Understanding ethnic minority
poverty in Vietnam
Country Social Analysis Study
The World Bank
April 2007
EM Poverty in VN
• Vietnam has made great strides in reducing the
poverty rate, from nearly 60% of the population
in 1993 to less than 20% in 2004.
• However, despite overall gains, ethnic
minorities have experienced lower rates of
poverty reduction than the general population.
• In 2004, ethnic minorities accounted for only
12.6% of the total population, but they made up
39.3% of the poor population (VHLSS 2004).
The poorest provinces are in the Northern
Mountains (NM) and the Central Highlands
(CH) - which have the highest EM populations
Province
Poverty rate, 2004
% EM, 1999
Lai Chau (NM)
74%
83%
Dien Bien (NM)
66%
*
Ha Giang (NM)
59%
88%
Son La (NM)
56%
83%
Lao Cai (NM)
54%
67%
Hoa Binh (NM)
54%
72%
Bac Can (NM)
50%
87%
Gia Lai (CH)
46%
44%
Kon Tum (CH)
42%
54%
* Lai Chau and Dien Bien were previously one province, Lai Chau, at the time of the 1999 Population
and Housing Census. More up to date figures are not yet available until the next decennial census.
Source: Turk 2006 presentation using VHLSS 2004; 1999 Population and Housing
Census
Poverty and Ethnicity
are Spatially Linked
Ethnic minority groups are concentrated in geographical
regions with high rates of poverty
Source: WRI 2002
But within these poor regions, Kinh have
experienced greater poverty reduction
Poverty trends of Kinh and non-Kinh in the North West and Central
Highlands
Ethnic minorities, North West Mtns
100
Ethnic minorities, Central Highlands
Poverty rate (%)
80
60
40
20
Kinh, Central Highlands
Kinh, North West Mtns
0
1993
Source: Swinkels and Turk 2006
1998
2002
2004
Kinh do better than EMs in “lagging regions”
CSA data supports previous PREM research (Swinkels and Turk
2004, p.7) showing that poverty reductions within “lagging
regions” have been greater for Kinh than for EMs.
ETHNICITY
INCOME per HH
Kinh
Pa Co
Mnong
Van Kieu
Hmong
Tay
Other
EMs
0 – 3,200,000 VND
10.0%
53.5%
13.0%
24.4%
22.0%
18.2%
12.2%
10.0%
15.5%
45.7%
26.7%
22.0%
36.4%
24.3%
26.7%
18.3%
19.6%
35.6%
29.3%
13.6%
25%
53.3%
12.7%
21.7%
13.3%
26.8%
31.8%
25.3%
(0- $192 US)
3,200,001 –
6,300,000 VND
($193 - 378 US)
6,300,001 –
12,100,000
($378 - 727 US)
12,100,001 –
61,700,000
($728 - 3,705 US)
Source: CSA survey 2006 (Chi-sq.=.00, R=.000)
Ethnicity and Poverty in “lagging regions”
Most ethnic minorities in CSA study sites have
significantly fewer high value assets than Kinh.
60
50
40
motorbike
water pump
refrigerator
30
20
10
0
Kinh
Tay
Hmong Mnong
Source: CSA survey 2006
Paco VanKieu
The Ethnic Dimensions to
Poverty Persists
• PREM research shows that “those who are able to
prosper in the more remote parts of the country are
likely to be from the Kinh majority population rather
than from an ethnic minority group.” (Swinkels and
Turk 2004, p. 1)
• Analysis of the 1993 and 1998 VHLSS shows “even
if minority households had the same endowments
as Kinh households, this would close no more than
a third of the gap in living standards” (Baulch et al
2002, p. 17)
• However, these previous studies, based primarily
on VHLSS data, have not been able to fully explain
the main factors as to WHY ethnic minorities
remain poorer than Kinh.
Previous Explanations
Previous explanations (Baulch et al 2002, p. 11)
have suggested two possibilities:
1) People may be poor because they lack
endowments, such as land, physical capital
and human capital.
2) People may be poor because their
knowledge, customs or culture result in lower
returns on endowments.
Endowments vs. Returns
• Van de Walle and Gunewardena (2001) find that
about half of the difference in expenditure per capita
between Kinh and EMs is due to differences in
endowments, with the remainder likely caused by
lower returns on endowments among EMs.
• They conclude that “there are systematic
differences not attributable to where you live… if we
look solely at communes where both groups live,
[endowments] no longer account for any of the
difference in average consumption. These results
lead us to conclude that fundamentally different
models generate incomes for the majority and
minority groups.” (p. 204)
Implications of previous research
• Even if ethnic minority groups had the
same endowments as Kinh, significant
poverty differences would still exist.
• There is an ethnic dimension to poverty
that goes beyond a “lagging regions”
explanation.
• Our CSA analysis set out to understand
how the cultural differences between Kinh
and EMs explain higher rates of EM
poverty.
CSA Approach and
Methodology
• Survey team did fieldwork in three provinces
representative of the three main regions where EMs live:
the Northern Mountains (Ha Giang Province), the Central
Highlands (Dak Lak Province), and the North Central
Coast (Quang Tri Province).
• The CSA combined detailed qualitative work in villages
(focus groups, interviews, oral histories, mapping, PRA),
with a quantitative survey (n=364), spread equally
among the provinces.
• We also interviewed and discussed EM policy issues
with local, commune, district, provincial and national
policy makers, and reviewed secondary and policy
literature.
• A gender survey was also carried out with 180 women of
various ethnicities.
