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BATTLE OF “HAMBURGER HILL,” MAY 10-20, 1969: THE
BEGINNING OF THE END OF AMERICA’S COMMITMENT
TO THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
WILLIAM HEAD
78 ABW OFFICE OF HISTORY
ROBINS AFB
Introduction: Why This Battle Was So Important
The Battle for Hill 937 that took place from May 10-20, 1969 is best known for its
sobriquet “Hamburger Hill.” To be sure, the name portends a negative connotation as in meat
grinder or turning American troops into hamburger. And, so it was in the strictest terms another
bloody tactical victory for the U.S. that became a strategic defeat. Fought between 800-900
regular troops of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and 1,800 American airborne troops, Hill
937 was located in Thua Thien Province in South Vietnam. In fact, even though the hill was of
little strategic value U.S. leadership ordered it to be taken by a bloody frontal assault. No sooner
than it was finally seized it was abandoned. All of this created a public outrage in the United
States that ultimately led President Richard M. Nixon to initiate a withdrawal of U.S. ground
forces and, under the tenets of the Nixon Doctrine, create his “Vietnamization” program.
As one military study says, “The Vietnam conflict wore many faces. It was at once an
insurrection by indigenous guerrilla forces and an invasion by the regular army of a neighboring
regime.” So it was, but for the most part, (until the Spring Offensive of 1972) it was not a
conventional war with set-piece battles like those in the World Wars and Korea. However, there
were some exceptions and the Battle of Hamburger Hill was one of those “big battles” for which
the post-World War II U.S. Army had long trained. One they expected to fight on the open
plains of Europe.1
The bloodletting itself took place on a rugged, jungle-shrouded mountain a little more
than a mile from the Laotian border named Dong Ap Bia or Ap Bia Mountain. It is a solitary
peak that is not connected to the other ridges of the Annamite range and rises out of the western
part of the A Shau Valley. It is 937 meters or 3,074 feet above sea level. There are also a series
of other high points to the south also reaching more than 3,000 feet. The reason the summit was
designated Hill 937 was because of the elevation shown on U.S. Army maps. It was, and is,
covered by triple-canopy jungles, dense thickets of bamboo and elephant grass that is often taller
than a man. Local native tribesmen call it “the mountain of the crouching beast.” In short it was
a hell of place to fight a battle!2
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Hill 937 or Hamburger Hill
One article on the battle by the military expert, and author, Col. Harry G. Summers opens
with a quote about the mountain and the battle:
“Don’t mean nothin.” That was the refrain of the powerful 1987 movie about the
battle for Hamburger Hill, more correctly Ap Bac Mountain or Hill 937. Many
veterans of that May 1969 fight would no doubt agree, since the hill was
abandoned to the enemy soon after it was taken. But the truth is that it was one of
the most significant battles of the war, for it spelled the end of major American
ground combat operations in Vietnam.3
The battle itself was part of Operation Apache Snow, the second part of a larger threephased campaign to destroy NVA base camps in remote areas of the A Shau Valley. The first
phase known as Operation Massachusetts Striker had taken place about ten weeks earlier with
limited success. Even so, American leaders believed that this rapid follow on campaign would
further degrade the NVA and set them up for a coup de grace.4
The region had been seized by communist forces in 1966 during a protracted struggle that
witnessed the fall of significant U.S. and South Vietnamese outposts throughout the valley
region. One official report described the fall of the primary outpost, a U.S. Special Forces camp
in the I Corps area located 20 miles from Hue and two miles from the Laotian border. It was
manned by 12 American advisers, 149 Chinese Nung mercenaries, 9 interpreters, and 210
Vietnamese Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) troops. In spite of heroic efforts during
dozens of sorties by AC-47D fixed-wing gunships, A-1E propeller aircraft, C-123 transport
aircraft, and B-57 tactical bombers, the 380-man camp fell to the enemy after a battle that lasted
from March 9 to 11, 1966. It was during this struggle that Major Bernard F. Fisher, under heavy
fire, landed his A-1E and rescued his downed comrade, Major Dafford W. Myers. For this and
other actions, during the battle, Fisher won the Congressional Medal of Honor.5
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Even so, the camp was overrun with heavy casualties on both sides. Still, as one camp
defender later acknowledged, “Without the air support . . . we wouldn’t have lasted one day. If
you hadn’t flown at all, the Special Forces wouldn’t have blamed you. It was suicidal, but you
carried out your mission anyway.”6 This would be the pattern over the next three years as a
determined enemy dedicated considerable manpower and material to taking and defending the
vital entry route into South Vietnam. It would be here that, eventually, the main event would be
staged—the bloody battle of Hamburger Hill.
