GMU CM 1AC – GSU
Cartels
State legalization is inevitable- but it fails absent federal reform
Ferner 14 Lawmaker Predicts Marijuana Will Be Legal Within 5 Years, Matt Ferner, Denver editor for the
Huffington Post, graduate of University of Colorado Boulder and University of California, Los Angeles,
04/02/2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/04/02/marijuana-prohibition-ending_n_5065594.html
Two states with legal recreational use. Twenty more that allow medical use. Record-high support at the national
level for more permissive policies. It seems fair to say that the United States' official stance on marijuana is
shifting quickly . In fact, one congressman is predicting that U.S. pot prohibition will be a thing of the past before the
end of the decade. "I think it’s game over in less than five years ," Rep. Earl Blumenauer (D-Ore.) said Monday during an
interview with The Huffington Post. "There's no question that we're likely to see another state or two this year legalizing
[recreational] use," Blumenauer said. "We're going to see more medical marijuana progress. The crazy prohibitions on bank services and probably the tax
disparities -- these are all eroding." As of now, 20 states have legalized marijuana for medical purposes, and voters in Colorado and Washington have approved
marijuana for recreational use. About
a dozen more states are expected to legalize marijuana in some form over the next
several years. One recent study has projected a $10 billion legal marijuana industry by 2018. Despite a growing
and profitable legal marijuana industry, the federal government continues to ban the plant , classifying it as a
Schedule I substance alongside drugs like heroin and LSD, and maintaining that it has "no currently accepted medical use."
Such policies cause a number of problems for state-legal, state-licensed pot businesses. Banks often refuse to
work with marijuana businesses out of fear that they could be implicated as money launderers if they offer
traditional banking services. The pot businesses also can't deduct traditional business expenses like advertising
costs, employee payroll, rent and health insurance from their combined federal and state taxes, meaning that
dispensary owners around the U.S. often face effective tax rates of anywhere from 50 to 80 percent , due to an
antiquated Internal Revenue Service rule.
Federal prohibition is the key impediment to state legalization *tentative
Lopez 14 6 ways the federal government continues its war on marijuana, German Lopez, Writing Fellow
Vox Media, Inc, June 11, 2014, http://www.vox.com/2014/6/11/5799916/6-ways-the-federal-government-continuesits-war-on-marijuana
Voters and lawmakers in 22 states have legalized medical marijuana, and voters in two states have approved full marijuana legalization. But federal
officials
haven't gone along with the new drug paradigm. Through multiple measures, ranging from hurdles in the tax code to
restricted waterways, the federal government has made it a lot harder for marijuana businesses to operate. Even in
states where medical or recreational marijuana is legal, the federal government's anti-marijuana stance has major
repercussions. Here are just a few of the ways the federal government's policies affect states' marijuana laws. 1) Marijuana businesses can't file
for some federal tax deductions Under the federal tax code, marijuana businesses can't file for several deductions and, as a
result, their income tax rates can soar to as high as 70 percent. The culprit: a section of the federal tax code, known as 280E,
originally meant for illegal drug dealers. Businesses, as a result, can deduct costs for growing pot, but they can't deduct typical
business expenses, such as advertising or rent. This obviously makes running a medical or retail marijuana business a
lot more expensive. As Colorado accountant Jim Marty put it to NPR, "If they were in a normal business, their top bracket
would be about 45 percent. But if you have to pay tax on your gross profit and not your net income, the calculations
I've done puts the federal and state income tax at about 70 percent." 2) Federal prohibition makes it too difficult for marijuana
businesses to work with conventional banks Since marijuana is still illegal at the federal level, banks are leery of
working with businesses that deal in the drug. This wariness persisted even after a federal guidance that attempted
to put some banks' minds at rest, largely because banks feel the guidance imposed too many unrealistic rules and
restrictions for doing business with marijuana shops and cultivators. That means marijuana businesses operate as largely
cash-only operations, and they can't take conventional loans. As a result, it's riskier and more expensive to run a
marijuana business: the cash-only model makes pot shops and cultivators more vulnerable to theft, and the loans
given to these businesses typically have much higher interest rates. 3) The National Institute on Drug Abuse holds a monopoly over
medical marijuana research The federal government holds a research monopoly on one drug: marijuana. To study the drug's
effects without running afoul of federal law, researchers need to get supplies from a University of Mississippi farm
contracted by the federal government — the only federally legal marijuana farm in the country. Researchers, such as the University of Arizona's
Sue Sisley, complain
that this adds a massive hurdle to conducting medical marijuana research, since it can take
months and even years to get approval for legal marijuana supplies. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), for its part, has taken
some steps to make getting supplies easier. In May, a DEA order boosted the amount of marijuana that can be grown at the farm from 21 kilograms to 650 kilograms.
The idea, National Institute on Drug Abuse officials said, was to meet rising demand from researchers. Medical marijuana advocates say it doesn't have to be this way.
The federal government could, for example, eliminate the extra approval requirement and let other willing growers, such as Lyle Craker of the University of
Massachusetts, Amherst, into the fold. That could significantly speed up the process, and allow researchers to get to the bottom of whether the legalization of medical
marijuana is truly justified. 4) The
feds restrict water for growing marijuana plants The US Bureau of Reclamation in late May
ruled that it won't allow federally controlled water to be used for marijuana farms, even if the farms are legal under
state law. The agency said its decision was necessary to comply with federal laws and rules keeping marijuana illegal. McClatchy
DC reported that the ruling could hit Washington, where full marijuana legalization is moving forward, the hardest, because the federal government controls water for
roughly two-thirds of the state's irrigated land. Marijuana farmers said the ruling will be an inconvenience, but there will be ways around it. Washington officials, for
one, have suggested some alternatives: drilling wells or tapping into a city's water supply. It's expected taking these extra steps will be more expensive, but it won't be
unmanageable. 5) The
DEA sometimes raids marijuana businesses Even after President Barack Obama vowed to stop the DEA's
raids on marijuana businesses that are compliant with state law, the raids have continued. Sometimes these raids seem justifiable. In
Colorado, for instance, the DEA and IRS went after a marijuana shop accused of money laundering and ties to Colombian drug cartels. If these charges hold up, the
feds probably made the right call. In
some cases, however, the Huffington Post found the raids hit legitimate businesses who are
compliant with state laws. For marijuana entrepreneurs, the fear of federal raids is a persistent concern. After all, it's
very hard for a business to operate under an environment in which it's possible the federal government will shut it
all down at a moment's notice. 6) The DEA intimidates doctors into not participating in the medical marijuana
industry As the DEA confirmed to Vox earlier in the week, it's protocol for the agency to intimidate physicians, hospitals, and
pharmacies who consider participating in medical marijuana operations that are compliant with state law. "DEA
enforces the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), and as a regulatory agency, it also ensures that those who are registered with DEA to handle
controlled substances — including physicians, hospitals, and pharmacies — are aware of their obligations under the CSA," a DEA spokesperson said. "It would not be
appropriate to comment on specific interactions with registrants or any ongoing investigations." To
enforce these rules, the DEA offers doctors
and other medical providers a choice: either they stop their involvement in the medical marijuana industry, or they'll
lose a federal licenses that's needed for prescribing certain drugs. Since some medical providers' livelihoods can rely
on their ability to prescribe drugs, they usually opt to abandon their medical marijuana dealings. The Boston Globe
reported that this has been happening for some time now in Massachusetts. So far, several doctors say they have dropped their jobs with medical marijuana
dispensaries in response to the alleged threats. How can this change? Many
of these problems stem from the federal government
classifying marijuana as a schedule 1 substance. Under the DEA's scheduling system, this labels marijuana as a
more dangerous and less medically valuable drug than cocaine and meth — a label that most medical experts and scientists consider
absurd. The Obama administration, through the US Department of Justice or US Department of Health and Human Services, could unilaterally begin a review process
that would change the DEA's harsh classification of marijuana. But so far the administration has said it will only act with congressional support. Of course, legislators
could also take action to rework the drug scheduling system, tax code, rules on waterways, or other hurdles facing the marijuana industry. Congress, for its part, seems
to be moving in favor of laxer marijuana laws. The Republican-controlled House of Representatives in late May voted — for the first time — to prohibit the federal
government from interfering with states' medical marijuana laws. Whether that bill will succeed in the Senate and get the president's signature to become law is, for
now, unclear. Either way, the
contradiction between state and federal laws is a constant concern for marijuana businesses
and the states in which they operate. Until the federal government's laws and rules align with states', the
contradiction will continue shutting down businesses that are legal under state law or, at the very least, making
their operations a lot more expensive.
