Round 3 Indiana
1AC
Same as round 1 indiana
2AC
Federalism
SOP key to African stability
Larry Diamond, Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution, “Africa: Building a Democratic Africa,” HOOVER DIGEST, 1998,
www.hooverdigest.org/983/diamond.html
THE PROBLEM The common root cause of economic decay, state collapse, ethnic violence, civil war,
and humanitarian disaster in Africa is bad, abusive governance. Because most states lack any semblance of a
rule of law and norms of accountability that bind the conduct of those in government, their societies have fallen prey to
massive corruption, nepotism, and the personal whims of a tiny ruling elite. In such circumstances, every political clique and
ethnic group struggles for control of a stagnant or diminishing stock of wealth. There are no institutions to facilitate trust,
cooperation, or confidence in the future. Every competing faction tries to grab what it can for the moment while excluding
other groups. THE SOLUTION The only real antidote to this decay is a constitutional framework that
facilitates the limitation, separation, devolution, and sharing of power so that each group can have a stake in the
system while checking the ruling elite and one another. In essence, this means a democratic political system, to one
degree or another. Given Africa’s authoritarian history, many changes in beliefs and institutions will be necessary for
democracy to emerge. A growing segment of African elites and the public realize that every type of dictatorship on the
continent has been a disaster. Thus, there is increasing hunger for economic and political freedom and the
predictability of a democratic constitution.
ASPEC
United States includes the federal government and states
Power 13 – Centre for Disability Law & Policy researcher
[Andrew, PhD, Janet Lord, and Allison deFranco, Active Citizenship and Disability, google books, p88, accessed 7-25-14]
The United States has a unique political and geographical landscape which provides a complex territorial system of
administration of disability support policy. It has an intricate federal-state level relationship, with different
institutions and actors who can shape disability support policy in many different ways and at various
different scales. At the federal level, the United States is a constitutional republic in which the
president, Congress and judiciary share powers reserved for the national government, and the
federal government shares sovereignty with the state governments . With the separation of powers (between
executive, legislative and judicial branches), the role of the executive branch, which is headed by the president and various
executive offices, is to enforce the laws. The legislative branch is vested in the two chambers of Congress: the Senate and the
House of Representatives. The legislative branch can set national legislation, under certain powers granted to it in the Constitution.
These include education, family law, contract law and legislation on most crimes. ¶ Meanwhile, the judicial branch comprising the
Supreme Court and lower federal courts exercises judicial power, and its function is to interpret the US Constitution and federal laws
and regulations. This includes resolving disputes between the exec- utive and legislative branches. The Supreme Court cannot pass
legislation which makes budget decisions for US states, but it has the power to decide what congressional laws mean and how they
apply in specific cases (this has become particularly relevant in some instances, such as the Olmslead case* detailed later in the
chapter), The president can introduce executive orders as a response to Supreme Court judge- ments affirming the United States'
Constitution to new judicial interpretations.
CP
Perm – do both – SC involvement key
Barbara A. Perry and Paul J. Weber, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Sweet Briar College, and Chairman of the
Department of Political Science, University of Louisville, Unfounded Fears, 1989, p. 111.
The second mechanism for resolving disputes is the Supreme Court . The proper role of the court in Article V
disputes is a hotly contested issue. Walter E Delinger set out a persuasive argument for a judicial role, which answers most
objections: Such review is justified as an initial matter by the same considerations that have made judicial review an accepted part
of the constitutional system since Marbury v Madison. The constitution is a positive law-law that may be invoked in court by
litigants. In fulfilling its role as a resolver of legal disputes, a court must interpret and apply all of the law applicable to the cases
before it, including the law of the constitution. The provisions of article V are fully a part of that law. The thesis of Dellinger’s
argument is that Coleman v Miller, a decision excluding the courts from Article V litigation, was wrongly decided. Coleman declared
the amending process to be “political in its entirety, from the submission of an amendment until it b;ecomes part of the constitutional
and therefore not subject to judicial guidance, control, or interference at a point. Dellinger concluded that Coleman should be
overturned. One may go further and argue that eventually Coleman would be overturned not only because it was wrongly decided
the first time, but because the political question doctrine has been radically transformed since 1939. The court has demonstrated its
willingness to limit what it considers strictly political in Reynolds v Sims and Baker v Carr and cases as diverse as Roe v Wade and
Brown v Hartlage indicate that the court will step in to decide problems it deems unresolvable in the political arena. To argue that the
court should keep its hands off the amendment process is quite different from saying that the court’s hands are tied. Clearly they
are not. It is a legitimate legal question to ask what the courts should do, but the raw political question is what the courts will do.
The history of our judicial system bears witness to the fact that the courts will not allow an unresolved legal dispute
to become an resolvable political dispute. In brief, although there are unsettled legal questions
about calling a convention, there are also institutions capable of settling them in a legitimate
manner
The counterplan is a voting issue– it’s not predictable---no amendment has dealt
with division of power amongst branches
Thomas O. Heuglin 6, Professor of Political Science at Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Canada and Alan Fenna, Professor
of Politics and Government at Curtin University, Perth, Australia, 2006 (Comparative Federalism p )
More important than the actual numbers are the political change effected by constitutional amendments. In the American
case, most have had to do with civil rights or functioning of the presidency, and only few with
federalism and the division of powers. In contrast to Canada and Australia, the US Constitution has never
been amended to alter the division of powers by transferring authority from one level of
government to the other.
Con-con links to politics, takes forever.