The A Shau Valley was critical to both sides. Without it the NVA could not bring troops
and supplies from North Vietnam into the South Vietnam. In this respect it was the final link to
the Ho Chi Minh Trail and essential to Northern victory. As for the U.S., shutting down this
route was vital to cutting off the flow of enemy men and materials. To quote one official Army
analysis of the situation, the “key to removing this logistical superhighway was controlling the A
Shau Valley, where the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army had developed logistical bases
following the removal of the A Shau Special Forces Camp.”7
From 1966 to 1969, efforts by the Americans to take back the valley failed. The 1969
campaign was only the latest in a long series of attempts to neutralize the communist presence in
the A Shau Valley which had been a thorn in the side of General William C. Westmoreland,
commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), throughout his tenure. And, so,
it continued to be after General Creighton Abrams succeeded him. As a result, in the spring of
1969, the commander of the XXIV Corps, Lieutenant General Richard G. Stilwell, assembled
two infantry divisions supported by massed artillery and close air support (CAS) to push the
NVA out of the area once and for all.8
Then Maj. Gen. Melvin Zais, commander of the “Screaming Eagles”
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Of significance to this story, three battalions of the 101st Airborne Division commanded
by Major General Melvin Zais (General, 1973) were at the core of the combat units. These
included the 3rd Brigade, led by Colonel Joseph B. Conmy, Jr.; the 3rd Battalion, 187th Infantry
Regiment (3/187, better known as the “Iron Rakkasans”) led by Lt. Col. Weldon Honeycutt; 2nd
Battalion, 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment (2/501), commanded by Lt. Col. Robert German;
and the 1st Battalion, 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment (1/506, the “Currahees”), commanded
by Lt. Col. John Bowers. In addition, two battalions of the 1st Division, Army of the Republic
of Vietnam (ARVN) were temporarily assigned to support the 3rd Brigade. Other units included
the 9th Marine Regiment, 3rd Squadron, 5th Cavalry Regiment and the 3rd ARVN Regiment.9
One important point to understand is that under General Westmoreland, the main thrust
of American operations was to reduce the Vietnam War to a war of attrition. Once General
Creighton Abrams took over as MACV commander, this operational approach changed to one of
“clear-and-hold.” This meant that U.S. units were supposed to create secure areas surrounding
population centers (in this case the old Imperial capital of Hue) to provide time for “institutional
rebuilding in South Vietnam.” To this end, Zais’ goal was to destroy the NVA forces in the A
Shau Valley and secure the area which would in his opinion bring the U.S. and ARVN “another
step closer toward achieving the strategic goal in Vietnam: a stable South Vietnam free of
communism.” The major fallacy with this notion was that the enemy had more than 1,000 trucks
moving supplies down the Ho Chi Minh Trail and such individualized operations like Apache
Snow lacked the synchronized nature necessary to “disaggregate” the NVA’s ability to move
troops and supplies from the North to the South.10
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Battle Map of A Shau Valley
As for the NVA forces in A Shau, they were still recovering from a February engagement
with U.S. Marines known as Operation Dewey Canyon. To this end, leaders in Hanoi sent the
6th, 9th and 29th Regiments into the area to bolster their surviving forces. They soon took up
well defended positions on the highest points on Hill 937. It was the 29th that would do most of
the NVA’s fighting and dying in the upcoming battle.11
Planning the Operation
In formulating the attack Colonel Conmy planned to airlift, by helicopter, five infantry
battalions into the valley on May 10, 1969. To this end, 65 UH-1 Huey helicopters were to
transport 1,800 men into the Valley near the base of Ap Bia Mountain. Conmy and Zais called it
a reconnaissance in force. Each unit would search their designated sector for People’s Army of
Vietnam (PAVN) forces and supplies. Marine and 5th Cavalry forces were ordered to recon
toward the Laotian border. In turn, ARVN units were supposed to occupy and divide the main
road running through the base of the valley. Assuming they accomplished this, troopers of the
2/501 and the 1/506 were to contact and destroy NVA units in their operating areas and block
enemy escape routes into Laos. If one of the American battalions ran into a large force of NVA,
Conmy planned to send reinforcements from one of the other battalions by helicopter. The basic
concept was that, being a mobile force, the 101st had the ability to move its forces quickly
enough to keep the PAVN from massing against any one unit. At the same time, any U.S.
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battalion confronting a significant NVA unit could fix it in place until a reinforcing battalion
could arrive and cut off the enemy’s retreat and destroy them.12
As preparations continued American and ARVN personnel, from top to bottom, knew
that throughout the previous three years each time they had ventured into the A Shau Valley,
they had encountered heavy resistance from the NVA. Based on cursory intelligence reports
they expected the same kind of opposition this time. However, most intelligence reports were
sketchy, especially with regards to the number and location of communist units. To quote Lt.
Col. Douglas Scalard’s official analysis of the battle, “they had little evidence as to the enemy’s
actual strength and dispositions.” Throughout this time, the PAVN had been able to all but
totally camouflage their bases from aerial observation and relegated their movements to night
time along trails hidden under triple-canopy jungle growth. To prevent the Americans from
monitoring their communications, they performed their command and control activities most
often using runners to eliminate any electronic signatures. As a result, in order to gather tactical
information U.S. commanders had to detail combat patrols to seize prisoners, documents and/or
equipment. This was the raw data from which they had to derive their assessment of the NVA’s
order of battle and dispositions.13
The Battle for Hamburger Hill Begins
On May 10th, the 3/187 set down at its landing zone (LZ) at 7:10 a.m., expecting a “hot
LZ.” Indeed, to Lt. Col. Honeycutt’s great surprise the entire deployment was uncontested.
What he would later discover was that the 29th NVA was waiting for him in heavily fortified
positions on the hill. Once on the ground, the “Rakkasans” spent much of this first phase of the
operation seeking intelligence on just what the enemy was up to. As it turned out, early in the
operation, the lack of contact continued. As the hero in the movies often says, “it was very quiet,
too quiet.” However, they soon began to gather captured dispatches that indicated the 29th
PAVN Regiment, better known as the “Pride of Ho Chi Minh,” was lurking somewhere on the
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Hill. The 29th had played a major role in the battle for Hue during the Tet Offensive of 1968
and they were a hardened group of veterans willing to fight to the end. Still, U.S. leaders were
convinced that like most of the battles against the NVA, if encountered they would put up a
ferocious fight for a short time and eventually withdraw. After all they reasoned protracted
battles like Ia Drang and Dak To were rare, especially once U.S. firepower was brought to bear.14
As intelligence data trickled in it became clear to Honeycutt that “the enemy was looking
for a big fight.” In this regard the Colonel “was eager to oblige.” Besides, if the NVA followed
their previous patterns of combat, Lt. Col. Honeycutt believed he did not need more troops to
execute a “reconnaissance in force” up Hill 937. He did ask that his own B Company, the
Brigade’s reserve, be sent to support his move and this request was granted. The Colonel, a
protégé of General Westmoreland and known for his aggressive personality and tactics, thus, on
May 11, decided to spread out his forces and comb the area north and northwest of the Mountain.
