1NC
1. Economic engagement requires a Quid Pro Quo—the topic demands the
plan must expand economic ties with an adversary to directly change target
behavior
Kahler and Kastner 06 (Miles, Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific
Studies at University of California, San Diego, and Scott, Department of Government and Politics
at University of Maryland, “STRATEGIC USES OF ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE:
ENGAGEMENT POLICIES IN SOUTH KOREA, SINGAPORE, AND TAIWAN”, Journal of
Peace Research)
Economic engagement – a policy of deliberately expanding economic ties with an adversary
in order to change the behavior of the target state and improve bilateral political relations –
is a subject of growing interest in international relations. Most research on economic statecraft emphasizes
coercive policies such as economic sanctions. This emphasis on negative forms of economic statecraft is not without justification: the
use of economic sanctions is widespread and well documented, and several quantitative studies have shown that adversarial relations
between countries tend to correspond to reduced, rather than enhanced, levels of trade (Gowa, 1994; Pollins, 1989). At the same time,
however, relatively
little is known about how often strategies of economic engagement are
deployed: scholars disagree on this point, in part because no database cataloging instances of positive economic statecraft exists
(Mastanduno, 2003). Beginning with the classic work of Hirschman (1945), most studies of economic engagement have been limited
to the policies of great powers (Mastanduno, 1992; Davis, 1999; Skalnes, 2000; Papayoanou & Kastner, 1999/2000; Copeland,
1999/2000; Abdelal & Kirshner, 1999/2000). However, engagement policies adopted by South Korea and one other state examined in
this study, Taiwan, demonstrate that engagement is not a strategy limited to the domain of great power politics and that it may be more
widespread than previously recognized. We begin by developing a theoretical approach to strategies of economic engagement. Based
on the existing literature, our framework distinguishes different forms of economic engagement and identifies the factors likely to
facilitate or undermine the implementation of these strategies. We then evaluate our hypotheses by examining the use of economic
engagement on the Korean Peninsula and across the Taiwan Strait. Because our conclusions are derived from a small number of cases,
we are cautious in making claims that our findings can be generalized. The narratives that we provide and the conclusions that we
draw from them may, however, spur further research on this interesting and important feature of security policy and international
politics.
2. Violation- the affirmative participates in unconditional engagement with
Cuba, Venezuela, or Mexico without requiring a behavioral or policy change
in the target state. This is defined as economic appeasement, not economic
engagement
Mastanduno 03 (Michael, Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Nelson A. Rockefeller
Professor of Government, B.A., Economics and Political Science, and Ph.D., Political Science,
Princeton University, “The Strategy of Economic Engagement: Theory and Practice,” Economic
Interdependence and International Conflict: New Perspectives on an Enduring Debate)
Our knowledge of the workings of economic engagement is still at a fairly preliminary stage. What we do
know thus far leads, at best, to an assessment of cautious optimism. A recent series of case studies suggests that economic engagement
can be effective as in instrument of statecraft. States
have managed in certain situations to use economic relations
to influence the foreign policies even of potential adversaries. Economic engagement is not
simply synonymous with economic appeasement .¶ Yet we must also appreciate the difficult
conditions that must be met for economic-engagement strategist to succeed. Success requires the
precise manipulation of domestic political forces in the target state. It requires some ability to control
the effects of interdependence. It requires that domestic politics and foreign policy of a target state be linked in predictable and
desirable ways. And the success of this strategy requires the effective management of domestic political constraints in the sanctioning
state. These conditions, outlined subsequently, are difficult to meet individually and all the more so cumulatively. ¶
3. Voting Issues
a. Limits- Unconditional economic engagement blows the lid on the
number of affirmatives- justifies USFG giving aid to any number private
institutions in the country to solve some small impact that even neg generics
can’t access
b. Precision- Our definition has resolutional context as it defines
economic engagement in relation to foreign countries the US empirically
engaged with such as South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan
2NC OV
Our interpretation of the resolution is that the affirmative must conditionally
increase economic engagement with either Cuba, Venezuela, or Mexico and
they don’t meet – their entire aff is predicated off unconditional engagement
that doesn’t seek behavior change – That is the Kahler and Kastner 06 card
Prefer our interp –
1. Predictable limits – we set a cap on the resolution – which leads to in-depth
research and education
a. We focus solely on economic engagement conditional and thus set a
clear brightline that EXCLUDES small affirmatives that merely give aid to a
random institution
2. We are key to education in this debate- we add meaning to the term
“engagement” and cultivate educational debate—the term requires use of
positive incentives
Haass and O’Sullivan 2K
