COURT SECURITY ASSESSMENT
WASHINGTON COUNTY, TEXAS
MAY 20 & 21, 2013
Review of Court Security Practices, Facilities and Procedures
Conducted by the
National Sheriffs’ Association
Table of Contents
Introduction………………………………………………………………………………….Page 1
Overview…………………………………………………………………………………….Page 2
Screening Process…………………………………………………………………………....Page 5
Courthouse Operations, Courtrooms, Corridors………………………………………….....Page 6
Physical Security………………………………………………………………........Page 6
Exterior of Courthouse……………………………………………………………...Page 7
Facility………………………………………………………………………………Page 8
Courthouse Operations, Corridors, Offices………………………………………...Page 12
Courtrooms…………………………………………………………………………Page 14
Prisoner Transport………………………………………………………………….Page 16
Child Support Court………………………………………………………………..Page 17
The Courthouse Annex Building…………………………………………………………..Page 18
Findings and Recommendations for Washington County Courthouse……………….........Page 20
Findings and Recommendations for Washington County Annex Building…………..........Page 31
Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………….Page 32
Appendices…………………………………………………………………………………Page 34
Introduction
Our courthouses are where reasonable men and women bring their grievances to be heard in a
fair and impartial manner, free from fear or intimidation. It is the Sheriff’s Constitutional
mandate to provide a safe environment for all court users.
Court security operations are proactive as opposed to reactive in nature. Unlike patrol operations,
where officers respond to crimes in progress or past events, then report same and create statistics
indicating numbers and types of events, arrests, etc., a successful day in court security will leave
no events to quantify. Court security operations should be designed to mitigate and prevent
incidents, rather than respond to incidents. The necessity of a response by security, other than for
an aided case or a spontaneous act, is a failure of the security process.
At the request of Sheriff Otto H. Hanak, Sheriff of Washington County, Texas, a Court Security
Assessment of the Washington County Courthouse was conducted on May 20 and 21, 2013. The
National Sheriffs’ Association (NSA) performed the assessment to provide the Sheriff with an
unbiased review of the court security processes and the physical plants at the Washington County
Courthouse and to offer suggestions for improvement of same where indicated. Elements of the
assessment included an assessment of staffing, a building inspection, observation of screening,
courtroom operations and prisoner operations, and interviews with numerous stakeholders. The
NSA Court Security Assessment Checklist was used to assist the assessors in their review and is
attached as an appendix to this report. As part of the security review, photographs were taken of
the exterior and interior of the building and will be included herein.
The assessment was conducted by former Major Greg Conrad, retired from the New York State
Courts and Mr. Jim Ludolph, retired Chief of Court Security for the Peoria County, IL, Sheriff’s
Office. Conrad is Past President of the Court Officers’ and Deputies’ Association of NSA and is
a member of the NSA Court and Judicial Security Advisory Board. Both men serve on the Court
Security and Transportation of Prisoners Committee of NSA. They have conducted numerous
court security assessments and provided court security training throughout the country. Together
they have over 50 years of court security experience.
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Overview
The security of a courthouse is based on a balance of four essential components: involvement of
all stakeholders, security personnel, technological devices, and the configuration of the physical
plant. The absence of any of these components will negatively impact the security of a facility.
An assessment of the Washington County Courthouse is a snapshot in time limited to the dates
on which it was conducted.
Washington County, Texas is a rural/suburban county encompassing approximately 600 square
miles with a population of about 34,000, of whom about 15,000 live in the City of Brenham, the
County Seat, according to the most recent Census figures. The Sheriff’s Office is a full service
agency providing civil process, court security, jail operations and patrol functions. Their total
uniformed strength is about 26 sworn deputies and supervisors and 20 jailers with an additional
three sworn. The court security staffing varies from day to day, based on caseloads, but is usually
4 deputies with additional help from the jail available as needed.
The courthouse, which was built around 1940, is a standalone building located at 100 East Main
Street in Brenham. There is also an annex, which is newer construction. The two buildings are
separated by a city street. The courthouse is an historic four story building. (The historic
designation will be discussed later in this report.) The District, County, Justice of the Peace
Courts and Juvenile/Family Courts all sit there. Additionally, the County Clerk, Treasurer,
Attorney and Voter Registration Office are all contained therein. The first floor contains a public
lavatory and the maintenance area. The second floor encompasses various offices, the JP and
County Courts. The third floor houses the District Courtroom, District Clerk’s Office, Chambers
and the District Court Coordinator’s office. The fourth floor, or “attic”, contains various power
panels, air handlers, old files and is used for storage. One can gain access to the roof from here.
Several interviews were conducted with stakeholders in the court operation. Among those
interviewed were:
District Court Judge Carson Campbell
District Court Judge Reva Towslee Corbett
County Judge John Brieden
Court at Law Judge Matthew Reue
Associate Judge Lisa Hubacek
Justice of the Peace Roy May
County Commissioner Zeb Heckmann**
District Attorney Julie Renken
County Attorney Renee Ann Mueller
District Clerk Tammy Brauner
County Clerk Beth Rothermel
County Treasurer Peggy Kramer
Tax Assessor Dot Borchgardt
County Auditor Sharon Stolz
Chief of Juvenile Services Department Jason Bender
Chief Clerk of JP Court Shawna Goerlitz
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Chief Deputy of Elections Carol Foster
Deputy County Attorney John Winkelman
Reception/Information Officer Janet Daniel
Facility Maintenance Supervisor Charlie Hakemack
Deputy Chief Fire Marshal Alan Finke
Human Resources Director Darrell Reimer
Human Resources Assistant Victoria Conarroe
Captain Jerry Green
Lieutenant Marlow Lowery
Sergeant Ann Mode*
Deputy Jose Perez
Deputy Daniel Gaskamp
Deputy Michael Janecek
*Interview via telephone 5/28/2013
** Interview via telephone 5/30/2013
Two members of the County Commission also came to the courthouse at separate times during
the assessment and had informal conversations with the assessors.
The assessors would like to note, they never before have had so many judicial officials and staff,
department heads, and elected officials make themselves available for an assessment.
Additionally, Sheriff Hanak was in virtual constant contact from the time the assessors came into
Brenham on Sunday evening until they left on Tuesday evening. He also made Lt. Lowery
available as a guide and to set up interviews for both days. It is very apparent that Sheriff Hanak
takes his Constitutional responsibility to provide court security for Washington County very
seriously and he was actively involved in improving security operations and inter-agency
communication as the assessment was in progress. The cooperation from all stakeholders was
beyond any the assessors had ever experienced and speaks to the awareness of the importance of
court security which all involved personnel in Washington County share. This serious approach
and commonality of goals will be referenced throughout this report. Their awareness of the
deficiencies in the security process and willingness to do whatever is necessary to improve it are
laudable, indeed.
As the list of those interviewed and the assessors comments above illustrate, the number of
interviews conducted was much higher than usual. What was also unusual was the similar nature
to the answers given by the respondents. This commonality of awareness, coupled with a
willingness to adapt to the necessary changes, seem to provide for a promising outcome to the
security problems at the Washington County Courthouse. Listed below are recurring themes
from answers given to interview questions or extemporaneous comments made by respondents
throughout the assessment process:
 Security at the courthouse is lacking and needs to be improved. Most felt it is not a
question of “if” something will happen, but rather “when”.
