canada cp
Jarrod, Aron B. , Modermatt, Kevin P, Grace P.
1nc shells
1nc sino-jap war
The counterplan solves the case
Jeffs, ’12 - President of the Canadian International Council a non-partisan, membership-based research council focused on international affairs, Ph.D. in
International Political Economy (IPE) from the University of Toronto, (Jennifer, Latin America: Land of Opportunity, March 22, 2012,
http://opencanada.org/features/blogs/dispatch/latin-america-land-of-opportunity/)//A-Berg
The recent Republican debates
in the U.S. have demonstrated a staggering lack of understanding of Latin
America. While fears of criminal networks becoming sufficiently internationalized to encompass and accommodate the jihadist threat are understandable in a
post-9/11 world, the strong historic economic and social ties between Latin America and the United States should surely translate into a deeper understanding –
and support – of the trends developing in these vibrant and often resource-rich countries. As Sabatini points out, “A little realism would go a long way.” But perhaps
the historic legacy of U.S. activity in the region is too strong, and resentments too enduring. Meanwhile, Canada
is ideally positioned to
deepen its relations with its hemispheric neighbours. Canada’s experience of democratic institutionbuilding – including its support for the development of judicial, educational, and policing systems in
the region – and, in contrast to the U.S., its historical record of no military intervention in the region, show potential for mutually
beneficial exchange and engagement with Latin American countries . Collaboration with Argentina, Brazil, and
Mexico, for example, in the development of fossil fuels and biofuels as alternative energy sources would further integrate
the hemisphere’s economy while de-emphasizing the importance of Venezuela’s oil. While Mexico’s security
threats are an obvious concern, Canada could take the lead in partnering with Mexican researchers in areas that would
provide entry for Mexico’s massive youth population into the knowledge-based economy. (In addition to clean energy, this could include areas such as
biotechnology, aerospace, and health care for developing regions.) By fostering these relations, Canada would
pave the way for other hemispheric partnerships , setting an example for the U.S. in its efforts to tackle governance,
resource management, and environmental issues through regional investment and partnerships.
Given the U.S.’s preoccupation with security, transnational crime and its potential links to the jihadist threat might be a good place to start. But
security is only one aspect of the global challenges facing the hemisphere, and cannot be addressed in isolation. Latin America
needs partnerships in its natural-resource and associated sectors, in education and health-care
research initiatives, and in bracing for climate change. Canada should fill that need, engaging with
Latin America in a spectrum of areas that the U.S. and China have largely neglected.
Canada’s soft power prevents Sino-Japan war---it goes nuclear.
FATDC 12 – Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada, Stopping the Free-Fall Implications of SinoJapanese Rivalry for Regional Stability and Canadian
Interests, 2012-09-14 http://www.international.gc.ca/arms-armes/isrop-prisi/research-recherche/intl_securitysecurite_int/yuan2007/section1a.aspx?lang=eng)//A-Berg
This report discusses developments in Sino-Japanese
relations since the end of the Cold War and analyses some of the underlining causes of mistrust,
misunderstanding, hostility, and emerging rivalry between these two major Asia powers . It presents a
preliminary assessment of the key issues and controversies ranging from Chinese views on the evolving U.S.-Japan military alliance, Japan's aspiration to become a
normal state and its pursuit of greater international role and enhancement of military capabilities, to historical legacies and rising nationalism in both countries,
unresolved territorial disputes and competition for resources, and growing Japan-Taiwan ties. The report argues that the end of the Cold War, the changing
international security environment in East Asia, domestic politics and leadership transition in both China and Japan, especially China's rise as a major power, present
serious challenges for the regional balance of power and the need for adaptation and adjustments to the power shift and transformation. This dramatic shift in the
power balance also leads to worst-case interpretations by both Beijing and Tokyo of the other's intentions and behavior. Under such circumstances, the old wounds
of history are further aggravated by new nationalism, personality, and changing domestic foreign policy making processes where societal pressures impose
significant constraints on conciliatory gestures and "new thinking" on managing bilateral relations. The report also reviews and evaluates the validity of limited
confidence building measures and security dialogue between Beijing and Tokyo and concludes that their utility is constrained by the overall political relationship
between the two countries. At the same time, the report also notes that growing economic interdependence, the recognition that continued deterioration of
relations serves neither side's interests; consequently, the resolve of Chinese and Japanese leaders in the post-Koizumi era to mend fences and promote common
interests at least for now have prevented the free fall in Asia's most important bilateral relationship. Sino-Japanese
relations have important
implications for Canada's interests. Canada has long maintained good relationships with both China
and Japan for economic and politico-security reasons. Japan has been a traditional trading partner of Canada while China's
phenomenal growth over the last quarter century has drawn significant interest from Canadian businesses. Ottawa made significant efforts in promoting its ties
with Asian Pacific countries in the 1990s, as well as participated in and introduced multilateral security institution-building. In this context, the
continuing
free fall of the Sino-Japanese relationship could seriously affect Canadian interests in the region. Canada
remains a "stakeholder" in the future developments in Sino-Japanese relations for at least three reasons: China's rise and its future direction
affect both regional peace and stability and the geo-strategic landscape at the global level. China has
become an important trading partner for Canada and Canadian "soft power" in engaging and
encouraging China to adopt a multilateral approach to regional security and good governance has
achieved important results. Ottawa should continue to play an active role in engaging Beijing to
promote a disarmament agenda and encourage military transparency so that China's emergence
could be better integrated into the existing international norms and frameworks, values a middle power such as
Canada holds dear. Japan and Canada share many common values and interests. Both are members of the G-8 and OECD, and are concerned with emerging nontraditional security challenges, human security, and international peacekeeping. However, Ottawa and Tokyo have placed different emphasis and have different
priorities due to their respective threat perceptions, geography and alliance commitments. Continued Sino-Japanese rivalry has serious implications for Canadian
interests. Prolonged instability and deteriorating security in that region would negatively affect Canada's interests. Intensified
disputes leading to
militarized conflicts between China and Japan could result in a number of negative developments.
There is the potential for an arms race. Japan strives for greater military capabilities, including
nuclear and missile capabilitie s as Tokyo's confidence in U.S. nuclear umbrella and the alliance
protection wanes.
Regional instability leads to extinction
Toon et. Al. 7 Department of Atmosphere and Oceanic Sciences, Laboratory for Atmosphere and Space Physics, University of Colorado,
Boulder (Owen B. Toon, 2 March 2007, “Consequences of Regional-Scale Nuclear Conflicts,” Science Magazine, Vol 315,
http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/SciencePolicyForumNW.pdf)//KP
*Secondary authors include: Alan Robock (Department of Environmental Sciences, Rutgers University), Richard P. Turco (Department of
Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences, University of California – Los Angeles), Charles Bardeen (Department of Atmosphere and Oceanic Sciences,
Laboratory for Atmosphere and Space Physics, University of Colorado, Boulder), Luke Oman (Department of Environmental Sciences, Rutgers
University; and Department of Earth and Planetary Sciences, Johns Hopkins University), and Georgiy L. Stenchikov (Department of
Environmental Sciences, Rutgers University).
The world may no longer face a serious threat of global nuclear warfare, but regional
conflicts continue. Within this milieu, acquiring
nuclear weapons has been considered a potent political, military, and social tool (1–3). National ownership of
nuclear weapons offers perceived international status and insurance against aggression at a modest financial cost. Against this backdrop, we provide a
quantitative assessment of the potential for casualties in a regional-scale nuclear conflict, or a terrorist
attack, and the associated environmental impacts (4, 5). Eight nations are known to have nuclear weapons. In addition, North Korea may
have a small, but growing, arsenal. Iran appears to be seeking nuclear weapons capability, but it probably needs several years to obtain enough fissionable material .
Of great concern, 32 other nations—including Brazil, Argentina, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan—have sufficient
fissionable materials to produce weapons (1, 6). A de facto nuclear arms race has emerged in Asia between
China, India, and Pakistan, which could expand to include North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan (1). In the Middle East, a nuclear
confrontation between Israel and Iran would be fearful. Saudi Arabia and Egypt could also seek nuclear weapons to balance Iran and Israel. Nuclear arms programs
in South America, notably in Brazil and Argentina, were ended by several treaties in the 1990s (6). We can hope that these agreements will hold and will serve as a
model for other regions, despite Brazil’s new, large uranium enrichment facilities. Nuclear arsenals containing 50 or more weapons of low yield [15 kilotons (kt),
equivalent to the Hiroshima bomb] are relatively easy to build (1, 6). India and Pakistan, the smallest nuclear powers, probably have such arsenals, although no
nuclear state has ever disclosed its inventory of warheads (7). Modern
weapons are compact and lightweight and are readily
transported (by car, truck, missile, plane, or boat) (8). The basic concepts of weapons design can be found on of the
Internet. The only serious obstacle to constructing a bomb is the limited availability of purified
fissionable fuels. There are many political, economic, and social factors that could trigger a
regionalscale nuclear conflict, plus many scenarios for the conduct of the ensuing war. We assumed (4) that the
densest population centers in each country—usually in megacities—are attacked. We did not evaluate specific military targets and related casualties. We
considered a nuclear exchange involving 100 weapons of 15-kt yield each, that is, ~0.3% of the total number of existing weapons (4). India and Pakistan, for
instance, have previously tested nuclear weapons and are now thought to have between 109 and 172 weapons of unknown yield (9). Fatalities were estimated by
means of a standard population database for a number of countries that might be targeted in a regional conflict (see figure, above). For instance, such an exchange
between India and Pakistan (10) could produce about 21 million fatalities—about half as many as occurred globally during World War II. The
direct effects
of thermal radiation and nuclear blasts, as well as gamma-ray and neutron radiation within the first
few minutes of the blast, would cause most casualties. Extensive damage to infrastructure,
contamination by long-lived radionuclides, and psychological trauma would likely result in the
indefinite abandonment of large areas leading to severe economic and social repercussions. Fires
ignited by nuclear bursts would release copious amounts of light-absorbing smoke into the upper
atmosphere. If 100 small nuclear weapons were detonated within cities, they could generate 1 to 5 million tons of carbonaceous smoke pa rticles (4),
darkening the sky and affecting the atmosphere more than major volcanic eruptions like Mt. Pinatubo (1991) or
Tambora (1815) (5). Carbonaceous smoke particles are transported by winds throughout the atmosphere but also induce circulations in response to solar heating.
Simulations (5) predict that such radiativedynamical interactions would loft and stabilize the smoke aerosol, which would allow it to persist in the middle and upper
atmosphere for a decade. Smoke
emissions of 100 lowyield urban explosions in a regional nuclear conflict would generate
substantial globalscale climate anomalies, although not as large as in previous “nuclear winter” scenarios for a full-scale war (11, 12).
However, indirect effects on surface land temperatures, precipitation rates, and growing season lengths
(see figure, page 1225) would be likely to degrade agricultural productivity to an extent that historically has led
to famines in Africa, India, and Japan after the 1783–1784 Laki eruption (13) or in the northeastern United States and
Europe after the Tambora eruption of 1815 (5). Climatic anomalies could persist for a decade or more because of
smoke stabilization, far longer than in previous nuclear winter calculations or after volcanic eruptions.
Studies of the consequences of full-scale nuclear war show that indirect effects of the war could cause more casualties than direct ones, perhaps eliminating the
majority of the world’s population (11, 12). Indirect
effects such as damage to transportation, energy, medical,
political, and social infrastructure could be limited to the combatant nations in a regional war.
However, climate anomalies would threaten the world outside the combat zone. The predicted smoke
emissions and fatalities per kiloton of explosive yield are roughly 100 times those expected from
estimates for full-scale nuclear attacks with high-yield weapons (4). Unfortunately, the Treaty on NonProliferation of Nuclear
Weapons has failed to prevent the expansion of nuclear states. A bipartisan group including two former U.S. secretaries of state, a former secretary of defense, and
a former chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee has recently pointed out that nuclear deterrence is no longer effective and may become dangerous (3).
Terrorists, for instance, are outside the bounds of deterrence strategies. Mutually assured destruction may not function in a world with large numbers of nuclear
states with widely varying political goals and philosophies. New nuclear states may not have well-developed safeguards and controls to prevent nuclear accidents or
unauthorized launches. This bipartisan group detailed numerous steps to inhibit or prevent the spread of nuclear weapons (3). Its list, with which we concur,
includes removing nuclear weapons from alert status to reduce the danger of an accidental or unauthorized use of a nuclear weapon; reducing the size of nuclear
forces in all states; eliminating tactical nuclear weapons; ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty worldwide; securing all stocks of weapons, weaponsusable
plutonium, and highly enriched uranium everywhere in the world; controlling uranium enrichment along with guaranteeing that uranium for nuclear power reactors
could be obtained from controlled international reserves; safeguarding spent fuel from reactors producing electricity; halting the production of fissile material for
weapons globally; phasing out the use of highly enriched uranium in civil commerce and research facilities and rendering the materials safe; and resolving regional
confrontations and conflicts that give rise to new nuclear powers. The analysis summarized here shows that the
world has reached a
crossroads. Having survived the threat of global nuclear war between the superpowers so far, the world is increasingly threatened by
the prospects of regional nuclear war. The consequences of regional-scale nuclear conflicts are
unexpectedly large, with the potential to become global catastrophes. The combination of nuclear
proliferation, political instability, and urban demographics may constitute one of the greatest dangers
to the stability of society since the dawn of humans.
1nc conflict res
The counterplan solves
Jeffs, ’12 - President of the Canadian International Council a non-partisan, membership-based research council focused on international affairs, Ph.D. in
International Political Economy (IPE) from the University of Toronto, (Jennifer, Latin America: Land of Opportunity, March 22, 2012,
http://opencanada.org/features/blogs/dispatch/latin-america-land-of-opportunity/)//A-Berg
The recent Republican debates
in the U.S. have demonstrated a staggering lack of understanding of Latin
America. While fears of criminal networks becoming sufficiently internationalized to encompass and accommodate the jihadist threat are understandable in a
post-9/11 world, the strong historic economic and social ties between Latin America and the United States should surely translate into a deeper understanding –
and support – of the trends developing in these vibrant and often resource-rich countries. As Sabatini points out, “A little realism would go a long way.” But perhaps
the historic legacy of U.S. activity in the region is too strong, and resentments too enduring. Meanwhile, Canada
is ideally positioned to
deepen its relations with its hemispheric neighbours. Canada’s experience of democratic institutionbuilding – including its support for the development of judicial, educational, and policing systems in
the region – and, in contrast to the U.S., its historical record of no military intervention in the region, show potential for mutually
beneficial exchange and engagement with Latin American countries . Collaboration with Argentina, Brazil, and
Mexico, for example, in the development of fossil fuels and biofuels as alternative energy sources would further integrate
the hemisphere’s economy while de-emphasizing the importance of Venezuela’s oil. While Mexico’s security
threats are an obvious concern, Canada could take the lead in partnering with Mexican researchers in areas that would
provide entry for Mexico’s massive youth population into the knowledge-based economy. (In addition to clean energy, this could include areas such as
biotechnology, aerospace, and health care for developing regions.) By fostering these relations, Canada would
pave the way for other hemispheric partnerships , setting an example for the U.S. in its efforts to tackle governance,
resource management, and environmental issues through regional investment and partnerships.
Given the U.S.’s preoccupation with security, transnational crime and its potential links to the jihadist threat might be a good place to start. But
security is only one aspect of the global challenges facing the hemisphere, and cannot be addressed in isolation. Latin America
needs partnerships in its natural-resource and associated sectors, in education and health-care
research initiatives, and in bracing for climate change. Canada should fill that need, engaging with
Latin America in a spectrum of areas that the U.S. and China have largely neglected.
Canada soft power is k/t UN cred and conflict prevention
Carment* and Marriott** 2003, *is the Director of the Centre for Security and Defence Studies at Carleton University, where he is Associate
Professor at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, **is a graduate of the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University,
(David B. and Koren “Conflict Prevention in Canada A Survey of Canadian Conflict Prevention Professionals,” September 2003, http://httpserver.carleton.ca/~dcarment/papers/conflictpreventionsurvey1.pdf)
According to IMPACS, “Canada
has the resources and capability to play a lead role in conflict prevention
internationally. It could provide support by delivering training or by building local capacities and developing local assets. Canada should
support initiatives related to media and peacebuilding, dialogues and roundtable sessions, mediation
efforts, etc”. In general, many of the respondents had basically positive things to say about Canada’s role in conflict prevention. Often this also
included ways to increase effectiveness, or to capitalize on what one respondent described as the ‘deferring’ to Canada on certain issues in multilateral fora.
Basically, the responses leave the impression that respondents believe that Canada and Canadians have made a good start and are generally motivated by the right
intentions but that more could be done. Particular suggestions included pushing for inclusion of women’s rights in international
treaties,
strengthening of the UN and its procedures, the championing of international law and the
encouragement of other states to adopt international treaties relating to the safety and security of
people around the globe. The overriding theme that appeared in several of the responses was that Canada should support the work of international
and regional organizations. UNICEF stated that by using soft power, “Canada is in a strong position to champion
international laws and treaties through the UN and other regional and international bodies”. CUSO’s
response reflected similar views, stating; “ Canada is respected internationally for being a promoter of peace and
human security, and should continue this role. It should continue to work within multi-lateral
frameworks, including the UN, ensuring rule of law is adhered to in all its conflict prevention and
interventions. Canada should support the reform of the UN in order to make it a more effective
international body capable of effecting positive change in today's world. Canada should be more active in ensuring that
people around the world share equitably in its resources. Canada should promote human rights and democratic development in all its international dealings
including in trade and development.” Theresa Dunn expressed a related opinion, saying she believes Canada
is strategically placed to
become a leader in conflict prevention through its role as peacebuilder and often impartial agent. She
went on to say that because of Canada’s size and commitment to conflict resolution through collaboration “we
are able to move internationally with knowledge and expertise”. These views are fairly representative of a major portion of
the responses received.
Southeast Asia is on the track to collapse---multiple regional and interstate hotspots
are on the brink---effective UN conflict prevention is key
Wainwright 10 - Elsina, Deputy Director for Personnel and a Senior Fellow in the Statebuilding Program at New York University’s Center on International
Cooperation, Adjunct Associate Professor at the Centre for International Security Studies (CISS) at the University of Sydney, Australia. PhD at Oxford University in
International Relations, Conflict Prevention in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific April 2010,
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/E9F30DCAFE830FC9492577140018C276-Full_Report.pdf)//A-Berg
The Asia Pacific region is in the most broadly peaceful era in its history – it has experienced thirty years without interstate conflict. Extraordinary economic growth
has lifted hundreds of millions out of poverty. Notwithstanding this striking record, however, a
host of long-running, low-level internal
conflicts continue in Southeast Asia, and several South Pacific states have recent experience of instability. Significant tensions also
exist at the inter-state level, which could be amplified by a raft of growing transnational threats such as climate change
and resource scarcity. Dramatic shifts in regional power dynamics are also creating new uncertainty. While for several
decades, U.S military strength and its network of alliances have underpinned stability in the region, the rise of China and India may signal
the end of this period of American predominance. By 2025 China and India will probably both have overtaken the GDP of all states
except the US and Japan;1 by 2030, China’s economy could overtake that of the US.2 The global financial crisis appears to have accelerated China and India’s rise,
and China is on track this year to overtake Japan to become the second largest economy globally.3 The Asia Pacific’s growing economic dominance is accompanied
by increasing diplomatic and strategic clout, and the 2009 US National Intelligence Community Estimate describes the
region as ‘poised to
become the long-term power center of the world.’4 China and India’s emergence is also recasting
Southeast Asia’s geopolitical landscape, as both compete for energy, markets, diplomatic influence,
and naval access. States in the region apprehend this strategic flux and the uncertainty surrounding continued US strategic
primacy. A number, including Australia, Cambodia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam, have increased their defense spending,
amplifying the very strategic uncertainty for which they are preparing.5 Who will take responsibility for conflict prevention and conflict management in this
transitional period? During any power shift, major power
competition can complicate or obstruct efforts to tackle conflicts, even
the Asia Pacific, the
existing conflict management mechanisms are under-developed.6 A review of operational conflict prevention efforts in the
where robust international or regional mechanisms have been established for prevention, peacemaking and peacekeeping. In
region shows that while international organizations, particularly the UN, and regional organizations perform some conflict prevention roles in Southeast Asia and
the South Pacific, these roles are circumscribed.7 The constraints upon them flow from the high degree of respect for sovereignty prevalent in the Asia Pacific, but
they also have historical, institutional, and political underpinnings. The UN itself faces particular skepticism, including the charge that it and the other Bretton
Woods institutions have a relative disinterest in the region, as well as having governance structures that have yet to accommodate the Asia Pacific’s accelerating
economic and geostrategic importance.8 Structural prevention initiatives have been less constrained, with a plethora of actors, including the UN, using statebuilding
and development tools to build state resilience, manage transnational threats, and avert violence.9 A number of multilateral ‘track two’ networks and confidencebuilding processes also contribute to conflict prevention in the region. But the
sum of all these efforts is still limited. Given the
long-running conflicts and sources of tension in the Asia Pacific, the limited conflict prevention role
played by international and regional institutions in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific is at first glance
surprising. Yet, as this paper argues, a fair amount of conflict prevention activity has taken place in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific, though less by grand
design than in an ad hoc fashion, as opportunities have arisen. In the absence of a major, formalized role for international and regional organizations, regional crisis
management has drawn in a variety of other actors, including states and NGOs, and seen ad hoc, multi-actor mechanisms assume a particular prominence. A series
of case-specific, multi-actor mechanisms have worked well in the region; their good track record and the ongoing features of the Asia Pacific suggest that they are
likely to remain the region’s primary conflict management vehicles. What role can the
UN and regional organizations play in this context? This
paper argues that in spite of their limitations, they can still make a significant contribution to conflict prevention and
management in the Asia Pacific. Their priorities should be to strengthen existing prevention mechanisms; support other actors on a caseby-case
basis; and flexibly add in capabilities to facilitate prevention efforts led by others. This report concludes with recommendations on how the UN and other actors can
develop new tools and networks to underpin a flexible strategy for prevention in the Asia Pacific. The first recommendation stresses the importance in the Asia
Pacific of a focus on cooperation in functional areas, such as civil-military cooperation in a disaster response context. Such functional cooperation is less constrained
by regional sensitivities than full-scale political or security cooperation, and offers the prospect of enabling future political/security cooperation in the region, by
allaying concerns about outside involvement. The analysis within this paper falls into two parts. First, it reviews the nature of crises in the region – highlighting the
complexity and diversity of current and potential conflicts, and noting how growing transnational threats may exacerbate these. Second, it analyzes existing conflict
prevention mechanisms, beginning with the UN and regional organizations, but also considering states, NGOs and financial institutions as preventive actors. This
paper shows that there are significant resources for conflict prevention in the Asia Pacific. The challenge is to
harness these in a period of growing strategic uncertainty. 1. Regional Crises Since the end of the Cold War, low-level internal violence
has been the prevailing type of conflict in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. This has arguably
contributed to the fragmented nature of conflict prevention in the region: case-specific coalitions of actors have
emerged to help deal with specific low-level conflicts. In some cases, conflict management processes have been complicated by
tensions arising from poor socio-economic conditions. There is also a risk of inter-state conflict in the region, while
transnational issues such as resource scarcity and climate change may foster instability and even conflict. a. Internal conflicts,
current and potential Internal conflicts persist in the southern part of Thailand, Mindanao in the Philippines, Papua in
Indonesia, and in Myanmar. All involve separatist insurgencies fuelled by enduring grievances about representation, access to resourcederived revenues, or employment opportunities, and all have ethnic and/or religious dimensions. In Southern Thailand, violence between the
militants and the Thai central government continues, with over 3,400 deaths since the conflict rekindled five years ago.10 The crisis within
the Thai political system has reduced attention to the conflict and slowed peace negotiations. Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva’s government declared itself open to
dialogue with the militants, and formulated fresh guidelines towards the conflict, which focus more on education, justice and development. However, the central
political turmoil has made the government loath to move too far on this issue, lest it be used against them in a domestic political dispute. This has left the Thai
military in charge of the response in the south. On the Philippine island of Mindanao, fighting reignited between the Philippine army and a Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF) rogue command in 2008 after the Philippine Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the Philippine government-MILF draft peace agreement. The
court decision damaged the credibility of moderate MILF members who support negotiation, and burnished the credibility of those that want to fight. Contact
between the government and the MILF has resumed – talks were held in December 2009, notwithstanding the pall cast by the massacre by the private militia of a
local warlord in Maguindanao a few weeks prior. An International Contact Group comprised of Japan, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the NGOs the Centre for
Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC), the Asia Foundation, Conciliation Resources, and Muhammadiyah has been established to assist with the negotiations process.11 The
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), from which the MILF splintered, is also still an actor in Mindanao’s four-decade, stop-start separatist insurgency. The 1976
Philippine government-MNLF agreement has not been fully implemented and has yet to resolve that dimension of the conflict. In addition, the Philippines continues
to experience a Communist insurgency, particularly in its south: the New People’s Army (NPA) has been battling government forces for 40 years, and anticipated
Myanmar remains embroiled in the world’s longestrunning
contemporary conflict – over 60 years – with numerous ethnic groups against the military regime. Myanmar’s junta has concluded ceasefires with over
a dozen of these ethnic groups, but these ceasefires are fragile. Political and development promises made to various
groups by the junta have not materialized, and over the last year the military has launched fresh offensives against some of the groups. With
elections scheduled for this year and ethnic groups supposed to play an opposition role, Myanmar is heading into a period of
considerable uncertainty. In the Indonesian province of Papua,12 President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has repaired some of the damage wrought
formal talks, the first in five years, have yet to take place.
by previous efforts to undermine the 2001 special autonomy initiative.13 A number of Free Papua Movement’s (Organisasi Papua Merdeka’s or OPM’s) political
demands have been met, and the President has stated that the over 40-year separatist struggle requires a political rather than military solution. The focus in the
province is also shifting from political issues to development, and there has been an increase in development spending. However, violence (by the fragmented OPM
or its affiliates against the security sector; as well as ethnic Papuans against immigrants; intra-Papuan tensions; and the targeting of the resources sector, especially
Freeport mine) increased in 2009, particularly in the lead up to the legislative elections last April. The military reaction was robust, with accusations of Indonesian
security sector intimidation.14 So while the last few years have seen a more positive political and development trajectory in Papua, the situation remains volatile.
Timor-Leste and the provinces of Aceh in Indonesia and Bougainville in Papua New Guinea are all in the consolidating phase after their respective conflicts. TimorLeste in particular has a tumultuous recent history, and around 550 Australian and New Zealand military personnel remain on the ground, at the Timorese
government’s request, to help maintain security. TimorLeste has stabilized politically since the 2006 security crisis and the 2008 assassination attempt on President
Jose Ramos Horta, and the Timorese government has taken more of a leading role over the UN mission – for example, the government has assumed responsibility
for policing. Many serious problems remain, however. These include a young and largely unemployed population (nearly half of whom are under 15); significant
land and food pressures; quasi-militias in the form of martial arts groups; and a highly problematic security sector, which is politicized and rife with internal
tensions, and in which the roles of the police and military are still blurred. Aceh, meanwhile, is enjoying the results of a reasonably successful peace process, with
the incorporation of Free Aceh Movement (GAM) militants into democratic political structures. The disarmament of GAM and decommissioning of its weapons, and
relocation of nonorganic military and police contributed to an upswing in security.15 Occasional violence in Aceh tends now to stem more from elite competition for
Aceh’s revenues than from actions against the state. Aceh’s growing prosperity has helped to reinforce the peace, as has public distaste for the involvement of
former GAM militants in illegal activities and intimidation. The winding up of the post-tsunami funding apparatus has created some uncertainty in Aceh, and a few
aspects of the peace agreement, such as a truth and reconciliation commission, have not been implemented. And while dramatic post-tsunami reconstruction has
helped to reinforce the peace in tsunami-affected communities, a number of conflict- but not tsunami-affected communities have not received a similar level of
donor support, and there is a risk that growing disparity in support and poverty levels might undermine the peace process. Furthermore, the recent discovery of a
terrorist training camp in Aceh indicates that such a
fragile post-conflict setting can be attractive to terrorists and
transnational criminal elements.16 Notwithstanding these risks, however, the autonomy framework is by and large working, and in the July 2009
presidential election, the reelected Indonesian President received a greater percentage of the votes in Aceh – 90% – than in any other part of Indonesia.17 While
the 2001 peace agreement in Bougainville also involved the granting of autonomy, the situation on the ground is not as positive as in Aceh.18 Nor has Bougainville
received a similar amount of attention from the international donor community or its national government, and its interim decentralization framework and the PNG
government-Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG) relationship are dysfunctional. Bougainville has not seen a significant improvement in development since
the 2005 withdrawal of the UN observer mission,19 and the south of the province has been restive, with little economic activity or government service provision.
The ongoing presence of weapons – with new ones coming in from neighboring Solomon Islands – continues to destabilize the province, particularly its south. The
election of President James Tanis in December 2008 resolved an ABG leadership vacuum, and there are signs that some of these problems might be addressed. But
Bougainville remains fragile as it moves towards its 2012 referendum on possible independence, and ongoing challenges include youth unemployment, and
weapons collection and disposal. Internal
conflicts will likely remain the most common type of conflict in the Asia
Pacific region in the medium term. Domestic political imperatives have inhibited resolution of the conflicts in Mindanao and Southern Thailand, for example,
and Papua (where political concessions have been made and the state-periphery relationship is sounder) and Myanmar both experienced an upsurge in violence last
year. In addition to post-conflict Timor-Leste and Solomon Islands, Southeast
Asia and the South Pacific contain a number of
other fragile states, including Cambodia, Laos and Papua New Guinea, which have weak institutions of governance and
jobless young populations. With limited state resilience, there is a risk such states might experience heightened
social and political instability, even conflict, if faced with a significant shock. b. Inter-state tensions in the Asia Pacific
While internal conflict is the predominant type of conflict in the region, multiple inter-state territorial disputes persist and occasionally escalate.
The starkest recent example is the 2008 Thai-Cambodia border crisis, in which the UNESCO World Heritage listing of the Preah Vihear Temple in Cambodia rekindled
Thai contestation of the temple and its nearby border, and the situation escalated into a military standoff. Cambodia brought the issue to ASEAN and the UN
Security Council, whereas Thailand sought to handle the issue bilaterally. While the two states eventually held bilateral negotiations and tensions lessened,
Cambodia has not formally withdrawn its request for the matter to be on the Security Council agenda, so the issue continues to simmer. Thai-Cambodian relations
have been further exacerbated by the Cambodian Prime Minister’s appointment of ousted former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra as economic advisor, and
Cambodia’s subsequent rejection of Thailand’s request for Thaksin’s extradition. Other territorial
disputes in the region include the
islands and waters of the South China Sea, which are contested by the Southeast Asian states of Brunei,
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, as well as by China and Taiwan; the energy-rich Gulf of Thailand,
contested by Thailand and Vietnam; and the Ambalat maritime area, over which ongoing Indonesian-Malaysian tensions
heightened last year, with Indonesia accusing Malaysia of a naval incursion into its waters.20 In North Asia, territorial disputes persist (such as those
between China-Japan and Japan-South Korea), and traditional regional flashpoints include Taiwan and
North Korea. With enduring territorial disputes and a shifting geostrategic landscape dominated by
China and to a lesser extent India’s rise, Asia’s continuing peaceful trajectory is by no means guaranteed. 21
Discontinuities are always possible, and potential threats to stability are many. At the great power level, China-Japan relations are still fraught,
though they have improved from their low point of several years ago; and the US-China relationship, as US President Obama recently declared, will ‘shape the 21st
Century.’22 For several decades Asia-Pacific stability has been premised on US strategic primacy, and the US has managed the region with a traditional hubandspokes alliance model. But China, if its rise continues, will at some point challenge this US primacy, while India’s rise is complicating the regional picture further.
c. Transnational security challenges Southeast
Asia and the South Pacific also face a host of pressing transnational
challenges including food, water and energy scarcity; climate change; lingering effects of the global
financial crisis; terrorism; transnational crime; and pandemics. A number of these challenges are
interconnected and can exacerbate each other.23 The 2008 food crisis hit Southeast Asia hard, with protests over
soybean scarcity in Indonesia and government crackdowns on those hoarding rice in the Philippines.24 Potable water availability and transboundary water
management are growing problems throughout the region. Along the Mekong river basin, for example, Thailand,
Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam
and Myanmar are downstream of Chinese dam projects which will control the river’s flow and have a potentially
dramatic effect on those countries’ fresh water and food supplies. Southeast Asia and the South Pacific will be among the
regions most affected by climate change and the attendant increase in the number and strength of natural disasters. The Asia Pacific broadly defined is
the most natural disaster-prone region – in the last ten years, the region has experienced more than half of the world’s disasters.25 Urbanization and high-density
living in Southeast Asia make its population highly vulnerable to such events. Flooding is expected to increase in coastal areas, particularly affecting the low-lying
megadelta regions in Southeast Asia and coastal Pacific island villages.26 Rising temperatures and rising sea levels will increase the risk of illnesses such as malaria,
and likely force
mass people movements throughout the region.27 Some of Indonesia’s smaller islands and whole Pacific Island
South Pacific as an existential threat.28 The effects of climate
change are already being felt by the archipelagic states of Southeast Asia and the low-lying atolls of the South Pacific. Storms are intensifying in the
South China Sea, and their patterns are altering: cyclones which once passed over the Philippines on their way to Vietnam are now bouncing back to
states will probably be subsumed. Climate change is therefore regarded in the
batter the Philippines a second time, in effect doubling its number of storm events. Rising sea levels are starting to submerge Pacific Island atolls such as Tuvalu and
the Carteret Islands within PNG, coastal villages in the South Pacific are emptying as waters rise (the evacuation of Carteret Islanders has already begun), and states
such as Kiribati are making plans to relocate its population. Food,
water and energy scarcity are all linked challenges, and climate
change will serve as a ‘major threat multiplier’.29 Climate change is already exacerbating existing water problems
such as the salination of the Mekong Delta; salt water is contaminating acquifers across the region, compromising drinking water.30 Experts predict that climate
change will also cause food shortages in the region due to lower crop yields and declining fish populations. The risk of significant political and social instability in the
region from the global financial crisis has diminished as the recovery has proceeded. In fact Asia, in particular China, India and Indonesia, has experienced the
world’s most pronounced economic recovery, and has driven a significant amount of broader global growth.31 However, the
financial crisis
amplified the stresses on a number of other regional states – including Cambodia, Thailand, Malaysia and Timor-Leste, which all experienced a rise in
the numbers of people in poverty32 – and increased the possibility of instability within those states. Southeast Asia also faces
an ongoing threat from Islamic terrorist groups with links to Al-Qaeda. The threat from Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) has diminished, due in large
measure to regional law enforcement cooperation and Indonesia’s policing and deradicalization efforts. JI retains some capability, however, as the hotel bombings
in Jakarta last July demonstrated, and the recent discovery of an Acehbased terrorist training camp – seemingly a new grouping which includes disaffected former
members of JI and other groups – indicates the durability of the terrorist threat.33 The militant group Abu Sayaff also remains active in southern Philippines, and
the Philippine military has launched further operations against it. Transnational
crime, including drug production and
trafficking, sex trafficking, money laundering and identity fraud, is also a serious problem in the
region, particularly emanating from states with weak security infrastructure and control over their territory. Laos, for example, has porous borders with its five
neighbors, and over recent years, there has been a significant increase in opium poppy cultivation and opium production and trafficking. Cambodia is susceptible to
money laundering as well as drug trafficking. Large-scale quantities of heroin and metamphetamines are produced in territory controlled by the Wa ethnic group
within Myanmar, and then trafficked throughout the region and beyond. Piracy
had long plagued the Malacca Straits, one of the
world’s most heavily used and strategic waterways, through which the vast majority of sea-borne
energy passes from the Middle East to the Asia Pacific. The number of attacks has decreased markedly over the last few years,
however, as a result of a concerted regional effort that will be discussed later in this paper. Finally, human proximity to birds and livestock in Asia make it the
world’s greatest reservoir of viruses transmissible to humans. As SARS and the Avian flu virus showed, Asia
is a likely source of future
pandemics which have the potential to overwhelm the health systems of fragile states . All of these
transnational threats have significant implications for regional security and could exacerbate the
region’s ongoing conflicts. Natural disasters occurring in Mindanao, Southern Thailand, and Bougainville, for instance, can
contribute to instability and worsen the plight of those affected by conflict. Recent flooding in Mindanao has displaced thousands of people already
displaced by the conflict there, increasing upheaval and the risk of disease.34 Climate change is now expected to have major geostrategic implications, such as the
destabilization of state governments, the fuelling of terrorism, and the mass movement of refugees and internally displaced persons.35 The US Department of
Defense is factoring climate change into US national security strategy.36 US defense planners are concerned that the humanitarian and relief operations required
after climate change-associated events will pose a significant burden on the US military, including its transportation and support assets, and consequently affect its
combat readiness posture.37 Transnational threats are also likely to be among the drivers of future instability and possibly internal conflict. A
major shock
to a fragile state’s system, for example from a severe pandemic or water shortage, could significantly weaken governments
and their institutions, and overwhelm a fragile state’s already-reduced capacity to function. Growing food,
water and energy scarcity could likewise cause an internal crisis if sub-state groups come into competition over access.
And threats such as water and energy scarcity have the potential to inflame interstate tensions . The continuing drive for energy
security, for instance, is intensifying competition between India and China within Myanmar, and could cause conflict between states contesting energy-rich territory
such as the South China Sea. The above analysis suggests that, while the main challenge in the Asia Pacific in the near to medium term is likely to remain low-level
internal conflicts, there is also a risk of rising inter-state tensions and even inter-state conflicts. The region’s many transnational challenges
could also generate or exacerbate instability. But these transnational challenges – for example, piracy, resource scarcity and climate change – are also opening up
new opportunities for functional cooperation between both Asia Pacific and outside actors.
South Asia tension causes nuclear war - low-intensity conflict, terrorism, cross-border
spillover
Khan 09 – Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs (ACDA), Strategic Plans Division, Joint Services Headquarters, Rawalpindi, Pakistan, fellow at Wilson
Center (Feroz Hassan, Reducing the Risk of Nuclear War in South Asia, December 2009, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/DigitalLibrary/Publications/Detail/?ots591=cab359a3-9328-19cc-a1d2-8023e646b22c&lng=en&id=112786)//A-Berg
The new international environment has altered the concept of national security. Threats
to international peace and security now
emanate not from strategic confrontation between the major powers, but from regional conflicts and tensions and the spread
of violent extremism by nonstate actors, threatening nation-states from within and transcending state
boundaries and international security. In recent years, the levels of security enjoyed by various states have become increasingly
asymmetric—some enjoy absolute security, others none at all. This environment of security imbalance has forced weaker
states to adopt a repertoire of strategies for survival and national security that includes alliances and
strategic partnerships, supporting low-intensity conflicts, and engaging in limited wars and nuclear
deterrence . South Asia has witnessed increased regional tensions , a rise in r eligious extremism , a
growing arms race, crisis stand-offs, and even armed conflict in recent years. Nuclear tests did not
bring an era of genuine stability between India and Pakistan, though military crises in the region did not escalate into full-fledged wars, underscoring
the need for greater imagination to rein in the risks due to the fragility of relations between two nuclear neighbors in an increasingly complex set of
circumstances. Pakistan’s primary and immediate threat now is from within. Its western borderlands are rapidly converting into a battleground
where ungoverned tribal space in proximity to the porous and disputed border is degenerating into insurgency both to
its east into Pakistan as well as to its west into Afghanistan. The al Qaeda threat has now metastasized into a spreading
insurgency in the tribal borderlands, which is taking a heavy toll on both Pakistan and Western forces in Afghanistan. The newly elected government in Pakistan has
hit the ground running; but still mired in domestic politics, it has been unable to focus on the al Qaeda and Taliban threat that is rapidly expanding its influence and
targeting strategy. The
most tragic aspect of this conundrum is the success of al Qaeda in creating cracks of
misunderstanding between Pakistan and the Western allies, while exacerbating tensions and mistrust
between Pakistan’s traditional adversaries, India and Afghanistan.1 For example, Pakistan’s security nightmare which
perceives India-Afghanistan collusion in squeezing Pakistan is exacerbated, while the Indian and Afghan security establishments perceive Pakistani Intelligence
malfeasance as perpetuating the Afghan imbroglio. Worse, the outcome of this confusion and blame generates real advantage for al Qaeda and the Taliban. Any
terrorist act that pits Kabul, New Delhi, and Islamabad against each other and intensifies existing tensions and crises also throws Washington off balance, allowing al
Qaeda and its sympathizers the time and space to recoup, reorganize, and reequip, and continue to survive. The only silver lining in this unhealthy regional security
picture is the slowly improving relationship between India and Pakistan, which has developed over the past 4 years. Though
relations are tense and
still fragile , there is a glimmer of hope in this overall crisis-ridden region. The dialogue process between India and Pakistan has been somewhat resilient in
the face of significant setbacks and changing domestic, political, and international landscapes within each. It is very improbable that a nuclear war between Pakistan
and India would spontaneously occur. The history of the region and strategic nuclear weapons theories suggest that a
nuclear exchange between
India and Pakistan would result from an uninhibited escalation of a conventional war vice a spontaneous unleashing of
nuclear arsenals. However, this region seems to be the one place in the world most likely to suffer nuclear
warfare due to the seemingly undiminished national, religious, and ethnic animosities
between these two
lack of transparency in nuclear programs leaves room to doubt the security
surrounding each country’s nuclear arsenal and the safeguards preventing accidental launches. Therefore,
discussions aimed at mitigating a catastrophic nuclear war in South Asia should focus mostly on the unilateral and bilateral anti-escalation
measures Pakistan and India can take regarding existing issues. Additionally, each country’s perception of its security is interwoven with the
political, diplomatic, and strategic movements of the external powers that wield significant influence
in the region. Coherent and consistent behavior that discourages conventional and nuclear escalation, although sometimes imperceptibly, is
needed from the United States, China, and Russia. Without this, both Pakistan and India are unlikely to feel confident enough to
reduce the aggressive posturing of their conventional forces over existing cross-border issues, leaving
the escalation from conventional warfare to nuclear warfare a very real possibility.
countries. Furthermore,
1nc econ/bmd
Canadian engagement key to export diversification and that’s critical to their economy
Randall, 10 professor of history at the University of Calgary, Director of the Latin American Research Centre at the University of Calgary, Fellow with the
Canadian International Council working on Canadian relations with the Caribbean and Latin America, elected member of the Royal Society of Canada, fellow with
the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, PhD from the University of Toronto (Stephen J. Randall, August 2010, “Canada, the Caribbean and Latin America:
Trade, Investment and Political Challenges,” Foreign Policy for Canada’s Tomorrow No. 9, Canadian International Council, http://www.opencanada.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/05/Canada-the-Caribbean-and-Latin-America_-Trade-Investment-and-Political-Challenges-Stephen-J.-Randall.pdf)//KP
Recommendations • The paper asserts that the
expansion of Canadian trade with the countries of the Americas
contributes to the diversification of Canadian trade, and that trade is essential to the health of the
Canadian economy, its workers, and social institutions. The Canadian government should continue to
seek ways to expand that trade in a politically and socially responsible manner. • The Canadian
government needs to continue to be proactive in seeking to expand and enhance economic relations
with the Canada’s main economic partners in the Caribbean and Latin America (Brazil, Mexico, Peru, Chile, and
Venezuela) and to devote less time, energy, and resources to cultivating the less economically significant countries in the region. • In its pursuit of trade agreements
with the countries of the Americas, the Canadian government should continue to include provisions on human rights, labour, and environmental standards. These
provisions should exceed international standards where possible and be consistent with Canadian values. • The
Canadian government should
not shy away from negotiating with countries that have experienced civil strife if, in the assessment of Canadian
policy-makers, engagement might help alleviate conflict. • With regard to foreign direct investment, especially in the natural resource extraction sector, the
Canadian government should continue to promote a high standard of corporate social responsibility. Where feasible, the government needs to go beyond the
application of purely voluntary principles by the private sector, and set high standards for accountability and mechanisms to ensure compliance. Nonetheless, the
primary responsibility to maintain good governance in the operation of foreign companies must reside with host countries. The
Canadian
government should continue to work closely with the governments of host countries to strengthen
their capacity to govern their own natural resources sector.
