecca and Medina, both located in Saudi Arabia.
Ibid.
134
Ibid., 20.
135
Ibid., 21.
136
Reiter, Jerusalem, 43.
133
40
Sharif was also known by the name of Mount Moriah, and that “Abraham came with his son
Isaac to this place to sacrifice him” on the Rock.137 He wrote that later, “King David bought [the
site]… to establish on it the Temple,” but he was unable to build it before his death.138 Instead
his son Solomon built the Temple in Jerusalem in 1005 BCE, on the site of Mount Moriah.139
El-Aref then chronicled the Babylonian destruction of Solomon’s Temple, the exile of the Jews,
their return under Persian King Cyrus, and their construction of a second temple. This temple,
he wrote, was then renovated by Roman King Herod in 18 BCE “to satisfy his people, the Jews”
but destroyed in the year 70 CE.140 El-Aref’s thorough historical account of the Jewish history
of the Haram al-Sharif in Tārīkh Qubbat al-Sakhrah and the absence of even the briefest
mention of this history in A Brief Guide to the Dome of the Rock and al-Haram al-Sharif, seems
to suggest that the Council’s historical account was edited to specifically leave out the Jewish
history of the Haram al-Sharif as a means of furthering the Jordanian regime’s political agenda.
By specifically excluding the narrative of Jewish associations with the Haram al-Sharif, the
Supreme Awqaf Council was seen to be protecting the integrity of the space, thereby
legitimizing themselves as custodians of the symbol of Palestine and as representatives of the
Palestinians, by extension.
Throughout the guidebooks the Supreme Awqaf Council, like the Supreme Muslim
Council, emphasized the connection between historical veneration of and renovations to the
Haram al-Sharif and legitimate sovereignty over it. The Council described kings of the
Ayyubite dynasty who had patronized the site with high praise, stating that their love for the
Haram al-Sharif was so profound that they “actually swept and cleaned the mosque with their
Aref el-Aref, Tārīkh Qubbat al-Sakhrah al-Musharrafah wa al-Masjid al-Aqsa al-Mubārak, trans. The Author
(Jerusalem, Islamic Orphanage Printing Press, 1955), 193.
138
Ibid.
139
Ibid.
140
Ibid., 194.
137
41
own hands, washing it with rose-water.”141 The Mameluke kings too they described as having
taken “much pride in the Dome of the Rock” which meant they “made many repairs to the
mosque.”142 Those Muslim rulers who took care of the site were lauded by the Supreme Awqaf
Council, in contrast to those who did not, such as Sultan Saleem of the Ottoman Empire who was
described disparagingly as unable to “give much thought to the holy places of Jerusalem
[because] he was busy setting up his rule.”143 This contrast is striking, and clearly distinguished
those responsible Muslim rulers who placed the Haram al-Sharif above all else from those who
advertently or inadvertently contributed to its deterioration.
This contrast was also set in modern terms, where Jewish association with the Haram alSharif was described only in Israeli bombings of the site, while the Supreme Awqaf Council
described themselves and their predecessor favorably, setting a sharp contrast between Muslim
patrons of the Haram al-Sharif and the Israeli state. In A Brief Guide to the Dome of the Rock
and al-Haram al-Sharif, the Supreme Awqaf Council wrote that “when the Supreme Moslem
Council took over the religious affairs of the Moslem in the early days of the British Mandate,
the first thing they did was to turn their attention to the two mosques,” the Dome of the Rock and
the Aqsa Mosque.144 Just as the Supreme Muslim Council made “arrangement [sic] to repair the
building,” distinguishing themselves as trustworthy religious authorities, the Supreme Awqaf
Council was described as the “responsible authorities” who after World War II had “wished to
continue repairs, but were… frustrated.”145 Their plans were obstructed once more by the United
Nations partition of Palestine, after which “fierce fighting ensued between Arabs and Jews,”
141
Awqaf Council, A Brief Guide, 23.
Ibid., 25.
143
Ibid., 27.
144
Ibid., 75.
145
Ibid., 39.
142
42
which meant “repairs had to be discontinued once again.”146 During this time, the Council
recounts, the Haram al-Sharif deteriorated not only from neglect, but from damage inflicted on
the holy site by Israel; “mnay [sic] times Israeli bombs fell in the area of the mosque and not a
few fell on the building causing considerable damage,” which added considerably to the Haram
al-Sharif’s “weakened state” causing further concern to “those who [were] responsible,” the
Jordanian Supreme Awqaf Council.147 This had the effect of clearly demonstrating that the
failure to enforce the exclusion of Jews from the Haram al-Sharif, threatening its fundamental
sacredness, resulted in significant damage to the site. The Council then further distinguished
itself from the Israelis, describing itself and the Jordanian regime favorably, explaining that their
renovations of the Haram al-Sharif were unique in that “no programme of restoration work has
been carried out on such a large scale since the construction of the Dome of the Rock by Abdul
Maliek Ibn Marwan” and were done so “under the auspices of the Jordan Government,” by the
order “and at the expense of H.M. Abdullah Ibn al-Hussein, king of the Hashemite Kingdom.”148
Conclusion
The Supreme Awqaf Council’s attempts to establish legitimate patronage over the Haram alSharif by distinguishing themselves as responsible caretakers of the site were meant to echo the
legitimacy of Jordanian sovereignty over Palestinians, and the West Bank and East Jerusalem.