CSA Findings: How ‘Difference’
becomes Disadvantage
• CSA analysis identifies six main interlocking factors
where ‘differences’ between ethnic groups result in
clear disadvantages for ethnic minorities, with
consequent livelihood impacts:
- less access to education
- more limited mobility
- unfavorable credit options - poorer returns from markets
- less productive lands
- stereotyping / misconceptions
• It appears that these factors strongly influence
livelihood outcomes, preventing ethnic minorities
from achieving greater economic progress.
The Pillars of the ‘Cycle of
Disadvantage’ for EMs
Lower Education
Stereotyping and
misconceptions
Less Mobility
Lower Livelihood
Outcomes
Lower market
access / lower
income from goods
sold
Less Access to
Formal Credit
Less productive
landholdings
Pillar One: Education
There are significant differences in level of education between Kinh and EM
respondents, with Kinh attaining more education across the board
ETHNICITY
Kinh majority
Ethnic minorities
None
6%
30.6 %
Primary (Grade 1 – 5 )
16 %
44.6 %
Lower (Grade 6 – 9)
52 %
22 %
Secondary (Grade 1012)
26 %
2.9 %
EDUCATION
Source: CSA survey 2006. (Chi-sq=.000, R=.000)
Educational attainment by region
The significant difference between EMs and Kinh in educational
attainment remains when we control for regional variations
Level of
education
Dak Lak
Ha Giang
Quang Tri
Kinh EMs Kinh EMs Kinh EMs
None
4%
25% 10% 26%
Primary
8%
48% 24% 40% 25% 46%
Lower
48% 24% 62% 29% 25% 14%
Secondary
40%
Source: CSA survey 2006.
(Chi-sq and R all below .03)
3%
5%
4%
0%
50%
39%
2%
For comparison purposes – low cell counts make significance testing inaccurate
Educational difference between all
ethnic groups
Kinh are the only ethnic group with a sizable percentage (26%)
of respondents having attained a high school education
Level of
education
Kinh
Tay
Dao
Hmong
Thai
Mnong
None
6%
0%
44% 46%
0%
30% 29%
Primary
16% 32% 56% 34% 38% 48% 50% 39% 41% 53% 56%
Lower
52% 59%
0%
15% 50% 17% 21% 62% 20%
4%
31%
Secondary
26%
0%
5%
2%
0%
Source: CSA survey 2006.
9%
13%
4%
Ede
0%
Bo Y
0%
0%
Pa
Co
Van
Kieu
Nung
38% 40% 13%
1%
For comparison purposes – low cell counts make significance testing inaccurate (Chi-sq=.000, R=.061)
Ethnicity and educational outcomes
are linked
A much higher percentage of ethnic minority children
start school late or drop out of school before completion.
30
25
20
15
Ethnic Minorities
Kinh
10
5
0
% children starting
% children
school late
dropping out of
school
Source: CSA survey 2006
Why do EMs start school late
and drop out early?
• The most common reason for starting school late
mentioned by EMs surveyed was because children were
not ready for school (26.9%). Lack of Vietnamese
language skills in young children and lack of pre-school
preparation were identified in the qualitative research as
factors.
• The most common reason for dropping out was because
the household lacked money for school fees (39.8%).
• Qualitative research suggests that EM students who
start late are also more likely to drop out early due to
embarrassment at being older and a general lack of
confidence.
Role of parents in education
• It appears NOT to be true that EM parents don’t understand the
value of education: nearly all households reported that pulling
children out of school is their very last option when faced with
food and cash scarcity.
• Furthermore, nearly 90% of Tay, Dao and Thai HHs reported
attending parent meetings or the PTA. Tay, Dao and Thai
parents were also more likely to speak Kinh and have higher
educational attainment themselves.
• Other EMs reported less frequent parent involvement, such as
the Hmong (45%), Mnong (49%) and Van Kieu (55%). This
was attributed to the lack of Kinh language skills among these
parents.
• Thus the educational attainment of parents has an impact on
their ability to be involved in their children’s education, with
potential effects on the success of their children in school.
• This may indicate the need to especially target school and
education efforts on those ethnic minorities who are less likely
to use Vietnamese at home and who have higher rates of adult
illiteracy.
Implications of Pillar One
• Education has a significant impact on a household’s
economic status. Less education means higher rates of
illiteracy among EMs, resulting in less opportunity, less
likelihood of off-farm employment, and less access to a
multitude of government and other services.
• A VASS study based on VHLSS data from 1993-2004
finds that the difference made by higher levels of
education are statistically significant: having a
vocational training certificate accounts for over one
million VND (US$60) additional income, and a degree of
higher education accounts for over two and half million
VND (US$150). (VASS 2006 p. 26)
• Yet in 2005, less than 2,000 EM nation-wide were
admitted to tertiary education, according to the Ministry
of Education.
Pillar Two: Mobility and Migration
EMs are less likely to be mobile. They visit areas outside their
village less often than Kinh and travel shorter distances
Members of HH
have been to:
Ethnic
minorities
Kinh majority
Commune
center
84.7 %
98 %
Province
city/town
54.1%
94 %
Other provinces
in region
17.6 %
66 %
Source: CSA survey 2006.
The Advantages of Mobility
How do ethnic minorities view their own lack of mobility?
In one multi-ethnic village in Dak Lak composed of
indigenous Ede, migrant Nung and migrant Kinh,
PRA revealed that Ede believed the Nung were
more ‘organized, well planned and decisive’,
having benefited from seeing agriculture in other
areas before they came to Dak Lak. The Ede also
believed the Kinh households had a ‘wider social
network’, leading the Kinh to be more proactive in
networking with local authorities, and local and
regional traders, as well as having contacts with
Kinh in other regions to learn from.