Legalization overwhelms cartel market share
Zoë Amerigian 11 is COHA Research Associate and Membership Coordinator at Marijuana Policy Project,
“Legalizing Marijuana: AN Exist Strategy from the War on Drugs,” 4-19-11, http://www.coha.org/legalizing-potan-exit-strategy-from-the-war-on-drugs/ DOA: 5-19-14, y2k
Eliminating the marijuana market share of Mexican cartels would hit them especially hard because it serves as a
steady, reliable source of income and carries relatively little risk for them to produce. The percentage of total cartel drug revenues
from marijuana is greatly debated—Mexican and American official figures range from 50-65 percent, but a study by the RAND Corporation suggests closer to 15-26
percent.13 Even
the most conservative of these estimates—roughly a fifth of revenue—would strike a blow to cartel
profits if eliminated. Marijuana is particularly valuable to cartels because they control the entire production line; they
both grow and distribute it themselves, making it more reliable and less risky. Conversely, cocaine is imported to Mexico mostly from
South America, heightening the risk of smuggling it. More troubling is that cartels are now even growing marijuana on U.S.
public lands, mostly throughout national parks and forests, in order to avoid the task of smuggling drugs across the U.S.-Mexican border.14 If
Mexico were to reach the point of legalizing marijuana, the U.S. could continue to buy the drug legally from south of the border, like many other consumer goods. But
even if Mexico did not implement its own legalization, recent
data indicates that a domestic U.S. industry could fill the role of the
supplier and eliminate the need for Mexican marijuana. The drug is increasingly grown domestically and U.S.
growers are already posing a threat to Mexican market share. Exact numbers are impossible to assess, but figures of American domestic
marijuana production range from 30-60 percent of the total consumed in the U.S.16 Additionally, a report by the RAND Corporation found that
legalizing marijuana in California alone (and a subsequent rise in state-wide marijuana production) could lower Mexican cartel
marijuana revenues by 65-85 percent. This could occur if Californian marijuana were smuggled to the rest of the U.S. where the drug would still be
illegal. The marijuana’s projected high quality and low price would make it an extremely competitive product.17 It seems reasonable to assume that if
the drug were legalized in all fifty states, the domestic market could easily overwhelm the Mexican market share. In
terms of tangible effects on Mexican drug violence, the RAND Corporation and UNODC agree that removing U.S. demand for illegal marijuana would increase
in the long run, once U.S. demand is
met by domestic supply, cartels would be financially debilitated and, most likely, some of the violence quelled . The
U.S. population is by far the largest drug market for Mexico, making our action necessary for any transnational
legalization to be effective. While cocaine, methamphetamines, and heroin are still funding cartels, drug violence will not be
completely eliminated; but any move to starve their resources is a step forward in weakening them and, ultimately, saving
lives.
violence in the short run because Mexican cartels would be fighting for dominance in a shrinking market.18 But
Plan frees up law enforcement resources
Hesson 14 Will Mexican Cartels Survive Marijuana Legalization? TED HESSON, immigration editor at Fusion,
02/24/2014, http://fusion.net/justice/story/mexican-cartels-survive-marijuana-legalization-450519
1. Mexico
is the top marijuana exporter to the U.S. A 2008 study by the RAND Corporation estimated that Mexican
marijuana accounted for somewhere between 40 and 67 percent of the drug in the U.S. The cartel grip on the U.S.
market may not last for long. Pot can now be grown for recreational use in Colorado and Washington, and for medical use in 20 states. For the first time,
American consumers can choose a legal product over the black market counterpart. Beau Kilmer, the co-director of
the RAND Drug Policy Research Center, says that a few states legalizing marijuana won’t eliminate the flow of the
drug from down south, but a change in policy from the federal government would be a game changer. “Our research also
suggests that legalizing commercial marijuana production at the national level could drive out most of the
marijuana imported from Mexico,” he wrote in a 2013 op-ed. 2. Marijuana makes up more than $1 billion of cartel income
Pot isn’t the main source of income for cartels. They make most of their cash from drugs like cocaine and heroin. But marijuana accounts for 15 to 26 percent of the
cartel haul, according to RAND’s 2008 data. That translates to an estimated $1.1 billion to $2 billion of gross income. The drop in sales certainly wouldn’t end the
existence of drug traffickers — they bring in an estimated $6 billion to $8 billion annually — but losing
a fifth of one’s income would hurt any
business. On top of that, Kilmer says that marijuana likely makes up a higher percentage of the cartel take today than it did back in 2008. So taking away pot
Authorities could focus on other drugs Marijuana made up 94 percent of the drugs seized by
Border Patrol in the 2012 fiscal year, judging by weight. If pot becomes legal in the U.S. and cartels are pushed out of the market,
that would allow law-enforcement agencies to dedicate more resources to combat the trafficking of drugs like
heroin and cocaine. This scenario presupposes that marijuana will be cheap enough in the states to disincentivize continued smuggling from Mexico. Eric
would sting even more. 3.
Farnsworth, the vice president of the Council of the Americas and Americas Society, says that high taxes could preserve the illicit market. “There will always be
arbitrage opportunities even for a legal product,” he said. “Cigarettes are completely legal in the U.S. and worldwide, yet counterfeits and parallel imports to evade
legal market could overtake illegal sales . American
buyers may be willing to pay more for legal weed and high tax rates could drop as states change their drug policies.
taxes are a major part of criminal enterprises and gangs.” In the future, though, the
That would make smuggling it across the border a waste of time.
Marijuana solves other drug revenues---diversification fails
Erik Kaine 11 is Forbes Contributor, “Would Legalizing Marijuana Stop the Drug Violence in Mexico?” 6-24-11,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/erikkain/2011/06/24/would-legalizing-marijuana-stop-the-drug-violence-in-mexico/
DOA: 5-20-14, y2k
I think what Longmire is missing is the way legalization
of pot would undermine the very nature of the black market from the
ground up. It’s not just about profits, for one thing. Marijuana is rightly considered a gateway drug but this is almost entirely because
when someone purchases marijuana they do so from a dealer. Dealers invariably have other drugs as well. More
people smoke pot than do drugs like cocaine, but cocaine and other illicit substances have a high profit margin for dealers
and the cartels. So if you legalize marijuana you hit the black market infrastructure where it hurts. Suddenly people are
buying their marijuana from the grocery store or a dispensary instead of from a dealer, and the ability of dealers to push
other harder drugs becomes greatly diminished. People who want to get high are suddenly able to do so legally so long as
they stick to marijuana, making the risk-gap between using marijuana and other drugs suddenly much wider. In other words, legalizing marijuana
fundamentally alters the landscape of the black market in ways that would make it harder for drug traffickers to
access the market in the first place, creating fewer consumers and potential consumers almost overnight. This means that even if
marijuana makes up much less than 60 percent of the cartels’ profits (Ozemik cites numbers around 26%) removing marijuana
from their product line would cut into profits all across the board. This would significantly weaken the cartels and
would – at some point – lead to a decrease in violence both in Mexico and here in the United States. We should always be
skeptical, and crime organizations may indeed move into other areas of business, but legalizing marijuana would hurt the cartels much more than the current war on
drugs.