Low economy leads to budget cuts – military acquisition programs next to cut
CBC News, 12 (Canadian News, “National defence cuts could tally $2.5B”, Oct 1, 2012, The Canadian Press,
https://mail.google.com/mail/?tab=mm#inbox)//GP
Defence Minister Peter MacKay announces the new Canadian Forces Leopard 2A4 tank at CFB Gagetown in Oromocto, N.B., on Thursday, September 13. ¶ An
independent analysis has concluded the waves of federal budget cuts washing over National Defence
will run deeper and likely be more painful than advertised by the Harper government.¶ While it won't
exactly be a return to the "decade of darkness" the Conservatives attribute to the Liberal years, the
reductions will be significant and are expected to cut into the military's "readiness" — or ability to
respond quickly to a crisis.¶ The days of soldiers rationing their training ammunition, fuel and money used to make equipment operationally ready
may be about to return, the report warned.¶ The research paper, written for the Centre for Security and Defence
Studies at Carleton University, estimates the cumulative effect of the Harper government's strategic
review and the overlapping deficit reduction action plan will carve up to $2.5 billion out of the nearly
$21 billion National Defence budget by 2014-15.¶ The 27-page report, penned by defence expert Dave Perry, is believed to be the first
comprehensive snapshot on the post-war military of the impact of the federal government's dual-tracked deficit reduction plan and spending freezes.¶ " With
the economy once again the government's top priority, the Canadian Forces will need to adjust to a
new fiscal climate, one which will reduce its budget by at least 11 per cent over the next three years,"
said the research report, a copy of which was obtained by The Canadian Press.¶ "At the same time, the military's
ability to make budgetary adjustments has been tightly constrained by the decision to retain its front-line military capabilities. As a result, the Operations and
Maintenance budget will bear the brunt of these budget cuts."¶ Expeditionary role may be reduced¶ The Harper government has repeatedly said it wants Canada
playing a leading role internationally alongside allies, but the report warns, the way the cuts are shaking out, the military will be strained almost as badly as in the
1990s.¶ "As a result, it will be very difficult for the military to play the same expeditionary role that it has in recent years," said the report. "While the pursuit of
influence may not be over, with less funding available for operational readiness, the prospects of making influential military contributions abroad will be greatly
reduced."¶ The government's mantra of being defenders of the military will be sorely tested over the next few years.¶ "They're cutting it quite hard, but no harder
than any other government would in the same position," said Perry, who is also a researcher for the Conference of Defence Associations. "DND is a huge chunk of
discretionary spending and if you want to cutback on overall federal outlays, no matter how much you like to support the military, you've got to cut defence."¶ But
a spokesman for Defence Minister Peter MacKay says the government has increased spending on the military by $1 billion per year since coming to office, including
a guarantee of annual operating increases.¶ "Following the combat mission in Afghanistan, and in conjunction with all government departments, the Department of
National Defence and the Canadian Forces need to ensure taxpayers are getting value for their tax dollars and that, in turn, makes the Canadian Forces more
efficient and, ultimately, more effective," said Jay Paxton.¶ Little room to manoeuvre¶ But Perry argues that unlike past budget cutting exercises, defence has less
room to manoeuvre because of a change in accounting policy and the reluctance to give up specific capabilities, such as submarines or transports.¶ When they've
wanted to reduce money to the military past governments have simply cancelled equipment purchases outright. But the system of accrual accounting, where
purchases are amortized over their lifetime, means such cuts will not produce large, immediate savings.¶ The Harper government's strategic review mandates a
direct defence budget cut of $1 billion by 2014-15, but at the same time it overlaps with a planned 7.4 per cent, or $1.12 billion, reduction under the Deficit
Reduction Action Plan.¶ In 2008, the Conservatives made political hay out of the promise to give the military stable and predictable funding, with planned operating
budget increases over 20 years.¶ Perry says the $344 million extra the department gets as a result of the Canada First Defence Strategy is being more than chewed
up by increased costs associated with the government's 2010 freeze on departmental spending, which came at the same time as negotiated wage hikes.¶ "Thus, the
wage measure has effectively negated any increase DND would have otherwise received under the CFDS spending plan," he wrote.¶ The
only place left
to cut would be in what's known as national procurement funding, which is money used to make
equipment operationally ready.¶ "Accounting for roughly 40 per cent of readiness spending,
National Procurement encompasses the acquisition of spare parts, contracts for maintenance, repair
and overhaul, technical support, and the ammunition used in training," said the report.¶ It suggests the recent
merging of commands will not save the government very much and a suggestion in the Leslie report to axe outside contractors will hurt the air force, which relies
extensively on them to keep aircraft maintained.
That kills BMD
McDonough, 6/06/13 - is a SSHRC post-doctoral fellow in the Department of Political Science ¶ at the University of British Columbia and a research
fellow at Dalhousie University’s Centre for ¶ Foreign Policy Studies. He is a recipient of the SSHRC Canadian Graduate Scholarship (2006–¶ 9), the SDF Dr Ronald
Baker Doctoral Scholarship (2009–10), and Killam Doctoral ¶ Scholarships (2008–11). He has published widely on Canadian defence and international ¶ security, in
International Journal, Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, RUSI Journal, Strategic ¶ Survey, Adelphi Papers, On Track, Orbis, Journal of Military and Strategic Studies,
Canadian ¶ Naval Review, Strategic Datalink, Third World Quarterly, Vanguard, Calgary Paper in ¶ Military and Strategic Studies (forthcoming), and Comparative
Strategy (forthcoming). He is ¶ the editor of Canada’s National Security in the Post-9/11 World: Strategy, Interests, and ¶ Threats (David S. McDonough, 6/06, “Back
to the Future: Debating Missile Defence in Canada… Again”, CDFAI,
http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Debating%20Missile%20Defence%20in%20Canada%20Again.pdf)//GP
The last point brings up another consideration, one that is closely tied to the degree of Canada’s ¶ input, confidence over its protection, and indeed nature of its
participation – and that
is the ¶ question of cost. Some commentators seem to assume that Canada’s
participation would not ¶ entail much in the way of substantial costs, without specifying what benefit the United States ¶
would gain or why it would then choose to be open to Canadian input. ¶ More astute observers have pointed to an asymmetrical
or “in-kind” contribution by Canada. Yet ¶ it is important to recognize that this might not come
cheaply. One cannot assume that Canada ¶ could simply incorporate its existing “satellite and landbased tracking facilities into Ballistic ¶ Missile Defence.”¶ 17 Canada has no land-based tracking facilities
to speak of, and its recently ¶ launched military satellite (Project Sapphire) is already a component of the US
Space ¶ Surveillance Network that feeds information to both NORAD and the GMD system, sharply ¶ reducing its capacity to
leverage this asset to play a role in missile defence. At most, by ¶ contributing to NORAD’s early warning and tracking functions,
Project Sapphire could ¶ potentially help safeguard the command’s aerospace role – and even this outcome is not ¶ guaranteed.18¶ Perhaps for this
reason, there are reports that Canada is now looking at revising earlier plans for ¶ a ground-based xband radar at Goose Bay, Newfoundland. Such a facility would provide important tracking and cueing capabilities and additional radar
coverage against an Iranian¶ ballistic missile, especially if the United States moves ahead with constructing a third ¶ interceptor site. Defence officials
seem confident that Canada would only need to supply ¶ territory and services for a total cost of $500
million, with the remainder (including the radar ¶ itself) to be supplied by the United States.19¶
Nevertheless, such an assumption also seems premature, at least if Ottawa hopes to translate ¶ such a
contribution into input in the interception planning process itself. Indeed, with the onset ¶ of
sequestration, the United States is expected to make some very sizable defence cuts over the ¶ next
ten years – totaling nearly $1 trillion, if one includes the initial spending caps brought in by ¶ the
Budget Control Act. Even Obama’s recent decision to deploy an additional 14 GBIs is ¶ expected to cost
an additional $1 billion, which was only partially offset by delaying (and ¶ potentially cancelling) the development of a more advanced Standard
Missile (SM-3 Block IIB) ¶ for its Aegis ships. The cost of a third interceptor site on the East coast would be even
steeper.¶ Canada could then find itself confronted with requests for additional contributions that
would ¶ be difficult to ignore, whether taking a greater share of the cost of a radar site on Canadian ¶
territory or contributing funds for a third GBI site. Even America’s recent overture for Canada’s ¶
participation, if reports prove accurate, could arise from Washington’s growing interest to offset ¶
some of the cost burden of this system. Canada needs a better sense of what participation entails ¶ and what costs might result from such a
decision. Proponents like Paul Chapin have criticized¶ the previous Liberal government for rejecting the draft MOU that could provide “the necessary ¶ flow of
information.”20 Yet there is also reason for caution. Yes, Canada would finally receive ¶ greater information on missile defence. But it would come at the price of
having less room to ¶ refuse American preferences, even
if it discovers that the costs are higher than expected.
BMD key to prevent north korean nuclear attack
Robertson, 4/02/13 - A former diplomat, Colin Robertson is vice president of the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute and a senior strategic
advisor to McKenna, Long and Aldridge LLP. (COLIN ROBERTSON, Apr. 03 2013, North Korea’s threats show that Canada needs to be part of U.S. missile defence
pact” http://www.theglobeandmail.com/commentary/north-koreas-threats-show-that-canada-needs-to-be-part-of-us-missile-defence-pact/article10713612/)//GP
Kim Jong-Un is the third in his family to lead the Hermit Kingdom, and this month has all but declared
war – including threats to target North America. Normally, sabre rattling by tinpot dictators can be managed
or contained. But not when the sabres are ballistic missiles.¶ “Nuclear threats are not a game,” United
Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon warned on Tuesday: “Aggressive rhetoric and military posturing
only result in counter-actions, and fuel fear and instability.Ӧ Coupled with the improvements that
Iran is making to its own ballistic missile capacity, the threat to North America is now clear and
present. The United States has moved aircraft and warships to the area and announced that it will increase its ground-based interceptors in California and
Alaska.¶ Canada has a conflicted history when it comes to nuclear weapons and domestic defence from
them. Though we were present at the creation – nuclear-energy research during the Second World War in Canada was vital – we eschewed the
development of nuclear arms for ourselves. Instead, we opted to develop nuclear power for peaceful purposes through the CANDU
reactor. (We were later deceived by the Indians, who developed their own nuclear weaponry using plutonium derived from a research reactor provided by
Canada.)¶ Placement of nuclear warheads on Canadian soil, as part of our alliance commitment, tormented John Diefenbaker and the resultingBOMARC
controversy contributed to his government’s undoing. Lester B. Pearson, who succeeded Mr. Diefenbaker as prime minister, faced similar dissent but concluded
that our obligations to NORAD and NATO required participation. Mr. Pearson, who had won the Nobel Peace Prize over the Suez crisis, was derisively labelled the
‘defrocked prince of peace’ by a young Pierre Trudeau.¶ Two decades later, prime minister Trudeau faced similar divisions in his own cabinet over testing of cruise
missiles on Canadian soil. Mr. Trudeau allowed the testing, arguing that “it is hardly fair to rely on the Americans to protect the West, but to refuse to lend them a
hand when the going gets rough.”¶ In good company (with Australia, France et al), prime minister Brian Mulroney rejected participation in the U.S. “Star Wars”
missile-defence program because Canada “would not be able to call the shots.”¶ When
Ballistic Missile Defence was developed
under George W. Bush, prime minister Paul Martin opted out, to the confusion of his new defence
chief and ambassador to the United States, both of whom thought that he was going to sign on.¶ A
divided Liberal caucus, especially the opposition from Quebec, had helped change Mr. Martin’s mind.¶
Mr. Bush was advised that newly-elected Prime Minister Stephen Harper would not welcome a renewed request. Mr. Bush found this puzzling, reportedly asking
what would happen if a North Korean missile, aimed at Los Angeles or Seattle, wound up heading towards Vancouver or Calgary.¶ The rest of the alliance, as well as
Australia, Japan and South Korea, have signed onto missile defence. The Israelis’ Iron Dome recently demonstrated the defensive worth of anti-missile technology.¶
Critics see Ballistic Missile Defence as a latter-day Maginot Line – costly, unreliable, and provocative. If you want to detonate a nuclear bomb in the United States
you would not send it by missile. NORAD, they argue, provides sufficient defence. But continental defence has been integral to Canadian national security since
MacKenzie King and Franklin Rooseveltparleyed at Kingston in 1938. We were architects of NATO because ofour belief in collective security.¶ The
U.S.
defence umbrella has guaranteed the peace since 1945, and has coincided with the greatest growth in
trade in world history. Canada has been a principal beneficiary, with marginal premiums. Some Canadians,
wrote Mr. Trudeau during the cruise missile debate, “are eager to take refuge under the U.S. umbrella, but don’t want to help hold it.”¶ Membership in
the alliance entails obligations. But it also brings great benefits that serve our national interests. ¶
Incorporating our satellite and land-based tracking facilities into Ballistic Missile Defence could make
a difference in shielding Canadians should the missiles be launched. A Senate report in 2006
concluded that an effective BMD “could save hundreds of thousands of Canadian lives.”¶ Protecting Canadians
(and Americans) was the logic of the original DEW line and NORAD, our bi-national aerospace defence agreement that has served us since 1958 and now includes
aspects of maritime defence.¶ Last summer, ministers John Baird and Peter McKay prepared a memorandum for Mr. Harper presenting Ballistic Missile Defence
options. The
Prime Minister decided the timing was not right. Circumstances have changed. BMD should
now be incorporated into our ‘Canada First’ defence strategy.
Extinction
Shultz et al, 2007 - A conference organized by Mr. Shultz and Sidney D. Drell was held at Hoover to reconsider the vision that Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev
brought to Reykjavik. In addition to Messrs. Shultz and Drell, the following participants also endorse the view in this statement: Martin Anderson, Steve Andreasen,
Michael Armacost, William Crowe, James Goodby, Thomas Graham Jr., Thomas Henriksen, David Holloway, Max Kampelman, Jack Matlock, John McLaughlin, Don
Oberdorfer, Rozanne Ridgway, Henry Rowen, Roald Sagdeev and Abraham Sofaer. (George Shultz, January 4 2007, "A World Free of Nuclear Weapons," Wall Street
Journal By George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn0, The Wall Street Journal January 4, 2007;
http://fcnl.org/issues/nuclear/world_free_of_nuclear_weapons/)//GP
Nuclear weapons today present tremendous dangers, but also an historic opportunity. U.S. leadership will be required to take the world to the next stage -- to a
solid consensus for reversing reliance on nuclear weapons globally as a vital contribution to preventing their proliferation into potentially dangerous hands, and
ultimately ending them as a threat to the world. Nuclear weapons were essential to maintaining international security during the Cold War because they were a
means of deterrence. The end of the Cold War made the doctrine of mutual Soviet-American deterrence obsolete. Deterrence continues to be a relevant
consideration for many states with regard to threats from other states. But reliance on nuclear weapons for this purpose is becoming increasingly hazardous and
decreasingly effective. North
Korea's recent nuclear test and Iran's refusal to stop its program to enrich
uranium -- potentially to weapons grade -- highlight the fact that the world is now on the precipice of
a new and dangerous nuclear era. Most alarmingly, the likelihood that non-state terrorists will get their hands on nuclear weaponry is
increasing. In today's war waged on world order by terrorists, nuclear weapons are the ultimate means of
mass devastation. And non-state terrorist groups with nuclear weapons are conceptually outside the bounds of a deterrent strategy and present difficult
new security challenges. Apart from the terrorist threat, unless urgent new actions are taken, the U.S. soon will be
compelled to enter a new nuclear era that will be more precarious, psychologically disorienting, and
economically even more costly than was Cold War deterrence. It is far from certain that we can successfully replicate the old
Soviet-American "mutually assured destruction" with an increasing number of potential nuclear enemies world-wide without dramatically increasing the risk that
nuclear weapons will be used. New nuclear states do not have the benefit of years of step-by-step safeguards put in effect during the Cold War to prevent nuclear
accidents, misjudgments or unauthorized launches. The
United States and the Soviet Union learned from mistakes that
were less than fatal. Both countries were diligent to ensure that no nuclear weapon was used during the Cold War by design or by accident. Will
new nuclear nations and the world be as fortunate in the next 50 years as we were during the Cold
War? * * * Leaders addressed this issue in earlier times. In his "Atoms for Peace" address to the United Nations in 1953, Dwight D. Eisenhower pledged
America's "determination to help solve the fearful atomic dilemma -- to devote its entire heart and mind to find the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of
man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life." John F. Kennedy, seeking to break the logjam on nuclear disarmament, said,
"The world
was not meant to be a prison in which man awaits his execution." Rajiv Gandhi, addressing the U.N.
General Assembly on June 9, 1988, appealed, " Nuclear war will not mean the death of a hundred million
people. Or even a thousand million. It will mean the extinction of four thousand million: the end of life
as we know it on our planet earth . We come to the United Nations to seek your support. We seek your support to put a stop to this madness."
Ronald Reagan called for the abolishment of "all nuclear weapons," which he considered to be "totally irrational, totally inhumane, good for nothing but killing,
possibly destructive of life on earth and civilization." Mikhail Gorbachev shared this vision, which had also been expressed by previous American presidents.
Although Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev failed at Reykjavik to achieve the goal of an agreement to get rid of all nuclear weapons, they did succeed in turning the arms
race on its head. They initiated steps leading to significant reductions in deployed long- and intermediate-range nuclear forces, including the elimination of an entire
class of threatening missiles. What will it take to rekindle the vision shared by Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev? Can a world-wide consensus be forged that defines a
series of practical steps leading to major reductions in the nuclear danger? There is an urgent need to address the challenge posed by these two questions. The
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) envisioned the end of all nuclear weapons. It provides (a) that states that did not possess nuclear weapons as of 1967 agree not to
obtain them, and (b) that states that do possess them agree to divest themselves of these weapons over time. Every president of both parties since Richard Nixon
has reaffirmed these treaty obligations, but non-nuclear weapon states have grown increasingly skeptical of the sincerity of the nuclear powers. Strong nonproliferation efforts are under way. The Cooperative Threat Reduction program, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, the Proliferation Security Initiative and the
Additional Protocols are innovative approaches that provide powerful new tools for detecting activities that violate the NPT and endanger world security. They
deserve full implementation.
The negotiations on proliferation of nuclear weapons by North Korea and Iran,
involving all the permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany and Japan, are crucially
important. They must be energetically pursued. But by themselves, none of these steps are adequate to the danger. Reagan and General Secretary
Gorbachev aspired to accomplish more at their meeting in Reykjavik 20 years ago -- the elimination of nuclear weapons altogether. Their vision shocked experts in
the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, but galvanized the hopes of people around the world. The leaders of the two countries with the largest arsenals of nuclear
weapons discussed the abolition of their most powerful weapons. * * * What should be done? Can the promise of the NPT and the possibilities envisioned at
Reykjavik be brought to fruition? We
believe that a major effort should be launched by the United States to
produce a positive answer through concrete stages. First and foremost is intensive work with leaders of the countries in possession of
nuclear weapons to turn the goal of a world without nuclear weapons into a joint enterprise. Such a joint enterprise, by involving changes in the disposition of the
states possessing nuclear weapons, would lend additional weight to efforts already under way
North Korea and Iran.
to avoid the emergence of a nuclear-armed
The program on which agreements should be sought would constitute a series of agreed and urgent steps that would lay the
groundwork for a world free of the nuclear threat. Steps would include: Changing the Cold War posture of deployed nuclear weapons to increase warning time and
thereby reduce the danger of an accidental or unauthorized use of a nuclear weapon. Continuing to reduce substantially the size of nuclear forces in all states that
possess them. Eliminating short-range nuclear weapons designed to be forward-deployed. Initiating a bipartisan process with the Senate, including understandings
to increase confidence and provide for periodic review, to achieve ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, taking advantage of recent technical advances,
and working to secure ratification by other key states. Providing the highest possible standards of security for all stocks of weapons, weapons-usable plutonium, and
highly enriched uranium everywhere in the world. Getting control of the uranium enrichment process, combined with the guarantee that uranium for nuclear
power reactors could be obtained at a reasonable price, first from the Nuclear Suppliers Group and then from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or
other controlled international reserves. It will also be necessary to deal with proliferation issues presented by spent fuel from reactors producing electricity. Halting
the production of fissile material for weapons globally; phasing out the use of highly enriched uranium in civil commerce and removing weapons-usable uranium
from research facilities around the world and rendering the materials safe. Redoubling our efforts to resolve regional confrontations and conflicts that give rise to
new nuclear powers. Achieving the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons will also require effective measures to impede or counter any nuclear-related conduct
that is potentially threatening to the security of any state or peoples. Reassertion of the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and practical measures toward
achieving that goal would be, and would be perceived as, a bold initiative consistent with America's moral heritage
. The effort could have a
profoundly positive impact on the security of future generations. Without the bold vision, the actions
will not be perceived as fair or urgent. Without the actions, the vision will not be perceived as realistic
or possible. We endorse setting the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and working energetically
on the actions required to achieve that goal, beginning with the measures outlined above.
1nc instability
Canada is critical to Latin American stability
Rochlin 12 professor of political science at the University of British Columbia-Okanagan (James Rochlin, 2012, “Introduction: Canada and the Americas:
There’s Still Much to Discover,” Canada Looks South: In Search of an American Policy, pages 21-23)//KP
What are the options for Canada? Although the New World now seems newer than ever, three rather traditional
themes have proven to
be quite resilient and deserve consideration as a possible centerpiece for a refashioned Canadian policy toward the Americas. First, despite the
profundity of transformations globally and regionally, democracy is not likely to go out of style.
Canada will win the support of Latin America’s majority population by working to enhance democratic structures and by
supporting their outcome regardless of its ideological implications. Unwavering support for the will of the majority is a primary
ingredient for the cultivation of regional political respect that will underpin Canada’s economic and
security interest in Latin America. Second, tolerance and respect for varied democratic outcomes will fortify
Canada’s traditional penchant for conflict resolution. Given the intensified ideological polarization in
Latin America, the rising tenor of anti-Americanism, and a growing regional potential for class warfare against
the backdrop of global economic crisis, the promotion of conflict resolution is more important than ever.
Given Canada’s past roles in helping the resolve disputes involving Cuba and Central America, Ottawa has a strong
foundation upon which to draw. To assume a position as a leading protagonist of serious conflict
resolution, Canada will need to formulate an even-handed policy that is respected by regional actors as fair and
independent. That kind of respect cannot be achieved quickly. It takes longer to build lasting friendships than to make enemies. There is no better
opportunity or role for Canada in the Americas than to evolve as the leading proponent of regional
conflict resolution. Third, support for democratic structures and for resolving escalating regional conflict
will provide a better context for Canadian economic interests in Latin America. The promotion of corporate social responsibility
should receive priority treatment in a reformulated Canadian policy to the region. This is especially relevant for Canada’s extractive sector, which has strong
interests in Latin America. Critics have observed ‘the Canadian government’s flat-out refusal to impose any kind of human rights standards on Canadian companies’
actions outside Canada,’ despite such recommendations from the parliamentary Standing Committee for Foreign Affairs and from other groups. When Canadian
companies are perceived to be involved in human rights abuses, as was the case in late 2009 when a Mexican activist who had protested against Canada’s Blackfire
gold mine in Chiapas was murdered, the reputation of the country’s mining sector is tarnished and may inhibit further economic prospects. In a globalized world,
and in a region such as Latin America that has become more suspicious of the dark side of transnational corporations, an enhanced platform of corporate
responsibility will serve well Canada’s economic, political, and security interests in Latin America. Simply put, Canada
is still in the process of
discovering the Americas. Incremental but generally steady progress has been made, especially since the
formulation of the Trudeau government’s Third Option. While the original manifestation of that policy
never reached its lofty objective, perhaps Ottawa should dust it off and have another look. This is
especially the case in a post-hegemonic world where rising powers such as China require more
attention and where the politics of Latin America have been redefined in a democratic but revolutionary way
to shed the exploitative and authoritarian yoke that was so dominant during the Cold War.
That causes nuclear war and a laundry list of other impacts
Manwaring, 4 [Max. Latin America Expert @ CSIS, PhD in Poli Sci from UChicago. Shadows of the Past and Images of the Future 2004, Pg 36-8]
State failure is an evolutionary process, not an outcome. This state of affairs is often brought on by poor,
irresponsible, and insensitive governance, and leads to at least one other very fundamental reason why states fail. That is, state failure can
be a process that is exacerbated by nonstate (insurgent) groups that, for whatever reason, want to take down or exercise illicit control over a given government. In
Latin America, Colombia is, Peru has been, and both continue to be good examples of this. The narco-insurgent/terrorist [is a]
threat to the authority of the central governments. Through murder, kidnapping, corruption, intimidation, destruction of
infrastructure, and other means of coercion and persuasion, these violent, internal, nonstate actors compromise the exercise of state authority. The
government and its institutions become progressively less and less capable of performing the tasks of
governance, including exercising their fundamental personal security functions to protect citizens. As a result , the narco-insurgents
become increasingly wealthy and powerful, and affected countries deteriorate further and further toward failed state status. Peru’s
Sendero Luminoso calls violent and destructive activities that facilitate the processes of state failure armed propaganda. Drug cartels operating in that country and
throughout the Andean Ridge of South America and elsewhere call these activities business incentives. Thus, in
addition to helping to provide
wider latitude to further their specific objectives, Sendero’s and other violent nonstate actors’ armed
propaganda and business incentives are aimed at lessening a regime’s credibility and capability in terms of its
ability and willingness to govern and develop its national territory and society. This debilitating and destabilizing activity generates
the most dangerous long-term security challenge facing the global community today. More specifically, failing
or failed states in Latin America, Africa, the Middle-East, and Asia are breeding grounds for instability,
insurgency, and terrorism. A breakdown in institutional governance can breed or exacerbate
humanitarian disasters and major refugee flows. Such states can host networks of all kinds, including
criminal business enterprises and/or some form of ideological, religious, or populist crusade. They also
spawn a variety of pernicious and lethal activities and outcomes, including torture and murder;
poverty, starvation, and disease; the recruitment and use of child soldiers; trafficking in women and human organs for
transplants; trafficking and proliferation of conventional weapons systems and weapons of mass
destruction; genocide, ethnic cleansing, warlordism; and criminal anarchy and insurgency. At the same time, these
networks and activities normally are unconfined and spill over into regional syndromes of destabilization and
failing and failed states simply do not go away . Ample evidence demonstrates that failing and failed states
become dysfunctional states, rogue states, criminal states, narco-states, or new people’s democracies.
Moreover, failing and failed states tend not to (1) buy U.S. and other exporting nations’ products, (2) be interested in
developing democratic and free market institutions and human rights, or (3) cooperate on shared problems such
as illegal drugs, illicit arms flows, debilitating refugee flows, and potentially dangerous environmental problems. In short, the longer they persist,
conflict. Additionally,
the more they and their associated problems endanger global security, peace, and prosperity .
answer to perms
at: perm
Engagement is zero sum---the plan forces Canada out.
Jeffs, ’12 - President of the Canadian International Council a non-partisan, membership-based research council focused on international affairs, Ph.D. in
International Political Economy (IPE) from the University of Toronto, (Jennifer, Latin America: Land of Opportunity, March 22, 2012,
http://opencanada.org/features/blogs/dispatch/latin-america-land-of-opportunity/)//A-Berg
Chris Sabatini’s piece in the current edition of Foreign Affairs points out that the
U.S. narrative on Latin America seems stuck in a 1980s
U.S. policymaker attitudes toward the region indicates that
U.S. thinking is stuck in a completely different geopolitical reality than the one that we live in today .
time capsule. His assertion that Cold War thinking still dominates
Social movements, electoral trends, and democratic development give little insight into the important relations between states in the region, and between the
newly emerged states both within the region and outside it. The rise of Brazil as a global power is promoting Colombia’s regional influence. The Chinese appetite for
natural resources that are found in abundance in the hemisphere, and their gifts of bridges and soccer stadiums to several Latin American countries, are trends that
U.S. students and policymakers should be watching and pondering, as should Canadians. Given
the substantial investment that
Canadian mining companies – and at least one major Canadian bank – have made in the region, on top of the
Canadian government’s recent focus on the hemisphere via its “Americas Strategy,” the short-sightedness of U.S. policymakers that
Sabatini laments is, in fact, an opportunity for Canada . As Sabatini points out, while the U.S. lacks sufficient interest in,
and understanding of, the rapidly changing geopolitical dynamics of Latin
America, Canada can fill that void by taking seriously
the actions of Latin America’s increasingly potent (and competitive) regional and global players. Informed
Canadian engagement with countries in the region will be mutually beneficial, and could also influence U.S. policymakers, encouraging them to think about Latin
America in terms of 2012 geopolitical realities.
Empirically the perm crushes Canadian soft power-only bilateral relationships enable
Canadian leadership
Muggah 4/17/13 research director of the Igarapé Institute, a principal of the SecDev Group, and a professor of international relations at the Instituto de
Relações Internacionais, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro (Robert Muggah, 17 April 2013, “Robert Muggah: Canada needs a real Americas
Strategy,” Igarapé Institute, http://pt.igarape.org.br/robert-muggah-canada-needs-a-real-americas-strategy/)//KP
For at least the past five years, Canada has quietly waged a half-hearted war on organized crime and drug
cartels. Even before Canada’s prolonged engagement in Afghanistan started winding down, politicians and strategists were refocusing on real and perceived
threats south of the border in Latin America and the Caribbean. After decades of non-engagement, Canada launched an
Americas Strategy in 2007, announcing that it would step up its diplomatic, defence and development
engagement in some of the most insecure countries on the planet. This was never going to be easy: six of the top
10 most violent countries in the world are in the Western Hemisphere and for some, the situation is worsening. Although this was characterized as a war of choice,
Canada was effectively drafted by the United States. The United States has long demanded that Canadians take a tougher stand
against illegal drugs trafficking, gun smuggling and undocumented migrants. This is hardly surprising. The United States is the principle
backer of massive anti-crime programs across the Western Hemisphere and has spent at least $14 billion since the late
1990s on the so-called Mérida Initiative in Mexico, the Central American Security Initiative, the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, Plan Colombia and a host of
counter-narcotics programs. The country is also one of the biggest suppliers of weapons and deportees to Latin America and the Caribbean. By way of comparison,
Canada’s spending on security and justice promotion across the Americas is in the tens of millions. Canada
exhibits a modest capacity to
project either hard or soft power in the Americas. It has traditionally pursued many of its security and
development priorities through multilateral organs such as the Organization of American States and the
Inter-American Development Bank. Canada is also an active participant in the Conferences of the Defense Ministers of the Americas, having hosted a regional
security summit a few years ago. During the 1980s, Canadian troops were deployed across Central America and the Caribbean to support United Nations peace
support operations. Yet Canada’s Conservative government has taken a hard unilateral turn in its posture toward the region. With the appointment of a minister of
state for the Americas in 2008, the government signaled a concerted interest in promoting law, order and democratic governance in its backyard through a “wholeof-government” approach. Of course, Canada had other pragmatic reasons besides common security and democracy priorities to launch an Americas Strategy. The
government recognizes that solidarity on the defence front might also open new business opportunities among the region’s 33 countries and 590 million residents.
Latin America’s impressive economic growth rates are enticing to Canada’s ordinarily cautious private sector. Just as successive Liberal governments made Africa a
priority in the 1990s, the Harper government is today looking to the South and the Pacific, to what Jean Daudelin calls the “Liberal Americas.” The prime minister
toured Latin America last year while Canada’s foreign minister attended the so-called Pacific Alliance whose members include Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico,
Peru and others. Yet Canada’s heavily publicized commitment to Latin America and the Caribbean also look decidedly securitized. Prime Minister Stephen Harper
has repeatedly stressed the government’s commitment to using force to achieve its objectives. And while Canadian military, intelligence, policing and justice
assistance to a scattering of countries in the region pales in comparison to the billions spent each year by the United States and the European Union, the
government is nevertheless seeking to re-align its support toward “harder” and “inter-operable” measures. On the ground, however, there are also concerns that
the Americas Strategy lacks direction and that interventions are piecemeal and disconnected. One Canadian diplomat describes it dryly as an “unfunded priority.”
Where Canada scores higher marks is in relation to strategic advocacy. On top of its diplomatic
presence in the United States and Mexico, Canada currently fields 27 embassies and high commissions
across Latin America and the Caribbean. Canada’s foreign affairs and defence departments are also
supporting small-scale forward operating stations to support interdiction efforts and modest training
packages, though offices in Lima and Panama were recently shuttered without explanation. Canada’s erstwhile aid agency also
secured annual commitments of hundreds of millions a year in development assistance since the strategy was launched. Some critics question
whether these investments are relevant given the massive footprint of the United States and the growing economic clout of countries across the region, particularly
Brazil and Mexico, but also those outside such as China and Russia. It is worth asking whether the Canadian government or its civil society has sufficiently thought
through its goals in the Americas. In
spite of efforts to deepen bilateral ties in Central and South America, Canada’s
investments in advancing the Americas Strategy are minuscule. If it is going to move beyond rhetoric,
Canada could set-up an adequately financed Americas Fund to demonstrate the seriousness of its
commitment to advancing public security, economic progress and democratic governance. Canada will
also need to set up a robust system to monitor and measure the outcomes of its investments, a legitimate
concern in an era of austerity. What is more, at a time when many donors are rebalancing their aid portfolios to promote violence prevention and harm reduction,
it appears that Canada’s law and order approach may be out of touch. The Americas Strategy has to be about more than
simply raising Canada’s visibility in the neighbourhood. As Canada reconfigures its foreign affairs and aid agencies in 2013, it would do well to initiate an open
debate on the intended objectives and outcomes of the Americas Strategy. Instead
of focusing inwardly on government
institutions alone, Canadians of Latin American and Caribbean descent could be enlisted into public
diplomacy efforts. What is more, Canada could usefully refocus its investments in a selection of strategic
partners and promote triangular and south-south partnerships in thematic and geographic areas
where Canada has demonstrated value-added. While Canada will at best muddle along in Central America and Haiti, deeper
involvement with regional leaders such as Brazil, Mexico, Costa Rica and Jamaica could reap
diplomatic and development dividends. This is not to say that Canada should not invest in citizen security in its near abroad. Indeed, Canada
could actually improve the situation by promoting the politics of peace over a war on drugs. This is especially so, given that Latin America and the Caribbean are at
the epicentre of a truly progressive debate on drug policy. Countries such as Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico and Uruguay are resisting the logic of repression and
changing tack. For their part, Canadians could also deliberately shift the debate from a narrow focus on the supply of drugs abroad to curbing demand at home.
Canada is among the world’s top consumers of a vast range of drugs fuelling violence in Latin America and the Caribbean, and many citizens are harmed by
irresponsible use. Canada is also a significant producer in its own right, a fact an updated Americas Strategy would do well to consider.
Foreign policy overlap with the U.S. dooms Canadian soft power
Klein, 4 author of “No Logo” and “Fences and Windows” (Naomi Klein, 16 June 2004, “Canada Should Keep its Distance from U.S. Foreign Policy,” Common
Dreams, http://www.commondreams.org/views04/0616-03.htm)
In Baghdad, every encounter we had was a bit like going through customs. "American?" was the inevitable first question. "No, no, Canadian," our over-eager reply.
Sometimes our word wasn't good enough and our interrogators wanted proof. We'd pull out our passports for inspection. On their faces, you could often see a
cloud of rage pass over. Women would sometimes let themselves smile. Kids would stop acting like mini-commandos and run off and play. Don't get me wrong:
Canadians aren't loved in Iraq; we just aren't, so far as I could tell, actively loathed. So it's wrenching being back in Canada confronting the prospect of Stephen
Harper as our next prime minister. This is a man who so longed to join George W. Bush's coalition of the willing that he called former defense minister John
McCallum an "idiot" in the House of Commons, declaring we should be in Iraq with the United States, "doing everything necessary to win." This is a man who was so
eager to "support the war effort" that he went on Fox and claimed that "the silent majority of Canadians is strongly supportive" of the invasion, defying the findings
of every credible opinion poll. If
the Conservatives are given the chance to turn Canada into more of a cardcarrying combatant in Mr. Bush's disastrous war on terrorism than we are already, the little bit of grace I
encountered in Iraq will quickly disappear. When I go back, showing my passport to the ad hoc inspectors could well have a very different effect. I was
in Iraq in April, at a pivotal moment when the United States decided to wage two pre-emptive wars within a pre-emptive war, one against the resistance in Fallujah,
the other against Muqtada al-Sadr in Najaf and Sadr City. The LA Times estimates that 800 Iraqis have been killed in the past two months of U.S. attacks on Sadr
City, almost as many as the 900 that than are estimated to have died in the siege on Fallujah. As mosques were desecrated, prisoners tortured and children killed, I
witnessed George Bush's awesome enemy-manufacturing machine up close. Hatred of Americans soared, not just in Iraq but also in neighboring countries. The
retaliation began immediately: a wave of kidnappings of foreigners, now so common they barely make the news. The change in mood was palpable. Anti-
Americanism was no longer a sentiment; it was an uncontrollable force of nature. Being Canadian didn't let us off
the hook; we were still part of an ugly invasion of foreign soldiers, contractors and journalists traipsing through the country and taking what wasn't ours: lives, jobs,
oil, stories, photographs. The kidnappers didn't usually discriminate based on nationality. But being Canadian, or more specifically, not being American, did
sometimes open up a little window. It gave people who were suffering permission to glimpse the humanity behind our nationality. And the overwhelming majority
of Iraqis I met -- even, miraculously, those who had just lost children and spouses to U.S. weapons -- were profoundly grateful for that reprieve, relieved not to have
to hate. I, of course, was even more grateful, since being not-American kept me out of serious danger more than once. It
is a privilege not to be
hated for your nationality, and we should not relinquish it lightly. George Bush has denied that privilege to his own people,
and Stephen Harper would cavalierly strip it from Canadians by erasing what few small but important
differences remain between Canadian and U.S. foreign policy. The danger posed by this act is not just about whether
Canadians are safe when we travel to the Middle East. The hatred that Mr. Bush is manufacturing there, for the United States and its coalition partners, is already
following the soldiers home. I have felt that hatred in Iraq, and trust me: We don't want to experience it here in Canada. Or don't trust
me, trust the citizens of Spain, who decided in their March elections that they are not willing to accept the blowback from George Bush's wars, that they don't want
these multiplying enemies to be their enemies too. Or the citizens of the United Kingdom, who just battered Tony Blair's Labour Party in last week's local elections,
furious at being dragged into a war that has made them less safe. Or the citizens of Australia, who are about to send the same message to John Howard. Or even the
citizens of the United States, 55 per cent of whom now disapprove of Mr. Bush's performance in Iraq, according to a recent Los Angles Times poll. Yet just
as
the rest of the world is finally saying "no more," Canadians are poised to elect a party that is saying
"me too." The hawks in Washington like to paint Canada as a freeloader, mooching off their expensive military protection, the continent's weak link on
terrorism. The truth is that around the world, it is blind government complicity with U.S. foreign policy,
precisely the kind of complicity advocated by Mr. Harper, that is putting civilians in the line of terror. It is the United States
that is the weak link. Before I went to Iraq, a seasoned war correspondent who had spent a year reporting from Baghdad gave me his best piece of
security advice. "Stay away from Americans, they're bad for your health." He wasn't being anti-American (he's an American citizen and supported the war); he was
just being practical. In Iraq, that advice means you don't want to ride in the U.S. convoys or embed with U.S. troops. You keep your distance and stay independent.
At this perilous moment in history, the same principle applies at home: Canadian
security depends on our ability to maintain
meaningful sovereignty from the United States. Being inside the U.S. security fortress isn't a missile
shield, it's a missile magnet. As long as the United States continues to act as a global aggressor, the
best way for us to stay healthy is to stay as far away as from Americans as possible. With 8,890 kilometers of
shared border, geographical distance is not an option. Fortunately, political distance still is. Let's not surrender it.
Perm fails – successful peacekeeping can’t include U.S. pressure
Klepak 12 professor emeritus of History and Strategy at the Royal Military College of Canada, special adviser to the Commander of the Canadian Army on
Inter-American Affairs (Hal Klepak, 2012, “The Most Challenging of Links? Canada and Inter-American Security,” Canada Looks South: In Search of an American
Policy, pages 49-51)//KP
The principal Canadian challenge for defence policy towards the Americans is to find ways , within reasonable
political and financial costs, to help advance our national goals in the hemisphere: creating a prosperous region
with which we can trade and invest, furthering that region’s elusive quest for effective democracy, and anchoring peaceful relations among its
nations. This, of course, is a tall order. It is also important to remember that while our policy on these issues dovetails in public
stances with that of the United States on many matters, it does not coincide with Washington on
either all of its objectives or on the means to achieve them. This is both Canada’s principal advantage and its principal handicap.
The fact that Canada has not always followed the U.S. lead on major issues in the past and present –
principally in its Cuba policy and on matters as thorny as how to treat the Nicaraguan Sandinista Revolution, what to do about the Central American civil wars, how
to perceive and deal with the recent drift to the left in the region, and what to single out as the major causes of unrest and instability there – has
meant
that Ottawa enjoys a legitimacy in the South of the hemisphere utterly lost by Washington since the end of
the Good Neighbor Policy in 1954 While Canada is not a formal ally of the United States in the hemisphere’s affairs south of the Rio Grande, it is that country’s close
ally in many parts of the world and in the northern part of the Americas its closest collaborator. I t
is difficult for Canada to resist U.S.
pressure to make the two nations’ approaches to the region as a whole since Washington often sees
Canadian legitimacy in the area as a potential aid in its own attempts to get certain things done, especially
in defence and security, where Ottawa’s comparative advantages are tangible. The U.S. is Canada’s most important trading partner and is its major source for
investment as well. And as mentioned, our policy objectives, as least on the public level of declaratory policy, do seem to aim at the same ends Accordingly, it
is
vital for the successful achievement of those shared objectives that Canadian efforts be seen as
properly Canadian and not merely those resulting from U.S. pressures. An approach showing that
Canada continues to understand the very special moment that Latin America is parsing through as its
democracies try to find their feet is crucial for the creation of a regional environment that lacks
confrontation and excessive ideological bombast and the dangers for peace that such a context presents. Canada is well placed to play
this interlocutory role and thereby move forward towards achieving its overall hemispheric goals. And
defence policy is even better placed to help in this because in the security field, until recently, the region was less divided than in the economic or political sphere.
There is more of a need for dialogue in the region than ever before, given the recent stresses caused by the
ideological chasm that has opened between reformists and conservative governments in the region. It is vital not to shut off discussion at such a dangerous
juncture. It
is worth recalling that Canada is appreciated across the spectrum of regimes as a country of
openness and democratic pluralism that has become especially tuned to the need for building bridges and not tearing them down when things
begin to go badly. The northern nation’s success in building a social democratic system essentially accepted by all its
political parties, along the British and now European continental models, is
acknowledged and generally applauded in Latin
America. Ottawa has traditionally understood excesses on the left as a reaction to long-standing excesses on the right, and the need to leave those excesses,
on whatever side of the ideological divide, as much behind us as possible in the search for sustainable development and enduring peace. The Canadian
Forces are a superbly developed asset in such a drive to find moderation. They are closely tied to those of the United
States but also have proud traditions and links with those of the United Kingdom. They are NATO and United Nations forces and
reflect that experience in peace enforcement and peacekeeping roles at this time and in the past. They
have been, and currently are, deeply involved in development and nation-building tasks in several parts of the world and here in our own hemisphere in
earthquake-ravaged Haiti in early 2010 (where Canada deployed an unprecedented range of military assets). They
are no longer strangers to
the region, and their linguistic capabilities, while still very limited, are much greater than they were even a short time ago.
Perm fails – empirically progress is dwarfed by U.S. policies
Rochlin 12 professor of political science at the University of British Columbia-Okanagan (James Rochlin, 2012, “Introduction: Canada and the Americas:
There’s Still Much to Discover,” Canada Looks South: In Search of an American Policy, page 21)//KP
Overall, in a proportional sense, some economic progress has been achieved, but this appears to be dwarfed by
the context of Canada’s overwhelming economic dependence upon the U.S. Politically, we have seen that Canada
has established a stronger profile in the region in the post-NAFTA period. This has been expressed, for
example, through its activities in the OAS, its support for democratic structures, and its crucial role in Haiti (which is analyzed later in this
volume). But that sense of progress has been limited by the Harper government’s tendency to mimic the
most pernicious aspects of U.S. policy to Latin America, and its penchant toward exacerbating regional polarization
rather than contributing to conflict resolution. Overall, the ‘new beginning’ promised to Ottawa’s Canada and the Americas: Priorities and Progress
was rote and failed to recognize tectonic transformations in the world order and in the Americas.
topic solvency
Generic
Canadian engagement solves the case.
Brickman, ’08 – Barry, President, North West International Ltd., “WESTERN CANADA AND LATIN AMERICA EXISTING AND POTENTIAL COMMERCIAL
RELATIONSHIPS,” August 1, 2008, http://www.wd.gc.ca/images/cont/11103-eng.pdf)//A-Berg
This report is intended to provide an overview of Western Canada's current
and potential commercial linkages with Latin
America and the Caribbean (LAC). It will seek to inform Western Economic Diversification Canada (WD) of potential opportunities to
increase Western Canada’s engagement in the LAC region. Current economic conditions in the LAC region are
becoming more favourable for international involvement. Effective macroeconomic policies have
resulted in increased economic growth and stability and improved social conditions to address low standards of
living and inequality. Trade activity is modest between Western Canada and LAC with the majority of exports consisting of agricultural
commodities, specifically wheat and pulse crops. The oil and gas industry has experienced an increase in demand for equipment exports to the LAC region.
