Afghanistan’s
Security and Development:
A grassroots, field-research perspective
Jorrit Kamminga
Workshop: Civil-Military Interaction Contributing to a
Comprehensive Approach from an Experimentation Perspective
9 December 2010
1
About the International Council on Security
and Development (ICOS)
ICOS is an international, independent policy think-tank working to combine
grassroots research and policy innovation at the intersections of security,
development, counter-narcotics and public health issues.
ICOS is a project of the Network of European Foundations’ Mercator Fund. By
developing projects on core global social issues, the objective of the NEF-Mercator
Fund is to generate innovative ideas to respond to key global challenges.
The Network of European Foundations is a compact and flexible not-for-profit
international organisation located in Brussels. Comprising fourteen foundations,
NEF acts as an operational platform for the development of joint initiatives by
foundations and other types of organised philanthropy.
2
ICOS Mandate
• Independent policy think-tank with no official linkages to governments or
international organisations;
• Grassroots field research and policy analysis in the fields of development,
security, and counter-narcotics;
• Investigating the interaction between military and civilian policies on the
ground;
• Policy recommendations for improved coordination of military and
development strategies in Afghanistan and other (post)conflict zones.
3
ICOS Fieldwork Experience
The International Council on Security and Development (ICOS) has been conducting
studies in conflict zones since 2007. In this time, ICOS has carried out over 20,500
interviews across Iraq, Somalia and Afghanistan. This fieldwork has examined the
root causes of current crises, in order to help achieve measurable and direct policy
results.
Previous ICOS Conflict Zone field research includes:
 Afghanistan Transition: Missing Variables (November 2010);
 Afghanistan: Relationship Gap: (July 2010);
 Operation Moshtarak: Lessons Learned (May 2010);
 Iraq - Angry Hearts and Angry Minds (June 2008);
 Chronic Failures in the War on Terror - From Afghanistan to Somalia (April 2008);
 Afghan and Somali Views on the United States Presidential Elections 2008 (April 2008);
 On a Knife Edge: Rapid Assessment Field Survey, Southern and Eastern Afghanistan (May 2007).
4
ICOS Fieldwork Experience in Afghanistan
Challenges
 Geographical focus of the field work sometimes limited by the security
environment;
 Interviewees willing to participate yet mindful of insurgent and
government presence in the area;
 Outspoken about the general situation in the country yet sometimes
reluctant to evaluate openly local and national political actors;
Opportunities
 Many Afghans eager to express their views, needs, and frustrations;
 Grassroots interviews at regular intervals crucial for evaluation of trends
in Afghan public opinion and to develop targeted, comprehensive approach.
5
ICOS Fieldwork Planning
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
Trip planning and organisation;
Development, testing and fine-tuning of the questionnaires;
Forming research teams in the field;
Analysis of data;
Presentation of main findings to military community;
Presentation of main findings to international media and policy
community.
6
Addressing civil-military interaction
1) Grassroots approach to Afghan perceptions: asking what people feel,
think, need and desire;
2 ) Evaluation: comprehensive assessment of the situation in Afghan
communities targeted by Taliban recruitment;
3) Policy solutions: developing civilian policies linked to the existing
military strategies, as part of the comprehensive approach.
7
Current situation
• Post-Lisbon: Transition calendar has been
established;
• Learning from or within Afghanistan?
• Is there enough time to improve the
comprehensive approach on the ground?
• Democratization process seriously under threat
• Future with us vs future with Taliban/Al Qaeda
8
Field Research
March – October 2010
March: 527 interviews in Helmand and Kandahar
June: 552 interviews in Helmand and Kandahar
October: 1500 interviews in Helmand, Kandahar,
Panjshir and Parwan
9
Research Findings:
Longitudinal Questions
10
L1.Was the recent military operation in your area good or bad for the
Afghan people?
Percentage of respondents saying ‘Good’
March 2010 June 2010 October 2010
Marjah
Lashkar Gah
Garmsir
Nawa
Kandahar City
Panjwai
31%
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
1%
27%
23%
20%
64%
24%
44%
59%
25%
51%
66%
30%
Status
Improved
Improved
No change
Improved
No change
Improved
11
L2. Do you think that working with foreign forces is right or
wrong?
Percentage of respondents saying ‘Right’
Marjah
Lashkar Gah
Garmsir
Nawa
Kandahar City
Panjwai
June 2010
October 2010
Status
2%
35%
16%
16%
30%
61%
20%
30%
49%
64%
19%
16%
Improved
Improved
Improved
Improved
Improved
No change
12
L3. Do the foreigners respect or disrespect your religion and
tradition?