People won’t switch to other drugs
Andrew Kirell 12, Mediaite editor-in-chief, “The Weekly Standard Is Absolutely Wrong About Drug
Legalization,” 5-1-12,
http://www.mediaite.com/online/the-weekly-standard-is-absolutely-wrong-about-drug-legalization/ DOA: 6-8-14,
y2k
According to the government’s National Survey on Drug Use & Health, most people who try hard drugs give it up.
Nearly 4 million people report to have tried heroin before, but only 213,000 are regular users. That’s about 5%.
Same rate for crack cocaine use. For meth, the percentage is even smaller. Walters also ignores the laws of economics. Demand for
hard drugs like heroin is what economists call “ inelastic .” Even if the price decreases dramatically, the demand will not increase
dramatically. There may be an increase in use, but only on the margins. In other words: most of us have absolutely no
interest in trying heroin. And even a dramatic price decrease won’t make us suddenly all crave that good junk.
National legalization is key---solves every other alt cause to cartels
Nathan Jones 14 is the Alfred C. Glassell III Postdoctoral Fellow in Drug Policy at the Baker Institute. 14, "Will
recreational marijuana sales in Colorado hurt Mexican cartels?," 9-12-2014, Baker Institute Blog,
http://blog.chron.com/bakerblog/2014/01/will-recreational-marijuana-sales-in-colorado-hurt-mexican-cartels/, DOA:
9-12-2014, y2k
-In terms of the impact on Mexican cartels in the short term, we might see a spike in other extortion-related crimes as profit starvation sets in for certain cells in illicit networks. Attributing this to
These illicit
networks may further diversify into territorial extortionist activities, but over the long term will be wiped out by civil society
and the state as these crimes draw a powerful backlash. I documented this process in Tijuana in my 2011 doctoral dissertation. The
real benefits of legalization will be seen in the medium- and long-term. By cutting into Mexican cartel profits, other cartel
activities and power could be reduced. We know that cartel profits can be redistributed to local cells to maintain
territorial control. The ability to weaken or reduce these payments could limit their activities and capital investments
in kidnapping and extortion franchises. Finally, reducing cartel profits could help Mexico strengthen its institutions. Building
effective police and security institutions takes decades. Decades can stretch into centuries if those agencies are constantly rejiggered and re-corrupted by highly
profitable and sophisticated organized criminal networks. Reducing illicit profits could have an important and salubrious effect on the
ability of Mexico to strengthen its security apparatus. Colorado’s legalization of marijuana will have a negligible impact
on drug-related violence in Mexico because Colorado is too small a market, and enforcement on marijuana leaving the state will be artificially
tight for the first year or two. As other states legalize — Washington is set to fully implement its voter-approved initiative later this year and states like California and
Washington appear poised to do so in the coming years — we will see a larger impact. If a state such as Texas were to legalize, we would
see a rapid and much greater impact due to the state’s size, geographic proximity to Mexico, and penchant for limited regulation of
big business. It is Colorado’s leadership role in this broader trend that could have a real impact over the long term on cartel profits and
violence in Mexico.
changing market dynamics in the United States will be difficult, given that violent black market forces (rival cartels) may be a much more important confounding variable.
Cartels cause Mexico instability
Pease 11 (Shadd A. June. Shadd A. Pease holds a Master of Arts in International Security from University of
Denver Josef Korbel School of International Studies. Pease's concentration on the areas of military analysis and
intelligence culminated in his graduate thesis, “Instability in the South: The Implications of Mexican State Failure
on U.S. National Security.” Supervised by Dr. Paul R. Viotti. Dr. Viotti has a PhD in International Relations,
American Foreign Policy, and US National Security Policy. “Instability in the South: Implications of Mexican State
Failure on U.S. National Security” Accessed by Proquest) 5/27/14 RK
Large swaths of Mexico are essentially controlled by the DTOs. Although a majority of the casualties of the violence are members of these
many ordinary Mexican citizens are affected by the violence and
carnage. Additionally, the instability and insecurity of the Northern areas of Mexico have left many American cities at
risk. In a March 2009 article released by The Brookings Institute, author Vanda Felbab-Brown states, “The number of kidnappings in Phoenix, Arizona, for example,
tripled from 48 in 2004 to 241 in 2008. Drug turf wars among the drug trafficking organizations are beginning to occur in major
violent organizations, or somehow related to drug trafficking,
cities in the U.S., such as Dallas, Texas.” This is an unnerving negative externality of the narcotics problem occurring along the U.S. southern border.
Continued kidnappings and murders will persist until the DTOs operating in Mexico are brought under control. As mentioned previously, the various drug trafficking
organizations operate throughout the state of Mexico. Two of the largest DTOs, the Tijuana Cartel and the Juarez Cartel are in close proximity with two major
American cities: San Diego, California and El Paso, Texas. Furthermore, many of the drug trafficking organizations operate in conjunction with each other. The figure
below provides the current areas of the major Mexican drug trafficking organizations. Figure 2: Drug Trafficking Organizations Areas of Influence The drug
trafficking organizations pose a serious threat to the security of Mexico. This is due in large part to the blatant disregard many of the members of these organizations
have for the government of Mexico and its citizenry. The Mexican government has implemented a tougher stance against the various DTOs by deploying military
forces; however, the drug trafficking organizations are heavily entrenched into the society of the Mexican state. In a
February 2009 article from The Wall Street Journal, the Mexican academic Edgardo Buscaglia “estimates there are 200 counties in Mexico-some 8% of the totalwhere
drug gangs wield more influence behind the scenes than the authorities. With
fearsome arsenals of rocket-propelled grenades, bazookas,
and automatic weapons, cartels are often better armed than the police and even the soldiers they fight.” The type of
arms that the various drug trafficking organizations own, the ability to control large areas of the Mexican state, and
the cultural entrenchment of these organizations is disconcerting for the security of Mexico . In addition, the drug trafficking cartels
are beginning to elevate their deadly attacks by implementing improvised explosive devices (IEDs) into their assaults.
Triggers Hezbollah border-terrorism---causes US retaliation against Iran
Steven Metz 14, a defense analyst, "Strategic Horizons: All Options Bad If Mexico’s Drug Violence Expands to
U.S.," 2-19-2014, No Publication, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13576/strategic-horizons-alloptions-bad-if-mexico-s-drug-violence-expands-to-u-s, DOA: 8-16-2014, y2k
Over the past few decades, violence in Mexico has reached horrific levels, claiming the lives of 70,000 as criminal organizations
fight each other for control of the drug trade and wage war on the Mexican police, military, government officials and anyone
else unlucky enough to get caught in the crossfire. The chaos has spread southward, engulfing Guatemala, Honduras and Belize. Americans must face the possibility that the conflict
may also expand northward, with intergang warfare, assassinations of government officials and outright terrorism in
the United States. If so, this will force Americans to undertake a fundamental reassessment of the threat , possibly
redefining it as a security issue demanding the use of U.S. military power. One way that large-scale drug violence might move to the United
States is if the cartels miscalculate and think they can intimidate the U.S. government or strike at American targets safely from a Mexican sanctuary. The most likely candidate would be the
group known as the Zetas. They were created when elite government anti-drug commandos switched sides in the drug war, first serving as mercenaries for the Gulf Cartel and then becoming a
powerful cartel in their own right. The Zetas used to recruit mostly ex-military and ex-law enforcement members in large part to maintain discipline and control. But the pool of soldiers and
policemen willing to join the narcotraffickers was inadequate to fuel the group’s ambition. Now the Zetas are tapping a very different, much larger, but less disciplined pool of recruits in U.S.
