Division of Economics AJ Palumbo School of Business Administration Duquesne University Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania IS THE INFLUENCE OF GOVERNMENT SIZE ON SOCIAL WELFARE DIFFERENT AMONG LESSER DEVELOPED, DEVELOPING AND MORE DEVELOPED NATIONS? AN ECONOMIC PANEL ANALYSIS James Vogelgesang Submitted to the Economics Faculty in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Science in Business Administration December 2008 Faculty Advisor Signature Page Matthew Marlin, Ph.D. Date Professor of Economics 2 IS THE INFLUENCE OF GOVERNMENT SIZE ON SOCIAL WELFARE DIFFERENT AMONG LESSER DEVELOPED, DEVELOPING AND MORE DEVELOPED NATIONS? AN ECONOMIC PANEL ANALYSIS James Vogelgesang, BSBA Duquesne University, 2008 Abstract Previous research has examined the relationship between the size of a country’s government and its GDP growth. In this paper, I conduct an analysis modeling the impact of a government’s size against several social welfare indices. The regression will be empirically analyzed using generalized method of moments with two staged least squares in a panel data framework. I hypothesize that higher levels of social welfare occur with a larger government in lesser developed nations compared to developing or developed nations. The results of this analysis find that the impact of government size varies significantly for lesser developed, developing, and developed nations. Evidence shows that as a country becomes more developed, the presence of a larger government decreases the level of social welfare. 3 Table of Contents I. Introduction…………………………………………………………………….......... 5 II. Literature Review……………………………………………………………………. 5 III. Methodology……………………………………………………………………........ 13 IV. Results …………….………………………………………………………………… 19 V. Analysis of Impact on Human Development Index…………………………………. 21 VI. Analysis of Impact on Social Welfare Function…………………………………….. 25 VII. Economic Implications………………………………………………………............ 29 VIII. Suggestion for further research………………………………………………............ 30 IX. Conclusion………………..…...…………………………………………………….. 31 X. References……………………………………………………………………............ 32 XI. Appendix…………………….………………………………………………............ 35 4 I. Introduction Beyond economic status, social welfare research has become increasingly popular as a method of determining the well-being of individuals in a given country. The need for an appropriate measure of social welfare has brought much debate and different perspectives. The most commonly cited measurement for government size is government expenditure as a percentage of GDP. This has been used to determine its impact on economic growth while neglecting to take into account how it affects a country’s social welfare. This paper will analyze it’s affect on the country’s social welfare. This paper is an empirical analysis of the effect of the size of government on social welfare for lesser developed, developing and developed nations. Using two separate measurements of social welfare, the Human Development Index (HDI) and a Social Welfare Function (SWF) developed by Amartya Sen, I will compare the effects of government size on countries with different levels of development. I expect that increases in government size will influence a country’s social welfare differently depending on their level of development. I hypothesize that a lesser developed nation will require a greater amount of government to maximize their social welfare while a larger government in developed nations will have a negative impact on social welfare based on findings of Yavas (1998) and Hetger (2001). II. Literature Review a. Size of Government Previous research into the optimal size of government falls somewhere on the spectrum from Keynesian models, which states that increases in government spending 5 will increase aggregate demand and lead to economic growth, to Neoclassical models, that claim that increases in government spending lead to decreases in economic growth. Ram (1986) uses a cross sectional analysis of 115 countries over the period of 1960-1980. To measure government size on economic growth Ram uses OLS regressions to test the effect of government size on economic growth1. From his results, Ram argues that, for most countries, larger governments are associated with increased economic growth in both the 1960s and the 1970s. Along with a positive effect on growth, Ram finds that governments become more productive. Although countries of every level of development show economic growth, evidence for increased growth with greater government size is strongest for lesser-developed countries. Yuk (2005) finds similar results for the United Kingdom in the years 1830-1993. He finds structural breaks in the data, which he then divides into four separate subgroups2. These groups allow Yuk to examine government size on growth to observe separate periods and test for cointegration across time. Yuk finds that government size Granger-causes growth for all three of the four subgroups. The subgroup of 1830-1867 only shows causality for increased government spending resulting in increased GDP. Loizides and Vamvoukas (2005) take the relationship between government size and growth a step further by testing for correlation as well as Granger-causality. The study uses data on economies for the UK, Greece, and Ireland. They define the UK as a developed nation and consider Greece and Ireland to be developing nations. Their study examines the three countries from the years 1950-1990 using bivariate and trivariate models. The analysis, uses government expenditure as a percent of GNP as a proxy for 1 Government size is measured by government consumption divided by GDP in domestic dollars while economic growth is calculated as the growth in GDP for a country 2 Periods include 1830-1868, 1869-1930, 1930-1993, 1830-1993 6 size, and find that an increase in government size results in an increase of real GNP per capita for all three countries. They also conclude, for all three countries, that an increase in real GNP per capita results in an increase in the size of government. The