Schaffner, ‘05 [Joan, Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School, American University Law
Review, August, 54 Am. U.L. Rev. 1487 ln]
the convention method for adoption and ratification is necessary when the
proposed amendment makes fundamental changes to the Constitution , especially when the amendment
Scholars have argued that use of
will deprive the people of individual liberty interests. Elai Katz explained his position in this way: A convention called for the express
purpose of amending the Constitution would reflect the will of the people regarding the specific matter at hand better than
legislatures that may have been elected before the public became aware of the proposed amendment. While delegates to the
convention would be selected based on their position on a single issue, such as the right to an abortion, legislators are rarely
elected because of their views regarding a single issue. In the eighteenth century, conventions were considered to be the highest
expression of popular will; they embodied popular sovereignty .... Thus, in the eyes of eighteenth century society and possibly
present society, a special convention, convened for the purpose of revising the fundamental law, would be the best substitute for an
act of pure popular sovereignty. Furthermore, conventions require a longer, more deliberative, and better
publicized process.
Since constitutional conventions are not permanent, ordinary organizations, their selection and debates are likely to be foll owed more carefully by the public than regular congressional sessions. Finally,
delegates to conventions are elected for one particular issue - to support or propose an amendment; ... It follows, then, that a principle-altering amendment proposed and ratified by conventions is more legitimate than the same amendment proposed by members of
Congress who were not elected for the express purpose of making particular changes to the fundamental law. Furthermore, throu ghout history, politicians have argued that the use of conventions for approving and ratifying fundamental changes to our Constitution is
necessary. For example, President Abraham Lincoln stated that a constitutional amendment that could potentially alter the "character of the Constitution," should be adopted by
Courts will ignore new amendments
Segal & Spaeth ‘02 [The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisted, p. 5-6]
If action by the Congress to undo the Court’s interpetation of one of its laws does not subert judicial authority, a fortiori neither does
the passage of a constitutional amendment, for example, the Twenty-Sixth Amendment reducing the voting age to eighteen and
thereby undoing the decision in Oregon v. Mitchell, which held that Congress could not constitutionally lower the voting age in state
elections. Furthermore, not only does a constitutional amendment not subvert judicial authority, courts themselves—ultimately, the
Supreme Court—have the last word when determining the sanctioning amendment’s meaning. Thus,
the Court is free to construe any amendment—whether or not it overturns one of its decisions—as it sees fit,
even though its construction deviates appreciably from the language or purpose of the amendment.
Consider, for example, the fourteenth and Sixteenth Amendments. The former clearly overturned the Court’s decision in Scott v.
Sandford and was meant to give blacks legal equality with whites. Scholars disagree about other objectives the amendment may
have had, but it does appear that the prohibition of sex discimination was not among them. Nonetheless, in 1871 the Court held that
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment encompassed women. As for the Sixteenth Amendment, it substantially,
but not completely, reversed the Court’s decisions in Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan and Trust Co., which declared unconstitutional the
income tax that Congress had enacted in 1894. In 1913, the requisite number of states ratified an amendment that authorized
Congress to levy a tax on income “from whatever source derived.” The language is unequivocal. Yet for the next twenty-six years
the [6] Supreme Court ruled that this language excluded the salaries of federal judges. Why the exclusion? Because Article III,
section I, of the original Constitution orders that judges’ salaries “not be diminished during their continuance in office.” Though it is
an elementary legal principle that later language erases incompatible earlier language, the justices ruled that any taxation of their
salaries, and those of their lower court colleagues, would obviously diminish them. Finally, in 1939 the justices overruled their
predecessors and magnaminously and unselfishly allowed themselves to be taxed.
Amendments to reverse judicial decisions destroy SOP
Joan Schaffner 5, Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. 54 Am. U.L. Rev. 1487. Lexis)
[*1525] Through amendment, the legislative branch has the power to enact laws that establish societal standards only so long as
the laws enacted do not violate the constitutional rights of individuals. 222 The legislature is not empowered to draft
laws to enshrine illegitimate prejudices of the majority. Allowing the legislature, with the
endorsement of the executive, to amend the Constitution to expressly overrule a decision of the
judiciary, which acted consistently with democratic principles by protecting the rights of a minority of the people, destroys
the delicate balance of power among the branches.
Raich’s key --- Swiss cheese precedents cause lower court confusion
Andrew Fan 6, UC-Irvine Law Forum Journal, "Raich v. Gonzales: Ramifications on Future Commerce Clause Jurisprudence and
Congressional Regulation", Fall, www.socsci.uci.edu/lawforum/content/journal/LFJ_2006_fan.pdf
Unfortunately, the
Raich Majority opinion is so lengthy and complex that future courts will struggle to
determine its specific meaning. In fact, it is possible that Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer
and Kennedy upheld the CSA for differing reasons, as did Justice Scalia, making this case even
more confusing as precedent for the future . ¶ Ultimately, the Court should have attempted to
consolidate the various considerations involved in deciding the Raich case. The Majority was undoubtedly
aware of the controversy that their decision would create in light of recent Commerce Clause
cases, and yet they were still unable to create a precedent that would be useful in determining
future Commerce Clause cases. Instead, the Majority seems to have tried to reconcile and incorporate the Wickard v. Filburn and U.S.
v. Lopez precedents with its own views on the effects test, even though these principles are arguably at odds with one another. In the end, the “new”
Raich Majority could have best served the law if they agreed that they wanted to do away with Rehnquist’s “economic in nature” test in favor of the
the need for clear
legal standards cannot be ignored . If the Supreme Court issues an unclear opinion, then lower
courts are left without guidelines to decide future Commerce Clause cases. In order to avoid
potential conflicting lower court opinions in the future, it would have been better for the Majority
to clarify exactly which test they wanted future courts to use, rather than forcing Congress and the
lower courts to guess as to where our Commerce Clause jurisprudence currently stands.