This was because the Haram al-Sharif became symbolic of solidarity with the Palestinian
struggle, and whoever demonstrated legitimate sovereignty over the site therefore proved
themselves to be representative of Palestinian aims. As Van der Leeuw suggests, when a
religious site is defined as “sacred” and ownership is claimed, that space assumes a political
purpose and becomes a tool to exercise territorial control and expand sovereignty. In taking
146
Ibid.
Ibid., 40.
148
Ibid. Ibid., 79.
147
43
historical control, by discrediting and dismissing Jewish connections to the site, and physical
command over the Haram al-Sharif and Jerusalem, the Supreme Awqaf Council legitimized
their rule and channeled national sentiment without empowering the Palestinian opposition.
While Jordan maintained sovereignty over the Haram al-Sharif from 1948 until 1967, the
Supreme Awqaf Council continued to publish A Brief Guide to the Dome of the Rock and alHaram al-Sharif. Confronted with Palestinian opposition in the aftermath of the Nakba and the
crushing defeat of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, the Jordanians were under increasing pressure to
legitimize their sovereignty, which they did over the Haram al-Sharif, the symbol of Palestinian
nationalism. This pressure was compounded by the Israeli declaration of Jerusalem as their
capital, and the repeated attempts of Jews to enter the Old City of Jerusalem to pray at the
Western Wall, both of which further antagonized the restless Palestinians under Jordanian rule.
In order to answer Palestinian demands for action and Israeli moves towards Jerusalem, the
Supreme Awqaf Council took a harsher political stance on the Haram al-Sharif than had Aref elAref and their predecessor, the Supreme Muslim Council.
In A Brief Guide to the Dome of the Rock and al-Haram al-Sharif, a public relations
booklet for visiting internationals, the Supreme Awqaf Council rewrote the history of the site for
political gain. They emphasized its Muslim and Christian character and history, mentioning
Jewish connections only in the damage incurred by the Aqsa mosque during the 1948 ArabIsraeli war. This evoked a stark contrast with the love and devotion shown for the site
throughout history by Muslims and Christians. The Hashemite Kingdom’s patronage of the
Haram al-Sharif was strategic; control over the sacred space that had become symbolic of the
Palestinian struggle not only legitimized Hashemite territorial rule, but it established the regime
as the official representative of Palestinians. In 1967 Israel conquered East Jerusalem and the
44
West Bank, ousting the Hashemites. The defeat came as a heavy blow, where the Kingdom lost
the power it had wielded over the Palestinians, and the legitimacy it had held as custodian of the
Haram al-Sharif. Most historians choose to evaluate the pre-1948 period or the post-1967 period
when studying Palestinian history. Yet these twenty years of sovereignty proved highly
influential in determining the course of modern politics between Israel and the Palestinians, with
regards to the Temple Mount. The two decades of Jordanian rule over East Jerusalem and the
West Bank had a permanent lasting effect of continuing the transformation of the Haram alSharif into a political symbol that would come to define the Palestinian struggle against Israel,
and framing the conflict in strictly religious terms that would fundamentally alter how
Palestinians understood their national history.
45
Conclusion
Mariam Shahin, the author of a popular tourist’s guide of Palestine, in her description of
the Haram al-Sharif warned that: “It is the whole area that fanatic Israelis want to destroy in
order to ‘rebuild’ a temple, which they claim once stood there.”149 Shahin’s implicit suggestion
that a Jewish temple never existed on the site falls into the modern phenomenon of “Temple
Denial.”150 This systematic denial of the existence of a Jewish temple by many Arab clergy,
historians, and public figures further disclaims a Jewish connection to the Temple Mount,
Jerusalem, and historic Palestine. The phenomenon of “Temple Denial,” however, only became
mainstream after Israel’s victory in the 1967 Six-Day War, in which they assumed sovereignty
over East Jerusalem and the West Bank. To understand how the transformation of the historical
narrative of the Haram al-Sharif occurred, this thesis examined the international tourist
guidebooks published by Muslim religious authorities before 1967.
This analysis is positioned within the greater body of scholarly work focusing on IsraeliPalestinian history and politics from the late nineteenth century until the present time. Despite
the wealth of scholarship devoted to this subject, there are no comprehensive studies on the
evolution of the Palestinian national narrative, and the role of the Haram al-Sharif therein. The
absence of such work is strange due to the centrality of the Haram al-Sharif within the
Palestinian national narrative. The significance, then, of this thesis is that it clarifies the
influence of political and social factors on the changing historical perception of the Haram alSharif throughout the twentieth century, as well as the significance of the sacred space within the
contemporary Palestinian dialogue.
149
Mariam Shahin, Palestine: A Guide, (Northampton: Interlink Publishing, 2005), 312.