results of these studies are consistent with the Keynesian theory. In contrast Barro (1991) examines economic growth in a cross sectional study of 98 countries for the years 1960-1985. He finds a negative relationship between government consumption expenditure and per capita growth in GDP. This study shows that countries with higher human capital, measured in GDP per capita, experience higher investment in GDP. Maddison (1987) finds similar results in an analysis that looks at six developed countries from 1913-1984. He uses separate OLS regressions for each country and theorizes that increased government spending is used to improve the quality of life within these countries and is a significant contributor to the decrease in GDP growth. Landau (1985) performs an OLS cross sectional analysis of 65 countries to test the effects of government consumption, education, investment, financial capital, military, and transfer payments on countries’ growths in per-capita RGDP. Landau’s results show that all five government expenditures cause negative growth. He also finds that private investment has a significant positive impact on growth in per capita GDP while all measures of public expenditure result in decreased per capita GDP growth. Landau states that for less developed countries, government support used to help the private sector was only beneficial if it promotes economic growth and does not protect it from competition. Saxton (1998) expands on the Neoclassic model through his use of the Armey Curve in the United States3. Saxton’s use of the Armey Curve predicts that a country with low per capita output will increase its per capita output with government input. As 3 A graphical technique popularized by Arthur Laffer and Richard Armey 7 the country continues to develop, the need for government input decreases and at a certain point begins to decrease output per capita. Saxton estimates the maximum size for the US government from the years 1801-1996 to be 13.42%. From his findings he points out that when government output increased to 16.28% in 1956, the United States experienced a decade of slower growth. Although the United States is a developed nation, one can make the argument within the period of the data set that the United States was at one point considered a developing nation and experienced diminishing returns from the government output. Recent research has discovered that government size affects countries economic growth differently based on their level of development. Yavas (1998) models the effects countries in a steady-state output level to changes in government size. His findings show that countries with a low-steady state that increasing government size increases the steady-state level4. Conversely, those countries with a high steady-state will have a lower steady-state with increased government5. Yavas points out several shortcomings in the modeling done by Ram and Landau and believes that his adjustments allow for a better interpretation of the effects of government size. In another study of the effects of government size on economic growth Heitger (2001) hypothesizes that increased government spending will allow for the building of the private sector in lesser developed nations while increased government spending in a developed nation will crowd out private sector investment. He confirms his hypothesis by using a 21-country panel study of European nations from 1960-2000. Heitger concludes that countries, which are under-producing, will have increased growth with 4 5 Low steady-state is considered an lesser developed nation High steady-state is considered a developed nation 8 greater government-provision of public goods provided; while more developed nations will have decreased growth with high government expenditure. Heitger also subdivides expenditure to examine investment expenditure alone. This reveals different effects on growth, but overall still negative. According to Heitger, the decrease in growth occurred due to increased taxes that took money away from private investment and resulted in an overproduction of public goods. The reasoning given by Heitger follows the logic that Joseph Stiglitz notes for lesser developed nations. Stiglitz (2002) argues that lesser developed countries forced to sell off their public sector caused their failing economies. He states that these countries’ private sectors do not have capable financial systems and that without the protection and guidance of the government, their private sector will fail. Decreasing the public sector works for developed nations with a mature and stable private sector, but it has been proven fatal for lesser developed economies. While debates on what size of government enable economic growth in a country to continue, it must be noted that policy makers alone do not make this decision. Voters in a democratic society elect officials who determine the tax rates and spending by the government. Voters choose officials based on policies that they believe will benefit themselves. Meltzer and Richards (1981) argue that the upper or lower classes do not decide the income redistribution by the government, but the middle class does, and over time, the size of government has increased because of their decisive votes. In a democratic society, a person’s vote is his or her idea on what size government will maximize his or her own social welfare. 