“economic in impact” test. Although the “economic in impact” test is more liberal in giving regulatory power to Congress,
Democratic peace either empirically disproven or not statistically significant
Rosato 11 PhD, Department of Political Science, The University of Chicago, Assistant Professor of Political Science
at the University of Notre Dame. The Handbookon the Political Economy of War By Christopher J. Coyne, Rachel L.
Mathers
Democratic wars There is considerable evidence that the absence of war claim is incorrect. As Christopher Laync(2001,
p. 801) notes, 'The most damning indictment of democratic peace theory, is that it happens not to be true: democratic
states have gone to war with one another." For example, categorizing
a state as democratic if it
achieves a democracy score of six or more in the Polity dataset on regime type - as
several analysts do - yields three inter-dcmocratic wars: the American Civil War. the
Spanish American War and the Boer War/' This is something defenders of the theory readily admit adopting relatively inclusive definitions of democracy, they themselves generate
anywhere between a dozen and three dozen cases of inter-democratic war. In order to
exclude these anomalies and thereby preserve the absence of war claim, the theory's
defenders restrict their definitions of democracy. In the most compelling analysis to date, Ray (1993,
pp. 256-9, 269) argues that no two democracies have gone to war with one another as long as a democracy is defined
as follows: the members of the executive and legislative branches arc determined in fair and competitive elections,
which is to say that at least two independent parties contest the election, half of the adult population is eligible to vole
and the possibility that the governing party can lose has been established by historical precedent. Similarly, Doyle
(1983a, pp. 216-17) rescues the claim by arguing that states" domestic and foreign policies must both be subject to the
control of the citizenry if they are to be considered liberal. Russett, meanwhile, argues that his no war claim rests on
defining democracy as a stale wilh a voting franchise for a substantial fraction of the population, a government brought
to power in elections involving two or more legally recognized parties, a popularly elected executive or one responsible
to an elected legislature, requirements for civil liberties including free speech and demonstrated longevity of at least
three years (Russett 1993, pp. 14-16). Despite imposing these definitional restrictions, proponents
of the democratic peace cannot exclude up to five major wars, a figure which, if
confirmed, would invalidate the democratic peace by their own admission (Ray 1995, p. 27).
The first is the War of 1812 between Britain and the United States. Ray argues that it does not
contradict the claim because Britain does not meet bis suffrage requirement. Yet this does not make Britain any less
democratic than the United States at the time where less than half the adult population was eligible to vote. In fact, as
Laync (2001, p. 801) notes, "the United States was not appreciably more democratic than un re formed Britain." This
poses a problem for the democratic peace; if the United States was a democracy, and Ray believes it was, then Britain
was also a democracy and the War of 1812 was an inter-democratic war. The second case is the American
Civil War. Democratic peace theorists believe the United States was a democracy in 1861, but exclude the case on
the grounds that it was a civil rather than interstate war (Russett 1993, pp. 16-17). However, a plausible argument can
be made that the United Stales was not a stale but a union of stales, and thai this was therefore a war between states
rather than within one. Note, for example, that the term "United States" was plural rather than singular at the time and
the conflict was known as the "War Between the States."7 This being the case, the Civil War also contradicts the
claim.8 The Spanish-American and Boer wars constitute two further exceptions to the rule.
Ray excludes the former because half of the members of Spain's upper house held their positions through hereditary
succession or royal appointment. Yet this made Spain little different to Britain, which he classifies as a democracy at the
time, thereby leading to the conclusion that the Spanish-American War was a war between democracies. Similarly, it is
hard to accept his claim that the Orange Free State was not a democracy during the Boer War because black Africans
were not allowed to vote when he is content to classify the United States as a democracy in the second half of the
nineteenth century (Ray 1993. pp. 265, 267; Layne 2001. p. 802). In short, defenders of (he democratic peace can only
rescue their core claim through the selective application of highly restrictive criteria. Perhaps the most important
exception is World War I, which, by virtue of the fact that Germany fought against Britain,
France, Italy, Belgium and the United States, would count as five instances of war
between liberal states in most analyses of the democratic peace.9 As Ido Oren (1995, pp. 178-9)
has shown. Germany was widely considered lo be a liberal state prior to World War I: "Germany was a member of a
select group of the most politically advanced countries, far more advanced than some of the nations that arc currently
coded as having been "liberal' during that period." In fact, Germany was consistently placed toward the top of that
group, "either as second only to the United States ... or as positioned below England and above France." Moreover,
Doyle*s assertion that the case ought to be excluded because Germany was liberal domestically, but not in foreign
affairs, does not stand up lo scrutiny. As Layne (1994, p. 42) points out. foreign policy was "insulated from parliamentary
control" in both France and Britain, two purportedly liberal states (see also Mcarshcimcr 1990, p. 51, fn. 77; Layne 2001,
pp. 803 807). Thus it is difficult to classify Germany as non-liberal and World War I constitutes an imporiant exception to
Ihe finding. Small numbers Even if restrictive definitions of democracy enable democratic peace
theorists to uphold their claim, they render it unsurprising by reducing the number of
democracies in any analysis. As several scholars have noted, there were only a dozen or so
democracies in the world prior to World War I, and even fewer in a position to fight one
another. Therefore, since war is a rare event for any pair of states, the fact that democracies
did not fight one another should occasion little surprise (Mearsheimer 1990, p. 50; Cohen 1994, pp.
214, 216; Layne 1994, p. 39; Henderson 1999, p. 212).10 It should be a source of even less surprise as the number of
democracies and the potential for conflict among them falls, something that is bound to happen as the democratic bar
rises. Ray*s suffrage criterion, for example, eliminates two great powers - Britain and the United States - from the
democratic ranks before World War I. thereby making the absence of war between democracies eminently predictable."