Further negotiations of Free Trade Agreements with LAC markets will facilitate exporting opportunities for
Western Canadian companies. Despite the strong connections in the oil and gas and mining sectors, few inroads have been made by Western Canadian
innovation clusters in the LAC region. However, the innovation clusters sampled in this study generally are taking note of potential opportunities for collaboration in
LAC and some relationship building is taking shape. Export
Development Canada (EDC) continues to be active in Latin
America supporting Canadian companies in accessing high tariff markets through foreign direct
investment and joint ventures. The LAC region is increasingly becoming more integrated into the global value chain because of competitive wage
advantages and an abundance of natural resources. Potential opportunities for Western Canada in Latin America exist in
traditional energy and natural resource sectors but also in the tech and advanced industry sectors.
There appears to be some awakening in Western Canada to the potential of Latin America. For example the Government of Manitoba has been increasing its focus
on Latin America over the past year. As well the Government of Alberta has identified Latin America as one of its top market priorities, largely thanks to the strong
ties in the energy sector. WD is well positioned to contribute to the
Government of Canada’s whole-of-government initiative
to re-engage in the LAC region. The recommended approach is to focus on enhancing science and
technology (S&T) based partnerships with LAC. WD’s extensive knowledge and involvement with
numerous partnerships and programs in the S&T industry will allow the department to focus on
innovation clusters and current S&T departmental priorities that are transferable into the LAC market.
Specific actions for WD consideration include: S&T Study Tour to Western Canada Relationship Building with Canada's Posts in Miami and Houston Facilitate
Clusters/Academia Partnerships Support Industry Associations Embraer Outreach Leverage Existing Western Canadian Links with LAC Inter-American Development
Bank Annual Meeting in Western Canada It is important that WD target any resulting efforts to support partnership development by innovation clusters to a limited
number of specific markets. Chile and Brazil appear to be the most promising areas for innovation relationships. Canada's Science Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) with Chile has strengthened the partnership between the two nations in the areas of sustainable development, S&T, and investment promotion while
negotiation of the Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement with Brazil will further encourage technology commercialization ventures. II. INTRODUCTION
II.a. Objectives of Research Study This study addresses Western Canada's
commercial linkages with Latin America (Central and South
America) and the Caribbean, otherwise referred to as the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) region. Mexico is not included in the study
because of its developed relationship with Canada and engagement in the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The remainder of this report provides a
general overview of the economic relationship between Canada (particularly Western Canada) and LAC, summarizes the current engagement activities of selected
Western Canadian stakeholders, reviews challenges associated with operating in LAC, highlights markets and sectors of greatest opportunity in the region, and
concludes with a list of potential options for WD on how to increase Western Canada’s engagement in LAC. The study relies on research and consultations with a
sample of federal, provincial, and municipal government officials, supplemented by limited outreach to innovation clusters, universities, associations, and a small
sample of companies and foreign representatives. The report is illustrative of the commercial linkages between Western Canada and the study area, but makes no
claim to being comprehensive. II.b. Canada and LAC: Natural Partners For much of the postwar period, predominantly
agricultural-based
trade dominated Canada's interactions with the LAC region. More recently investment, particularly in the
energy and mining industries, has driven the Canada – LAC economic relationship. This relationship has
been accelerated by significant shifts in trade policy towards the aggressive negotiation of free trade arrangements (FTAs) in
the region. Prime Minister Stephen Harper has emphasized that Canada’s neighbourhood does not end at the 49th parallel, and neither do Canada’s interests. That
is why Canada is seeking to re-engage relationships throughout the Americas1. In recent years the relationship between Canada and LAC has been driven by the
Canadian mining industry. Capital flows have been impressive and have generated both the
development of recipient countries’ economies and trade flows from Canada to the region. Members of the Canadian
Association of Mining Equipment and Services for Export have been particularly active in efforts to follow their domestic clients overseas. The Canadian mining
industry began investing in LAC in an era of few resource shortages when resource prices were low. Capital
flows are now being propelled
by higher resource prices given the fundamental shift in the demand-supply equation. The needs of the mining industry and the opportunities
offered should be the subject of any Latin American strategies the Government of Canada eventually adopts. II.c. Canadian Free Trade Agreements with LAC New
Free Trade Agreements (FTA) are an important element of Canada's re-engagement efforts with LAC.
Building on the success of NAFTA and Canada's mutually beneficial FTAs with Chile (1997) and Costa Rica (2002), FTA negotiations have been
launched with Colombia, Peru, the Dominican Republic, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and with the Central America Four (CA4)-which includes the countries
of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua.2
Canada solves better than the US
Patrick Donnelly 09- energy securities lawyer in Calgary with the Burstall-Winger (“Canadian Engagement in Latin America can counter Chavez Mischief”,
June 22, 2009, http://c2cjournal.ca/2009/06/canadian-engagement-in-latin-america-can-counter-chavez-mischief/)//Modermatt
Not only are Canadian companies perceived as safer and more stable than their Latin American
counterparts—and somewhat removed from local corruption—they are also viewed as “Not
American.” Accurate or not and fair or not, Latin America enjoys, at best, a schizophrenic relationship with the
United States. Despite the significant Hispanic demographic in the United States, too much American interest in the region is greeted with suspicion of
imperialism and shouts of “Yankee, Go Home” (as President Bush was confronted on his 2007 tour). When America appears preoccupied with other areas of the
world, as has happened since 9-11, Latin
America accuses the United States of indifference. Therein lays an
opportunity for Canada. We are well-positioned to mentor the region’s growth as it develops its vast potential. Aside from private
investment, Canada can best assist Latin America’s development through enhanced support of
democratic regimes and encouragement of good governance. We can do this through government-togovernment contacts and the promotion of free trade with Latin America, either through the nowmoribund Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA), or by negotiating separate bilateral trade
agreements with individual countries (as we have with Chile). The FTAA talks were derailed in 2003 by a combination of
disinterest from participating countries and fierce opposition by Hugo Chavez and anti-globalists who viewed the FTAA as an American-imperialist plot. Latin
America is at a cross-road. Canada’s government must not allow this close neighbor, through our own
indifference, to slip into the destructive orbit of Hugo Chavez. By engaging with Latin America on all
fronts, Prime Minister Harper will provide healthy alternatives to Venezuela’s easy money. We can
assist with elimination of the corruption, cronyism, human rights abuses and bad economics that have
held the region back for too long. Simon Bolivar would approve.
Canada solves best – empirically successful with economic engagement in Latin
America
Morris, 11 - Regional Vice-President, Western Canada of Haskayne School of Business & Canadian Council for the Americas
(Linda Morris, May 26, 2011, “Doing Business in Latin America: Are You There Yet?”, Canada of Haskayne School of Business, http://www.edc.ca/EN/AboutUs/News-Room/Speeches/Pages/doing-business-latin-america.aspx)//GP
Key Regions and Sectors of Opportunity¶ Now, let’s take a whirlwind tour of the key regions and sectors of opportunity, starting with Brazil.¶ Given that Brazil is
hosting the 2014 FIFA World Cup and 2016 Olympics, beyond the potential tourist boom, it means massive construction in the run up to the games.¶ And it’s not
just sports venues—but all the roads, mass transit, ports, public buildings and power grids that need to support the influx of people and show their pride.¶
Estimates are as high as $1 trillion for both government and private spending over the next four years.
And that doesn’t even include oil and gas, mining and other resource investment!¶ Many of the capital goods and
specialized services for these industries simply cannot be sourced from within Brazil and represent some of the best opportunities for Canadians.¶ For those
interested in these opportunities, there is a DFAIT mission to Brazil on June 11th - more information can be found on their website.¶ Still, Brazil is not without its
challenges–including expensive tax frameworks, strong local and foreign competition, and requirements to partner with a local firm or to hire locally.¶ The right
market advice can make all the difference—and you can get it from Canada’s trade commissioners in Brazil and EDC’s representatives in Sao Paulo and Rio de
Janeiro.¶ They can also help connect you to creditworthy buyers and potential local business partners, reputable agents and legal experts to navigate the maze of
regulations.¶
Most of Canada ’s world-leading engineering-consulting firms already have a strong presence
in Brazil . For example, SNC-Lavalin alone has more than 2,000 employees there.¶ These connections provide opportunities for other Canadian firms to enter
their supply chains, with niche equipment or services.¶ That’s how one of our Calgary clients, Born Canada, makers of direct-fired heaters, first entered world
markets back in the late ’80s. They started filling contracts for big Canadian engineering firms doing business overseas. Today
they’re around the
world and starting to tap into the supply chain of Brazil’s oil & gas giant Petrobras. We’re told it took lots of backand-forth negotiations, but now the business is opening up.¶ Talking about Petrobras, EDC helped finance their growth to encourage them to use Canadian
suppliers and partners.¶ We’ve pulled the process along by setting up matchmaking meetings between their key decision makers and more than 200 Canadian
companies –at least 150 from Western Canada. 60-plus companies are doing business with them now.¶ By the way, we call this our pull strategy. We’ve taken a
similar approach with Brazil’s mining leader Vale and other corporations seeking Canadian expertise.¶ The result: EDC’s loans and insurance volume,
facilitating Canadian trade in Brazil, doubled since 2006—to nearly $3 billion; it’s now our largest market, by volume, after China.¶
Mexico is next on our quick tour :¶ Mexico is recognized as a competitive and relatively close
manufacturing base for foreign companies looking to save costs.¶ Two of the country’s chief attributes, our clients have told
us, are its well-educated labour force and well-equipped industrial facilities for rent—what they call corporate shelters.¶ We estimate about 2,000
Canadian companies have set up affiliates in Mexico to date.¶ EDC too has a relatively large customer base exporting or
investing there--more than 700 companies in 2010, benefiting from nearly $2.5 billion worth of our loans and insurance.¶ In volume, that’s more than double our
previous year’s activity.¶ Key sectors for our clients include extractive, transportation, infrastructure, and ICT.¶ As in Brazil, we help finance strategic companies,
like Pemex in Oil & Gas, Industrias Penoles in mining, and CFE, Mexico’s electricity company, to encourage Canadian procurement.¶ Our representatives in Mexico
City and Monterrey also lead matchmaking efforts, bringing these companies and ours together, to strengthen existing business and build future ties.¶ On the risk
side, Mexico was relatively hard hit by the credit crunch and is just climbing back to pre-crisis growth levels—but its banking sector is stable and foreign investment
is growing.¶ Some regions must be avoided owing to violence related to drug-trafficking, and our market experts can steer you in the right direction—literally.¶
Zipping down to Chile…¶ This is the second largest market in Latin America for Canadian direct investment .¶ And
Canada ranked as the largest
foreign investor in Chile in 2010--mostly in the mining sector.¶ In 2006, EDC started to introduce Canadian companies to Chilean copper giant
CODELCO.¶ What’s interesting is that this was the first foreign corporation we financed to encourage purchases from Canadian suppliers; Since then, they
have bought nearly $1 billion worth of goods & services from more than 150 Canadian firms.¶ As I
mentioned before, this “pull strategy” has now connected many more Latin American companies with like-minded Canadian firms in nearly all key sectors.¶ Overall,
EDC’s support to Canadian companies in Chile nearly quadrupled over the past decade, with the help of our representative in Santiago. He also serves the
Argentinean market.¶ Let’s back up again, this
time to Central America & the Caribbean…¶ This region covers some 34
markets, where EDC’s total volume reached $2.7 billion in 2010.¶ I’ll just touch on three markets that have shown the biggest
jump in trade with Canada.¶ Trinidad &Tobago is one of the largest economies in the Caribbean, thanks to its
energy sector. It’s a good candidate for our Western Canadian expertise to help develop its oil
reserves.¶ It has also allocated about a third of its budget to rebuilding roads, bridges and its water supply network.¶ Overall, Canadian exports to the country
shot up 70 per cent between 2005 and 2010.¶ Our exports to the Dominican Republic have also grown steadily since 2005, as
much as 50 per cent before the global downturn.¶ Today this trade is being revived by opportunities in infrastructure and the environment, and demand for
agricultural products, pharmaceuticals, textiles and other consumer goods.¶ Canada ranks third in foreign direct investment stock in the country, after the U.S. and
Spain.¶ In mining, Canada’s Barrick Gold and Goldcorp are undertaking the largest project in the country’s history, offering supply chain opportunities there too.¶
Another great pick for Canadian trade is Panama.¶ Speak to Canadians doing business there and virtually everyone is passionate about
the region.¶ Some of the pluses include a well-trained workforce, business that’s conducted in US dollars and the largest free trade zone in the world after Hong
Kong.¶ The
$5-billion-plus expansion of the Panama Canal is also leading to billions more in other infrastructure
improvements.¶ If you are willing to go farther south, to the Andean region, Peru and Colombia are the best bets.¶ Peru is now ranked first in
South America for ease of doing business; Colombia is second.¶ The Canada-Peru Free Trade Agreement has been in full swing since 2009, eliminating tariffs on 95
per cent of Canadian exports.¶ Canada is already the main investor in Peru’s mining sector, and, today, the infrastructure sector is helping lead the country’s
growth. Demand is also up for industrial equipment, consumer goods and water treatment technologies.¶ In
Colombia, opportunities abound
in the oil and gas sector—20 out of the 28 foreign Oil & Gas companies in Colombia are Canadian!¶ For
example, early this year Ecopetrol and Talisman Energy completed the purchase of BP in Colombia, creating a new joint venture.¶ Colombia also seeks investment
in infrastructure to improve its highways, ports, airports, water and waste management services, and more.¶ The Canada-Colombia Free Trade Agreement should
be ratified this year, which could give some of our goods an edge over U.S. exports.¶ Fears generated from years of drug-related violence in Colombia are also
subsiding – the country has vastly improved its domestic security since 2002, including large-scale demobilization of guerilla forces.¶ Companies in the extractive
sector, in particular, still have to take security seriously, know which areas to avoid and beware of extortion by some private security services.¶ EDC’s representative
in Lima and Canadian Trade Commissioners in the region are both helpful sources of information about market conditions, laws and security issues in the Andean
many parts of Latin America offer more and better
opportunities for Canadians today than in their entire history.¶ Nowadays too, more companies recognize
they need to diversify their customer base—the U.S. financial crisis gave many firms enough of a scare to actually start doing something
region.¶ Conclusion¶ To sum up, from what EDC is seeing and supporting,
about it!¶ We see our clients increasingly importing, exporting and investing in Latin America to create more cost-effective operations—or global supply chains. EDC
calls this integrative trade.¶ Indeed,
Latin America has become the most popular emerging-market region for
Canadian participation in this integrative trade —whether by investing in projects or joint ventures,
setting up a service office, importing lower-cost supplies or exporting finished products.
Structural barriers prevent US leadership in Latin America – Canada is uniquely suited
to solve
Duquenal, 11 editor of Venezuela News and Views with a PhD in Molecular Biology (Daniel Duquenal, 2 March 2011, “Loss of U.S. influence in Latin America
opportunity for Canada,” Troy Media, http://www.troymedia.com/2011/03/02/loss-of-u-s-influence-in-latin-america-opportunity-for-canada/)//KP
Events are occurring in the Middle East that, even last December, we would never have thought possible. The
modern Beys and Pharaohs have been ejected from power and the worst dictator of the area is teetering. The Western World, in fear for his
oil supply, resembles deer caught in the headlights. And yet there are other world concerns that need to
be kept in mind, in particular for the U.S. which is slowly but surely losing dominance in its own
hemisphere. Events in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries are occurring at the same time
as the U.S. has a chance to recover some of the influence it lost in Latin America under former President George W.
Bush’s tenure. It was in 1998 that Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez won his first election, reviving Fidel Castro’s old dreams under a new format financed by the
oil boom that started in 2002. But, because of U.S. incompetence, Chavez was able to survive a 2002 setback, which led him to hatch schemes in many Latin
American countries, including Nicaragua, Ecuador and Bolivia, where he succeeded, and Peru and Mexico. But other countries tied their band wagon to a cash rich
Chavez and closed their eyes to his abuses as well. By the time Bush was replaced, it seemed that the whole area was veering from left to hard left: only Mexico and
Colombia seemed to be the last allies. The left tide recedes But a
world financial crisis, which definitely put a strain on Chavez’ chequebook, and
the election of Barack Obama as U.S. President stymied the leftist tide. Obama’s election, particularly, brought
with it a propaganda bonus that had been lost with Bush. Yet, these “victories have not translated into the ability
of the U.S. to recover the ground it had lost in the preceding decade, a void that Brazil has been busily filling. This
has led to a mostly silent contest between the U.S. and Brazil to assert their dominance, a contest which has included
dirty tricks from Brazil, such as trying to create a separate structure from the Organization of American States (OAS), one which will not include either the U.S. or
Canada. The leftist tide has, in fact, been receding faster than would have been believed two years ago. Its first major setback was the Honduras
coup: although mishandled at first by the U.S., it eventually became the first real victory in the area for democracy over Chavez’s authoritarian neo-socialism. Both
Chavez and Brazil’s President, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, overplayed their hands in Honduras, with Lula even offering shelter to former Honduras President Josa
Manuel Zelaya Rosales in his embassy at the worst moment of the crisis. This was an error on Zelaya’s part, because Brazil had never exerted significant influence in
Central America before and thus looked like an unacceptable interloper, almost as imperialist an interloper as the U.S. of yore. But there was another contribution
to counter Lula’s and Chavez’ ambitions: in
Panama, Honduras and Chile: the democratic right took office, in Chile after 20
seems that the coming elections in Peru and Argentina could confirm a more
centrist route for Latin America, the more so now that the new leader of Brazil - Dilma Rousseff – seems to have less international ambitions than
Lula did. Unfortunately the U.S. neither seems to wish nor is unable to recover its leadership in the area. For
example free trade agreements (FTA) keep languishing in Congress, taken hostage by unions and other
interest groups. New paradigms wanted There are, fortunately, other options for the Americas besides a soft
struggle between Brazil and the U.S. for dominance: partnership has become the new buzz word. It
years of centre-left concertacion. And it
started in the U.S. State Department with the understanding that there is life after Iraq and that it is south of the Rio Grande. A first priority, with a Republican
House more inclined to support anti Chavez initiatives, should be to approve an FTA with Colombia before the country starts drifting elsewhere. Brazil’s Roussef may
want to forget the cheap leftist ideas that Lula practiced only outside Brazil. By keeping Chavez and Cuba (and Iran) at arms’ length, Brazil could become, under her,
a real mediator, welcomed and respected, and not be seen as the wannabe substitute of the U.S. There
are other options that could be
very appealing: Canada could wake up and realize that the U.S. is a weakening barrier and that there
is more to do for the Americas than helping some little islands in the Caribbean. Let’s dream of a
Three C Group composed of three countries with an impeccable record in human rights and economic
development in the last quarter century, one in North America, one in Central America and one in South America: Canada, Costa Rica and
Chile. What countries could say no to their combined friendly mediation offer to help solve some regional conflict?
Canada is better positioned than other countries
Dade, 12 senior fellow at the University of Ottawa’s School of International Development and Global Studies (Carlo Dade, 13 April 2012, “We need Latin
America more than it needs us,” The Globe and Mail, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/commentary/we-need-latin-america-more-than-it-needsus/article4100477/)//KP
When Stephen Harper buttons up his guayabera to join fellow heads of state and government for the sixth Summit of the Americas in Colombia this weekend, he
Canada will notice that something is different: For the first time, we may need Latin America more than it needs
us. Latin America prospered during the 2008-09 financial crisis largely because its house was in order, thanks to reforms put in place during earlier periods of
and
economic turmoil. Countries also benefited from an enormous, continuing Chinese appetite for its exports and the region’s successful adaptation of bits and pieces
of Asian policies of resource and economic nationalism where the state and state-owned companies play a bigger role in the economy – a direct rejection of the
economic orthodoxy preached by the U.S., Canada and others. It’s
been the relative success of Latin American economic
governance models against the failure of U.S. and European models, coupled with the rise of China as
an alternative to dependence on the U.S. and Europe for trade and loans, that has Brazil and Mexico poised to become
the world’s fourth- and fifth-largest economies in a few decades and Colombia to be a leader of the next group of superstar emerging economies. As a result, among
the countries that matter at the Cartagena summit, Mr. Harper will find little interest in the usual lectures from Canada. In fact, he may get pointed rebukes about
our irresponsibility in refusing to adopt what these countries view as common-sense policies on charging royalties for mining and oil projects. There’ll also be
questions about our capability to be a serious partner in the region. Mr. Harper’s announcement five
years ago that the Americas were a Canadian priority was noticed in the region. But the footnote, that
Canada wouldn’t spend any real money in support of this goal, was largely missed. The same won’t
hold this time. In the past five years, the government has managed some accomplishments in the region by
squeezing the few pennies that were spent beyond what seemed possible. But with the severe cuts in the government’s spring
budget, even that penny is now gone. It will be hard not to notice these cuts in the region , especially when local
government officials and business leaders are asked to bring their own lunch and coffee to meetings at Canadian embassies. If the government hasn’t
adequately funded investment in building relations with Latin America, Canada’s private sector has
done worse. It has failed to invest in building broader and stronger relations through support, or even interest, in the types of research, policy and advocacy
infrastructure that its competitors are funding to build their national brands in the region and secure future advantage. All of this combines to make the region
wonder whether anyone in Canada is serious. Weak
U.S. growth and potential for negative growth in Europe mean
Latin America’s growing economies and growing middle classes in countries such as Mexico and Brazil are more
important. As opposed to Asia, the region is also more important as a partner internationally in places and
ways that matter to Canada, from Brazil’s running the United Nations mission in Haiti to Mexico’s establishing its own foreign-aid agency.
Canada has several advantages in the region, especially compared with China. But as more of the world looks to Latin
America, Canada has to sell these advantages and fight aggressively for markets and influence in a region
that now regards us as less important. The question is whether Canada still has the resources and ability to do so. There are
positive signs. Canada’s private sector will be well represented at the CEO Summit also taking place in Cartagena, and the government is set to reaffirm the
Americas as a priority. But without adequate funding from the government, it will be up to the private sector
to step in and step up.
AT can’t solve China
China is crowding out the U.S. – Canada is key to fill the gap – the impact is a net
positive
Carmichael and Grant, 11 Economics Correspondent for The Globe and Mail; Economics Reporter for The Globe and Mail (Kevin Carmichael; Tavia
Grant, 25 March 2011, “South America: Canada’s forgotten continent,” The Globe and Mail, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/economy/southamerica-canadas-forgotten-continent/article577891/?page=all)//KP
An escaping opportunity Canada's
false start in boosting economic ties with Latin America and the Caribbean
come as the region seeks to diminish its reliance on the United States. China surpassed the U.S. last
year to become Brazil's largest trading partner, and the country's Foreign Minister boasts that he's taking Mandarin lessons twice a
week. The region's shift to Asia from the U.S. is dramati c. According to the World Bank figures, U.S. imports
represented 30.9 per cent of the average total between 2007 and 2009 compared with 48.8 per cent
in 2000; imports from "other" countries, a group dominated by China and other Asian exporters, were almost 56 per
cent of the average total between 2007 and 2009, compared with 38 per cent in 2000. Canada has "all
these natural advantages and long-standing ties in Latin America and yet we remain fixated on India and China," said
Jonathan Hausman, vice-chair at the Canadian Council for the Americas who has travelled to the region for the past 15 years.
"Canada has a lot at stake, and in my view we're not leveraging it to the degree we should and could." At the Calgary conference, Enrique Pescarmona, CEO of
IMPSA in Argentina, a company that works with renewable energy and has operations around the world, said Canadians can't afford to miss the opportunity to
invest in Latin America. "Whoever comes to Latin America is going to hit big as long as he does things correctly ,"
he told hundreds of delegates at the Inter-American Development Bank's annual meeting of the boards of governors in Calgary Friday. "The best way to do it is to
try to [form]partnerships with Latin American [companies]" he said. Still,
challenges remain. The gap between the rich and the
poor is getting wider around the world, but the situation remains most extreme in Latin America. "This can be an obstacle to
growth," Angel Gurria, secretary-general of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, told reporters Wednesday in Washington. It's not
the only obstacle. Inflation, a plague of the past, is creeping back, especially in Venezuela, Argentina and Brazil. Mexico is fighting a drug war that has
spilled into other Central American countries. Rising currencies are pressuring local manufacturers. Also, Brazil's currency, the real, has been "up
and down like a yo-yo," said Hani Basile, an executive at Montreal-based Dorel Industries, which entered Brazil in 2009 to sell car seats. It took Dorel
more than a year to complete the regulatory process - six months longer than expected. Whereas in Canada there might be 10 steps to start a business, in Brazil
there are 150, said Eric Bonner, an executive at Brookfield Asset Management and chairman of the Brazil-Canada Chamber of Commerce. The
situation is
getting better, but slowly. The regulatory maze is one reason that finding a local partner is essential, Mr. Bonner said. But those who have
ventured into Latin American and the Caribbean contend the positives far outweigh the negatives. Mr.
Jamieson of ABS Friction said he had to get used to the fact that his clients were going to "give you a big hug and kiss you on the cheeks," but the benefit for
adjusting to cultural differences is a market that accounts for 25 per cent of his sales. To capture the promise of Latin America, "the
window for
Canadians is open, but in three or four years, it's going to close," said Scotiabank's Mr. Waugh. "It won't close
completely, but opportunities are presenting themselves and it would be a shame for us not to take part."
Venezuela
Canada solves best – increasing relations with Venezuela now
The Canadian Press, 2/17 - Minister of Foreign Affairs John Baird responds to questions in the House of Commons (“Baird concerned with Iran ties
with Venezuela”, 2/17 /13 , CBC News, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/story/2013/02/17/baird-chavez-iran.html)//GP
Canada is increasingly concerned with the growing cozy relations between Iran and Venezuela and
intends to press the issue with the regime of Hugo Chavez in Caracas next week, Foreign Affairs Minister
John Baird said Sunday.¶ "I'm concerned about Iran in general," he told The Canadian Press from Lima, Peru. "I'm concerned about their nuclear program.
I'm concerned about their support of terrorism.¶ "And I'm concerned about their deteriorating human rights record at home. So I don't think we'll see eye to eye
with Venezuela on that."¶
Baird is on an eight-day, six-country Latin American tour that also took him last week to Cuba,
Caracas on Wednesday.¶ The Cuba-Venezuela bond was
underscored as Baird arrived in Havana on Friday. He was greeted with the release of a new photograph of Chavez convalescing
the hemisphere's most repressive anti-democratic country. He visits
happily in a Cuban hospital, where he has spent the last two months receiving treatment for cancer.¶ Though Venezuela is a functioning democracy, it has in Chavez
an aging and ailing iron-fisted leader similar to that of communist Cuba, where Raul Castro, 81, succeeded his iconic, 86-year-old brother Fidel five years ago, and
has begun instituting modest economic reforms.¶ Deeper economic and commerical engagement¶
Baird said he is pushing for deeper
economic and commercial engagement for Canada in both countries because that can promote change
at what is looking like a pivotal moment in history.¶ The minister said he sees potential for Canadian
companies in the financial services, energy and mining sectors.¶ But with Chavez potentially on his last legs, the Obama
administration is hopeful it can reset relations with Venezuela. Chavez has courted Iran as an ally.¶ The Obama administration believes Iran is trying to gain a
foothold in Latin America, including perhaps establishing a military base.¶ Last week, Venezuela had to explain a $46-million cheque found in the possession of
Iran's former central bank chief when he was detained in Germany.¶ On Sunday, a report by Iran's Press TV said Venezuela's state-owned weapons manufacturer,
CAVIM, would continue to do business with Iran in the face of sanctions by the U.S. State Department.¶ Baird said he is eager to bring up the Iran relationship with
his counterpart in Caracas later this week.¶ 'On Iran, we have strong views.'—John Baird, Minister of Foreign Affairs¶ "On Iran, we have strong views," he said.¶
Baird is also scheduled to meet with opposition figures in Venezuela.¶ "The elections held recently were by no means
perfect but I think even the opposition conceded they were much better than anticipated," Baird said in reference to the ballot that returned Chavez to power last
fall before his illness struck.¶ "Obviously,
we want to promote democracy, and we want to promote political
freedoms."¶ In Cuba, Baird said he had frank discussions with his counterpart, Bruno Rodriguez, who at 54 is a political spring chicken compared the
octogenarian holdovers from the 1959 revolution who still occupy high offices.¶ Since taking charge, Raul Castro has allowed a series of small, free market reforms,
and eased travel restrictions on Cubans.¶
"I think there's a long way to go," said Baird. "They're beginning to make
some significant economic reform, so I think there's some reason for optimism there."¶ He also said Cuba is
beginning a transition to new leadership.¶ "There is beginning to be a change of the guard in the
cabinet, and among the senior leadership — just a beginning — I think that gives us some reason for
optimism," he said.¶ "Obviously, we want to see people in Cuba live in freedom and prosperity."¶ Baird said Canada still opposes Cuba's return to the
Organization of American States when it holds its next summit in 2015, saying the country needs to go further on its reforms. Canada and the U.S. oppose the return
of Cuba to the 35-country Western Hemisphere club.¶ But Canada supports Cuba's calls for the United States to end its five-decade long economic embargo.¶
Canadian engagement solves
Cameron, 13 - Ph.D., California, Berkeley, 1989, specializes in comparative politics and international political economy, (Maxwell, “Cameron: Should building
ties in Latin America be a policy priority for Canada?” March 11, 2013, http://opencanada.org/rapid-response-group/cameron-should-building-ties-in-latin-americabe-a-policy-priority-for-canada/)//A-Berg
Building ties in Latin America already is, ostensibly, a policy priority. Canada has been talking about “re-engagement with
Latin America” for some time. But we’re seen as out of step and irrelevant by most of the region: we’re not even included in diplomatic fora like UNASUR and
CELAC. It may be time to hit the reset button regardless
of what happens in Venezuela. The way that Canada handles the
situation in Venezuela offers an opportunity, not for immediate rapprochement with Venezuela – I agree with Bill Graham that it is
difficult to foresee much change in Canada-Venezuela relations in the near term – but for a fresh approach to Canada’s relations with
the region as a whole, Venezuela included. Here’s how. Right now, Venezuela is in crisis. Chavez was elected to a third term in
October. Now he is dead. How will his successors manage the transition? The solution is elections. A presidential election must be called within a month. For the
new government to have democratic legitimacy, the election must not only be free from fraud, it must give the opposition a genuine opportunity to put forward an
alternative. Canada
should work with all other democracies in the region—both through bilateral as well
as multilateral diplomacy—to ensure that the new leadership understands that its legitimacy at home
and abroad depends on credible elections. I can already hear the objections, so let me address them. Canada has almost no political
capital in Venezuela. True. The likelihood that the elections will held on a level playing field is next to nill. Also true. Canada has no business lecturing other countries
about democracy when we have our own problems at home (electoral irregularities, erosion of the separation of powers). Sadly, true. But these objections
miss the point. All democracies have imperfections, and there are many types of democratic regimes. That does not prevent
democracies from working together to provide a supportive international context for democratization
and to avert backsliding. Will Canada play such a role? If so, maybe it does need to hit the reset
button.
Empirics prove – Canada can fix oil nationalization
Gindin 06 - an independent journalist and researcher living between Toronto and Caracas (Jonah, “Venezuela's and Canada's Very Different Approaches to
Oil,” December 14th 2006, http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/2138) //A-Berg
Canada and Venezuela represent the most important sources of oil outside the Middle East—and as heavy oil extraction methods improve, they may
surpass even that black-gold mine. But their approaches to oil revenue could not be more different. Venezuela's oil
industry was very similar to Alberta's in the early- to mid-1990s, when US-promoted neo-liberalism—“free trade” and the privatization and deregulation of
the oil industry—was implemented. But when the controversial yet popular Hugo Chávez was elected in 1998, Venezuela embarked on a transformative
experiment, “re-nationalizing” the state oil company. With the country’s oil-based income increasing exponentially, Venezuela has
invested heavily in social programs. According to the Venezuelan National Statistics Institute, poverty rates have declined from 49 to 37 per cent since Chávez
assumed office. The Chávez administration has presented a serious challenge to neo-liberalism in Latin America by developing a social-democratic model with a
sharp revolutionary edge. This process was made possible by Chávez's successful mobilization of poor Venezuelans into a mass movement. Canada’s
oil
sector is highly regionalized, with royalty rates and the bulk of corporate taxes set and collected at the
provincial level. Alberta Premier Ralph Klein has pursued diametrically different policies than Chávez. Despite its business-friendly approach, the Klein
government has presided over huge surpluses over the past few years. Nevertheless, though social spending has increased marginally over this period, it remains
below the level it reached in 1993 before being slashed by Klein. Were Alberta to begin demanding a bigger piece of the oil-revenue pie, would it end up being
invested in the public good? Would it inspire (or require) popular mobilization along the lines of the Venezuelan experience? Two Models From the birth of the
Canadian and Venezuelan oil industries in the early 20th century to the late 1990s, the policies in both countries followed similar trajectories. Up until the 1973
OPEC oil shock, both oil industries were increasingly dominated by foreign corporations, most of them American. As happened in many other OPEC countries as a
result of the crisis, then-President of Venezuela Carlos Andrés Peréz nationalized the oil industry in 1975, creating state-run oil company Petroleos de Venezuela S.
A. (PDVSA). Venezuela pursued a series of nationalist policies during the late seventies and early eighties, investing oil revenues in a a slew of ill-conceived
development projects. Ultimately, these were doomed by poor planning, arrogance and the misconception that everlasting high oil rents would provide permanent
subsidies. Venezuela experienced a country-wide depression for much of the 1980s, as oil wealth was replaced by foreign debt. By 1989, at the behest of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the US Treasury Department, the government implemented the Apertura Petrolera—the “oil opening.” While PDVSA
technically remained state-run, the industry was opened up to external investment under extremely generous conditions, quickly becoming dominated (once again)
by foreign multinationals. PDVSA itself came under the control of a technocratic elite, eventually becoming known as a “state within a state” for its viciously
defended autonomy from the Venezuelan government. It resisted government oversight through “internationalization”—investing oil rents in overseas ventures to
avoid transferring the money to the government. Though not an OPEC member, Canada also founded
a state-run oil company, PetroCanada, in 1975, during the first Trudeau government. In 1980 the federal government implemented the National Energy Program (NEP), despite fervent
opposition from Western Canada. The NEP expanded the role of Petro-Canada, gave preferential treatment to
Canadian oil producers, and by fixing domestic prices sought to brace Canada’s industrial east from
the terrifying jumps in the international price of oil. In 1984, however, Brian Mulroney won the federal
election campaigning against the NEP, heralding the rise of an emboldened regionalism and the end of nationalist
oil politics in Canada. The signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) effectively enshrined Canada as an energy satellite of the US, making
it exceedingly difficult for Albertan or Canadian governments to serve the province or the country’s energy needs until the US had been served first. In 1990, the
Mulroney government declared its intention to privatize Petro-Canada, a process completed under Chrétien in 2004.
Canada must act in Venezuela to rebuild its soft power throughout Latin America
Cameron, 3/11/13 Ph.D. from UC Berkeley, specializes in comparative politics of Latin America and international political economy (Maxwell, 11 March
2013, “Should building ties in Latin America be a policy priority for Canada? Rapid Response, http://opencanada.org/rapid-response/should-building-ties-in-latinamerica-be-a-policy-priority-for-canada/)//KP
Building ties in Latin America already is, ostensibly, a policy priority. Canada has been talking about “re-engagement with Latin
America” for some time. But we’re seen as out of step and irrelevant by most of the region: we’re not even
included in diplomatic fora like UNASUR and CELAC. It may be time to hit the reset button regardless of what
happens in Venezuela. The way that Canada handles the situation in Venezuela offers an opportunity, not for
immediate rapprochement with Venezuela – I agree with Bill Graham that it is difficult to foresee much change in Canada-Venezuela relations in the near term – but
for a fresh approach to Canada’s relations with the region as a whole, Venezuela included. Here’s how.
Right now, Venezuela is in crisis. Chavez was elected to a third term in October. Now he is dead. How will his successors manage the transition?
The solution is elections. A presidential election must be called within a month. For the new government to have democratic legitimacy, the election must not only
be free from fraud, it must give the opposition a genuine opportunity to put forward an alternative. Canada
should work with all other
democracies in the region—both through bilateral as well as multilateral diplomacy—to ensure that
the new leadership understands that its legitimacy at home and abroad depends on credible
elections. I can already hear the objections, so let me address them. Canada has almost no political capital in Venezuela. True.
The likelihood that the elections will held on a level playing field is next to nill. Also true. Canada has no
business lecturing other countries about democracy when we have our own problems at home (electoral
irregularities, erosion of the separation of powers). Sadly, true. But these objections miss the point. All democracies have
imperfections, and there are many types of democratic regimes. That does not prevent democracies from working
together to provide a supportive international context for democratization and to avert backsliding.
Will Canada play such a role? If so, maybe it does need to hit the reset button.
Canada is in a position to engage Venezuela
FAIT, 2/14/13 Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Government of Canada (14 February 2013, “Baird to Travel to Latin America: Promoting and
Protecting Canadian Interests and Values,” http://www.international.gc.ca/wet30-1/aff/news-communiques/2013/02/13a.aspx?lang=eng)//KP
Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird today announced that he will travel to six Latin American countries from
February 14 to 22, 2013. In Mexico, Peru, Panama and the Dominican Republic, the focus will be on expanding cooperation in a variety of areas. In Cuba and
Venezuela, Baird will focus especially on democracy, human rights and economic liberalization. “Our
government is focused on creating jobs, growth and economic prosperity,” said Baird. “As part of our
principled foreign policy, we will also deliver strong messages on economic reforms and greater
respect for human rights and democracy as appropriate.” Baird added: “Our government is committed to
ensuring we exercise Canadian leadership in key areas affecting our hemisphere from the Arctic to the
Antarctic.” Baird will begin his trip in Mexico City, where he will meet José Antonio Meade Kuribreña, Mexico's new Secretary of Foreign Relations. This will
be the first meeting between the two men and a chance to expand relations with this key partner. In Mexico and later in Peru, Baird will be engaging like-minded
partners, and pursuing the steps needed for membership in the very promising Pacific Alliance. (Canada became an official observer at the Pacific Alliance in
November 2012. Alliance members are working to facilitate the free movement of goods, services, capital and people among themselves, while also strengthening
trade and investment ties with Asia. The Alliance's founding members—Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru—are four of Latin America's fastest-growing economies.)
In meetings in Panama and the Dominican Republic, Ba ird
will seek new ways to create opportunities for long-term
economic prosperity, while also promoting our shared values regionally and globally. To that end,
Baird will conduct visits to Cuba and Venezuela to engage with government representatives. While in these
countries, he will also meet with civil society organizations and local members of the Canadian business
community. Canada is keenly interested in seeing further progress on human rights, democratic
governance and economic liberalization.
Cuba
Canadian engagement solves Cuban economy and ag
CIDA, ‘6/6 - Canadian International Development Agency, “Cuba,” Date Modified: 2013-6-6, http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cuba-e)//A-Berg
CIDA maintains a continuing dialogue with the Government of Cuba on development priorities. CIDA
supports the interest that Cuban officials have expressed in maintaining social gains during a period of economic liberalization. Throughout these discussions,
Canada seeks to respond to Cuban development priorities in ways that also correspond to Canadian values and expertise. CIDA's
programming in
Cuba is aligned with several of the priorities of the Cuban Government, in particular increasing agricultural productivity and
improving the efficient and accountable delivery of public services. For this reason, CIDA's program in Cuba focuses on
helping the country increase sustainable economic growth and food security. This includes increasing
the diversity, availability and sustainability of food production, and more effective, efficient and accountable public services
delivery for all Cubans. Economic growth CIDA works with Canadian organizations and trusted multilateral partners to
support ministries and institutions that promote economic growth and that play a key role in implementing
Cuba's economic reform process. Selected examples of expected results Competency-based technical training and certification of 200 workers
to international standards will lead to improved industrial productivity Five training programs to help prepare Cubans for employment in emerging industries such
as oil and gas operations, petrochemical exploration, power engineering, pipefitting and renewable energy will be introduced Training of up to 6,000 auditors in
modern auditing techniques and information technologies will help solidify the advances of government agencies and state-run enterprises toward greater
transparency and accountability Food security CIDA
support is increasing agricultural diversification, productivity and
competitiveness, emphasizing the poorer provinces. CIDA is helping Cuba strengthen small businesses and
cooperatives by building skills and promoting more integrated and efficient production chains. Selected
examples of expected results Increased volume (up to 10 percent) of fruit and grain production in cooperatives in selected municipalities in the provinces of
Santiago de Cuba and Sancti Spiritus Implementation of the Ministry of Agriculture's National Strategy for Diversified Crop Production resulting in a 12 percent
increase in agricultural production in 19 farms, generating a 30 percent increase in farmers' income
Canada can boost Cuban tourism and infrastructure
Brickman, ’08 – Barry, President, North West International Ltd., “WESTERN CANADA AND LATIN AMERICA EXISTING AND POTENTIAL COMMERCIAL
RELATIONSHIPS,” August 1, 2008, http://www.wd.gc.ca/images/cont/11103-eng.pdf)//A-Berg
The tourism industry and infrastructure projects are priority sectors for Canada in many countries in the
Caribbean. International Financial Institutions (IFIs) play an increasingly important role in generating greater business opportunities
in the countries of the Caribbean Community. Many of the islands (such as Cuba, Trinidad and Tobago) are also rich in crude oil and natural
gas, making them especially important for Canada’s oil and gas industry. Canada has an important
relationship with Cuba and has consistently recognized Cuba’s strong commitment to economic and
social rights, with its particularly important achievements in the areas of education and health. At the
same time, Canada has urged Cuban authorities to achieve similar progress with respect to basic civil and political rights, such as freedom of speech, association,
and the press.38
Canada Solves Cuba
Heine 2/13- Jorge, freelance National Affairs writer (“Canada re-engages with Latin America” , 2/22/13,
http://www.thestar.com/opinion/editorialopinion/2013/02/22/canada_reengages_with_latin_america.html)//Modermatt
The visit by Foreign Minister John Baird to Mexico, Cuba, Peru, the Dominican Republic and Panama is a welcome development. The same goes for the one by
Minister of State for the Americas and Consular Affairs Diane Ablonczy to Nicaragua, Ecuador, Colombia and Chile, also this week. Both visits give a badly needed
fresh impetus to the priority given to Latin America by Prime Minister Stephen Harper in 2007. It
should also give Canadian officials a firsthand impression of what is happening in the region. Over the past decade — the region’s most
successful — there has been a sea-change in its politics, its economies and its foreign relations. Yet many
observers continue to look at Latin America through a Cold War lens. Since 2000, the middle class has increased by 50 per cent, and poverty has fallen to 28.8 per
cent. Leaving underdevelopment behind seems within the grasp of several countries. A key source of this takeoff has been the region’s changing international ties.
Since 2007, the region’s foreign trade in goods has increased by 40 per cent — from $1.55 trillion (U.S.) to $2.19 trillion in 2012, during the worst international
financial crisis in 80 years, which left the region unscathed. While unemployment in Spain and Greece clocks in at 26 per cent, and the U.S. rate is 8 per cent, in
Brazil it has reached an all-time low of 4.6 per cent, in Peru 6.7 per cent, and in Ecuador 4.8 per cent. In 2013, Panama’s economy is projected to grow 7.5 per cent,
Peru 5.8 per cent, the Dominican Republic 4.3 per cent and Colombia 3.8 per cent. Chile has grown at an average rate of 5.9 per cent over the past three years and
attracted a record $26.4 billion in foreign direct investment in 2012 — more than Mexico and second only to Brazil. The
business opportunities
for Canadian companies are enormous. South America’s largely natural-resource-based economies are
strong in areas where Canada has comparative advantages and can move in swiftly. Mining companies like
Barrick Gold have been at the forefront of this, while banks like Scotiabank have also made significant inroads. Yet many Canadian companies still regard Latin lands
as terra incognita. Given the good will toward Canadians out there, and how much beckons, this is a pity. Latin American regionalism has also been growing in leaps
and bounds, and is one of the secrets behind the region’s success. The latest entity is the Pacific Alliance. It was launched on May 6, 2012, in Paranal, northern Chile,
in the presence of the presidents of Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. Originally mooted by former Chilean president Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010), the grouping
came formally into being with the Lima Declaration of April 2011. Its main objective is to “create an area of deep integration . . . as well as greater growth,
development and competitiveness.” It aims to do so through the gradual liberalization of the circulation of goods, services, capital and people, including the
integration of its members’ stock exchanges (though this has run into some difficulties). Canada
may want to explore closer ties with
the Pacific Alliance, though it should keep in mind that imposing visas on Mexicans (a NAFTA partner)
in 2009 went over like lead balloon. It would need sorting out if serious progress is to be made on this
front. Minister Baird’s visit to Havana is especially encouraging. Though much hope was placed on the possibility of the Obama administration’s coming up with
a new Cuba policy, it is stuck in neutral, held hostage to Miami’s Cuban-American lobby. Canada’s long-standing, special relationship
with Cuba puts it in a good position to act as a broker to sort out Cuba’s overdue rejoining the interAmerican community as a full member. Few issues command such unanimous support throughout
Latin America and the Caribbean. A breakthrough on this thorny issue, a Cold War relic that should
have been disposed of long ago, would be a real feather in Canada’s cap.
