Add-on Exercise
Step One
Background
Do the following two things.
 Re-tag the following cards below. Each new tag must be six or fewer words long.
 Determine which color(s) highlighting you would not include if your goal was to have a
shorter card that was still coherent.
Privacy example
Reject utilitarianism and put privacy before security. The ballot should create a side
constraint where ends don’t justify the means. This is especially applies to data
collection in the absence of probable cause.
Albright ‘14
Logan Albright is the Research Analyst at FreedomWorks, and is responsible for producing a wide variety of written content for
print and the web, as well as conducting research for staff media appearances and special projects. He received his Master’s
degree in economics from Georgia State University. “The NSA's Collateral Spying” – Freedom Works - 07/08/2014 http://www.freedomworks.org/content/nsas-collateral-spying
In short, the report, based on information obtained by Edward Snowden, reveals that during the course of its ordinary, otherwise legal surveillance operations,
the NSA also collected data on large numbers of people who were not specifically targeted. The agency
calls this practice “incidental surveillance.” I call it “collateral spying.” The report found that, on average, 9 out of every 10 people
spied on were not the intended target. The NSA has the legal authority to obtain a warrant based on
probable cause in order to surveil an individual. No one is disputing that. But when this targeting results
in collateral spying on vast numbers of innocents, in the absence of probable cause and the corresponding warrants, that is a
major problem. The NSA has asserted that such incidental data collection is inevitable, and to a certain extent that’s likely true. It is
understandable that in some situations the NSA may learn information about people other than the direct target, but this should obviously be
minimized as far as possible , and at the very least the information should be immediately purged from
government databases , not stored for years on end. In any case, the whole situation is indicative of the agency’s cavalier attitude
towards individual rights. While national security is a concern we all share, the ends do not justify the means when
those means involve violate the constitutional protections afforded to citizens by our nation’s founders. It is not okay to
violate the rights of an innocent in the process of achieving a broader goal, even if that goal is noble.
The way the NSA has been behaving is Machiavellian in the most literal sense. In his 16th century political treatise, The Prince, Niccolo
Machiavelli recognized a harsh reality of politics that still plagues us half a millennium later, writing, “A prince wishing to keep his state is very often forced to do
evil.” Taking Machiavelli’s advice as a
green light for immoral behavior has been the problem with governments throughout history, a problem
the founding fathers sought to avoid by setting down precise guidelines for what the government could and could not do in the form of a Constitution. The
disregard of these rules, and the
argument that there should be a national security exception to the Fourth
Amendment, undermines the entire purpose of the American experiment, and restores the European-style tyrannies the revolutionaries fought
against.
Even in a utilitarian framework, privacy outweighs due to relative certainty. The disad
only may cause violence - surveillance definitely does. Privacy is paramount for dignity
and protecting our unique individuality.
Schneier ‘6
Bruce Schneier is a fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School, a program fellow at the New
America Foundation's Open Technology Institute and the CTO of Resilient Systems. He is the author of Beyond Fear: Thinking
Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World. Commentary, “The Eternal Value of Privacy”, WIRED, May 18, 2006,
http://www.wired.com/news/columns/1,70886-0.html
The most common retort against privacy advocates -- by those in favor of ID checks, cameras, databases, data mining and
other wholesale surveillance measures -- is this line: "If you aren't doing anything wrong, what do you have to
hide?" Some clever answers: "If I'm not doing anything wrong, then you have no cause to watch me."
"Because the government gets to define what's wrong, and they keep changing the definition." "Because you might do something wrong
with my information." My problem with quips like these -- as right as they are -- is that they accept the premise
that privacy is about hiding a wrong. It's not. Privacy is an inherent human right, and a requirement for
maintaining the human condition with dignity and respect. Two proverbs say it best: Quis custodiet custodes ipsos? ("Who watches the
watchers?") and "Absolute power corrupts absolutely." Cardinal Richelieu understood the value of surveillance when he famously said, "If one would give me six
lines written by the hand of the most honest man, I would find something in them to have him hanged." Watch someone long enough, and you'll find something to
arrest -- or just blackmail -- with. Privacy
is important because without it, surveillance information will be abused : to
peep, to sell to marketers and to spy on political enemies -- whoever they happen to be at the time. Privacy protects us from abuses by those
in power, even if we're doing nothing wrong at the time of surveillance. We do nothing wrong when we make love or go to
the bathroom. We are not deliberately hiding anything when we seek out private places for reflection or conversation. We keep private journals, sing in the privacy
of the shower, and write letters to secret lovers and then burn them.