As they went they also searched the area to the west near the Laotian border. Finally, they
pushed up the north slope of Ap Bia itself. Here, late in the day, they encountered heavy NVA
fire. The main battle had begun!15
Engaging the Enemy
Once the 3/187 was engaged with the PAVN, Honeycutt requested support from AH-1
Cobra attack helicopters. Called “Snakes” by their crews, Army personnel called them aerial
rocket artillery or ARAs. It appeared American planning was working out flawlessly and they
had the NVA right where they wanted them. However, things soon went terribly wrong. Unable
to correctly identify friend from foe under the thick jungle foliage, the AH-1s mistakenly
attacked the 3/187’s command post (CP) killing two and wounding thirty-five. This early
opportunity was now thwarted. Bravo Company had been only a few hundred yards from the
summit of the Mountain. Now, with the Battalion’s command and control destroyed all units
had to pull back to nighttime defensive positions. Even so, this action confirmed what
Honeycutt suspected; the area to his front was thick with enemy soldiers determined to fight
savagely. Of primary concern to the Colonel now was the fact that he was also facing a much
larger force than anticipated. Instead of “a few trail watchers,” he was confronted by at least a
“reinforced platoon or even a company.” While his troopers could still deal with that number,
they “would have to concentrate to do so.”16
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Cobra Helicopter
As it turned out, concentrating his forces proved to be a difficult proposition. Ultimately,
it took two days to consolidate them in order to setup for a planned three-company attack on the
mountain peak. Not only did the craggy terrain and jungle undergrowth slow them to a crawl,
but on several occasions as they tried to maneuver around these encumbrances, they were
ambushed by well entrenched and deftly hidden NVA. In one case, Delta Company was stopped
cold by an ambush as it tried to descend down a steep ravine and it took five hours to move 500
yards. To quote Scalard, “The steep, mud-covered slopes, more than the enemy, kept this
company from fulfilling Honeycutt’s intent. In the end, the troops had to abandon their attack
and withdraw the way they had come.”17
During these three days, Honeycutt was left to do a great deal of reflection. It turned out
that intelligence information about the size of the enemy forces was grossly underestimated. The
map references and aerial data were equally useless. On top of everything the Colonel’s own
instincts honed by a long and “distinguished” career in Korea and Vietnam, had betrayed him
and he was slow to fully grasp his miscalculations. Sticking to his original evaluation of the
enemy’s strength, he ordered attacks by both Bravo and Charlie Companies with dreadful results.
What he finally came to realize was not only had the NVA forces been larger than even he
realized but every night they received more troops from Laos. Honeycutt soon understood that
since the NVA commander was willing “to replace heavy losses” that “he intended to put up a
stiff fight.” It would certainly be more tenacious than any American officer had anticipated.18
On May 13, Col. Conmy changed things up. Since by noon, his own troops had faced
only limited enemy resistance, he decided to support Honeycutt’s assault up the southern side of
Hill 937. First Conmy moved to cut off NVA reinforcements from Laos and then he had
helicopters take Bravo Company to Hill 916. This accomplished, the Company took this
position on May 15. The rest of the battalion marched the two and one-half miles to the base of
Hill 937. They anticipated 1/506th forces being ready to make an attack up Hill 937 by May
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15th. However, the march through the thick jungles and elephant grass proved very difficult and
the entire battalion was not in position until May 19. To quote Scalard’s report, the “1/506
Infantry’s pace was glacial. In one forty-hour period over May 13-14, the battalion was able to
cover only 1,500 of the 4,000 meters separating it from its objective on Ap Bia Mountain.19
As they waited for the other units, troopers of the 3/187 attempted several multi-company
maneuver strikes on May 14 and May 15. Their casualty numbers again proved severe. On May
16 and 17, other units of the 506th made probing attacks on the south slopes of the mountain
with little success. Not only did the terrain prove daunting to navigate but the NVA was well dug
in and determined not to give up its positions. The Americans could never seem to get any
forward momentum started due to concealed fire and unexpected ambushes on Hills 916, 900,
and 937. Efforts to initiate helicopter airlifts or airdrops were nearly impossible due to the steep
gradients and dense foliage which limited nearby LZs.20
Since the landscape concealed NVA positions, this meant any airlift was in danger from
hidden anti-aircraft fire. On those occasions when U.S. aircraft attempted drops or landings,
PAVN units, able to maneuver nearly at will, damaged or destroyed several helicopters with
small arms fire, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and crew-served weapons (mostly mortars).
The enemy also hit adjacent logistical support LZs and CPs at least four times during the battle.
This meant that U.S. units that might have helped in the assaults were forced to undertake
security details. Each time an American unit attempted to move up the hill, they had to place
security flankers all around the unit as they maneuvered, since the topography generally
prevented various units from supporting one another. With this awkward and slow moving
American formation before them NVA, units repeatedly smashed into the rear or flanks of
ambling U.S. forces.21
In short, the great strength of U.S. forces, their ability to quickly maneuver was nearly
eliminated. They were, instead forced down narrow trails that reduced their effective size at the
combat point to squads or platoons. This allowed the communists to hit them with similar size
units in places where the PAVN had prepared interlocking fields of fire. Another consequence
of this arrangement was that most firefights were close in with small arms where American fire
support was impeded. As a result, American forces often had to withdraw in order to call in
artillery or close air support. The NVA quickly realized that as soon as the U.S. troopers pulled
back, they needed to take cover in their well-sited and cleverly-built bunkers. They even had
overhead cover to withstand most aerial bombardments. 22
Naturally, as the battle proceeded the vegetation was stripped away exposing some of the
trenches. However, they had built so many they could simply take refuge in other places. Still
others were so well made the Americans could not destroy them by indirect fire or recoilless
rifles. Even napalm proved ineffective in some cases. Eventually, the only real success came
from small unit actions. This proved slow and costly in terms of lives and equipment.