 Screening and restricted entry point with x-ray and magnetometer staffed by officers
should be established. In this area, many stakeholders displayed a unique security
perception and awareness to the dangers of workplace violence. Many believed that
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screening of everyone, to include employees, entering the facility would be the best
option.
More uniformed security was required.
The Sheriff and his staff were working hard to provide security and the interest shown
and the presence of Sheriff Hanak was welcomed.
Most everyone was aware that the cost for improvement, whether new construction or
improvements to present courthouse, would be considerable. They were also aware that
they would take time. Nearly all expressed a willingness to be inconvenienced during
these processes in order to make the courthouse safer.
Every elected and judicial official and department head expressed concern for the safety
of all staff.
There is a need for private restrooms for staff.
Deputies should be given some court specific training.
More training is desired for non-security staff regarding what their response and
responsibility should be in the events of fire, tornado, evacuation, court disruption, and
other emergencies.
4
Screening Process
The screening station is the first layer of defense for the courthouse and sets the tone for all
entering as to the serious nature of court security. Failures or perceived lack of ability to protect
at the screening station invites disruption in other areas within the courthouse. It is important to
remember that no screening operation is 100 percent successful and that a person intent on
introducing contraband or willing to risk death or injury to circumvent security to disrupt the
judicial process has a chance of success.
The screening process in the Washington County Courthouse consists of a deputy standing
immediately outside the courtroom with a handheld metal detector “wand”. While this is better
than no screening at all, it is only slightly so. The handheld devices are recommended as back up
screening when a full arch type metal detector, such as those used at airports, has alarmed when
a person walks through and additional screening is indicated. Not as a primary screening method
for a facility. The reasons for this are manifold, but the main reasons are they are not as thorough
or accurate as a full arch and they also give many false positive readings, as the rebar in most
floors in public buildings causes the alarm to activate as the deputy scans the lower areas of a
person’s body. While the assessors were present on both days of the assessment observing the
process at the Washington County Courthouse, this occurred with every person being screened.
It was obvious to the assessors, and, more importantly, to anyone observing the process that it
was flawed and ineffective.
Additionally, the deputy responsible for screening in this fashion is constantly being placed in a
position of disadvantage while crouching to scan the lower areas of persons being screened. The
area around the District courtroom on the third floor becomes very crowded on court days. This
makes the situation even more perilous for the deputy as, frequently, persons other than those
being screened are in close proximity to the deputy while the screening process is occurring. This
makes the possibility of an assault or attempted weapon grab more likely.
Screening at a single entrance is the more accepted standard practice and removes the noise and
confusion associated with the present situation from the area of the courts and gives staff more
control while providing a secure environment for everyone within the courthouse. Limiting
screening to only certain times or for certain events also opens the door to “failure to protect”
issues that can present themselves with adverse notoriety or, worse yet, wrongful death or injury
litigation.
The west entrance to the courthouse is the only entrance that is handicap assessable. This
entrance is narrow and accommodating a screening point with a walk thru magnetometer and x
ray machine would be difficult to accomplish. The north or south entrance would present less of
a design challenge. However, these entrances, along with the east entrance, are not handicap
assessable. Possible remedies are discussed in the Findings/Recommendations section.
5
Courthouse Operations, Courtrooms, Corridors
Physical Security
Washington County Courthouse
The Washington County Courthouse occupies one block in the heart of Brenham, Texas. There
are four entrances open to the public; once entrance each on the north, south, east, and west sides
of the courthouse. There is, at this time, no restricted entry into the courthouse. There are no
physical barriers to prevent intrusion by vehicle. There are staircases and landscape features on
the north and south entrances pictured above, which could delay and make breach by a vehicle
difficult. Pictured below is the east entrance, which is used as the entry point for prisoners who
are transported by van from the jail. Also pictured is the west entrance which is the designated
ADA accessible entrance. Judges, employees, Sheriff’s staff, and prisoners all utilize public
entrances.
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East Entrance (Prisoner Entrance)
West Entrance (ADA Compliant)
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Exterior of Courthouse
The lighting around the courthouse is provided by public street lighting and limited courthouse
lighting that does provide lighting after hours. The lighting is controlled by timers, inspected
regularly, the controls are inaccessible to unauthorized persons, and there is limited auxiliary
power, both exterior and interior, for the courthouse according to Facilities Management.
Benches at the east prisoner entrance are attached. Shrubbery and trees are maintained and offer
some opportunity to hide contraband.
There is marked restricted official parking on the street surrounding the courthouse at various
locations. Judges, Prosecutors, and elected officials do not have assigned parking, although there
is shared parking behind and across from the courthouse annex for court staff. There is no
designated parking for jurors. There are no separate entrances into this courthouse for judges, incustody inmates and the public. There was concern expressed by some judges about their
personal safety from their vehicles to the courthouse.
There are four cameras in and around the courthouse which monitor the interior entrances. The
video is recorded; however recovery of video was not possible during the assessment. The
computer program for the video appeared outdated. This situation appeared to be being
addressed while the assessment was in progress.
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Facility
This courthouse has no sprinkler system or fire hoses and smoke detectors are only in the one
elevator that services the entire courthouse. Stairwells at the west and east entrances lead to the
first and second floors. Of great concern is the fact that only one stairwell leads to the third floor
and is the only ingress and egress to the third floor. This situation creates serious problems in the
event of fire or disruptive events. Windows are sealed and most cannot be opened; a good idea
for security purposes, however, in the case of fire or entrapment this could be a serious problem.
Doors for utility control points, attics, and basement were found unsecured during the
assessment, allowing access to ventilation, elevator, electrical, telephone, HVAC systems as well
as numerous edged weapons, blunt objects and cleaning solvents (photographs on next two
pages).There is an emergency power supply that will automatically activate. The Facility
Manager expressed concerns about the age of the generator. The courthouse has no facility
intrusion alarms. There is concern, and it was reported to the assessors, that the magnetic locks
that controlled the afterhours exit door had been and could be easily compromised by a hard pull
on same. This was corroborated by several persons interviewed, but not attempted by the
assessors for fear of damaging the doors. It was also observed first hand by the assessors that
some of the interior doors could be “jimmied” simply by sliding a business card through the
striker plates on the doors and manipulating the doorknob. One assessor was able to perform this
on two doors in the Justice of the Peace office area. Keys and key fobs are issued through the
Facilities Department and it appears that the Facilities Department makes decisions and keeps
the records relative to issuance of same.
(PLEASE NOTE: DATES ON THE PHOTOGRAPHS ARE INCORRECT AND APPEAR IN THE PHOTOGRAPHS
INADVERTANTLY. ALL PHOTOGRAPHS WERE TAKEN MAY 20 AND 21, 2013 AT THE WASHINGTON COUNTY, TX,
COURTHOUSE.)
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(PLEASE NOTE: DATES ON THE PHOTOGRAPHS ARE INCORRECT AND APPEAR IN PHOTGRAPHS INADVERTENTLY.