prisons and street gangs. This is an ominous turn of events. Since intimidation through extreme violence is a trademark of the Zetas, its spread to the United States raises the possibility of largescale violence on American soil. As George Grayson of the College of William and Mary put it, “The Zetas are determined to gain the reputation of being the most sadistic, cruel and beastly
organization that ever existed.” And without concern for extradition, which helped break the back of the Colombian drug cartels, the Zetas show little fear of the United States government,
already having ordered direct violence against American law enforcement. Like the Zetas, most of the other Mexican cartels are expanding their operations inside the United States. Only a
handful of U.S. states are free of them today. So far the cartels don’t appear directly responsible for large numbers of killings in the United States, but as expansion and reliance on undisciplined
recruits looking to make a name for themselves through ferocity continue, the chances of miscalculation or violent freelancing by a cartel affiliate mount. This could potentially move beyond
intergang warfare to the killing of U.S. officials or outright terrorism like the car bombs that drug cartels used in Mexico and Colombia. In an assessment for the U.S. Army War College Strategic
Mexico’s
violence could spread north is via the partnership between the narcotraffickers and ideologically motivated terrorist
groups. The Zetas already have a substantial connection to Hezbollah, based on collaborative narcotrafficking and arms smuggling. Hezbollah
has relied on terrorism since its founding and has few qualms about conducting attacks far from its home turf in southern
Lebanon. Since Hezbollah is a close ally or proxy of Iran, it might some day attempt to strike the United States in retribution
for American action against Tehran. If so, it would likely attempt to exploit its connection with the Zetas, pulling the
narcotraffickers into a transnational proxy war. The foundation for this scenario is already in place: Security analysts like Douglas Farah have
warned of a “tier-one security threat for the United States” from an “improbable alliance” between narcotraffickers and antiAmerican states like Iran and the “Bolivarian” regime in Venezuela. The longer this relationship continues and the more it expands, the greater the
chances of dangerous miscalculation. No matter how violence from the Mexican cartels came to the United States, the key issue would be Washington’s response. If
the Zetas, another Mexican cartel or someone acting in their stead launched a campaign of assassinations or bombings in the United States
or helped Hezbollah or some other transnational terrorist organization with a mass casualty attack, and the Mexican government proved unwilling or unable to
respond in a way that Washington considered adequate, the United States would have to consider military action. While the United States has deep cultural and
Studies Institute, Robert Bunker and John Sullivan considered narcotrafficker car bombs inside the United States to be unlikely but not impossible. A second way that
economic ties to Mexico and works closely with Mexican law enforcement on the narcotrafficking problem, the security relationship between the two has always been difficult—understandably
so given the long history of U.S. military intervention in Mexico. Mexico would be unlikely to allow the U.S. military or other government agencies free rein to strike at narcotrafficking cartels
any U.S. president would face immense
political pressure to strike at America’s enemies if the Mexican government could not or would not do so itself. Failing to act firmly and
decisively would weaken the president and encourage the Mexican cartels to believe that they could attack U.S. targets
with impunity. After all, the primary lesson from Sept. 11 was that playing only defense and allowing groups that attack the United States
undisturbed foreign sanctuary does not work. But using the U.S. military against the cartels on Mexican soil could weaken the Mexican government or even cause its collapse, end
in its territory, even if those organizations were tied to assassinations, bombings or terrorism in the United States. But
further security cooperation between Mexico and the United States and damage one of the most important and intimate bilateral economic relationships in the world. Quite simply, every
available strategic option would be disastrous.
US retaliation causes extinction
Avery 13 An Attack On Iran Could Escalate Into Global Nuclear War, John Scales Avery, B.Sc. in theoretical
physics from MIT and an M.Sc. from the University of Chicago, studied theoretical chemistry at the University of
London, and was awarded a Ph.D. now Lektor Emeritus, Associate Professor, at the Department of Chemistry,
University of Copenhagen, 06 November, 2013, http://www.countercurrents.org/avery061113.htm
Despite the willingness of Iran's new President, Hassan Rouhani to make all reasonable concessions to US demands, Israeli pressure groups in Washington continue to demand an attack on Iran.
an attack might escalate into a global nuclear war, with catastrophic consequences. As we approach the 100th anniversary
There is a danger that an attack on
Iran would escalate into a large-scale war in the Middle East, entirely destabilizing a region that is already deep in
problems. The unstable government of Pakistan might be overthrown, and the revolutionary Pakistani government might enter the war on the side of
Iran, thus introducing nuclear weapons into the conflict. Russia and China, firm allies of Iran, might also be drawn
into a general war in the Middle East. Since much of the world's oil comes from the region, such a war would certainly cause the price of oil to reach unheard-of
heights, with catastrophic effects on the global economy. In the dangerous situation that could potentially result from an attack on Iran , there is
a risk that nuclear weapons would be used, either intentionally, or by accident or miscalculation. Recent research
has shown that besides making large areas of the world uninhabitable through long-lasting radioactive contamination, a
nuclear war would damage global agriculture to such a extent that a global famine of previously unknown
proportions would result. Thus, nuclear war is the ultimate ecological catastrophe. It could destroy human civilization
and much of the biosphere. To risk such a war would be an unforgivable offense against the lives and future of all the peoples of the world, US citizens included.
But such
World War I, we should remember that this colossal disaster escalated uncontrollably from what was intended to be a minor conflict.
Cartels undermine investment needed for successful energy reform
Chapa 14 Mexico's oil industry on a collision course with drug cartels, Sergio Chapa, Interactive Manager,
08.12.2014, http://www.valleycentral.com/news/story.aspx?id=1082548#.U_uy-FZD9c5
Monday was a historic day in Mexico where congress passed a second round of legislation
to open the nation's oil industry to foreign
investment. Supporters say both investment and technology are sorely needed to improve Mexico's national oil
company PEMEX and their aging infrastructure. Opponents are worried about corruption and Mexico getting short-changed on a highlyprized natural resource. But with the lands with the most oil and natural gas reserves terrorized by drug cartels, experts
believe energy reform is on a collision course with organized crime. Cartel Lands Ranging from Gulf of Mexico in
Tamaulipas the foothills of Coahuila, the Burgos Basin contains untold amounts of oil and natural gas. Foreign
investment, hydraulic fracturing technology and water infrastructure improvements are needed on land while deep
water oil platforms are needed in the gulf. But northern Mexico remains divided up by the Zetas drug cartel and rival
members of the Gulf Cartel. In addition to fighting with each other and soldiers, the two groups have been linked to the theft of oil
and gasoline as well as kidnapping and extortion of businessmen. UTB Professor Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera is an expert
on Mexican drug cartels. Although there have been no confirmed direct attacks on oil companies or their workers, some foreign workers have
reportedly been caught in the cartel cross-fire . There have also been rumors of foreign oil workers kidnapped in Tamaulipas, none of those
reports have been confirmed. "It's a very big risk for those companies to come," Correa-Cabrera said. Oil Theft The theft of oil,
gasoline and other petroleum products has been documented in dozens of cases in the State of Tamaulipas and neighboring Nuevo
Leon over the past four years. Drug cartel operatives have placed illegal siphons directly on pipelines with stolen gasoline being
sold openly at discount prices in the streets of Mexican border cities. Professor Correa-Cabrera said stolen oil and gasoline is a multimillion dollar business for drug cartels and they aren't likely to give it up any time soon. The professor said foreign companies and their
drilling operations could be an equally tempting targets for drug cartels. "They are not going to disappear just because legislation is
passed," Correa-Cabrera said.
