A Vote of Confidence
in Smartmatic?
Roberto Verzola
Secretary-General
Halalang Marangal
rverzola@gn.apc.org
March 8: Smartmatic full-page ad
Last March 8, 2010
a full-page ad by Smartmatic-TIM
came out in several national dailies.
The ad was entitled
“A Vote of Confidence for the 2010 Elections”
Hardware / supplies / consumables



82,200 PCOS manufactured, delivered
1,722 canvassing and
consolidation servers
and printers delivered
1,722 power
generators delivered



180,640 compact
flash memory cards
purchased
82,200 batteries for
each PCOS delivered
338,750 rolls for
printing 30 copies of
ER per pcnt delivered
82,200 PCOS made, delivered



Note the careful omission: manufactured in
China, delivered in Manila, but no mention of
full testing and acceptance by the Comelec
Omission creates false impression of readiness
In 2004, thorough testing of 1,990 counting
machines took 3 months (source: Comelec
Comm. Mehol Sadain, a HALAL convenor)
1,722 canvassing and consolidation
servers and printers delivered
No mention of test results
or Comelec acceptance
1,722 power generators delivered
No mention of test results
or Comelec acceptance
180,640 compact flash memory
cards purchased

Each machine uses two memory cards

82,200 PCOS machines, including backups

82,200 x 2 = 164,400 memory cards needed

180,640–164,400 = 16,240 extra memory cards

There are only 75,471 precinct clusters

Warning: potential capability to substitute
memory cards in 21.5% of PCOS machines
Hardware / supplies / consumables


Unknown test results:

82,200 PCOS and batteries

1,722 canvassing and consolidation servers,
printers, generators
180,640 compact flash memory cards; at least
20% more than necessary
PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS:
80%
Software / certifications
/ voter education



Source code
customization finished
Source code in
escrow at BSP
System audit
internationallyrecognized
certification entity
finished




Source code public
review process
opened
Successful field tests
and mock elections
Voter education
websites launched
Voter educn TV and
radio infomercials
Source code customization finished



“Customization” included disabling of voter
verification and confirmation feature which is
built into the PCOS machine.
This feature would have displayed the names of
candidates marked in the ballot. Voters must
then confirm through a CAST button that their
ballot was scanned accurately.
It assures voters that their votes were scanned
accurately. This feature was disabled.
Source code in escrow at BSP





Source code is Smartmatic's general
instructions directed to every machine
No mention of source code certification by
Systest, for which Comelec paid P72 million
No mention of any certification document, or of
the full Systest report, on its source code review
Insiders cite “series of written exchanges”
between Systest and Comelec about the review
Release the full text of the Systest review NOW
System audit by internationallyrecognized certification entity
System audit covers
not only the source code
but all the five sub-systems
essential to AES success
Smartmatic claims “finished”. But no certification,
much less a full report, has been released to the
public. Full audit report must be released.
Source code
public review process opened
Process is highly restrictive
and makes a review extremely difficult
So far, no group has managed
to conduct a code review
Successful field tests
and mock elections


WHAT A LIE!

High ballot rejection rates (light shading of ovals
should not cause ballot rejection)

Transmission problems even in Metro Manila

Blackout on machine accuracy/error rates
A contractor that will put such a lie in a full-page
ad can lie about anything
Software / certifications
/ voter education



System audit and source code review: no full
text report or certification released
Source code public review: no local group has
done a code review
Successful field tests and mock elections:
What a lie!
PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS:
70%
Logistics / Support / Preparations




28 multinational
experts at the PMT

327 qualified Filipino
organic employees

Over 36,000 voting
centers surveyed for
signal, power, etc.

438 Comelec trainers
23,000 sqm central
warehouse and config
facility operational
Contracts with
logistics providers,
forwarders signed
Recruitment, training
of 48,000 field techs
started
Over 36,000 voting centers
surveyed for signal, power, etc.
Since there are 48,000 voting centers
only 75% have been covered
904 test and config line employees
working two shifts


Tests needed

Burn-in of machines, batteries, generators, etc.

Full testing of batteries: will they last at least 12
hrs?

Testing for failures rates and mean time between
failures (MTBF)

Testing for ballot rejection rates

Testing for scan accuracy/error rates (should be
less than 5 per 100,000 marks)
In 2004, testing 1,990 machines took 3 months
Contracts with logistics providers,
forwarders signed


Relative unknowns. Have you heard of the ff?
(Malaya, 15 March 2010)?