ALL PHOTOGRAPHS IN THIS DOCUMENT WERE TAKEN ON MAY 20 AND 21, 2013 AT WASHINGTON COUNTY, TX
COURTHOUSE)
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(PLEASE NOTE: DATES ON THE PHOTOGRAPHS ARE INCORRECT AND APPEAR IN PHOTGRAPHS INADVERTENTLY.
ALL PHOTOGRAPHS IN THIS DOCUMENT WERE TAKEN ON MAY 20 AND 21, 2013 AT WASHINGTON COUNTY, TX
COURTHOUSE)
The preceding two pages of photographs show some of the items and systems to which the
assessors had unfettered access during the assessment. There are more photographs, similar in
nature, which were not included in order to avoid redundancy. Public access to the items and
devices in the enclosed photos could create grave danger in an assault or escape scenario or, at
the very least, significant disruption to courthouse operations by disruption of elevator, phone,
HVAC or electrical service. The creation of a hazardous condition rendering the courthouse
unusable by introducing a noxious or hazardous substance to the air circulation system also
exists. Some of the items were flammable and could be used as accelerants to start a fire. This
could result in illnesses or injuries to staff and building users and the inability to use the
courthouse until decontamination can be completed. Many of the items were accessible because
the practice currently in place is to keep certain custodial and maintenance doors open to allow
employee access to paper products and other supplies without inconvenience.
Duress alarms (panic buttons) were a major concern during the assessment. It was clear from the
onset that there was no clear policy and procedure in place as to who was responsible for
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checking the alarms for functionality, maintaining them or where the alarms were responded
to/dispatched from. On a positive note, everyone with an alarm button knew how to activate it.
After this, there seemed to be no clear chain of command or control of responsibility for the
duress system. Several people interviewed stated that when the alarms were dispatched often
there was “no response”, “someone calls us”, “the county treasurer called us when we activated
it”, “private security handles half the alarms and county dispatch the other”, and numerous
other responses, indicating overall confusion regarding the duress system. Further complicating
the picture, it was learned that many of the alarms, when activated, either did not give a location
or gave an incorrect location. Despite the apparent flaws in the system and process, more alarm
buttons were being installed during the assessment in what appeared to be a slapdash manner.
Overall, the system seemed disorganized and severely flawed.
The courthouse, as indicated earlier, is somewhat old and is designated a Texas historical site. It
demonstrates the problems of trying to secure an environment that was meant to be open to the
public. When constructed in 1939 and 1940, attacks in and on the courts were almost unheard of
and not envisioned occurring as often as in today’s society.
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Courthouse Operations, Corridors, Offices
The Washington County Courthouse is a full service courthouse operation. Consistent with the
time in which it was constructed, it is built to be open and accessible. The courthouse contains
District, County, County Court of Law and Justice of the Peace Courts. The other government
offices such as Clerks, Recorder, Assessor’s, County Attorney and support offices are all
working with security, space and storage limitations. At the time of its construction, Washington
County Government was much smaller in scope and the court calendars were, presumably, also
less crowded. They are performing twenty-first century services in a mid-twentieth century
facility built at the conclusion of The Great Depression as a works project.
One facility issue found during the assessment was a lack of separate restroom facilities for staff,
public, and prisoners. At present, everyone uses public restrooms, except when the restroom in
the Jury Deliberation room is available for use by judges and staff. In many offices, there is only
one way in and out, creating security as well as evacuation safety risks. Some problems and
potentially hazardous conditions related to lack of space observed during this assessment were
public access to areas that put them in close proximity to working staff, money, and non-public
records. This was especially the case in one elected official’s office which occupied two levels of
the courthouse and contained both public and non-public records on the lower level. There was
no assigned staff on the lower level to monitor activity of the public when in the area. One
assessor gained access to a room containing non-public records simply by opening a door. In
this same room was a safe containing public records. Windows in most offices were not
operational. This situation creates serious safety concerns in those offices with only one entrance
and exit. In the case of a fire or event blocking the one way in and out, the consequences could
be disastrous. Offices dealing with the public in all but the District Clerk’s Office have counters
that separate the public from staff which were not built with the security principle of creating a
high enough and wide enough barrier to allow reaction time for the staff in the case of a hostile
client. In interviews with stakeholders and their supervisors, the safety of employees was a
concern in the area of this separation and reaction time. This can become more of a security issue
in offices that handle money; particularly on days when large amounts of cash and checks are
received. One office had a wall constructed to prevent the public from being able to observe the
counting of receipts. Most office staff seemed aware of keeping weapons of opportunity such as
staplers, scissors, tape dispensers and other potential weapons or projectiles out of public reach.
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All offices had duress alarms and all staff interviewed understood how to operate them. One
office supervisor had provided wasp spray to the staff working the counter area as a means of
personal protection.
The jury deliberation room can best described as a multi-use room. In addition to being used for
jurors during trials, the room is used as an attorney conference room and is the only private
restroom for judges, prosecutors, and staff. There are no client/attorney rooms and consequently
conferencing occurs in the hallways outside the courts. An exception to this being on the second
floor, where the county attorneys conduct conferences in a small, isolated office with only one
method of ingress and egress. Separation of defense and prosecution witnesses in this courthouse
would be a difficult task. Exit from the jury deliberation room is only accomplished through the
courtroom. This creates potential problems after verdicts and hearings when a jury, witnesses,
defendants and so forth must exit with defense, prosecution, media, family and friends still in the
courtroom and vicinity.
This courthouse has four cameras and, at the time of the assessment, no method to retrieve video
or a working control room with staff to monitor activity occurring on camera. Cameras can be
an asset in situations of incident review or live monitoring by staff to react to possible security,
medical, or other assistance needed in the areas of the cameras. The present situation offers a
false sense of security. At the time of assessment, the Sheriff was attempting to rectify the
situation.
The halls within the Washington County Courthouse are as other aspects of this courthouse,
historic in design and lacking the functionally needed in a twenty-first century courthouse. The
second floor information booth is pictured below. As the picture shows, the location of the
booth, at the intersection of steps and hallway leading from the north and south entrances and at
top of steps from the east and west entrances and located in the middle of courthouse, is
convenient for those needing information, but for security creates a situation wherein deputies do
not have an unobstructed view of the many entrances to this courthouse. If construction of a new
criminal justice center is not to be pursued, then the information booth ought to be removed and
an alternate desk be installed or space be found in a nearby office. If new construction is
approved, from a historical standpoint, keeping the booth as is and “living with the situation” is
recommended.
.
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Courtrooms
The third floor district court is the only operational courtroom observed for this report. As the
pictures below show, the courtroom is ornate and majestic, with high ceilings and rich
woodwork. Again, it is consistent with the era of its design and construction and does not have
any of the security features one would expect in a more modern courtroom.
District Courtroom 05/20/2013
District Courtroom 05/20/13
(PLEASE NOTE: DATES ON THE PHOTOGRAPHS ARE INCORRECT AND APPEAR IN PHOTGRAPHS INADVERTENTLY.