9 While most studies on government size measure its effects on government growth, very few studies have looked at government size’s influence on social welfare. Davies (2008) discusses the differences in the effects of increased GDP compared to increased HDI. He argues that countries with higher levels of GDP do not necessarily have higher levels of HDI, and that the criterion for a good government is to maximize the social welfare of the individuals in that country. Davies concludes that there is a relationship between government size and social welfare. b. Social Welfare The study of social welfare indicators began in the mid-1960s when Raymond Bauer originally investigated this topic. He defined social welfare indicators as “statistics, statistical series, and all other forms of evidence that enable us to assess where we stand and are going with respect to our values and goals.” The United Nations later stated that: Social indicators can be defined as statistics that usefully reflect important social conditions and facilitate the process of assessing those conditions and their evolution. Social indicators are used to identify social problems that require action, to develop priorities and goals for action and spending to assess the effectiveness of programmers and policies. It is difficult to determine what actually determines a good “quality of life.” Many studies find that measures for subjective quality of life, where measurements experienced at the individual level, are the best indicators (Noll 2004). Bjornskov (2003) does a cross sectional analysis to determine the factors influencing life satisfaction across various countries. Data for life satisfaction is gathered 10 from World Value’s Survey and tested on 32 countries across Europe. The purpose of his analysis is to determine the effectiveness of social capital on life satisfaction. 6 Bjornskov concludes that high levels of life satisfaction result from decreased levels of income, and those countries with the highest level of social capital have higher levels of life satisfaction. He also states that the countries with the highest level of social capital are not the countries with the greatest level of GDP. Using the same indicator of social welfare, The World Value’s Survey, Bjornskov, Dreher and Fischer (2006) create a cross sectional analysis of 70 countries using over 90,000 observations to find the best indicators of social welfare by conducting robustness tests. Their robustness tests indicate how well an independent variable predicts the dependent variable. They find that variables showing a person’s ability to move up in status are important, while indicators such as GDP per capita, by itself, do not pass their robustness test for being a good indicator. Stroup (2006) tests the relationship between economic freedom and social welfare is examined. For the measurement of social welfare, Stroup individually uses life expectancy, mortality rates, literacy rates, grades, water availability, and shot availability. As a result, Stroup argues that it is beneficial for a country to increase its level of economic freedom or decrease government intervention to increase a country’s social welfare. He also concludes that market forces and the private sector allow for the best allocation of goods that help improve social welfare. Wickrama and Mulford (1996) take into account the level of political democracy in a country and test its impact on a country’s well being. They test this using a crosssectional analysis in 82 countries, excluding oil-exporting economies. To measure social 6 Bjornksov defines social capital as ones perceived trust in the government 11 welfare, Wickrama and Mulford use the Human Development Index because of its inclusion of life expectancy, adult literacy, and purchasing power. They find that social welfare is determined not only by economic growth, but also by the level of democracy. These findings expand on Richards (1998) study, stating that by increasing the voters ability to choose there will be an increase in social welfare. Previous literature looks at the use of GDP per capita or income as a measurement of social welfare. Welsch (2006) argues that by only observing income you cannot determine the level of happiness in a country. Although income may be a good supporting variable to determining the quality of life, it cannot be the only indicator. He argues that variables such as air pollution, which can be controlled by government regulations, are better determinants of one’s social welfare. Welsch gives the example that when air pollution increases, it subjects people to higher health risks and lower life expectancy. His findings show that indicators that affect people are better at explaining social welfare than measurements such as income. In contrast to this study, Dipietro and Anorou (2006) argue that GDP per capita is a better measure of a country’s social welfare compared to HDI. To determine this they use results from quality of life surveys as the dependent variable and test to see which measurement of social welfare is a better predictor across countries. Their findings show that GDP per capita is a better predictor of happiness across time than HDI. They note that part of the criticism in using GDP per capita is that it is not a measurement of welfare. Expanding on this idea, Amartya Sen develops a social welfare function based on three main criteria. The first states that social welfare function must have act 12 consequentialism. This means that the conclusion of utility must be a function of what is actually happening, and in this case, what is actually happening in the country. Second, it must include welfarism, meaning it must be based on an individual’s social welfare defined by the level of individual utility. Lastly, it must contain sum ranking, which is the sum of the individual utilities (Atkinson 1999). The Social Welfare Function created by Sen uses an individual’s income, GDP per capita, as a function of the income distribution in a country. Prior literature is unclear on what size of government is needed to increase the economic growth in a country, and the amount of government necessary to improve social welfare. Because previous literature fails to agree on the best measure of social welfare, the models in this paper test two separate measures of social welfare. Doing this allows one to reach a better understanding of the effects of government size on social welfare for countries in different development stages. This method accounts for disagreements in measurements for social welfare to produce an overall conclusion about the effects of government size’s influence on social welfare for countries in different development stages. III. Methodology a. Dependent Variables Due to the uncertainty