Canada solves best – increasing relations with Venezuela and Cuba now
The Canadian Press, 2/17 - Minister of Foreign Affairs John Baird responds to questions in the House of Commons (“Baird concerned with Iran ties
with Venezuela”, 2/17 /13 , CBC News, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/story/2013/02/17/baird-chavez-iran.html)//GP
Canada is increasingly concerned with the growing cozy relations between Iran and Venezuela and intends
to press the issue with the regime of Hugo Chavez in Caracas next week, Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird said Sunday.¶ "I'm concerned
about Iran in general," he told The Canadian Press from Lima, Peru. "I'm concerned about their nuclear program. I'm concerned about their support of terrorism.¶
"And I'm concerned about their deteriorating human rights record at home. So I don't think we'll see eye to eye with Venezuela on that."¶
Baird is on an
eight-day, six-country Latin American tour that also took him last week to Cuba, the hemisphere's
most repressive anti-democratic country. He visits Caracas on Wednesday.¶ The Cuba-Venezuela bond was
underscored as Baird arrived in Havana on Friday. He was greeted with the release of a new
photograph of Chavez convalescing happily in a Cuban hospital, where he has spent the last two months receiving treatment
for cancer.¶ Though Venezuela is a functioning democracy, it has in Chavez an aging and ailing iron-fisted leader similar to that of communist Cuba,
where Raul Castro, 81, succeeded his iconic, 86-year-old brother Fidel five years ago, and has begun
instituting modest economic reforms.¶ Deeper economic and commerical engagement¶ Baird said he is pushing for
deeper economic and commercial engagement for Canada in both countries because that can
promote change at what is looking like a pivotal moment in history.¶ The minister said he sees
potential for Canadian companies in the financial services, energy and mining sectors.¶ But with Chavez
potentially on his last legs, the Obama administration is hopeful it can reset relations with Venezuela. Chavez has courted Iran as an ally.¶ The Obama
administration believes Iran is trying to gain a foothold in Latin America, including perhaps establishing a military base.¶ Last week, Venezuela had to explain a $46million cheque found in the possession of Iran's former central bank chief when he was detained in Germany.¶ On Sunday, a report by Iran's Press TV said
Venezuela's state-owned weapons manufacturer, CAVIM, would continue to do business with Iran in the face of sanctions by the U.S. State Department.¶ Baird said
he is eager to bring up the Iran relationship with his counterpart in Caracas later this week.¶ 'On Iran, we have strong views.'—John Baird, Minister of Foreign
Affairs¶ "On Iran, we have strong views," he said.¶ Baird is also scheduled to meet with opposition figures in Venezuela.¶ "The elections held recently were by no
means perfect but I think even the opposition conceded they were much better than anticipated," Baird said in reference to the ballot that returned Chavez to
power last fall before his illness struck.¶ " Obviously,
we want to promote democracy, and we want to promote
political freedoms."¶ In Cuba, Baird said he had frank discussions with his counterpart, Bruno Rodriguez, who at
54 is a political spring chicken compared the octogenarian holdovers from the 1959 revolution who still occupy high offices.¶ Since taking charge, Raul Castro has
allowed a series of small, free market reforms, and eased travel restrictions on
Cubans.¶ "I think there's a long way to go," said
Baird. "They're beginning to make some significant economic reform, so I think there's some reason
for optimism there."¶ He also said Cuba is beginning a transition to new leadership.¶ "There is beginning to
be a change of the guard in the cabinet, and among the senior leadership — just a beginning — I think
that gives us some reason for optimism," he said.¶ "Obviously, we want to see people in Cuba live in
freedom and prosperity."¶ Baird said Canada still opposes Cuba's return to the Organization of American States when it holds its next summit
in 2015, saying the country needs to go further on its reforms. Canada and the U.S. oppose the return of Cuba to the 35-country Western Hemisphere club.¶ But
Canada supports Cuba's calls for the United States to end its five-decade long economic embargo.¶
Canada solves the Aff better than the US
Heine, 2/22/13 CIGI Professor of Global Governance at the Balsillie School of International Affairs, Wilfrid Laurier University (Jorge, 22 February 2013,
“Canada re-engages with Latin America,” The Toronto Star,
http://www.thestar.com/opinion/editorialopinion/2013/02/22/canada_reengages_with_latin_america.html)//KP
The visit by Foreign Minister John Baird to Mexico, Cuba, Peru, the Dominican Republic and Panama is a
welcome development. The same goes for the one by Minister of State for the Americas and Consular
Affairs Diane Ablonczy to Nicaragua, Ecuador, Colombia and Chile, also this week. Both visits give a badly
needed fresh impetus to the priority given to Latin America by Prime Minister Stephen Harper in 2007.¶ It should also give Canadian
officials a first-hand impression of what is happening in the region. Over the past decade — the region’s most
successful — there has been a sea-change in its politics, its economies and its foreign relations. Yet many
observers continue to look at Latin America through a Cold War lens. Since 2000, the middle class has increased by 50 per
cent, and poverty has fallen to 28.8 per cent. Leaving underdevelopment behind seems within the grasp of several countries. A key source of this takeoff has been
the region’s changing international ties.¶ Since 2007, the region’s foreign trade in goods has increased by 40 per cent — from $1.55 trillion (U.S.) to $2.19 trillion in
2012, during the worst international financial crisis in 80 years, which left the region unscathed. While unemployment in Spain and Greece clocks in at 26 per cent,
and the U.S. rate is 8 per cent, in Brazil it has reached an all-time low of 4.6 per cent, in Peru 6.7 per cent, and in Ecuador 4.8 per cent. In 2013, Panama’s economy is
projected to grow 7.5 per cent, Peru 5.8 per cent, the Dominican Republic 4.3 per cent and Colombia 3.8 per cent. Chile has grown at an average rate of 5.9 per cent
over the past three years and attracted a record $26.4 billion in foreign direct investment in 2012 — more than Mexico and second only to Brazil.¶ The
business opportunities for Canadian companies are enormous. South America’s largely natural-resource-based economies are
strong in areas where Canada has comparative advantages and can move in swiftly. Mining companies like Barrick Gold have been at the forefront of this, while
banks like Scotiabank have also made significant inroads. Yet many Canadian companies still regard Latin lands as terra incognita. Given the good will toward
Canadians out there, and how much beckons, this is a pity.¶ Latin American regionalism has also been growing in leaps and bounds, and is one of the secrets behind
the region’s success. The latest entity is the Pacific Alliance. It was launched on May 6, 2012, in Paranal, northern Chile, in the presence of the
presidents of Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. Originally mooted by former Chilean president Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010), the grouping came formally into
being with the Lima Declaration of April 2011. Its
main objective is to “create an area of deep integration . . . as well as
greater growth, development and competitiveness.” It aims to do so through the gradual
liberalization of the circulation of goods, services, capital and people, including the integration of its members’ stock
exchanges (though this has run into some difficulties).¶ Canada may want to explore closer ties with the Pacific Alliance ,
though it should keep in mind that imposing visas on Mexicans (a NAFTA partner) in 2009 went over like lead balloon. It would need sorting out if serious progress is
to be made on this front.¶ Minister
Baird’s visit to Havana is especially encouraging. Though much hope was
placed on the possibility of the Obama administration’s coming up with a new Cuba policy, it is stuck
in neutral, held hostage to Miami’s Cuban-American lobby.¶ Canada’s long-standing, special
relationship with Cuba puts it in a good position to act as a broker to sort out Cuba’s overdue rejoining
the inter-American community as a full member. Few issues command such unanimous support throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. A
breakthrough on this thorny issue, a Cold War relic that should have been disposed of long ago, would
be a real feather in Canada’s cap.
Canada is in a position to engage Cuba
FAIT, 2/14/13 Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Government of Canada (14 February 2013, “Baird to Travel to Latin America: Promoting and
Protecting Canadian Interests and Values,” http://www.international.gc.ca/wet30-1/aff/news-communiques/2013/02/13a.aspx?lang=eng)//KP
Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird today announced that he will travel to six Latin American countries from
February 14 to 22, 2013. In Mexico, Peru, Panama and the Dominican Republic, the focus will be on expanding cooperation in a variety of areas. In Cuba and
Venezuela, Baird will focus especially on democracy, human rights and economic liberalization. “Our
government is focused on creating jobs, growth and economic prosperity,” said Baird. “As part of our
principled foreign policy, we will also deliver strong messages on economic reforms and greater
respect for human rights and democracy as appropriate.” Baird added: “Our government is committed to
ensuring we exercise Canadian leadership in key areas affecting our hemisphere from the Arctic to the
Antarctic.” Baird will begin his trip in Mexico City, where he will meet José Antonio Meade Kuribreña, Mexico's new Secretary of Foreign Relations. This will be
the first meeting between the two men and a chance to expand relations with this key partner. In Mexico and later in Peru, Baird will be engaging like-minded
partners, and pursuing the steps needed for membership in the very promising Pacific Alliance. (Canada became an official observer at the Pacific Alliance in
November 2012. Alliance members are working to facilitate the free movement of goods, services, capital and people among themselves, while also strengthening
trade and investment ties with Asia. The Alliance's founding members—Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru—are four of Latin America's fastest-growing economies.)
In meetings in Panama and the Dominican Republic, Baird
will seek new ways to create opportunities for long-term
economic prosperity, while also promoting our shared values regionally and globally. To that end,
Baird will conduct visits to Cuba and Venezuela to engage with government representatives. While in these countries,
he will also meet with civil society organizations and local members of the Canadian business
community. Canada is keenly interested in seeing further progress on human rights, democratic
governance and economic liberalization.
Cuba will say yes – development funds and diplomacy
McKenna 12 chair and professor of political science at the of University of Prince Edward Island (Peter McKenna, 2012, “Through the Sun and Ice: Canada,
Cuba, and Fifty Year of ‘Normal’ Relations,” Canada Looks South: In Search of an American Policy, pages 159-160)//KP
Clearly, the
Cuban government is interested in strengthening political and economic relations with
Canada for a number of pragmatic reasons: the Canadian government is a key supplier of financing and credit;
approximately seventy Canadian companies comprise the largest source of badly needed foreign investment; and some 900,000 Canadians travel to Cuba annually,
generating important revenue and employment on the island. Canada
also provides valuable development assistance funds,
officials are now (or rather have been in the past)
involved in improving Cuba’s banking system, tax structure, tourism sector, and its economic planning
procedures and intuitions. In sum, constructive relations with Canada provide a host of benefits to Cuba,
and without any onerous preconditions. Cuban officials know that, for the most part, the Canadian government does not do
Washington’s bidding and is not seeking to destabilize the Cuban government or punish the Cuban
people. Cuban authorities also recognize that a cordial and constructive relationship with Canada could prove
valuable to Havana some time down the road. Indeed, Canada has often been touted as an important
intermediary in any future Cuba-U.S. rapprochement.
including CIDA’s outstanding programs and technical expertise. Additionally, Canadian
Mexico
Canada solves – bilateral institutions for energy cooperation already exist.
SRE 11 – Mexican Secretariat of Foreign Affairs (Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, “Canada-Mexico Joint Action Plan 2010-2012”, 6/17/11;
< http://embamex.sre.gob.mx/canada/images/mexico-jap.pdf>)//Beddow
1) Fostering Competitive and Sustainable Economies. Canada and Mexico’s economic partnership has evolved, from
“exports” in the 1990s to “integrated production” in the 21st century. We have a joint interest in the
vitality of this partnership, and in strengthening North American competitiveness. A concerted focus on innovation and
applied science and technology is critical to our societies’ goal of achieving and sustaining economic
competitiveness. Canada and Mexico share an interest in a wide range of economic activities that could
benefit from our closer collaboration, leading to new business opportunities. Our countries also
acknowledge the dynamic intersection of the economy and the environment. Energy and climate change
initiatives support long-term economic competitiveness, enhance energy security and mitigate air
pollution. Our two countries have built a platform of pragmatic cooperation through a number of
bilateral, North American and multilateral mechanisms, including the Canada-Mexico Partnership, the
North American Leaders Summit, the Commission for Environmental Cooperation, the technology
cooperation partnerships such as the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP), the
Methane-to-Markets Partnership, the International Partnership for Energy Efficiency Cooperation (IPEEC) and,
most recently, the Energy and Climate Partnership for the Americas (ECPA). Work programs already
underway bilaterally, trilaterally, and globally will be complemented by further initiatives, including in
the area of corporate social responsibility.
Canadian engagement with Mexico solves the aff and is key to their soft power. (also
has say yes warrant)
Greenspon et. Al ’10 - Edward, Chair, The GPS Project, André Beaulieu, Vice-president,Value Creation and Procurement, Bell Canada, Cathy Beehan,
Founding CEO, A ction Canada, Gerald Butts, President and CEO, World Wildlife Fund Canada, Mark Cameron, Director, Corporate Affairs, Ontario Power
Generation, Hancock Counsellor, WTO, Jonathan Hausman, Vice-president, Alternative, Investments and Emerging, Markets, Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan, Farah
Mohamed President, Belinda Stronach, Foundation, George Roter, Co-CEO and cofounder, Engineers Without Borders Canada, Stéphane Roussel, Pr ofessor,
Université du, Québec à Montréal, Mercedes Stephenson, Host and producer, Mercedes Stephenson Investigates, and vice-president, Breakout Educ ational
Network, Kristina Tomaz-Young, Founder and producer, Venture Capital TV, and president and practice leader, Smart Initiatives, Inc., Yuen Pau Woo , President and
CEO, Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada – (“Open Canada: A Global Positioning Strategy for a Networked Age,” June 2010, http://opencanada.
org/features/reports/opencanada/)//A-Berg
Mexico is one of Canada’s most important—and most underdeveloped—relationships. Few countries care as much
about their relationship with Canada as Mexico, and there are few places where Canada’s interests are so clear. Getting along with Mexico
contributes to both of our goals: deepening ties with the United States and broadening ties with others . Mexico gives
Canada an opportunity to contribute to our prosperity, matter more in Washington, and do good at
the same time. Mexico respects Canada as the more established and stable bookend to the U.S. However, it has felt rejected in the trilateral NAFTA and
blindsided by the imposition last year of stringent visa requirements for Mexicans seeking entry to Canada—requirements that are far tougher than the U.S. visa
standards. Sixteen years into the NAFTA era, Canada’s two-way trade with Mexico is a modest $24 billion a year, largely in Mexico’s favour. Still, it is our fifth-largest
export market and growing every year. It is also a major destination for investment, tourists and retirees, and our sixth-largest source of visitors to Canada, at least
before the visa requirement.
Our relations with Mexico—mostly good, some bad—should not be forgotten in the
stampede to Asia. As neighbours to the U.S., Canada and Mexico face opposite challenges: Canada can’t attract enough attention, and Mexico attracts
too much. Canada only went into NAFTA as a defensive measure against being left behind by a U.S.–Mexican bilateral agreement. Some Canadian policy thinkers, in
hindsight, argue that Canada’s post-1994 flirtation with a third amigo was a strategic mistake; that we need to distance ourselves from Mexico in order to ensure
that the U.S. does not treat our respective borders and the countries beyond them in the same way. The GPS Panel dismisses such guilt-by-association fears as the
product of faulty analysis. Canada has its own interests in a healthy Mexico. Mexico is a nation in transition. At times it has been rough, no doubt about it. For
Canadians who know Mexico only through the media, it is crime ridden and drug infested. But Mexico also is a more democratic and better-managed state than it
was in the pre-NAFTA era. It has stabilized its economy, financial system and currency. Its infant mortality is down and its life expectancy is up. It is a democracy,
although one with stark reminders of how tenuous young democracies can be. Mexico is a nation in transition. At times it has been rough, no doubt about it.
Canada cannot be certain that Mexico will overcome all of its challenges to become a fully fledged democracy and market economy. But the balance is in its favour,
and Canada can help itself by helping Mexico achiev e that balance. Tested as it is by drug wars, judicial corruption, an inefficient
economy, income inequality and global insularity, it can use whatever help we can muster. The last thing Canada needs is a failed experiment in liberal democratic
capitalism on the doorstep of our most important strategic partner. If
the U.S. is already distracted by Mexico to the detriment
of Canada, a Mexico beset by political and economic disorder will only make matters worse. That would
really give Homeland Security a license to tighten the screws. The U.S. is heavily invested in Mexican success, knowing this is the only hope of securing its southern
flank. But it is also constrained by its history of violent intervention. Canadians need to appreciate that we have a stake in Mexico, too—for better or worse—and
that our involvement will be welcomed by both Mexico City and Washington. ROOM TO GROW Canadians might also reflect on projections by forecasters such as
Goldman Sachs, creators of the BRIC designation, that say the size of the Mexican economy will surpass Canada’s within 20 years. Here is an emerging market, 111
million strong, integrated into the North American supply chain (our China), already an OECD and G20 member-state and only four hours away by air and a day and
a half by road. Mexico’s per capita income is more than twice that of China and four times that of India. There
is no other region in the world
in which our political influence and economic interests have the same potential to expand. The GPS
Panel recommends making Mexico a major diplomatic priority to help secure its democracy, quell its
violence, improve its public administration and become a more active player on the international
stage. We see Mexico as a fertile market for more Canadian trade and investment and a partner in our relations with the U.S. To a lesser extent, we would like to
see the same strategy employed elsewhere in the hemisphere. Unlike the failed Free Trade of the Americas, we are not calling for a grand hemispheric strategy but
rather a discriminating one. Not all countries in the Americas hold out the same promise for Canada, nor should we spread our resources too thinly. We see great
potential in Colombia, a nation of 44 million emerging from decades of brutal violence, as well as in Chile (17 million), Peru (29 million) and much of the Caribbean
(40 million). Brazil, the B in BRIC and brimming with confidence, may not have the same desire to engage Canada, but we must find ways to engage it and its 200
million people as the second most important player in the Americas. EASY FIRST STEPS Still, a
focused relationship with Latin America
economic and diplomatic bridge into Central
starts with Mexico, our Latin cousin in North America and potentially an
America. Deepening the relationship begins with simple deliverables: • Mexico wants RCMP and legal trainers to help professionalize
its police forces and justice system. • Mexico is not a poor country but it has extremely poor regions. It could use Canada’s help in poverty alleviation and education,
among other things. • Mexico has one of the worst records of tax collection in the hemisphere. Just as Elections Canada helped develop a world-class electoral
commission in Mexico, so the Canadian Revenue Agency can make similar efforts on the tax front. • Mexico is the perfect place for a newly consolidated Canadian
Centre for Democratic Development to make its mark. • There is lots of room for
cooperation —trilaterally or bilaterally— in energy
production, environmental protection, forestry, oceanography, medicine and more. We would like to see Mexico
more engaged in global security but appreciate its historic aversion to intervention in the affairs of other nations. The Mexican Constitution grants its president
exclusive control over foreign policy in accordance with six principles, including one of non-intervention. Mexico did send troops to New Orleans to help during the
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Although unprecedented, this move did not stir controversy. As the
lines between humanitarian
assistance, development and security narrow, Mexico may be more willing to step out and
experiment. We would also like to see Mexico, a strong supporter of the United Nations, eventually join Canada in our failing states strategy. The goal,
although difficult to picture today, would be for Mexico, already an OECD member, to join NATO just as the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe have. But first
things first. Some Mexico experts have said that joint naval exercises would be a good place to start. Building trust and capability with the Mexican navy would
boost confidence on both sides and combine forces against the smuggling operations that bring drugs from Mexico to Canada. The GPS Panel heard many calls to lift
visa requirements imposed on Mexican visitors last year after a surge in refugee claimants. We reluctantly support retaining the visa, as part of a larger goal of longterm harmonization of our visa list with the U.S. But we would also harmonize the application, adopting the far simpler and less intrusive American visa form. As
neighbours to the United States, Canada and Mexico face opposite challenges: Canada can’t attract enough attention, and Mexico attracts too much. With
less
competition and much need, this is a part of the world where Canada can make a difference. We can
offer our services to countries looking for a better future and be useful to our allies, particularly, the
U.S., in the process. Canada played an active part during the Peruvian democracy crisis in 2000. There is no reason why we could not have helped
mediate the Honduran democracy crisis last year. Our connections with Cuba, although sometimes used to score cheap political points, should help smooth the way
to the eventual normalization of relations with the U.S. We certainly have made a humanitarian difference in Haiti, the failed state of the Americas. Canada
cannot save the world, but it can
work toward social and economic progress and against democratic backsliding
in our hemisphere. A strategy in Latin America requires staying power, however. To grasp the nuances of this region, like any region, Canada needs to
think in decades, not to the next summit. The 1950s generation did not build close relations with Europe on a passing fancy or single agreement. Two of our
founding peoples were European. We fought two wars in Europe. We sold Europeans our wheat, lumber and minerals and were open to their investment. We
welcomed their immigrants. We
posted the best and brightest of our diplomats there and developed deep
partnerships within international institutions. Specialization, consistency, full engagement —that is
how truly beneficial relationships are built.
Canada Solves Mexico
FAITC 11- Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada government website (“Canada and Mexico Continue to Strengthen Economic Ties”, June 13th 2011,
http://www.international.gc.ca/media_commerce/comm/news-communiques/2011/160.aspx)//Modermatt
The Honourable Ed Fast, Minister of International Trade and Minister for the Asia-Pacific Gateway, and the Honourable Christian Paradis, Minister of Industry and
Minister of State (Agriculture), today welcomed to Ottawa, Bruno Ferrari, Mexico’s Secretary of the Economy, and discussed how trade can achieve greater
prosperity for Canadians and Mexicans alike. The
ministers and secretary met on the margins of the Mexico-Canada
Business2Business Forum: Global Business Opportunities and Innovation Strategies, organized by the Embassy of Mexico to Canada, Canadian
Manufacturers and Exporters and the Mexican Business Council for Foreign Trade. The forum runs from June 13 to 14. “The Harper government’s priority is to
create jobs, increase prosperity and preserve and strengthen the financial security of Canadians,” said
Minister Fast. “Deepening trade, which represents about 60 percent of our economy, with key
countries like Mexico is vital to our economic recovery and future prosperity.” Since NAFTA came into
effect, merchandise trade between Canada and Mexico has increased sixfold and was worth $27.1
billion in 2010. Besides being among each other’s largest trading partners, Canada has also become a major foreign investor
in Mexico. “Our government continues to enhance the competitiveness of Canada, which helps attract
foreign investment,” said Minister Paradis. “We are also helping Canadian businesses grow and
succeed around the world, so they can create jobs and economic growth here at home.” During his two-day
visit to Ottawa, Secretary Ferrari also met the Honourable Gerry Ritz, Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food and Minister for the Canadian Wheat Board, and
Canada’s Foreign Affairs Minister, John Baird. On the opening day of the forum, Minister Fast also delivered the inaugural keynote address along with Secretary
Ferrari.
He told the group of more than 400 Canadian and Mexican business leaders that Canada has a
lot to offer Mexico in many key areas—from energy, agriculture, the environment and forestry to
transportation, infrastructure and high technology. “Canada and Mexico are important strategic
partners,” concluded Minister Fast. “In my meeting today with Secretary Ferrari, I told him the Harper government is committed to
working closely with Mexico, building on the incredible success of NAFTA, to further strengthen trade and investment
opportunities for both countries.”
Canadia-Mexico bilateral relationship key to solvency
between Canada and Mexico
Beatty and Rozental 12- Perrin Beatty and Andres Rozental, staff writers (“What’s good for Mexico is good for Canada”, Nov. 27, 2012,
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/commentary/whats-good-for-mexico-is-good-for-canada/article5697426/)
President-elect Enrique Peña Nieto’s visit to Ottawa this week offers a major opportunity to upgrade
bilateral relations between Canada and Mexico to the level of a strategic partnership. Although Canada joined
the North American free-trade agreement talks to preserve the gains from the earlier Canadian-U.S. free-trade agreement, this “reluctant” decision has proved
to be remarkably rewarding. Canada not only succeeded in protecting its primary market with its most important trading partner – the United States – but it also
found a new partner in Mexico.
Since NAFTA, Canadian trade with Mexico has grown nearly sixfold. Mexico is
now Canada’s third-largest trading partner, with two-way trade reaching $34.4-billion in 2011. The
growth in the bilateral economic relationship has not been limited to trade. Canadian investments in
Mexico have more than doubled since the late 1980s, as Canada has become one of Mexico’s largest sources of foreign direct
investment. More than 2,500 Canadian companies have offices and operations in Mexico. Many have used their Mexican operations as launch pads to reach
other markets in Central and South America. Mexican
firms are now also showing greater interest in Canada. After the
United States, Mexico is now the most popular foreign destination for Canadians . The majority of these are short-term
visitors, but there are also a growing number of business people, students and other long-term residents living in Mexico. In the other direction, Mexico is the
second-largest source of temporary foreign workers for Canada, boosting the productivity of Canada’s agricultural sector through the Seasonal Agricultural
Workers Program. As Canada’s labour force continues to age, Mexico offers a rich source of younger workers upon which to draw. Despite these growing
interactions, most Canadians and Mexicans still hold largely stereotypical images of each other. Many Canadians see Mexico as sun, sand and margaritas, while
others focus on criminality, corruption and drugs. Our two countries still have much to learn about one another. There
is a tremendous
opportunity to increase that knowledge by, for example, increasing exchanges between Mexicans and
Canadians through labour and student mobility agreements and initiatives. As global competition
becomes more intense, Canada and Mexico could each benefit from taking a broader view of North
American relations. An enhanced economic partnership among Canada, Mexico and the United States would make North America as productive and
competitive as any other major economic area. To make this a reality, Canada and Mexico must first strengthen their
own bilateral bonds. To that end, the two countries should realize that, despite the growth in bilateral
trade and investment, they are leaving major economic opportunities on the table. Today, Canada’s economy is
larger than Mexico’s, but within a few decades, their relative positions will switch. PricewaterhouseCoopers projects that, on a purchasing power parity basis,
Mexico’s GDP will be $6.6-trillion by 2050 – the seventh-largest economy in the world, with twice Canada’s projected GDP of $3.3-trillion. Additionally, by 2050,
one in six Americans will be of Mexican ancestry. In short, the Mexican economy and the Mexican diaspora will provide new and compelling opportunities for
trade and investment far too large for Canadians to ignore. In
the immediate future, there are opportunities for Canada and
Mexico to collaborate on regional and international issues. Both boast large hydrocarbon industries and both have relatively
carbon-intensive economies. With Mr. Peña Nieto’s promise to allow foreign investment in the Mexican petroleum sector, Canadian energy firms can look for
opportunities in Mexico. Mexican-Canadian co-ordination on some continental issues could help even the playing field. This applies, for example, to pursuing
greater alignment in their regulatory regimes. Strengthening Mexico’s economy will not only help the 52 million Mexicans who live in poverty, it will enhance
Canada’s ability to service Mexico’s growing middle class. In
the longer term, Canada should support efforts to further
reform the Mexican economy and to deal with organized crime. Ultimately, turning the bilateral
relationship into a strategic partnership will mean realizing that what’s good for Mexico is also good
for Canada.
CP solves economic engagement with Mexico – experience and good relations
Morris, 11 - Regional Vice-President, Western Canada of Haskayne School of Business & Canadian Council for the Americas
(Linda Morris, May 26, 2011, “Doing Business in Latin America: Are You There Yet?”, Canada of Haskayne School of Business, http://www.edc.ca/EN/AboutUs/News-Room/Speeches/Pages/doing-business-latin-america.aspx)//GP
Ladies and gentlemen -- Good Evening, Bonsoir, Buenas Noches and Boa Noite.¶ Thank you to the Haskayne School of Business and the Canadian Council for the
Americas-Alberta for this speaking invitation.¶ Trying to cover business opportunities in Latin America is a little like being asked how to do business in all of North
America. It’s a huge topic and each of the countries in Latin America is unique.¶ Differences aside,
three key developments are making
trade and investment in many parts of Latin America hard—or foolhardy-- to resist anymore:¶ Many Latin American
countries are more stable, growing faster and ranked higher for ease of doing business than ever before in their history. And the growth rates, this
year and next, of key markets, like Brazil, Panama, Mexico and Peru, are forecast to do much better than the
U.S. or Canada’s.¶ Canadian exports and direct investment in many key parts of Latin America have
increased steadily over the past decade--except for a blip in recessionary 2009. Compared to five years ago, for
instance, Canada’s exports to the region as a whole jumped 25 per cent.¶ Latin America has several
concrete trade advantages over emerging giants like China and India. We have 5 free trade
agreements with key Latin American countries, either in force or near completion, eliminating burdensome tariffs
and making direct investment more secure. The region’s relative proximity also gives exporters
delivery speed and cost savings.¶ Today, I’ll focus on 5 key Latin American markets, where EDC has seen
the biggest boom in bilateral trade : Brazil, Mexico , Chile, the Andean Region, and key markets in Central America
and the Caribbean.¶ EDC’s experience in these markets serves as a good reflection of what Canadian exporters and investors are doing in general.¶
Indeed, it’s no coincidence that EDC has representations in all these regions, including two locations in Mexico and Brazil. We celebrated a
decade in those markets in 2010. And we opened in Santiago (Chile); Lima (Peru); and Panama in each of the past three years. ¶ EDC – Overview
and Role in Latin America ¶ For those who don’t know EDC well: We are a Crown corporation whose purpose is to develop and expand Canada’s international trade.
To give you a flavor of the growth in Latin America through the EDC lens, EDC helped Canadian
companies do more than $10 billion
worth of business in 2010: That’s nearly 40 per cent more than 10 years ago.¶ ¶ We served close to 1,500
customers in the region, 60 per cent more than a decade ago.¶ ¶ And our business volume in the region represents about 40
per cent of EDC’s total emerging market volume—more than for any other broad emerging region.¶ ¶ So Latin America is clearly growing as
THE place for Canadians to diversify their customer base beyond the United States. ¶ If you want further proof,
take a look at Canadian exports and investments at large:¶ They reached record highs in Latin America in 2008--before the effects of the credit crunch hit most
markets-- and have picked up encouragingly in 2010.¶ Canadian merchandise exports rose 20 per cent between 2009 and 2010, to some $11 billion.¶ These
exports are especially strong in mining, oil and gas, infrastructure and resource sectors.¶ By 2008, most
Canadian direct investment in emerging markets--more than 40 per cent--went to Latin America; and their value more
than doubled since 2003, to nearly US$ 40 billion.¶ Investment advisors too are bullish about Latin America:¶ According to a Santander Global Banking survey of
750 top investment
managers, more than half will increase investments in Latin America this year,
compared to about 15 per cent in Asia.¶ Brazil is the favourite market, followed by Mexico, Peru, Argentina &
Colombia.¶ And the World Bank Ease of Doing Business Index ranks Mexico, Peru & Colombia as the Top 3 countries in Latin America; the index is a composite
rating of the ease or complexity of such factors as starting up a business, getting permits, paying taxes and enforcing contracts.¶ Economic Environment¶ Is
anything changing in the coming year?¶ Before looking at some of the region’s top markets, I’ll touch on the broad economic landscape-fresh from our Chief Economist’s latest Global Export Forecast.¶ Growth in many of the hottest Latin American markets is
expected to moderate this year. It should still be well-above industrialized markets and a little higher than the world average—which is forecast
to exceed 4 per cent.¶ The strongest growth will continue to be in Peru, Panama, Chile, Argentina and Brazil, with Mexico close behind. These results will be
supported by strong domestic consumer demand and high commodity prices.¶ On the more challenging side, many governments, in even the best markets of the
region, still put up stumbling blocks in the form of highly bureaucratic or weak institutions, tie-ups between federal, provincial and municipal bodies, complex tax
structures and layers of regulations.¶ Many Latin American countries recognize they will need to strengthen their state institutions and mechanisms to address
these concerns by investors and local communities alike. The timeline for such changes is of course harder to predict.¶ Development projects are also coming under
greater public scrutiny in all countries.¶ Today too, the
majority of reputable lenders increasingly require that project
sponsors not only mitigate the environmental risks of major projects, but also engage with the
community, to respect social and human rights. This requires the joint efforts of the company,
community and local government—to monitor and apply commitments that are made.¶
There’s a precedent and a means for bilateral security cooperation
Ventura and Allen 12 Undersecretary for North America in Mexico; assistant deputy minister for the Americas at the Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade in Canada (Julián Ventura; Jon Allen, February 2012, “The Evolution of Government Relations,” Canada Among Nations, 2011-2012: Canada and
Mexico’s Unfinished Agenda)//KP
Protecting Our Citizens Security
co-operation is rapidly becoming a key feature of Canada and Mexico’s
bilateral relationship today, as part of a strong bilateral commitment to address transnational threats. A
Consultation Mechanism on New and Traditional Security Issues and a Mexico-Canada Security Working Group were established in 2007 to complement the
Canada-Mexico Political-Military Talks. Other institutional contacts on security issues of mutual concern include those between Public Safety Canada and Mexico's
Centre for Investigation and National Security (CISEN) and Secretariat for Public Safety. The
Security Consultations, an umbrella mechanism
at the centre of our co-operation. Held annually, the
Security Consultations enable the departments and agencies to share information on their activities with a view to
promoting coherence and identifying new areas for potential collaboration. This mechanism is complemented by various working
groups that aim to enhance co-operation in law-enforcement, border administration, emergency management, and critical infrastructure protection. In 2008
Mexico undertook far-reaching and ambitious reforms of its judicial system and police forces. Canada's Anti- Crime Capacity Building
Program (ACCBP), created in 2009, is the main channel of co-operation for supporting this effort to enhance
capacity-building against transnational organized crime. Thus far, Canada has committed over $4.1 million
in direct bilateral projects with Mexico To date, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police has provided law
enforcement training to 1500 Mexican federal investigative police officers, 250 mid-level federal
police officers, and 45 federal police commanders. In terms of judicial reform, the ACCBP contributed to the harmonization of criminal
procedures between jurisdictions, professionalization of prosecutors and defence counsels, and training of judges. In 2010-11, over 400 Mexican
judicial officials participated in 18 activities organized by the Canadian Department of Justice. In other
regrouping departments and agencies involved in the broad field of security, are
priority areas of corrections and crime prevention, Canadian and Mexican partners are strengthening co-operation through visits and seminars and jointly preparing
specific proposals. Among other programs, Canada's
Counter Terrorism Capacity Building Program (CTCBP) supports
bilateral and regional projects in the areas of border and transportation security, critical infrastructure
protection, and bioterrorism response. Through the Global Partnership Program, a G8-led initiative, Canada, the United States, and Mexico
are working together to convert a Mexican research reactor from highly enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium fuel, as an expression of their firm commitment
to global nuclear security. Defence relations are centred on two initiatives: the Military Training and Cooperation Program (MTCP) and the Canada- Mexico Political
Military Talks. Since 2004, Canada has offered training opportunities to Mexico under the MTCP. The political-military talks are co-chaired by each country’s
respective foreign and defence ministries and advance dialogue and co-operation on foreign policy, defence, and security matters. In May 2011, the countries held
the first military-level staff talks between Canada Command and the Mexican secretariats of National Defence and the Navy to provide a framework for advancing
direct military-to-military collaboration.
Canada is in a position to engage Mexico
FAIT, 2/14/13 Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Government of Canada (14 February 2013, “Baird to Travel to Latin America: Promoting and
Protecting Canadian Interests and Values,” http://www.international.gc.ca/wet30-1/aff/news-communiques/2013/02/13a.aspx?lang=eng)//KP
Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird today announced that he will travel to six Latin American countries from February 14 to 22,
2013. In Mexico, Peru, Panama and the Dominican Republic, the focus will be on expanding cooperation in a variety of
areas. In Cuba and Venezuela, Baird will focus especially on democracy, human rights and economic liberalization. “ Our government is focused
on creating jobs, growth and economic prosperity,” said Baird. “As part of our principled foreign policy, we will also deliver strong
messages on economic reforms and greater respect for human rights and democracy as appropriate.” Baird added: “ Our government is
committed to ensuring we exercise Canadian leadership in key areas affecting our hemisphere from
the Arctic to the Antarctic.” Baird will begin his trip in Mexico City, where he will meet José Antonio Meade
Kuribreña, Mexico's new Secretary of Foreign Relations. This will be the first meeting between the
two men and a chance to expand relations with this key partner. In Mexico and later in Peru, Baird will be
engaging like-minded partners, and pursuing the steps needed for membership in the very promising
Pacific Alliance. (Canada became an official observer at the Pacific Alliance in November 2012. Alliance members are working to facilitate the free
movement of goods, services, capital and people among themselves, while also strengthening trade and investment ties with Asia. The Alliance's founding
members—Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru—are four of Latin America's fastest-growing economies.) In meetings in Panama and the Dominican Republic, Baird
will seek new ways to create opportunities for long-term economic prosperity, while also promoting our shared values regionally and globally.
Mexico wants engagement with Canada absent U.S. intervention
Clark, 6/17/13 Foreign affairs reporter for The Globe and Mail (Campbell Clark, 17 June 2013, “Mexico pushes for direct ties with Canada, apart from U.S.
influence,” The Globe and Mail, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/authors/campbell-clark)//KP
New Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto
wants ties with Canada to be a priority in the country’s foreign policy,
rather than the on-again, off-again interest of two countries distracted by relations with the United States, Mexico’s ambassador
says. Ambassador Francisco Suarez Davila arrived in Ottawa a week ago with a mandate to pursue a new deepening of
relations between the two countries – not just for dealing with the U.S., but also as direct trading partners, and potential diplomatic allies on
the world stage. “I think I have arrived at a very opportune time. The political stars are aligned,” Mr. Suarez said in an interview with The Globe
and Mail. “That’s the indication I have received from President Pena, to go beyond the rhetoric to really establish that Canada is a priority for Mexico’s foreign
policy. It’s a real priority: Canada, itself, apart from the North American [regional dynamic].” It is a simple but important signal in Canada-Mexico relations: that the
two countries should see each other as important for more than just what that means in dealing with the United States. They have been trade partners in the North
American Free Trade Agreement since 1993, and from time to time expressed a desire for stronger ties. But the
interest has blown hot and
cold. Both countries’ perspectives on North America are, of course, dominated by relations with the U.S.
“It’s a fact of life that we have this big elephant in between. It’s there. But we don’t at all like the idea of an off and on approach,” Mr. Suarez said. “Sort of, you
know, oh now Mexico is important, but until that time, no, it’s more important for us just to have a relationship with the United States.” The “political stars” that
Mr. Suarez refers to is that changes in both capitals are coming at the same time as Ottawa tries to re-focus Canadian foreign policy around major emerging
markets, and Mr. Pena is signalling new interest in Canada. Mr. Suarez, an economist who has served as Mexico’s envoy to the International Monetary Fund and to
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, noted the
two countries are already important to each other in
economic terms, as each other’s third-largest trading partners. He noted that Mexico and Canada joined together to fight protectionist U.S. meat-labelling
rules, known by the acronym COOL, by challenging them at the World Trade Organization, winning a decision from a trade tribunal. “We acted together
with the WTO. We’ve got the decision. And we’re ready to act, taking possible reprisals if they don’t fulfill the WTO. Common vision and common action,”
Mr. Suarez said. He said that Mexico and Canada can strike a similar alliance in 12-nation talks for the TransPacific Partnership, to ensure that the talks stay focused on economics and trade, and that it is not used by the U.S. to jockey with China for political
influence. Within North America, Canada and Mexico have common interests in integrating the continent’s three
economies, by pushing for better-aligned infrastructure – notably railways and oil-and-gas pipelines –
across the continent. That, and cheap energy – from the U.S. shale-gas revolution, and extensive oil and gas in both Canada and Mexico,
can lead to a revival of North American manufacturing if it’s combined with integrated infrastructure
and better transportation costs, he argues, leading to “the re-industrialization of these countries.”
AT environment DA
Canadian Investment in Latin America high now – mining industry
CIDP, 11 - The objective of this dataset is to give an overview of the reach and size of the Canadian mining industry in Latin America. This data is part of
ongoing work at The North-South Institute.
(Canadian International Development Platform, Canadian Mining Investments in Latin America, http://cidpnsi.ca/blog/portfolio/canadian-mining-investments-inlatin-america/#sthash.7pSikW9S.dpuf)//GP
Growing global demand for various metals and minerals has sparked an unprecedented global mining
rush. As part of this trend, Canadian companies have rapidly acquired hundreds of new properties in Latin
America for exploration and extraction. Canadian companies now operate 66 mining projects in the
region and have 20 more in construction. Accompanying that, extraordinary revenues have been accrued by
these mining firms.¶ ¶ This dashboard allows you to explore active, Canadian owned mines in Latin America. You can explore by
company, country, and the year that the mine was acquired.¶ ¶ The aim of this project is to track the economic impact of
these mining investments from Canadian firms, looking at their tax contributions, local employment
practices and contracting of local or national companies in host countries.¶ ¶ Our estimate for the total
revenue (mine production per commodity x international price of commodity) of Canadian mining investments in the region is approx. US$18.7
billion. The vast majority of which or about US$16.5 billion, accrues in 5 countries: Chile, Mexico, Argentina, Peru and
Brazil. 7 Canadian companies are dominant in terms of mining revenue from the region: Barrick Gold, Yamana Gold, Goldcorp, Teck, Kinross
Gold, Pan American Silver and Sherrit International.¶ ¶ The project contributes to ongoing debates in Canada and Latin
America regarding the direct economic effect of these projects on communities and host countries in
which they operate.¶
oil drilling
Canada should drill instead of US, safety
Oilweek 10 (“Should the U.S. Give Canada the Oil-Drilling Business”, 6/28/10. http://www.actio.net/default/index.cfm/actio-blog/should-the-us-give-canadathe-oildrilling-business/)//Modermatt
Today, BP spending on the Gulf oil spill has hit $100 million per day (source: James Heron, Wall Street Journal). AP reports the total oil spill price-tag so far: $2.65
billion. See overview article on the Gulf Oil Spill. An article in the July Oilweek Magazine simultaneously suggests that Canada
might be best suited
to take over oil and gas exploration. The article says that Worker Safety is the thing that Canadian oil
exploration has that other countries have not yet mastered. And that the investment pays off when
you start looking at the price-tag that less-than-spectacular Safety Procedures can bring. "The EH&S stool has
three legs," McKenzie-Brown writes: "customs and social attitudes; regulatory and industrial codes; technical skills and operating environments. If the legs aren´t
the same length, the stool wobbles. Since the three legs of the
Canadian stool are level and strong, there are good reasons
to encourage the industry to reach out to new operating environments." "People [doing safety turnarounds at gas
plants] now have fall-arrest equipment. They don´t do anything without fire protection and breathing air equipment .
A friend of mine tells me that at the plant he works at, the safety bill used to be $20,000. Now it´s like $300,000 to $400,000. Every time someone goes into a
vessel, someone has to be there to watch. They may need to have specialized safety equipment or even specially trained personnel to watch that person in the
vessel."
His point is that this investment pays off in a relatively safe and accident-less history of oil and
gas incidents. With oil leaking in the Gulf of Mexico, Canada is well-positioned to deal with the heightened risks—
and reap the bountiful rewards—of frontier exploration, says Peter McKenzie-Brown. He argues that
Canada has Environmental, Health & Safety -- or EH&S -- so embedded in its policies and the fabric of
its business culture that Canada is in prime position to pick up the slack in oil drilling that the U.S. may
be unable to handle.
demo/hr/rule of law/natural disasters
Canadian engagement can solve democracy promotion, human rights, rule of law
assistance and natural disaster relief.
Brickman, ’08 – Barry, President, North West International Ltd., “WESTERN CANADA AND LATIN AMERICA EXISTING AND POTENTIAL COMMERCIAL
RELATIONSHIPS,” August 1, 2008, http://www.wd.gc.ca/images/cont/11103-eng.pdf)//A-Berg
During a February 2008 speech to CCA-BC, then International Trade Minister David Emerson indicated that "To help our businesses and investors succeed in Latin
American and Caribbean markets” the Government of Canada is “putting a new focus on getting more Canadian Trade Commissioners on the ground
throughout the Americas".24 Three key objectives
that form the basis of Canada’s engagement in the Americas, including the
Latin America and Caribbean region, include25: To strengthen and promote our foundational values of
freedom, democracy, human rights and rule of law. To build strong, sustainable economies through
increased trade and investment linkages, as well as mutual commitment to expanding opportunity to
all citizens. To meet new security challenges, as well as natural disasters and health pandemics.