Ethnicity and Migration
Kinh are more likely to have migrated
80
70
60
50
Kinh
Ethnic minorities
40
30
20
10
0
% born outside of village
Ethnicity and Migration: Differences
between Kinh and EMs
• Kinh migrants are more likely to have come farther distances
in their migration: Kinh in the uplands have come from many
areas, including as far away as the Red River Delta and the
South Central Coast.
• While 35% of minority HHs reported they had a household
head or spouse born in another village, minority ‘migrants’ are
more likely to have simply moved within the local commune or
district.
• This is particularly true given policies since 1968 to
‘sedentarize’ ethnic minorities by moving them to state-built
villages; minorities reporting that they live outside their home
village have often simply been moved by these programs a
few kms away from their original villages.
Some Minorities Have Migrated
Longer Distances…
• Many minorities in Dak Lak and Quang Tri had to temporarily
migrate from their birth village due to the disruptions of the
Vietnam War (1961-1975). Many minorities in Ha Giang had to
temporarily migrate during the Vietnam-China border war of
1979.
• The only long-distance migration among minorities comes from
some EM groups (Thai, Dao, Hmong, Tay, Nung) in the Northern
Mountains who migrated in the 1990s to the Central Highlands
to seek larger plots of land. Many of these EMs traveled in
groups from their home villages.
• The Pa Co of Quang Tri also report inter-provincial migration,
but only with the neighboring province of Thua Thien Hue,
because of cultural preferences for Pa Co spouses from outside
the home district.
Access to land after migration is more
favorable to Kinh
Most ethnic minorities clear their own land after migration, while the
majority of Kinh have money to buy their land (which as a result is
often better quality land). Kinh are also more likely to receive
government land allocations after migrating.
Method for
obtaining land
Ethnic minorities
Kinh majority
Buy
14.4 %
62.2 %
Rent
1.7 %
2.7 %
Clear the land
66.9 %
10.8 %
Gov’t allocation
5.1 %
21.6 %
Other
11.9 %
2.7 %
Source: CSA survey 2006. (Chi-sq.=.000, R=.000)
Ethnicity and Sponsored Migration
An example of how official migration programs may favor Kinh
at the expense of EMs
Since 2003, Quang Tri province has encouraged Kinh migrants to come to
the border areas of the province, arguing that the migration will help
minorities “progress faster as they will be near Kinh”, in the words of a
district official. This program promised the Kinh who moved upland many
preferable polices to increase production. In the first year of the program,
each Kinh household that moved was promised 3 ha of land, 3 million VND
in cash, 10 million in construction materials for a house, 5 million VND in
food equivalent, and 500,000 VND in moving/travel expenses. To encourage
the Kinh migrants to take advantage of their new lands, the state bank has
recently started a program to provide credit for the planting of rubber. Those
who plant rubber can get up to 24.5 million VND in loans.
By comparison, investment in ethnic minority sedentarization schemes has
usually been capped at 1 million VND in government investment per
household (IEMA 2005).
This provincial policy focus on investing in Kinh migrants, rather than
directly investing in EM communities, may have impacts on the different
poverty rates found in the provinces.
Implications of Pillar Two
• Much poverty investment has focused on infrastructure (roads) to
increase access and mobility for remote areas. However, the CSA
research suggests that mobility is more than access to roads.
• While roads are important, in order to take the most advantage of
roads, EMs need to have places to go (markets, schools, training
centers), people to talk to (contacts) and relationships/networks.
• Without Vnese language skills, without contacts outside the village,
and without wider networks of people to work with/help them
outside their commune, EMs cannot take advantage of roads and
infrastructure to increase mobility and subsequently improve
livelihoods in the same way that Kinh can.
• Analysis of VHLSS data has shown that, given the above
disadvantages, rural roads have mainly benefited Kinh and
Chinese –not other ethnic minority groups. (VASS 2006 p. 27-28)
Pillar Three: Access to Credit
Ethnic minorities, at much higher rates than Kinh, report
a lack of credit as their biggest production constraint.
Main problem
with production
Ethnic
minorities
Kinh majority
Lack of capital
81 %
52 %
Lack of experience
with new techniques
36%
8%
Lack of extension
services
27%
8%
Ethnicity and access to credit
Ethnic minorities have access to smaller loans than Kinh
Amount borrowed
Ethnic minorities
Kinh majority
None
32.1%
20%
1 – 1,999,999
11.9%
6%
22.1%
12%
34%
62%
(0 - US$120)
2,000,000 –
4,999,999
(US$121 - 300)
5,000,000 or more
(US$301 or more)
Source: CSA survey 2006. (Chi-square = .002, R = .002)
Cash crops, ethnicity and
access to credit
In CSA data, the difference in loan size is most pronounced in Dak Lak, a region
where both majority and minority groups are involved in coffee production, which
requires significant capital. Significantly higher percentages of Kinh in Dak Lak get
the larger loans needed for coffee farms.
Amount borrowed
Ethnic minorities in Dak
Lak
Kinh majority in Dak
Lak
None
21.2%
8%
1 – 1,999,999 VND
(US$1-120)
15.2%
4%
2,000,000 – 4,999,999
VND
(US$121-300)
14.1%
8%
5,000,000 VND or more
(US$301 or more)
49.5%
80%
Source: CSA survey 2006 (Chi-square = .052, R = .011)
EM lack of formal credit has a high cost
Comparing Ede and Kinh coffee farmers in Dak Lak
The credit situation is particularly acute in the Central Highlands, which are
more cash crop oriented than other minority regions. There, the lack of
access to larger loans has driven many Ede to take their coffee production
loans from the informal system (private traders and agricultural supply
stores) which can provide much larger loans much faster and with much
less paperwork (one day versus several months for the formal system).