of the best measure for social welfare, this paper uses two of the most widely accepted measurements for social welfare. I estimate the two measures separately as dependent variables. The first measure comes from United Nations Development Programme: the Human Development Index (HDI). This index is 13 calculated from 1975 to 2005 for 177 countries. The second measure of social welfare is a Social Welfare Function developed by Sen using GDP per capita and the GINI coefficient. The HDI is a composite measure of a country’s social welfare that is remeasured every five years. The index includes measurements of literacy and educational attainment, life expectancy, and standard of living. The United Nations uses the following calculation to build their HDI in their 2007/2008 report: πΏπππ πΈπ₯ππππ‘ππππ¦ πΌππππ₯ (πΏπΈπΌ) = πΏπππ πΈπ₯ππππ‘ππππ¦−25 85−25 2 π΄ππ’ππ‘ πΏππ‘πππππ¦ π ππ‘π−0 1 πΊπππ π ππππππππππ‘ πππ‘ππ−0 + (3) 100−0 100−0 πΈππ’πππ‘πππ πΌππππ₯ (πΈπΌ) = (3) πΏππ(πΊπ·π)−πΏππ(100) (0.1) (0.2) πΊπ·π πΌππππ₯ (πΊπ·ππΌ) πΏππ(40,000)−πΏππ(100) (0.3) ο¦1οΆ ο¦1οΆ ο¦1οΆ HDI ο½ ο§ ο· ο¨ LEI ο© ο« ο§ ο· ο¨ EI ο© ο« ο§ ο· ο¨ GDPI ο© ο¨ 3οΈ ο¨ 3οΈ ο¨ 3οΈ (0.4) When building each dimension of the index, the United Nations creates a minimum and maximum for each measurement to determine a value between zero and one allowing them to create a composite index. The final measurement of the index is scaled between zero and one with one being the highest level of social welfare. Due to the five year increments of data I follow the works of Davies and Quinlavin (2006), and construct a straight-line annual progression between the intervening years from one measurement to the next. The second measure of a country’s social welfare is the social welfare function (SWF) developed by Sen. Following his previously outlined criterion, he develops his SWF using an individual’s average income for a country, allowing it to be weighted by the inequality of distribution of income within a country and is calculated as: 14 SWFit = πΊπ·π πππ πππππ‘πππ‘ ∗ (1 − πΊπΌππΌππ‘ ) (1.5) GDP per capita is the average level of income in a given country i at time t. GINI is the most commonly used measurement of income inequality for country i at time t. The combined measurement developed by Sen follows the definitional guidelines given by the United Nations and Bauer (Noll 2004). It also meets the criterion of a good measurement of social welfare according to Dipietro and Anorou (2006), and Welsh (2006) b. Independent variables Following the works of Heitger (2001) and Davies (2008) I expect to find different impacts from the two different measures of government: government investment expenditure, Iit, and government consumption expenditure, Cit, each measured as a percent of GDP for country i and year t. GINVit = GCONit = πΊππ£πππππππ‘ πΌππ£ππ π‘ππππ‘ πΈπ₯ππππππ‘π’ππππ‘ πΊπππ π π·ππππ π‘ππ πππππ’ππ‘ππ‘ πΊππ£πππππππ‘ πΆπππ π’πππ‘πππ πΈπ₯ππππππ‘π’ππππ‘ πΊπππ π π·ππππ π‘ππ πππππ’ππ‘ππ‘ (1.6) (1.7) Data for government expenditures and Gross domestic product come from the International Financial Statistics March 2007. Table 1 includes all other independent variables included in the analysis. 15 Table 1 Variable GWGDPit CORRit GDPPCit POPit PUBLICit HDIi(t-1) SWFi(t-1) Description Growth in world GDP Freedom from Corruption GDP per capita Unit Growth rate Growth in Population Public Rights Lagged HDI Lagged Social Welfare Function Growth Rate First difference First Difference First Difference Source Penn World Tables Index of Economic Freedom7 International Monetary Foundation Penn World Tables Freedom House UNDP Penn World Tables and UNU-WIDER The analysis includes control variables I found to be significant in previous literature. Paloni and Zanardi (2007) use lagged HDI, growth in world population, and GDP per capita to control for HDI. The use of population and corruption as control variables were found significant in work done by Antic (2004) who used GDP per capita as a dependent variable for social welfare. I also include public rights as a measurement of democracy in a nation following the findings of Wikrama and Mulford (1996). The lagged dependent variable included is similar to the work by Davies (2008) as well as Paloni and Zanardi because I expect a country’s current HDI to be similar to its previous HDI level and extend the idea to a country’s level according to Sen’s SWF. Lastly, I include a squared term for government expenditure as I expect a non-linear relationship, similar to findings by Saxton (1998) with the Armey Curve. Other control variables were considered for the regressions, but were not included because of an insufficient number of observations for countries, or were not found to be 7 Calculations are based off of the transparency index 16 significant. Measures of investment and consumption were analyzed but omitted because they were not found significant. c. Method Specifications In this analysis I estimate 12 different regression models. For each dependent variable, HDI and SWF, I examine government consumption expenditure as a percentage of GDP as well as government investment expenditure as a percent of GDP for lesser developed, developing and developed nations. I estimate the level of nation’s development based on their level of GDP per capita similar to the method used by the United Nations Development Programme. Lesser developed nations include countries with an annual GDP per capita less than $2000. Developing nations include countries with a GDP per capita between $2,000 and $8,000 while developed nations have a GDP per capita greater than $8,000. I estimate the following general equations: π»π·πΌππ‘ = π½1 πΊπΆππππ‘ + π½2 πΊπΆππππ‘ 2 + π½3 πΊππΊπ·πππ‘ + π½4 πΆππ π ππ‘ + π½5 πππ΅πΏπΌπΆππ‘ + π½6 πΊπ·πππΆππ‘ + π½7 π»π·πΌπ(π‘−1) (1.8) π»π·πΌππ‘ = π½1 πΊπΌππππ‘ + π½2 πΊπΌππππ‘ 2 + π½3 πΊππΊπ·πππ‘ + π½4 πΆππ π ππ‘ + π½5 πππ΅πΏπΌπΆππ‘ + π½6 πΊπ·πππΆππ‘ + π½7 π»π·πΌπ(π‘−1) (1.9) πππΉππ‘ = π½1 πΊπΆππππ‘ + π½2 πΊπΆππππ‘ 2 + π½3 πΊππΊπ·πππ‘ + π½4 πΆππ π ππ‘ + π½5 πππ΅πΏπΌπΆππ‘ + π½6 πππππ‘ + π½7 πππΉπ(π‘−1) (1.10) πππΉππ‘ = π½1 