Percentage of respondents saying ‘Respect’
Marjah
Lashkar Gah
Garmsir
Nawa
Kandahar City
Panjwai
June 2010
October 2010
Status
22%
18%
28%
8%
39%
21%
15%
47%
30%
18%
5%
8%
Improved
No change
Deteriorated
Improved
Deteriorated
No change
13
L4. Do you support or oppose military operations against the Taliban in
the area?
Percentage of respondents saying ‘Support’
Marjah
Lashkar Gah
Garmsir
Nawa
Kandahar City
Panjwai
March 2010
June 2010
October 2010
Status
67%
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
20%
42%
46%
35%
68%
5%
37%
67%
22%
32%
60%
18%
Improved
Improved
Deteriorated
No change
Deteriorated
Improved
14
L5. Was the number of Afghans joining the Taliban in the last year
higher, lower or the same as before?
Percentage of respondents saying ‘Higher’
Marjah
Lashkar Gah
Garmsir
Nawa
Kandahar City
Panjwai
March 2010
June 2010
October 2010
Status
95%
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
81%
44%
64%
31%
59%
65%
14%
24%
22%
23%
21%
36%
Improved
Improved
Improved
Improved
Improved
Improved
15
L6. Do you believe the NATO forces protect the local population?
Percentage of respondents saying ‘Yes’
Marjah
Lashkar Gah
Garmsir
Nawa
Kandahar City
Panjwai
June 2010
October 2010
Status
26%
27%
40%
35%
36%
14%
13%
34%
59%
24%
45%
17%
Deteriorated
Improved
Improved
Deteriorated
Improved
No change
16
L7. Compared to one year ago is your opinion of the foreign forces
more positive or more negative?
Percentage of respondents saying ‘More negative’
June 2010
October 2010
Status
Marjah
73%
23%
Improvement
Lashkar Gah
46%
15%
Garmsir
Nawa
47%
55%
18%
17%
Improvement
Improvement
Improvement
Kandahar City
Panjwai
44%
44%
59%
60%
No change
No change
17
L.8 Who is winning the war?
Percentage of respondents saying ‘NATO and the
Afghan government’
June 2010
October 2010
Status
Marjah
34%
64%
Improvement
Lashkar Gah
73%
69%
No change
Garmsir
58%
80%
53%
64%
71%
67%
41%
47%
Deterioration
Deterioration
No change
Improvement
Nawa
Kandahar City
Panjwai
18
Selected Research Findings:
19
Pictures of 9/11 shown to interviewees
before asking the next question
20
After being shown the picture on previous slide:
Do you recognise this picture?
Yes
No
Garmsir
Marjah
Naawa
Lashkar Gah
53%
61%
60%
45%
47%
39%
40%
Sangin
39%
Helmand
Kandahar City
Panjwayi
52%
83%
55%
61%
48%
17%
17%
Zhari
83%
86%
Kandahar
84%
16%
Total
68%
32%
14%
21
Explanation of 9/11
Interviewer reads: “On September 11 2001, Al Qaeda attackers hijacked planes in
the United States which were full of ordinary passengers, including women and
children. They flew these planes, full of people, into two tall buildings in the city of
New York. They destroyed both buildings, which were full of ordinary people.
The attacks killed 3000 innocent citizens, including Muslims. They were organised
and directed by Al Qaeda, led by Osama Bin Laden, who was then living in
Afghanistan protected by the Taliban government.
The American government asked the Taliban to hand over Osama Bin Laden. They
refused, so the Americans and their allies NATO attacked the Taliban, and came into
Afghanistan to look for Osama Bin Laden and overthrew the Taliban.”
22
After being read the explanation on previous slide:
Did you know about this event which the foreigners call 9/11?
Yes
No
Garmsir
Marjah
Naawa
1%
12%
11%
99%
Lashkar Gah
Sangin
Helmand
Kandahar City
14%
3%
8%
8%
86%
97%
92%
92%
Panjwayi
1%
99%
Zhari
Kandahar
13%
8%
87%
92%
Total
8%
92%
88%
89%
23
Explanation of NATO
Interviewer reads: “NATO is an alliance of lots of foreign
countries, including the United States. If one member of the
alliance is attacked, all other members have a duty to join
them in the response.
So because the United States was attacked the other
foreigners, like Canadians, British and Dutch, are also in
Afghanistan.”
24
Kandahar and Helmand provinces, October 2010
25
Kandahar and Helmand provinces, October 2010
26
Kandahar and Helmand provinces, October 2010
27
Kandahar and Helmand provinces, October 2010
28
Kandahar and Helmand provinces, June 2010
29
Kandahar and Helmand provinces, October 2010
30
Kandahar and Helmand provinces, October 2010
31
Kandahar and Helmand provinces, October 2010
32
Kandahar and Helmand provinces, October 2010
What could a Taliban government provide which the current Afghan
government cannot?