These loans are highly risky, however, as they involve very high rates of
interest and short term loan periods which cannot usually be extended
without potentially forfeiting the collateral put up for the loan (usually a land
tenure certificate). When coffee prices dropped in the year 2000, many Ede
with these short term private loans could not pay. In many cases the traders
took the Ede land which had been put up as collateral, or Ede had to sell
other lands to pay the debts, leading to some increasing landlessness
among Ede. The Kinh, who also had to face the same drop in coffee prices,
appear to have been more likely to have had their loans from the former
bank sector, and provincial and central policies were adopted to let banks
extend loan terms during the coffee crisis with the interest on these
extended loans being subsidized by the government. Thus there was less
land forfeiture among those with formal loans during this period.
EMs lack access to the banks that
issue larger loans
More EMs borrow from the Bank for Social Policies (VBSP), which
has a smaller maximum loan size (5 million VND) than the Bank for
Agriculture and Rural Development (VBARD) or other banks (which
regularly lend 10 million VND or more).
70
60
50
% households that
borrowed from VBSP
40
% households that
borrowed from
VBARD
30
20
10
0
Kinh
Tay
Mong
Mnong
Paco
VanKieu
Why can’t some EMs access
the formal credit system?
• Of EM households which had never obtained bank loans, half
mentioned that the reason was they did not have collateral.
EMs without land tenure certificates have trouble accessing
loans (IEMA 2006).
• VBSP Bank credit officers usually set a fixed number of
eligible clients for each village, regardless of eligibility or
need. This is a result of the limited funds of VBSP’s local
branches, as they are completely dependent on allocations
from central levels.
• Targeting to the poor has been hampered by the inclusion of
the non-poor in credit. VBSP is supposed to target credit to
those on village lists of poor households, but an IEMA study
found VBSP providing credit to the non-poor in all study
villages. In this study of EM access to credit in the northern
mountains, 31% of VBSP loans went to high income groups
while only 11% went to the poorest (IEMA 2006).
Ethnicity and buying on credit in
the informal sector
Fewer ethnic minority households have access to buying
on credit from the informal sector (private traders,
moneylenders) for household purchases
Did household
purchase on credit
in last year?
Ethnic minorities
Kinh majority
Yes
31.8%
64%
No
68.2%
36%
Source: CSA survey 2006. (chi-square = .000, R = .000)
Ethnicity affects interest rates in
the informal sector
Ethnic minorities may get less informal credit than Kinh,
but they are far more likely to have to pay interest when
they purchase on credit
40
35
30
25
20
Kinh
Ethnic minorities
15
10
5
0
% who pay interest for purchasing on
credit
Source: CSA survey 2006 (Chi-square = .007, R = .007)
Purchasing on Credit
The cycle of indebtedness facing many EMs
Through PRA with Kinh moneylenders, we found that informal lending
can lead to a cycle of indebtedness and dependency. For example,
Kinh traders in one commune in Dak Lak lend money to Mnong prior to
the corn planting season when cash is needed to buy inputs. The Kinh
will lend cash but then convert the amount to be repaid to corn
equivalence. For example, if the price of the previous year’s crop was
VND700,000/ton, the Kinh traders lend Mnong HHs VND700,000 (US
$42) then collect one ton of maize from them after the harvest. The
traders never accept repayment in cash as they make their money on
the rise in prices from season to season. For example, last year the
price was 700,000/ton but in 2006 it was 1,400,000/ton (US $84). So
with repayment in maize the traders get 100 percent interest in the
course of 6 months, but if they worked with cash they could only get 30
– 35% interest (after 6 months). In 2005’s corn season, in one village
alone, 56 households borrowed from a Mrs. S (a Kinh trader from
another village) and repaid in 84 tons of maize (equivalent to
VND109,200,000 – US $6,558). If half of this is interest profit, her
yearly income from lending alone is over 50 million VND (US $3,279).
Implications of Pillar Three
• The lack of access to affordable credit has
serious implications for EMs ability to expand
agricultural production, diversify livelihoods, and
invest in new activities like trade or services.
• Results of a household survey among EMs in
2005 showed that credit and savings schemes
had positive impacts on income of ethnic
minority households when they could access
them. 78% of the surveyed households that
borrowed money from VBSP and VBARD said
the credit had had a positive impact on their
household (IEMA 2006).
Pillar Four: Poorer, Less
Productive Landholdings
• According to recent VHLSS (2002/2004), overall
size of landholdings are often higher for EMs than
for the for Kinh. However, while these landholdings
may be larger overall, they are often less
productive than Kinh lands. In the CSA survey EMs
reported smaller landholdings of the most profitable
and productive land types than Kinh.
• CSA data shows significant differences between
ethnic minority groups and Kinh in the amount of
wetland, industrial crop land, and upland areas
cultivated.
Irrigated rice land holdings are
small across the board
Somewhat surprisingly, the majority of Kinh respondents
reported that they were not cultivating irrigated rice land
Irrigated rice land
cultivated in m3
Ethnic minorities
Kinh majority
None
35 %
56 %
1 – 1000 m3
(0.0001 - 0.10 ha)
24 %
14 %
1001 – 2000 m3
(0.11 ha - 0.2 ha)
17 %
14 %
2001 – 3000 m3
(0.21 - 0.3 ha)
9%
10 %
3001 or more m3
(0.3 ha or more)
15 %
6%
Source: CSA survey 2006.
Industrial crop area is smaller
for EMs
The majority of EMs respondents do not cultivate
industrial crops, and those who do concentrate on smaller
plots than Kinh respondents
Industrial crop
area in m3
Ethnic minorities
Kinh majority
None
87 %
68 %
1 – 5000 m3
(0.0001-0.5 ha)
9%
14 %
5001 – 10000 m3
(0.51 - 1 ha)
4%
2%
10001 or more m3
(more than 1 ha)
1%
16 %
Source: CSA survey 2006 (Chi-sq.=.000, R=.000)
Upland swidden fields are very
important to EMs
Upland swidden fields are essential to EM production,
with over half of HHs cultivating over a third of a hectare.