A simple numerical example should serve to illustrate the point. Using a Polity score of six or more to
designate a state as a democracy yields 716 purely democratic dyads out of a total 23240 politically relevant
dyads between 1816 and 1913. Assuming that wars arc distributed according to the proportion of democratic dyads in
the population and knowing that there were 86 dyads at war during this period, we
should expect to observe
three democratic-democratic wars between the Congress of Vienna and World War I. If we
actually observed no wars between democracies, the democratic peace phenomenon might be worth investigating
further even though the difference between three and zero wars is barely statistically significant." Increasing the
score required for a state to be coded as a democracy to eight - a score that would make
Britain democratic from 1901 onwards only and eliminate states like Spain and the
Orange Free State from the ranks of the democracies - makes a dramatic difference. The
number of democratic dyads falls to 171. and the expected number of wars is now
between zero and one. Now the absence of war finding is to be expected. In short, by adopting
restrictive definitions of democracy, proponents of the democratic peace render their
central claim wholly unexceptional. In sum, proponents of the democratic peace have unsuccessfully
attempted to tread a fine line in order to substantiate their claim that democracies have rarely if ever waged war against
one another. On the one hand, they admit that inter-democratic war is not an unusual
phenomenon if they adopt relatively inclusive definitions of democracy. On the other
hand, in their attempts to restrict the definition of democracy and thereby save the
finding they inadvertently make the absence of war between democracies trivial.
PTX
No risk of an attack—all talk
Rubin ‘12 (Barry Rubin, Professor at the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya, Israel, the Director of the Global Research and
International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, and a Senior Fellow at the International Policy Institute for Counterterrorism, “Israel Isn’t
Going to Attack Iran and Neither Will the United States.” http://pjmedia.com/barryrubin/2012/01/26/israel-is-not-about-to-attack-iranand-neither-is-the-united-states-get-used-to-it/, 2012)
The radio superhero The Shadow had the power to “cloud men’s minds.” But nothing clouds men’s minds like anything that has to
do with Jews or Israel. This year’s variation on that theme is the idea that Israel is about to attack Iran.
Such a claim repeatedly appears in the media. Some have criticized Israel for attacking Iran and turning the Middle East into a
cauldron of turmoil (not as if the region needs any help in that department) despite the fact that it hasn’t even happened. On the
surface, of course, there is apparent evidence for such a thesis. Israel has talked about attacking Iran and one can
Yet any serious consideration of this scenario — based on actual
research and real analysis rather than what the uninformed assemble in their own heads or Israeli
leaders sending a message to create a situation where an attack isn’t necessary — is this: It isn’t
going to happen. Indeed, the main leak from the Israeli government, by an ex-intelligence official
who hates Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, has been that the Israeli government already decided
not to attack Iran. He says that he worries this might change in the future but there’s no hint that this has happened or will
happen. Defense Minister Ehud Barak has publicly denied plans for an imminent attack as have other
senior government officials. Of course, one might joke that the fact that Israeli leaders talk about attacking Iran is the
make a case for such an operation.
biggest proof that they aren’t about to do it. But Israel, like other countries, should be subject to rational analysis. Articles written by
others are being spun as saying Israel is going to attack when that’s not what they are saying. I stand by my analysis and before
December 31 we will see who was right. I’m not at all worried about stating very clearly that Israel is not going to go to
war with Iran. So why are Israelis talking about a potential attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities?
Because that’s a good way – indeed, the only way Israel has — to pressure Western countries to
work harder on the issue, to increase sanctions and diplomatic efforts. If one believes that somehow pushing Tehran into
slowing down or stopping its nuclear weapons drive is the only alternative to war, that greatly concentrates policymakers’ minds.
Personally, I don’t participate — consciously or as an instrument — in disinformation campaigns, even if they are for a good cause.
Regarding Ronen Bergman’s article in the New York Times, I think the answer is simple: Israeli leaders are not
announcing that they are about to attack Iran. They are sending a message that the United States
and Europe should act more decisively so that Israel does not feel the need to attack Iran in the
future. That is a debate that can be held but it does not deal with a different issue: Is Israel about to attack Iran? The
answer is “no.”
Commerce clause decisions create backdoor legalization that avoids PC loss
David Downs 12, citing Jeremy Daw, JD from Harvard Law, "What Obama and the Feds Will Do About Washington and
Colorado Legalization - Expert Analysis", November 13, blog.sfgate.com/smellthetruth/2012/11/13/what-obama-and-the-feds-will-doabout-washington-and-colorado-legalization-expert-analysis/
If Obama really does want to end pot prohibition but doesn’t want to take such a large risk, he has an
alternate strategy which he could play through the courts. At this very moment, two historic lawsuits are working their way through
the federal court system: a petition by Americans for Safe Access to reschedule cannabis, and a sought injunction by the City of Oakland against
federal action to shut down Harborside Health Center, a significant source of the struggling city’s tax revenue. Obama could – as he did with the
Defense of Marriage Act – instruct his attorneys not to defend the government’s position in federal court, essentially handing the plaintiffs a win by
forfeit. But such a strategy would likely be just as injurious to his political capital as proposing a change of law in Congress or ordering the DEA to
reschedule directly. So if he means to legalize cannabis through the courts, he must be more subtle.¶ Here we may take a lesson from
the Obamacare decision – Chief Justice Roberts, while allowing the Affordable Care Act to stand, nevertheless fired a constitutional
warning shot across the White House’s bow when he declared that he would not uphold the health care law under federal interstate
commerce powers – the same powers, by the way, which provide the foundation for federal pot prohibition. If Roberts means to
knit his historical legacy out of a series of decisions chipping away at big federal government power,
Obama’s legal team could play into the chief justice’s hand by framing their arguments ostensibly in favor of
cannabis prohibition in such a way as to gift-wrap Roberts the legal reasoning he will need to push his
agenda.¶ Then, after the Supreme Court rules that the DEA has to reschedule cannabis based on
constitutional principles, Obama can claim that he has no choice but to do as they command. Think of it
as backdoor legalization.