πΊπΌππππ‘ + π½2 πΊπΌππππ‘ 2 + π½3 πΊππΊπ·πππ‘ + π½4 πΆππ π ππ‘ + π½5 πππ΅πΏπΌπΆππ‘ + π½6 πππππ‘ + π½7 πππΉπ(π‘−1) (1.11) Where: HDI SWF GCON GINV GWGDP = First difference of the human development index = First difference of social welfare function = Government consumption expenditure as a percent of GDP = Government investment expenditure as a percent of GDP = Growth in world GDP 17 CORR PUBLIC GDPPC POP HDI(t-1) SWF(t-1) = Freedom from corruption = Public Rights = First difference of GDP per capita = Growth in population = Lagged first difference of human development index = Lagged first difference of the social welfare function Due to the panel data and the lagged dependent variable on the right sides of the equations in (1.8) through (1.11) I model these equations as geometric lag models and estimate them using generalized method of moments (GMM) with two staged least squares similar to works done by Davies and Quinlavin (2006) and Davies (2008). As instruments in the two staged least squares I used lagged GWGDP, lagged CORR, lagged PUBLIC, lagged GDPPC, lagged GCON or GINV and lagged GCON2 or GINV2. d. Data issues Before estimating the regression, variables were tested for non-stationarity. Due to the bounded nature of HDI, public rights, and freedom from corruption, they are by definition non-stationary and cannot be adjusted. I have adjusted world GDP into a growth variable in order to correct for non-stationarity. GDP per capita also showed signs of non-stationarity and is corrected using the first difference. Data was also found to have low levels of multicollinearity through observation in a correlation matrix. Though difficult to estimate the presence of heteroskedasticity in panel data, it is reasonable to assume an unequal variance across periods for countries of similar levels of development. To correct for problems of an increasing level of variance across periods, I use period weights with cross sectional weights. Within the panel data sets, it is reasonable to expect variance in error terms due to economic shocks across time. Because of the use of GDP in the dependent variable, it is 18 reasonable to assume autocorrelation will occur. In addition, because countries are separated by levels of development, each regression may not experience similar levels of autocorrelation. To test for this, I examine the correlogram of the residuals as well as examine the Durbin-Watson statistic and adjust levels of AR process accordingly e. Expected results I expected to find different results for different levels of development. For lesser developed countries, I expect that with an increasing size of government, ceterius paribus, there will be an increasing level of social welfare. Accordingly, I expect to find similar results for developing nations, to a certain point, when the benefit of the increased size of government begins to decrease the level of the country’s social welfare. Lastly, I expect to find an increase in a developed country’s size of government to result in a decrease in its social welfare. IV. Results Table 2 displays regression output for HDI and SWF using government consumption expenditure as a percentage of GDP estimating the size of government. 19 Table 2: Government Consumption Expenditure HDI Constant SWF Developed Developing Lesser developed Developed Developing Lesser developed -0.001* 0.00096* 0.001912* 5.538477* -603.292* 2875.12* GCON 0.008572** -0.004563** -0.011889* -1.92065*** 6450.076* -45352.39* 2 -2.17E-02** 0.009229*** 0.024651** -1.77147*** -17721.91* 174845.3* 0.018973* -0.008426* -1.57E-02* 3.136259* n/a -1166.061* 6.10E-08*** 1.41E-07** 3.48E-06* n/a n/a n/a Public Rights Freedom from Corruption n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 21.23803** n/a n/a n/a n/a 6.135581* n/a Population n/a n/a n/a 1.658049*** 31480.62** n/a HDIt-1 1.036111* 0.864282* 0.766298* n/a n/a n/a SWFt-1 n/a n/a n/a -1.239949 0.580824* -0.383811* Ar(1) n/a 0.068832* n/a -7.437871* -0.481283* n/a Ar(2) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.257446** Ar(3) n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.094035* n/a GCON World GDP GDP Per Capita *Significant at 0.01, **Significant at 0.05, ***Significant at 0.1 Table 3 displays regression output for HDI and SWF using government investment expenditure as a percentage of GDP estimating the size of government. Table 3: Government Investment Expenditure HDI SWF Developed Developing Lesser developed Developed Developing Lesser developed Constant 0.000107 0.000378*** 0.008712* 44.03926 166.8547* 117.9228** GINV 0.000887*** 0.000715*** -0.03088** 2692.886** 661.7471* -3196.928* 2 -0.00211*** -0.002546*** 0.106969*** -5858.065** -936.9448** 15591.05* World GDP GDP Per Capita 0.003331*** -0.008081 -1.19E-05* 7472.793 n/a n/a 1.15E-07* 1.80E-07** -0.024346** n/a n/a n/a Public Rights Freedom from Corruption 4.26E-05* n/a n/a n/a -37.82781* 26.86719* n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a Population n/a n/a n/a 19810.22*** 25862.42* -2981.123** HDI(t-1) 0.91402* 0.88045* -0.411296** n/a n/a n/a GINV 20 SWF(t-1) n/a n/a n/a 0.470918* 0.648701* -0.201326*** Ar(1) 0.009684* 0.059632** 0.498915* -1.083752* -0.937574* n/a Ar(2) n/a n/a n/a -0.556258* -0.278309* n/a *Significant at 0.01, **Significant at 0.05, ***Significant at 0.1 V. Analysis of impact on HDI a. Table of results for first difference in HDI Table 4 shows the estimating equations for the change in the first difference of HDI for government consumption expenditure as well as government investment expenditure. Table 4: The Impact of Government on HDI Δ in First difference HDIit = f(GCON) 2 Δ in First difference HDIit = f(GINV) Lesser developed - 0.012GCON + .025GCON -0.031GINV + 0.107GINV2 Developing 0.004GCON + .009GCON2 0.0007GINV -0.0026GINV2 Developed 0.009GCON - .022GCON2 0.0009GINV - 0.002GINV2 b. Effect of government consumption expenditure on HDI Figure 1 uses the estimating equations for the impact of government consumption expenditure on HDI while taking the average of all other independent variables and using them as constants. The