Germalin Enterprises (P2.3M 2006 net income)

Agro Intl Forwarders (P3.7M 2008 retained
earnings)

ACF Logistics Worldwide (P1.1M 2008 cash
balance)
Assuming a delivery team of 3, at least 200,000
delivery personnel needed for 75,471 clusters
Recruitment, training
of 48,000 field techs started
48,000 field technicians for 75,471 machines?
438 Comelec trainers
For 226,000 BEI members?
Logistics / Support / Preparations

Over 36,000 voting centers surveyed: 75%
coverage

438 Comelec trainers: 260,000 BEIs to train

Logistics providers, forwarders: unknowns

Recruitment, training of 48,000 field techs: only
started
PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS:
80%
Telecommunications and
Transmission




48,000 modems
delivered

46,000 SIM cards
secured
5,500 BGAN mobile
sat xmtrs purchased
680 VSAT mobile sat
xmtrs leased

2 data centers for
backup of nationwide
results with
redundancy secured
Contract with major
telcos to provide VPN
for transmitting results
secured
48,000 modems delivered
For 75,471 machines?
(63.6%)
How many of them can actually get
a signal in the field?
46,000 SIM cards secured
False security:
Smartmatic generates passwords, issues digital
certificates, verifies the certificates, and operates
the machines
This is like merging in a single person the
functions of accountant, cashier, auditor,
operator and vendor!
5,500 BGAN mobile sat xmtrs
purchased
48,000 + 5,500 = 53,500
680 VSAT mobile sat xmtrs leased
53,500 + 680 = 54,180
(for 75,471 machines, or 71.8%)
2 data centers for backup of results
with redundancy secured
Data centers in secret locations which
the Comelec refuses to reveal to the public
This is equivalent to conducting a canvass
in a secret place only the Comelec
and Smartmatic know
Contract with major telcos to provide
VPN for transmitting results secured
According to Smartmatic's own field surveys,
only 70% of voting centers have reliable signals
Telecommunications and
Transmission


46,000 SIM cards: for 48,000 modems?
48,000 modems; 5,500 BGAN; 680 mobile sat
transmitters: for 75,741 machines? (72%)

Contract with major telcos: 70% coverage

2 data centers for backup: secret locations
PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS:
70%
Ballot Printing Infrastructure
Delivered to COMELEC and NPO



4 high-speed digital
printers
1,500 metric tons of
ballot paper
9,380 liters of ink

Over 10 million ballots
with security marks
(invisible ultraviolet
mark and unique
barcode) printed
Over 10 million ballots with security
marks (invisible ultraviolet mark and
unique barcode) printed
Ballot printing begins after a half-day delay
C. LAPEÑA, K. J. TAN, GMANews.TV
02/08/2010 | 02:11 PM
The printing of ballots for the May 2010 elections has finally begun
after “technical considerations" hampered the process, the
Commission on Elections (Comelec) said Monday.
This was announced by Commissioner Gregorio Larrazabal at 1
p.m. after printing was delayed by more than half a day.
Confidential March 1 Comelec
memo on ballot printing problem
... The Comelec memorandum noted that as of March 1, some 7.9 million ballots
for the electronic balloting had been printed. Of the number, 5.3 million were
accepted as “good ballots,” while the rest have yet to be checked.
“Granting that 7,878,480 are all good ballots, we still have to print a total of
42,845,254 for a period of 54 days. This means, we should be able to have a
daily production of 793,430,629, more or less, per day from four printers, which
is impossible!” the memorandum read.
Smartmatic-TIM has leased to the commission four Kodak VersaMark VL 4000
printers, each capable of printing 200,000 ballots.
Ladra said the printers’ daily output was only 650,000 or 162,500 each. At this
capacity, she said only 34.1 million ballots would be printed by April 25, when the
Comelec starts to ship out the ballots. (PDI report, 10Mar2010)
7.9 million ballots printed
from Feb. 8 to Mar. 1
Dates
Days
Ballots
Rate
2/8 – 3/1
20
7.9 million 394,000/day
assuming the same printing rate...
3/2 – 4/30
60
21.3 million
7.9 million + 21.3 million = 39.2 million
If the remaining 10.8 million ballots are printed at
the same rate, they will be finished on May 27
1,600 print jobs in 80 days
Each municipality/city has its own ballot design
Each ballot design is one print job
1,600 print jobs in 80 days
is 20 print jobs per day
What if a printing error is made?
Do candidates verify if their names
are accurately positioned? (Due diligence!)
4 high-speed digital printers
According to insiders,
these special Kodak printers
are not available off-the-shelf.
Kodak makes them
only when orders are received
Over 10 million ballots with security
marks (invisible ultraviolet mark and
unique barcode) printed
Ultraviolet scanning capability
disabled, according to CJ Panganiban
(UV mark is a security feature)
ARMM ballots minus NPO security mark
Over 10 million ballots with security
marks (invisible ultraviolet mark and
unique barcode) printed
PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS:
80%
Expected probabilities of success,
as of March 8 Smartmatic ad
Sub-project
PoS
Hardware and supplies
80%
Software and certifications
70%
Logistics and support
80%
Telecomms and transmission 70%
Ballot printing
80%
Basic Principle
of Project Management
(and Reliability Engineering)
To get the overall probability of success
of a project with a series of sub-projects,
each one essential to overall project success,
multiply together
each sub-project's probability of success:
.8 x .7 x .8 x .7 x .8 = ?
If each subproject had 99%
chances of success...
.99 x .99 x .99 x .99 x .99
= .95
If each subproject had 95%
chances of success...
.95 x .95 x .95 x .95 x .95
= .77
If each subproject had 90%
chances of success...
.9 x .9 x .9 x .9 x .9
= .59
If each subproject had 87%
chances of success...
.87 x .87 x .87 x .87 x .87
= .498
If each subproject had 80%
chances of success...
.8 x .8 x .8 x .8 x .8
= .33
Estimated AES chances of success,
as of March 8 ad by Smartmatic
.8 x .7 x .8 x .7 x .8
= .25
Will Smartmatic vote on behalf of
the Filipino people?
The March 8 ad implies that voters have given
Smartmatic solid votes of confidence
in each of their five automation sub-projects.
Smartmatic marked those ovals, not the voters.
Will Smartmatic, a foreign company,
also speak for Filipino voters on May 10?
I. The COMELEC should ...