Upland swidden
cultivated
Ethnic minorities
Kinh majority
None
19 %
52 %
1 – 3000 m3
(0.0001 - 0.3 ha)
29 %
32 %
3001 m3 or more
(more than 0.3 ha)
52 %
16 %
Source: CSA survey 2006 (Chi-sq.=.000, R=.000)
Implications of Land Use
Patterns for EM Policies
• Simplistic assumptions that Kinh know wet rice agriculture
and must have brought it with them when they migrated to the
uplands, explaining their higher success rates in economic
development in minority areas, are not borne out by the CSA
data. We see that more than half of Kinh in minority areas
don’t bother to cultivate wet rice. These Kinh focus on high
value industrial and fruit trees, and trading and other services.
• Yet it is common to see Vietnamese state policy interventions
focused on wet rice development in minority areas, the
assumption being that wet rice can be intensified and more
productive than non-irrigated swidden fields.
• CSA data indicates that investment in extension and
infrastructure for wet rice may be misguided, given rice’s low
productivity and low profits in many upland areas. Even most
Kinh are not focusing on wet rice, so why should minorities?
Upland Lands: The need for
agricultural services
• Upland swidden fields remain extremely important for most HH - yet the
extension services focus mostly on lowland Kinh models of production
(wet rice, fruit trees).
• More than half the HH surveyed had never been to an extension training,
and the large majority had never seen a production model or used new
techniques from extension.
• PRA with those who did go to trainings revealed that the content often
concerned irrigated rice, hybrid corn, and fruit trees (only hybrid corn is
regularly grown in upland fields). There is also a heavy emphasis on
technical advice and subsidies regarding chemical fertilizers and
pesticides -- which are not often used on upland fields. For example, in
one Ede village where more than 90% of HHs grew coffee and wanted
extension on improving coffee yields, the only extension they got was a
‘demonstration model’ of new hybrid wet rice seeds (which failed to grow
in the local conditions).
• More research and extension to address the needs of upland field
farmers - like terracing, soil erosion protection, intercropping, SALT
techniques, and new non-irrigated, drought-resistant crops - were
requested by farmers in PRA meetings.
Have sedentarization programs
had the intended impact?
•
•
•
•
Since 1968, the policy of the Vietnamese government has been to eliminate
‘shifting cultivation’ among ethnic minorities. This policy has been justified
with concern over deforestation and the belief that upland swidden fields
(fields that are used and fallowed in cycles) are less productive than
permanent fields of wet rice and other crops. The sedentarization policies of
the GOV have moved hundreds of thousands of EM households into statebuilt villages or into more lowland areas, and has invested millions of dollars
into eliminating the use of swidden fields.
Yet in our CSA, the importance of swidden to EM livelihoods remains clear.
28% of HH using uplands reported their fields had grown compared with five
years ago, while only 17% said it had decreased (the rest stayed the same).
Pa Co and Van Kieu were most likely to have expanded swidden fields, due
to lack of production from other lands and a reported preference for swidden
produce.
However, there is a worrisome trend that 25% of HHs using swidden fields
reported shorter fallow times, while 8% reported longer, and the rest said
there was no change.
These trends confirm the 2005 IEMA study which found that sedentarization
programs to halt the use of swidden and upland fields are ineffective and
unrealistic, given these fields’ importance to household livelihoods.
Forestry Policies Also Not Effective
in Improving EM Livelihoods
• Since 1993, the GOV has had policies in place to transfer land use
rights for forestry lands to individual households and away from the
state, which previously managed forests in State Forest Enterprises
(para-statal logging companies).
• This process of Forest Land Allocation (FLA) can involve essentially
permanent and privatized land use rights (Red Books) as well as
less secure or long term contracts to manage forestry land. Some
FLA comes with payments to the HH to protect the land (usually
around 50,000 VND/ha/yr - around US$3) while other forms of FLA
involve no financial payments or investments.
• Overall, the goals of FLA were to increase forest cover in the
uplands and to assist upland HHs in finding new sources of income
from forestry activities (timber, fuelwood, non-timber forest products)
• However, the CSA confirms other recent studies (such as Dinh Duc
Thuan 2005) that indicate FLA has had almost no livelihood impact
for EMs.
Forestry land and ethnicity
While 26.6% of all respondents received FLA, there are significant
differences between allocations to different ethnic groups
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
% receiving forest land allocation
Source: CSA survey 2006. (chi-square = .000, R = .000)
Tay
Dao
Hmong
Thai
Mnong
Ede
BoY
PaCo
VanKieu
Kinh
Nung
Other
Forestry Land and Region
• FLA is very skewed regionally. Less than 1% of Dak Lak
HHs had FLA, while 67% of HHs in Ha Giang did.
• Furthermore, less than half of all recipients of FLA in the
survey got a Red Book that establishes the most secure
tenure claims.
• Evidence from many sources (VHLSS, TECOS, our
CSA) indicates that the government (primarily through
the State Forest Enterprises) continues to control much
of the forest estate in the Central Highlands. More than
45% of Dak Lak’s total land area is still controlled by
SFEs and state farms (GSO 2003).
• Less than 2% of the total forest cover of the four
provinces of the Central Highlands has been allocated to
individual households to use, while the figure is 46% in
the Northwest (TECOS 2006).