Through an integrated commerce agenda, Canada hopes to build prosperity, generate economic
activity, and fuel corporate social investments and commitments that will create jobs, wealth, and
opportunities, both domestically and throughout the LAC region. DFAIT's top country priorities in LAC are Brazil, CARICOM, Colombia, Chile, Haiti and Peru.
DFAIT recognizes that commercial re-engagement with LAC will raise important policy considerations for
Canada. Sound policy formulation and delivery will be needed to address numerous issues linked to the promotion of
sustainable growth. These include energy security, sustainable environmental practices, corporate social
responsibility (CSR), human capital development needs, and finding creative approaches to the issue of labour mobility.
DFAIT's Science and Technology Division has led development of the Global Innovation Strategy (GIS) that seeks to relate the Government of Canada's
domestic Science and Technology Strategy with its Global Commerce Strategy in a manner that is consistent, deliberate,
and results-oriented. Priority countries in LAC identified in the GIS include Brazil and Chile. Priority sectors are environmental
science and technologies, natural resources and energy, health and related life sciences, and
information and communication technologies.
fdi - resources
Canadian FDI solves resource extraction --- companies are already in place.
Randall, ’10 - PhD (Toronto), professor of history at University of Calgary, Fellow with the Canadian International Council, was director of the University of
Calgary Institute for United States Policy Research in the School of Public Policy, fellow with the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute (Stephen J., Canada,
the Caribbean and Latin America: Trade, Investment and Political Challenges, August 2010 http://www.opencanada.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/Canada-theCaribbean-and-Latin-America_-Trade-Investment-and-Political-Challenges-Stephen-J.-Randall.pdf)//A-Berg
Canadian direct investment in the Caribbean and Latin America has become increasingly diversified, but there
is still a concentration in extractive industries and the service sector. A relatively new area of Canadian investment in the region has been
global delivery or call centres. Sitel of Canada, for instance, has operations in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Panama.47 Chile was the major recipient of
Canadian FDI. Between 1974 and mid-2007, Canadian interests accounted for 16.4 percent of foreign investment in Chile. Canadian companies
and
their business practices enjoy a favourable reputation in the region, partly because they tend to hire local
management and offer the possibility of rising within the corporate structure. Nonetheless, any concentration of FDI
in the natural resource sector carries with it certain political problems. ECLAC notes that “ resource-seeking FDI has contributed to
higher exports and has generated employment and fiscal revenue. TNCs [transnational corporations] in the natural-resource
sector often continue to operate as enclaves in isolation from the domestic economy, however, with very limited local processing operations and high risks in terms
of pollution and environmental degradation.”48 Canadian
direct investment in the mining sector in Latin America is one
of the most significant areas of Canadian economic activity in the region; it is also the most controversial, with a
significant impact on local populations and the environment. By the early twenty-first century, seven Canadian mining companies ranked
among the top 20 mining companies with operations in Latin America.49 The main Canadian mining companies investing in Latin
America and the Caribbean and their locations are: In precious metals: B2Gold Corp, a Vancouver-based gold mining company with two mines in Nicaragua and
development projects in Colombia and Costa Rica50; Goldcorp (Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico); Yamana Gold (Argentina, Brazil, Honduras, and Nicaragua);
Barrick Gold (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and the Dominican Republic); IAM Gold (Guyana and Surinam); Kinross Gold (Brazil, Chile, and El Salvador); Peak Gold
(Brazil). Greystar Resources, the Angostura gold-silver operation near Bucaramanga. In common metals: Teck Cominco (Chile, Mexico, Panama, and Peru); Sherritt
(Cuba); PotashCorp (Brazil and Chile); This paper does not explore the details of each company’s operations but rather focuses on Canadian and regional criticism
of their operations and the policy implications of that criticism. Those who radically oppose the operation of foreign mining companies would like to prevent it
altogether; governments and the companies themselves have tended to focus on self-regulation with a preference for increasing the commitment of companies to
corporate social responsibility (CSR). Ostensibly the latter approach results in more attention to the environmental and human impact of mining operations. Some
of the more critical Canadian analyses of the impact of Canadian mining in Latin America have been advanced by Todd Gordon and Jeffery Webber, and by Liisa
North and T.D. Clark, the latter in an edited collection of papers that were part of a conference at York University’s Centre for Research on Latin America and the
Caribbean (CERLAC). Detailed analyses of Canadian corporate activity in the Caribbean and Latin America are still relatively rare. There has been some Canadian
media attention to the impact of Canadian mining in the region. Writing in Maclean’s magazine in 2006, Colin Campbell was particularly critical of CIDA’s work with
the Canadian Energy Research Institute in the late 1990s to assist Colombia in developing a new mining code. The code has been criticized for being too liberal in
providing access to foreign investment without adequate protection for local labour and the environment.51 What Campbell and other critics fail to note is that the
terms of the code reflect Colombian, not Canadian, policy and law. Whether
or not CIDA should be involved in assisting Latin
American countries to develop regulatory policies in the natural resource sector has become a
contentious issue in recent years, in spite of the fact that CIDA has a long and very positive record of contributing to good governance in this
area. Colombia has been a focus of attention not only because of the debate over the free trade agreement but also because of rapid expansion of foreign
investment in the mining sector. Between 2006 and 2008, an estimated 40 foreign companies expressed interest in developing Colombian gold and other mineral
resources.52 Mining and other extractive operations in Colombia frequently occur in areas that have been affected by armed conflict and narcotics trafficking,
making it difficult for mining operators to avoid getting caught up in problems of security. Colombia’s Semana magazine noted in an article in July 2009 that the
Colombian government, under its policy of “democratic security,” had been giving special protection to foreign companies in sensitive areas and that local small
mining interests and labour leaders had suffered negative consequences. Even more critical of both the liberalization of investment regulations, the role of Canadian
enterprise in the mining sector, and the role of CIDA and CERI in the revision of the Colombian mining code was a 2003 report of the Colombian miners union,
Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Empresa Nacional de Minas Minercol.53 The most systematic analysis to date of Canadian involvement in the mining sector in Latin
America came out of a conference held at York University’s Centre for Research on Latin America and the Caribbean in 2002, entitled “Canadian Mining Companies
in Latin America: Community Rights and Corporate Responsibility.” It was sponsored by the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), the Canadian Auto
Workers, and the Canadian Environmental Law Association. This was one of the first efforts to draw together current research by Canadians and Latin Americans on
the issues. The conference featured papers on a range of mining operations where there have been challenges: the Tambogrande in Peru; petroleum exploration in
Ecuador; mining investment in Mexico; Canadian gold mining companies in La Libertad and Bonanza, Nicaragua; environmental conflicts in Chilean mining; Bolivia’s
Amayapampa and Capasirca mines in which Da Capo Resources Ltd. has invested; and Canadian investment in Colombian mining. The principal themes that
emerged from a discussion of these and other cases were the role of the state, the tension between corporate self-regulation and the priorities of the communities
in which they operate, and the potential role for civil society to promote social and ecological sustainability in mineral extraction operations.54 The
Canadian government’s response to concerns in Latin America has been to encourage the
development of a voluntary corporate social responsibility strategy by the private sector, inspired by
the increasingly global reach of Canadian incorporated companies. In March 2009, the Canadian government produced a
report entitled “Building the Canadian Advantage: A Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Strategy for the Canadian International Extractive Sector.”55 The report
noted that as of 2008 over 75
percent of the world’s exploration and mining companies were headquartered in
Canada. The report added that Prime Minister Harper indicated that the government expects and encourages Canadian companies to meet high standards of
corporate social responsibility, during a speech delivered in Tanzania inn 2007. He added that the government understood that Canadian companies often faced
extremely complex circumstances abroad. The report noted that the Canadian government supported the development of an online Sustainability Reporting Toolkit
in 2003 and provided national training workshops on CSR for Canadian companies. The government also supported reviews of the reporting performances of
Canadian companies, not only in the extractive sector, in 2001, 2003, and 2005. Since 2005, Canada has also supported the work of the UN Secretary-General’s
Special Representative for Business and Human Rights, through the Global Peace and Security Fund. As well, in 2008 the EDC outlined principles under which human
rights factors would be taken into consideration in projects it supported. The EDC’s Statement on Human Rights recognizes the sensitivity of natural resource
extraction in developing countries that have experienced a history of conflict. The guidelines adopted by the Harper government stress the importance of the
extractive sector’s contribution to reducing poverty reduction and protecting human rights in developing countries where Canadian companies operate. The
Canadian government’s approach to policy on CSR is designed to be consistent with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises. Implementation of policy has involved several initiatives. One was to establish a contact point in the Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade for CSR issues. A second was DFAIT’s allocation of funds to assist Canadian offices abroad to engage in CSR-related activities. A third was the
2007 decision to endorse the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), which deals with transparency in financial operations. The EITI insists on the full
publication and verification of company payments made to governments and of government revenues received from oil, gas, and mining activities. Natural
Resources Canada (NRCan) reports that “Canada
participates in the EITI in recognition of the potential development
benefits it can bring to resource-rich developing countries, and because of the importance Canadians
attach to transparency.” The EITI involves a requirement that participating governments work with the private sector and civil society. Since the
system is still voluntary, host countries still have to commit to implement EITI. If a host country does so, then the company is expected to implement the initiative
through the reporting of payments to the host government, using approved templates. For EITI reporting to be effective, it must be implemented by all extractive
industry companies (including international, national, and state-owned companies) operating in that country. Among the Canadian
companies that
have committed to the system are Goldcorp of Vancouver, which is involved in the Peñasquito Mine in Mexico; Talisman Energy of Calgary, which
has operations in Colombia and Trinidad and Tobago; and Barrick Gold, with its head office in Toronto. Barrick has active gold mining operations in Argentina and
Peru and has been exploring possibilities in Chile.56 The case studies of progress made under the EITI which NRCan provides on its website relate to Nigeria and
Liberia rather than to the Americas. In the same year Export Development Canada became a signatory to the Equator Principles, which are the international
benchmark for financial standards. In the specific context of Latin America, both CIDA and NRCan are providing assistance to host countries to enhance their
governance capacity in the natural resource sector. CIDA has been mandated to develop an Andean Regional Initiative to strengthen the capacity of regional and
local governments to implement sustainable development projects. CSR issues were included in the discussions with Colombia and Peru during the free trade
negotiations, with the result that there are provisions in both agreements encouraging the respective parties to promote CSR in their business communities. Again,
the approach is voluntary and no penalties are imposed on the parties for failure to be proactive or on the private sector for failure to implement voluntary CSR
strategies. Clearly, even companies that are not direct signatories to international agreements have been very proactive in support of local community initiatives in
the countries where they operate. Bombardier, for instance, which has major manufacturing facilities in Querétaro, Mexico, became a long-term supporter of the
Sierra Gorda World Biosphere Reserve in Querétaro, in October 2008. The company reports that its assistance with three environmental and economic
development projects will benefit the reserve’s 23,000 residents directly and the more than 90,000 people in the region indirectly.57
energy
Chavez’s death only helps “reset” Canada-Venezuelan Relations
Wood, 4/16 - a reporter at the Toronto Star and Kingston Whig-Standard. I have a degree in history and political studies from Queen's University, where I
spent most of my time at the campus newspaper, the Journal. I've also spent two summers working in the federal public service. (Michael Woods, 4/16/2013,
Canada News, http://o.canada.com/2013/03/05/hugo-chavezs-death-could-lead-to-warmer-canada-venezuela-relations-experts-say/)//GP
OTTAWA –Venezuelan
President Hugo Chavez’s death on Tuesday prompted uncertainty about what
Canada’s relations with the Latin American state will look like without the socialist strongman in
charge.¶ According to some experts, Chavez’s absence could lead to an eventual warming in Canada’s
relations with the socialist state .¶ The Venezuelan ruler’s heir apparent, Vice-President Nicolas Maduro, announced
the 58-year-old’s death after battling cancer on Tuesday, creating immediate uncertainty about the country’s political
future.¶ Canada will likely wait and see how the politics unfold as Venezuelans face the prospect of snap elections to choose
Chavez’s successor, experts said. Chavez publicly anointed Maduro as his heir, and the country’s elections have been heavily criticized in the past.¶ “This is an
opportunity to see whether the Venezuelan system can function democratically in the absence of
Chavez,” said University of British Columbia political studies professor Maxwell Cameron, who specializes
in comparative politics in Latin America.¶ Canada’s relations with Venezuela have been particularly chilly of late. The government viewed
Chavez as a destabilizing presence and a threat to Canadian interests in the region.¶ In addition to clamping down on human rights and democracy in Venezuela,
Chavez funded guerrilla groups and allied with Iran, and worked closely with Cuba to spread a socialist economic model throughout Latin America. Foreign Affairs
Minister John Baird was to stop there last month, but Venezuela cancelled his visit.¶ In a statement, Prime
Minister Stephen Harper offered
condolences to the Venezuelan people and said he looks forward to working with Chavez’s successor
and other leaders in the region “ to build a hemisphere that is more prosperous, secure and
democratic .”¶ “At this key juncture, I hope the people of Venezuela can now build for themselves a better,
brighter future based on the principles of freedom, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human
rights.”¶ In the longer term, Cameron said, Chavez’s absence could create a chance to “ press the reset button ” and
improve diplomatic relations with Venezuela.¶
venezuela ccs
Increased Canada-Venezuela coop increases CCS tech development in Venezuela
UNFCC, 12 – United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (9/02, “Clean Development Mechanism and Carbon Capture and Storage”
http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Clean_Development_Mechanism_and_Carbon_Capture_and_Storage)//GP
*CDM: Clean Development Mechanism
Canada's October 2007 submission called CCS "a critical bridge towards a low-carbon world, given the
forecasted global dependency in fossil fuel use in the near future." Canada further called CCS "critical
to maximizing GHG [greenhouse gas] mitigation opportunities worldwide" and "an important element in
furthering the transfer of CCS technology and expertise to developing countries." The submission added,
"Considerable work undertaken by Canada and other countries over years concludes that geological
storage of CO2 is secure." Like Japan, Canada suggested "post-project closure monitoring and
remediation liability ... rest with the host country." [7]¶ Norway's September 2007 supported CCS, "under the right site conditions
... for project activities under the CDM." Its submission noted that "CCS technology related to CO2 storage in geological formations is available and has been proven
under full scale operational conditions for more than 10 years," including at the Sleipner Field in the North Sea. Norway flagged responsibility for long-term
monitoring and liability for later problems as questions that need to be resolved. [7]¶ Portugal's October 2007 submission on behalf of the European Union stated,
"The EU does not support CCS projects involving the direct injection of CO2 into the water column because of high levels of uncertainty about levels of CO2
retention and the negative effects on ecosystems." However, the EU supported "environmentally and health safe CCS involving geological storage as a possible
mitigation option ... provided that the necessary technical, economic and regulatory framework exists to provide maximum environmental integrity and ensure that
any seepage is avoided." At the same time, the EU submission called joint CCS projects a "capacity building exercise" and noted an EU-China agreement "to develop
and demonstrate near zero emissions coal (NZEC) technology through carbon capture and storage by 2020," along with the involvement of some EU member
countries in the Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum. [7]¶ Korea's November 2007 submission expressed some support for CCS but cautioned, "there is not
enough data on CCS technology to quantitatively evaluate its risks and effectiveness. Therefore, efforts should be made to further develop different forms of CCS
technology and to strengthen international cooperation so as to accumulate more knowledge." Korea suggested "joint responsibility," if a CCS project later required
repairs to stop carbon leakage. For long-term project monitoring, Korea supported establishing an "independent monitoring agency under the CDM Executive
Board." [8]¶ Environmental Groups Position on CCS¶ The Climate Action Network has argued that CCS should not be included in the Clean Development on a
number of grounds. Firstly, it states that the Marrakech accords setting out the rules for the Clean Developmernt Mechanism require that projects be
environmentally "safe and sound". "Many concerns surround CCS, i.e. leakage, liability and monitoring, and unless such issues are resolved, inclusion in the CDM is
not appropriate," CAN states. CAN also argued that, as the purpose¶ e of the CDM was to assist non Annex 1 countries acheive sustainable development, the
mechanism should "help developing countries 'leapfrog' an unsustainable fossil fuel economy. However, if CCS – a risky and potentially expensive technology – were
to be included in the CDM, it could divert much needed investments from renewables and energy efficiency as well as the many longterm benefits that accompany
these energy strategies. In this context, CCS could easily serve as a dangerous distraction in efforts to deploy sustainable solutions that protect our climate." Nor did
CAN support the suggestion by the European Union that CCS pilot projects designed to gain experience with the technology be included. "Countries advocating for
CCS should seek to gain practical experience in their own countries before exporting it," CAN responded.[9]¶ They also argued that "requirements needed to assure
proper site selection, operating practices to guarantee permanent retention of injected carbon dioxide, monitoring, measurement and verification provisions, and
responsibility for leakage of injected gas should be developed before any decision is taken on whether CCS should be a part of the CDM."[9]¶ In its submission to
the UNFCCC, WWF
expressed its in-principle support for the development of CCS but opposed its inclusion in the CDM.
"CCS if proven to be ‘safe’ needs to be implemented both in developed and developing nations as
soon as possible to reduce CO2 emissions – but this is distinctively different from CCS in the CDM," it submitted. It argued that "the
unresolved issues of including CCS in the CDM pose higher risks to the environmental integrity and effectiveness of the Kyoto compliance and post-2012 climate
regime than the perceived advantages of including CCS."[10]¶ Industry Submissions¶ In its May 2007 submission to the UNFCCC, the World Coal Institute implied
that CCS technology was already well established, albeit more expensive. The WCI stated that there is already a "wide body of expertise developed through
operational experience from; industrial-scale CCS projects, underground injection of CO2 for enhanced oil recovery, and the use of analogous technologies such as
acid gas injection and natural gas storage. These practical experiences are complemented by numerous research-scale CCS projects, research programmes,
stakeholder networks and partnerships." While acknowledging that CCS technologies "add to the cost of supplying energy services" it argued that "incentives and
policies are needed that address these additional costs thereby enabling CCS to be deployed."[11]¶ "Allowing CCS activities to be eligible to receive revenues
generated by the CDM is an important step for the worldwide deployment of this vital mitigation technology, permitting developing countries to meet their
development goals in an environmentally sustainable manner," it argued.[11]¶ In June 2008 the International Chamber of Commerce made a submission to the
SBSTA of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change arguing that the as yet unproven Carbon Capture and Storage technology should be
included in the Clean Development Mechanism. In its submission, the ICC argued that "should CCS fail to qualify as a recognised emissions reduction option under
the CDM, the cost of achieving the required emissions reductions will increase and the chances of meeting climate change goals would likely fall as a result."[12]¶ It
also noted that "in practice it is a relatively costly, energy and capital intensive technology, albeit with the potential for future cost reduction. The adoption of CCS
by the private sector will depend on the incentives provided by the carbon market and other emissions reduction policies that overcome the additional cost of CCS
development and deployment."[12]¶ While acknowledging the technology would be expensive, the ICC signalled its clear intention that governments would
underwrite its initial funding. "It
is expected that most of the near-term CCS plants will be commissioned in Annex
1 countries and will receive the support that is required from host governments of those countries.
However, it is also important that CCS obtains recognition as a valid abatement option in non-Annex 1 countries so that the legitimacy of the technology is
established and that financial support measures are available at an early date," the ICC argued.[12]¶ In June 2008 submission to the
United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Carbon Capture and Storage Association (CCSA) argued in favour of the inclusion of CCS
projects in the Clean Development Mechanism as "the primary method for incentivising low-carbon projects in the developing world."[13]¶ It argued that
"the threat of climate change cannot be addressed without CCS – the scale is too great and the
window of time in which action is required, is closing fast. Each year of delay in bringing CCS to deployment represents an
increase in million tonnes of CO2. Climate change is a global challenge, therefore both developed and developing
countries must apply CCS as part of the solution ... This is particularly important in China and India where massive economic
development is already resulting in escalating energy consumption, the majority of which is being met by fossil fuels."[13]¶ While noting that "CCS has yet to be
deployed at a widespread, large scale commercial level and first-mover projects are needed to demonstrate costs and technology, to enable learning-by-doing" they
argued that "CDM is currently the only method to provide such incentives in developing countries" to overcome the costs of developing the first CCS projects.[13]¶
In its submission the
International Emissions Trading Association (IETA) argued that "delaying its use risks
large GHG emissions to the atmosphere that could have been captured and stored, thereby reducing
our ability to tackle global climate change" and that "CCS is a proven technology. The oil and gas
industry has gained considerable experience over several decades relating to the capture, transport
and storage of CO2 and the monitoring of CO2 injected in geological formations".[14]¶ The
International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association (IPIECA), was more matter
of fact in its submission, simply stating that carbon dioxide capture and storage has been used to
enhance oil recovery in some oil and gas fields and that over "the past several decades have stored
roughly half a billion tonnes of CO2 in oil reservoirs." This experience, it stated, was relevant to
consideration of risks of leakage, the operation of reservoirs and other potential environmental
risks.[15]¶ In a May 2007 submission, the International Risk Governance Council stated general support for the inclusion of CCS in the CDM "provided
appropriate modalities and procedures for considering CCS projects are established. However, questions arise about whether the emission reductions as a
consequence of CCS are measurable and predictable with sufficient certainty. Although there are remaining unknowns, the level of existing knowledge in the field of
site selection and characterization, risk assessment and management, and monitoring techniques is substantial, and should not be downplayed. Bringing CCS under
the CDM should be done in a careful manner, and the approval processes should be designed in such a way as to allow for flexibility of improvements as the
knowledge and experience on CCS increase."[16]¶ While noting the potential of CCS to store large volumes of carbon dioxide over long periods of time, it
acknowledged that the financial issues arising from it for developing countries were substantial. The high cost of CCS projects, it stated, "are beyond the ability of
many developing countries - potentially requiring a different CDM budget to attract new types of industry participation and enable independent technical assistance
to referee licensing and site assessment", that the costs of long-term monitoring may need to be borne by the developer and that there could be the need to
"remove risk from the developing country" by way of "novel forms of long-term financial bond, or insurance, from the project developer."[16]¶ Negotiations at
COP14 and Beyond¶ CCS at the December 2008 COP14 meeting¶ At the COP14 meeting in Poznan, Poland in December 2008 ,
a number of countries
were strongly pushing for the inclusion of CCS within the CDM. At the outset of COP14, the Umbrella Group argued in its
opening statements to theSubsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA 29), that there was a need to make progress on methodological aspects of
including CCS in the CDM.[17] The following day, Saudi Arabia, Norway, the European Union, Japan and others supported including CCS under the CDM.
Jamaica, Venezuela and Micronesia "noted that although CCS has potential, it has not been fully
tested or proven. Brazil said CCS is incompatible with the CDM." It also noted that acontact group had been established to canvass the issue further.[18]
Other countries opposing the inclusion of CCS were the Alliance of Small Island States and India.[19]¶ Earth Negotiations Bulletin reported that in discussion on the
possible inclusion of CCS in the CDM "delegates considered draft text setting out various options, including an EU proposal for a pilot phase. Some parties supported
CCS under the CDM, while others said it should not be included in the current commitment period, but might be considered at a later stage."[20] The following day
it was noted by Earth Negotiations Bulletin that "during informal consultations, delegates discussed the various options set out in the Co-Chairs’ draft text.
However, differences remained over including CCS under the CDM. Informal consultations will continue," it reported.[21]¶ At a LWG-LCA Workshop on Research
and Development of Technology, the Australian government proclaimed its work on the Global Carbon Capture and Storage Institute and the Asia-Pacific
Partnership as examples of how it was taking action on CCS while Norway highlighted CCS as an option to allow a "climate-friendly transition to a low carbon
society.[22] Despite the lobbying for the inclusion of CCS, the opposition remained steadfast. By December 10, the lobbying push for CCS had made little progress,
with ENB reporting that "informal consultations on this issue ended without agreement on draft decision text, which remained bracketed. Delegates then
considered whether to forward the bracketed text to the COP/MOP or to SBSTA 31. However, they were unable to agree on where to forward the text."[23]¶ In its
concluding statement, the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) simply noted that they had "considered the conclusions and the draft
decision proposed by the Chair. However, it did not agree to adopt these conclusions and therefore could not conclude its consideration of this issue."[24]¶ At the
conclusion of COP14, Earth Negotiations Bulletin noted that the discussion would be taken up again at the next SBSTA meeting. It also reported that "The EU, Saudi
Arabia, Australia, Norway and Japan expressed regret that agreement had not been reached. Jamaica noted that CCS technology is not ready for use in an offset
mechanism such as the CDM. Brazil highlighted concerns relating to long-term permanence and host-country liabilities."[25]¶ Earth Negotiations Bulletin also
reported that supporters of the inclusion of Carbon Capture and Storage projects in the Clean Development Mechanism gained agreement for the matter to be
referred to the Executive Board of CDM who would "report back to COP/MOP 5." ENB
also noted that in the final plenary meeting
"Venezuela proposed that the Board set up a working group to study the technical and legal aspects
of CCS, and delegates agreed to reflect Venezuela’s statement in the meeting’s record."[26]
democracy
Canadian engagement promotes democratization
Donnelly 2009 - energy securities lawyer in Calgary with Burstall-Winger LLP (Patrick June 22, 2009, Canadian Engagement in Latin America can counter
Chavez Mischief http://c2cjournal.ca/2009/06/canadian-engagement-in-latin-america-can-counter-chavez-mischief/)A-Berg
Not only are Canadian
companies perceived as safer and more stable than their Latin American counterparts—and somewhat removed
from local corruption—they are also viewed as “Not American.” Accurate or not and fair or not, Latin America enjoys, at best, a
schizophrenic relationship with the United States. Despite the significant Hispanic demographic in the United States, too much American interest in the region is
greeted with suspicion of imperialism and shouts of “Yankee, Go Home” (as President Bush was confronted on his 2007 tour). When America appears preoccupied
with other areas of the world, as has happened since 9-11, Latin America accuses the United States of indifference. Therein
lays an opportunity
for Canada. We are well-positioned to mentor the region’s growth as it develops its vast potential. Aside
from private investment, Canada can best assist Latin America’s development through enhanced support of
democratic regimes and encouragement of good governance. We can do this through government-togovernment contacts and the promotion of free trade with Latin America, either through the now-moribund Free
Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA), or by negotiating separate bilateral trade agreements with individual countries
(as we have with Chile). The FTAA talks were derailed in 2003 by a combination of disinterest from participating countries and fierce opposition by Hugo Chavez and
anti-globalists who viewed the FTAA as an American-imperialist plot. Latin America is at a cross-road. Canada’s
government must not allow this close
Latin America on all fronts, Prime
Minister Harper will provide healthy alternatives to Venezuela’s easy money. We can assist with elimination of the
corruption, cronyism, human rights abuses and bad economics that have held the region back for too
long. Simon Bolivar would approve.
neighbor, through our own indifference, to slip into the destructive orbit of Hugo Chavez. By engaging with
Canada solves democracy in Latin America
Cameron 13 - Ph.D., California, Berkeley, 1989, specializes in comparative politics and international political economy, (Maxwell, “Cameron: What should
Canada’s top foreign policy priority be in 2013?” January 7, 2013, http://opencanada.org/rapid-response-group/cameron-what-should-canadas-top-foreign-policypriority-be-in-2013/)//A-Berg
I’m not sure what Canada’s
top foreign policy priority should be, at least on a global level. I work on the Western Hemisphere, and would make
be to deliver on the promise of greater engagement with Latin America especially with
respect to democracy assistance. A few years back a “whole-of-government” approach to re-engagement with Latin America was
the case that a priority should
announced. Democracy promotion was a major theme, and a democracy hub—formally called the Andean Unit for Democratic Governance—was created in Lima,
Peru. This has since been disbanded, inexplicably, as far as I can tell, and re-engagement seems to have floundered. We’ve seen no evidence of the creation of a
democracy assistance agency. We
don’t seem to have a clear foreign policy direction in Latin America, and the
fact that we vote consistently with the U.S. on issues like Cuba and drugs does not help us to build
bridges. A widely shared perception in Latin America is that Canada is disoriented. The illness of Venezuela’s Chavez, and hence prospect of new elections, is
going to make Venezuela the focus of much of the attention of the world over the next while. We need to work with the OAS and our
allies in the region to provide a supportive context to ensure that democracy is not undermined by
instability in that country, but also in Paraguay, Honduras and elsewhere.
environmental
Canada has the tech and expertise for environmental protection
Brickman, ’08 – Barry, President, North West International Ltd., “WESTERN CANADA AND LATIN AMERICA EXISTING AND POTENTIAL COMMERCIAL
RELATIONSHIPS,” August 1, 2008, http://www.wd.gc.ca/images/cont/11103-eng.pdf)//A-Berg
The Canadian
environmental industry is a global leader in hydrogen and fuel cell technology . Many
Canadian companies specialize in environmental management for major resource industries such as
oil and gas, mining, and pulp and paper. Canada’s environmental industry is comparable in size to pharmaceutical and aerospace industries and equally
sophisticated in its products and services offerings. The market for environmental goods and services in Latin America
presents a prime opportunity for Canadian investment and trade. Latin America's larger, faster-developing economies are
turning their attention and growing resources to environmental reforms. Strong economic growth and market-oriented reforms in
Latin America, such as extensive privatization and hemispheric trade liberalization, have increased
awareness of environmental problems and have generated pressure to solve them. Some key Latin American nations have begun to
strengthen outmoded or weak environmental regulations. Increased environmental awareness throughout Latin America is being matched, in many cases, by
additional resources to deal with environmental problems.
Answers to:
at: u.s. framework key
Canadian-Mexican partnership spills-over globally
Jeffs 12 President of the Canadian International Counicl, Ph.D. in International Political Economy from the University of Toronto (Jennifer Jeffs, February 2012,
“A Partnership Approach to Development and Global Challenges,” Canada Among Nations, 2011-2012: Canada and Mexico’s Unfinished Agenda)//KP
The World Intellectual Property Organization in Geneva (w1Po), a specialized agency of the
United Nations, was established to develop an intemational
climate change, health,
and food security as the three major global challenges to human survival and has recently set up a section to look specifically at
work being done globally in these areas. The urgent and global nature of these issues demands collaborative efforts
and the leveraging of limited resources. Less developed countries will suffer disproportionately from
challenges related to climate change, health, and food security, and their suffering will have an effect on richer nations . Thus, in
addition to the ethical imperatives of addressing inequalities, partnerships between rich and poor nations make good
practical sense. Collaborations between countries at disparate levels of development that share a
continent make particularly good sense, since they share regional, as well as global, concerns. By
addressing global issues in partnership, Canada and Mexico could serve as an example to the rest of
the world.
intellectual property system to stimulate innovation and contribute to economic development. The organization has defined
at: us key
Ideological differences prevent effective U.S. engagement- Canadian bilateralism is
key
Donnelly, 9 energy securities lawyer with Burstall Winger, Bachelor of Laws from the University of Western Ontario (Patrick Donnelly, 22 June 2009,
“Canadian Engagement in Latin America can counter Chavez Mischief,” C2C Journal, http://c2cjournal.ca/2009/06/canadian-engagement-in-latin-america-cancounter-chavez-mischief/)//KP
Not only are Canadian
companies perceived as safer and more stable than their Latin American
counterparts—and somewhat removed from local corruption—they are also viewed as “Not American.”
Accurate or not and fair or not, Latin America enjoys, at best, a schizophrenic relationship with the United States.
Despite the significant Hispanic demographic in the United States, too much American interest in the region is greeted with suspicion of
imperialism and shouts of “Yankee, Go Home” (as President Bush was confronted on his 2007 tour). When America appears
preoccupied with other areas of the world, as has happened since 9-11, Latin America -accuses the United States
of indifference. Therein lays an opportunity for Canada. We are well-positioned to mentor the region’s
growth as it develops its vast potential. Aside from private investment, Canada can best assist Latin America’s
development through enhanced support of democratic regimes and encouragement of good
governance. We can do this through government-to-government contacts and the promotion of free
trade with Latin America, either through the now-moribund Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA), or by negotiating
separate bilateral trade agreements with individual countries (as we have with Chile). The FTAA talks were derailed in 2003 by
a combination of disinterest from participating countries and fierce opposition by Hugo Chavez and anti-globalists who viewed the FTAA as an American-imperialist
plot. Latin
America is at a cross-road. Canada’s government must not allow this close neighbor, through our own indifference, to slip into the
engaging with Latin America on all fronts, Prime Minister Harper will provide healthy alternatives to
Venezuela’s easy money. We can assist with elimination of the corruption, cronyism, human rights abuses and
bad economics that have held the region back for too long. Simon Bolivar would approve.
destructive orbit of Hugo Chavez. By
The U.S. lacks necessary understanding of the region – Canadian action can set the example
Jeffs, 12 President of the Canadian International Council, Ph.D. in International Political Economy from the University of Toronto (Jennifer Jeffs, 22 March 2012,
“Latin America: Land of Opportunity,” Canadian International Council, http://opencanada.org/features/blogs/dispatch/latin-america-land-of-opportunity/)//KP
The rise of Brazil as a global power is promoting Colombia’s regional influence. The
Chinese appetite for natural resources that are
found in abundance in the hemisphere, and their gifts of bridges and soccer stadiums to several Latin American countries, are trends
that U.S. students and policymakers should be watching and pondering, as should Canadians. Given the
substantial investment that Canadian mining companies – and at least one major Canadian bank – have made in the
region, on top of the Canadian government’s recent focus on the hemisphere via its “Americas Strategy,” the
short-sightedness of U.S. policymakers that Sabatini laments is, in fact, an opportunity for Canada. As Sabatini points out,
while the U.S. lacks sufficient interest in, and understanding of, the rapidly changing geopolitical
dynamics of Latin America, Canada can fill that void by taking seriously the actions of Latin America’s
increasingly potent (and competitive) regional and global players. Informed Canadian engagement
with countries in the region will be mutually beneficial, and could also influence U.S. policymakers,
encouraging them to think about Latin America in terms of 2012 geopolitical realities. The recent
Republican debates in the U.S. have demonstrated a staggering lack of understanding of Latin
America. While fears of criminal networks becoming sufficiently internationalized to encompass and accommodate the jihadist threat are understandable in a
post-9/11 world, the strong historic economic and social ties between Latin America and the United States should surely translate into a deeper understanding –
and support – of the trends developing in these vibrant and often resource-rich countries. As Sabatini points out, “A
little realism would go a long
way.” But perhaps the historic legacy of U.S. activity in the region is too strong, and resentments too
enduring. Meanwhile, Canada is ideally positioned to deepen its relations with its hemispheric neighbours.
Canada’s experience of democratic institution-building – including its support for the development of judicial, educational, and
policing systems in the region – and, in contrast to the U.S., its historical record of no military intervention in the
region, show potential for mutually beneficial exchange and engagement with Latin American countries .
Collaboration with Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, for example, in the development of fossil fuels and biofuels as alternative energy sources would further integrate
the hemisphere’s economy while de-emphasizing the importance of Venezuela’s oil. While Mexico’s security threats are an obvious concern, Canada could take the
lead in partnering with Mexican researchers in areas that would provide entry for Mexico’s massive youth population into the knowledge-based economy. (In
addition to clean energy, this could include areas such as biotechnology, aerospace, and health care for developing regions.) By
fostering these
relations, Canada would pave the way for other hemispheric partnerships, setting an example for the
U.S. in its efforts to tackle governance, resource management, and environmental issues through regional investment and partnerships. Given the U.S.’s
preoccupation with security, transnational crime and its potential links to the jihadist threat might be a good place to start. But security is only one aspect of the
global challenges facing the hemisphere, and cannot be addressed in isolation. Latin
America needs partnerships in its naturalresource and associated sectors, in education and health-care research initiatives, and in bracing for
climate change. Canada should fill that need, engaging with Latin America in a spectrum of areas that
the U.S. and China have largely neglected.
at: chavez’s death
Chavez’s death only helps “reset” Canada-Venezuelan Relations
Wood, 4/16 - a reporter at the Toronto Star and Kingston Whig-Standard. I have a degree in history and political studies from Queen's University, where I
spent most of my time at the campus newspaper, the Journal. I've also spent two summers working in the federal public service. (Michael Woods, 4/16/2013,
Canada News, http://o.canada.com/2013/03/05/hugo-chavezs-death-could-lead-to-warmer-canada-venezuela-relations-experts-say/)//GP
OTTAWA –Venezuelan
President Hugo Chavez’s death on Tuesday prompted uncertainty about what
Canada’s relations with the Latin American state will look like without the socialist strongman in
charge.¶ According to some experts, Chavez’s absence could lead to an eventual warming in Canada’s
relations with the socialist state .¶ The Venezuelan ruler’s heir apparent, Vice-President Nicolas Maduro, announced
the 58-year-old’s death after battling cancer on Tuesday, creating immediate uncertainty about the country’s political
future.¶ Canada will likely wait and see how the politics unfold as Venezuelans face the prospect of snap elections to choose
Chavez’s successor, experts said. Chavez publicly anointed Maduro as his heir, and the country’s elections have been heavily criticized in the past.¶ “ This is an
opportunity to see whether the Venezuelan system can function democratically in the absence of
Chavez,” said University of British Columbia political studies professor Maxwell Cameron, who specializes
in comparative politics in Latin America.¶ Canada’s relations with Venezuela have been particularly chilly of late. The government viewed
Chavez as a destabilizing presence and a threat to Canadian interests in the region.¶ In addition to clamping down on human rights and democracy in Venezuela,
Chavez funded guerrilla groups and allied with Iran, and worked closely with Cuba to spread a socialist economic model throughout Latin America. Foreign Affairs
Minister John Baird was to stop there last month, but Venezuela cancelled his visit.¶ In a statement, Prime
Minister Stephen Harper offered
condolences to the Venezuelan people and said he looks forward to working with Chavez’s successor
and other leaders in the region “ to build a hemisphere that is more prosperous, secure and
democratic .”¶ “At this key juncture, I hope the people of Venezuela can now build for themselves a better,
brighter future based on the principles of freedom, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human
rights.”¶ In the longer term, Cameron said, Chavez’s absence could create a chance to “ press the reset button ” and
improve diplomatic relations with Venezuela.¶
nb: soft power ext.
uniqueness
Canadian soft power is set to decline --- closure of CIDA
Johnston, ’13 - journalist (Geoffrey, “Scrapping CIDA may sap Canada’s soft power,” March 28, 2013 http://www.thewhig.com/2013/03/28/scrapping-cidamay-sap-canadas-soft-power)//A-Berg
For many decades, Canada has wielded considerable influence, thanks, in large part, to this country’s altruistic commitment to reducing extreme poverty and
suffering around the globe. However, a bureaucratic
restructuring of the federal government could sap Canada’s hard-earned soft
power. Last week, Finance Minister Jim Flaherty delivered a rather bland budget, with one notable exception: he announced the
demise of the Canadian International Development Agency. Immediately after Flaherty’s speech, International Cooperation
Minister and CIDA boss Julian Fantino explained the restructuring in a written statement. “To enhance coordination of international assistance with broader
Canadian values and objectives, and to put development on equal footing with trade and diplomacy, the Canadian International Development Agency will
amalgamate with the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade," Fantino declared. CIDA’s international
development and humanitarian assistance mandate will now be exercised by the new Department of Foreign
Affairs, Trade and Development. Established in 1968 by then-prime minister Pierre Trudeau, CIDA was a stand-alone
institution tasked with alleviating extreme poverty around the globe. In recent years, the agency tended to focus on three
main themes: boosting food security; the advancement of child health and education; and promoting sustainable economic growth. According to Fantino, “the
priority of international development and humanitarian assistance will, for the first time ever, be enshrined into law.” That is a positive development, says Anthony
Scoggins, the executive director of Oxfam, which has partnered with CIDA since the mid-1970s. The amalgamation isn’t necessarily a bad thing,
according to Scoggins. He points out that international development programs are successfully run by Scandinavian foreign affairs departments, which allocate up
to 0.7% of the country's Gross National Products to foreign aid. However, Scoggins doubts
that the development branch will have an
equal partnership with the traditional foreign affairs section of the Canadian government. “It’ll be
very much a secondary, if not subservient, relationship.” And he wonders whether poverty reduction and human rights “will be
priorities when there are multiple other political and economic concerns and self-interests of the larger ministry.” Even though contributions from CIDA make up
only 5% of World Vision Canada’s total budget, the Christian NGO, which delivers both humanitarian assistance and long-term development aid around the globe, is
worried about the amalgamation. “We’re concerned about this direction, which seems to highlight development assistance being used
for advancing Canada’s prosperity rather than focusing on the needs and aspirations of the poor as an objective in its own right,” says Elly Vandenber, a director of
policy and advocacy at World Vision. And she warns that “voices that prioritize the poor risk being lost.” “For us, the devil will be in the details of actually how this is
going to be done, and how it’s all structured,” says Jim Cornelius, executive director of the Canadian Foodgrains Bank. The NGO is one of the main vehicles for the
delivery of the Canadian government’s funding for food assistance. Two years ago, the Canadian Foodgrains Bank and the Harper government entered into a fiveyear funding arrangement that will channel $125 million in food assistance to the developing world. And the NGO doesn’t expect that arrangement to change.
According to Cornelius, cooperation with the Canadian Foodgrains Bank has “enabled CIDA to have outreach to some of the most desperate parts of the world.”
Similarly, Scoggins says that Oxfam brings “significant expertise and capacity in a whole range of development activity; and most particularly, those that are focused
on the very poor and on humanitarian efforts.” And Oxfam hopes that Ottawa will “continue to consider NGOs active partners in this process.” Under the new
regime, there is a danger that development policy will become increasingly focused on trade. “ However, it need
not be the outcome,” says Cornelius. To protect the integrity of development assistance programs, he says Ottawa should establish “clear parameters” to ensure
that “the aid mandate is protected” and “doesn’t simply become a junior partner to other foreign policy issues.” For the record, Scoggins doesn’t see anything
wrong with Ottawa’s efforts to advance Canadian economic or corporate interests. However, he says that such initiatives
“should just not be
framed as poverty reduction.” China has been investing heavily in Africa in recent years, building roads, rail lines and other infrastructure. But
Beijing’s foreign aid expenditures aren’t motivated by an altruistic desire to help alleviate extreme poverty in Africa. On the contrary, China targets a select group of
mineral- and oil-rich African countries. And that aid should be viewed as an investment in the establishment of a reliable supply chain that will feed the growth of
China’s massive economy and superpower aspirations. It is no coincidence that newly minted Chinese President Xi Jinping has been touring Africa this week, with
stops in mineral-rich Republic of Congo, Tanzania, and South Africa. However, there is growing resentment that the Communist regime’s policies are retarding
Africa’s development. By pursuing an international development assistance strategy more closely linked to Canada’s commercial interests, Ottawa risks becoming
indistinguishable from Beijing in the eyes of some Africans. Canada’s international reputation has already taken a hit on the
world’s poorest continent. In 2009, the Harper government launched the aid effectiveness agenda, reducing the number of countries receiving Canadian
development assistance. There can be little doubt that it undermined African support for Canada’s ill-fated 2010 bid for a temporary seat on the United Nations
Security Council.
Canada soft power still high but dropping
Nevil Gibson 13- writer for the National Business Review (Despite Hobbit, NZ falls off global Top 20 'Soft Power' list, January 2013,
http://www.nbr.co.nz/article/hobbits-hold-nz-loses-soft-power-grip-ng-134311)//Modermatt
“Gangnam style,” Brazil’s burgeoning status and Turkey’s increasing global outreach have all combined to push New Zealand out of a new ranking of the world’s top
20 “soft powers.” Each
year, London-based trendy globalist magazine Monocle measures countries’ influence
based on their values, culture, policies and institutions. In 2011, New Zealand ranked 17th largely on the basis of two things –
rugby and Hobbits. This year, the ranking has dropped to 21st, with only the Hobbits featuring: “New Zealand milks JRR Tolkien’s sagas for all they’re worth…the
country’s mint has even produced special Hobbit coins,” Monocle says, adding that New Zealand also plays an important diplomatic role in the South Pacific." The
UK displaces the US from the top slot, mainly due to the successful London Olympics. In particular, Monocle describes Danny Boyle’s three-hour Games opening
ceremony as a “brilliant advert” shown for free in “pretty much every country (which even included the briefest lesbian kiss, something that may have come as a
surprise to some viewers in Saudi Arabia).” The US drops to second due to its continued dependence on “hard power” while Germany has reached its highest
ranking yet at the expense of France with its “economic uncertainty and stumbling president.” Others to rise are Sweden (fifth), Japan (sixth) and Denmark
(seventh). Going
down are Australia (ninth behind unchanged Switzerland) and Canada (10th). The latter is
ranked highly for its tolerant immigration policy in contrast with Australia’s failings in that area,
according to Monocle.