Court legitimacy shields
Pacelle 02 Richard L. Pacelle, Associate Professor, Political Science, University of Missouri-St. Louis, THE ROLE OF THE
SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS, 2002, p. 102.
The limitations on the Court are not as significant as they once seemed. They constrain the Court, but the boundaries of those
constraints are very broad. Justiciability is self-imposed and seems to be a function of the composition of the Court rarther than a
philosophical position. Checks and balances are seldom successfully invoked against the judiciary, in
part because the Court has positive institutional resource to justify its decision. The Supreme
Court has a relatively high level of diffuse support that comes, in part, from a general lack of
knowledge by the public and that contributes to its legitimacy. The cloak of the Constitution and
the symbolism attendant to the marble palace and the law contribute as well. As a result,
presidents and the Congress should pause before striking at the Court or refusing to follow its
directives. Indeed, presidents and members of Congress can often use unpopular Court
decisions as political cover. They cite the need to enforce or support such decision even though
they disagree with them. In the end, the institutional limitations do not mandate judicial restraint,
but turn the focus to judicial capacity, the subject of the next chapter.
Issues are compartmentalized
Dickenson 09
Presidential Power, A NonPartisan Analysis of Presidential Politics . “Sotomayor, Obama and Presidential
Power” May 26, 2009 by Matthew Dickinson Categories: Uncategorized
http://blogs.middlebury.edu/presidentialpower/2009/05/26/sotamayor-obama-and-presidential-power/
What is of more interest to me, however, is what her selection reveals about the basis of presidential power. Political
scientists, like baseball writers evaluating hitters, have devised numerous means of measuring a president’s
influence in Congress. I will devote a separate post to discussing these, but in brief, they often center on the creation of
legislative “box scores” designed to measure how many times a president’s preferred piece of legislation, or nominee to the
executive branch or the courts, is approved by Congress. That is, how many pieces of legislation that the president supports actually
pass Congress? How often do members of Congress vote with the president’s preferences? How often is a president’s policy
position supported by roll call outcomes? These measures, however, are a misleading gauge of presidential
power – they are a better indicator of congressional power. This is because how members of
Congress vote on a nominee or legislative item is rarely influenced by anything a president does .
Although journalists (and political scientists) often focus on the legislative “endgame” to gauge
presidential influence – will the President swing enough votes to get his preferred legislation
enacted? – this mistakes an outcome with actual evidence of presidential influence. Once we
control for other factors – a member of Congress’ ideological and partisan leanings, the political
leanings of her constituency, whether she’s up for reelection or not – we can usually predict how
she will vote without needing to know much of anything about what the president wants. (I am
ignoring the importance of a president’s veto power for the moment.) Despite the much publicized and celebrated
instances of presidential arm-twisting during the legislative endgame, then, most legislative outcomes don’t
depend on presidential lobbying. But this is not to say that presidents lack influence. Instead, the primary means by which
presidents influence what Congress does is through their ability to determine the alternatives from which Congress must choose.
That is, presidential power is largely an exercise in agenda-setting – not arm-twisting. And we see this in the Sotomayer nomination.
Barring a major scandal, she will almost certainly be confirmed to the Supreme Court whether Obama spends the confirmation
hearings calling every Senator or instead spends the next few weeks ignoring the Senate debate in order to play Halo III on his
Xbox. That is, how senators decide to vote on Sotomayor will have almost nothing to do with Obama’s lobbying from here on in (or
lack thereof). His real influence has already occurred, in the decision to present Sotomayor as his nominee.
Laundry list of thumpers
AP 1/23, Associated Press, "What issues roil D.C.? Obama’s veto threats are clues," 1/23/15,
www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/2015/01/23/obama-hit-list/22207701/
Washington — President Barack Obama has a telling hit list. The veto threats that he’s issued over the last three
weeks are a microcosm of American politics, representing the roiling issues of the day, the power struggle playing out
between Congress and the White House, and even the pique between the president and GOP congressional leaders.
Obama, who vetoed just two minor bills over the past six years, has been tossing out veto threats like confetti since Republicans
took full control of Congress. In addition to delivering eight formal veto notices on specific bills under consideration, the president
has sounded broader warnings that he’ll block legislative efforts that jeopardize his health care law, roll back rules
governing Wall Street, reverse his immigration actions or impose new sanctions on Iran. There’s a little bit of everything
in Obama’s veto threats: the culture wars (abortion), energy policy (Keystone XL oil pipeline), social matters (Obamacare), foreign
policy (Iran), economic angst (financial regulation), even wonky details of governance (rule-making processes). The list lays bare
two competing visions of the proper role of government. And while there’s plenty of political strategy behind what Obama has
chosen to single out for a potential veto, he’s also “really expressing what his values are and what he believes in,” says James
Thurber, director of the Center for Congressional and Presidential Studies at American University. Likewise, Thurber says, for all the
political positioning going on among congressional Republicans, they’ve advanced any number of bills in the face of certain veto
because they believe in them. “It’s not just a chess game,” says Thurber. Game or not, the odds of winning are in Obama’s favor.