Forestry land incomes are small
and impact few EM HHs
Only 9.4% of those with FLA reported that it contributed to the
HHs overall household income and livelihood. Sale of
fuelwood accounted for most of this income from FLA
20
18
Tay
Dao
Hmong
BoY
PaCo
VanKieu
Kinh
Nung
Other
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
% reporting that FLA contributed to production
Source: CSA survey 2006. (Differences between groups are not significant here: all groups reported low earnings.)
Fundamentally different production models?
The differences in all land endowments appear to impact the
earning potential of ethnic groups, putting EMs at a disadvantage
% earning income from activity
INCOME SOURCE
Kinh majority
Ethnic minorities
Rice (both irrigated and swidden rice)
36.7
76.3
Maize
26.7
71.3
10
36.5
46.7
17.9
66.7
36.6
3
17.4
Trade
27.3
2.2
Salary/wage labor
9.1
23.9
Cassava
Perennial trees (coffee, tea, fruit,
etc)
Pigs
Wood/timber
Implications of Pillar Four
• EMs have less productive lands and smaller landholdings of the
highest value lands for industrial crops.
• Swidden lands remain important but due to restrictions on their use
and a lack of attention from extension services they are not as
productive as they could be.
• FLA is very regionally skewed, and is practically nonexistent in the
Central Highlands.
• As a result, EMs have little chance to benefit financially from forest
lands. Unless there is aggressive investment in productive use of
FLA lands after allocation, there does not appear to be much
livelihood benefit from forests.
• Fundamentally different production models appear between Kinh
and EMs, with different crops grown on different lands, and different
sources of off-farm income (trading/services for Kinh and often lowvalue and unstable wage labor for EMs). Policies for agricultural
investment should take these differences into account, rather than
formulating blanket policies for provinces and regions.
Pillar 5: Lower Market Access
• There is a widespread belief among government officials and
others that EMs are poor because they lack familiarity with the
market economy and are only concerned with self-sufficiency.
• For example, the VN government’s SEDEMA for 2006-2010
says that in EM areas the “Economy is characterized by
predominantly agricultural production and [is] autarkyoriented. Cultivation skills are backward. Market economy is
rather passive and underdeveloped” .
• However, the CSA has found that minorities want to be and
are engaged in the market - nearly half of all households sold
something at a physical marketplace last year, and the vast
majority raised some sort of income from selling goods - but
they face disadvantages there which limits their livelihood
benefits from market involvement.
Ethnic differences in market access
Minorities tend to use central marketplaces less than Kinh.
Kinh report more frequent visits to markets.
Average number Ethnic minorities
of times HH goes
to market monthly
Kinh majority
none
14.6 %
2%
1 to 4
71.7 %
54 %
5 to 10
7%
10 %
6.7 %
34 %
11 or more
Source: CSA survey 2006.
Minorities also have less
profitable crops to sell
• The survey shows Kinh are more likely to sell higher value
industrial crops on the market (coffee, sugar, cashew, tea,
fruit, etc). Minorities primarily sell lower value corn and
cassava crops. They are also more likely to sell rice.
• Some EM communities, like the Khmer, sell their rice crop
immediately after harvest to raise quick cash, but this is
when the prices are usually lowest (IEMA 2007). The
Khmer then have to buy rice later at a time when the price
is higher than what they sold for.
• Other EM communities in the CSA reported selling
unprocessed goods (corn on cobs, green coffee cherries,
raw wet cassava) because of a lack of access to storage
and processing facilities. This guarantees lower prices for
these goods than if they were processed.
EMs sell high value cash crops
at lower rates than Kinh
Products sold in
market
% Ethnic
minorities HH that
sell
% Kinh majority
HH that sell
Rice
7.6 %
0%
Maize
28 %
6%
Fruit
11.5 %
22 %
Industrial/cash crops
(coffee, tea, pepper,
cashew, sugarcane, etc)
6.7 %
24%
Source: CSA survey 2006.
Kinh Dominate Village Trading
in EM areas
• Minorities are much less likely to engage in any sort of
trading: only 3% of ethnic minority HHs reported income
from trading, while 27% of Kinh HH did.
• Even in overwhelmingly minority villages, the village
trader/shop owner is almost always Kinh.
• This is because there are cultural barriers to opening a
shop for trade since much of minority village life is
governed by community reciprocity - reciprocity that
extends especially to those who accumulate capital or open
stores/do trade.
• Minority people repeatedly stated that these social
obligations, which cannot be refused, result in bad
business, as it is also socially unacceptable to demand
repayments of gifts and loans.
Disadvantages Minorities Face
Language may be a barrier to full market access
• In the CSA survey, 82% of HH said the people they dealt
with at markets were Kinh.
• Only 15% of minorities could use their mother tongue in
the marketplace. The rest had to use Vietnamese or
another second language. This disadvantages those
who are not skilled or fluent in Kinh.
• Ethnic minority women’s lack of fluency in Vietnamese
often keeps EM women away from marketplaces at
much higher rates than Kinh, where women dominate
petty trading.
Tricks of the Marketplace
How traders take advantage of ethnic minorities
PRA revealed numerous ‘tricks’ that are used in the market
place to reduce the prices paid for produce bought from EMs.
Scales may be rigged by attaching a small piece of thick
paper to the scale, resulting in mismeasurements of 20-30kgs
on the 100kg. Mobile rice millers charge low rates to
encourage minorities to mill their rice with them -- but then
make a small hole in the bottom of the machine to collect
extra rice (about 2.5kg per 50kg of rice milled), resulting in a
profit about 10 times the charged price.
Such tricks are played on everyone, but EMs reported these
problems more often in PRA.
In interviews with officials, they confirmed that traders often
deliberately take advantage of EMs lack of language skills
and literacy skills (interview with the Ede head of Dak Lak’s
ethnic minority committee).
Do Minorities Need More
Markets?