Throughout, command of the American units was fragmented even though Lt. Col. Honeycutt
urged his company commanders to push forward. It was not until the final attack, with units
closer to each other, that he could coordinate the movement of his men and order effective fire
support. Prior to this final push, artillery fire and CAS, proved a risky business as noted earlier.
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There were five friendly fire events that killed seven and wounded fifty-three members of the
187th. Four of these were accidental attacks by Cobra gunship helicopters, one of which was
more than a mile from the actual target.23
The Battle Drags On
On May 17, the Currahees pushed forward again with little progress and so, Col. Conmy
ordered a two-pronged assault by two battalions for the next morning. The 1/506th would attack
from the south and the 3/187th from the north. In this manner he hoped he could prevent the
NVA from concentrating on either battalion. Ultimately, troops of Delta Company, 3/187th
reached within 246 feet of the summit. Throughout the attack most of the fighting was close
combat, at one point the two forces fired small arms within 66 feet of each other. Both sides
suffered heavy casualties. All of the 3/187th’s officers were either killed or wounded. Circling
overhead in a light observation helicopter, Honeycutt struggled to coordinate the movements of
supporting companies. However, they were making progress. Just as it seemed they might
finally take the summit a violent thunderstorm struck cutting visibility down to zero and ending
the combat. At this point the 3/187th had to abandon all the ground they had so dearly won.24
Even as this drama played out, three converging companies of the 1/506th were groping
their way up Hill 900, the southern crest of the mountain. All along their path they faced heavy
opposition. Having already sustained severe casualties the high number suffered during this
push led Zais to consider ending the advance all together. Besides, he had already suffered a
great deal of media scrutiny and criticism for making the attack in the first place. Nevertheless,
publicly supported by General Abrams, Zais decided to commit three fresh battalions to the
battle. One of these new units he wanted to replace the battered 3/187th. They had suffered the
greatest losses up to this point with 320 killed and wounded, including 60 percent of the 450
experienced troops who had originally ventured into valley. Indeed, two of its four company
commanders and eight of twelve platoon leaders were casualties.25
Airlifting the Wounded
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Following the attack of May 18th, Lt. Col. Gene Sherron, the commander of the 2nd
battalion of the 506th, came to Honeycutt’s Command Post to coordinate the relief. As he
arrived the 187th was airlifting its latest casualties out of the battle area. At this point Honeycutt
had not been told about his unit being relieved. He was not happy to hear this news. However,
before he could argue his point, Gen. Zais landed. The Colonel immediately confronted him
contending that his battalion was still capable of taking their objective. Eventually Zais relented,
but not before he redeployed one of Sherron’s companies to Honeycutt forces to bolster what he
hoped would be the final assault.26
Putting an End to it: The Final Attack
On May 19, in preparation for this final push, Zais had the 2nd battalion of the 501st
Infantry Regiment and the 2nd battalion of the ARVN 3d Infantry airlifted into LZs northeast
and southeast of the base of Ap Bia. They quickly moved onto the mountain to their attack
positions. Plans called for this assault to begin the following morning. Meanwhile, for the third
day in a row, the 506th units pressed on with its effort to finally take Hill 900.27
Making it to the Top
On May 20, the final action began with four battalions spearheading the push. These
included two companies of the 3/187th reinforced by Alpha Company 1st battalion, 506th.
Beginning at 8:00 a.m., and lasting for two hours before the ground action began, the U.S. Air
Force hammered the enemy positions with every conceivable kind of attack and gunship aircraft
available. Indeed, the air attacks were so successful that in retrospect one has to wonder why the
Americans, from the outset, did not choose to eliminate the enemy forces with several B-52 Arc
Light carpet bombing raids. Soon, the air sorties were joined by ninety minutes of preparatory
artillery fire. The ground assault began at 10:00 a.m. with the battalions simultaneously
attacking. By 11:30 a.m., NVA fire slackened, and by noon, units of 3/187th had reached the
crest. Once they had gained a foothold they cleaned out the enemy bunkers most often without
knowing if NVA soldiers were still inside. If anyone inside was alive they were buried inside or
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burned alive. The vast majority of the PAVN defenders were killed, but a few did escape into
Laos. Hill 937 was officially secured at 5:00 p.m.28
Finally at the Summit
While the Battle for Hill 937 was primarily an American show, the ARVN 1st Division,
2nd Battalion, 3rd Regiment participated in the engagement. According to Gen. Abrams in what
is known as “The Abrams Tapes,” this unit was positioned near a place where the NVA defense
line that was lightly defended. They sent a scout party to test the forward enemy lines earlier
than the proposed assault time. Once close to the NVA lines, these ARVN soldiers reported that
the enemy’s strength was minimal at best. The ARVN 2/3 commanding officer decided to
exploit the situation, and attacked in advance of the other units. Thus, they reached the crest of
Hamburger Hill around 10:00 a.m., ahead of the 3/187th, but were directed to withdraw since
allied artillery was about to open fire on the top of the hill. Instead of arguing the point the
ARVN did as directed and the opportunity to overrun the NVA lines facing the 3/187th was lost.