Presidents have prevailed on 96 percent of their more than 2,500 vetoes over the years, with Congress able to muster the votes to
override the presidents’ objections just 4 percent of the time. Of all the legislation subject to an Obama veto threat, a bipartisan effort
to impose new sanctions on Iran to discourage its nuclear program may have the best chance of mustering the two-thirds vote
needed to override a presidential veto. A vote on that could come as early as next month. Many of the other bills don’t stand a
chance. And Republicans know that going in. Still, it’s smart for Republicans to put forward their ideas to show a clear contrast with
the president, says Dan Holler, communications director for the conservative Heritage Action for America. Holler said it’s also
important to understand that any major legislation that has a chance of being enacted is going to be negotiated with
the White House behind the scenes. “By necessity that will be quiet,” says Holler, “because pretty much every single member
of the Republican Party ran against Obama and everything he’s done over the past six years. Their constituents would
understandably be upset if they are working hand in glove with the administration.” Both sides appear to be
“frontloading” their agendas with confrontational matters to help set the stage for the 2016 elections,
with the real work to find compromises to come later, says William Galston, a former Clinton administration official. “The question,
then, is what does Phase 2 look like?” says Galston. After Obama vetoes GOP proposals and the Republicans fail to override him,
“that’s when the 2015 game begins.” Obama might want to pay more attention to timing if he wants to improve his working relations
with congressional leaders. His first two veto threats were issued while the new Congress still was being sworn in, prompting plenty
of grousing from Republicans. “He could have waited a few hours,” said House Speaker John Boehner. “Maybe he could have
waited a few days. We were taking our oath of office when they were issuing veto threats. Come on.” The ever-growing list of
Obama veto threats If these bills reach his desk, President Barack Obama has threatened to veto them: — Pain-Capable
Unborn Child Protection Act. Would ban most abortions after the 20th week of pregnancy. — No Taxpayer Funding
for Abortion Act. Would ban taxpayer funding for abortion, a prohibition that is already largely in effect. — Natural Gas Pipeline
Permitting Reform Act. Would accelerate the approval of natural gas pipeline projects by requiring a decision on applications
within 12 months. — Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act. Amendments would overturn Obama’s executive
actions on immigration and expose hundreds of thousands of younger immigrants to deportation. — Regulatory
Accountability Act of 2015. Would establish tougher requirements for writing federal regulations, which critics say would create
confusion and delays. — Promoting Job Creation and Reducing Small Business Burdens Act. Would weaken requirements
under the 2010 Dodd-Frank financial overhaul, which put banks and Wall Street under the most sweeping rules since the Great
Depression. — Keystone XL Pipeline Act. Would approve construction of a long-stalled oil pipeline to carry tar sands oil from
Canada to the U.S. Gulf Coast. — Save American Workers Act of 2015. Would narrow the definition of fulltime workers who
must be offered employer-provided health insurance from those working at least 30 hours weekly to those with a 40-hour minimum.
Besides those specific bills, Obama has also threatened to veto any bill that places new sanctions against Iran, saying they would
threaten ongoing negotiations over its nuclear program.
No bill introduced now, no sanctions until after negotiations, veto proof majority
now
Bennett 1/29, “Senate Panel OKs Threat of New Iran Sanctions” By John T. Bennett January 29, 2015, Defense News,
http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-budget/congress/2015/01/29/iran-sanctions-nuclear-weapons-obama/22524903/
The Banking Committee, in a bipartisan 18-4 vote, approved a new Iran sanctions bill crafted by Senate
Foreign Relations Committee Ranking Member Sen. Bob Menendez, D-N.J., and Sen. Mark Kirk, R-Ill. Senators from
both panels spoke in support of the legislation, arguing the threat of new economic penalties will cause Iranian officials to take the
ongoing "P5+1 talks" more seriously. "Sanctions are what got Iran to the table," the Senate's No. 3 Democrat, Sen. Chuck Schumer
of New York, said. "If they don't come to a strong deal that prevents a nuclear Iran, period, there will be additional sanctions by this
body." Menendez and other Democrats are pushing Republican chamber leaders to put off a vote until at least March
24, essentially giving Iranian negotiators two months to agree to concessions being pushed by the United States
and other Western countries. The Senate's agenda beyond a weeklong recess that starts on Feb. 16 is unclear. Senate Majority
Leader Sen. Mitch McConnell, R-Ky., has only said that the chamber will next take up a Department of Homeland
Security funding measure after it completes work on a Keystone XL Pipeline bill. Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Chairman Sen. Bob Corker, R-Tenn., also a Banking Committee member, called the measure "a placeholder" that
McConnell could call up at any time. Hawkish Republicans like new Sen. Tom Cotton, R-Ark., a former House member, say
Washington needs to do something as soon as possible to put more pressure on Tehran. In fact, Cotton made his first splash since
moving across the Capitol complex, saying, "I would rather see these negotiations end." The Kirk-Menendez bill would "increase the
current congressional oversight of the negotiations and require the administration to formally submit any new nuclear agreement text
or extension to Congress within five days." Schumer called that "a very good check" on the White House's deal, adding "it must be
done carefully." The measure would green-light new sanctions and reinstitute ones waived during the
"P5+1" talks only if a June 30 deadline for a deal with Iran passes with no such pact. The bill, known
informally on Capitol Hill as "Kirk-Menendez," would install new sanctions on Iran, including ones
to "close loopholes in existing petroleum sanctions, enhance sanctions on Iran's oil trade and
financial transactions, and impose further sanctions on Iran's senior government officials, family
members and other individuals," according to a summary of the legislation. The panel approved, 18-4, an amendment
offered by Sen. Pat Toomey, R-Pa., that would make it the sense of the Congress that lawmakers should vote on any potential deal
the Obama administration strikes with Iran. The Kirk-Menendez sanctions would be implemented one by one
over several months. The committee killed, 10-12, an amendment from Cotton that would have made them all binding on
July 6. Menendez wants to wait at least two months before the full Senate votes on the bill. But he stressed that if Iranian officials
continue to stall, the chamber should vote on his bill. To him, if a vote is held at the right time, "I believe it would
have broad bipartisan support." Banking Committee Ranking Member Sen. Sherrod Brown, D-Ohio, said it's clear
President Barack Obama, who likely soon will ask Congress for more time to keep the P5+1 process alive, "would veto the bill." Still,
the 18-4 committee vote suggests there may be the 67 required votes in the chamber to overturn a
veto.