Total
Security
Stop corruption
No answer / Don’t know
Efficient government and administration
Provide Justice
Sharia law & Islamic schools
Nothing
52%
19%
11%
9%
6%
3%
1%
33
What can we do?
34
I. Influencing Grassroots
Political Dynamics to tackle
Taliban Recruitment
35
Current situation
 Afghans do not understand why we are there;
 Military operations have provoked anger,
disillusionment and more hostility;
 Civilian casualties and refugee flows are seen as
consequences of the international presence;
 We need “Dramatic Positive Local Actions”;
 Symbolic cultural and political acts to increase support
for the international community’s presence.
 We should deal directly with the Afghan people
36
Dealing directly with the Afghan people…
International Community
and NATO-ISAF
Afghan
Government and
Afghan Elites
The Afghan People
37
Non-Violent Security Instruments
Tackling the insurgency recruitment by providing the youth
with a sustainable future, social empowerment and a stake
in the society:






Marriage allowances and grants for necessary wedding celebrations;
Family allowances and grants for new families on the birth of their first
child;
Housing allowances;
Land allotments for residences and businesses;
Monthly stipends for poor families;
A widespread, dramatic programme of micro-financing.
COIN Impact Equation
Meet Negative Impact with a Positive
Impact
Positive Impact must be greater than
Negative Impact
39
Interfering With Insurgency
Recruitment
Example 1: Marriage Allowance
Providing young Afghans with a sense of social
achievement, belonging and purpose:
ICOS field research has revealed that supporting young men to get married is
perceived by Afghan interviewees as one of the key factors for limiting Taliban
recruitment.
Providing financial assistance to cover the high costs of a dowry and a wedding
would provide them with a stable family situation and socio-economic
responsibilities, reducing the risks of Taliban recruitment.
Example 2: Restoration of religious
sites and Quran distribution
Demonstrating respect for Afghan culture and religion
The presence of the international community in Afghanistan is often portrayed in
Taliban propaganda as a “War against Islam”. Countering this perception is vital
to winning hearts and minds, including:
A programme to restore local mosques and shrines, as well as sites of historical
importance
A Quran distribution programme could be a complementing element to this
initiative.
42
Example 3: Land Allotments
Providing Afghans with a stake in stable development
Land titling is designed to help or facilitate landless poor purchase land through
grants. It usually involves the redistribution of state-owned land.
In Afghanistan this would increase land ownership, create sustainable
households, and help inoculate the youth against Taliban recruitment.
43
II. Refugee Support and Aid
Capacity
44
Current situation
 Each substantial military operation since 2006 has caused
new flows of internally displaced people.
 Since 2006 many new IDP camps, especially in the south.
 Makeshift refugee camps are overcrowded, lack of
sufficient food, medical supplies and shelter.
 Symbolic failure of our “hearts and minds” approach.
 Solution: military should deliver humanitarian aid and
assistance.
45
III. Counter-Narcotics Policy
46
Current situation
 Poppy cultivation stable (123,000 hectares);
 Opium production down 48% (3,600 metric tons)
 1.6 million of Afghans directly dependent on the illegal
opium economy.
 No structural, short term solutions.
 Alternative livelihood programmes take time.
 Taliban earns roughly US$ 125 million a year from the
illegal opium economy.
47
Poppy for Medicine (P4M)
Poppy for Medicine is a combination of a classic counter-narcotics policy
addressing illegal poppy cultivation and opium production.
It is an economic development tool aiming at reducing Afghanistan´s
dependence on the illegal opium economy, and a counter-insurgency
instrument tackling the recruitment base of the insurgency.
48
How would P4M work?










Counter-Insurgency
Putting the Afghan poppy farmers in business with us, not with the Taliban
Decreasing dependence of farmers on insurgency and criminal actors
Linking local communities with the central government
Giving Afghan farmers a vested interest in stable and legitimate state
institutions
Counter-Narcotics
Producing an Afghan brand of morphine instead of illegal heroin
Integrating poppy farming communities into the legal economy
Control
“One village – one license”: Local Afghan ownership and commitment
Central role for the local shura
Expertise and support of international (development) community
Export of medicines, not raw opium
49
Taliban Revenues
“Externally, funding originates in Islamic states…
Internally, a significant portion of funds are derived from opium trade or other
illicit activities, such as timber smuggling and illegal chromite mining in RCEast.”
Source: The Report to Congress on Progress Toward Security and
Stability in Afghanistan, November 2010
50
Contact
Jorrit Kamminga
Director of Policy Research
kamminga@icosgroup.net
www.icosgroup.net
www.poppyformedicine.net
51