ALL PHOTOGRAPHS IN THIS DOCUMENT WERE TAKEN ON MAY 20 AND 21, 2013 AT WASHINGTON COUNTY, TX
COURTHOUSE)
To the left of the judge’s bench is a door leading to chambers and support staff. The door to the
right rear is the Jury Deliberation room. Entry through the clerk’s office from a public hall at the
front of the courtroom is possible. Public entry to the courtroom is primarily at the rear. There
are no cameras in the courtroom. The Sheriff’s officers working the courtroom are called
Bailiffs. They are in uniform and are sworn, armed law enforcement. Staffing is dependent on
the number of prisoners attending court and there is not sufficient staff to establish assignments.
Normally, transport officers work the courtroom when there are prisoners produced. When there
are prisoners in the courtroom (see photos on next page), the prisoners are seated in the public
area to the left rear of the courtroom. Portable partitions to their rear and along their right are
used to discourage contact with the public. One officer is assigned to monitor inmates and as
much of the public as possible.
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Prisoner Seating Area District Courtroom 05/20/13
Prisoners in District Courtroom 05/21/13
(PLEASE NOTE: DATES ON THE PHOTOGRAPHS ARE INCORRECT AND APPEAR IN PHOTGRAPHS INADVERTENTLY.
ALL PHOTOGRAPHS IN THIS DOCUMENT WERE TAKEN ON MAY 20 AND 21, 2013 AT WASHINGTON COUNTY, TX
COURTHOUSE)
An officer with a handheld metal detector “wand” is stationed outside the courtroom at the door.
A third officer is in the well of the court. This officer in the well of the court has, in addition to
security duties, the assignment of handling files and fingerprinting out-of-custody defendants
upon entry of out-of-custody pleas. According to those interviewed, the practice of immediately
fingerprinting individuals not in custody is a legal mandate. This armed officer has out-ofcustody defendants moving all around his/her person with his/her back to the public area of the
courtroom and his/her focus occupied by the labor intensive fingerprinting process. This practice
appeared to create a hazardous condition for all in the courtroom, virtually inviting an assault or
attempted weapon grab by anyone in proximity to the deputy. The assessors were unable to
determine whether or not immediate fingerprinting of these individuals was a statutory
requirement or not.
On the days the assessors were in the courtroom, May 20, 2013, (child support/custody date) and
May 21, 2013 (inmate appearance date) there appeared to be significant overcrowding in the
courtroom and in the area outside the courtroom. This was particularly so on “child support day”.
The volatile nature of these cases, coupled with the crowded conditions and small security force
create a dangerous “powder keg” condition wherein one small disruption or outburst can result in
an explosive and potentially deadly situation. On the dates of the assessment, Sheriff Hanak
assisted with security in the public area of the courtroom, mitigating some of the assessors’
concerns about the operational dangers inherent to courtroom overcrowding and mingling of
prisoners and public in a confined area separated only by a portable partition. The short staffing
further heightens the potential for an undesired incident.
The Judge’s Bench has a duress (panic) button. The bench does not have any installed ballistic
protection, but, consistent with the construction of the era, would most likely be durable enough
to slow down or stop a small caliber round.
Lighting is good. Furnishings and fixtures in the courtroom are typical for the era of
construction. The bailiffs perform periodic searches of the courtroom and appear to use sound
practices and procedures regarding searches of the courtroom.
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Prisoner Transport
During the assessment, prisoner transport was observed from the jail to the courthouse. The
movement of prisoners within the jail and into the transport van appeared to be to the same
standard one would expect at a similar facility. The jail has a secure sally port and prisoners are
transported in handcuffs and shackles. They wear black and white striped jail uniforms. The trip
from the jail to the courthouse is of short duration; approximately a mile and a half. Twelve
prisoners were produced and the assessors were told this was a smaller number than usual. The
prisoner van parked in an area designated for sheriff’s van parking only on Alamo Street and the
prisoners exited onto the travelled section of road, as opposed to the sidewalk. They then walked,
under supervision, about a half block to the Baylor Street (East) entrance. Once inside the
courthouse, they traveled up the steps to the third floor courtroom. In case of medical or
handicapped needs, prisoners are transported to the courtroom by the public elevator. All
movement of prisoners, including use of restrooms, as needed, after arrival at the courthouse is in
areas accessible to the public.
It was noted that, although inmates were produced from the jail to court at around nine o’clock in
the morning on the day the assessors were present, many were not seen until after lunch. The
results of this were three more high risk transports needing to be done. The first being the return
trip from the courthouse to the jail to provide lunch for the prisoners, a trip back to the
courthouse with those prisoners not seen in the morning, and a final return trip to the jail at the
end of the court session. This is not at all an accepted safe standard of practice and is exacerbated
by the constant possible contact with the public once the inmates are removed from the transport
vans at the courthouse. Further, the longer the prisoners are in court, the potential for an incident
to occur becomes greater.
Prisoner movement in itself is among the most hazardous duties in law enforcement and is
consistently among the leading incidents wherein officers are assaulted or killed. Prisoner
transport outside the jail to courthouses or other destinations, and then movement within these
locations heightens the potential for these events. In circumstances such as those that exist in
Washington County, as indicated above, the potential for a disastrous incident is nearly constant.
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Child Support Court
Monday, May 20, 2013 was Child Support Court day. The courtroom was busy and activity
high. The courtroom and the surrounding area on the third floor were very crowded. The very
nature of these cases is a recipe for conflict. Frequently, there is much enmity between the
litigants in these proceedings and the close proximity to each other which existed on May 20,
2013, can bring about potentially violent results. Should a fight break out in this confined area,
injuries to bystanders are also a possible consequence. This dangerous condition is further
inflamed by the volatile conditions inherent in matters such as those being heard. Overcrowding
in this area is a significant problem, as discussed earlier in this report, for both officer safety and
public safety reasons. There is only one method of ingress/egress to this floor making evacuation
difficult in an emergency.
Another significant problem, again addressed earlier, is that there is simply not enough security
personnel assigned to the facility. A strong uniformed presence in adequate numbers can prevent
potential problems simply from the perception a rapid law enforcement response is forthcoming
in the event of misconduct by litigants.
District Courtroom 05/20/2013 (Child Support Court)
(PLEASE NOTE: DATES ON THE PHOTOGRAPHS ARE INCORRECT AND APPEAR IN THE PHOTOGRAPHS
INADVERTANTLY. ALL PHOTOGRAPHS WERE TAKEN MAY 20 AND 21, 2013 AT THE WASHINGTON COUNTY, TX,
COURTHOUSE.)
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The Courthouse Annex Building
The Washington County Annex Building is located across the street from the courthouse. This
annex is of newer construction and has had remodeling performed to update and secure the
building, although there is no screening process. The annex public entrance is the side location
shown in the lower photo above. The annex houses the offices of Environmental Health, Human
Resources, Veterans’ Services, Auditor, Treasurer, Community Supervision & Corrections,
Juvenile Probation, and Star Program.
The assessment was conducted toward the end of the business day on the last day of the
assessment, so observations are from the period of that day. There was not a lot of public
activity, although it appeared individuals were entering for a function on the second floor in a
room set up for classes. Activity was less than the courthouse.