Privacy is a basic human need.
A future in which privacy would face
constant assault was so alien to the framers of the Constitution that it never occurred to them to call out privacy as an explicit right. Privacy was inherent to the
nobility of their being and their cause. Of course being watched in your own home was unreasonable. Watching at all was an act so unseemly as to be inconceivable
among gentlemen in their day. You watched convicted criminals, not free citizens. You ruled your own home. It's intrinsic to the concept of liberty. For
if we
are observed in all matters, we are constantly under threat of correction, judgment, criticism, even plagiarism of our
own uniqueness. We become children, fettered under watchful eyes, constantly fearful that -- either now or in the
uncertain future -- patterns we leave behind will be brought back to implicate us, by whatever authority
has now become focused upon our once-private and innocent acts. We lose our individuality , because
everything we do is observable and recordable. How many of us have paused during conversation in the past fourand-a-half years, suddenly aware that we might be eavesdropped on? Probably it was a phone conversation, although
maybe it was an e-mail or instant-message exchange or a conversation in a public place. Maybe the topic was terrorism, or
politics, or Islam. We stop suddenly, momentarily afraid that our words might be taken out of context, then
we laugh at our paranoia and go on. But our demeanor has changed, and our words are subtly altered. This is
the loss of freedom we face when our privacy is taken from us. This is life in former East Germany, or life in Saddam Hussein's Iraq. And it's our future as we allow an
ever-intrusive eye into our personal, private lives. Too
many wrongly characterize the debate as "security versus privacy."
The real choice is liberty versus control. Tyranny, whether it arises under threat of foreign physical attack or
under constant domestic authoritative scrutiny, is still tyranny. Liberty requires security without intrusion, security plus
privacy. Widespread police surveillance is the very definition of a police state. And that's why we should
champion privacy even when we have nothing to hide.
HUMINT example
(Note: for this example, assume that you want your tags to both set-up a turn to the terror disad AND to
also make an external impact to the HUMINT).
The squo relies Big Data surveillance. That means info overload & less HUMINT.
Volz, 14
(Dustin, The National Journal, “Snowden: Overreliance on Mass Surveillance Abetted Boston Marathon Bombing: The former
NSA contractor says a focus on mass surveillance is impeding traditional intelligence-gathering efforts—and allowing terrorists
to succeed”, October 20, 2014, ak.)
Edward Snowden on Monday suggested
that if the National Security Agency focused more on traditional intelligence gathering—and less on its
mass-surveillance programs—it could have thwarted the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings. The fugitive leaker, speaking via video to a Harvard class, said that a
preoccupation with collecting bulk communications data has led to resource constraints at U.S.
intelligence agencies, often leaving more traditional, targeted methods of spying on the back burner. "We
miss attacks, we miss leads, and investigations fail because when the government is doing its 'collect it
all,' where we're watching everybody, we're not seeing anything with specificity because it is impossible to
keep an eye on all of your targets," Snowden told Harvard professor and Internet freedom activist Lawrence Lessig. "A good example of this is,
actually, the Boston Marathon bombings." Snowden said that Dzhokhar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev were pointed out by Russian intelligence
to U.S. officials prior to the bombings last year that killed three and left hundreds wounded, but that such actionable
intelligence was largely ignored. He argued that targeted surveillance on known extremists and diligent pursuit
of intelligence leads provides for better counterterrorism efforts than mass spying. "We didn't really watch
these guys and the question is, why?" Snowden asked. "The reality of that is because we do have finite resources and the
question is, should we be spending 10 billion dollars a year on mass-surveillance programs of the NSA to the extent
that we no longer have effective means of traditional [targeting]?" Anti-spying activists have frequently
argued that bulk data collection has no record of successfully thwarting a terrorist attack, a line of argument
some federal judges reviewing the NSA's programs have also used in their legal reviews of the activities. Snowden's suggestion—that such mass
surveillance has not only failed to directly stop a threat, but actually makes the U.S. less safe by
distracting resource-strapped intelligence officials from performing their jobs—takes his criticism of spy programs to a
new level. "We're watching everybody that we have no reason to be watching simply because it may have value, at the
expense of being able to watch specific people for which we have a specific cause for investigating, and
that's something that we need to look carefully at how to balance," Snowden said.