Shortly after the 2/3 ARVN completed their withdrawal, the 3/187th was able to break through
the NVA defenses and occupy the summit.29
U.S. losses during the ten-day battle totaled 72 killed and 372 wounded. To take the
position, the 101st Airborne Division eventually committed five infantry battalions and ten
batteries of artillery. In addition, the Air Force flew 272 missions and expended more than 500
tons of ordnance. The U.S. claimed the 7th and 8th Battalions of the 29th NVA Regiment
suffered 630 dead. These were the bodies found on or around the battlefield. A large number of
the bodies were discovered in makeshift mortuaries located in the myriad of tunnel complexes.30
On June 5, 1969, less than two weeks after the 11th and final assault, Major General John
M. Wright, now in command, quietly abandoned the hill. A spokesman for the 101st Airborne
Division said that the U.S. troops “have completed their search of the mountain and are now
continuing their reconnaissance-in-force mission throughout the A Shau Valley.” A few weeks
later the NVA reoccupied the valley once and for all.31
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The Public Outcry and the Origins of the name Hamburger Hill
So, the battle was over. The Americans had taken the hill--temporarily. Like Khe Sanh,
less than a year before, after such dedication from, and bloodshed by, the American troops
involved, their senior commanders abandoned the battlefield. All along these officers had
argued that they had to fight on in spite of suggested alternatives such as aerial bombing, because
taking this precious ground spelled a tactical victory and would bring the enemy closer to defeat
because of the heavy losses they were taking. Yet, once the ground was captured and held, at
great expense and loss of life, military planners decided this blood socked land was not
strategically valuable. And, thus, these commanders went down in history with other officers
who failed to take care of the lives of their men, generals like those from World War I who
expended so many young lives at places like the Somme and Verdun.
At least this was the public perception which was fueled by reports from the battle front.
On May 16, even as the battle was still underway, Jay Sharbutt an Associated Press reporter,
who was in Saigon, got word of a protracted engagement going on for Hill 937. It seemed a
worthwhile news story so he went to General Zais’ headquarters to interview him about the
engagement. Taking the time to answer journalist’s questions and conduct a battle at the same
time must have been disconcerting. Depending on one’s point of view, Zais either “answered
Sharbutt’s questions politely and honestly” or was evasive. According to Scalard’s account, “the
journalist was not satisfied. His subsequent newspaper account of ‘Hamburger Hill’ stirred up a
storm of controversy that swept the nation and resounded in the halls of Congress.”32
From Sharbutt’s point of view, he was just trying to get the real story and report it to the
American public. One of the more pointed questions he asked involved why infantry rather than
firepower was used as the primary offensive tool on Hill 937. In fact, this was a legitimate
question that required a detailed answer, one that General Zais believed he did not have the time
or inclination to answer. A product of the World War II Army, Zais was used to supportive
correspondents like Ernie Pyle, not confrontational ones like Sharbutt. As is all too often the
case when officials don’t or won’t directly answer hard questions, the reporter assumes that they
are covering up something. The resulting article or report is frequently not favorable to the
official involved.33
As had been the case since the U.S. had first sent soldiers to fight in Indochina, the
relationship between Generals and reporters changed. TV news anchors like Chet Huntley,
David Brinkley, Howard K. Smith, and Walter Cronkite had become trusted agents for millions
of Americans who spent much of their time from 6:00 and 7:00 p.m. listening to what they were
certain was the factual truth they needed to make informed decisions. A new kind correspondent
was born, the investigative reporter. They dug deep behind the scenes to find the “truth.” They
made news as much as they reported it and the relationship between military leaders in Vietnam
and journalists was not always friendly, especially since the Americans were not winning.
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In the case of the battle for Hill 937, the relationship festered after Sharbutt’s interview
and led to two critical news articles in the Washington Post that appeared on May 20th and 21st.
Sharbutt, harkening back to the Korean War and the much bloodier Battle of Pork Chop Hill,
sought to increase public interest in his piece by coining the term “Hamburger Hill.” That is
American soldiers being ground up in combat. The result was that more reporters soon arrived
to cover the battle, and the term "Hamburger Hill" became widely used. Concurrent with
Sharbutt’s articles, other articles appeared in numerous other newspapers like the New York
Times. To veterans of World War II and Korea, like Zais, this was simply no way for the
“American” media to behave. Indeed, to Generals it was all but un-American.34 In fairness
several other articles provided the Army’s view of the situation.35
So, in fact, the public outcry had begun to percolate even before the end of the “Battle of
Hamburger Hill.” As mentioned to above, the furor made its way into the halls of Congress.
After ten days and eleven attacks, on May 20th, Zais and his men could finally breathe a sigh of
relief. The battle was over. They had captured their objective and won a hard earned victory.
While they had suffered roughly 350 casualties these numbers while significant were far less
than Khe Sanh, Hue and Dak To and about the same as Ia Drang Valley. And, yet, back home
“Hamburger Hill” became a catch phrase for defeat and hard evidence that America could not
win the war and that the time had come for President Nixon to bring the troops home.36
On the heels of the conclusion of the struggle for Hill 937, Senator Edward “Teddy”
Kennedy (D-Mass) spoke before the U.S. Senate and declared, “I feel that it is both senseless and
irresponsible to continue sending our young men to their deaths to capture hills and positions that
have no relation to ending this conflict.” It was a shocking statement but one that reflected the
growing public fatigue over what seemed to be a never ending nightmare. While President
Nixon and senior members of the U.S. Army, especially Gen. Zais, denounced these kinds of
statements as disloyal to the troops in Vietnam, the fact was that Americans were at a cross roads
that would eventually see Nixon begin the withdrawal of U.S. military personnel.37
Throughout the extended aftermath of the battle and, eventually, the war, Zais spent
much of his time attempting, as he put it, to make sure that the “proper story” of the battle was
told and the 101st Airborne’s reputation, especially that of Col. Honeycutt, were protected. To
quote the General,
“I didn’t care about me, but I just thought that we had fought such a gallant and
brilliant fight, and that Honeycutt had done well. For those men to think that it
had all been a needless, suicidal attack just galled me, and that is why I was
willing to talk to the television, radio and newspaper people who obviously were
aware of what Senator [Edward] Kennedy said and were clamoring to talk to
me.’”38
One can hardly blame Zais for defending the deserved reputation and consistent courage
of his troops. They fought bravely and, given the circumstances, as well as might be expected.