Energy boom makes hegemony sustainable- it’s the NAFTA century
Kotkin 13 America's True Power In The NAFTA Century, Joel Kotkin, R.C. Hobbs Professor of Urban Studies at
Chapman University in California and executive editor of newgeography.com, 9/13/2013,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/joelkotkin/2013/09/13/americas-true-power-in-the-nafta-century/
Welcome then to the NAFTA century , in which our power is fundamentally based on developing a common
economic region with our two large neighbors. Since its origins in 1994, NAFTA has emerged as the world’s largest
trading bloc, linking 450 million people that produce $17 trillion in output. Foreign policy elites in both parties may focus on Europe, Asia
and the Middle East, but our long-term fate lies more with Canada, Mexico and the rest of the Americas. Nowhere
is this shift in power more obvious than in the critical energy arena, the wellspring of our deep involvement in the
lunatic Middle East. Massive finds have given us a new energy lifeline in places like the Gulf coast, the Alberta tar
sands, the Great Plains, the Inland West, Ohio, Pennsylvania and potentially California. And if Mexico successfully reforms
its state-owned energy monopoly, PEMEX, the world energy — and economic — balance of power will likely shift
more decisively to North America . Mexican President Pena Nieto’s plan, which would allow increased foreign investment in
the energy sector, is projected by at least one analyst to boost Mexico’s oil output by 20% to 50% in the coming decades. Taken together , the
NAFTA countries now boast larger reserves of oil, gas (and if we want it, coal) than any other part of the world. More important,
given our concerns with greenhouse gases, NAFTA countries now possess, by some estimates, more clean-burning
natural gas than Russia, Iran and Qatar put together. All this at a time when U.S. energy use is declining, further
eroding the leverage of these troublesome countries. This particularly undermines the position of Putin , who has had
his way with Obama but faces long-term political decline. Russia, which relies on hydrocarbons for two-thirds of its export revenues
and half its budget, is being forced to cut gas prices in Europe due to a forthcoming gusher of LNG exports from the U.S.
and other countries. In the end, Russia is an economic one-horse show with declining demography and a discredited
political system. In terms of the Middle East, the NAFTA century means we can disengage , when it threatens our
actual strategic interests. Afraid of a shut off of oil from the Persian Gulf? Our response should be: Make my day .
Energy prices will rise, but this will hurt Europe and China more than us , and also will stimulate more jobs and economic growth in much
of the country, particularly the energy belts of the Gulf Coast and the Great Plains. China and India have boosted energy imports as we decrease
ours; China is expected to surpass the United States as the world’s largest oil importer this year. At the same time, in the EU, bans
on fracking and over-reliance on unreliable, expensive “green” energy has driven up prices for both gas and electricity. These high prices have not only eroded
depleted consumer spending but is leading some manufacturers, including in Germany, to look at relocating production, notably to energy-rich regions of the United
States. This
shift in industrial production is still nascent, but is evidenced by growing U.S. manufacturing at a time when
Europe and Asia, particularly China, are facing stagnation or even declines. Europe’s industry minister recently warned of
“an industrial massacre” brought on in large part by unsustainably high energy prices. The key beneficiaries of NAFTA’s
energy surge will be energy-intensive industries such as petrochemicals — major new investments are being made
in this sector along the Gulf Coast by both foreign and domestic companies. But it also can be seen in the resurgence in North
American manufacturing in automobiles , steel and other key sectors. Particularly critical is Mexico’s recharged
industrial boom . In 2011 roughly half of the nearly $20 billion invested in the country was for manufacturing. Increasingly companies from around
the world see our southern neighbor as an ideal locale for new manufacturing plants ; General Motors , Audi , Honda, Perelli,
Alcoa and the Swedish appliance giant Electrolux have all announced major investments. Critically this is not so much Ross Perot’s old “sucking sound” of American
jobs draining away, but about the shift in the economic balance of power away from China and East Asia. Rather
than rivals, the U.S., Mexican and
Canadian economies are becoming increasingly integrated , with raw materials, manufacturing goods and services traded across the
borders. This integration has proceeded rapidly since NAFTA, with U.S. merchandise exports to Mexico growing from $41.6 billion in 1993 to
$216.3 billion in 2012, an increase of 420%, while service exports doubled. Meanwhile U.S. imports from Mexico increased from $39.9 billion in 1993 to $277.7
billion in 2012, an increase of 596%. At the same time, U.S. exports to Canada increased from $100.2 billion in 1993 to $291.8 billion in 2012. Investment flows
mirror this integration. As of 2011, the United States accounted for 44% of all foreign investment in Mexico, more than twice that of second-place Spain; Canada,
ranking fourth, accounts for another 10%. Canada, which, according to a recent AT Kearney report, now ranks as the No. 4 destination for foreign direct investment,
with the U.S. accounting for more than half the total in the country. Over 70% of Canada’s outbound investment goes to the U.S. Our human ties to these neighbors
may be even more important. (Disclaimer: my wife is a native of Quebec). Mexico, for example, accounts for nearly 30% of our foreign-born population, by far the
largest group. Canada, surprisingly, is the largest source of foreign-born Americans of any country outside Asia or Latin America. We also visit each other on a
regular basis, with Canada by far the biggest sender of tourists to the U.S., more than the next nine countries combined; Mexico ranks second. The U.S., for its part,
accounts for two-thirds of all visitors to Canada and the U.S. remains by far largest source of travelers to Mexico. These interactions reflect an intimacy Americans
simply do not share with such places as the Middle East (outside Israel), Russia, and China. There’s the little matter of democracy, as well as a common sharing of a
continent, with rivers, lakes and mountain ranges that often don’t respect national borders. Policy-maker may prefer to look further afield but North America is our
home, Mexico
and Canada our natural allies for the future. Adios, Middle East and Europe; bonjour, North America.
US engagement is inevitable---maintaining Hegemony is key to solve nuclear conflict and
every geopolitical hotspot and to fostering international cooperation which solves every
existential threat
Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth 13
Stephen Brooks is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College AND John Ikenberry is Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and
International Affairs at Princeton University and Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul AND John Wohlforth is Daniel
Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. “Lean Forward,” Jan/Feb 2013, Foreign Affairs, EBSCO, Accessed date: 1-9-13 y2k
In Defense of American Engagement Since
the end of World War II, the U nited S tates has pursued a single grand
strategy: deep engagement . In an effort to protect its security and prosperity, the country has promoted a liberal
economic order and established close defense ties with partners in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East. Its
military bases cover the map, its ships patrol transit routes across the globe, and tens of thousands of its troops stand guard in allied countries
such as Germany, Japan, and South Korea. The details of U.S. foreign policy have differed from administration to
administration, including the emphasis placed on democracy promotion and humanitarian goals, but for over 60 years , every
president has agreed on the fundamental decision to remain deeply engaged in the world, even as the rationale for
that strategy has shifted. During the Cold War, the United States' security commitments to Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East served
primarily to prevent Soviet encroachment into the world's wealthiest and most resource-rich regions. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the
aim has become to make these same regions more secure, and thus less threatening to the U nited S tates, and to use
these security partnerships to foster the cooperation necessary for a stable and open international order .
Now, more than ever, Washington might be tempted to abandon this grand strategy and pull back from the world. The
rise of China is chipping away at the United States' preponderance of power, a budget crisis has put defense
spending on the chopping block, and two long wars have left the U.S. military and public exhausted. Indeed, even as
most politicians continue to assert their commitment to global leadership, a very different view has taken hold among scholars of
international relations over the past decade: that the United States should minimize its overseas military presence, shed its security ties, and
give up its efforts to lead the liberal international order. Proponents of retrenchment argue that a globally engaged grand strategy
wastes money by subsidizing the defense of well-off allies and generates resentment among foreign populations and governments. A more
modest posture, they contend, would put an end to allies' free-riding and defuse anti-American sentiment. Even if allies did not take over
every mission the United States now performs, most of these roles have nothing to do with U.S. security and only risk entrapping the United
States in unnecessary wars. In short, those in this camp maintain that pulling back would not only save blood and treasure but also make the
are wrong . In making their case, advocates of retrenchment overstate the costs of
the current grand strategy and understate its benefits . In fact, the budgetary savings of lowering the U nited
S tates' international profile are debatable, and there is little evidence to suggest that an internationally engaged
America provokes other countries to balance against it, becomes overextended, or gets dragged into
unnecessary wars. The benefits of deep engagement, on the other hand, are legion. U.S. security commitments
reduce competition in key regions and act as a check against potential rivals. They help maintain an open world
economy and give Washington leverage in economic negotiations. And they make it easier for the U nited S tates to secure
cooperation for combating a wide range of global threats . Were the U nited S tates to cede its global
leadership role, it would forgo these proven upsides while exposing itself to the unprecedented downsides of a
world in which the country was less secure, prosperous, and influential.