Bubble DA
No impact to econ
Daniel Drezner 14, IR prof at Tufts, The System Worked: Global Economic Governance during the Great Recession, World
Politics, Volume 66. Number 1, January 2014, pp. 123-164
The final significant outcome addresses a dog that hasn't barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict
and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis
would lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.42 They voiced genuine concern that
the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict—whether through greater internal repression,
diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict. Violence in the Middle East,
border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fueled impressions of a surge in global
public disorder.
The aggregate data suggest otherwise , however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has
concluded that "the average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in
2007."43 Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis, as have
military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not
triggered any increase in violent conflict, as Lotta Themner and Peter Wallensteen conclude: "[T]he pattern is one of
relative stability when we consider the trend for the past five years."44 The secular decline in violence that started with
the end of the Cold War has not been reversed. Rogers Brubaker observes that "the crisis has not to date
generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been
expected."43
It’s resilient
Zakaria ’9 [Fareed Zakaria is editor of Newsweek International “The Secrets of Stability,” 12/12 http://www.newsweek.com/id/226425/page/2]
One year ago, the world seemed as if it might be coming apart . The global financial system, which had fueled a
great expansion of capitalism and trade across the world, was crumbling. All the certainties of the age of globalization—about the
virtues of free markets, trade, and technology—were being called into question. Faith in the American model had collapsed. The
financial industry had crumbled. Once-roaring emerging markets like China, India, and Brazil were sinking. Worldwide trade was
shrinking to a degree not seen since the 1930s. Pundits whose bearishness had been vindicated predicted we were doomed to a
long, painful bust, with cascading failures in sector after sector, country after country. In a widely cited essay that appeared in The
Atlantic this May, Simon Johnson, former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, wrote: "The conventional wisdom
among the elite is still that the current slump 'cannot be as bad as the Great Depression.' This view is wrong. What we face now
could, in fact, be worse than the Great Depression." Others predicted that these economic shocks would lead
to political instability and violence in the worst-hit countries. At his confirmation hearing in February, the new
U.S. director of national intelligence, Adm. Dennis Blair, cautioned the Senate that "the financial crisis and global recession are likely
to produce a wave of economic crises in emerging-market nations over the next year." Hillary Clinton endorsed this grim view. And
she was hardly alone. Foreign Policy ran a cover story predicting serious unrest in several emerging markets. Of one thing everyone
was sure: nothing would ever be the same again. Not the financial industry, not capitalism, not globalization. One year later, how
much has the world really changed? Well, Wall Street is home to two fewer investment banks (three, if you count Merrill Lynch).
Some regional banks have gone bust. There was some turmoil in Moldova and (entirely unrelated to the financial crisis) in Iran.
Severe problems remain, like high unemployment in the West, and we face new problems caused by responses to the crisis—
overall, things look nothing like they did in the 1930s. The
predictions of economic and political collapse have not materialized at all. A key measure of fear and
soaring debt and fears of inflation. But
fragility is the ability of poor and unstable countries to borrow money on the debt markets. So consider this: the sovereign bonds of
tottering Pakistan have returned 168 percent so far this year. All this doesn't add up to a recovery yet, but it does reflect a return to
some level of normalcy. And that rebound has been so rapid that even the shrewdest observers remain puzzled. "The question I
have at the back of my head is 'Is that it?' " says Charles Kaye, the co-head of Warburg Pincus. "We had this huge crisis, and now
we're back to business as usual?" This revival did not happen because markets managed to stabilize themselves on their own.
Rather, governments, having learned the lessons of the Great Depression, were determined not to repeat the same mistakes once
this crisis hit. By massively expanding state support for the economy—through central banks and national
treasuries—they buffered the worst of the damage. (Whether they made new mistakes in the process remains to be
seen.) The extensive social safety nets that have been established across the industrialized world also cushioned the pain felt by
many. Times are still tough, but things are nowhere near as bad as in the 1930s, when governments played a tiny role in national
economies. It's true that the massive state interventions of the past year may be fueling some new bubbles: the cheap cash and
government guarantees provided to banks, companies, and consumers have fueled some irrational exuberance in stock and bond
markets. Yet these rallies also demonstrate the return of confidence, and confidence is a very
powerful economic force. When John Maynard Keynes described his own prescriptions for economic growth, he believed
government action could provide only a temporary fix until the real motor of the economy started cranking again—the animal spirits
of investors, consumers, and companies seeking risk and profit. Beyond all this, though, I believe there's a fundamental reason why
we have not faced global collapse in the last year. It is the same reason that we weathered the stock-market crash of 1987, the
recession of 1992, the Asian crisis of 1997, the Russian default of 1998, and the tech-bubble collapse of 2000. The current
global economic system is inherently more resilient than we think. The world today is
characterized by three major forces for stability, each reinforcing the other and each historical in
nature.