In spite of everything, they did, finally, take their objective at a devastating cost to the NVA.
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However, a tactical effort without a strategic purpose is a futile gesture and the blame for the
public response can only be placed at the feet of senior leaders who failed to formulate a
winnable definition of victory. Thus, it is quite understandable why senators like Kennedy, who
were already convinced of the futility of the war, would react the way they did. In fact, in a
sense, Zais and Kennedy were both concerned about the lives and welfare of the young troopers
who fought on Hill 937. What was happening was that as the war was being lost, the blame
game was already in full flower. 39
Soon after the battle, Time Magazine published an article which highlighted this fact and
reported the intense fighting, claiming that 597 North Vietnamese were killed and 56 Americans
were killed and 420 wounded. They described the combat as “bitter” and the loss of life as
‘high.” Time, being a highly respected news magazine, had a major impact on public attitudes.40
Of course, the piece failed to note that the initial purpose of the operation was not to hold
territory but rather to kill North Vietnamese soldiers and cut off supply routes.
However, in early June, when the Americans left the hill, no one could ignore what
appeared to be the senseless nature of the battle. The cold hard fact was that after American
leaders asked the flower of her young men to sacrifice so much against such a determined enemy
that once they had achieved their goal they had to abandon the mountain and watch the NVA
occupy it a month after it was forsaken.41
Perception vs. Reality
On June 27, 1969, with the controversy swirling over U.S. battle casualties, Life
Magazine published a troubling photographic montage openly questioning what appeared to be
the never ending and senseless loss of American lives. In the piece they showed the pictures of
241 U.S. soldiers killed during “that week’s combat. The impact on President Nixon was direct
and powerful. He immediately ordered Gen. Creighton Abrams, to avoid such battles. Because
of Hamburger Hill, and other battles like it, the President would now move to replace U.S. troops
with ARVN forces and emphasize what he called “Vietnamization” From here on South
Vietnamese young men would engage in direct combat operations, not Americans.42
As if to keep the public fires burning against further U.S. involvement in Vietnam,
Harper’s Weekly published a poignant article by Neil Sheehan entitled, “Letters from Hamburger
Hill” in its November 1969 issue. Done in a style that only Neil Sheehan could master, it was
enough to bring tears to the eyes of most Americans. Focusing on the loneliness and fear that
only a combat soldier could feel, the letters made it clear that many of the troopers at Hamburger
Hill were convinced they would never get home.43
In simple terms, the controversy over the conduct of the Battle of Hamburger Hill led to a
reassessment of U.S. policy and its commitment to South Vietnam. As a direct result, to reduce
casualties, General Abrams was forced by the President to cease his policy of “maximum
pressure” against the NVA and replace it with one of “protective reaction” for troops threatened
with combat action. At the same time, Nixon announced the first troop withdrawal from South
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Vietnam. In short, America had had enough and was going home. In hindsight they had also
signed the death warrant for the Republic of Vietnam.44
Abrams, himself, was frustrated by the entire situation. One night, not long after the
battle he had friends over for a round of poker. He told those present that he had had a visit from
a congressional delegation headed by “Teddy Kennedy” that morning. They expressed
displeasure over the loss of lives at Hamburger Hill. Abrams replied “the last time the 29th
NVA Regiment came out of North Vietnam it destroyed Hue, and I heard from every antiquarian
in the world.” After a short pause he continued, “This time, when they came out again, I issued
orders that they were to be intercepted and defeated before they could get to Hue. We drove
them back into North Vietnam, but I was criticized for the casualties that entailed.” He then
concluded, “If they would let me know where they would like me to fight the next battle I would
be glad to do it there.” At that point they dealt the cards.45
Ultimately, the real battle over Hill 937 took place in the U.S. Senate and media not on a
mountain in Vietnam. As noted earlier, in late May soon after the Americans took the hill, the
debate over “Hamburger Hill” came to the U.S. Senate, when Senators Edward Kennedy, George
McGovern, and Stephen M. Young chastised American military leadership for a lack of concern
for the lives of their troops and for repeatedly attacking an unimportant position. Most impactful
was the protracted May 29th speech by Young in which he accused American generals of
knowing nothing about military history and instead “flinging our paratroopers piecemeal into
frontal assaults.” These he said were repeated attacks that were ineffective and only “killed our
boys who went up Hamburger Hill.”46
Later, when the June 27 issue of Life Magazine published the photographs of 241
Americans killed in one week in Vietnam, the name “Hamburger Hill” once again appeared front
and center in the public consciousness. In retrospect many historians have seen this event as a
watershed event of negative public opinion toward the Vietnam War. However, only 5 of the
241 featured photos were of those killed on Hill 937. No matter, most Americans concluded that
all of the featured photos were casualties of the battle.47
I am reminded that so many veterans of that war and revisionist analysts have long
contended that America never lost a battle during the Vietnam War but the politicians lost the
war. I would say that winning or losing the battles was beside the point. To quote Harry G.
Summers:
The Hamburger Hill battle had run afoul of a fundamental war-fighting equation.
Master philosopher of war Karl von Clausewitz emphasized almost a century and
a half earlier that because war is controlled by its political object, the value of this
object must determine the sacrifices to be made for it both in magnitude and also
in duration. He went on to say, once the expenditure of effort exceeds the value
of the political object, the object must be renounced. And that’s exactly what
happened. The expenditure of effort at Hamburger Hill exceeded the value the
American people attached to the war in Vietnam. The public had turned against
the war a year and a half earlier, and it was their intense reaction to the cost of
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that battle in American lives, inflamed by sensationalist media reporting, that
forced the Nixon administration to order the end of major tactical ground
operations.48
In another words, winning tactical victories is only relevant if they lead to the strategic
goal of contributing to attaining the political goals of the nation. This is the definition of
winning a war and realizing victory. Hamburger Hill, while another demonstration of the
heroism of America’s fighting forces, failed to contribute anything to winning the war. Instead,
it was like a last drop of water that caused the water in the bucket to overflow.