United States more secure. They
UNBALANCED One such alleged cost of the current grand strategy is that, in the words of the
political scientist Barry Posen, it "prompts states to balance against U.S. power however they can." Yet there is no evidence that countries have banded together in anti-American alliances or tried to match the United States' military capacity on their own-- or that they will do so in the
future. Indeed, it's hard to see how the current grand strategy could generate true counterbalancing. Unlike past hegemons, the United States is geographically isolated, which means that it is far less threatening to other major states and that it faces no contiguous great-power rivals
that could step up to the task of balancing against it. Moreover, any competitor would have a hard time matching the U.S. military. Not only is the United States so far ahead militarily in both quantitative and qualitative terms, but its security guarantees also give it the leverage to
prevent allies from giving military technology to potential U.S. rivals. Because the United States dominates the high-end defense industry, it can trade access to its defense market for allies' agreement not to transfer key military technologies to its competitors. The embargo that the
United States has convinced the EU to maintain on military sales to China since 1989 is a case in point. If U.S. global leadership were prompting balancing, then one would expect actual examples of pushback--especially during the administration of George W. Bush, who pursued a
foreign policy that seemed particularly unilateral. Yet since the Soviet Union collapsed, no major powers have tried to balance against the United States by seeking to match its military might or by assembling a formidable alliance; the prospect is simply too daunting. Instead, they
have resorted to what scholars call "soft balancing," using international institutions and norms to constrain Washington. Setting aside the fact that soft balancing is a slippery concept and difficult to distinguish from everyday diplomatic competition, it is wrong to say that the practice
only harms the United States. Arguably, as the global leader, the United States benefits from employing soft-balancing-style leverage more than any other country. After all, today's rules and institutions came about under its auspices and largely reflect its interests, and so they are in
fact tailor-made for soft balancing by the United States itself. In 2011, for example, Washington coordinated action with several Southea st Asian states to oppose Beijing's claims in the South China Sea by pointing to established international law and norms. Another argument for
retrenchment holds that the United States will fall prey to the same fate as past hegemons and accelerate its own decline. In order to keep its ambitious strategy in place, the logic goes, the country will have to divert resources away from more productive purposes--infrastructure,
education, scientific research, and so on--that are necessary to keep its economy competitive. Allies, meanwhile, can get away with lower military expenditures and grow faster than they otherwise would. The historical evidence for this phenomenon is thin; for the most part, past
superpowers lost their leadership not because they pursued hegemony but because other major powers balanced against them--a prospect that is not in the cards today. (If anything, leading states can use their position to stave off their decline.) A bigger problem with the warnings
against "imperial overstretch" is that there is no reason to believe that the pursuit of global leadership saps economic growth. Instead, most studies by economists find no clear relationship between military expenditures and economic decline. To be sure, if the United States were a
dramatic outlier and spent around A quarter of its GDP on defense, as the Soviet Union did in its last decades, its growth and competitiveness would suffer. But in 2012, even as it fought a war in Afghanistan and conducted counterterrorism operations around the globe, Washington
spent just 4.5 percent of GDP on defense--a relatively small fraction, historically speaking. (From 1950 to 1990, that figure averaged 7.6 percent.) Recent economic difficulties might prompt Washington to reevaluate its defense budgets and international commitments, but that does
not mean that those policies caused the downturn. And any money freed up from dropping global commitments would not necessarily be spent in ways that would help the U.S. economy. Likewise, U.S. allies' economic growth rates have nothing to do with any security subsidies
they receive from Washington. The contention that lower military expenditures facilitated the rise of Japan, West Germany, and other countries dependent on U.S. defense guarantees may have seemed plausible during the last bout of declinist anxiety, in the 1980s. But these states
eventually stopped climbing up the global economic ranks as their per capita wealth approached U.S. levels--just as standard models of economic growth would predict. Over the past 20 years, the United States has maintained its lead in per capita GDP over its European allies and
Japan, even as those countries' defense efforts have fallen further behind. Their failure to modernize their militaries has only served to entrench the United States' dominance. LED NOT INTO TEMPTATION The costs of U.S. foreign policy that matter most, of course, are human
lives, and critics of an expansive grand strategy worry that the United States might get dragged into unnecessary wars. Securing smaller allies, they argue, emboldens those states to take risks they would not otherwise accept, pulling the superpower sponsor into costly conflicts--a
classic moral hazard problem. Concerned about the reputational costs of failing to honor the country's alliance commitments, U.S. leaders might go to war even when no national interests are at stake. History shows, however, that great powers anticipate the danger of entrapment and
structure their agreements to protect themselves from it. It is nearly impossible to find a clear case of a smaller power luring a reluctant great power into war. For decades, World War I served as the canonical example of entangling alliances supposedly drawing great powers into a
fight, but an outpouring of new historical research has overturned the conventional wisdom, revealing that the war was more the result of a conscious decision on Germany's part to try to dominate Europe than a case of alliance entrapment. If anything, alliances reduce the risk of
getting pulled into a conflict. In East Asia, the regional security agreements that Washington struck after World War II were designed, in the words of the political scientist Victor Cha, to "constrain anticommunist allies in the region that might engage in aggressive behavior against
adversaries that could entrap the United States in an unwanted larger war." The same logic is now at play in the U.S.Taiwanese relationship. After cross-strait tensions flared in the 1990s and the first decade of this century, U.S. officials grew concerned that their ambiguous support
for Taiwan might expose them to the risk of entrapment. So the Bush administration adjusted its policy, clarifying that its goal was to not only deter China from an unprovoked attack but also deter Taiwan from unilateral moves toward independence. For many advocates of
retrenchment, the problem is that the mere possession of globe-girdling military capabilities supposedly inflates policymakers' conception of the national interest, so much so that every foreign problem begins to look like America's to solve. Critics also argue that the country's
military superiority causes it to seek total solutions to security problems, as in Afghanistan and Iraq, that could be dealt with in less costly ways. Only a country that possessed such awesome military power and faced no serious geopolitical rival would fail to be satisfied with partial
fixes, such as containment, and instead embark on wild schemes of democracy building, the argument goes. Furthermore, they contend, the United States' outsized military creates a sense of obligation to do something with it even when no U.S. interests are at stake. As Madeleine
Albright, then the U.S. ambassador to the UN, famously asked Colin Powell, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, when debating intervention in Bosnia in 1993, "What's the point of having this superb military you're always talking about if we can't use it?" If the U.S. military
scrapped its forces and shuttered its bases, then the country would no doubt eliminate the risk of entering needless wars, having tied itself to the mast like Ulysses. But if it instead merely moved its forces over the horizon, as is more commonly proposed by advocates of
retrenchment, whatever temptations there were to intervene would not disappear. The bigger problem with the idea that a forward posture distorts conceptions of the national interest, however, is that it rests on just one case: Iraq. That war is an outlier in terms of both its high costs (it
accounts for some two-thirds of the casualties and budget costs of all U.S. wars since 1990) and the degree to which the United States shouldered them alone. In the Persian Gulf War and the interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Libya, U.S. allies bore more of the burden, controlling for the size of their economies and populations. Besides
,
the Iraq war was not an inevitable consequence of pursuing the United States' existing grand strategy;
many scholars and policymakers who prefer an engaged America strongly opposed the war .