US economy decoupled from the world
Charles Hugh Smith,Of Two Minds, 1-6-12, p. Lexis
It's possible that the U.S. economy can keep logging positive statistics even as the global
economy spiralsinto depression. Never mind that gasoline consumption has plummeted or that savings have dropped or
that austerity and higher debt service payments insure a deep recession in Europe; and who cares about China's real estate bubble
popping? None of that matters here--or so it seems. Heck, maybe we've entered a new golden era of low
volatility; that's possible, too. Everything's fixed, and the U.S. has successfully decoupled from
the rest of the global economy. Based on sentiment and volatility readings, those are the
consensus views .Reportedly16 out of 16 stock market mavens see nothing but rally ahead--and
we all know unanimity is astonishingly accurate in predicting stock prices. The U.S. dollar has
traded on a see-saw with equities for years; recently, both equities and the dollar have surged. So
either the see-saw has broken or this is the mother of all divergences.
Their bubble argument is non-unique, has no impact, and is resolved by the plan
Equities 14 (6-23-14, "Are Marijuana Stocks the Next Dotcom Bubble?" Equities) www.equities.com/editorsdesk/stocks/consumer-discretionary/marijuana-stocks-next-dotcom-bubble
The dotcom bubble can be blamed on investors’ irrational exuberance toward any and every company that had something to do with
the internet. Every few decades, we see such irrational exuberance cause bubbles, which eventually burst as
they are not backed by sound fundamentals . While internet stocks were the bubble to start the millennium ,
investors may now be dealing with a growing one in marijuana stocks. A Possible Bubble in The Making
Ever since, marijuana was legalized in Colorado and Washington for recreational purposes, there has
been growing interest in marijuana stocks. But while medical marijuana is legal in 22 states at the moment,
marijuana is still illegal in the eyes of the federal government. But that has not stopped investors
from pouring money into stocks related to marijuana businesses as they believe more states will legalize the
substance for medical and recreational purposes. Year-to-date, we have seen huge rally in marijuana stocks, most of
which trade on the OTC market. Medical Marijuana (MJNA) is one such stock. Year-to-date, the OTC market traded stock has
gained more than 61%. Another OTC market traded stock, Cannabis Science Inc. (CBIS) has gained more than 155% this year.
Hemp Inc. (HEMP) has gained more than 290%. Medbox Inc. (MDBX) is up nearly 26%. Growlife Inc. ($PHOT) is one of the rare
losers this year, falling more than 22%. The gains in marijuana stocks certainly indicate that there is a
potential bubble in the making. Investors Could Burn Their Fingers Like Dotcom if They Are Not Careful While the
scale of a marijuana bubble is nowhere near that of the dotcom bubble , investors could still lose money if
they are not careful. Again, the majority of the marijuana stocks trade on OTC market. This in itself should make investors cautious
as their disclosure standards will not be the same as those of companies listed on the NYSE and Nasdaq. Add to this the fact that
marijuana stocks are extremely volatile. Investors also need to understand that the marijuana business still
faces many hurdles. The marijuana industry does not have access to banking services as most
banks are federally insured, and obstacles created by Washington's passive approach to
marijuana are not helping.
No bubble—SEC solved it
Morgan 14 (John, 4-28-14, "Forbes's Vardi: Poof! Marijuana Stock Bubble Goes Up in Smoke" Money News)
www.moneynews.com/StreetTalk/Vardi-marijuana-stock-SEC/2014/05/28/id/573737/
The marijuana stock bubble that emerged earlier this year has been deflated , following actions by the
S ecurities and E xchange C ommission that have scared investors away from penny pot shares, according to Forbes
columnist Nathan Vardi. Pot stocks are different from other over-the-counter (OTC) bulletin board stocks and are buffeted by
ongoing changes in various state laws on medical marijuana and recreational marijuana, in addition to uncertain interpretation of
federal law. "To the degree there has been a penny stock market boom in the U.S., it has been led by the marijuana sector," Vardi
wrote. Editor’s Note: Retire 10 Years Earlier With These 4 Stocks But now that leadership is frayed because the SEC has
temporarily halted at least eight pot stocks in recent months on regulatory concerns over such
matters as "manipulative transactions" and "unlawful distribution of securities," according to
Vardi. One popular pot stock, GrowLife, plummeted 88 percent from its March high after being temporarily halted. Earlier this
month, the SEC issued an investor alert warning about "possible scams involving marijuana-related investment,"
noting that "fraudsters often exploit the latest growth industry to lure investors with the promise of high returns." As a result of the
SEC's actions, the 420 Marijuana Index has sunk 62 percent since March, showing the damage also
has been widespread among pot stocks not mentioned by the SEC. "The allure of combining marijuana with
penny stocks is strong, but for now investors seem to be spooked — worried that if their investments won't be
undermined by a penny stock huckster, it will be by securities regulators," Vardi explained.
1AR
‘Legalization’ is a process that is just removing a legal prohibition while opening
up possibility for regulation
Rolles 9 [Stephen Rolles, Company Director of Transform Drugs Campaign Limited, “A Comparison of the Cost-effectiveness of
Prohibition and Regulation of Drugs”, April, http://www.tdpf.org.uk/sites/default/files/Cost-Effectiveness.pdf]
‘Prohibition’ is used in this paper to refer to the set of policies that formally prohibit—through the application
of legal sanctions —all production, distribution and possession of specific psychoactive drugs for non-medical use, as defined under the UN
drug conventions and the Misuse of Drugs Act 197137. Reduction in use, specifically the aim of a ‘drug free’ society, is often given as the primary goal.
‘Decriminalisation’, which is often confused with legalisation/regulation, is the reduction or abolition (actual or de facto) of criminal penalties in relation
to certain acts. While decriminalised acts are no longer crimes, they may still be the subject of regulation; for example, a civil or administrative penalty
(commonly a fine) in place of a criminal charge for the possession of a decriminalised drug for personal use. ‘Legalisation’,
in contrast
to decriminalisation, is the process of removing a legal prohibition against something which is
currently illegal. ‘Legalisation’ describes a process or shift in legal status , rather than describing
a policy position or form of legal regulation.