Comparative Political Institutions
Spring 2011
Tuesday 4-7pm Burkle 26
Professor Melissa Ziegler Rogers
Email: mrogers@cgu.edu
Office Hours: Tuesday 2-4pm
Course Description: The study of political institutions dominates the field of comparative
politics. In this course, we will examine both the validity and foundations of the study of
political institutions as well as look in-depth at the institutions of modern government
Course Requirements: All students taking the seminar must do the assigned readings, write four
3-4 page response papers, and participate in discussions. The response papers are short critical
analyses of the readings; students will sign up for their choice of topics during the first seminar
meeting. These critical reviews should focus your thoughts, prompt possible research topics, and
guide our discussions. The papers should raise general questions about the readings as well as
specific questions about the readings as well as specific questions about the readings under
review. They should be thought-provoking. They can take on any aspect of the readings to be
discussed that week; just be sure to analyze rather than summarize. The papers might critique or
extend theories, consider applications to different cases, reexamine empirical evidence, etc.
Students writing critical reviews will present their analysis (approximately 10 minutes) in
seminar. To accommodate discussion, critical review papers are due 24 hours in advance of
seminar, via email, to everyone enrolled.
Grading: each critical analysis will be worth 20% of the final grade and seminar participation is
worth 20%.
Readings: Most readings are journal articles available online through the library. The book
chapters are available, when possible, on Sakai. We will read significant portions or the entirety
of certain books. You may want to purchase these books through online sources.
Week 1: Introduction
Week 2: Institutions and Institutional Analysis
James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Institutional Perspectives on Political Institutions.
Governance 9, 3 (July 1996), 247-64 .
Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach,"
Journal of Theoretical Politics 1, 2 (April 1989), 131-147.
Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, eds., Structuring Politics: Historical
Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, ch. 1.
Adam Przeworski, “Institutions Matter?” Government and Opposition 39, 2004: 527-540.
Week 3: Democracy vs. Autocracy
Barry R. Weingast, “Political foundations of democracy and the rule of law,” American Political
Science Review, 91: 245-263.
Adam Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2000, chs. 1 and 2.
Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson. Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, Chs. 1-3.
Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, ch. 3.
Philip G. Roeder, Red Sunset. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993, chs. 1-2.
Week 4: Consensual vs. Majoritarian Democracy
Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy, chs. 1-4.
John Ferejohn. “Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control.” Public Choice 30, Fall 1986: 525.
James Fearon. “Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types
versus Sanctioning Poor Performance.” In Democracy, Accountability, and Representation,
edited by Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes, and Bernard Manin. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1999.
G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Elections as Instruments of Democracy. New Haven: Yale University
Press, 2000, ch. 1
Richard Rose, The End of Consensus in Austria and Switzerland. Journal of Democracy 11, 2
(April 2000), 26-40.
Week 5: Presidentialism and Executives
Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy, chs. 7 and 13.
Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., The Failure of Presidential Democracy: Comparative
Perspectives. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994, chs. 1(Linz) and 4 (Stepan and
Skach).
Scott Mainwaring and Matthew S. Shugart, eds., Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin
America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, chs. 1 and 11.
Jose Antonio Cheibub, “Presidentialism and Democratic Performance.” In The Architecture of
Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy, edited by Andrew
Reynolds, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
Week 6: Parliamentary Democracy
Gary W. Cox, The Efficient Secret. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, ch. 6.
Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy, ch. 6.
Michael J. Laver and Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Coalitions and Cabinet Government," American
Political Science Review 84, 3 (September 1990), 873-90.
Lanny W. Martin and Randolph T. Stevenson, Government Formation in Parliamentary
Democracies. American Journal of Political Science 45, 1 (January 2001), 33-50.
Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang C. Müller and Torbjörn Bergman, eds., Delegation and Accountability
in Parliamentary Democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. Chapters 3 and 22.
Week 7: Electoral Rules
Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy, chs. 5 and 8.
Carles Boix, Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced
Democracies. American Political Science Review 93, 3 (September 1999), 609-24.
Gary W. Cox, Making Votes Count. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, chs. 1-4, 8,
and 15.