Likewise, continuing the current
grand strategy in no way condemns the United States to more wars like it. Consider how the country, after it lost in Vietnam, waged the rest of the Cold War with proxies and highly limited interventions. Iraq has generated a similar reluctance to undertake large expeditionary
operations--what the political scientist John Mueller has dubbed "the Iraq syndrome." Those contending that the United States' grand strategy ineluctably leads the country into temptation need to present much more evidence before their case can be convincing.
KEEPING THE PEACE Of course, even if it is true that the costs of deep engagement fall far below what advocates of
The most obvious benefit
of the current strategy is that it reduces the risk of a dangerous conflict. The United States' security
commitments deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and dissuade
U.S. partners from trying to solve security problems on their own in ways that would end up threatening other
states. Skeptics discount this benefit by arguing that U.S. security guarantees aren't necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries from
erupting. They maintain that the high costs of territorial conquest and the many tools countries can use to signal their benign intentions
are enough to prevent conflict. In other words, major powers could peacefully manage regional multipolarity without the
American pacifier. But that outlook is too sanguine . If Washington got out of East Asia, Japan and South
Korea would likely expand their military capabilities and go nuclear , which could provoke a destabilizing
reaction from China . It's worth noting that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan tried to obtain nuclear weapons; the
only thing that stopped them was the United States, which used its security commitments to restrain their nuclear temptations. Similarly,
retrenchment claim, they would not be worth bearing unless they yielded greater benefits. In fact, they do.
were the U nited S tates to leave the Middle East , the countries currently backed by Washington--notably, Israel ,
Egypt , and Saudi Arabia --might act in ways that would intensify the region's security dilemmas. There
would even be reason to worry about Europe . Although it's hard to imagine the return of great-power military
competition in a post-American Europe, it's not difficult to foresee governments there refusing to pay the budgetary costs
of higher military outlays and the political costs of increasing EU defense cooperation. The result might be a
continent incapable of securing itself from threats on its periphery, unable to join foreign interventions on which U.S. leaders might
want European help, and vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. Given how easily a U.S. withdrawal from key
regions could lead to dangerous competition, advocates of retrenchment tend to put forth another argument: that such rivalries wouldn't
actually hurt the United States. To be sure, few doubt that the United States could survive the return of conflict among powers
in Asia or the Middle East--but at what cost? Were states in one or both of these regions to start competing against one
another, they
would likely boost their military budgets , arm client states , and perhaps even start regional proxy
wars, all of which should concern the United States, in part because its lead in military capabilities would narrow. Greater regional
insecurity could also produce cascades of nuclear proliferation as powers such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Japan, South
Korea, and Taiwan built nuclear forces of their own. Those countries' regional competitors might then also seek nuclear
arsenals. Although nuclear deterrence can promote stability between two states with the kinds of nuclear forces that the Soviet
Union and the United States possessed, things get shakier when there are multiple nuclear rivals with less robust
arsenals . As the number of nuclear powers increases, the probability of illicit transfers , irrational decisions ,
accidents , and unforeseen crises goes up. The case for abandoning the United States' global role misses the underlying security logic
of the current approach. By reassuring allies and actively managing regional relations, Washington dampens
competition in the world’s key areas, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse in which countries
would grow new military capabilities. For proof that this strategy is working, one need look no further than the
defense budgets of the current great powers: on average , since 1991 they have kept their military expenditures as A
percentage of GDP to historic lows , and they have not attempted to match the United States' top-end military capabilities.
Moreover, all of the world's most modern militaries are U.S. allies, and the United States' military lead over its potential
rivals is by many measures growing . On top of all this, the current grand strategy acts as a hedge against the emergence
regional hegemons. Some supporters of retrenchment argue that the U.S. military should keep its forces over the horizon and pass the
buck to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing rising regional powers. Washington, they contend, should deploy forces
abroad only when a truly credible contender for regional hegemony arises, as in the cases of Germany and Japan during World War II and
the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Yet there
is already a potential contender for regional hegemony-- China --and to
balance it, the United States will need to maintain its key alliances in Asia and the military capacity to intervene there.
The implication is that the United States should get out of Afghanistan and Iraq, reduce its military presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia.
Yet that is exactly what the Obama administration is doing. Preoccupied with security issues, critics of the current grand strategy
miss one of its most important benefits: sustaining an open global economy and a favorable place for the United States
within it. To be sure, the sheer size of its output would guarantee the United States a major role in the global economy
whatever grand strategy it adopted. Yet the country's military dominance undergirds its economic leadership . In
addition to protecting the world economy from instability, its military commitments and naval superiority help secure the sealanes and other shipping corridors that allow trade to flow freely and cheaply. Were the U nited S tates to pull back
from the world, the task of securing the global commons would get much harder. Washington would have less
leverage with which it could convince countries to cooperate on economic matters and less access to the military bases throughout the
world needed to keep the seas open. A global role also lets the United States structure the world economy in ways that serve its particular
economic interests. During the Cold War, Washington used its overseas security commitments to get allies to embrace the
economic policies it preferred--convincing West Germany in the 1960s, for example, to take costly steps to support the U.S. dollar
as a reserve currency. U.S. defense agreements work the same way today. For example, when negotiating the 2011 free-trade
agreement with South Korea, U.S. officials took advantage of Seoul's desire to use the agreement as a means of
tightening its security relations with Washington. As one diplomat explained to us privately, "We asked for changes in labor and
environment clauses, in auto clauses, and the Koreans took it all." Why? Because they feared a failed agreement would be "a setback to the
political and security relationship." More broadly, the United States wields its security leverage to shape the overall structure
of the global economy . Much of what the United States wants from the economic order is more of the same: for instance, it likes the
current structure of the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund and prefers that free trade continue. Washington
wins when U.S. allies favor this status quo , and one reason they are inclined to support the existing system is
because they value their military alliances. Japan, to name one example, has shown interest in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the
Obama administration's most important free-trade initiative in the region, less because its economic interests compel it to do so than because
Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda believes that his support will strengthen Japan's security ties with the United States. The United States'
geopolitical dominance also helps keep the U.S. dollar in place as the world's reserve currency, which confers
enormous benefits on the country, such as a greater ability to borrow money. This is perhaps clearest with Europe: the EU'S dependence
on the United States for its security precludes the EU from having the kind of political leverage to support the
euro that the United States has with the dollar. As with other aspects of the global economy, the United States does not provide its
leadership for free: it extracts disproportionate gains. Shirking that responsibility would place those benefits at risk. CREATING
COOPERATION What
goes for the global economy goes for other forms of international cooperation . Here, too,
order to counter transnational
threats , such as terrorism , piracy , organized crime , climate change , and pandemics , states have to work
together and take collective action. But cooperation does not come about effortlessly, especially when national
interests diverge. The United States' military efforts to promote stability and its broader leadership make it easier for
Washington to launch joint initiatives and shape them in ways that reflect U.S. interests. After all, cooperation is hard to
come by in regions where chaos reigns, and it flourishes where leaders can anticipate lasting stability . U.S.
alliances are about security first, but they also provide the political framework and channels of communication for
cooperation on nonmilitary issues . NATO, for example, has spawned new institutions, such as the Atlantic Council, a
think tank, that make it easier for Americans and Europeans to talk to one another and do business. Likewise, consultations
with allies in East Asia spill over into other policy issues; for example, when American diplomats travel to Seoul to manage the
military alliance, they also end up discussing the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Thanks to conduits such as this, the United States can use
bargaining chips in one issue area to make progress in others. The benefits of these communication channels are
especially pronounced when it comes to fighting the kinds of threats that require new forms of cooperation, such
as terrorism and pandemics. With its alliance system in place, the United States is in a stronger position than it would
otherwise be to advance cooperation and share burdens. For example, the intelligence-sharing network within NATO,
which was originally designed to gather information on the Soviet Union, has been adapted to deal with terrorism. Similarly, after
a tsunami in the Indian Ocean devastated surrounding countries in 2004, Washington had a much easier time orchestrating
a fast humanitarian response with Australia, India, and Japan, since their militaries were already comfortable working
with one another. The operation did wonders for the United States' image in the region. The United States' global role also has the
more direct effect of facilitating the bargains among governments that get cooperation going in the first place.