Notes:
Lt. Col. Douglas P. Scalard, “The Battle of Hamburger Hill: Battle Command in Difficult
Terrain Against a Determined Enemy,” original, Study 24, Studies in Battle Command, Combat
Studies Institute, U.S. Army, found in E-History Archives, http://ehistory.osu.edu/vietnam/
essays/battlecommand/, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma, accessed September
17, 2013, [hereafter Battle Command].
2
Ibid.; Sheet 6441-IV, Series L7014, Defense Mapping Agency, 2070; Samuel Zaffiri,
Hamburger Hill: The Brutal Battle for Dong Ap Bia, May 11- May 20, 1969, Novato, California:
Presidio Press, 1988), p. 1, [hereafter Brutal Battle]. For book length accounts of the battle, see
John DiConsiglio, Vietnam: the Bloodbath at Hamburger Hill, (New York: Franklin Watts,
2010); John Pimlott, Vietnam: the Decisive Battles, (New York: MacMillan, 1990). Among the
important archival collections available, research “Combat Operations After Action ReportSummary Apache Snow.” June 25, 1969. 3rd Brigade 101st Airborne Division. Lubbock,
Texas: Vietnam Center and Archive. Virtual Archive, http://www.virtual.vietnam.ttu.edu/cgibin/starfetch.exe?3gZvRAZjJuNMR6iXFv8nbGi6lWwCRfNbqJPk1GEMm3eJLQMEZLN6C.b
MKsEAbBxk8aP1fjiXoef@AKpF5iYWucFq2wPUOyQiG259F3ARtm0/168300010449.pdf;
Tony Mabb, “Five Days in May.” Screaming Eagle, The (Jan.-Feb. 2002), pp. 39-43. Lubbock,
Texas: Vietnam Center and Archive. Virtual Archive, http://www.virtual.vietnam.ttu.edu/cgibin/starfetch.exe?fc68Z.Rr8L5w4gqJ5KRvw04oxI.@tp2dzrphJb5JzeVdviDav4ZyGziGu4dTniF
OI2jv9v5NXp@.sxZRm@Udb92O.v2LNFX7XafvG1CpdhI/1160106014.pdf; John J. McGrath,
John J. “Brigade: a History: its Organization and Employment in the U.S. Army, The.” Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004, pp. 69-76. U.S. Army Combined
Arms Center, http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/Brigade-AHistory.pdf;
“Narrative, Operation ‘Apache Snow’ 101st Airborne,” no date, Lubbock, Texas: Vietnam
Center and Archive. Virtual Archive, http://www.virtual.vietnam.ttu.edu/cgi-bin/starfetch.exe?
4BF9eRYsP8eGPHqmMG7UWTw0.nnxUfFPFQ.NooGdqmy17SWaFqlVEjwJkouh5GeHRgd
WcL05cA3kMcjlEsZk97Az4XLZ5dOOTs.SVdJWatA/168300010493.pdf.
3
Col. Harry G. Summers, Jr., “Battle of Hamburger Hill During the Vietnam War,” Vietnam
Magazine, original June 1999. Published online June 12, 2006,
http://www.historynet.com/battle-for-hamburger-hill-during-the-vietnam-war.htm., [hereafter
Hamburger Hill, Vietnam War].
4
Ibid.; Zaffiri, Brutal Battle, pp. 5-10, 42-46, 47-52, 60-62.
1
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Kenneth Sams, Chief, SE Asia Team Project CHECO, “The Fall of A Shau,” HQ PACAF,
CHECO Report, 18 April 1966; Interview by Kenneth Sams with Majors Bernard F. Fisher and
Dafford W. Myers and Captains Jon I. Lucas and Dennes B. Hague, 12 March 1966.
6
2nd Air Division Department of Information News Release, 20 March 1966.
7
Major Kelly Boian, USA, “Major General Melvin Zais and Hamburger Hill,” Monograph,
School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, AY 2012-002, p. 25, [hereafter “Zais and Hamburger Hill”].
8
Ibid., p. 25; Scalard, Battle Command; Zaffiri, Brutal Battle, pp. 48-50
9
Boian, “Zais and Hamburger Hill,” pp. 26-28; Zaffiri, Brutal Battle, pp. 49-50, 58, 186; Oral
History Interview, “Vietnam Veteran, Arthur Wiknik describing his experiences during the
Battle of Hamburger Hill,” Veterans History Project, Central Connecticut State University,
[hereafter Wiknik Interview]; “The Battle for Hamburger Hill,” Time Magazine, Vol. 93, No. 22,
May 30, 1969, accessed September 17, 2013, https://www.google.com/#q=%E2%80%9C
The+Battle+for +Hamburger+Hill%2C%E2%80%9D++Time+Magazine%2C+May+30%2C
+1969. [hereafter “Hamburger Hill”]. The term Rakkasans literally means “falling down
umbrellas.” The 3/187 was born as a glider airborne unit at Camp Mackall, North Carolina, on
February 25, 1943. Since then it has participated in every major war fought by the United States.
Today its headquarters are located at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. The unit was one of the most
decorated during the Vietnam War. For detailed information on the 3/187 see E.M. Flanagan Jr.,
Rakkasans, (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1997). The 506th Infantry Regiment was
originally formed as the 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR) at Camp Toccoa, Georgia on
June 10, 1942. The camp was near Currahee Mountain and the unit became known as the
“Currahees.” Today the unit is headquartered at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. For more on the
early days of the 506th, see Stephen Ambrose, Band of Brothers: E Company, 506th Regiment,
101st Airborne from Normandy to Hitler’s Eagles Nest, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001).