The offices have entry off public hallways. There were no cameras observed and no security
assigned to this annex. Although much newer than the courthouse with regard to construction,
the security could be improved. This building offers private entry off of an adjacent parking lot
and, once inside, there is some private circulation and entry controlled offices. To the extent that
these offices operate apart from the courthouse, some basic security concepts could be
incorporated. An example is expanding controlled entry, difficult for offices such as Auditor or
Treasurer because of the nature of their business, but possible for offices such as Human
Resources to have more view of entering public. Creation of some barriers, such as protective
windows and partitions would add to making this workplace more secure.
18
The second floor of the Washington County Courthouse Annex is devoted to Juvenile Probation,
the Star Program, and a meeting/classroom. The offices on this floor contain the multi-county
CEN-TEX Regional Juvenile Board for the Counties of Bastrop, Burleson, Lee, and Washington.
Entry into these offices was monitored when the assessors were present and there is security
awareness on the part of those working in this area.
The assessors attempted to enter the private circulation areas of the facility through various doors
and found them all to be locked and functioning correctly. Overall, the facility is more secure
than the main courthouse.
Interviews with stakeholders in the annex, although fewer, mirrored some of the same safety
concerns as those expressed by those working in the courthouse.
 No screening of public upon entering building.
 No regularly assigned on site security.
 Employees should have picture identification to better distinguish the employees from the
public.
 Some type of film or covering for street level windows should be installed to prevent
observation from street level.
 Some offices need to have exit other than public entrance.
 Configure offices in way that employees would be situated better to observe those
entering and not have backs to public entering.
19
Findings and Recommendations
for Washington County Courthouse
Finding 1: The Washington County Courthouse as it currently exists is obsolete and very
difficult to retrofit to make secure. It is also so overcrowded as to create a dangerous condition to
all court and building users. There appears to be unanimity among all stakeholders interviewed
on this point.
Recommendation 1: Serious consideration must be given to building a new courthouse/justice
center. Renovations, although expensive to accomplish, will be recommended further on in this
section, but the assessors would like to stress that the renovations should be considered as
temporary fixes until a new facility can be designed and constructed. Renovations to the facility
are further complicated by its historic designation, age and also the space limitations. The
renovation suggestions will need to be reviewed by the decision makers in Washington County
with regard to priorities, but the assessors will identify some of those which they feel are most
important by rank herein.
Finding 2: The current weapon and contraband screening process is better than no screening at
all, but only slightly so.
Recommendation 2: A single public entrance should be established with a screening checkpoint
set up at same. Ideally, this entrance would be the ADA Compliant West Entrance.
West Entrance
As stated earlier, there are some space limitations with this entrance. The following suggestions
could allow for screening at the West Entrance:
 Install an awning type structure outside the door to allow people to queue and to mitigate
inclement weather issues. The facility’s no smoking prohibition should include this area
20
to avoid conflicts among those on line. Temporary tensa barrier could be deployed,
depending on caseloads, to allow for more orderly queuing.
 Install signage instructing people to remove all items from their pockets and their belts
and to place them in the bins provided. This signage could also inform persons entering
the courthouse as to prohibited items. The signage could be supplemented with verbal
reminders from those personnel assigned to the screening process.
 Place a table inside the awning with bins large enough to hold the contents of peoples’
pockets, their belts and bags on same.
 Do not deploy a full scale x-ray screening operation and simply install an arch type metal
detector supplemented with hand wanding and physical searches of all bags and packages
entering the courthouse. A small table could be set up to allow this searching to occur.
This will be more time consuming than an x-ray screening, but can be almost as effective
if properly done.
 Hand wand people as they enter the facility, but prior to them entering the arch to assist
in identifying areas of potential activation.
 Trim or remove shrubs in immediate area of entrance and place trash receptacle and
cigarette butt receptacle closer to street.
 If modifying the West entrance is determined to not be viable due to logistical or other
considerations, either the North or South entrances could be used using the same model
as above. These entrances would most likely allow for x-ray operations, but not
handicapped accessibility. As such, in addition to screening at these locations, staffing
and equipment allowances will have to be made to provide screening of some sort at the
West entrance as needed regardless.
 Additional staff will be necessary to provide screening as described above. Staff already
assigned would need to be augmented in some way. At least two more deputies would be
needed to provide adequate coverage. Additional staff will be required for busy periods.
A possible solution might be to bring patrol deputies in during peak morning hours to
assist until the crowds dissipate or using the Citizens on Patrol program in some way.
It should also be noted that some electrical or other facility modifications will most likely be
needed to install the screening apparatus.
Setting a precedent in this report, the assessors have identified another item as being equally
important as revamping the screening operations and have decided to make the following
findings and recommendation 2a-2d
Finding 2a: Prisoner movement and production upon arrival at the courthouse is dangerous and
in need of serious, immediate improvement.
21
Recommendation 2a: A separate prisoner entrance should be designated. Using the current
prisoner entrance would be recommended with the following changes to the area:
 Designation of the door as a secured prisoner only entrance, with separate keying/key fob
access.
 Installation of a curb cut to allow the Sheriff’s transport van to back directly up to the
door to unload prisoners. This would accomplish several safety improvements, some
being: Prisoners and Sheriff staff would no longer be standing in traffic lanes and
exposure to the public would be greatly reduced. Reduced contact with the public reduces
the risk of weapons and contraband being passed to the inmates, assaults on inmates or
staff and the risk of escape.
 Installation of fencing, historically appropriate if possible, to provide a barrier to
unauthorized persons from loitering in the area in which prisoners are being unloaded and
moved. Signage indicating prohibition of loitering in the area and contacting the
prisoners and allowing only authorized personnel would discourage persons loitering in
the area.
 Trim or remove existing shrubs to prevent the concealment of weapons or contraband in
area.
 Removal of the benches and cigarette butt receptacle from the area to discourage
employee breaks in the prisoner area.
Finding 2b: Prisoner movement in court, from the van to the courtroom, is flawed and
dangerous and is in serious need of immediate change and improvement.
Recommendation 2b: While it appeared to the assessors that, due to the inherent logistical
problems within the facility, little could be done to improve movement of prisoners within the
courthouse, the following recommendations are made which could help:
 Additional Sheriff staff should be assigned to the courthouse on prisoner production days.
This staff would assist in securing hallways, moving civilians and employees out of
harm’s way, against walls, clearing stairways or the elevator as needed and other
functions while the prisoners are being moved within the courthouse. In order to avoid
hiring at this time, perhaps the Sheriff could look at expanding his very successful
“Citizens on Patrol” program or enlist reserve deputies to assist in this area. However it is
accomplished, having crowd control techniques in place as the prisoners are being moved
within the facility will greatly enhance safety for all court users. In recommendation 2c
below, more staffing suggestions will be discussed.
22

Training, or at the very least, briefings should be had with all civilian employees and
elected officials as to what the expectation of them is when they encounter prisoners
being moved through the hallways and other areas of the courthouse and vicinity. This
will enhance their personal safety and the efficiency of the prisoner movement process.
Finding 2c: Prisoner production in the courtroom is seriously flawed and creates a dangerous
condition. Immediate remediation is required.
Recommendation 2c: As previously indicated, the prisoners, once in the courtroom, sit in the
rear left of the courtroom behind temporary partitions to discourage contact with the public.