(Richard N. Haass, Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Fellow in the Foreign
Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution, vol. 42, no. 2, Summer 2000, pp. 113–35,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1093/survival/42.2.113#preview)
The term ‘engagement’ was popularised in the early 1980s amid controversy about the Reagan administration’s policy of
‘constructive engagement’ towards South Africa. However, the term itself remains a source of confusion. Except in the few instances
where the US has sought to isolate a regime or country, America arguably ‘engages’ states and actors all the
time simply by interacting with them. To be a meaningful subject of analysis, the term
‘engagement’ must refer to something more specific than a policy of ‘non-isolation’. As used
in this article, ‘engagement’ refers to a foreign-policy strategy which depends to a significant
degree on positive incentives to achieve its objectives. Certainly, it does not preclude the simultaneous use of
other foreign-policy instruments such as sanctions or military force: in practice, there is often considerable overlap of strategies,
particularly when the termination or lifting of sanctions is used as a positive inducement. Yet the
distinguishing feature
of American engagement strategies is their reliance on the extension or provision of
incentives to shape the behaviour of countries with which the US has important
disagreements.
2NC Generic Blocks
2NC Limits
1. Depth outweighs breadth – studies overwhelmingly vote neg – key to
education
TPC (Texas Panhandle P-16 Council, Texas-based group of teachers and educators from across
the state) 2010 “Breadth vs. Depth of High School Curriculum Content”
http://www.panhandlep-16.net/users/0001/docs/Position%20Paper2.pdf
Less breadth and more depth in curriculum better prepares students for future careers and
education. This is the position of over one hundred faculty assembled in the Texas Panhandle, and it is also the
conclusion of many scholarly studies reviewed for this paper. In fact, there are far too many studies
to cite in this paper, so only a few representative studies are used. In a 2008 study entitled “Depth Versus Breadth: How Content
Coverage in High School Science Courses Relates to Later Success in College Science Coursework”1 the researchers noted: “ In a
comparison of 46 countries, Schmidt et al. (2005) noted that in top-achieving countries, the science
frameworks cover far fewer topics than in the United States, and that students from these countries perform
significantly better than students in the United States. They conclude that U.S. standards are not likely to create a framework
that develops a deeper understanding of the structure of the discipline. By international standards, the U.S. science framework is
„unfocused, repetitive, and undemanding‟”. The study went on to say that “the baseline model reveals a direct and compelling
outcome: teaching
for depth is associated with improvements in later performance”.
2. We can quantify it – literally doubles the educational benefit
Arrington 2009 (Rebecca, UVA Today, “Study Finds That Students Benefit From
Depth, Rather Than Breadth, in High School Science Courses” March 4)
A recent study reports that high school students who study fewer science topics, but study them in greater
depth, have an advantage in college science classes over their peers who study more topics and spend less time
on each. Robert Tai, associate professor at the University of Virginia's Curry School of Education, worked with Marc S. Schwartz of
the University of Texas at Arlington and Philip M. Sadler and Gerhard Sonnert of the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics to
conduct the study and produce the report. "Depth Versus Breadth: How Content Coverage in High School Courses Relates to Later
Success in College Science Coursework" relates the amount of content covered on a particular topic in high school classes with
students' performance in college-level science classes. The study will appear in the July 2009 print edition of Science Education and is
currently available as an online pre-print from the journal. "As a former high school teacher, I always worried about whether it was
better to teach less in greater depth or more with no real depth. This study offers evidence that teaching fewer topics in greater depth is
a better way to prepare students for success in college science," Tai said. "These results are based on the performance of thousands of
college science students from across the United States." The 8,310 students in the study were enrolled in introductory biology,
chemistry or physics in randomly selected four-year colleges and universities. Those who spent one month or more studying one
major topic in-depth in high school earned higher grades in college science than their peers who studied more topics in the same
period of time. The study revealed that students in courses that focused on mastering
a particular topic were
impacted twice as much as those in courses that touched on every major topic
3. Turns their offense—limits are vital to creativity and innovation
David Intrator (President of The Creative Organization) October 21, 2010 “Thinking Inside
the Box,” http://www.trainingmag.com/article/thinking-inside-box
One of the most pernicious myths about creativity, one that seriously inhibits creative thinking and innovation,
is the belief that one needs to “think outside the box.” As someone who has worked for decades as a
professional creative, nothing could be further from the truth. This a is view shared by the vast majority of
creatives, expressed famously by the modernist designer Charles Eames when he wrote, “Design depends largely upon constraints.”