10
Boian, “Zais and Hamburger Hill,” p. 29; James H. Willbanks, “Hamburger Hill” Vietnam
(June 2009), p. 29.
11
Zaffiri, Brutal Battle, pp. 19-36.
12
Scalard, Battle Command.
13
Scalard, Battle Command; Zaffiri, Brutal Battle, pp. 1-10.
14
Scalard, Battle Command.
15
Ibid.; Zaffiri, Brutal Battle, pp. 70-74, 90-98, 151
16
Scalard, Battle Command, Zaffiri, Brutal Battle, pp. 83-95; Boian, “Zais and Hamburger Hill,”
pp. 30-31.
17
Zaffiri, Brutal Battle, pp. 95-98. Quote in Scalard, Battle Command.
18
Scalard, Battle Command.
19
Ibid. For a non-analytical account by a front line soldier, see Frank Boccia, The Crouching
Beast: A United States Army Lieutenant's Account of the Battle for Hamburger Hill, May 1969
(Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Co., Inc., 2013), [hereafter Crouching Beast]
20
Scalard, Battle Command; Zaffiri, Brutal Battle, pp. 193-208.
21
Scalard, Battle Command.
22
Ibid.
23
Ibid.; Zaffiri, Brutal Battle, pp. 173-192.
24
Scalard, Battle Command; Zaffiri, Brutal Battle, p. 207.
5
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Head: Battle of Hamburger Hill
Scalard, Battle Command; Zaffiri, Brutal Battle, pp. 206-208; Boian, “Zais and Hamburger
Hill,” p. 32.
26
Scalard, Battle Command; Zaffiri, Brutal Battle, p. 208; Boian, “Zais and Hamburger Hill,” p.
33; Gunter Lewy, America in Vietnam, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 144.
27
Scalard, Battle Command; Zaffiri, Brutal Battle, p. 241-244.
28
Scalard, Battle Command; Zaffiri, Brutal Battle, p. 244; Boian, “Zais and Hamburger Hill,” p.
34.
29
Andrew Wiest, Vietnam's Forgotten Army: Heroism and Betrayal in the ARVN, (New York:
NYU Press, 2007), p. 168.
30
Scalard, Battle Command; Zaffiri, Brutal Battle, pp. 244-252; Boian, “Zais and Hamburger
Hill,” p. 35.
31
Zaffiri, Brutal Battle, pp. 273-280; “Foe Reported Back on Hamburger Hill,” New York Times,
June 18, 1969.
32
Scalard, Battle Command; Zaffiri, Brutal Battle, p. 204.
33
To read more about Sharbutt and this controversy, see Rob Kirkpatrick, 1969: The Year that
Everything Changed, (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2011); David Lamb, “Reporters at
Work: Giving a Battle a Name,” Jack Limpert.com, September 4, 2012, http://jacklimpert.com/
2012/09/04/, [hereafter “Giving a Battle a Name”].
34
Lamb, “Giving a Battle a Name;” Jay Sharbutt, “U.S. Assault on Viet Mountain Continues,
Despite Heavy Toll.” The Washington Post, May 20, 1969, p. 1; -------, “Allied Troops Capture
Mountain On Eleventh Try in Ten Days.” The Washington Post, 21 May 1969, p. 1. Among the
subsequent articles about the battle for Hill 937 were: “Allies Operating in Ashau Valley,” The
New York Times, May 16, 1969; “GI’s, In 10th Try, Fail to Rout Foe on Peak at Ashau,” The
New York Times, May 20, 1969.
35
Fred Farrar, “Army Defends Long Fight For Hill in South Vietnam,” The Chicago Tribune,
June 9, 1969; Robert G. Kaiser, “Commanders Say Tactics Save Lives,” The Washington Post,
June 8, 1969; B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., “U.S. Aides Defend Ap Bia Peak Battle,” The New York
Times, May 22, 1969.
36
“U.S. troops abandon ‘Hamburger Hill,’” May 28, 1969, History Channel: This Day in History,
May 28, 1969, http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/us-troops-abandon-hamburger-hill,
accessed 16 September 2013, [hereafter “Abandon Hamburger Hill”].
37
Senate, Congressional Record. Military Operations in Vietnam, (Washington, D.C.
Government Printing Office, 1969).
38
Boain, “Zais and Hamburger Hill,” pp. 37-38. Original from Maj. Gen. Melvin Zais, interview
with Colonels William L. Golden and Richard C. Rice, 1977, Project 77-3, transcript Vol. 3,
Sneior Officers Oral History Program, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle
Barracks, Pennsylvania, p. 582.
39
Ibid.
40
“The Battle for Hamburger Hill,” Time, May 30, 1969, http://content.time.com/time/magazine/
article/0,9171,840113,00.html, accessed 13 September 2013.
41
History Channel, “Abandon Hamburger Hill.”
42
“The Faces of The American Dead in Vietnam: One Week’s Toll,” Life Magazine, 27 June
1969, [hereafter “Faces of The American Dead”]. For more on the Nixon Doctrine and
“Vietnamization,” see Henry Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War: A History of America’s
25
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involvement and extrication from the Vietnam War, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003), pp.
81-82.
43
Neil Sheehan, “Ap Bia Mountain (Vietnam), Battle of 1969: Letters from Hamburger Hill,”
Harper’s Weekly, November 1969, http://harpers.org/archive/1969/11/letters-from-hamburgerhill/.
44
Zaffiri, Brutal Battle, pp. 281-292.
45
Summers, Hamburger Hill, Vietnam War.
46
Ibid.
47
Ibid.; Faces of The American Dead;” “Kennedy Criticizes the ‘Hamburger Hill’ Battle, May
20, 1969, History Channel: This Day in History, http://www.history.com/this-day-inhistory/kennedy-criticizes-the-hamburger-hill-battle, accessed 20 September 2013.
48
Summers, Hamburger Hill, Vietnam War.
112