graph shows the impact of the first difference on HDI with respect to amount of government consumption expenditure as a percent of GDP. 21 Figure 1 HDI as a function of Government Consumption Expenditure Impact on first difference HDI 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.004 Lesser Developed Developing 0.003 Developed 0.002 0.001 0 1% 5% 9% 13% 17% 21% 25% 29% 33% 37% 41% 45% 49% The results for a lesser developed nation show that when government consumption expenditure is less than 24.1% of the total GDP, the level of HDI decreases. When the government consumption expenditure exceeds 24.1% of total GDP, the level of HDI for the lesser developed country will begin to increase and will continue to increase as the amount of government consumption expenditure increases. Developing nations experience similar effects from government consumption expenditure as lesser developed nations but to a lesser degree. The results for a developing nation show that when government consumption expenditure as a percent of GDP is less than 24.7% it will have a decreased level of HDI, compared to more than 22 24.7% where an increase in government consumption expenditure gives a developing country an increased level of HDI. In contrast, when a developed nation increases its government consumption expenditure as a percent of total GDP to 19.7%, it will experience in increase in HDI. When the government consumption expenditure surpasses 19.7% of its total GDP, it will begin to decrease the HDI in the country. c. Effect of government investment expenditure on HDI Figure 2 shows estimates of government investment expenditures impact on the first difference of HDI, holding all other variables constant. The graph shows the impact of the first difference on HDI with respect to amount of government investment expenditure as a percent of GDP. Figure 2 HDI as a function of Government Investment Expenditure 0.016 Impact on first difference HDI 0.014 0.012 0.01 Lesser Developed 0.008 Developing 0.006 Developed 0.004 0.002 0 1% 5% 9% 13% 17% 21% 25% 29% 33% 37% 41% 45% 49% 23 Results for a lesser developed nation show that until government investment expenditure reaches 14.4% of total GDP, the government will have a negative impact on the country’s HDI. When the investment expenditure becomes higher than 14.4% the lesser developed nation will see a positive effect on its HDI. For a developing nation, the amount of government investment expenditure does not have much impact on HDI and will result in only 1.1% growth until government investment expenditure reaches 14%. After this point, the impact of the investment expenditure will have a negative impact on HDI. The impact of government investment expenditure in developed nations is similar to developing nations. The government investment expenditure will have a positive impact on a developed country’s HDI until it reaches 21% where it begins to decrease the country’s level of HDI. Similar to developing nations, the amount of government investment expenditure does not have much impact on a country’s level of HDI and only improves HDI by 3.4%. d. Comparison of Government Consumption and Investment Expenditure on HDI. Similar to findings by Saxton (1998) and Davies (2008) I find that the effect of government consumption and investment expenditures on a country’s HDI has different impacts on lesser developed, developing and developed nations. Lesser developed nations will benefit greatly from high levels of both government consumption expenditure and government investment expenditure. When countries have low levels of either type of expenditure, their level of HDI will be lower. 24 For developing nations, a high level of government consumption expenditure will benefit the country and will raise its level of HDI compared to investment expenditure. A developing nation with government consumption expenditure that exceeds 24.7% of GDP will have higher levels of HDI. A developed nation will benefit more from government consumption expenditure, than it will from government investment expenditure. The developed country will improve its level of HDI with in increased amount of government consumption expenditure until it reaches 19.7% of GDP. VI. Analysis of Impact on the SWF a. Table of results for first difference in SWF Table 5 shows the estimating equations for the change in the first difference of the SWF for government consumption expenditure as well as government investment expenditure. Table 5 Δ in First difference SWFit = f(GCON) 2 Δ in First difference SWFit = f(GINV) Lesser developed -45352.39GCON + 174845.3GCON -3196.928GCON + 15591.05GCON2 Developing 6450.076GCON - 17721.91GCON2 661.747GCON - 936.945GCON2 Developed -1.921GCON - 1.771GCON2 2692.886GCON - 5858.065GCON2 b. Effect of Government consumption expenditure on SWF Figure 3 shows the impact of government consumption expenditure on the first difference of SWF, holding all other variables constant. The graph shows the impact of the first difference on SWF with respect to amount of government consumption expenditure as a percent of GDP. 25 Figure 3 SWF as a function of Government Consumption Expenditure 30000 Impact on first difference SWF 25000 20000 15000 Lesser Developed 10000 Developing Developed 5000 0 1% 5% 9% 13% 17% 21% 25% 29% 33% 37% 41% 45% 49% -5000 -10000 Results for a lesser developed nation show that until government consumption expenditure reaches 13% of total GDP, the country will not be allocating enough toward investment expenditure resulting in a decreased SWF. Once a lesser developed nation’s government expenditure exceeds 13%, they will experience higher levels as measured by the SWF. Developing nations will benefit from increased levels of government consumption expenditure until it reaches 18.2% of the total GDP where the impact of the government consumption investment on the SWF begins to decrease. For a developed nation, any amount of government consumption expenditure will result in a negative impact on a country’s SWF. 26 c. Effect of government investment expenditure on SWF Figure 4 shows the