Canadian soft power low—laundry list
Hirst ‘9- Jeremy, Canadian International Council Administrator( “Canada's global influence wanes” Winnipeg Free Press, June 4
http://www.canadianinternationalcouncil.org/blogs/opeds/canadasglo)//Modermatt
A projection by Jim O'Neill, head of Global Economics Research for Goldman Sachs International in London, shows that by 2050, China's
economy will
be more than twice as large as that of the United States. He stresses that the international American-based bank is not saying
that's how the world will be, but it could be. Predictions are notoriously unreliable and the further forward the predictions are, the less reliable they are. What
is undeniable, however, are the shifts in world economic power that have happened already. Eight years
ago, O'Neill gained fame in economic circles for coining the acronym "BRIC". It stands for Brazil, Russia, India and China. O'Neill suggested that these four countries
were the powerhouses of the future. In some ways, they already are. In a presentation to the Vancouver branch of the Canadian International Council last week,
O'Neill suggested that within four years the economies of the four BRIC countries together would exceed that of the United States and that it was those countries
that were leading the world out of recession. The world economic order is changing very quickly. At the same conference, Debra Steger, a law professor at the
University of Ottawa, said the economic world was "at a really transformational point in history." World financial institutions, however, The World Bank, The
International Monetary Fund, summit meetings of rich nations, are all constructed on what used to be: a world economic order ruled by the United States, Europe
and Japan with Canada as a minor, but still significant player. According
to the Goldman Sachs 2050 projections, Canada will
rank 16th in world economic output: still important, but less so than today. Economic power and
diplomatic influence, however, are not the same thing. Canada has traditionally pulled above its
weight in world affairs. The concern of ex-diplomats, former politicians and some academics now is
that as the world changes, Canada is less engaged than it used to be and is losing influence at a crucial
time. Jeremy Kinsman, one of Canada's foremost diplomats, former ambassador to Russia and high commissioner in London, spoke to the Vancouver conference
of Canada's international record of "objectivity and helpfulness." No longer. "No one in Ottawa is trying," he said. "There are
virtually no relationships." The Harper government has increased military spending, but reduced spending on foreign affairs and aid. "Why the
double standard?" asked former Progressive Conservative prime minister Joe Clark. "Why are we prepared to accept more of our share of the military burden than
we are of the diplomatic and development burdens?" At times at the two-day conference, it felt as though many academics, former politicians and diplomats were
acting like a foreign service in exile, despairing of a government that with the exception of Arctic sovereignty and Afghanistan has turned inward. Clark and Kinsman
both spoke of how Canada was losing what had become a precious national asset: its outgoing foreign affairs policies. Kinsman complained that the reduction
in money for arts groups to travel abroad was spoiling Canada's image; Clark of a failure to lead the
kind of initiatives against land-mines and blood diamonds this country had pursued in the past. Others
spoke of Canada's dismal performance on cutting greenhouse gases; and how its failure to live up to
the Kyoto protocol had damaged our credibility. All of this cannot be laid at the door of the Harper government. What the former
politicians, diplomats and academics are saying is that the lack of international engagement of the present government
has reduced rather than improved our standing. Canada is emerging from the present economic crisis far stronger than most. Our
banking system is the envy of the world, but our influence in bringing about change to the world financial regulatory system and to world economic institutions is
not nearly as strong as it could be. In the World Trade Organization, where Canada had for years been a voice or calm and reason, Canada's place has been taken by
Australia. As
the world economic summits have moved from the influence of the old group of rich
countries, the G8, to the broader G20 group, which includes the BRIC countries, Canada's influence
has waned.
Canadian soft power slipping
Andrew Cohen, 02- Professor of Journalism at Carleton University and Norman Patersno School of International Affairs (“Canada's new 'soft power' weapon”,
27/7/02, http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/docview/384148948)//Modermatt
But even if Ms. Wallin can take Manhattan, what of Canada in the rest of America? In
terms of visibility, we are slipping off the
radar screen. The special relationship is less special these days, and it is Mexico, not Canada, that has become America's most favoured nation. Economically,
Canada remains the biggest trading partner of the United States. But Mexico threatens. Between 1994 and 1999, U.S. exports to Mexico rose by 70 per cent and to
Canada by 45 per cent; imports from Mexico increased 121 per cent and from Canada by 54 per cent. Politically,
geography and history are
against Canada in Washington. The amiability between George W. Bush and Mexican President Vicente Fox neatly reflects the shift in the centre
of political gravity from the Northeast, where Canada is known, to the Southwest, where it is not. The Mexicans have opened 47 consulates and offices. Many
handle immigration, but they serve a growing electoral constituency. For its part, Canada has its embassy and 15 offices, which is fewer than 10 years ago.
Militarily, Canada is so weak Americans call our forces "irrelevant." Diplomatically, Canada has
alienated Washington with its support for the ban on land mines, the Kyoto treaty and the
International Criminal Court. In each case, Canada was right. Like a weak military, however, independent diplomacy comes at a cost. Canadian
diplomats in Washington insist that Mr. Bush has nothing personal against Canada. But there seems to be no rapport between the
leaders and, as former Canadian ambassador Allan Gotlieb argues, it is a mistake to think that
personal relations don't matter. They do. The neglect has never been more benign. When Lester Pearson sent peacekeepers to Cyprus in
1964, a grateful Lyndon Johnson asked how he could return the favour. Today, Canada sends troops to Afghanistan and the
favour is tariffs and quotas. Restoring our stature in the United States -- if it matters to Canada, and
maybe a low profile is ultimately preferable when you have a trade surplus -- will not happen
overnight. It will take a real military, a creative public diplomacy, more trade offices and more trade
missions, and a recasting of our image. It will also take a few more Pamela Wallins. Andrew Cohen, a former
Washington correspondent with The Globe and Mail, teaches at the School of Journalism and the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton
University.
i/L
Soft power key ext.
Canadian Soft power key to soft power convention
Axworthy, 1998 - Minister of Foreign Affairs (Lloyd “Why `soft power' is the right policy for Canada: [Final Edition]”, 4/25/98,
http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/docview/240146828)//Modermatt
I was interested in the April 23 article, "Foreign policy for wimps," by Prof. Kim Richard Nossal on Canadian foreign policy. Unfortunately, it shows
just how out of touch some members of our academic community are in understanding the changing world forces that face Canada. Mr. Nossal seems to
be exercised that I use the term "soft power" coined a few years back by an American thinker, Joseph Nye, in reference to U.S. foreign policy. I suppose
this means that Mr. Nossal does not read the views of American, British, Russian, Brazilian or other foreign writers to garner the best thought available.
It is too bad that such isolationist tendencies cut him off from international thought. It must be said, though, that in reading the views of Mr. Nossal I
detect a strong whiff of Hans Morgenthau, the American advocate of hardline power politics. More serious is his misinterpretation of what is meant by
the term
"soft power" in the Canadian context. The reason I use this phrase in my speeches is that it
exemplifies the Canadian talent for drawing upon our skills in negotiating,
building coalitions and presenting diplomatic initiatives; in other words, for
influencing the behaviour of other nations not through military intimidation but
through a variety of diplomatic and political tools. The author grossly misrepresents my remarks when he
claims this is foreign policy on the cheap, and does not require improved peacekeeping, political or developmental resources. Quite the opposite is true.
We are pursuing an active foreign policy in resolving conflicts in such places as
Haiti, Central Africa and Bosnia, using our skilled peacekeepers. We have
developed a peace-building strategy, with a separate fund attached. We deployed
our military resources as part of the UN coalition on Iraq, and we are actively
participating in developing a security network in Southeast Asia -- all of which Mr. Nossal ignores.
Worse, he appears to be completely unaware of our efforts to deal with emerging human security issues. Unlike the Cold War approach that is the
template of Mr. Nossal's thinking, foreign policy now involves tackling global problems such as drugs, terrorism, human- rights abuses and child labour
-- matters that directly affect individual Canadians.
To address these issues we need new international co-operation,
covenants, rules and collective behaviour . This is where much of our foreign policy is
being directed: witness our role in the land-mine treaty, in developing a drug
strategy for the hemisphere, in initiating protection for exploited children, in
working on international anti-terrorism efforts, in negotiating for an
International Criminal Court, or in countering American extra- territorial laws such as HelmsBurton . These efforts put a premium on "soft power" techniques, the very ones that are decried in
Mr. Nossal's article. Far from being wimps, we are in fact very robust in our defence of Canadian interests, and in the re-shaping of international norms
and institutions. What is clear from Mr. Nossal's remarks is that many academics, like generals, are still fighting old wars on old issues, not those of the
present or the future.
Canada’s soft power prevents Sino-Japan war---it goes nuclear.
FATDC 12 – Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada, Stopping the Free-Fall Implications of SinoJapanese Rivalry for Regional Stability and Canadian
Interests, 2012-09-14 http://www.international.gc.ca/arms-armes/isrop-prisi/research-recherche/intl_securitysecurite_int/yuan2007/section1a.aspx?lang=eng)//A-Berg
This report discusses developments in Sino-Japanese
relations since the end of the Cold War and analyses some of the underlining causes of mistrust,
misunderstanding, hostility, and emerging rivalry between these two major Asia powers . It presents a
preliminary assessment of the key issues and controversies ranging from Chinese views on the evolving U.S.-Japan military alliance, Japan's aspiration to become a
normal state and its pursuit of greater international role and enhancement of military capabilities, to historical legacies and rising nationalism in both countries,
unresolved territorial disputes and competition for resources, and growing Japan-Taiwan ties. The report argues that the end of the Cold War, the changing
international security environment in East Asia, domestic politics and leadership transition in both China and Japan, especially China's rise as a major power, present
serious challenges for the regional balance of power and the need for adaptation and adjustments to the power shift and transformation. This dramatic shift in the
power balance also leads to worst-case interpretations by both Beijing and Tokyo of the other's intentions and behavior. Under such circumstances, the old wounds
of history are further aggravated by new nationalism, personality, and changing domestic foreign policy making processes where societal pressures impose
significant constraints on conciliatory gestures and "new thinking" on managing bilateral relations. The report also reviews and evaluates the validity of limited
confidence building measures and security dialogue between Beijing and Tokyo and concludes that their utility is constrained by the overall political relationship
between the two countries. At the same time, the report also notes that growing economic interdependence, the recognition that continued deterioration of
relations serves neither side's interests; consequently, the resolve of Chinese and Japanese leaders in the post-Koizumi era to mend fences and promote common
interests at least for now have prevented the free fall in Asia's most important bilateral relationship. Sino-Japanese
relations have important
implications for Canada's interests. Canada has long maintained good relationships with both China
and Japan for economic and politico-security reasons. Japan has been a traditional trading partner of Canada while China's
phenomenal growth over the last quarter century has drawn significant interest from Canadian businesses. Ottawa made significant efforts in promoting its ties
with Asian Pacific countries in the 1990s, as well as participated in and introduced multilateral security institution-building. In this context, the
continuing
free fall of the Sino-Japanese relationship could seriously affect Canadian interests in the region. Canada
remains a "stakeholder" in the future developments in Sino-Japanese relations for at least three reasons: China's rise and its future direction
affect both regional peace and stability and the geo-strategic landscape at the global level. China has
become an important trading partner for Canada and Canadian "soft power" in engaging and
encouraging China to adopt a multilateral approach to regional security and good governance has
achieved important results. Ottawa should continue to play an active role in engaging Beijing to
promote a disarmament agenda and encourage military transparency so that China's emergence could
be better integrated into the existing international norms and frameworks, values a middle power such as Canada
holds dear. Japan and Canada share many common values and interests. Both are members of the G-8 and OECD, and are concerned with emerging non-traditional
security challenges, human security, and international peacekeeping. However, Ottawa and Tokyo have placed different emphasis and have different priorities due
to their respective threat perceptions, geography and alliance commitments. Continued Sino-Japanese rivalry has serious implications for Canadian interests.
Prolonged instability and deteriorating security in that region would negatively affect Canada's interests. Intensified
disputes leading to
militarized conflicts between China and Japan could result in a number of negative developments.
There is the potential for an arms race. Japan strives for greater military capabilities, including nuclear
and missile capabilities as Tokyo's confidence in U.S. nuclear umbrella and the alliance protection
wanes.
Canada soft power key to check China
Axworthy, 03-Thomas, senior fellow at both the Munk School of Global Affairs and Massey College at the University of Toronto. 9/24/ (“Eastern Instablity”,
www.tibet.ca/en/wtnarchive/2003/9/24_1.html)
Asia is the most dangerous place in the world. With Americans dying daily in Iraq; the Bush road map for Israel and Palestine in tatters;
and the ghostly visage of Osama bin Laden broadcast to the world by al-Jazeera on the second anniversary of Sept. 11, threatening all of us with even worse horrors;
it may be difficult to fathom that the greatest threats to peace and security reside outside the Middle East. But in this league of infamy, Asia leads the first division.
The six-nation talks with North Korea, for example, have ended with nodiscernible progress and North Korea moving at full speed to expand its nuclear arsenal.
in North Korea: There a rogue regime has starved
hundreds of thousands of its own citizens, attacked its neighbours, built a nuclear bomb, and
trafficked with terrorists. North Korea is the world's most deadly problem. Right behind is the situation in Pakistan. The
Pakistani intelligence service helped invent the Taliban; Islamists are honeycombed within the
intelligence service and the armed forces. Pakistan has also developed nuclear weapons to protect itself in the 50-year conflict with India
Everything that George Bush went to war to prevent in Iraq is occurring irrefutably
over Kashmir. Terrorists can either spark outrages in India hoping to bring about Armageddon in a nuclear war between India and Pakistan, or Islamists could
promote a coup in Pakistan itself, putting a Taliban-style regime in power in Islamabad. The regime of President Pervez Musharraf presides over one of the world's
most turbulent countries, and if you thought the Taliban in Afghanistan was a problem, what about if a similarly motivated group had its thumb on a nuclear
trigger? In
this Asian cauldron of animosity, one optimistic possibility is the emergence of a peaceful,
engaged China. The Middle Kingdom has been the dominant player in Asia for 5,000 years, and in our time it has been a key ally of both North Korea and
Pakistan. We are witnessing in the early years of the 21st century a China that is systematically turning away from the isolation and madness of the cultural
revolution of Mao towards an engagement with its neighbours. This engagement is primarily economic. China's ascension to the World Trade Organization is of the
utmost importance, but it is also strategic with China participating in the six-nation negotiations with North Korea. Encouraging
China to take a
constructive role in its own region is in the interests of us all. Canada might be able to play a small
part in this engagement strategy. The National Post has recently run a foreign policy series with much
debate about the utility of "hard views" and "soft power." Of course, you need both, and we need to
invest more in both elements of power if we are to play a role in the world. With China, Canada does
have some unique soft power assets.
impacts
sino-japan War ext.
Military conflict will occur by the end of the year and will escalate to great power war
White 12 professor of strategic studies at Australian’s National University, visiting fellow at the Lowy Institute (Hugh White, 26 December
2012, “Caught in a bind that threatens an Asian war nobody wants,” The Sydney Morning Herald,
http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/politics/caught-in-a-bind-that-threatens-an-asian-war-nobody-wants-201212252bv38.html#ixzz2GAKA8VUy)//KP
This is how wars usually start: with a steadily escalating stand-off over something intrinsically
worthless. So don't be too surprised if the US and Japan go to war with China next year over the
uninhabited rocks that Japan calls the Senkakus and China calls the Diaoyu islands. And don't assume the war would be
contained and short. Of course we should all hope that common sense prevails. It seems almost laughably unthinkable that the world's
three richest countries - two of them nuclear-armed - would go to war over something so trivial. But that is to confuse what starts a war with
what causes it. The Greek historian Thucydides first explained the difference almost 2500 years ago. He wrote that the catastrophic
Peloponnesian War started from a spat between Athens and one of Sparta's allies over a relatively insignificant dispute. But what caused the
war was something much graver: the growing wealth and power of Athens, and the fear this caused in Sparta. The analogy with Asia today is
uncomfortably close and not at all reassuring. No one in 431BC really wanted a war, but when Athens threatened one of Sparta's allies over a
disputed colony, the Spartans felt they had to intervene. They feared that to step back in the face of Athens' growing power would fatally
compromise Sparta's position in the Greek world, and concede supremacy to Athens. The
Senkakus issue is likewise a
symptom of tensions whose cause lies elsewhere, in China's growing challenge to America's longstanding leadership in Asia, and America's response. In the past few years China has become both markedly
stronger and notably more assertive. America has countered with the strategic pivot to Asia. Now, China is pushing back
against President Barack Obama's pivot by targeting Japan in the Senkakus. The Japanese themselves genuinely fear
that China will become even more overbearing as its strength grows, and they depend on America to protect them. But they also worry
whether they can rely on Washington as China becomes more formidable. China's ratcheting pressure over the Senkakus strikes at both these
anxieties. The push and shove over the islands has been escalating for months. Just before Japan's recent election, China flew surveillance
aircraft over the islands for the first time, and since the election both sides have reiterated their tough talk. Where will it end? The risk is that,
without a clear circuit-breaker, the escalation will continue until at some point shots are exchanged,
and a spiral to war begins that no one can stop. Neither side could win such a war, and it would be
devastating not just for them but for the rest of us. No one wants this, but the crisis will not stop by itself. One
side or other, or both, will have to take positive steps to break the cycle of action and reaction. This will be difficult, because any
concession by either side would so easily be seen as a backdown, with huge domestic political costs
and international implications. It would therefore need real political strength and skill, which is in short
supply all round - especially in Tokyo and Beijing, which both have new and untested leaders. And each side apparently hopes that they will
not have to face this test, because they expect the other side will back down first. Beijing apparently believes that if it keeps
pushing, Washington will persuade Tokyo to make concessions over the disputed islands in order to avoid being dragged into a war with China,
which would be a big win for them. Tokyo on the other hand fervently hopes that, faced with firm US support for Japan, China will have no
choice but to back down. And in Washington, too, most people seem to think China will back off. They argue that China needs America more
than America needs China, and that Beijing will back down rather than risk a break with the US which would devastate China's economy.
Unfortunately, the
Chinese seem to see things differently. They believe America will not risk a break with China
because America's economy would suffer so much. These mutual misconceptions carry the seeds of a
terrible miscalculation, as each side underestimates how much is at stake for the other. For Japan, bowing to
Chinese pressure would feel like acknowledging China's right to push them around, and accepting that America can't help them. For
Washington, not supporting Tokyo would not only fatally damage the alliance with Japan, it would amount to an acknowledgment America is
no longer Asia's leading power, and that the ''pivot'' is just posturing. And for Beijing, a backdown would mean that instead of proving its
growing power, its foray into the Senkakus would simply have demonstrated America's continued primacy. So for all of them, the
largest
issues of power and status are at stake. These are exactly the kind of issues that great powers have
often gone to war over.
It goes nuclear --- tensions escalate.
Anokhin 09 – Pravda.Ru columnist, (Vladimir, “Nuclear war to break out in South Asia,” 12.05.2009 http://english.pravda.ru/world/asia/12-05-2009/107537nuclear_war-0/)//A-Berg
The danger of a nuclear war in the world will remain even if Russia and the United States agree to reduce their strategic offensive arms.
Asia’s nuclear powers - India and Pakistan – do not intend to follow the example of the two superpowers. The
ongoing standoff in South Asia may lead to catastrophic consequences for the whole world. The conflict
between India and Pakistan lasts for over 60 years already. Their confrontation became especially dangerous after 1998, when both India and Pakistan conducted a
series of nuclear tests and showed the world their ability to build nuclear weapons. India has never concealed an intention to possess nuclear weapons. The nuclear
doctrine was approved in the nation in 2001. It is worthy of note that India never signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Indian government believes that
it has a full right to possess nuclear arms just like Russia, the USA, China, France and Great Britain. In accordance with the nuclear doctrine, India ’s nuclear arsenal
will have the air, the ground and the sea constituents. The country’s Air Force already has nuclear-capable Mirage-2000, MiG-27 and Jaguar aircraft. It also has
ground-based ballistic missiles. India does not have nuclear submarines yet, but it may become a reality very soon. Pakistan
is India’s primary
potential enemy. China can also be a threat to one of Asia’s largest nations. The Indian nuclear program of the 1960s
was a response to its own defeat, which the nation suffered as a result of the border war with China in 1962. Several dozens of nuclear
warheads will be enough for India to contain Pakistan. Even if Pakistan launches a massive attack against India’s vast territory, it will be impossible to destroy
most of the Indian strategic nuclear arms. Quite on the contrary: India’s nuclear retaliation with the use of 15-20 nukes will cause much bigger damage to
Pakistan, which is a lot smaller in size. India has 115 nukes at the moment. About 80 warheads will be enough to
destroy Pakistan entirely. However, India will not be able to attack China afterwards. The latter has
410 nuclear warheads. Therefore, India will most likely try to enlarge its nuclear potential. Unlike India,
Pakistan does not have its nuclear doctrine officially documented. There is not enough information about the details and the structure of the nuclear forces of this
country either. Official spokesmen for the Pakistani authorities say that the development of the nation’s nuclear forces will fully depend on the actions of the Indian
government. Pakistan possesses nuclear arms as a nuclear deterrent against a possible attack from India. In addition, Pakistan aims to reduce India’s predominance
in other arms. Pakistan has all chances to build 40-45 nuclear warheads. The country has ballistic missiles too A
nuclear blow in South Asia can
result in a global catastrophe. The population of India and Pakistan totals over one billion people. The
two countries do not have any means of protection against a nuclear attack. Even a minor nuclear
explosion will kill millions of people and trigger a humanitarian catastrophe.
Disputes ensure nuclear escalation
Weitz, 10 - director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis and a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, (Richard, “South Asia’s Nuclear War Risk,” July 12,
2010, http://thediplomat.com/2010/07/12/south-asia%E2%80%99s-nuclear-war-risk/?all=true
But there’s more to the Chasma reactor dispute than the question of equity between India and Pakistan—the deal goes to the heart of concerns
over
civilian nuclear cooperation and proliferation in Asia. Chinese assertions of the need to maintain a
nuclear balance between Pakistan and India reflect the interconnected nature of these three
countries’ nuclear programmes. After the Sino-Soviet split of the late 1950s, the Chinese Communists redoubled their efforts to acquire nuclear
weapons to counter the USSR’s superiority in nuclear and conventional force. China’s successful development of an atomic bomb in 1964 in turn persuaded Indian
leaders to pursue nuclear weapons. After India detonated a non-deliverable fission device in May 1974 at its Pokhran testing site, China increased its sharing of
nuclear material and technology with Pakistan, allowing Islamabad to respond quickly when India finally detonated several deliverable nuclear warheads in May
1998. Indian policymakers cited China’s actions, including its growing nuclear weapons capacity and Beijing’s transfer of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile
technologies to Pakistan, as the reasons for their tests (and in the process implied that New Delhi was seeking the capacity to target China with nuclear weapons).
But what’s perhaps the most fundamental point about the dispute with Pakistan is that it could so easily apply to many other Asian
countries that
might plausibly seek nuclear weapons—after all, its successful acquisition of an expanding nuclear force encourages other governments to believe
they too could acquire a nuclear arsenal and overcome the resulting international opprobrium. That’s not all. Nuclear proliferation anywhere
increases the risk that a non-rational actor, whether a leader of a state or a terrorist group, will
acquire nuclear weapons. Everything being equal, the risk of nuclear accidents or nuclear weapons diversion to non-state actors rises with the
increase in the number of nuclear weapons states. Both these considerations also apply to India, North Korea, Iran and other potential new nuclear weapons states.
In addition, Pakistan’s sometimes acute political instability raises the risk of regime collapse followed by the transfer of Pakistani nuclear weapons to a less
moderate government, domestic extremists, or foreign countries or non-state actors such as an international terrorist group or transnational criminal organization.
The larger Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, the more difficult it becomes for Islamabad to secure all its weapons adequately. But it wouldn’t even take regime collapse for
extremists to possibly gain control of a Pakistani nuclear weapon. In its 2008 report, the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism
describes Pakistan as ‘the geographic crossroads for terrorism and weapons of mass destruction’ given the presence of so many Islamist extremists, with suspected
sympathizers in the government and armed forces, in a country with a rapidly growing arsenal of nuclear weapons. Yet even setting aside the question of nuclear
weapons falling into terrorist hands, nuclear competition between India and Pakistan is especially dangerous. Active
(and ongoing) political
disputes between the two countries have resulted in three past wars as well as numerous proxy
conflicts. Pakistani leaders in particular have concluded that their nuclear arsenal has deterred India from again using its conventional forces to attack
Pakistani territory. As a result, Pakistan’s implicit nuclear doctrine presumes the possible first use of nuclear weapons. The risks of such tensions are compounded by
the physical proximity of the two countries, as well as their reliance on ballistic missiles as delivery vehicles, which means that early warning times might be as little
as five to ten minutes. Although it remains unclear whether India or Pakistan have combined its nuclear warheads with their assigned delivery systems, such a
precarious stance would increase the risks of both accidental and catalytic war (a nuclear conflict
between both governments precipitated by a third party, such as a terrorist group). Throw China into
the mix, with Pakistan at risk of viewing its own nuclear programme as increasingly inadequate as
India seeks to achieve mutual deterrence with China, and the picture becomes more complicated. And
add in the risk of widespread political disorder in either India or Pakistan, which could see a
dangerous political adventurism as political leaders look to rally domestic support, and the peculiar challenges posed by the region become
clearer. The fact is South Asia is particularly prone to a destabilizing arms race. And perhaps nuclear war.
Nuclear war
Tatlow 12 - International Herald Tribune- (Didi K., Rising Tension — and Stakes — in Japan-China Island Dispute, September 14, 2012,
http://rendezvous.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/14/rising-tension-and-stakes-in-japan-china-island-dispute/)//A-Berg
BEIJING — It has all the ingredients of a future tragedy, peppered with grim farce. A collapsing Japanese ambassador. A noodle soup attack. A
nuclear war threat. Music concerts canceled along with tens of thousands of private vacations and major friendship celebrations. An 81year-old national trauma revived. And underneath all that, the shopping continues. Welcome to Chinese-Japanese relations in
2012. In China, the state-run media were so angry on Friday over the Japanese government’s purchase earlier in the week of some of the
Diaoyu islands, which the two nations both claim — Japan calls them the Senkakus — that the word “purchase” appears only in quotation
marks in stories, as if it didn’t happen. (It did.) Early on Friday morning, six Chinese navy surveillance vessels arrived at the newly nationalized
islands, bought from a Japanese family, prompting a protest from the Japanese government. So far so normal, perhaps, in this long running,
acrimonious dispute between these love-hate neighbors over a clutch of small, craggy islands in the East China Sea (for
background on the issue, see this post by my colleague Mark McDonald.) Yet this round of fury in China may prove worse than
previous ones. This week, in a startling, apparently one-time call, the state-run Beijing Evening News suggested China should use
nuclear weapons in the dispute, claiming it would be “simpler.” “Just skip to the main course and drop an atomic bomb. Simpler,”
the newspaper posted on its Weibo account, provoking both critical and supportive responses from readers. Continuing the – perhaps unusual
– food and war metaphor, early on Friday, a user writing in Chinese under the name izhangzhe mocked the newspaper: “Did you explode the
bomb? Did it taste good?” Other Chinese commentators pointed out that it was one thing for angry netizens to make extreme calls, but quite
another for an official newspaper to do so(this link is in Chinese). The People’s Daily on Friday carried a furiously worded article demanding that
Japan “return to reason,” with the headline on its online news page blaring (in Chinese): “Is Japan prepared for the consequences of its odious
acts?” In Tokyo, the new Japanese ambassador to Beijing, Shinichi Nishimiya, appointed just two days before, collapsed on the street near his
home and was taken to hospital unconscious, Japanese media reported. He has since recovered somewhat but Japan will choose a new
ambassador, China News Service said. His predecessor was recalled after a Japanese national flag was plucked off the ambassadorial car on a
Beijing highway recently, apparently by Chinese nationalist hotheads. On Thursday in Shanghai, a bowl of hot noodle soup was thrown in the
face of a Japanese, the Kyodo news agency reported, in a first recorded attack on a Japanese person since the islands dispute flared after Japan
purchased three islands on Tuesday from the family that owned them, for about $26 million. Photographs circulating online purport to show a
burning Japanese-made car in Shanghai, apparently set on fire by its owner, with anti-Japanese banners in the background. Relations
are
almost certain to worsen. Next Tuesday is the anniversary of the 1931 Mukden Incident, the trigger for the Japanese seizure of
Manchuria in northeast China, and for many Chinese the beginning of 14 years of vicious subjugation by Japan that ended only when the United
States dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, leading to a Japanese surrender in World War II. “9.18,” as it’s known by its dates, is
on people’s minds here. Marching in Tokyo yesterday, Chinese men held a handwritten cardboard sign proclaiming: “New scores and old scores
will be settled together,” in this photograph on the People’s Daily Web site. Celebrities are getting in on the act, with the Chinese actress Li
Bingbing canceling a trip to Japan, The Beijing News reported. Friendship events planned for the end of the month to mark the 40th anniversary
of the resumption of Chinese-Japanese ties are falling like ninepins. A report in the Asahi Shimbun outlined many other cancellations. Hong
Kong’s South China Morning Post presented a dark picture of the situation, writing: “Ten Chinese generals issued
a joint
statement yesterday warning that the People’s Liberation Army is ‘ready to take Japan on’ ,” and citing an
editor of a Communist Party-run magazine, the Central Party School’s Study Times, Deng Yuwen, that there was a chance of armed clashes after
the party’s 18th congress, which will probably be held next month. The government is believed to want a peaceful meeting at all costs, since it
is when an heir to the party general-secretary, President Hu Jintao, will be announced. While all this is very disquieting in this region, what does
it mean to the world? Nuclear war talk makes everyone nervous. And then there’s the importance of global trade and a weak
global economy. In a new twist, China’s deputy minister of commerce, Jiang Zengwei, said on Thursday that economic and trade ties could be
affected by the dispute, Reuters reported.
at: no war
Lack of communication means accidental war and escalation is probable
Wittmeyer 3/19/13 Assistant Editor at Foreign Policy Magazine (Alicia P.Q. Wittmeyer, 19 March 2013, “Why Japan and China could
accidentally end up at war,” Foreign Policy, http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/03/19/china_japan_accidental_war_islands)//KP
Great. At a time when Chinese authorities seem to be making efforts to dial down tensions with Japan over disputed islands, could
a war
between East Asian superpowers be sparked by accident -- by some frigate commander gone rogue? That nuclear
war could come about in just such a scenario was, of course, a major concern during the Cold War. But
decades of tension, as well as apocalyptic visions of global annihilation as a result of the U.S. and
U.S.S.R. locking horns, produced carefully designed systems to minimize the damage any one rogue actor
could inflict (only the president can access the nuclear codes), and to minimize misunderstandings from more minor incidents (the
Kremlin-White House hotline). But East Asia -- relatively free of military buildup until recently -- doesn't have these same
systems in place. A soon-to-be-released report from the International Institute for Strategic Studies
highlights the danger that emerges when a region's military systems develop faster than its
communication mechanisms, and finds that accidental war in East Asia is a real possibility: Across East
Asia, advanced military systems such as anti-ship missiles, new submarines, advanced combat aircraft
are proliferating in a region lacking security mechanisms that could defuse crises. Bilateral military-to-military
ties are often only embryonic. There is a tangible risk of accidental conflict and escalation, particularly in the absence of
a strong tradition of military confidence-building measures."
at: no escalation
Any conflict in the region escalates
Sutton 4/3/13 Ph.D., visiting fellow at the World Trade Organization Research Center, former assistant professor of International
Relations (Michael Sutton, 3 April 2013, “War with China is not inevitable, so tread carefully,” The Japan Times,
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2013/04/03/commentary/war-with-china-is-not-inevitable-so-tread-carefully/#.UdSgl_m1Fsk)
There are dangers for the United States and Japan in underestimating or confronting China. The Abe
government’s interest in changing the postwar Japanese Constitution threatens relations not only with China but also with the U.S. Despite the
optimists, military
conflict in the region would be uncontainable. Any form of confrontation involving
China would likely spiral out of control and engulf the entire region, if not the world. Since the Liberal
Democratic Party was last in power, the world has profoundly changed. The first noticeable change is that the U.S. is in serious, perhaps
irretrievable trouble. Much has been said about how the Chinese giant awoke and arose, but much less has been said about what happens
when the U.S. giant stumbles and falls. The decline of the U.S. has sent shock waves around the world, and even America’s enemies shudder.
The cumulative effects of poor financial decisions, social fragmentation, national debt and overseas
conflict have taken their toll, injecting a profound and deleterious sense of uncertainty. The second
noticeable change is the immaturity of Chinese ambition. China has risen during a time of peace. U.S.sanctioned free trade underpinned this success. Instead, Beijing talks of islands, oceans, and territories in terms of
rights to ownership. This reflects an immature China that coexists alongside a confident, globaloriented China. Politically, Chinese leadership is dysfunctional. China has effectively dominated the
global economy, but it seems obsessed with a few islands of minimal value in the East and South
China Seas. Both the uncertain path ahead for the U.S. and the immature ambitions of China threaten the future of Japan. Changing the
Constitution would inject further uncertainty into an already tense region.
turns narcoterror
Canadian soft power is key to prevent narco-terror
Axworthy, 98 - Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ottawa, (Lloyd, “Why `soft power' is the right policy for Canada,” Apr 25, 1998, ProQuest)//A-Berg
Worse, he appears to be completely unaware of our efforts to deal with emerging human security issues. Unlike the Cold War approach that is the template of Mr.
Nossal's thinking, foreign
policy now involves tackling global problems such as drugs, terrorism, humanrights abuses and child labour -- matters that directly affect individual Canadians. To address these issues we need new
international co-operation, covenants, rules and collective behaviour. This is where much of our foreign
policy is being directed: witness our role in the land-mine treaty, in developing a drug strategy for the hemisphere, in
initiating protection for exploited children, in working on international anti-terrorism efforts, in negotiating for an International
Criminal Court, or in countering American extra- territorial laws such as Helms-Burton. These efforts put a premium on "soft power"
techniques, the very ones that are decried in Mr. Nossal's article.
turns militarism
Canadian soft power provides a key check against US militarism
Mulligan, 02 – (Thomas, Toronto Star, “Embracing 'soft power' ; Canada's muscle lies in the realm of ideas, culture: [Ontario Edition],” 09 Sep 2002,
ProQuest)//A-Berg
The great
transformations come, as Stein says, through "soft power"- the power to influence through ideas, culture and example.
has been a champion of soft
power. Ours is a civil, literate nation with a long history of international co-operation. Even our military has
a tradition of policing and peacekeeping. But now, U.S. President George W. Bush is twisting arms and pressuring
Military generals scorch the Earth; leaders like Gandhi and Martin Luther King build on it. Historically, Canada
nb 2: canada econ
2nc i/L
The CP boosts Canada’s economy
Dade, ’13 - Senior Fellow at the School for International Development and Global Studies at the University of Ottawa, served for five years as Executive
Director of the Canadian Foundation for the Americas, (Carlo, “Why Canada Needs the Pacific Alliance,” May 22, 2013 http://opencanada.org/features/the-thinktank/comments/why-canada-needs-the-pacific-alliance/)//A-Berg
The Pacific Alliance, a common market comprised of Chile, Peru, Colombia and Mexico, is the most important new
economic opportunity facing Canada as it seeks to grow and diversify its trade. Joining the Pacific Alliance
will position Canadian companies ahead of their competitors in a market composed of the fastest
growing, richest, most dynamic, and like-minded countries in the Americas that together form the fifth BRIC power.
Chile, Peru, Columbia, and Mexico are in the process of seamlessly linking their economies to better trade with each other and Asia. These countries have a
combined GDP of just under US$3 trillion, average per capita GDP of close to US$12,000 and average above 5 per cent annual growth compared to 1.7 per cent in
the U.S. and negative rates in most of Europe. The block has over one third of Latin America’s population and would be the world’s ninth largest economy – it is
essentially the fifth BRIC but without the political negatives and risks of India, Russia, and China. Pacific
Alliance countries are among the
most attractive markets with sound macro-economic fundamentals and mature democracies – they all rank
in the top 25 per cent of the World Bank Ease of Doing Business Index. Chile and Mexico are members of the OECD while Colombia will likely join soon. As other
trade blocs such as the EU, Mercosur and NAFTA have faltered or gone backwards, the
Pacific Alliance has progressed due to a
pragmatic focus on competitiveness issues, not politics. The bloc is implementing a “platinum
standard” agenda of regulatory reforms and economic liberalization that should make it among the
most competitive trading areas globally. The bloc’s stronger long-term political and macroeconomic environment makes it attractive for
Canadian firms to build or join regional supply chains and as a second platform, in addition to North America, for trade with Asia. Canada’s major competitors in the
region – Spain in banking, Australia in mining and mining equipment, and the United States in everything – also have trade agreements with Pacific Alliance
countries. Joining
the Alliance will give Canadian companies important advantages over their main
competitors. As an example, the Alliance countries have linked their stock markets creating a unified exchange; joining will bring unique new opportunities
for the TSX and Canada. Being a member, as opposed to an observer, will also give Canada a say in rules for how the Alliance is structured and a seat in negotiations
with other blocs and countries, especially in Asia. Entering the Pacific Alliance is as important for Canada as finalizing a new trade agreement with the European
Union but for different reasons. The Pacific Alliance offers a new set of opportunities for Canada to diversify its trade. A trade agreement with the EU is crucial to
protect Canada from losing market share to American firms once the U.S. signs its own agreement, but in the end, Canada will still be only one of several countries
with a trade agreement with the EU. Full membership in the Pacific Alliance will give Canada a “second NAFTA” – a market in which its companies enjoy privileges
and access beyond those available to through simple trade agreements. This would include things such as regulatory harmonization and an Alliance “Beyond the
Border” type agreement for facilitating trade and eliminating non-tariff barriers. Devoting energy to negotiating with the Pacific Alliance should not detract from
progress on other negotiations. Since Canada already has trade agreements with all Pacific Alliance countries, the hard work has been done. Negotiations will be
limited to those things that the Pacific Alliance has recently undertaken and will yield immediate benefits as Canada will be joining a process that is underway and
already producing results. The rapid pace of liberalization in the Pacific Alliance is in marked contrast to dealings with the U.S. on issues like Beyond the Border,
which have stalled due to political dysfunction in Washington. No such dysfunction exists with the Pacific Alliance; in fact just the opposite is the case. It is true that
to join the Pacific Alliance, Canada will eventually have to make concessions on agricultural and dairy price supports, but not immediately. The Pacific Alliance is
establishing an aggressive agenda to reduce all tariffs within the block to zero. But Canada has already, or is in the process of making, concessions in its trade
agreement with the EU. The U.S., Australia, and New Zealand have made it clear that Canadian dairy and agricultural price supports will be on the chopping block
with the Trans Pacific Partnership negotiations; cutting tariffs with Pacific Alliance countries will be easier on Canadian producers than with the EU or the TPP.
Liberalizing these sectors within the Alliance will be a useful, less painful, first adjustment for Canadian producers. The cost of joining for Canada will be minimal and
will require similar types of resources as required for working with the U.S. on the full range of North American issues. This will mean designating personnel in
ministries beyond International Trade to take part in technical working groups. It will require the prime minister to attend an annual summit and the trade and
other ministers to attend annual or bi-annual meetings. It will also require education and outreach to Canadian businesses beyond those currently operating in
these markets. The fact that the Canadian private sector has to be educated about the markets of the Pacific Alliance should not be a deterrent to negotiations. An
underwhelming U.S. recovery and negative growth in Europe are forcing Canadian companies to look beyond those markets. As the Pacific Alliance grows more
Canadian companies, but also their competitors, will become interested. The
government can move now while the entry cost is
low and Canada has a privileged position thanks to its history, since 2007, as an observer with the Alliance and its predecessor. This has
positioned the country ahead of its principle competitors in the region who are also seeking entry.
Trade diversification key to Canada’s economy
Marowits, 4/16/13 – analyst for the Huffington Post: Canada (Ross Marowits, 04/16/2013 “Canadian Exports Decline: Country Needs New Trade
Partners, CIBC Says”, The Canadian Press,
http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2013/04/16/exports-canada-new-markets_n_3089941.html)//GP
Companies need to take more risks in emerging markets so Canada doesn't experience another lost
decade for exports, says CIBC's senior economist.¶ Despite nine free trade agreements, the volume of
Canadian exports has receded back to about the same level it was a decade ago.¶ That's because
exports to countries outside the U.S. have hardly increased over the past four years — and in recent quarters,
volume has actually dropped.¶ Benjamin Tal said part of the reason is that Canadian exporters have
been squarely focused on China and the United States for growth.¶ While global trade has surged 70 per cent and imports
have increased by 45 per cent since 2002, the volume of exports has hardly changed over the same time, he said.¶
"That's basically a lost decade. Now for a small open economy that relies heavily on exports, that's
not a very positive trajectory," he said after releasing the report titled "Stuck in Neutral."¶ Tal said the stagnant growth
can't solely be blamed on the strength of the loonie, but also other factors, including the struggling
U.S. economy and heightened competition from emerging markets.¶ Tal said Canadian companies need
to look beyond its two largest trading partners, which promise only slow and unreliable economic
growth in the near term, and focus more on emerging countries such as Brazil, India and Indonesia.¶ "I think it's more a
problem of attitude, it's more a problem of taking risks and I think that it's doable because we have proven that we can do it," he said.¶ Export Development
Canada chief economist Peter Hall said the report doesn't reflect the efforts by Canadian companies to expand trade outside China.¶ "To say it's a lost decade is
more true of the world than it is for Canada in isolation," he said.¶ "I think it's important to put this in a context of a world that has seen incredible duress in the last
four to five years."¶ Hall said the high Canadian dollar has had a bigger impact on exports than the report captures.¶ Canadian exports to almost all countries but
China got pummelled in the downturn. Using 2009 as a reference year would reveal growth in emerging countries such as Brazil, Hong Kong, Indonesia and Russia
that are on par with China, he said.¶ Hall doesn't dispute the general thrust of the report, adding Canada can do a better job of boosting trade with South Korea,
India and the Middle East.¶ "A very strong growth trend was resumed post-crisis," he said. "It's just that trade was affected in most nations in the crisis year."¶
Lakehead University economics professor Livio di Matteo agreed that trading diversification has stalled
even though Canada has become less reliant on the U.S.¶ Canada has traditionally been a "monogamist trade country" — first
focused largely on Britain and after the Second World War, on the United States and then China.¶ Di Matteo said Canada can accelerate its
ties with emerging countries by increasing international business student exchanges.¶ "Let them learn about
the country and when they come back of course you'll have all these automatic human capital resources that will help
you grow your trade," he said from Thunder Bay, Ont.¶ Meanwhile, Tal said diversifying Canada's trading partners
will create employment, economic growth and the standard of living at home.¶ "In the past,
diversification out of the U.S. was a nice thing to do, today for many companies it's a question of
survival," he added.
Canada increasing investment in Latin America now – key to investment
diversification
ROBERTSON, 11 - (COLIN ROBERTSON, Nov 3, 2011 “Diplomacy: Canada's New Policies Toward Latin America”
http://www.americasquarterly.org/node/3039)
In August, on his fourth official visit to Latin America, Prime Minister Stephen Harper set out to reboot
Canada’s on-and-off-again relationship with the region. In the first stop on a four-country tour that took him to Brazil, Colombia,
Costa Rica, and Honduras, Harper declared in São Paulo that “during too long a time we neglected relations[…]too much grass grows in the cracks on the road. It is
time,” he added, “for increased ambition.”¶ Ambition is important. But so is perseverance.¶ Canadian efforts in the Americas are characterized by quixotic spasms
of tango-like embrace: joining the Organization of American States (1990); negotiating the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA, 1993–1994); and
committing to the Free Trade Area of the Americas (1994)—all nearly 20 years ago. But this rush of engagement was followed by a long siesta until 2007, when the
Harper government announced its Strategy of Engagement in the Americas, which emphasized democratic governance, prosperity and security. The plan is only
now taking shape.¶ It does take two to tango, and Latin American governments share equal responsibility for failing to take advantage of Canadian interest and
opportunities.¶ So what makes Harper’s newest effort different?¶ First, there
is the economic malaise in the United States and
the recognition that Canadians really do need options to the U.S. market. Agree or not with Standard
& Poor’s’ reevaluation of American creditworthiness, there is no disagreement with its analysis that
“the effectiveness, stability and predictability of American policymaking and political institutions have
weakened.” ¶ For Canadians, the U.S. market and the bilateral relationship will always remain
primordial, but as the U.S. hunkers down and the administration focuses on a “jobs” agenda, there is
a likelihood of renewed protectionism—which could affect the huge Canada–U.S. resource trade in everything from
lumber to fish. Notwithstanding President Barack Obama’s promise to export his way out of the economic malaise, certain Democrats and Tea Party Republicans
equate free trade with the outsourcing of jobs. And that may impede further efforts to broaden the opportunities for Canada under NAFTA.¶ While Canadian and
U.S. negotiators are in discussions to ease border access for people and goods, these steps alone will not strengthen the Canadian market. Canada must look to new
opportunities to hedge its bets.¶ That
is being done slowly in Latin America. On August 15, a free-trade agreement
Colombia—an economy equal to the state of Connecticut—went into effect, and new
implementing legislation for the Canada–Panama Free Trade Agreement (similar in economic weight to Vermont) is
(FTA) with
being introduced in Parliament this fall. Canada also has FTAs with Costa Rica, Peru and Chile.¶ Beyond FTAs, Latin
American countries are making it easier for Canada to invest and do business in the region. A decade-long
dose of the Washington Consensus, whatever its faults, has rinsed away the previous attachment to the Prebisch-inspired statism that stigmatized earlier efforts at
boosting investment and terms of trade.¶
Mexico is a prime example.