Carey, John, and Matthew Shugart. 1995. “Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote.” Electoral
Studies 14(4): 417-439.
Week 8: Parties and Party Systems
Giovanni Sartori. Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1976, chapter 6.
Wolfgang C. Muller and Kaare Strom, eds., Policy, Office, or Votes: How Political Parties in
Western Europe Make Hard Decisions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, ch. 1.
Gary W. Cox, Making Votes Count. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, chs. 10 and
12.
Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully, eds., Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems
in Latin America. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995, ch. 1.
Kitschelt. 2000. Linkages between Citizens and Politicans in Democratic Politics. Comparative
Political Studies 33 (6/7)
Week 9: Federalism
William H. Riker, "Federalism." In Handbook of Political Science, eds. Fred Greenstein and
Nelson Polsby. Vol. 5, pp. 93-172.
Barry R. Weingast, 1995. “The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving
Federalism and Economic Development.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 11, 1,
1-31.
Daniel Treisman, “Political Decentralization and Economic Reform.” American Journal of
Political Science 43, 2 (April 1999), 488-517.
Samuels, David. 2000. "Concurrent Elections, Discordant Results: Presidentialism, Federalism,
and Governance in Brazil." Comparative Politics 33(1): 1-20.
Week 10: Veto Players and Policy Outcomes
George Tsebelis. Veto Players. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002. Chapter 1
Gary Cox and Mathew McCubbins. “The Institutional Determinants of Economic Policy
Outcomes.” In Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy, edited by Stephan Haggard and Mathew
McCubbins, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Matthew Shugart and Stephan Haggard, “Institutions and Public Policy in Presidential Systems.”
In Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy, edited by Stephan Haggard and Mathew McCubbins,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Andrew MacIntyre, “Institutions and Investors: The Politics of the Economic Crisis in Southeast
Asia.” International Organization 55(1), 2001: 81-122.
Week 11: Institutions and Economic Performance
Philip Keefer, “What Does Political Economy Tell Us About Economic Development -- and
Vice Versa?,” Annual Review of Political Science, 7: 247-272.
Mancur Olson, “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development.” American Political Science
Review 87(3), September 1993: 567-576.
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph Diverson, and Alastair Smith. “Political
Competition and Economic Growth.” Journal of Democracy 12(1), January 2001.
Adam Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2000, ch. 3.
Abhijit Banerjee and Lakshmi Iyer, “History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The
Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India,” American Economic Review, 94: 1190-1212.
Week 12: The State
David Stasavage. “Cities, Constitutions, and Sovereign Borrowing in Europe, 1274-1785.” International Organization, 61:489{525, Summer 2007
Reuschmeyer, Dietrich, et al. Capitalist Development & Democracy, Chicago 1992, 75-99.
North Douglass and and Robert Paul Thomas (1973) The Rise of the Western World: A New
Economic History, CUP, pp.1-158.
Week 13: Bureaucracy
James E. Rauch and Peter B. Evans. Bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic performance
in less developed countries. Journal of Public Economics, 75:49-71, 2000
Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz. Congressional oversight overlooked: Police
patrols verus fire alarms. American Journal of Political Science, 28(1):165{179, February
1984
Georgy Egorov and Konstantin Sonin. Dictators and their viziers: Agency problems in dictatorships. December 2004 http://www.cefir.ru/papers/WP43update.pdf
Jakob Svensson. Eight questions about corruption. Journal of Economic Perspectives,
19(3):19-42, Summer 2005
Week 14: The Extension of Suffrage
Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson. Why did the west extend the franchise? Democ-
racy, inequality, and growth in historical perspective. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
115(4):1167-1199, November 2000
Davide Ticchi and Andrea Vindigni. War and endogenous democracy. December 2007
http://www.cepr.org/meets/wkcn/6/6681/papers/TicchiFinal.pdf
Adam Przeworski. 2008. “Conquered or granted? A history of suffrage extensions.” British
Journal of Political Science. http://clacs.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/2800/suffrage_ext.pdf
Leonard Wantchekon. The Paradox of “Warlord" Democracy: A Theoretical Investigation.” The
American Political Science Review, 98.1:17-33, February 2004