The myth of thinking outside the box stems from a fundamental misconception of what creativity is, and what it’s not. In the popular
imagination, creativity is something weird and wacky. The creative process is magical, or divinely inspired. But, in fact,
creativity is not about divine inspiration or magic. It’s about problem-solving, and by definition a
problem is a constraint, a limit, a box. One of the best illustrations of this is the work of photographers. They create
by excluding the great mass what’s before them, choosing a small frame in which to work. Within that tiny frame, literally a box, they
uncover relationships and establish priorities. What
makes creative problem-solving uniquely challenging
is that you, as the creator, are the one defining the problem. You’re the one choosing the frame. And you alone
you are
required to establish limits, set priorities, and cull patterns and relationships from a great deal of material, much of it
determine what’s an effective solution. This can be quite demanding, both intellectually and emotionally. Intellectually,
fragmentary. More often than not, this is the material you generated during brainstorming sessions. At the end of these sessions,
you’re usually left with a big mess of ideas, half-ideas, vague notions, and the like. Now, chances are you’ve had a great time making
your mess. You might have gone off-site, enjoyed a “brainstorming camp,” played a number of warm-up games. You feel artistic and
empowered. But to
be truly creative, you have to clean up your mess, organizing those fragments
into something real, something useful, something that actually works. That’s the hard part.
It takes a lot of energy, time, and willpower to make sense of the mess you’ve just generated. It also can be emotionally difficult.
You’ll need to throw out many ideas you originally thought were great, ideas you’ve become attached to, because they simply don’t fit
into the rules you’re creating as you build your box.
2NC AT: Reasonability
1. Reasonability is way too arbitrary for you to vote on. It allows way to much
judge intervention because there is no brightline for what is reasonable and
what isn’t and this is especially true in the instance of the conditional
engagement- some concessions my be “reasonable” while others may not
2. The affirmative has to be 100% topical not just reasonable, that’s their
burden as the affirmative
3. Reasonability is unfair because the aff is the one who gets to chose what is
and what isn’t reasonable meaning even obscure affirmatives would be able
to claim this.
4. Topicality is always a voting issue for jurisdiction meaning it’s all or
nothing
2NC AT: RVI
1.This is dumb. You don’t win a debate just because your case is topical
2. Time skew is inevitable plus Topicality is a necessary test for every
affirmative
3. RVI is not an argument
Seungwon Chung, Think Tank Extraordinaire, 2013
Reverse Voting Issue is not an argument, I’d rather vote on a defecated flow. Go fuck yourself.
And I don’t give a fuck if by reading this card you lost speaker points. RVI can go fuck itself.
2NC AT: Potential Abuse
1. Just because there’s not visible abuse doesn’t mean that there wasn’t any.
We weren’t able to run any disads or counterplans off the way that you ask
for a concession from the target
2. Proving in round abuse is always going to loose because you can say it
didn’t happen.
3. Potential abuse is always going to be a voting issue because it’s not what
you do it’s what you justify.
2NC AT: Theory O/W T
1. Topicality comes before theory –
2. We internal link turn any theory they have on any flow – we only had to
read an abusive strategy because they weren’t topical.
3. Topicality sets a precedent – it defines the topic for the rest of the year,
whereas theory debates rarely change anything – people have been losing on
condo for years, but negatives still read conditional advocacies.