(PLEASE NOTE: DATES ON THE PHOTOGRAPHS ARE INCORRECT AND APPEAR IN PHOTGRAPHS
INADVERTENTLY. ALL PHOTOGRAPHS IN THIS DOCUMENT WERE TAKEN ON MAY 20 AND 21, 2013 AT
WASHINGTON COUNTY, TX COURTHOUSE)
The situation is far from ideal, but better than no separation at all. It would be recommended that
additional barriers be placed both behind and alongside the prisoner area. Of course, the barriers
will further obscure the deputy assigned to stand behind prisoners ability to observe the gallery,
which is not desirable but is still better than the current situation.
Of greater concern than this relatively easy to correct logistical problem is that, on the date
observed, as indicated previously in this report, the prisoners, although produced early in the day
were not all completed until the afternoon session. Even in a state-of-the-art courthouse security
setting, the courthouse remains the weak link in the custodial chain. Having the prisoners sit for
such long periods of time in a public area is not at all the recommended standard of practice and
creates an extremely dangerous situation. In conditions such as those which exist in the
Washington County Courthouse the potential danger rises exponentially. Possible solutions are
to either prioritize and expedite the calling of prisoner cases once the prisoners are produced in
the courtroom or to create a separate prisoner calendar call at a specific time or times. To further
assist in this endeavor, it is strongly recommended that a process be put into place wherein
prisoners who are only going to have their cases adjourned to another date not be produced at all.
The forgoing suggestions will require the cooperation of several stakeholders: the Judiciary,
defense bar, District Attorney, County Attorney, Sheriff, clerical staff and others. It is also going
to require the previously mentioned cultural changes to occur.
23
Finding 2d: Overcrowding of the District Courtroom and surrounding area is dangerous during
Child Support Court. The situation, as observed during the assessment, caused grave concern due
to the volatile nature of the cases, the close proximity of the antagonists to each other during the
pendency of their cases and the near impossibility of being able to effectively evacuate everyone
from the floor should the need arise. Further complicating this dangerous condition is the limited
security staff, which makes a positive response to an incident more difficult to achieve.
District Courtroom 05/20/2013 Child Support Calendar
(PLEASE NOTE: DATES ON THE PHOTOGRAPHS ARE INCORRECT AND APPEAR IN PHOTGRAPHS
INADVERTENTLY. ALL PHOTOGRAPHS IN THIS DOCUMENT WERE TAKEN ON MAY 20 AND 21, 2013 AT
WASHINGTON COUNTY, TX COURTHOUSE)
Recommendation 2d: A system should be implemented wherein the calendar call is staged or
separate morning and afternoon sessions are held, splitting the calendar in half and alleviating
some of the crowd condition.
Finding 3: The duress alarm system was not operating accurately, efficiently or effectively while
assessment was in progress.
Recommendation 3: A full review and assessment of the system needs to be done to include:
 Determining where alarms are responded from when activated and who is responsible for
notifications for responders.
 Ensuring that accurate incident locations are being given to dispatch when an alarm is
activated.
 Determining who is responsible for incident response.
 Determining who is responsible for overall control of the system.
 Insuring there are sufficient alarm activation buttons and they are properly installed in the
courthouse.
 Determining whether or not the current system is able to communicate wirelessly with
the radios used by Sheriff personnel in the facility and, if so, insure proper function.
Demonstration of proper function should be made a condition of payment to the vendor.
It is recommended that the above assessment be done by the Sheriff or his designee and with the
assistance of Mr. Hakemack. Once the assessment is done, overall control of the system should
be given to the Sheriff.
24
Finding 4: Doors to various maintenance and mechanical rooms were left open allowing for
unauthorized persons to obtain edged and blunt force weapons of opportunity, various solvents
and chemical products and other hazardous items.
Recommendation 4: Lock doors leading to the areas indicated to restrict access.
Finding 5: Anecdotally, the assessors were made aware that the main ingress doors to the
facility have problems with the locking mechanisms and can be easily overridden allowing
unauthorized entry. On personal knowledge, they were able to “jimmy” some locked interior
doors and gain access to chambers and offices.
Recommendation 5: All exterior and interior door locks should be inspected for functionality
and effectiveness. Those door locks found to be inoperable or ineffective should be repaired or
replaced as needed immediately. All doors should also be re-keyed and control of issuance of
keys, key fobs, access cards, etc. should become the responsibility of the Sheriff.
Finding 6: In all but one office, there were no barriers to prevent inappropriate contact from
occurring between building users and employees at counters.
Recommendation 6: Install partitions such as those which exist at the counter in the District
Clerk’s Office in the offices which do not have them (i.e. Tax Assessor, County Clerk, County
Attorney, and Elections Commissioner).
Finding 7: Some judges expressed a wish to be escorted to and from their vehicles by Sheriff’s
personnel.
Recommendation 7: A procedure should be developed and put into place wherein either the
judge’s staff or a deputy (possibly those assigned to the screening station), are notified by the
judge via telephone of his/her arrival or imminent arrival at the courthouse and a deputy could
then meet the judge at their vehicle to escort them into the courthouse. This might also be an
opportunity to expand the “Citizens on Patrol” program and have members of this unit provide
this service.
Finding 8: There is not currently sufficient deputy staffing to provide a secure level of control
for this courthouse.
Recommendation 8: A full assessment of the staffing level for the unit should be done. This
would involve, but not be limited to:
 Analyzing the current number of individuals assigned to the unit and the shifts to which
they are assigned.
 Determining if there are specific days (i.e. “Child Support Day” prisoner day) where
additional staff is required.
 Identifying areas of the courthouse and vicinity where assigned security personnel would
enhance operations, but does not currently exist.
25

Consideration should be given making greater use of part-time bailiffs, “Citizens on
Patrol” personnel or enlisting reserve deputies. Assignments that might be considered
include, assisting with the mailing of summonses, handling paperwork in the courtroom
which will free sworn officers to perform security functions instead of clerical, help
expedite at the screening station and provide foot patrols in and around the courthouse
and annex.
Finding 9: The assessors observed that non-uniformed personnel do not display ID cards and
they were advised that no county identification cards are issued.
Recommendation 9: County employees and all courthouse staff should be issued a photo
identification card, showing their name and the agency, department or office in which they work.
These cards should be displayed by all personnel while in the courthouse. This will make it
easier for security personnel to identify unauthorized individuals in private or secure areas and,
in an emergency event, make identifying staff easier.
Finding 10: There is currently no process in place for stakeholders to communicate concerns or
ideas relative to courthouse security to the Sheriff.
Recommendation 10: Establish a Court Security Committee. A Court Security Committee
should be established where representatives of each of the stakeholders in the courthouse can
discuss security issues. This committee should meet on a regular basis, monthly at the onset and
then quarterly or more frequently should the need arise. It is recommended that a secretary be
appointed and that minutes be taken and agendas be prepared and distributed to all members of
the committee prior to each meeting. This committee will bring security concerns to the attention
of the Sheriff, identify areas where training of staff is indicated and help strengthen the overall
security mindset in the courthouse. Another advantage to this committee is that lines of
communication will be created or improved amongst the agencies, offices and departments
within the courthouse and the Sheriff’s Office. This committee will be vital to the success of the
new construction project should it go forward.