impact of government investment expenditure on the first difference of SWF, holding all other variables constant. The graph shows the impact of the first difference on SWF with respect to amount of government investment expenditure as a percent of GDP. Figure 4 SWF as a function of Government Investment Expenditure 3000 Impact on first difference SWF 2500 2000 Lesser Developed 1500 Developing 1000 Developed 500 0 1% 5% 9% 13% 17% 21% 25% 29% 33% 37% 41% 45% 49% -500 For lesser developed nations, government investment expenditure results in a positive impact on a country’s SWF when it is greater than 10.3% of its total GDP. Before that point, the government investment expenditure negatively affects the country’s SWF. 27 When a country is developing, government investment expenditure affects its level of SWF differently than it does for lesser developed nations. As the amount of government investment expenditure increases to 35.3% of GDP, the country experiences higher SWF. After this point, the government investment expenditure results in a negative impact on the SWF. For developed nations, government investment expenditure will result in a positive impact on SWF until it reaches 23% of the total GDP. Any increase in government investment expenditure after 23% will have a negative impact on the SWF. d. Comparison of government consumption and investment expenditure on SWF Government consumption and investment expenditures impact the first difference of SWF differently for lesser developed, developing, and developed nations. Lesser developed nations benefit from both high levels of government consumption expenditure and high levels of government investment expenditure. The results show that when there are low levels of government consumption or investment expenditure there is a negative impact on the country’s SWF. For developing nations, both government consumption expenditure and government investment expenditure will have a positive impact on a country’s SWF until a certain threshold. Once government consumption expenditure reaches 18.2% of total GDP it begins to have a negative impact while government investment expenditure continues to have a positive impact until it reaches 35.3% of total GDP. A developed nation will not want to use government consumption expenditure, because it only results in a negative impact on the SWF. The developed nation will 28 benefit from government investment expenditure until it reaches 23% of total GDP, where it too begins to have a negative impact on the country’s SWF. VII. Economic Implications Obtaining higher levels of social welfare in a country is a main concern for every government. By measuring the amount of expenditure appropriate to obtain higher levels of social welfare policy makers will be able adjust their policies domestically. It is important to recognize that social welfare improvements are important for not only lesser developed nations, but developing and developed nations as well. Using two different social welfare, measurements also can aide policy makers. Although there is debate on what type of measurement is best, these findings show that both measurements of social welfare react similarly to increases in government size. Knowing this, policy makers will be able to make better government decisions. The current findings also show evidence supporting the works of Yavas (1998), Heitger (2001) and Stiglitz (2002). The results from HDI and SWF for lesser developed countries illustrate that an increased amount of government does lead to an increase in the social welfare of the country. This agrees with the Keynsian point of view. Following the logic of Stiglitz, this implies that lesser developed nations will require higher levels of governance to increase social welfare because the private sector is not capable of improving social welfare alone. On the other hand, as a country continues to develop and eventually becomes a developed nation, a larger size of government results in decreased levels of social welfare. This implies for more developed nations that the private sector is 29 able to sustain higher levels of social welfare, and by increasing the public sector, the private sector is crowded out resulting in diminishing marginal returns. VIII. Suggestions of future research Further research may investigate different types of government expenditure programs and analyze their individual effects on a country’s social welfare as opposed to an aggregate perspective. Doing this would help to estimate whether certain programs are being over or under-funded and what type of government expenditure may lead the largest amount of growth for lesser developed nations. Another perspective, with data availability, would be to observe the levels of government decentralization and its impact on the social welfare for lesser developed, developing, and developed nations. Results could indicate different levels of decentralization should be utilized for countries in different stages of development. Because we see that increases in the sizes of government affect countries in different development stages differently, it would be useful to examine how the government expenditure could be divided between central and lower levels of government. Lastly, future research should further examine the relationship between government expenditure and social welfare in lesser developed nations. Findings in this paper conclude that after a certain point an increase in government expenditure always increases social welfare. By reviewing this, one could argue that once a lesser developed country reaches a certain level of social welfare, it has become a developing nation. If 30 this were the case then it too would experience decreasing marginal returns to government expenditure. IX. Conclusion The purpose of this analysis was to test differences in the size of governments’ spending on a country’s social welfare in lesser developed, developed, and developed nations through a multi-year and multi-country panel analysis. Findings suggest that countries respond differently to government consumption expenditure and government investment expenditure, and that different levels of development require different amounts of expenditure for higher levels of social welfare. This paper provides evidence that less developed nations, or lesser developed nations, need higher amounts of government consumption expenditure as well as government investment expenditure as a percent of their total GDP. Developing nations, also need higher levels of government expenditure, although at a certain point, higher levels of government expenditure have a negative impact on a country’s social welfare. Lastly, developed nations require lower amounts of government expenditure to increase social welfare, while higher amounts of both government consumption expenditure and government investment expenditure result in negative impacts on a country’s social welfare. 