Big Data kills human-intel – which is key to overall US operations.
Margolis ‘13
Gabriel Margolis – the author presently holds a Master of Arts (MA) in Conflict Management & Resolution from UNC
Wilmington and in his final semester of the program when this article was published in the peer-reviewed journal Global
Security Studies . Global Security Studies (GSS) is a premier academic and professional journal for strategic issues involving
international security affairs. All articles submitted to and published in Global Security Studies (GSS) undergo a rigorous, peerreviewed process. From the article: “The Lack of HUMINT: A Recurring Intelligence Problem” - Global Security Studies - Spring
2013, Volume 4, Issue 2http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Margolis%20Intelligence%20(ag%20edits).pdf
The United States has accumulated an unequivocal ability to collect intelligence as a result of the technological advances of the 20th
century. Numerous methods of collection have been employed in clandestine operations around the world
including those that focus on human, signals, geospatial, and measurements and signals intelligence. An
infatuation with technological methods of intelligence gathering has developed within many intelligence
organizations, often leaving the age old practice of espionage as an afterthought. As a result of the focus on technical
methods, some of the worst intelligence failures of the 20th century can be attributed to an absence of human
intelligence. The 21st century has ushered in advances in technology have allowed UAVs to become the ultimate technical
intelligence gathering platform; however human intelligence is still being neglected. The increasing reliance on
UAVs will make the United States susceptible to intelligence failures unless human intelligence can be
properly integrated. In the near future UAVs may be able to gather human level intelligence, but it will be a long time before classical
espionage is a thing of the past.
BW and nuclear use coming. HUMINT is key to stay-ahead of these risks.
Johnson ‘9
Dr. Loch K. Johnson is Regents Professor of Political Science at the University of Georgia. He is editor of the journal "Intelligence
and National Security" and has written numerous books on American foreign policy. Dr. Johnson served as staff director of the
House Subcommittee on Intelligence Oversight from 1977 to 1979. Dr. Johnson earned his Ph.D. in political science from the
University of California at Riverside. "Evaluating "Humint": The Role of Foreign Agents in U.S. Security" Paper presented at the
annual meeting of the ISA's 50th ANNUAL CONVENTION "EXPLORING THE PAST, ANTICIPATING THE FUTURE", New York
Marriott Marquis, NEW YORK CITY, NY, USA, Feb 15, 2009 – available via:
http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/3/1/0/6/6/p310665_index.html
The world is a dangerous place , plagued by the presence of terrorist cells; failed or failing states; competition for scarce
resources, such as oil, water, uranium, and food; chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, not to mention bristling arsenals
of conventional armaments; and deep-seated animosities between rival nations and factions. For self-protection, if for no other
reason, government officials leaders seek information about the capabilities and—an especially elusive topic—the intentions of
those overseas (or subversives at home) who can inflict harm upon the nation. That is the core purpose of
espionage: to gather information about threats, whether external or internal, and to warn leaders about perils facing the homeland. Further, the secret
services hope to provide leaders with data that can help advance the national interest—the opportunity side of the
security equation. Through the practice of espionage—spying or clandestine human intelligence: whichever is one's favorite
term—the central task, stated baldly, is to steal secrets from adversaries as a means for achieving a more thorough
understanding of threats and opportunities in the world. National governments study information that is available in
the public domain (Chinese newspapers, for example), but knowledge gaps are bound to arise. A favorite metaphor for intelligence is the jigsaw
puzzle. Many of the pieces to the puzzle are available in the stacks of the Library of Congress or on the Internet; nevertheless, there will continue to be several
missing pieces— perhaps the most important ones. They may be hidden away in Kremlin vaults or in caves where members of Al Qaeda hunker down
in Pakistan's western frontier. The public pieces of the puzzle can be acquired through careful research; but often discovery of the missing secret pieces has to
rely on spying, if they can be found at all. Some things— "mysteries" in the argot of intelligence professionals—are unknowable in any definitive way, such as who is likely to replace
the current leader of North Korea. Secrets, in contrast, may be uncovered with a combination of luck and skill—say, the number of Chinese nuclear-armed submarines, which are vulnerable to
Espionage can be pursued by way of human agents or with machines, respectively known
inside America's secret agencies as human intelligence ("humint," in the acronym) and technical intelligence ("techint"). Humint
satellite and sonar tracking.