The World Bank and International Finance Corporation’sDoing Business 2011
report declared this NAFTA partner as the easiest place in Latin America to run a company. The
International Monetary Fund says
Mexico’s economic growth will eclipse that of the U.S. and Canada from now until 2015, and Goldman Sachs
predicts that in 40 years Mexico will be the world’s fifth-largest economy—bigger than Russia, Japan or Germany.¶ Third, Canadian business is
prepared for risk, recognizing that the options are either grow or get absorbed. Twenty years of freer trade have
given Canadian companies, especially the larger ones, the confidence that they can compete internationally and the experience of operations on the global stage.¶
CTV network anchor Andrea Mandel-Campbell notes in Why Mexicans Don’t Drink Molson that Canadian companies are historically timid about venturing into
international markets, but Mexicans ride on Bombardier-constructed subways and Scotiabank is the sixth-largest retail bank in Mexico. Where
once
Canada’s business associations focused almost exclusively on the U.S., their membership is now
encouraging them to look beyond its neighbor to the south.¶ Fourth, the renewed Canadian approach melds trade objectives
with development aspirations. Attitudes toward aid are changing with the increasing recognition that a job is the best form of development assistance. A key
feature of the rebooted relationship with Brazil is a CEO Forum, staffed by the Canadian Council of Chief Executives and the Brazilian National Confederation of
Industry.¶ This business-to-business dimension promises real gains, especially if Brazilians and Canadians can agree on a set of practical objectives such as
increasing direct flights and identifying business impediments that can be addressed by working with governments. CEO forums should be included in every FTA
negotiation and built into the existing relationships with Mexico and Chile .¶
To sustain the opening with Brazil and to move the
relationships with key partners like Mexico and Chile to the next level will require a series of focused
blueprints . These will have to address critical questions such as how to attract more Latin American
investment in Canada and what barriers—especially those specific to Latin America—can be
addressed by Canadian initiatives. The Canadian business community is engaged and should be a driving force for taking the relationship to the
next level.¶ In every case, there needs to be a systematic plan of engagement starting at the most senior political level.¶ For one, the prime minister needs to block
at least one week a year for visits to the region. To provide the needed intellectual capital, Canadians also need to actively support the work of think tanks and
improve existing synergies among organizations.¶ The demise for lack of funding in September of the Canadian Foundation for the Americas (FOCAL) research
center, after 21 years of advancing Canadian interests, is a setback because it consistently provided useful intellectual heft and intelligent trend-spotting.¶ FOCAL
had been largely dependent on Canadian government funding after it was created by an act of cabinet under Prime Minister Brian Mulroney (1984–1993). In its next
iteration it should look more like the Inter-American Dialogue or Americas Society/Council of the Americas, with strong private-sector involvement and a focus on
investment and trade as the best means of generating development and creating long-term relationships.¶ The current Canadian government is not the first to
promise a new look at the region, but all too often action never followed rhetoric. If
the Americas are truly a priority, and Harper’s
promise to be “ambitious” is more than just repetition of the old rhetoric, the prime minister’s
continued attention to the region will be necessary.¶ Unless the Canada–Latin America relationship is
given a place of priority on the agenda and moves from aspiration to pragmatic results, the grass will
grow back in the cracks.
Decrease in oil exports leads to Canadian economic collapse – now is key
Gray, 3/13 - is the former editor of Oilweek magazine and author of seven books about Canada’s petroleum industry. (Earle Gray, Mar 13 2013 “Collapse of
oilsands boom will scramble Canadian economy”, The Canada Star,
http://www.thestar.com/opinion/commentary/2013/03/13/collapse_of_oilsands_boom_will_scramble_canadian_economy.html)//GP
Slower growth in world oil demand, increasing energy efficiency, alternative fuels and possible caps on carbon dioxide emissions will
negatively affect Alberta’s oilsands.¶ The “shale revolution,” which releases oil and natural gas from
buried shale rocks, promises a fivefold increase in the world’s known recoverable oil, according to
estimates by the International Energy Agency, and double known gas reserves, according to the U.S.
Energy Information Administration. The shale revolution has enormously increased the volume and
dramatically slashed the price of natural gas in North America. Shale oil production is increasing almost as dramatically.¶
Other factors weighing against the oilsands include slower growth in world oil demand, increasing energy
efficiency, alternative fuels and possible caps on global warming emissions of carbon dioxide.¶ BP sees world oil demand growth slowing
to a rate of less than 1 per cent a year, but still increasing 2030 requirements by 16 million barrels a
day. China is expected to account for fully half the increased demand. It will soon pass the United States to become the world’s largest oil importer. But the
ability of high-cost synthetic oilsands production to crack that market at a time of ample world oil supplies is no slam dunk.¶ Increasing efficiency in energy use will
continue to reduce the U.S. need for oil. So will growing alternative fuels, such as ethane and fuels that come as a by-product of natural gas production.¶ As
for
caps on CO2 emission, if they were “implemented worldwide, the Canadian bitumen production (from
the oilsands) becomes essentially nonviable,” according to a study by the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology.¶ Plans to increase Alberta oil sales to Ontario, Quebec and the Atlantic provinces have
been mooted. That would likely require an expanded version of the long forgotten National Oil Policy, which prohibited the use of imported oil and refined
products west of Ottawa from 1961 to 1971. Ontario paid an average $3.46 per barrel for Alberta and Saskatchewan oil, while Quebec paid $2.65 for imported oil.
The difference cost Ontario consumers a calculated $527 million — billions in today’s money. The program ran for 11 years before collapsing in 1972. A new,
expanded National Oil Policy does not seem likely.¶ Under any plausible scenario, the
oilsands prop of the Canadian economy seems
likely to collapse. Too bad the government has leaned so heavily on it.
BMD impact
Econ Uniqueness
Low economy leads to budget cuts – military acquisition programs next to cut
CBC News, 12 (Canadian News, “National defence cuts could tally $2.5B”, Oct 1, 2012, The Canadian Press,
https://mail.google.com/mail/?tab=mm#inbox)//GP
Defence Minister Peter MacKay announces the new Canadian Forces Leopard 2A4 tank at CFB Gagetown in Oromocto, N.B., on Thursday, September 13. ¶ An
independent analysis has concluded the waves of federal budget cuts washing over National Defence
will run deeper and likely be more painful than advertised by the Harper government.¶ While it won't
exactly be a return to the "decade of darkness" the Conservatives attribute to the Liberal years, the
reductions will be significant and are expected to cut into the military's "readiness" — or ability to
respond quickly to a crisis.¶ The days of soldiers rationing their training ammunition, fuel and money used to make equipment operationally ready
may be about to return, the report warned.¶ The research paper, written for the Centre for Security and Defence
Studies at Carleton University, estimates the cumulative effect of the Harper government's strategic
review and the overlapping deficit reduction action plan will carve up to $2.5 billion out of the nearly
$21 billion National Defence budget by 2014-15.¶ The 27-page report, penned by defence expert Dave Perry, is believed to be the first
comprehensive snapshot on the post-war military of the impact of the federal government's dual-tracked deficit reduction plan and spending freezes.¶ " With
the economy once again the government's top priority, the Canadian Forces will need to adjust to a
new fiscal climate, one which will reduce its budget by at least 11 per cent over the next three years,"
said the research report, a copy of which was obtained by The Canadian Press.¶ "At the same time, the military's
ability to make budgetary adjustments has been tightly constrained by the decision to retain its front-line military capabilities. As a result, the Operations and
Maintenance budget will bear the brunt of these budget cuts."¶ Expeditionary role may be reduced¶ The Harper government has repeatedly said it wants Canada
playing a leading role internationally alongside allies, but the report warns, the way the cuts are shaking out, the military will be strained almost as badly as in the
1990s.¶ "As a result, it will be very difficult for the military to play the same expeditionary role that it has in recent years," said the report. "While the pursuit of
influence may not be over, with less funding available for operational readiness, the prospects of making influential military contributions abroad will be greatly
reduced."¶ The government's mantra of being defenders of the military will be sorely tested over the next few years.¶ "They're cutting it quite hard, but no harder
than any other government would in the same position," said Perry, who is also a researcher for the Conference of Defence Associations. "DND is a huge chunk of
discretionary spending and if you want to cutback on overall federal outlays, no matter how much you like to support the military, you've got to cut defence."¶ But
a spokesman for Defence Minister Peter MacKay says the government has increased spending on the military by $1 billion per year since coming to office, including
a guarantee of annual operating increases.¶ "Following the combat mission in Afghanistan, and in conjunction with all government departments, the Department of
National Defence and the Canadian Forces need to ensure taxpayers are getting value for their tax dollars and that, in turn, makes the Canadian Forces more
efficient and, ultimately, more effective," said Jay Paxton.¶ Little room to manoeuvre¶ But Perry argues that unlike past budget cutting exercises, defence has less
room to manoeuvre because of a change in accounting policy and the reluctance to give up specific capabilities, such as submarines or transports.¶ When they've
wanted to reduce money to the military past governments have simply cancelled equipment purchases outright. But the system of accrual accounting, where
purchases are amortized over their lifetime, means such cuts will not produce large, immediate savings.¶ The Harper government's strategic review mandates a
direct defence budget cut of $1 billion by 2014-15, but at the same time it overlaps with a planned 7.4 per cent, or $1.12 billion, reduction under the Deficit
Reduction Action Plan.¶ In 2008, the Conservatives made political hay out of the promise to give the military stable and predictable funding, with planned operating
budget increases over 20 years.¶ Perry says the $344 million extra the department gets as a result of the Canada First Defence Strategy is being more than chewed
up by increased costs associated with the government's 2010 freeze on departmental spending, which came at the same time as negotiated wage hikes.¶ "Thus, the
wage measure has effectively negated any increase DND would have otherwise received under the CFDS spending plan," he wrote.¶ The
only place left
to cut would be in what's known as national procurement funding, which is money used to make
equipment operationally ready.¶ "Accounting for roughly 40 per cent of readiness spending, National Procurement
encompasses the acquisition of spare parts, contracts for maintenance, repair and overhaul, technical
support, and the ammunition used in training," said the report.¶ It suggests the recent merging of commands will not save
the government very much and a suggestion in the Leslie report to axe outside contractors will hurt the air force, which relies extensively on them to keep aircraft
maintained.
Economic downturn leading to defense budget cuts now
Geddes, 3/14 – political writer for Macleans Canada (John Geddes, March 14, 2013, “Combat cutbacks:
Conservatives target the military budget”, Daily Mail and Globe,
http://www2.macleans.ca/2013/03/14/cutting-where-it-hurts-most/)//GP
Back when Canada’s military was deploying waves of combat troops to Afghanistan, top officers would often talk about the demanding
“operational tempo.” In those days, the tempo of political events designed to highlight enthusiastic Conservative support for the troops was
pretty brisk, too. Soon after winning power in 2006, Prime Minister Stephen Harper stood before soldiers mustered on the air field in Kandahar
to pledge that “cutting and running is not my way.” In 2008, Harper used a Halifax drill hall as the backdrop for unveiling his 20-year, $490billion Canada First Defence Strategy, promising, among other things, new ships, helicopters, planes and armoured vehicles. In 2010, Defence
Minister Peter MacKay climbed into a model of a Lockheed Martin F-35 in Ottawa to announce the government’s commitment to buy 65 of the
advanced fighter jets.¶ But the once heady atmosphere around Canada’s expanding military has turned subdued and anxious. The troops
withdrew from combat in Kandahar in 2011, and their follow-up mission to train the Afghan army is slated to wrap up next year, with
Afghanistan’s stability still in grave doubt. The buoyant years of rapidly ramping up spending ended when
the 2012 budget
imposed three years of cuts; another squeeze is among the most anticipated items in the 2013 budget
expected late this month. As for all that new hardware, not only is the widely criticized F-35 buy being reconsidered, much of the
program to upgrade equipment is plagued by delays and questions about the real costs.¶ Asked by Maclean’s how the Tories hope to maintain
their image as unswervingly pro-military, MacKay suggested the investments of those former years outweigh the current and coming restraint.
“I would put it this way—we’ve put a lot in the bag,” he said.¶ Indeed, the Harper government hiked annual Department of National Defence
spending to $22.8 billion for 2011-12, up from $15 billion when it took office in 2005-06. As the additional billions flowed, backing the forces
became a pillar of Conservative election messaging. Along with spending heavily, the Tories made strategic symbolic moves, notably by bringing
back the word “royal”— as in Royal Canadian Air Force—four decades after the adjective binding Canada’s military heritage to British tradition
was erased by the Liberal government of the day.¶ Even that nostalgia play, though, might not inoculate the Conservatives against criticism.
David Perry, a doctoral fellow at Carleton University’s Centre for Security and Defence Studies, has analyzed the cuts and says they are already
biting deeper than is widely understood. And he says the next round of decisions about where to find even more savings is bound to put new
stress on military and bureaucratic planners.¶ Perry’s
fine-grained analysis starts by setting aside the major parts of
defence spending that are, at least in theory, protected from cuts. Last year’s fiscal plan called for
more than $1 billion a year to be cut from the defence department’s overall budget of more than $20
billion by 2014-15. That doesn’t seem so tough. But the Conservatives pledged to do that while
keeping up the troop strength of the Canadian Forces, at about 68,000 regular members and 27,000 in
the reserves, and also protecting most planned capital spending. According to Perry, that means
about $12 billion a year was deemed uncuttable—leaving all the reductions to be found somehow in
the remaining $8 billion that is spent on the civilian workforce and on military “operations,
maintenance and readiness.Ӧ How hard is it to achieve those savings? The clearest indication so far came from Lt.-Gen. Peter
Devlin, the commander of the army, in surprising testimony he gave late last year before a Senate committee. Devlin said his land force’s
operating budget has been shrunk by an eye-popping 22 per cent—a figure that doesn’t show up anywhere in publicly available defence
documents. “As you would expect,” Devlin said with classic officer-class understatement, “that has an effect on people, infrastructure and
training.” And he took pains to counter any suggestion that the army should be eliminating desk jobs to save field assets, stressing that
administrative and head-office functions occupy only four per cent of his workforce. ¶ But that’s just the army itself. Tough questions about
National Defence’s multi-layered Ottawa operations could dominate the next round of debate about cuts. The department employs about
20,000 in the capital, from senior brass down through ordinary bureaucrats. Last June 15, Harper wrote to MacKay, in a private letter reported
on by the Canadian Press and later obtained by Maclean’s, instructing him to find savings in administration. The Prime Minister’s letter said that
only about 44 per cent of the defence budget is attributable to “the ready force,” and the rest to management, institutional support and
services. Harper called that “a serious imbalance in our current defence organization.” He instructed MacKay to “present detailed proposals
that critically examine corporate and institutional overhead with a view to avoiding budgetary reductions that impact on operational
capabilities, the part-time reserves, training within Canada, and the promotion and protection of our national sovereignty.”¶ Harper’s letter
echoed the thrust of Lt.-Gen. Andrew Leslie’s 2011 “transformation” report. Leslie, who has since retired, conducted an extensive study of
defence spending and concluded that the department must “ruthlessly focus” on reducing its spending on outside consultants and private
contractors, with the aim of redistributing resources to military units. He delivered his report two years ago. Yet the latest figures available
show that the defence department’s spending on professional services and consultants continued to climb to $3.25 billion in 2011-12 from
$2.77 billion in 2009-10. And that increase came after a period when head-office growth outstripped the expansion of the fighting forces.
According to Leslie’s report, headquarters personnel numbers grew 40 per cent from 2004 to 2010, while the regular forces grew by just 11 per
cent.¶ As the military struggles to absorb cuts in its operations, high-profile procurements are coming under more intense scrutiny. Doubts are
growing about the defence department’s capacity to simultaneously manage all the major projects called for in the Conservatives’ ambitious
2008 strategy. As well, Perry
argues that the credibility of the blueprint for re-equipping the forces is
undermined by inadequate funding. “There isn’t actually enough money in the capital program both
to buy everything that’s on the list and then to maintain it once it’s in service,” he says. That view gained a
prominent piece of supporting evidence recently, when Kevin Page, the parliamentary budget officer whose tenure as a
spending watchdog ends this month, released a detailed report that looks closely at just one multibillion-dollar project—the planned acquisition of new naval supply ships.¶ The project goes back to 2004, when the then-Liberal
government earmarked $2.1 billion to design, develop and acquire three new supply vessels. By 2009, the Conservatives realized
that wasn’t nearly enough, and scaled down that project to buying just two ships, while boosting its
budget to $2.6 billion. However, Page’s report, released late last month, estimated a more realistic
cost for two ships of $3.3 billion. Worse, he said that, given the uncertainties surrounding this sort of military
purchase, the U.S. government’s “best practice” policy suggests Ottawa should more prudently budget at least
$4.1 billion for the supply ships—or about 60 per cent more than the amount currently budgeted. Why
the huge gap? Page said his “best guess” is that the government is sticking with a low number to avoid
confronting hard truths. “You make the requirements fit within the budget constraint ,” he said.¶
Controversy about administrative overhead costs, complaints that cuts are already hampering troop training and readiness, doubts about the
credibility of procurement plans—it’s a messy combination. Despite any misgivings, though, prominent Conservatives continue to tout their
pro-military bona fides in the run-up to the 2013 budget. In a key speech to Conservatives in Ottawa earlier this month, Immigration Minister
Jason Kenney capped a summing-up of what the party stands for—from law and order to entrepreneurship—by touting “pride in our Canadian
armed forces and our history of military sacrifice and glory.” With
the glory and sacrifice of the Kandahar mission fading
into memory, the military’s new chapter is dominated by cost-cutting and recrimination. For the
Harper government, saving money might turn out to be easier than safeguarding such a critical part of
their political brand.
Increased budget cuts now – readiness at all time low
Rennie, 3/18/13 – analyst for the Canadian Press (Steve Rennie, “Federal Budget 2013: Gen. Thomas Lawson Says Military Has No Fat
Left To Cut”, http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2013/03/18/canada--budget-military_n_2902963.html)//gpastor
OTTAWA - Canada's
top soldier says the armed forces have no fat left to cut ahead of this week's
austerity budget. But Gen. Thomas Lawson told the Senate security and defence committee he understands that militaries around the
world are being forced to operate with less money. Finance Minister Jim Flaherty's budget on Thursday is widely
expected to make substantial cuts across government, and the Defence Department and Canadian Forces
won't escape unscathed. Lawson, who took over last year as chief of defence staff, said the military already runs
a lean operation. "I would like to think that there was fat in the armed forces," he said Monday. "I
don't think there is." "What we find as we squeeze (is) that there is very little fat," he added later. Still, the
governing Conservatives will be looking to shave off a little more . A leaked army planning document,
obtained by The Canadian Press, says land forces are bracing for a big hit on operating and
maintenance on top of existing budget cuts. Those cuts will slice into the army's ability to train for
operations in the jungle, desert and mountains. The document, dated Jan. 31 and written by Lt.-Gen. Peter Devlin,
says funding for full-time reservists will have to be further reduced, and unused cash in the budget for
part-time soldiers may have to be raided in order to keep full-timers. Lawson acknowledged more reservists —
many of whom signed up for full-time service during the Afghanistan mission — will likely go from being full-time to part-time soldiers. "Really,
we relied on them to keep the home fires burning within the headquarters as we had more and more head off into operational service," he
said. "The numbers will remain the same. ... What we'll see is that we'll have far fewer full-time members of the reserve, and back to a more
traditional ... part-time reserve." He also says he expects fewer outside companies will be contracted as more jobs are brought back in-house.
Prime Minister Stephen Harper warned Defence Minister Peter MacKay last June that initial budget cut
proposals did not go deep enough on the administrative side of the department. Lawson's remarks
came on the heels of a paper that says the Defence Department has struggled to spend billions of
dollars allocated to it in past budgets. The Conference of Defence Associations Institute puts unspent and carried-over funding
over the last six years at nearly $8 billion — mostly in the areas of capital equipment and infrastructure. But the problem, as defence
analyst David Perry sees it, is that sections of the department that seem to find themselves with more
budget dollars than they can spend are not be the ones facing reductions. Instead, he says it is areas such
as operations and maintenance — which have no trouble spending their allocated money — that will
feel the brunt of the budget cuts. "It is therefore not the case that the funds being cut would not have been spent in any event,"
Perry writes. "Rather, DND faces the dual pressures of funding reductions in some budget areas, and a loss
of purchasing power in others." DND could lose more than $500 million worth of purchasing power, he
estimates. Perry based that calculation on what he says is nearly $8 billion in unspent and carried-over budget money over the last six
years. "As Defence Specific Inflation (DSI) averages seven per cent annually, the cumulative impact of under-spending capital funds is
consequential," the report says. "Assuming that these measures represent only a series of financial shifts from one fiscal year to the next, the
impact of the annual seven per cent DSI applied to a total of $7.94 billion not spent in the year intended could mean a loss of $556 million
worth of purchasing power." Perry also notes that while defence funding has steadily increased since 2004, there's still a big gap between the
Canada First Defence Strategy's investment plan and the money allocated to implement it. The
department faces a "significant
fiscal challenge," he concludes. "The existing (Canada First Defence Strategy) plan was insufficiently
resourced to finance its planned capital acquisitions, and an inability to spend money on capital
acquisition in the year intended, will reduce DND's purchasing power as a result of inflation," the report says. "Both of these
measures mean that not all of the CFDS acquisitions are affordable. Three successive budgets have reduced DND's funding allocations, largely
directed towards (operations and maintenance) spending.
"As a result, the Canadian Forces' readiness has been
reduced significantly."
Billions of dollars for defense spending being cut now
Clark, 12 (CAMPBELL CLARK, Mar. 29 2012, “Deep cuts to military mark reversal for Harper”,
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/budget/deep-cuts-to-military-mark-reversal-forharper/article4097823/)//GP
The regular increases in defence spending that Stephen Harper promised to lift the Canadian military
from a decade of neglect are over. For the first time, his government is not just slowing growth in
military budgets but scaling them back with years of cuts. It means that by 2014-15, $1.1-billion will
be slashed from the roughly $20-billion defence budget – just over 5 per cent. In addition, the
government will delay the purchase of $3.5-billion in equipment for seven years , allowing it to trim
hundreds of millions of dollars more each year. For Mr. Harper, a Prime Minister who has centred so
much of his political persona around building a Canadian military that’s not only able to deploy, but will,
the budget marks a reversal. Defence budgets are now going down, and combined with a $1-billion
cut to spending growth announced two years ago, the military faces years of scaling back. The effect
of the two rounds of budget trims amount to roughly a 10-per-cent cut from planned spending, more
than $2-billion, said David Perry, a defence analyst with the CDA Institute. “ This is going to have a
really significant impact on their ability to deploy and conduct missions,” he said. The details of what
will be cut were not revealed. The budget said the Department of National Defence will do things like
streamline its contracting process and centralize its management of property and human resources, but
it’s not clear what other cuts will be made. The amount the Defence Department has to trim would be
equivalent to chopping the department’s entire civilian staff of 29,000, Mr. Perry said. But he said he
believes a big chunk will have to be come from what the military terms “readiness” – training to fly
planes, operate ships, and conduct operations that prepare the troops to go on missions. The cuts to the
annual budget will get deeper in each of the next three years, starting with a $327-million reduction in
the coming year and reaching $1.1-billion by 2014-15. The government is also backing off its target of
increasing the size of the Canadian Forces to a regular force of 70,000 and 30,000 reserves, but the
budget committed to maintaining the current, slightly smaller force of 68,000 regulars and 27,000
reserves. Some savings will come from delaying $3.5-billion in capital spending that had been planned
for the next seven years – the money used to buy planes, ships, tanks, trucks, and weapons. The
government didn’t identify what purchases it would delay, but will book savings of $500-million this
year and $1.3-billion next year from pushing off purchases. If those delayed purchases do go ahead
later, the spending will have to be booked in budgets by future governments over a period of years –
at a time when, according to the government’s defence plans, Ottawa will also be paying for
multibillion-dollar purchases of new fighters and ships that will take up big chunks of the defence
budget. Plans to buy the controversial F-35 fighter jets were not affected by the current budget, because
costs from the purchase will not show up on government books until at least 2016. The budget said only
that the government will buy an “affordable” replacement for the current CF-18 fighter fleet. In all, the
defence budget for the rest of Mr. Harper’s term will be billions less than the $21.2-billion spent last
year. The cuts won’t bring the defence budget back to the level it was at when Mr. Harper took office,
Mr. Perry noted, but they will undo a significant part of the increases. It’s not clear, however, precisely
how much that defence budget sum will be, because the government refused to provide a figure for the
total defence budget in the coming year or future years affected by the budget. Before the budget, the
Defence Department reported in government estimates that it would spend $19.8-billion in the 201213 fiscal year, and a spokesman for Defence Minister Peter MacKay said that amount will now be
reduced to $19.5-billion. But because the estimates use a different accounting method from the
budget, that figure doesn’t include the $500-million the government says it will save that year from
delaying capital spending. Based on figures from the previous budgets, the cuts would bring the
defence budget to roughly $19-billion, less than it is now, in 2014-15.
BMD Uniqueness
Increased defense industry key to BMD
McDonough, 6/06/13 - is a SSHRC post-doctoral fellow in the Department of Political Science ¶ at the University of British Columbia and a research
fellow at Dalhousie University’s Centre for ¶ Foreign Policy Studies. He is a recipient of the SSHRC Canadian Graduate Scholarship (2006–¶ 9), the SDF Dr Ronald
Baker Doctoral Scholarship (2009–10), and Killam Doctoral ¶ Scholarships (2008–11). He has published widely on Canadian defence and international ¶ security, in
International Journal, Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, RUSI Journal, Strategic ¶ Survey, Adelphi Papers, On Track, Orbis, Journal of Military and Strategic Studies,
Canadian ¶ Naval Review, Strategic Datalink, Third World Quarterly, Vanguard, Calgary Paper in ¶ Military and Strategic Studies (forthcoming), and Comparative
Strategy (forthcoming). He is ¶ the editor of Canada’s National Security in the Post-9/11 World: Strategy, Interests, and ¶ Threats (David S. McDonough, 6/06, “Back
to the Future: Debating Missile Defence in Canada… Again”, CDFAI,
http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Debating%20Missile%20Defence%20in%20Canada%20Again.pdf)//GP
The last point brings up another consideration, one that is closely tied to the degree of Canada’s ¶ input, confidence over its protection, and indeed nature of its
participation – and that
is the ¶ question of cost. Some commentators seem to assume that Canada’s
participation would not ¶ entail much in the way of substantial costs, without specifying what benefit the United States ¶
would gain or why it would then choose to be open to Canadian input. ¶ More astute observers have pointed to an asymmetrical
or “in-kind” contribution by Canada. Yet ¶ it is important to recognize that this might not come
cheaply. One cannot assume that Canada ¶ could simply incorporate its existing “satellite and landbased tracking facilities into Ballistic ¶ Missile Defence.”¶ 17 Canada has no land-based tracking facilities
to speak of, and its recently ¶ launched military satellite (Project Sapphire) is already a component of the US
Space ¶ Surveillance Network that feeds information to both NORAD and the GMD system, sharply ¶ reducing its capacity to
leverage this asset to play a role in missile defence. At most, by ¶ contributing to NORAD’s early warning and tracking functions,
Project Sapphire could ¶ potentially help safeguard the command’s aerospace role – and even this outcome is not ¶ guaranteed.18¶ Perhaps for this
reason, there are reports that Canada is now looking at revising earlier plans for ¶ a ground-based xband radar at Goose Bay, Newfoundland. Such a facility would provide important tracking and cueing capabilities and additional radar
coverage against an Iranian¶ ballistic missile, especially if the United States moves ahead with constructing a third ¶ interceptor site. Defence officials
seem confident that Canada would only need to supply ¶ territory and services for a total cost of $500
million, with the remainder (including the radar ¶ itself) to be supplied by the United States.19¶
Nevertheless, such an assumption also seems premature, at least if Ottawa hopes to translate ¶ such a
contribution into input in the interception planning process itself. Indeed, with the onset ¶ of
sequestration, the United States is expected to make some very sizable defence cuts over the ¶ next
ten years – totaling nearly $1 trillion, if one includes the initial spending caps brought in by ¶ the
Budget Control Act. Even Obama’s recent decision to deploy an additional 14 GBIs is ¶ expected to cost
an additional $1 billion, which was only partially offset by delaying (and ¶ potentially cancelling) the development of a more advanced Standard
Missile (SM-3 Block IIB) ¶ for its Aegis ships. The cost of a third interceptor site on the East coast would be even
steeper.¶ Canada could then find itself confronted with requests for additional contributions that
would ¶ be difficult to ignore, whether taking a greater share of the cost of a radar site on Canadian ¶
territory or contributing funds for a third GBI site. Even America’s recent overture for Canada’s ¶
participation, if reports prove accurate, could arise from Washington’s growing interest to offset¶
some of the cost burden of this system. Canada needs a better sense of what participation entails ¶ and what costs might result from such a
decision. Proponents like Paul Chapin have criticized¶ the previous Liberal government for rejecting the draft MOU that could provide “the necessary ¶ flow of
information.”20 Yet there is also reason for caution. Yes, Canada would finally receive ¶ greater information on missile defence. But it would come at the price of
having less room to ¶ refuse American preferences, even
if it discovers that the costs are higher than expected.
Increased coop over BMD now
McDonough, 6/6/13 - is a SSHRC post-doctoral fellow in the Department of Political Science ¶ at the University of British Columbia and a research
fellow at Dalhousie University’s Centre for ¶ Foreign Policy Studies. He is a recipient of the SSHRC Canadian Graduate Scholarship (2006–¶ 9), the SDF Dr Ronald
Baker Doctoral Scholarship (2009–10), and Killam Doctoral ¶ Scholarships (2008–11). He has published widely on Canadian defence and international ¶ security, in
International Journal, Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, RUSI Journal, Strategic ¶ Survey, Adelphi Papers, On Track, Orbis, Journal of Military and Strategic Studies,
Canadian ¶ Naval Review, Strategic Datalink, Third World Quarterly, Vanguard, Calgary Paper in ¶ Military and Strategic Studies (forthcoming), and Comparative
Strategy (forthcoming). He is ¶ the editor of Canada’s National Security in the Post-9/11 World: Strategy, Interests, and ¶ Threats (David S. McDonough, 6/06, “Back
to the Future: Debating Missile Defence in Canada… Again”, CDFAI,
http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Debating%20Missile%20Defence%20in%20Canada%20Again.pdf)//GPastor
President Barack Obama recently agreed to deploy an additional 14 ground-based ¶ interceptors (GBIs)
at Fort Greely, Alaska by 2017, in response to growing bellicosity ¶ coming from Pyongyang . This would
bring the end strength of America’s ground-based ¶ midcourse defence (GMD) system to 44 GBIs,
designed primarily to undertake multiple ¶ intercept attempts against missiles from North Korea
under the shoot-look-shoot doctrine, with ¶ a single-shot capacity against Iranian missiles. In so doing, the
United States has shown some ¶ willingness to reconsider the value of GMD in protecting North
America, even as it moves ¶ forward on theatre systems designed to counter shorter-range threats. Secretary of Defense ¶ Chuck Hagel
has even assented to an environmental assessment of a possible third interceptor ¶ site on the East
Coast. ¶ Obama’s recent plans have also had one unintended consequence – it has reignited debate in
¶ this country on whether Canada should finally take part in the GMD system that covers North ¶
America, which was effectively closed with Prime Minister Paul Martin’s decision against formal ¶ participation in 2005. Prime Minister Stephen
Harper has little appetite to revisit his ¶ predecessor’s decision even after achieving a majority
Conservative government in 2011, as ¶ shown by his refusal to consider a memorandum on possible missile defence options prepared ¶ by
Ministers of Foreign Affairs and National Defence John Baird and Peter MacKay in the ¶ summer of 2012.1¶ Yet this fact may soon change.
Soon after Obama’s announcement, commentators in this ¶ country began to question the wisdom of
staying outside of GMD. Former diplomat Colin ¶ Robertson, for example, points to North Korea as a principal
reason why Canada should now ¶ reconsider its decision.2 Others emphasize how missile defence failed to result in either space
¶ weaponization or strategic instability, pointing out how Canadian concerns on this matter were ¶ misplaced.¶ 3 Reports even indicate that the United States
requested Canada’s participation, ¶ which was just as quickly denied by the Pentagon. But the government remains coy on this issue, ¶ with Peter MacKay stating
how Canada’s security policies were being “consistently reviewed” ¶ and Public Safety Minister Vic Toews calling for a “broader discussion” on missile defence.¶ 4
I/L
Increase in BMD coop is the only possibility of reducing the threat of nuclear attack
Burney and Hampson, 5/21 – Derek H. Burney is senior strategic adviser for Norton Rose Canada LLP and a former Canadian ambassador to the
United States (1989–1993). Fen Osler Hampson is director of global security at the Centre for International Governance Innovation and Chancellor’s Professor at
Carleton University. (Derek Burney and Fen Olser Hampson, “Let’s put missile defence back in our arsenal”, May 21, 2013 MISSILE THREAT: A Project of the George
C. Marshall and Claremont Institutes, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/commentary/lets-put-missile-defence-back-in-our-arsenal/article12003778/)//GP
In a turbulent and uncertain world where nationalism and religious zealotry are on the rise, Canada
needs to consider actions that will
safeguard and advance its national interests. Nowhere is this more true than in the area of nuclear
proliferation, as states such as North Korea and Iran develop these weapons and, with them, a longrange missile delivery capability. A good place to start would be to relaunch discussions with the U.S.
for a partnership role in ballistic missile defence.¶ The most obvious threat is from the erratic regime
in Pyongyang, which is desperately pursuing its ambition to deploy a missile capacity capable of
striking the U.S. homeland. One may discount the wild rhetoric and clumsy tests, but there’s little doubt that North Korea is
determined to acquire a capability to threaten North America and hold our cities hostage, however
perverse or irrational such a goal might seem to be. Conventional analyses simply do not apply on
anything emanating from a government about which so little is known.¶ Like it or not, given the
uncertainties about North Korea’s technological prowess, Canada would be as vulnerable as the
United States. We would almost certainly be on the flight path of any missile the North Koreans
decided to fire at the U.S., should that day come. And there’s no guarantee that a missile directed at
Washington or New York, or even Seattle or Los Angeles, wouldn’t inadvertently land on Toronto or
Vancouver. It would be prudent for us to act accordingly and begin to deal with this security challenge now.¶ The infamous Kim dynasty has ruined the lives
of millions of its own people, most of whom, apart from a privileged military and civilian elite, live in brutal gulag-style conditions denied even the most basic means
of livelihood. What little wealth North Korea generates, mostly through illicit drug and arms sales, is squandered on military muscle and advanced weapons
technology.¶ What the newest Kim intends to do with North Korea’s nuclear arsenal, assuming he’s really in control, is as unpredictable as it is destabilizing. Even
China, its closest neighbour and ally, is increasingly wary about spontaneous combustion on the Korean Peninsula. The humanitarian and economic fallout would be
devastating, and not just in the immediate vicinity.¶ Canada came very close to signing a ballistic missile defence agreement with the U.S. in 2004 but backed away
at the last minute, ostensibly to avoid a renewal of the arms race but more likely because of domestic political allergies about doing anything on security with the
George W. Bush administration.¶ At that time, the Liberal government of Paul Martin seemed to want a “say” in what was planned but was reluctant to make any
kind of hard commitment to participate. As a result, we’re on the outside looking in at what had the potential of refitting NORAD to a 21st-century threat. (The
initial purpose of NORAD was for a different threat in a different age.) By standing down, we simply became irrelevant.¶ A
priority for any
government is the preservation of national security and, if anything, the risk of nuclear proliferation is
greater today than it was a decade ago and not just from North Korea but also from countries such as
Iran that appear intent on acquiring such capabilities. Initiatives are under way to quash the threat from terrorists, including the
homegrown variety. Even more lethal are looming missile threats against which Canada has no practical
defence other than to hope that our neighbour will act in its own interest and defend us against an
attack, accidental or otherwise.¶ That’s simply not good enough . The best antidote to the antics of
North Korea is, as political economist Nicholas Eberstadt contended in The Wall Street Journal recently, a
“threat reduction strategy” – a combination of sustained military and civilian actions, and not a repeat
of offers of dialogue in the face of “bait and switch” extortion demands from North Korea trying to
gain rewards for bad behaviour from all-too-gullible Western powers.¶ A serious effort by Canada to
join in ballistic missile defence could be a constructive and prudent part of this strategy,
complementing our continued support for strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation treaty regime,
and would provide us with both a say and a role against missiles from other regimes as well. The time to act
in our own security interest is now, and a partnership in ballistic missile defence should be the obvious priority .¶
Threat of Nuclear attack real – nations without missile defense in danger now
Calabresi, 2/12 – (Massimo Calabresi, Feb. 12, 2013, “Is Iran a Bigger Threat than North Korea?”, Time Magazine,
http://swampland.time.com/2013/02/12/why-a-nuclear-iran-worries-obama-more-than-north-korea/)//GP
President Barack Obama has committed to preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, by military
force if necessary. Last year, he told Jeffrey Goldberg of the Atlantic, “As President of the United States, I don’t bluff.” But why should anyone
believe him when North Korea has gone nuclear with impunity? It’s an uncomfortable question for the Administration, at a
particularly bad moment.¶ North Korea’s third nuclear test, confirmed overnight by its KCNA news agency,
comes just as the U.S. is entering a new round of diplomacy with Iran. Talks are scheduled between
Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency this week; negotiations between Iran, the U.S. and
other world powers will take place on Feb. 26 in Kazakhstan.¶ Expectations are low for both talks, but at the
least the Administration is hoping to push back further into the future any possible military action
against the Iranian nuclear program. A harder line by Tehran in the wake of the North Korean test could move things in the wrong direction.¶
But current and former Administration officials argue the two situations are different and that Iran would be making a mistake to see
strength in North Korea’s defiance of international sanctions and its abandonment of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty. Administration officials admit that they have adopted a policy of containing
a nuclear North Korea, even as they say Pyongyang’s program is “unacceptable,” but they say there’s
no way they would cave in to containing Iran if Tehran went nuclear. They explain their position like this:¶ First,
containing a nuclear North Korea, as the U.S. contained Russia in the Cold War, is possible. Containing
a nuclear Iran is not . Japan and South Korea accept the U.S. nuclear umbrella to protect them, thereby
preventing a regional arms race that could lead to nukes all over Asia. In the Middle East, Saudi Arabia,
Egypt and Turkey are unlikely to accept U.S. guarantees of protection against a nuclear Iran, so would
pursue their own programs.¶ That would mean a region that is already prone to conflict suddenly
awash in nukes. “The risk of having a crisis [in a nuclear Middle East] that moves very quickly, and not
controllably, increases geometrically the prospect of a nuclear war,” says a former senior
Administration official familiar with Obama’s thinking on Iran.¶ Second, say former and current Administration officials, the
North Korea situation was inherited: North Korea kicked out nuclear watchdogs and tested its first nuclear weapon before Obama came into office, so Pyongyang
was already nuclear and was already being contained. Rather than preventing the North from going nuclear, Obama would have had to disarm the country. “Then
you’re talking about a rollback strategy,” says another former senior Administration official, which is harder than hitting a program like Iran’s before it has a nuclear
weapon stashed away for its defense.¶ Third, the Administration says, even if it wanted to take out the North Korean nuclear sites, it can’t: it doesn’t know where
many of them are. “Nobody has any idea where the North Korean stuff is,” says another former senior Administration official. “There are facilities that can be hit,
but in terms of the reprocessed plutonium and aspects of the uranium-enrichment program, we have much less of an idea,” compared with Iran.¶ Last, the regional
politics are different. In
the Middle East, Israel has made it clear publicly and privately that it will take military
action to stop Iran from going nuclear. If it did, the U.S. likely would be drawn into a war regardless. In
Asia, a U.S. attack on North Korea, nominally an ally of China, would be more destabilizing than the current approach of trying to contain Pyongyang, the
Administration argues.¶ Ultimately, the U.S. hopes China will pressure North Korea to stop the pursuit of nuclear weapons. China’s response to North Korea’s test
was firm, but noncommittal. The Administration is pursuing further sanctions against the North at the U.N. today, and is looking for Chinese support.
Increase in BMD tech is the only way to protect Canada from nuclear attack
ROBERTSON, 4/02/13 - A former diplomat, Colin Robertson is vice president of the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute and a senior
strategic advisor to McKenna, Long and Aldridge LLP. (COLIN ROBERTSON, Apr. 03 2013, North Korea’s threats show that Canada needs to be part of U.S. missile
defence pact” http://www.theglobeandmail.com/commentary/north-koreas-threats-show-that-canada-needs-to-be-part-of-us-missile-defencepact/article10713612/)//GP
Kim Jong-Un is the third in his family to lead the Hermit Kingdom, and this month has all but declared
war – including threats to target North America. Normally, sabre rattling by tinpot dictators can be managed
or contained. But not when the sabres are ballistic missiles.¶ “Nuclear threats are not a game,” United
Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon warned on Tuesday: “Aggressive rhetoric and military posturing
only result in counter-actions, and fuel fear and instability.Ӧ Coupled with the improvements that
Iran is making to its own ballistic missile capacity, the threat to North America is now clear and
present. The United States has moved aircraft and warships to the area and announced that it will increase its ground-based interceptors in California and
Alaska.¶ Canada has a conflicted history when it comes to nuclear weapons and domestic defence from
them. Though we were present at the creation – nuclear-energy research during the Second World War in Canada was vital – we eschewed the
development of nuclear arms for ourselves. Instead, we opted to develop nuclear power for peaceful purposes through the CANDU
reactor. (We were later deceived by the Indians, who developed their own nuclear weaponry using plutonium derived from a research reactor provided by
Canada.)¶ Placement of nuclear warheads on Canadian soil, as part of our alliance commitment, tormented John Diefenbaker and the resultingBOMARC
controversy contributed to his government’s undoing. Lester B. Pearson, who succeeded Mr. Diefenbaker as prime minister, faced similar dissent but concluded
that our obligations to NORAD and NATO required participation. Mr. Pearson, who had won the Nobel Peace Prize over the Suez crisis, was derisively labelled the
‘defrocked prince of peace’ by a young Pierre Trudeau.¶ Two decades later, prime minister Trudeau faced similar divisions in his own cabinet over testing of cruise
missiles on Canadian soil. Mr. Trudeau allowed the testing, arguing that “it is hardly fair to rely on the Americans to protect the West, but to refuse to lend them a
hand when the going gets rough.”¶ In good company (with Australia, France et al), prime minister Brian Mulroney rejected participation in the U.S. “Star Wars”
missile-defence program because Canada “would not be able to call the shots.”¶ When
Ballistic Missile Defence was developed
under George W. Bush, prime minister Paul Martin opted out, to the confusion of his new defence
chief and ambassador to the United States, both of whom thought that he was going to sign on.¶ A
divided Liberal caucus, especially the opposition from Quebec, had helped change Mr. Martin’s mind.¶
Mr. Bush was advised that newly-elected Prime Minister Stephen Harper would not welcome a renewed request. Mr. Bush found this puzzling, reportedly asking
what would happen if a North Korean missile, aimed at Los Angeles or Seattle, wound up heading towards Vancouver or Calgary.¶ The rest of the alliance, as well as
Australia, Japan and South Korea, have signed onto missile defence. The Israelis’ Iron Dome recently demonstrated the defensive worth of anti-missile technology.¶
Critics see Ballistic Missile Defence as a latter-day Maginot Line – costly, unreliable, and provocative. If you want to detonate a nuclear bomb in the United States
you would not send it by missile. NORAD, they argue, provides sufficient defence. But continental defence has been integral to Canadian national security since
MacKenzie King and Franklin Rooseveltparleyed at Kingston in 1938. We were architects of NATO because ofour belief in collective security.¶ The
U.S.
defence umbrella has guaranteed the peace since 1945, and has coincided with the greatest growth in
trade in world history. Canada has been a principal beneficiary, with marginal premiums. Some Canadians,
wrote Mr. Trudeau during the cruise missile debate, “are eager to take refuge under the U.S. umbrella, but don’t want to help hold it.”¶ Membership in
the alliance entails obligations. But it also brings great benefits that serve our national interests. ¶
Incorporating our satellite and land-based tracking facilities into Ballistic Missile Defence could make
a difference in shielding Canadians should the missiles be launched. A Senate report in 2006
concluded that an effective BMD “could save hundreds of thousands of Canadian lives.”¶ Protecting Canadians
(and Americans) was the logic of the original DEW line and NORAD, our bi-national aerospace defence agreement that has served us since 1958 and now includes
aspects of maritime defence.¶ Last summer, ministers John Baird and Peter McKay prepared a memorandum for Mr. Harper presenting Ballistic Missile Defence
options. The
Prime Minister decided the timing was not right. Circumstances have changed. BMD should
now be incorporated into our ‘Canada First’ defence strategy.