Nadav Shragai, “In the beginning was Al-Aqsa,” Ha’aretz, November 27, 2005, accessed March 18, 2015,
http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/features/in-the-beginning-was-al-aqsa-1.175216. For further detail of this
topic, see Benny Morris, “Temple Denial,” The Daily Beast, April 24, 2012, accessed March 18, 2015,
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/04/24/temple-denial.html.
150
46
In both A Brief Guide to al-Haram al-Sharif and A Brief Guide to the Dome of the Rock
and al-Haram al-Sharif, the Haram al-Sharif, a space that has been held as sacred for thousands
of years, was coopted for political means. In the Mandatory period, the Haram al-Sharif was
transformed from a religiously significant site into a national symbol of Palestine under the
direction of the Palestinian Supreme Muslim Council’s Hajj Amin al-Husayni. After their
annexation of the West Bank and East Jerusalem in 1948, the Jordanian regime capitalized on the
symbolism of the Haram al-Sharif in order to promote their own national interests. The
historical narrative promoted by the Jordanian Supreme Awqaf Council was meant to maintain
the tenuous status quo, legitimizing Jordanian rule and channeling national sentiment without
empowering the Palestinian opposition. In contrast with the narrative of the Haram al-Sharif
promoted by the Supreme Muslim Council, it was this narrative that has had the most substantial
impact on Palestinian identity and the perception of the Haram al-Sharif in the modern
Palestinian dialogue.
The decision of the Supreme Awqaf Council to chronicle the narrative of the Haram alSharif within a religious framework determined the character of the national narrative and
identity inherited by generations of Palestinians who lived after 1967. Because the Jordanian
regime had engaged in such brutal repression of Palestinian autonomy, when Jordanian
sovereignty ended in 1967, Palestinians had no clearly defined national character and no national
narrative. What was left to them was the framework created by the Jordanian government, in
which the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was understood to be a clash of religious ideologies.
Consequently this religiously tinged perception of the Palestinian struggle was adopted by most
Palestinians, including prominent Palestinian leader, Yasser Arafat.151 The consequences of this
In a speech to Arab diplomats in Stockholm, he proclaimed that “The PLO will… eliminate the State of Israel
and establish a Palestinian state. We will make life unbearable for the Jews by psychological warfare and
151
47
situation were far reaching, and, I hypothesize, have led to the rise of radical Islamist groups
within Palestine such as Hamas and the Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine that have, at certain
times, dominated Palestinian national dialogue.152
In the present day, the Haram al-Sharif exists as the pinnacle of sacredness in historic
Palestine and as the national symbol of Palestinians because changing social and political factors
throughout the twentieth century influenced this specific depiction. The narrative that was
created and adapted by the Supreme Muslim Council and the Supreme Awqaf Council, with the
influences of their personal agendas, has determined the modern national Palestinian narrative
and pervaded all aspects of Palestinian society. Just as the historical account of these religious
authorities evolved over time, so too has the narrative of the history of the Haram al-Sharif and
its station within Palestinian dialogue. Ultimately, however, what will determine the course of
history is not a reiteration of the authentic historical account of the Temple Mount, it is the
changing narrative inherited by the people who cherish this sacred space.
population explosion. Jews will not want to live among Arabs.”
“Arafat sees Israel’s demise,” The Jerusalem Post, February 23, 1996, 3.
For further detail of this topic, see Hadid, Diaa, “Palestinian Women Join Effort to Keep Jews From Contested Site,”
The New York Times, April 16, 2015, accessed April 17, 2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/17/world/middleeast/palestinian-women-join-effort-to-keep-jews-from-contestedholy-site.html?_r=0.
152
It is interesting to note that in the official logos of both groups, the Dome of the Rock is prominently featured.
48
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Glossary
Ahl al-Kitaab: “People of the Book” in Arabic, this characterization of religious peoples
refers to Jews and Christians, who are also believed by Muslims to have received
scriptures containing the word of the Divine.
Al Aqsa: The farthest-most place. Also see Masjid al-Aqsa.
Al Haram al-Sharif: “The Noble Sanctuary” in Arabic, the Haram al-Sharif encompasses
an area that houses many structures, among which are the Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of
the Rock. The entire complex is known in English as “The Temple Mount.”
Awqaf: Plural form of waqf.
Haram: See al-Haram al-Sharif.
Isrā: Muhammad’s night journey from Mecca to Al-Aqsa.
Jibreel: The Arabic name for the angel Gabriel.
Masjid al-Aqsa: The farthest mosque, the site from which Muhammad ascended to
heaven, traditionally assumed to be Jerusalem.
Mi’raj: Muhammad’s ascension to heaven on his night journey.
Mufti: An Islamic scholar who interprets Islamic Law.
Nakba: Catastrophe, the term used by Arabs and Palestinians to refer to the 1947-1948
war that resulted in the establishment of the State of Israel and the mass exile of
thousands of Palestinians from their homes.
Rajab: The seventh month of the Islamic calendar.
Sharī’a: Islamic law.
Sharif: A traditional Arabic title signaling one of noble birth and position.
Waqf: A Muslim pious endowment, for either public or private use.
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