consists of spy rings that rely on foreign agents or "assets" in the field, recruited by intelligence professionals (known as case officers during the Cold War or. in more current jargon, operations
officers). -_
Techint includes mechanical devises large and small, including satellites the size of Greyhound buses, equipped with fancy cameras and listening
devices that can see and hear acutely from orbits deep in space; reconnaissance aircraft, most famously the U-2; unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or drones, such as the Predator—often
armed with Hellfire missiles, allowing the option to kill what its handlers have just spotted through the lens of an onboard camera); enormous ground-based listening antennae, aimed at
enemy territory: listening devices clamped surreptitiously on fiber-optic communications cables that carry telephone conversations; and miniature listening "bugs" concealed within sparkling
cut-glass chandeliers in foreign embassies or palaces.
Techint attracts the most funding in Washington, D.C. (machines are costly, especially heavy
satellites that must be launched into space), by a ratio of some nine-to-one over humint in America's widely estimated S50 billion annual intelligence budget. Human spies, though, continue to
be recruited by the United States in most every region of the globe. Some critics contend that these spies contribute little to the knowledge of Washington officials about the state of
only human agents can provide insights into that most vital of all
national security questions: the intentions of one's rivals— especially those adversaries who are well
armed and hostile. The purpose of this essay is to examine the value of humint, based on a review7 of the research literature on intelligence, survey data, and the author's
international affairs; other authorities maintain, though, that
interviews with individuals in the espionage trade. The essay is organized in the following manner: it opens with a primer on the purpose, structure, and methods of humint; then examines
some empirical data on its value; surveys more broadly the pros and cons of this approach to spying; and concludes with an overall judgment about the value of agents for a nation's security.
Step Two
Here is a list of possible add-ons
Use it as a guide when answering the tests on the following page.
Add-on option:
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Privacy
Bigotry
Journalism
GIF –econ
GIF – Democracy
India – Econ
India –Democracy
Humint, Info Overload
Example # 1
In your 1AC, you ran privacy and India (Econ)
The 1NC said:
-
T – prev intent
Wyden Cplan
Trust net benefit
Politics – TPP – Global trade impact
Circumvention
Fisc Cplan
Terrorism disad
Defense versus both advantages
List the two add-ons you’d most like to read – based on Aff strategy. Why did you choose these add-ons
?...
Example # 2
In your 1AC, you ran Bigotry and GIF (econ)
The 1NC said:
-
T – prev intent
Extra T – super minimization
Politics – TPP – Global trade impact
Wilderson - long
Circumvention
Defense versus both advantages
List the two add-ons you’d most like to read – based on Aff strategy. Why did you choose these add-ons
?...
Example # 3
In your 1AC, you ran Privacy and GIF (democracy)
The 1NC said:
-
T – prev intent
Extra T – super minimization
Wilderson - short
Terrorism disad
Lots of Defense versus both advantages
List the two add-ons you’d most like to read – based on Aff strategy. Why did you choose these add-ons
?...