31 X. References Antic, Miljenko. 2004. 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Eviews output HDI results for a developed country using consumption expenditure π»π·πΌππ‘ = π + π½1 πΊπΆππππ‘ + π½2 πΊπΆππππ‘ 2 + π½3 πΊππΊπ·πππ‘ + π½4 πΊπ·πππΆππ‘ +π½5 π»π·πΌπ(π‘−1) + π Coefficient Probability Constant 0.001912 0.0001 GCON -0.011889 0.0094 2 GCON 0.024651 0.0377 GWGDP -1.57E-02 0.0085 GDPPC 3.48E-06 0.0007 HDI(-1) 0.766298 0 R-squared 0.755593 Adjusted R-Squared 0.753842 Durbin-Watson 1.747193 HDI results for developing nations using consumption expenditure π»π·πΌππ‘ = π + π½1 πΊπΆππππ‘ + π½2 πΊπΆππππ‘ 2 + π½3 πΊππΊπ·πππ‘ + π½4 πΊπ·πππΆππ‘ +π½5 π»π·πΌπ(π‘−1) + π΄π (1) + π Coefficient Probability C 0.00096 0 GCON -0.004563 0.0296 GCON2 0.009229 0.0894 GWGDP -0.008426 0.0075 GDPPC 1.41E-07 0.0144 HDI1(-1) 0.864282 0 AR(1) 0.068832 0 R-squared 0.798378 Adjusted R-squared 0.797815 Durbin-Watson stat 2.075484 HDI results an lesser developed country using consumption expenditure π»π·πΌππ‘ = π + π½1 πΊπΆππππ‘ + π½2 πΊπΆππππ‘ 2 + π½3 πΊππΊπ·πππ‘ + π½4 πΊπ·πππΆππ‘ +π½5 π»π·πΌπ(π‘−1) + π Coefficient Probability C -0.000999 0.0071 GCON 0.008572 0.0277 GCON2 -2.17E-02 0.0325 GWGDP 0.018973 0 GDPPC 6.10E-08 0.0605 HDI1(-1) 1.036111 0 R-squared 0.90934 Adjusted R-squared 0.907673 Durbin-Watson stat 2.043563 35 HDI results for a developed country using investment expenditure π»π·πΌππ‘ = π + π½1 πΊπΌππππ‘ + π½2 πΊπΌππππ‘ 2 + π½3 πΊππΊπ·πππ‘ + π½4 πΊπ·πππΆππ‘ +π½5 πππ΅πΏπΌπΆ + π½6 π»π·πΌπ(π‘−1) + π΄π (1) + π Coefficient Probability C 0.000107 0.1672 INV 0.000887 0.0664 2 INV -0.00211 0.0875 GDPPCF 1.15E-07 0.0002 GWGDP 0.003331 0.0576 PUBLIC 4.26E-05 0.0044 HDI(-1) 0.91402 0 AR(1) 0.009684 0.0001 R-squared 0.913814 Adjusted R-squared 0.912536 Durbin-Watson stat 2.020094 HDI results for a developing country using investment expenditure π»π·πΌππ‘ = π + π½1 πΊπΌππππ‘ + π½2 πΊπΌππππ‘ 2 + π½3 πΊππΊπ·πππ‘ + π½4 πΊπ·πππΆππ‘ +π½5 π»π·πΌπ(π‘−1) + π΄π (1) + π Coefficient Probability C 0.000378 0.076 INV 0.000715 0.0898 2 INV -0.002546 0.067 GDPPCF 1.80E-07 0.0455 GWGDP -0.008081 0.2177 HDI(-1) 0.88045 0 AR(1) 0.059632 0.0333 R-squared 0.810779 Adjusted R-squared 0.810055 Durbin-Watson stat 2.054619 36 HDI results for an lesser developed country using investment expenditure π»π·πΌππ‘ = π + π½1 πΊπΌππππ‘ + π½2 πΊπΌππππ‘ 2 + π½3 πΊππΊπ·πππ‘ + π½4 πΊπ·πππΆππ‘ +π½5 π»π·πΌπ(π‘−1) + π΄π (1) + π Coefficient Probability C 0.008712 0 INV -0.03088 0.0497 2 INV 0.106969 0.0747 GDPPCF -1.19E-05 0.0148 GWGDP -0.024346 0.0005 HDI(-1) -0.411296 0.0436 AR(1) 0.498915 0 R-squared 0.927005 Adjusted R-squared 0.880775 Durbin-Watson stat 2.15893 SWF results for a developed country using consumption expenditure πππΉππ‘ = π + π½1 πΊπΆππππ‘ + π½2 πΊπΆππππ‘ 2 + π½3 πΊππΊπ·πππ‘ + π½4 πΊπππππ‘ +π½5 πππΉπ(π‘−1) + π΄π (1) + π Coefficient Probability C 2226.666 0 GCON -4414.251 0.0564 2 GCON -17553.68 0.0783 GWGDP 10009.85 0.002 GPOP1 9148.104 0.0991 SWF(-1) -0.243733 0.2167 AR(1) -0.504648 0 R-squared 0.418256 Adjusted R-squared 0.313407 Durbin-Watson stat 1.978902 37 SWF results for a developing country using consumption expenditure πππΉππ‘ = π + π½1 πΊπΆππππ‘ + π½2 πΊπΆππππ‘ 2 + π½3 πΆππ π ππ‘ + π½4 πΊπππππ‘ +π½5 πππΉπ(π‘−1) + π΄π (1) + π΄π (3) π Coefficient Probability C -603.292 0.0001 GCON 6450.076 0.0001 2 GCON -17721.91 0.0005 CORR 6.135581 0.0001 GPOP 31480.62 0.0227 SWF(-1) 0.580824 0 AR(3) 0.094035 0.003 AR(1) -0.481283 0 R-squared 0.507977 Adjusted R-squared 0.477225 Durbin-Watson stat 1.795114 SWF results for an lesser developed country using consumption expenditure πππΉππ‘ = π + π½1 πΊπΆππππ‘ + π½2 πΊπΆππππ‘ 2 + π½3 πΊππΊπ·πππ‘ + π½4 πππ΅πΏπΌπΆππ‘ +π½5 πππΉπ(π‘−1) + π΄π (2) + π Coefficient Probability C 2875.12 0.0093 GCON -45352.39 0.0087 2 GCON 174845.3 0.0065 PUBLIC 21.23803 0.0226 GWGDP -1166.061 0.0005 SWF(-1) -0.383811 0 AR(2) 0.257446 0.0183 R-squared 0.489845 Adjusted R-squared 0.254388 Durbin-Watson stat 2.344068 SWF results for a developed country using investment expenditure πππΉππ‘ = π + π½1 πΊπΌππππ‘ + π½2 πΊπΌππππ‘ 2 + π½3 πΊππΊπ·πππ‘ + π½4 πΊπππππ‘ +π½5 πππΉπ(π‘−1) + π΄π (1) + π΄π (2) + π Coefficient Probability C 44.03926 0.5854 INV 2692.886 0.0365 INV^2 -5858.065 0.0351 GWGDP 7472.793 0.2306 GPOP 19810.22 0.0616 SWF(-1) 0.470918 0 AR(1) -1.083752 0 AR(2) -0.556258 0.0001 R-squared 0.306005 Adjusted R-squared 0.272033 Durbin-Watson stat 2.091921 38 SWF results for a developing country using investment expenditure πππΉππ‘ = π + π½1 πΊπΌππππ‘ + π½2 πΊπΌππππ‘ 2 + π½3 πΊππΊπ·πππ‘ + π½4 πππ΅πΏπΌπΆππ‘ +π½5 πππΉπ(π‘−1) + π΄π (1) + π΄π (2) + π Coefficient Probability C 166.8547 0 INV 661.7471 0 INV^2 -936.9448 0.0586 GPOP1 25862.42 0.05 PUBLIC -37.82781 0 SWF(-1) 0.648701 0 AR(1) -0.937574 0 AR(2) -0.278309 0.0001 R-squared 0.538999 Adjusted R-squared 0.515949 Durbin-Watson stat 1.674956 SWF results for an lesser developed country using investment expenditure πππΉππ‘ = π + π½1 πΊπΌππππ‘ + π½2 πΊπΌππππ‘ 2 + π½3 πΊπππππ‘ + π½4 πππ΅πΏπΌπΆππ‘ +π½5 πππΉπ(π‘−1) + π Coefficient Probability C 117.9228 0.023 INV -3196.928 0.0003 INV^2 15591.05 0.0001 PUBLIC 26.86719 0.0011 GPOP -2981.123 0.0449 SWF(-1) -0.201326 0.0673 R-squared 0.693628 Adjusted R-squared 0.636893 Durbin-Watson stat 1.870397 39