• 74% of HHs reported that traders come to their
village to buy things. Only the Bo Y reported that
traders did not often come to their village to buy
products.
• This implies that physical marketplaces
(infrastructure) may not always be needed to
encourage minorities to engage in trading if mobile
traders are already present and farmgate trading is
taking place.
• Investment currently spent on building markets
might then be better spent on credit or agricultural
processing facilities, or preferential policies to
increase EM involvement in business and trading.
Implications of Pillar Five
• Market access is about more than infrastructure. EMs use
physical marketplaces less than Kinh, implying that
investment in marketplaces may have benefited Kinh more
than EMs.
• Access to markets is tied to other issue such as the ability of
EMs to sell higher value or processed crops, and to obtain fair
prices for them. Disadvantages in language, credit, and type
of crops sold affect EMs’ ability to compete.
• There has been almost no policy attention paid to the fact that
trading and business in minority areas is dominated by Kinh.
Support to alternative models of trade that reflect community
and cultural norms (such as loans to start community-owned
supply stores rather than relying on private Kinh-owned ones)
could be a option to give EMs a foothold in the market.
Pillar Six: Stereotyping and
Attitudes Among and Toward EMs
• Stereotyping can lead to both decreased participation of
EMs (due to lack of self-confidence) but also less
inclination of authorities to listen to EMs because they
are perceived to be ‘less educated’ or have ‘lower
intellectual levels’.
• Stereotyping also leads to assumptions that are often not
backed up by reality: that EMs are ‘aukartic’ or ‘nomadic’,
when quantitative data shows most EMs produce for the
market and no one is ‘nomadic’. Many Kinh beliefs
about EMs are based on stereotypes that have persisted
for many years, backed up by mass media, about the
‘backwardness’ of EMs.
How do Gov’t Cadre view EMs?
Examples of attitudes expressed by gov’t cadre in field sites
• “Ethnic minorities don’t know how to make a living” head of EM committee, Ha Giang
• “Ethnic minorities don’t consume - they are only selfsufficient” - Ha Giang MOLISA official
• “Minorities don’t know how to use credit effectively” representative of Social Policy Bank, Dak Lak
• “Minorities have low intellectual levels, which has an
impact on their economies. They don’t know how to use
technology or raise livestock” - vice head of Lak District,
Dak Lak
• “Mnong let their pigs run around their stilt houses and
sleep under the house. It’s very dirty and unhygienic” head of Central Highlands ethnic office
Impacts of Stereotyping on EM
Self Image
Belief that EMs are less capable than Kinh is
widespread among government cadres and also
among EMs themselves.
• Ethnic minorities are more likely to consider themselves
backwards: 47.1 % do, compared to 16 % of Kinh.
• Ethnic minorities are also more likely to report that their
own ethnic group is lazy: 12.1% of EMs said this was
true, compared to 0% of the Kinh surveyed.
• Ethnic minorities view themselves as having low levels of
education (73.9%), while only 52% of Kinh respondents
reported their ethnic group has low levels of education.
Stereotyping lumps all EMs together,
ignoring differences among EMs
There are differences in self perception between ethnic groups; Tay for
example do not often say they are ‘backward’, but that they have low
education and are ‘ignorant’, while nearly 80% of Van Kieu think they
are ‘backwards’
80
70
60
50
40
30
Backward
Lazy
Tradition-bound
Ignorant
Superstitous
20
10
0
Tay
Hmong
Paco
VanKieu
Kinh
Stereotyping may lead to flawed
policy prescriptions
• For example, the stereotype that that EMs are nomadic and
in need of sedentarization has resulted in funding of
sedentarization programs that have not had discernible
impacts on poverty or on deforestation (IEMA 2005).
• Belief that EMs are not market oriented can lead to funding
of infrastructure (like markets) that benefits more Kinh than
EMs, as EMs tend to engage in the market but at the
village/farmgate, and they go to central commune/district
markets less than Kinh.
• Belief that EMs have less intellectual capacity can result in
investment in Kinh development to ‘show EMs how to
develop’ as was the case with migration programs in Quang
Tri, rather than directly investing in minority communities
themselves.
EM access to gov't policies
remains an open question
• Access to gov't policies varies considerably, but a lack of
disaggregated data at gov’t levels prevents much
analysis of access by EM groups. There is much we
simply don’t know about access to gov't services, such
as healthcare.
• EMs do not report higher rates of hesitance in using gov't
services, but they do have lower rates of use - such as in
credit access, smaller loans, and higher drop out rates
for education.
• More research on this question -- and better data at all
levels in EM areas -- is clearly needed to determine if the
design of policy interventions is limiting EM access to
needed services.
Conclusions: How Do the Six
Pillars of Disadvantage Combine
to Perpetuate Poverty?
• Less education and less mobility means less exposure to new ideas
and new productive crops.
• Less productive lands and less access to industrial crops means
more dependence on low value crops.
• Less access to trading and stable off farm employment means lower
incomes and more dependence on agriculture and low value wage
labor.
• Less access to credit means less money to buy inputs for agriculture.
• Less inputs for agriculture means lower productivity of crops.
• Less productivity means less to sell at the market
• Less to sell at the market means less overall income
• Less overall income means less money to buy inputs or invest in new
diversified activities
• Then the cycle starts again….
Disadvantages of EM Women
Special barriers highlighted by EM women in field research
• 26 year old Mnong woman in Dak Lak: “I know I don’t speak
Kinh very fluently, so I’m afraid to go to the market alone,
because I don’t understand when people respond to me.”
• 52-year old Hmong woman with 2nd grade education: “No
one invites women to the village meetings. I make sure I go
because if I didn’t no women would be there. I have to go to
make sure some woman is there.”