Make public test protocols and test results of every
machine, particularly the mean time between failures,
ballot rejection rates, and scan accurary rates
Allow pol parties to test some machines themselves
Not accept, deploy or pay for machines which do not
meet specifications – simple due diligence
Distribute machines randomly: what if bad machines
are sent to opposition bailiwicks?
Embargo the 16,240 extra memory cards
II. The COMELEC should ...




Reenable voter verification and confirmation if
ballot was scanned accurately by the machine
Make public Systest certification and full reports
on the system audit and source code review
Provide stakeholder access to the source code
on the same terms and conditions as Systest
Make public the series of exchanges between
Comelec and its Technical Evaluation
Committee (TEC) and Systest
III. The COMELEC should ...




Make public the transmission and power
availability survey report of Smartmatic
Make public the list of field offices of all
forwarding firms contracted by Smartmatic
Make public the contracts with forwarding firms
Make public the latest version of its machine
testing, ballot printing, delivery and training
timelines
IV. The COMELEC should ...

Make public detailed continuity plan for areas
with weak or no signals, or where transmission
failures occur

Make public copy of contracts with telcos

Open to the public Comelec data servers site

Transfer digital security management from
Smartmatic to independent third party (DOST?)
V. The COMELEC should ...



Grant observer status to political parties in the
ballot printing committee
Conduct random testing of ballots for quality,
machine readability and rejection rates
Allow political parties to inspect and test ballot
batches themselves
To political parties and
the public: beware of ...

Location-specific “problems”, authentic or not:
Regional variations in delivery capabilities,
quality/reliability of counting machines, modems,
batteries, servers, electricity, generators, telco
signals, ballots availability, conduct of trainings, etc.
These variations can bias voter turnout in favor of
some candidate bailiwicks over others

Ballot fraud in millions: it is easier with shading
ovals than writing names
Reducing the risk of failure



All proposals for ensuring transparency in the
AES must be heeded
Every precinct must be authorized and
prepared to count votes manually in cases of
machine delay or failure, valid but rejected
ballots and for a post-election manual audit
Full parallel count by a consortium of citizens'
groups based on one of the 8 official ER copies
must be authorized and done in public
Options in case of failure...


Orderly constitutional transition must be
ensured, if no president, vice-president or
senators are proclaimed
Clarify the role of such interim post-GMA
government in settling election disputes or even
possibly conducting new, credible elections
Turbulent times are coming
Pray for the best
Prepare for the worst