Finding 11: In one office, the head of the department had provided wasp spray to staff for selfdefense at the counter. Most wasp sprays are capable of causing blindness, respiratory problems
and, depending upon on whom the spray is used, death. The use of this type of force by civilian,
or for that matter, any employees, with no training can create a serious liability issue for both the
individuals and the county.
Recommendation 11: This practice should be stopped immediately.
Finding 12: There are no private restrooms for Judges and employees.
Recommendation 12: The assessors were informed that at one time there was a private, locked
restroom for employees in the courthouse. This restroom should be again made into a private
restroom. If this is not possible because of ADA compliance or other reasons, another bathroom
within the facility should be identified and utilized as an employee facility. This is particularly
important when one considers how vulnerable one can be while using a restroom facility. A
26
situation wherein a Judge could be in a restroom with a defendant with whom the judge has had a
negative interaction can become very dangerous. Likewise, an employee who has had to reject an
application or otherwise negatively interacted with a building user could be placed in harm’s way
at a very vulnerable time.
Finding 13: No one asked could recall a fire drill being conducted at the courthouse.
Recommendation 13: Fire drills should be conducted regularly; at least annually.
These drills should be supervised by the Sheriff’s Office and the Fire Marshal and critiqued and
reviewed with appropriate corrections and improvements instituted.
Finding 14: Some persons interviewed were unsure what to do in a lock down, lock out,
hostage, evacuation, prisoner escape or rapid deployment event.
Recommendation 14: Training with civilian employees should be done in these areas. This does
not need to be the same training given to first responders, but could be done as a briefing,
specific to each office as necessary, to inform civilian staff what the expectation of them would
be in the above situations. Sheriff John Aubrey of Jefferson County, KY has promulgated a
document called, “What Do I Do If…”, which each civilian employee in Jefferson County
Courthouses is provided. It describes the expected response of the employee to the above
incidents as well as natural disasters. It is contained in the appendix of this document and is
easily adaptable to virtually any jurisdiction or facility.
Finding 15: Each person asked indicated that they thought the personnel assigned to the Court
Security Unit were professional and would respond to any reasonable request relative to security
issues; however, there was some suggestion that some additional training be provided to the
deputies newly assigned as to court procedures.
Recommendation 15: The Sheriff should determine if such training is indicated by speaking to
deputies assigned, judges, clerks and other stakeholders and, if so, provide court specific training
to any Sheriff’s Office personnel assigned to the courthouse.
Finding 16: The cameras in both the main courthouse and the annex appeared to be obsolete and
the coverage provided inadequate for the facilities.
Recommendation 16: Research should be done to determine if the present system can be
updated and improved, with additional cameras installed, or if replacement is indicated. If
improvements can be done in a cost effective manner, as determined by the decision makers in
Washington County, then those improvements should be made. It is important to remember that
the camera system right now is ineffective simply because no one is monitoring what is going on
within camera view. They can only be used to gather evidence and information after an event. If
the decision is made to go forward with new construction, the recommendation would be to live
with the existing system, with perhaps some additional cameras installed, updates to the system
and a monitoring system being devised. The monitoring might be done by Sheriff’s dispatch or
Brenham PD dispatch to provide for a response to events as they occur.
27
Finding 17: The process currently in place for fingerprinting out-of-custody individuals who
have entered a plea is unsafe. An armed officer fingerprinting people is not the recommended
standard of practice. Additionally, having others milling about within the area where the
fingerprinting is occurring is extremely unsafe.
Recommendation 17: A procedure should be put in place wherein the deputy assigned to
fingerprinting can do so in a controlled manner in a more secure environment. It seemed that,
once again, this was a matter of inadequate staffing. The addition of a single deputy would
eliminate that consideration. The assessors were unable to determine whether the process
currently in place is mandated by law or if it is just local custom. If it is legislative, a concerted
effort by the State Sheriffs’ Association and the Judiciary to lobby for change of the law should
be commenced. If it is custom or culture, or local policy or procedure it needs to be changed
immediately.
Finding 18: The assessors requested copies of Rules and Procedures, Policy Manuals, Post
Orders and Directives relative to the Sheriff’s Court Security Operations and were informed that
no such documents existed.
Recommendation 18: The Sheriff or his designee should promulgate Rules and Procedures,
Policies, Post Orders, Directives and provide training for same to all Sheriff’s Office personnel
assigned to or potentially assigned to court security. It would also be recommended that any
judicial orders or legislation dealing with court security be included in this training.
Finding 19: The Assistant County Attorneys conference is a small room which is somewhat
isolated. Their means of escape should a litigant become angry or violent is easily blocked with
the current configuration of the room.
Recommendation 19: The room should be reconfigured to allow an escape route for the county
attorney. This would most likely require moving telephone and LAN line, the duress alarm, and
placing the desk currently used in a reverse position from its current location. This will place the
attorneys closest to the door with the desk between them and the litigants. It might also be
advisable, on an as needed basis, to provide the attorneys assigned to this conference room with a
radio with which to communicate with court security on heavy conference days or when a known
difficult litigant is going to be in.
Finding 20: Deputies assigned to court security do not have ear pieces for their radios. This can
disrupt court proceedings, add to the noise already occurring in the crowded vicinity of the
courtrooms and allow for public monitoring of confidential transmissions.
Recommendation 20: Provide radio earpieces for deputies assigned to court security.
Finding 21: The current facility maintenance staff is not adequate to maintain the building on a
day to day basis. This will make implementation of some of the recommendations contained
herein, if followed, difficult to implement.
28
Recommendation 21: Make one of the staff currently employed part-time a full-time employee.
Revisit this as the renovation/construction process proceeds to ensure that staffing is adequate to
the task at hand.
Finding 22: There did not appear to be formal agreements with local agencies regarding
assistance to emergency events occurring at the courthouse in place.
Recommendation 22: Establish formal memoranda establishing a “Mutual Aid” agreement
between all appropriate agencies. If such agreements exist already, review to ensure they are still
appropriate and effective as written.
Finding 23: The security camera system currently in place at the courthouse is obsolete and
ineffective.
Recommendation 23: Evaluate the present system and facility to determine what upgrades need
to be done and where cameras could best be utilized. This evaluation should include, but is not
limited to the following considerations:
 What are the cameras to be used for? To gather evidence and information after an event
or to provide swift response to an event in progress. If the former, what means for storing
the video currently exist and is it adequate? If the latter, who will be monitoring the
cameras and where will the monitoring occur?
 Can the current LAN support IP cameras which can be monitored from any authorized
computer in the network?
 Operating on the assumption that new construction is to be approved, will the cameras be
movable to the new facility?
 What types of cameras will be needed – point/tilt/zoom, stationary, a combination; color,
black and white, night vision?
 Will the vendor provide free training and service? For how long?
Finding 24: Although not observed by the assessors, some people interviewed stated that the
deputies did not screen persons leaving the courtroom to use facilities, etc., when they returned.
Recommendation 24: Deputies need to be reminded to scan anyone entering the courtroom.
Even though the screening process as it exists now is far from ideal, there is still a chance that a
weapon or contraband will be discovered. An individual could secrete something in a restroom
or other area, go through the screening process initially, go to the restroom to retrieve the item
and introduce it to the courtroom. The screening as it exists now might prevent this. Not
screening will, obviously, not prevent it.