• 20 year old Dao woman: “The biggest expectation for us is to
get married. If you are Dao and 15 years old you start to get
nervous and scared if no one is interested yet. If you get to
age 20 and you don’t have a husband, it’s too hard. You’re too
old.”
• 21 year old Hmong woman: “I really didn’t want to have a 3rd
child. But I was pressured by my mother-in-law who said that
2 was not enough. So I had another one, another son”.
Challenges Facing EM Youth
EM youth share their dreams and the constraints they face
• 18 yr old Ede girl: “I took photography classes from the district technical
school, but I had to drop out before finishing the 12th grade because we
didn’t have any money. If I wanted to go look for work, I’d be scared. I
don’t have any relatives there, I don’t know any Ede there. That’s why
I’m hesitant to leave the village to pursue my dream.”
• 23 yr old Ede man with 5th grade education: “There’s nothing to do here
but be a laborer on the coffee plantation. There aren’t any books to read
or newspapers here, not even at the commune. I don’t know anyone
who has ever borrowed books to read.”
• 21 yr old Hmong man: “Some one in the family had to take care of our
elderly parents, help them in the fields. So even though I wanted to
study and become a cadre, I knew I had to help my family first, so I
dropped out at 9th grade.”
• 20 yr old Dao boy: “We don’t really have any place to go with our Youth
Union. We met at my house to practice singing together but my parents
got annoyed and so we had to stop. There’s no place to watch TV, do
anything, without electricity or a cultural house.”
Some Possible Considerations for
how the ‘Culture’ Variable might
be better built into EM policy
• Language: While more than 90% of EMs speak their ethnic language
at home, less than half the HHs reported village and other meetings
were held in minority languages. Extension and credit in particular are
hard to assess for those without language skills. Increasing access to
education and other services though bilingual EM cadre is important,
as is increasing minority language training for Kinh cadres.
• EM Training: Cadres in EM communities often know little about local
cultural preferences. Better government programming from the bottom
up could better take into account local preferences: for example, the
Hmong staple food is corn, not rice, yet they have been targeted with
rice extension training. Sensitivity and affirmative action training to
reduce stereotyping is also needed at all levels. Top down policies
exacerbate these situations.
Other EM Policy Questions
Raised by the CSA
• Targeting communities: Questions were raised by minority communities
in PRA about current poverty efforts targeted at individual households
versus communities. Some EMs prefer poverty targeting to the whole
community if possible. Individual HH targeting is seen to increase
inequality, not level it, among Ede and Mnong, for example. Some
villages said they could not pick a small number of poor HH for
HEPR/P134 benefits without causing community discord overall.
Community sentiment is very strong in many EM areas -- policies that
recognize this are more likely to succeed. Suggestions might include
more attention to agricultural and processing co-ops in EM villages to
play on this community sentiment to build in stronger bargaining power
in the market for EM produce.
• Targeting some ethnic groups: Some EMs are clearly better off than
others (the indigenous minorities in in Dak Lak are doing worse than
EM migrants; Mnong doing worse than Ede on income; Ede doing
worse than Mnong on loss of lands/landlessness). While some
provinces have asked for ethnically specific funding, there is still a
national preference for blanket EM and geographically targeted
policies. A discussion should take place: is a general policy always
warranted? Which might be made ethnically specific?
References
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Baulch, B. et al. (2002). Ethnic minority development in Vietnam: a socio-economic perspective. Policy Research
Paper 2836, Washington DC, World Bank.
Dinh Duc Thuan et al (2005). Forestry, Poverty Reduction and Rural Livelihoods in Vietnam, MARD: Forest Sector
Support Programme.
GSO (2003). Results of the 2001 Rural, Agricultural and Fishery Census. Ha Noi: Statistical Publishing House.
GSO, NCCR, et al. (2004). Socioeconomic atlas of Vietnam: A depiction of the 1999 population and housing
census. Ha Noi, Cartographic Publishing House.
Gunewardena D., and van de Walle D., 2001. “Sources of ethic inequality in Vietnam” Journal of Development
Economics, Vol. 65, pp. 177-207
IEMA and McElwee, P. (2005) . Research on Policies for Fixed Cultivation and Sedentarization in Vietnam. Hanoi:
NXB Dan Toc Hoc.
IEMA - Hoang Cong Dung, Tran Van Doai, Pham Anh Duc, and Pamela McElwee. (2006). Access By Ethnic
Minorities to Financial Services in the Northern Mountainous Region of Vietnam. Hanoi: Institute for Ethnic
Minority Affairs and the World Bank.
IEMA - Le Ngoc Thang, Thach Muni, Nong Hong Thai, Vu Thanh Hien and Pamela McElwee (2007). Living
standard analysis for socio-economic development of the ethnic Khmer in the Mekong Delta, 2005-2010. Hanoi:
Institute for Ethnic Minority Affairs and the World Bank
Swinkels, R. and C. Turk ( 2004). Poverty and Remote areas: evidence from new data and questions for the
future. Background paper for the PAC conference, 24-26 November 2004 , World Bank, Vietnam.
Swinkels, R. and C. Turk (2006). Explaining ethnic minority poverty in Vietnam. Presentation, Nov 28, World Bank.
TECOS (2006). Consultancy Service and Technology Development Company for Natural Resources and
Environment. Poverty and Environment Nexus Study Phase !!: Land resource - Poverty Study in Vietnam. MS for
World Bank.
VASS - Le Thuc Duc, Nguyen Thang, et al. (2006). Poverty Reduction in Viet Nam: Disharmonies Behind the
Impressive Achievements. Hanoi, Viet Nam Academy of Social Sciences.
WRI (2002). Where are the Poor? Experiences with the Development and Use of Poverty Maps. Washington,
World Resources Institute.