Impact
Nuclear War leads to extinction
Shultz et al, 2007 - A conference organized by Mr. Shultz and Sidney D. Drell was held at Hoover to reconsider the vision that Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev
brought to Reykjavik. In addition to Messrs. Shultz and Drell, the following participants also endorse the view in this statement: Martin Anderson, Steve Andreasen,
Michael Armacost, William Crowe, James Goodby, Thomas Graham Jr., Thomas Henriksen, David Holloway, Max Kampelman, Jack Matlock, John McLaughlin, Don
Oberdorfer, Rozanne Ridgway, Henry Rowen, Roald Sagdeev and Abraham Sofaer. (George Shultz, January 4 2007, "A World Free of Nuclear Weapons," Wall Street
Journal By George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn0, The Wall Street Journal January 4, 2007;
http://fcnl.org/issues/nuclear/world_free_of_nuclear_weapons/)//GP
Nuclear weapons today present tremendous dangers, but also an historic opportunity. U.S. leadership will be required to take the world to the next stage -- to a
solid consensus for reversing reliance on nuclear weapons globally as a vital contribution to preventing their proliferation into potentially dangerous hands, and
ultimately ending them as a threat to the world. Nuclear weapons were essential to maintaining international security during the Cold War because they were a
means of deterrence. The end of the Cold War made the doctrine of mutual Soviet-American deterrence obsolete. Deterrence continues to be a relevant
consideration for many states with regard to threats from other states. But reliance on nuclear weapons for this purpose is becoming increasingly hazardous and
decreasingly effective. North
Korea's recent nuclear test and Iran's refusal to stop its program to enrich
uranium -- potentially to weapons grade -- highlight the fact that the world is now on the precipice of
a new and dangerous nuclear era. Most alarmingly, the likelihood that non-state terrorists will get their hands on nuclear weaponry is
increasing. In today's war waged on world order by terrorists, nuclear weapons are the ultimate means of
mass devastation. And non-state terrorist groups with nuclear weapons are conceptually outside the bounds of a deterrent strategy and present difficult
new security challenges. Apart from the terrorist threat, unless urgent new actions are taken, the U.S. soon will be
compelled to enter a new nuclear era that will be more precarious, psychologically disorienting, and
economically even more costly than was Cold War deterrence. It is far from certain that we can successfully replicate the old
Soviet-American "mutually assured destruction" with an increasing number of potential nuclear enemies world-wide without dramatically increasing the risk that
nuclear weapons will be used. New nuclear states do not have the benefit of years of step-by-step safeguards put in effect during the Cold War to prevent nuclear
accidents, misjudgments or unauthorized launches. The
United States and the Soviet Union learned from mistakes that
were less than fatal. Both countries were diligent to ensure that no nuclear weapon was used during the Cold War by design or by accident. Will
new nuclear nations and the world be as fortunate in the next 50 years as we were during the Cold
War? * * * Leaders addressed this issue in earlier times. In his "Atoms for Peace" address to the United Nations in 1953, Dwight D. Eisenhower pledged
America's "determination to help solve the fearful atomic dilemma -- to devote its entire heart and mind to find the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of
man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life." John F. Kennedy, seeking to break the logjam on nuclear disarmament, said,
"The world
was not meant to be a prison in which man awaits his execution." Rajiv Gandhi, addressing the U.N.
General Assembly on June 9, 1988, appealed, " Nuclear war will not mean the death of a hundred million
people. Or even a thousand million. It will mean the extinction of four thousand million: the end of life
as we know it on our planet earth . We come to the United Nations to seek your support. We seek your support to put a stop to this madness."
Ronald Reagan called for the abolishment of "all nuclear weapons," which he considered to be "totally irrational, totally inhumane, good for nothing but killing,
possibly destructive of life on earth and civilization." Mikhail Gorbachev shared this vision, which had also been expressed by previous American presidents.
Although Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev failed at Reykjavik to achieve the goal of an agreement to get rid of all nuclear weapons, they did succeed in turning the arms
race on its head. They initiated steps leading to significant reductions in deployed long- and intermediate-range nuclear forces, including the elimination of an entire
class of threatening missiles. What will it take to rekindle the vision shared by Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev? Can a world-wide consensus be forged that defines a
series of practical steps leading to major reductions in the nuclear danger? There is an urgent need to address the challenge posed by these two questions. The
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) envisioned the end of all nuclear weapons. It provides (a) that states that did not possess nuclear weapons as of 1967 agree not to
obtain them, and (b) that states that do possess them agree to divest themselves of these weapons over time. Every president of both parties since Richard Nixon
has reaffirmed these treaty obligations, but non-nuclear weapon states have grown increasingly skeptical of the sincerity of the nuclear powers. Strong nonproliferation efforts are under way. The Cooperative Threat Reduction program, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, the Proliferation Security Initiative and the
Additional Protocols are innovative approaches that provide powerful new tools for detecting activities that violate the NPT and endanger world security. They
deserve full implementation.
The negotiations on proliferation of nuclear weapons by North Korea and Iran,
involving all the permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany and Japan, are crucially
important. They must be energetically pursued. But by themselves, none of these steps are adequate to the danger. Reagan and General Secretary
Gorbachev aspired to accomplish more at their meeting in Reykjavik 20 years ago -- the elimination of nuclear weapons altogether. Their vision shocked experts in
the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, but galvanized the hopes of people around the world. The leaders of the two countries with the largest arsenals of nuclear
weapons discussed the abolition of their most powerful weapons. * * * What should be done? Can the promise of the NPT and the possibilities envisioned at
Reykjavik be brought to fruition? We
believe that a major effort should be launched by the United States to
produce a positive answer through concrete stages. First and foremost is intensive work with leaders of the countries in possession of
nuclear weapons to turn the goal of a world without nuclear weapons into a joint enterprise. Such a joint enterprise, by involving changes in the disposition of the
states possessing nuclear weapons, would lend additional weight to efforts already under way
to avoid the emergence of a nuclear-armed
North Korea and Iran.
The program on which agreements should be sought would constitute a series of agreed and urgent steps that would lay the
groundwork for a world free of the nuclear threat. Steps would include: Changing the Cold War posture of deployed nuclear weapons to increase warning time and
thereby reduce the danger of an accidental or unauthorized use of a nuclear weapon. Continuing to reduce substantially the size of nuclear forces in all states that
possess them. Eliminating short-range nuclear weapons designed to be forward-deployed. Initiating a bipartisan process with the Senate, including understandings
to increase confidence and provide for periodic review, to achieve ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, taking advantage of recent technical advances,
and working to secure ratification by other key states. Providing the highest possible standards of security for all stocks of weapons, weapons-usable plutonium, and
highly enriched uranium everywhere in the world. Getting control of the uranium enrichment process, combined with the guarantee that uranium for nuclear
power reactors could be obtained at a reasonable price, first from the Nuclear Suppliers Group and then from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or
other controlled international reserves. It will also be necessary to deal with proliferation issues presented by spent fuel from reactors producing electricity. Halting
the production of fissile material for weapons globally; phasing out the use of highly enriched uranium in civil commerce and removing weapons-usable uranium
from research facilities around the world and rendering the materials safe. Redoubling our efforts to resolve regional confrontations and conflicts that give rise to
new nuclear powers. Achieving the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons will also require effective measures to impede or counter any nuclear-related conduct
that is potentially threatening to the security of any state or peoples. Reassertion of the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and practical measures toward
achieving that goal would be, and would be perceived as, a bold initiative consistent with America's moral heritage
. The effort could have a
profoundly positive impact on the security of future generations. Without the bold vision, the actions
will not be perceived as fair or urgent. Without the actions, the vision will not be perceived as realistic
or possible. We endorse setting the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and working energetically
on the actions required to achieve that goal, beginning with the measures outlined above.
north korea impact
I/L
The US Will get involved in any attack on its allies
Associated Press, 03/11/13 (“North Korea nuclear threats ‘hyperbolic’ and ‘bellicose rhetoric,’ but U.S. will protect allies if need be: White House”,
http://news.nationalpost.com/2013/03/11/north-korea-nuclear-threats-hyperbolic-and-bellicose-rhetoric-but-u-s-will-protect-allies-if-need-be-white-house/)//GP
WASHINGTON — President
Barack Obama’s spokesman says the White House is concerned by war threats
coming from North Korea.¶ North Korean state media said Monday that Pyongyang was cancelling the
60-year-old armistice that ended the Korean War.¶ White House press secretary Jay Carney responded
that Pyongyang will achieve nothing with threats. But he said the White House is “concerned by North
Korea’s bellicose rhetoric.”¶ Obama National Security adviser Tom Donilon told a meeting of the Asia
Society in New York the claims may be “hyperbolic.” He said the United States will protect its allies if
Pyongyang uses any weapons of mass destruction or transfers nuclear materials. ¶ Donilon also said Obama will
meet with newly inaugurated South Korean President Park Geun-hye at the White House in May.¶ North and South Korea staged dueling war games Monday as
threatening rhetoric from the rivals rose to the highest level since North Korea rained artillery shells on a South Korean island in 2010.¶ Enraged over the South’s
joint military drills with the United States and recent UN sanctions, Pyongyang has piled threat on top of threat, including vows to launch a nuclear strike on the U.S.
and to scrap the nearly 60-year-old armistice that ended the Korean War. Seoul has responded with tough talk of its own and has placed its troops on high alert.¶
North Korea’s main newspaper, Rodong Sinmun, reported that the armistice was nullified Monday as Pyongyang had earlier announced. The North followed
through on another promise Monday, shutting down a Red Cross hotline that the North and South used for general communication and to discuss aid shipments
and separated families’ reunions.¶ The 11-day military drills that started Monday involve 10,000 South Korean and about 3,000 American troops. Those coincide
with two months of separate U.S.-South Korean field exercises that began March 1.¶ Also continuing are large-scale North Korean drills that Seoul says involve the
army, navy and air force. The South Korean defense ministry said there have been no military activities it considers suspicious.¶ The North has threatened to nullify
the armistice several times in times of tension with the outside world, and in 1996 the country sent hundreds of armed troops into a border village. The troops later
withdrew.¶ Despite the heightened tension, there were signs of business as usual Monday.¶ The two Koreas continue to have at least two working channels of
communication between their militaries and aviation authorities.¶ One of those hotlines was used Monday to give hundreds of South Koreans approval to enter
North Korea to go to work. Their jobs are at the only remaining operational symbol of joint inter-Korean cooperation, the Kaesong industrial complex. It is operated
in North Korea with South Korean money and knowhow and a mostly North Korean work force.¶ The
North Korean rhetoric escalated as
the UN Security Council last week approved a new round of sanctions over Pyongyang’s latest nuclear
weapons test Feb. 12.¶ Analysts said that much of the bellicosity is meant to shore up loyalty among
citizens and the military for North Korea’s young leader, Kim Jong-un.¶ “This is part of their
brinksmanship,” said Daniel Pinkston, a Seoul-based expert on North Korea with the International Crisis
Group think tank. “It’s an effort to signal their resolve, to show they are willing to take greater risks,
with the expectation that everyone else caves in and gives them what they want.Ӧ Part of what North Korea
wants is a formal peace treaty to end the Korean War, instead of the armistice that leaves the peninsula still technically in a state of war. It also wants security
guarantees and other concessions, direct talks with Washington, recognition as a nuclear weapons state and the removal of 28,500 U.S. troops stationed in South
Korea.¶ Pinkston
said there is little chance of fighting breaking out while war games are being conducted,
but he added that he expects North Korea to follow through with a somewhat mysterious promise to
respond at a time and place of its own choosing.¶ North Korea was responsible for an artillery attack that killed four South Koreans in
2010. A South Korean-led international investigation found that North Korea torpedoed a South Korean warship that same year, killing 46 sailors. Pyongyang denies
sinking the ship.¶ Among other threats in the past week, North Korea has warned Seoul of a nuclear war on the divided peninsula and said it was cancelling
nonaggression pacts.¶ South Korean and U.S. officials have been closely monitoring Pyongyang’s actions and parsing its recent rhetoric, which has been more
warlike than usual.¶ One analyst said Kaesong’s continued operations show that North Korea’s cutting of the Red Cross communication channel was symbolic. More
than 840 South Koreans were set to cross the border Monday to Kaesong, which provides a badly-needed flow of hard currency to a country where many face food
shortages, according to Seoul’s Unification Ministry.¶ “If South Koreans don’t go to work at Kaesong, North Korea will suffer [financially],” said analyst Hong Hyun-ik
at the private Sejong Institute in South Korea. “If North Korea really intends to start a war with South Korea, it could have taken South Koreans at Kaesong
hostage.”¶ Under newly inaugurated President Park Geun-hye, South Korea’s Defense Ministry, which often brushes off North Korean threats, has looked to send a
message of strength in response to the latest comments from Pyongyang.¶ The
ministry has warned that the North’s government
would “evaporate from the face of the Earth” if it ever used a nuclear weapon. The White House also
said the U.S. is fully capable of defending itself against a North Korean ballistic attack. ¶ On Monday, Park told a
Cabinet Council meeting that South Korea should strongly respond to any provocation by North Korea. But she also said Seoul should move ahead with her
campaign promise to build up trust with the North.¶ North
Korea has said the U.S. mainland is within the range of its
long-range missiles, and an army general told a Pyongyang rally last week that the military is ready to
fire a long-range nuclear-armed missile to turn Washington into a “sea of fire.”¶
US Would strike North Korea off the face of the earth if Canada was attacked
ANTHONY DePALMA, 99 (Anthony DePalma, March 07, 1999, “Word for Word/News of the North; How Canadians Stopped Worrying And Laughed at a
Journalistic Bomb”, The New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/03/07/weekinreview/word-for-word-north-canadians-stopped-worrying-laughed-journalistic-bomb.html)//GP
The original report appeared on Feb. 12 in The National Post, the new flagship of the Southam newspaper chain. The article had more prominence on the front page
than news of the expected acquittal of President Clinton that day:
U.S. Army officials say they expect Canada would be the first target of a North Korean nuclear attack if
tensions were to escalate between the Communist power and the United States. According to a war scenario being
developed at the U.S. Army War College, Montreal would be the Canadian city likely to be hit by North Korea, which
is suspected of having nuclear weapons. Three Canadian M.P.'s were briefed about the war scenario during a meeting of elected
representatives from the 16 NATO countries in Carlisle, Pa., last week, the National Post has learned. U.S. Army officials told the MP's they
doubt North Korea would attack the U.S. directly because it would result in massive nuclear
retaliation that would wipe the Asian nation off the map. American officials therefore think it more
likely for North Korea to hit U.S. interests indirectly by attacking a close ally and a friend -- Canada -that does not have nuclear weapons.
Attack on Canada would be perceived as an attack on the U.S.
Bratt, 06 - teaches political science in the Department of Policy Studies at Mount Royal College. (Duane Bratt, “The Politics of Candu Exports”, Book)//GP
¶ Eventually Canada did reverse course and began, in 1968, to remove all nuclear weapons systems from its bases. The process of nuclear weapons removal allowed
Pierre Trudeau to give his famous nuclear suffocation speech to the United Nations General Assembly in 1978. During this speech, Trudeau bragged that Canada
was not only the first country with the capability to produce nuclear weapons that chose not to do so, we are also the first nuclear-armed country to have chosen to
divest itself of nuclear weapons. What Trudeau did not mention in his speech was that there were still nuclear weapons in Canada. In fact, it would not be until 1984
Despite having removed U.S. nuclear weapons from its forces and
territory, Canada remains firmly under the protection of the American nuclear umbrella. It
participates in the nuclear defense of North America not only through its membership in NATO but
also through NORAD. And even if Canada were not a member of these alliances, it is likely that
Washington would continue to view an attack against its northern neighbor as an attack against the
that Canada was completely free of nuclear weapons.¶
United States . Thus, it can be argued that American nuclear deterrence would extend to include
Canadian territory irregardless of Ottawa’s nuclear policy.¶ Canadians generally believe in nuclear non-proliferation, and Canada
was the first country capable of building nuclear weapons that decided not to. It has continued to refrain from developing nuclear weapons and, in a precedentsetting move that Ukraine and Kazakhstan later followed, removed all nuclear weapons from its soil. Canada also implemented a policy of not assisting in any
country’s production of nuclear weapons through either CANDU or uranium exports. However, Canada
continues to accept the protection
of the American nuclear umbrella. There is a certain logic to the Canadian position, but one can also understand why countries like India and
Pakistan, which may not live in such a secure environment, view the Canadians as hypocrites for preaching against the development of nuclear weapons while at
the same time accepting their protection.
Attack on Canada would be perceived as an attack on the U.S.
Bratt, 06 - teaches political science in the Department of Policy Studies at Mount Royal College. (Duane Bratt, “The Politics of Candu Exports”, Book)//GP
¶ Eventually Canada did reverse course and began, in 1968, to remove all nuclear weapons systems from its bases. The process of nuclear weapons removal allowed
Pierre Trudeau to give his famous nuclear suffocation speech to the United Nations General Assembly in 1978. During this speech, Trudeau bragged that Canada
was not only the first country with the capability to produce nuclear weapons that chose not to do so, we are also the first nuclear-armed country to have chosen to
divest itself of nuclear weapons. What Trudeau did not mention in his speech was that there were still nuclear weapons in Canada. In fact, it would not be until 1984
Despite having removed U.S. nuclear weapons from its forces and
territory, Canada remains firmly under the protection of the American nuclear umbrella. It
participates in the nuclear defense of North America not only through its membership in NATO but
also through NORAD. And even if Canada were not a member of these alliances, it is likely that
Washington would continue to view an attack against its northern neighbor as an attack against the
that Canada was completely free of nuclear weapons.¶
United States . Thus, it can be argued that American nuclear deterrence would extend to include
Canadian territory irregardless of Ottawa’s nuclear policy.¶ Canadians generally believe in nuclear non-proliferation, and Canada
was the first country capable of building nuclear weapons that decided not to. It has continued to refrain from developing nuclear weapons and, in a precedent-
setting move that Ukraine and Kazakhstan later followed, removed all nuclear weapons from its soil. Canada also implemented a policy of not assisting in any
country’s production of nuclear weapons through either CANDU or uranium exports. However, Canada
continues to accept the protection
of the American nuclear umbrella. There is a certain logic to the Canadian position, but one can also understand why countries like India and
Pakistan, which may not live in such a secure environment, view the Canadians as hypocrites for preaching against the development of nuclear weapons while at
the same time accepting their protection.
North Korea attacks draws Canada in – causes nuclear war
Bratt, 06 - teaches political science in the Department of Policy Studies at Mount Royal College. (Duane Bratt, “The Politics of Candu Exports”, Book)//GP
The death of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il and the changing of the guard in that unhappy country will be felt around the world , but one
defence expert says the potential is there for Canada to launch a military presence there with allied
forces, nearly 60 years after the end of the Korean War.¶ With so much uncertainty surrounding the future of North Korea under the rule of Kim’s youngest son
— Kim Jong-un — Canada likely would play a key role in any international response should the regime
collapse, said Christian Leuprecht of Queen’s University in Kingston, Ont.¶ “If there was a conflict on the
Korean Peninsula, (Canada) would likely end up getting dragged into it because we consider ourselves
a South Korean ally,” said Leuprecht, from the department of political studies at Queen’s. “We were there in the early 50s, so chances are we
would support them again if there was a conflict. Whatever happens there has direct repercussions for us here in
Canada.Ӧ That prospect is sure to bring a chill to veterans of the brutal 1950-53 Korean War like 78-year-old Harry
Marshall of Peterborough, Ont. He served 18 months in the region in 1952 and 1953; he said he hopes the situation there improves without the need for military
action.¶ Marshall
agrees, though, that Canada would help out its allies if tensions boiled over, but he
hopes the new leader will take a different approach to governing.¶ “I hope to hell it doesn’t come to
that,” said Marshall, who serves as president of a chapter of the Korea Veterans Association of
Canada in Peterborough. “This one would be a modern (war) with all the nuclear stuff they’ve got
going around. I don’t think I’d want to see that happen at all. Once was enough.¶ “I think Canada would stand up again to help
them out. I think North Korea would have to let off some of those long-range missiles they got. So far, they
haven’t directed them on any positive targets — from what I can tell. It would take quite a bit (to motivate military action), but I don’t think South
Korea will stand for anything. What I’ve seen of their army, they’re pretty good, too. Very skillful.”¶ On Monday, Foreign Affairs
Minister John Baird said Canada has made a firm commitment to ensure peace in the region.¶ “ It is past
due for North Korea to change its ways and for those who lead it to meet the real needs of the North
Korean people,” Baird said in a statement. “Canada remains committed to a secure Korean Peninsula
and a peaceful, prosperous broader region; we will work with our allies to those ends.Ӧ Prime Minister Stephen
Harper also weighed in on the issue and said North Korea should “close this sad chapter in its history”
following the death of leader Kim Jong-il, and use his death as a means to achieve “positive change” going forward.¶ In a statement, Harper said the legacy of Kim is
far from admirable and that his death brings great opportunities to move ahead in a different direction.¶ “Kim Jong-il will be remembered as the leader of a
totalitarian regime who violated the basic rights of the North Korean people for nearly two decades,” Harper said.¶ “We hope his passing brings positive change,
allowing the people of North Korea to emerge from six decades of isolation, oppression and misery.Ӧ L euprecht
said it will be hard to
determine how things are playing out in North Korea in the early days of its new leadership.¶ With a lack of
social media tools such as Twitter and Facebook, there is virtually no flow of intelligence coming from people inside the Hermit Kingdom, he said,¶ For about a year,
Kim had been trying to secure succession for his youngest son, but it is not clear if he has been able to manage this transition.¶ “The whole regime … has been built
around this personality cult around this family,” said Leuprecht. “The continuity of the regime hinges on their ability to install him as a credible successor to his
father.”¶ Leuprecht said it’s widely believed that, since Kim Jong-il suffered a stroke in 2008, North
Korea’s military council essentially
has been running the country. He said that potential friction between the new leader and military authorities could provide fuel for future
conflict.¶ If the new leader wanted to lay the framework for a different direction for North Korea, Leuprecht said even that wouldn’t be easy.¶ “There’s a serious
generational gap between the senior military leadership — which is in their 70s and 80s — and him,” he said of the man believed to be in his late 20s. “They’re not
just going to transfer power to somebody 50 years younger than they are.¶ “I’m not sure Kim Jong-un would have the legitimacy that he would need and the
credibility to institute reforms, even if he wanted to. If he tries to do it in an autocratic way (it would be) splitting the regime and causing only further instability.Ӧ
impact
Nuclear War leads to extinction
Shultz et al, 2007 - A conference organized by Mr. Shultz and Sidney D. Drell was held at Hoover to reconsider the vision that Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev
brought to Reykjavik. In addition to Messrs. Shultz and Drell, the following participants also endorse the view in this statement: Martin Anderson, Steve Andreasen,
Michael Armacost, William Crowe, James Goodby, Thomas Graham Jr., Thomas Henriksen, David Holloway, Max Kampelman, Jack Matlock, John McLaughlin, Don
Oberdorfer, Rozanne Ridgway, Henry Rowen, Roald Sagdeev and Abraham Sofaer. (George Shultz, January 4 2007, "A World Free of Nuclear Weapons," Wall Street
Journal By George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn0, The Wall Street Journal January 4, 2007;
http://fcnl.org/issues/nuclear/world_free_of_nuclear_weapons/)//GP
Nuclear weapons today present tremendous dangers, but also an historic opportunity. U.S. leadership will be required to take the world to the next stage -- to a
solid consensus for reversing reliance on nuclear weapons globally as a vital contribution to preventing their proliferation into potentially dangerous hands, and
ultimately ending them as a threat to the world. Nuclear weapons were essential to maintaining international security during the Cold War because they were a
means of deterrence. The end of the Cold War made the doctrine of mutual Soviet-American deterrence obsolete. Deterrence continues to be a relevant
consideration for many states with regard to threats from other states. But reliance on nuclear weapons for this purpose is becoming increasingly hazardous and
decreasingly effective. North
Korea's recent nuclear test and Iran's refusal to stop its program to enrich
uranium -- potentially to weapons grade -- highlight the fact that the world is now on the precipice of
a new and dangerous nuclear era. Most alarmingly, the likelihood that non-state terrorists will get their hands on nuclear weaponry is
increasing. In today's war waged on world order by terrorists, nuclear weapons are the ultimate means of
mass devastation. And non-state terrorist groups with nuclear weapons are conceptually outside the bounds of a deterrent strategy and present difficult
new security challenges. Apart from the terrorist threat, unless urgent new actions are taken, the U.S. soon will be
compelled to enter a new nuclear era that will be more precarious, psychologically disorienting, and
economically even more costly than was Cold War deterrence. It is far from certain that we can successfully replicate the old
Soviet-American "mutually assured destruction" with an increasing number of potential nuclear enemies world-wide without dramatically increasing the risk that
nuclear weapons will be used. New nuclear states do not have the benefit of years of step-by-step safeguards put in effect during the Cold War to prevent nuclear
accidents, misjudgments or unauthorized launches. The
United States and the Soviet Union learned from mistakes that
were less than fatal. Both countries were diligent to ensure that no nuclear weapon was used during the Cold War by design or by accident. Will
new nuclear nations and the world be as fortunate in the next 50 years as we were during the Cold
War? * * * Leaders addressed this issue in earlier times. In his "Atoms for Peace" address to the United Nations in 1953, Dwight D. Eisenhower pledged
America's "determination to help solve the fearful atomic dilemma -- to devote its entire heart and mind to find the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of
man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life." John F. Kennedy, seeking to break the logjam on nuclear disarmament, said,
"The world
was not meant to be a prison in which man awaits his execution." Rajiv Gandhi, addressing the U.N.
General Assembly on June 9, 1988, appealed, " Nuclear war will not mean the death of a hundred million
people. Or even a thousand million. It will mean the extinction of four thousand million: the end of life
as we know it on our planet earth . We come to the United Nations to seek your support. We seek your support to put a stop to this madness."
Ronald Reagan called for the abolishment of "all nuclear weapons," which he considered to be "totally irrational, totally inhumane, good for nothing but killing,
possibly destructive of life on earth and civilization." Mikhail Gorbachev shared this vision, which had also been expressed by previous American presidents.
Although Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev failed at Reykjavik to achieve the goal of an agreement to get rid of all nuclear weapons, they did succeed in turning the arms
race on its head. They initiated steps leading to significant reductions in deployed long- and intermediate-range nuclear forces, including the elimination of an entire
class of threatening missiles. What will it take to rekindle the vision shared by Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev? Can a world-wide consensus be forged that defines a
series of practical steps leading to major reductions in the nuclear danger? There is an urgent need to address the challenge posed by these two questions. The
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) envisioned the end of all nuclear weapons. It provides (a) that states that did not possess nuclear weapons as of 1967 agree not to
obtain them, and (b) that states that do possess them agree to divest themselves of these weapons over time. Every president of both parties since Richard Nixon
has reaffirmed these treaty obligations, but non-nuclear weapon states have grown increasingly skeptical of the sincerity of the nuclear powers. Strong nonproliferation efforts are under way. The Cooperative Threat Reduction program, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, the Proliferation Security Initiative and the
Additional Protocols are innovative approaches that provide powerful new tools for detecting activities that violate the NPT and endanger world security. They
deserve full implementation.
The negotiations on proliferation of nuclear weapons by North Korea and Iran,
involving all the permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany and Japan, are crucially
important. They must be energetically pursued. But by themselves, none of these steps are adequate to the danger. Reagan and General Secretary
Gorbachev aspired to accomplish more at their meeting in Reykjavik 20 years ago -- the elimination of nuclear weapons altogether. Their vision shocked experts in
the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, but galvanized the hopes of people around the world. The leaders of the two countries with the largest arsenals of nuclear
weapons discussed the abolition of their most powerful weapons. * * * What should be done? Can the promise of the NPT and the possibilities envisioned at
Reykjavik be brought to fruition? We
believe that a major effort should be launched by the United States to
produce a positive answer through concrete stages. First and foremost is intensive work with leaders of the countries in possession of
nuclear weapons to turn the goal of a world without nuclear weapons into a joint enterprise. Such a joint enterprise, by involving changes in the disposition of the
states possessing nuclear weapons, would lend additional weight to efforts already under way
to avoid the emergence of a nuclear-armed
North Korea and Iran.
The program on which agreements should be sought would constitute a series of agreed and urgent steps that would lay the
groundwork for a world free of the nuclear threat. Steps would include: Changing the Cold War posture of deployed nuclear weapons to increase warning time and
thereby reduce the danger of an accidental or unauthorized use of a nuclear weapon. Continuing to reduce substantially the size of nuclear forces in all states that
possess them. Eliminating short-range nuclear weapons designed to be forward-deployed. Initiating a bipartisan process with the Senate, including understandings
to increase confidence and provide for periodic review, to achieve ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, taking advantage of recent technical advances,
and working to secure ratification by other key states. Providing the highest possible standards of security for all stocks of weapons, weapons-usable plutonium, and
highly enriched uranium everywhere in the world. Getting control of the uranium enrichment process, combined with the guarantee that uranium for nuclear
power reactors could be obtained at a reasonable price, first from the Nuclear Suppliers Group and then from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or
other controlled international reserves. It will also be necessary to deal with proliferation issues presented by spent fuel from reactors producing electricity. Halting
the production of fissile material for weapons globally; phasing out the use of highly enriched uranium in civil commerce and removing weapons-usable uranium
from research facilities around the world and rendering the materials safe. Redoubling our efforts to resolve regional confrontations and conflicts that give rise to
new nuclear powers. Achieving the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons will also require effective measures to impede or counter any nuclear-related conduct
that is potentially threatening to the security of any state or peoples. Reassertion of the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and practical measures toward
achieving that goal would be, and would be perceived as, a bold initiative consistent with America's moral heritage
. The effort could have a
profoundly positive impact on the security of future generations. Without the bold vision, the actions
will not be perceived as fair or urgent. Without the actions, the vision will not be perceived as realistic
or possible. We endorse setting the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and working energetically
on the actions required to achieve that goal, beginning with the measures outlined above.
at: squo solves
Current engagement is insufficient – substantial investments are needed
Graham, 10 governance consultant and former Senior Associate with the Institute On Governance (John Graham, first quarter 2010, “Canadian Policy in the
Americas: Between Rhetoric and Reality – a Needless Distance,” Canada Among nations, 2009-2010: As Others See Us, pages 110-112)//KP
THE POLICY: CAN IT WORK? The policy of re-engagement with the Americas is well out of the gate, but it is unlikely to
reach its destination without a major adjustment in the government’s approach to foreign policy. Misconceptions about the importance of foreign policy delivery
systems to vital national interests began with Pierre Trudeau, became entrenched under Jean Chretien and Paul Martin, and, more recently, have been exacerbated
by Stephen Harper. Such robust initiatives as the International Criminal Court, demining, the “responsibility to protect,” and now the Americas
strategy
have been advanced, but the machinery necessary to sustain and build Canadian credibility with
foreign governments has been allowed to rust. Forget about “punching above our weight,” although thanks to the skill of some
individuals this still occurs. In more concrete terms, our current condition means that we are less able to compete with our competitors. This diagnosis does not
apply solely to the front lines of foreign policy as usually represented by DFAIT and CIDA, but to the need for well coordinated and well resourced “whole of
government” operations. Go
to the capitals in Latin America and ask the foreign ministry or the office of the president which
foreign governments are top in terms of access and influence. In almost all cases, Canada will not be
in the top ten, a situation that cannot be laid at the door of the Canadian ambassador. Because public diplomacy has been removed from the Canadian
diplomatic toolkit, it is difficult for Canadian representatives to broadcast achievements and the message of
serious re-engagement. It is absurd that many key groups in target countries are still largely unaware
that their countries have become Canada’s third highest foreign policy priority . No wonder there is little reciprocity
of that view. A more general problem is the failure at the political level to understand the importance of relationships of mutual confidence among senior
professionals and the value of open dialogue that emerges when shared confidence exists. There are exceptions, but policy development has been stunted by a
culture of suspicion. Successive governments have resisted coming to grips with the dynamics and the costs of effective foreign policy. The result has been a decline
in image, leverage, and productivity. In 2003, Andrew Cohen wrote that without real resources it is harder for Canada to be taken seriously. Six years later it is much
harder. Thomas Friedman (2008) recalls an aphorism by Pentagon planners: “A vision without resources is a hallucination.” A recent survey by the Strategic Council
of Canada reports Canadians widespread self-satisfaction with living in the “best” country in the world. The survey underscores the disconnect between how we see
ourselves and how others see us. Canada
will not achieve its Americas policy objectives without changing the core
of its policymaking and without substantial investments. This year at a major conference in Kingston on hemispheric security, a
Brazilian general was asked to explain the secret of Brazil’s remarkable growth over the past decade into a much respected and influential player on the world stage.
The answer was complex, involving growth and good governance. But the key, the general said, was “diplomacy, diplomacy, diplomacy!”
at: diversification now
Recent attempts at diversification failed – new strategy needed for growth
McKenna 4/4/13 National Business Correspondent for The Globe and Mail (Barrie McKenna, 4 April 2013, “For Canadian Trade, a ‘lost decade’,” The
Globe and Mail, http://m.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/economy/economy-lab/for-canadian-trade-a-lostdecade/article10719450/?service=mobile)//KP
After nine free trade deals, countless trade missions and endless talk of global diversification, Canada
remains as wedded as ever to the U.S. market. Efforts to broaden and grow the country’s exports
apparently aren’t working, committing Canada to a “lost decade” in trade, according to a report Wednesday by CIBC World
Markets Inc. Merchandise trade figures for February, due out Friday, are expected to show that Canada continues to run a small trade deficit, but the gap has been
narrowing in recent months thanks to rebounding energy exports and a lower dollar. The CIBC report points out that the
volume of Canadian
exports to all countries is back to the same level it was a decade ago. The share of non-U.S. exports
peaked at 25 per cent last year and is now falling again. China and Britain accounted for virtually all
the recent diversification. In Britain’s case, the main driver was a 300 per cent rise in the price of gold –
“hardly an inspiring diversification story,” argue CIBC economists Benjamin Tal and Andrew Grantham. “This uni-diversification is certainly
not what the architects of Canada’s nine free trade agreements with non-U.S. partners envisioned,” Mr. Tal and Mr. Grantham write. “This was a lost
decade for Canadian exports. And for a small, open economy, this is not a positive trajectory.” Canada’s share of
non-U.S. exports rose to 25 per cent from 13 per cent between 2001 and 2009. But it’s been stuck at roughly that level since. “Despite
intensifying efforts, Canadian export diversification is losing momentum” the report says. The strength of the Canadian
dollar in the early 2000s is only partly responsible for the poor export performance, according to CIBC. Just as important have been weak U.S. demand, diminishing
returns from the North American free trade agreement, competition from emerging markets and cost-cutting by U.S. manufacturers. CIBC cautions that while
the U.S. economy is showing signs of life, it likely won’t be a long-term answer for Canada’s export
woes, due to U.S. fiscal restraint and more cautious consumers. So the promise of trade lies in China and beyond. Mr. Tal and
Mr. Grantham conclude that Canada’s modest success penetrating the Chinese market suggests that despite a strong currency, Canadian companies
can “win and compete in a very competitive emerging market environment.” Since 2003, China has accounted for half
of the export growth to developing countries.
Diversification isn’t necessary and wouldn’t solve anything – the U.S. economy is fine
Walberg 4/23/13 business author for the Financial Post (Rebecca Walberg, 23 April 2013, “Don’t write them off just yet: U.S. still critical to Canadian
exporters,” Financial Post, http://business.financialpost.com/2013/04/23/dont-write-them-off-just-yet-u-s-still-critical-to-canadian-exporters/)//KP
Calls to diversify Canadian exports beyond American markets intensified in late 2012, as the U.S. approached its
fiscal cliff. The push to reduce the dependence of Canadian trade upon the U.S. is nothing new , though, despite
the steady increase of other markets as consumers of Canadian goods. I n 1999, 87% of total exports went to the U.S., and in 2012
that number had fallen to 75%. Even with this decrease, government ministers, business
spokespeople and economists have in recent months called for diversifying Canadian trade, citing the
problems plaguing the U.S. economy and the strength of the Canadian dollar, whose relative
weakness traditionally underpinned Canadian exports to the U.S. But is the conventional wisdom right? Peter Hall,
chief economist for Export Development Canada, doesn’t agree that the American economy is in so
precarious a state that Canada should look elsewhere for markets. “I challenge the notion that the U.S. isn’t doing well,” he
says. “Yes, the aggregate numbers are nothing to write home about. But when you look more closely at
the sources of growth and decline in the U.S., there is a clear defining line between those two.”
Government spending, which is not yet in full austerity mode, has decreased sharply, and with cuts in pensions and healthcare spending expected in the near
future, the government will withdraw from the U.S. economy even more. Growth, however, ranges
from “promising” in some sectors
to “booming” in others, says Mr. Hall, enough to offset the government contraction, with better to come. New
starts in the housing sector, traditionally an indicator of economic strength, are growing by 40% per year, while
consumer spending, which accounts for 70% of the U.S. economy, is rising at an inflation-adjusted rate
of 5% without a reduction in savings. “Business investment in machinery and equipment is also growing at a very
strong pace,” says Mr. Hall. “American businesses are sitting on US$6.2-trillion of cash or near-cash; that’s between 35% and 40% of U.S. GDP. We believe
they’re about to start spending that reserve. “The capacity gap that opened up in the recession has now been 98%
closed, and that means that in order to keep pace with the current business and inflow of orders, they’re going to have to expand, and that means dipping into
this well of cash. “We’re expecting to see about 16% growth in business investment this year. So when you’ve got 70%
of the economy growing at 5% a year, which might not sound like a lot but is actually extremely strong, and two major sectors growing — by 40% for housing and
16% for business investment — that sounds like pretty rock-solid recovery to me.” The
glum bottom line of the U.S. economy, he says, is
due to government spending and increased imports, the latter of which bodes well for Canadian
trade, as does the fact business investment will boost imports of machinery and equipment — categories that have already recently shown a rise in Canadian
exports to the U.S. Nor is the strong dollar a reason to assume Canadian trade with the U.S. will, or should,
shrink. “To the extent that manufacturers thought being competitive meant being able to sell at a 70¢ dollar, then yes, we have a problem today,” says Jeremy
Leonard, director of industry services at British consultancy Oxford Economics and former research director with the Institute for Research on Public Policy. “But
there has to be a change in mindset. Truly competitive companies compete at whatever the market says the currency is valued at.” Just as China’s entry into the
WTO, originally heralded as the downfall of U.S. manufacturing, ultimately drove dramatic increases in productivity in manufacturing, logistics and management, so
can the stimulus of a consistently strong dollar prompt similar improvements in Canadian industry, Mr. Leonard believes, particularly if competition-friendly
government policy creates an environment conducive to that. Finally, diversification
isn’t a panacea because it’s no longer
possible to consider trade with any single country in isolation from the international market, says Ari van
Assche, professor at HEC Montreal. “The rise of global value chains means that more and more
Canadian trade involves working together with U.S. companies to build a product that can be sold all
around the world, so if they’re working together to sell into Europe or Asia, you’re going to see an increase in trade between the U.S. and Canada as
well,” he says.
nb 3: Mexican Climate Coop
Canadian cooperation solves climate change – emission restrictions and renewables
Jeffs 12 President of the Canadian International Council, Ph.D. in International Political Economy from the University of Toronto (Jennifer Jeffs, February 2012,
“A Partnership Approach to Development and Global Challenges,” Canada Among Nations, 2011-2012: Canada and Mexico’s Unfinished Agenda)//KP
ALTERNATIVE ENERGY SOURCES AND CLIMATE CHANGE Both
Canada and Mexico suffer from disproportionate dependence
on their national oil industries for their energy needs and their Gross National Product (GNP). The oil industry provides
extraordinarily rich fodder for research on clean extraction technologies and is an excellent example of an area where universities and industry can work together to
create intellectual property related to issues of mutual concern. Canada recently created an intellectual property sharing consortium among oil companies
operating in the Canadian oil sands for developing clean and environmentally friendly extraction technologies. It
would be in the best interests
of Canada and Mexico to co-operate in the energy area for many reasons. The post-Copenhagen Accord era represents
a major challenge to these two countries: both have committed themselves to reducing greenhouse gas emissions,
yet both national economies depend disproportionately on the production and export of
hydrocarbons as their main income. This contradiction presents a good opportunity for Canada and Mexico to
work together to comply with current low-carbon energy policies while maintaining their roles as
leading energy suppliers. The main areas on which they can work together include the
implementation of energy-efficient policies and the development of renewable energies through
political and technical dialogues (while the relationships around oil and gas still play the most important role) both at federal and
provincial/state levels. Bilateral interaction to date has taken place mostly between Canadian provinces and the Mexican federal government or with the stateowned oil company, Pemex. For example, in 2007, Alberta's and Mexico's energy ministries signed a co-operation agreement which includes the sharing of best
practices on regulations of hydrocarbon exploration, development of energy efficiency, and promotion of technical co-operation; RENEWABLE ENERGIES A focal
report tells us that Canada has a small installed generation capacity in wind, solid biomass, and photovoltaic energy. Mexico has a similar profile with an even
smaller percentage of wind generation but greater installed capacity in biomass and geothermal energy. Both
countries could further develop
their renewable energy capacities. With the exception of hydro and ocean energy, provincial governments have jurisdiction over renewable
resources in Canada. Notably, Mexico could launch a program of co-operation in wind power generation with Alberta, Ontario, Quebec, and Manitobal Canada,
meanwhile, should pay attention to, and invest funds and research into, existing companies and projects
developing innovative energy technologies in Mexico. One such company, Canromex, has adopted biogas-to-energy development
projects in Chihuahua, Quintana R00, Atizapan, and San Luis Potosi, and it continues to secure new projects in the State of Mexico with its partner company, Green
Point Energy.§ CLIMATE CHANGE AND ENVIRONMENT Mexico’s specific interest in preserving and enhancing sustainable ecosystems stems from the fact that it
is one of the most biodiverse countries in the world. As with any country, Mexico's resilience to the effects of
climate change depends on co-operation with its regional neighbours. After the Conference of the
Parties (c0P) 16 in, Canada and Mexico agreed to further implement bilateral Cancun initiatives to fight climate
change. These include mitigation of methane emissions at oil facilities, energy efficiency, and anaerobic treatment of residuals in the
pork industry in Yucatan. So far, the most important outcome of this dialogue is the implementation of a joint model to measure greenhouse gas emissionsm The
2011 initiative, under the Canada-Mexico Partnership, proposes implementing the Canadian model of carbon
emissions detection and capture in Mexico. This model also helps prevent soil contamination, fires, and other environmental dangers. To
implement this model, Canadian experts organized a workshop for Mexican environmental authorities in March 2011. The Canadian govemment
should not ignore these precedents for Canadian-Mexican environmental research projects. By sharing and
co-producing models for addressing climate change, Canadian and Mexican research commtmities can demonstrate to the
rest of the world that climate change research is most productive when collaborative, since countries
with vastly different climates share environmental problems that may have common solutions.
<insert warming impact>
Warming ext.
A Canadian-Mexican partnership sets an example for action on climate change
Jeffs 12 President of the Canadian International Counicl, Ph.D. in International Political Economy from the University of Toronto (Jennifer Jeffs, February 2012,
“A Partnership Approach to Development and Global Challenges,” Canada Among Nations, 2011-2012: Canada and Mexico’s Unfinished Agenda)//KP
The World Intellectual Property Organization in Geneva (w1Po), a specialized agency of the
United Nations, was established to develop an intemational
intellectual property system to stimulate innovation and contribute to economic development. The organization has defined climate change,
health, and food security as the three major global challenges to human survival and has recently set up a section
to look specifically at work being done globally in these areas. The urgent and global nature of these issues demands
collaborative efforts and the leveraging of limited resources. Less developed countries will suffer
disproportionately from challenges related to climate change, health, and food security, and their suffering will have an effect on richer
nations. Thus, in addition to the ethical imperatives of addressing inequalities, partnerships between rich and poor nations make
good practical sense. Collaborations between countries at disparate levels of development that share
a continent make particularly good sense, since they share regional, as well as global, concerns. By
addressing global issues in partnership, Canada and Mexico could serve as an example to the rest of
the world.