Finding 25: Although the tables and benches in the courtrooms appear to be substantial and
difficult to move, they are not bolted to the courtroom floor.
Recommendation 25: It is recommended that tables and benches, including those in the gallery
section, in courtrooms be bolted or otherwise permanently affixed to the floors. An “L Bracket”
attached to the legs and then screwed into the floor can easily and inexpensively provide
29
protection against a table or bench being overturned during a violent encounter in the courtroom
and causing injuries to staff or bystanders.
Finding 26: Persons applying for a public defender are required to fill out a form requesting
such representation. On the day observed, these individuals then re-enter the well area of the
courtroom to present the form to the clerk. They walked behind the bailiff while court was in
session and he was otherwise distracted.
Recommendation 26: A different method of performing this function should be developed. A
possibility is to permanently affix a basket or bin to the railing where individuals can leave their
applications to be retrieved by court personnel at a convenient time. Allowing persons other than
those whose cases are before the court unfettered access to the well area is not recommended. It
could provide an opportunity for an attack on security staff who are otherwise distracted or
potentially put the individual presenting the paperwork in danger should a situation evolve
wherein the deputy(ies) must use force on an individual before the court and they are in close
proximity to the event.
30
Findings and Recommendations
for Washington County Annex Building
Although separated by a street from the courthouse, the functions of these offices are supportive
of courthouse operations. Addition and incorporation of these offices and functions into a new
criminal justice facility, if constructed, would be most desirable. Absent construction of a new
criminal justice facility, the following are suggested.
Finding 27: This building, although more modern than the main courthouse, still requires a
security presence. The same stresses that exist in child support/custody cases being heard in the
main courthouse are present in the juvenile probation system, which contain families and
children involved with the court system and can create very emotional and stressful situations.
While not necessarily as stressful as those conditions which exist at the main courthouse, there is
still the potential for violence and acting out. Also, the possibility of a disgruntled employee,
veteran, or tax payer becoming upset and acting inappropriately is always present. A uniformed
presence can mitigate a potentially violent situation before it occurs and, at the very least, can
insure a quick response to an event.
Recommendation 27: The installation of a screening point is the most secure option. It is also
the most expensive. At the very least, consideration should be given to introducing handheld
metal detector screening of all persons entering the facility. Additional Sheriff personnel will be
needed to accomplish this. Again, perhaps “Citizens on Patrol”, reserve deputies, or part-time
active or retired law enforcement could be incorporated to provide roving patrols and screening
and perform other duties at both facilities as needed.
Finding 28: There is limited video surveillance.
Recommendation 28: Addition of cameras in conjunction with courthouse operation with
monitoring during hours of operation would enhance security. Viewing by those occupying
offices in the annex on monitor or on their office computer is an option if incorporation of
courthouse is not feasible.
Finding 29: Some offices offer only one way in and out.
Recommendation 29: Where possible, an addition of an alternate exit or private entrance into
the office for staff should be installed. In situations where this is not possible, adding a door to an
adjacent office can add another way of exit in cases where an exit is blocked either by an
emergency or a disgruntled building user.
31
Conclusion
A component of courthouse operations and security, or that of any public building or
organization, is the culture of that facility or organization. Frequently, the attitude of “Oh
nothing like that will ever happen here” is the norm that exists. This attitude was not observed by
any of the persons interviewed during this assessment. In fact, everyone with whom the assessors
spoke was acutely aware of the serious deficiencies in the court security operation and the
building itself. With that said, some of the recommendations in this report are going to require a
change in the day to day culture of the courthouse in order for security to be improved. The
changes may be resisted by building users at first, but will provide tangible results if instituted
and adhered to.
It must also be noted that most of the changes recommended for the current facility, if enacted in
whole or in part, are going to make access to the building less convenient for building users. This
will undoubtedly result in complaints from the public, the bar and those who work in the
building. As time goes by, people begin to grow accustomed to the changes and the deputies
responsible for court security become more proficient in the screening process, these complaints
should dissipate.
The first recommendation made in this report was to construct a new facility. The assessors
recognize that even if that process was begun today, the project would not be complete for some
time. They are also aware of the large costs associated with new construction. With these two
facts in mind, thoughtful consideration was given to the recommendations for improvements to
the current facilities. It is imperative that the screening process be improved at the Washington
County Courthouse. The current procedures are woefully inadequate and seem to invite litigation
in the event of an incident.
While the recommendations provided herein are by no means an ideal solution, the assessors
believe they at least provide a reasonable standard for a courthouse screening operation. The
monies spent to implement the recommendations, or a similar operation as determined by the
decision makers for the county, will most assuredly be much less than payouts in one or more
successful wrongful injury or death litigations. Likewise, the improvements recommended in the
production of prisoners and courtroom operations, besides the obvious improvements to the
safety of all in the Washington County Courthouse, will also provide a more reasonable standard
of practice. The other significant advantage to improving the prisoner production system as
indicated is that the changes are primarily procedural and cultural in nature and not as cost driven
as the screening operation. It should also be noted that there is significant cost associated to
many of these recommendations, but there are several with little or no cost attached; simply
changing day to day procedures in cited areas will make a marked difference in the security of
the buildings.
Throughout the assessment process, the assessors were repeatedly told “the Historical
Commission will not let us do that,” or similar comments to this effect. While in Washington
County and in subsequent internet searches and phone conversations, the assessors could not get
a clear grasp of what the “Historical Commission” is or from whence its authority and ability to
32
dictate safety renovations at the courthouse derives. It is the assessors’ strong opinion that the
changes recommended herein are essential to the safety of all persons using the Washington
County Courthouse and far outweigh any historical aspects of the facility. Having said that, and
recognizing the great community pride which exists in “The Birthplace of Texas,” whenever
possible, any renovations decided upon should be done with an eye towards their being undone
upon completion of the new facility and constructed in a way to maintain the historical character
of the building whenever possible.
The tone of this report may seem negative and the findings disconcerting in these difficult fiscal
times. It is important to note, however, that there are huge positives that exist in Washington
County that make Washington County unique from other jurisdictions the assessors have visited.
The two most important are the awareness of all stakeholders of the gravity of the situation and
the apparent commonality of goals in finding a way to proceed with construction of a new
criminal justice facility. It is the assessors hope that these two items will sustain themselves
throughout the journey ahead and that all stakeholders will move forward in a continued spirit of
unity and mutual respect which will make this arduous but positive process easier to accomplish.
It is again noted that the willingness of all stakeholders to participate in this assessment and their
candor while doing so has been enormously helpful to the creation of this document.
Staffing is addressed multiple times in this report. The assessors are acutely aware that staffing is
often the costliest of additions to the security paradigm. Where technology can be used with
cameras and other items, this is a more cost effective way to proceed. However, there will be
instances where only a human resource can be used to provide the security needed. With that in
mind, as a possible helpful reference, attached to the appendix of this document is a Staffing
Recommendations Guide created by Sheriff John Zaruba of DuPage County, IL.
The assessors and the National Sheriffs’ Association stand ready to assist in any way they can to
help Washington County, Texas to implement the improvements they seek for their court
security operations.
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