American leadership benefits many countries but disproportionately helps the United States. In
As the scholar Joseph Nye has written, "The American military role in deterring threats to allies, or of assuring access to a crucial resource
such as oil in the Persian Gulf, means that the provision of protective force can be used in bargaining situations. Sometimes the linkage may
be direct; more often it is a factor not mentioned openly but present in the back of statesmen's minds." THE DEVIL WE KNOW Should
America come home? For many prominent scholars of international relations, the answer is yes--a view that seems even wiser in the wake of
the disaster in Iraq and the Great Recession. Yet their arguments simply don't hold up. There is little evidence that the United States
would save much money switching to a smaller global posture. Nor is the current strategy self-defeating : it has
not provoked the formation of counterbalancing coalitions or caused the country to spend itself into economic
decline. Nor will it condemn the United States to foolhardy wars in the future. What the strategy does do is help
prevent the outbreak of conflict in the world's most important regions, keep the global economy humming , and make
international cooperation easier . Charting a different course would threaten all these benefits. This is not to
say that the United States' current foreign policy can't be adapted to new circumstances and challenges. Washington does not need to retain
every commitment at all costs, and there is nothing wrong with rejiggering its strategy in response to new opportunities or setbacks. That is
what the Nixon administration did by winding down the Vietnam War and increasing the United States' reliance on regional partners to
contain Soviet power, and it is what the Obama administration has been doing after the Iraq war by pivoting to Asia. These episodes of
rebalancing belie the argument that a powerful and internationally engaged America cannot tailor its policies to a changing world. A grand
strategy of actively managing global security and promoting the liberal economic order has served the United
States exceptionally well for the past six decades , and there is no reason to give it up now. The country's globe-spanning
posture is the devil we know, and a world with a disengaged America is the devil we don't know . Were American
leaders to choose retrenchment, they would in essence be running a massive experiment to test how the world would
work without an engaged and liberal leading power. The results could well be disastrous.
FBI
Federal prohibition creates a shortage of cyber-security workers
Aliya Sternstein 14, Next Gov Senior Correspondent, FEDERAL CYBER HIRING COULD TAKE A HIT
UNDER MARIJUANA MANDATE, March 14, http://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2014/03/federal-cyberhiring-could-take-hit-under-marijuana-mandate/80527/, accessed 8/7/14]jap
The Obama administration’s policy to uphold a ban on federal employees smoking pot -- even where recreational marijuana is now
legal under state law -- could snuff out efforts to hire nonconventional but trusted hackers to search for holes in
government computer systems. Many of the best of these white hats known as “ethical hackers” tend to shy away from the
establishment. "It is only recently that I started hearing that this state ban would be a challenge to hiring ethical hackers," said Kathleen Smith, chief management officer at
ClearedJobs.Net, an online forum for cleared security professionals that also hosts job fairs. "The managers are having a difficult time with balancing
between what an employee can do based on state law -- and what they are banned from doing based on federal law,
especially with regards to cleared work and their security clearance." A July 2013 blog post on state marijuana laws that appeared on ClearedJobs.Net
was the second most popular story on the site last year. It read: “Those of you with (or planning to obtain) security clearances who have an interest in adding marijuana use to your recreational
pastime may think, ‘Great! If I’m ever in Colorado or Washington State, I can smoke pot without any ramifications!’ Unfortunately, you are wrong!” Colorado on New Year's Day became the
first state to allow the use of marijuana for leisure, and Washington will follow this summer. The federal government effectively criminalized marijuana in 1937. Now the feds say they will look
Marijuana is
illegal under federal law and the rules prohibiting federal employees from using it still apply, regardless of state
laws,” a Justice Department spokesperson told Nextgov's sister publication Government Executive. Officials already had announced that federal employees
are barred from inhaling while working in Colorado or anywhere else where cannabis is legal . Undergraduate code
crackers – in high demand nationwide -- are seeing that some freedoms granted to their neighbors will not apply to them if they
join public service. "When I'm talking to college kids, I tell people: 'You are going to have to think about how you are going to change your life to do this,'" Smith said. A December
2013 letter to Obama administration officials from the information security trade group (ISC)2 said 61 percent of federal
employees surveyed "believe that their agency has too few information security workers to manage threats now, let alone
in the future, yet information security positions are going unfilled." Federal employers might be able to entice nonconventional computer whizzes with stimulants
the other way in states that legalize dope, unless they see drugged driving, distribution to minors or certain other infractions. Or, unless those rolling a joint work for them. “
instead of hallucinogens, Smith said. "What I found with people who like doing cleared work and working for the government is they like to work on the really cool stuff," said Smith, whose
clients include security cleared professionals in the federal government and private sector. "The price to work on the really cool stuff might be: Some of the recreational drug use I can't do any
longer."
Legalization is key to recruiting
Sam Tracy 14, Chairman of Students for Sensible Drug Policy, “The FBI Isn't Updating Its Drug-Related Hiring
Policies, But It Should Be,” 5-27-14, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sam-tracy/the-fbi-isnt-updatingits_b_5394775.html?utm_hp_ref=tw, DOA: 8-13-14, y2k
Last week, the Internet erupted in praise, skepticism, and played-out puns following reports that the FBI was reconsidering its
hiring restrictions on marijuana use. FBI Director James B. Comey said Monday that the agency was "grappling with the question right now" as the
country changed its approach to marijuana, but backpedaled two days later, declaring at a Senate hearing, "I am absolutely dead set against
using marijuana... I did not say I'm going to change that ban." It's a shame -- to stay as effective as possible, the FBI would do well to become more flexible on prospective
employees' marijuana use. The supposed potential change was a reaction to the agency's troubles recruiting hackers to fight
cybercrime amid growing threats from China and elsewhere. Comey, playing up stereotypes while stating a valid concern, went so far to say, "I have to hire a great
work force to compete with those cyber criminals and some of those kids want to smoke weed on the way to the interview." Meanwhile, the FBI's policies state that job
applicants can't have used marijuana within the past three years, any other illegal drug in the past 10, or ever sold or transported any illegal drug. It is
certainly true that many talented young hackers use marijuana . 14 percent of 18-29 year olds told the latest Gallup poll they were current marijuana users, and
36 percent reported trying it at some point in their lives -- and hackers are one of many subcultures well-known for their cannabis use. The cream of the crop is even more
susceptible to disqualification: a number of studies have found smart people are more likely to experiment with
drugs than their less-intelligent peers. But a policy change wouldn't just affect young hackers who use marijuana recreationally. The FBI employs over 35,000 people, from hackers to
secretaries to spies to janitors. When a young hacker who enjoys marijuana is turned away from an FBI job for her past-time, she can probably find a better-paying, drug-test-free job at Google,
Microsoft, or one of the countless startups hoping to be listed along with those giants one day. But a medical marijuana patient in one of the 21 states (and the nation's capital) where it's legal may
A majority of
Americans live in states where it's legal to use marijuana for medical purposes, and millions of adults who live in (or vacation to) Colorado can already use
it like they do alcohol or tobacco. Yet the federal government's unwillingness to update its approach to marijuana precludes
countless otherwise law-abiding citizens from serving our country in agencies like the FBI or CIA. This already-nonsensical
policy is all the more ridiculous when you consider our last three presidents -- each the ultimate head of the FBI -- has
admitted to past illegal drug use. If having used cocaine doesn't disqualify one from being Commander in Chief, why should it take you out of the running to be an entrylevel security analyst? The FBI could greatly expand its applicant pool, thus increasing the quality of its hires, if it simply threw out
the rules barring past drug use and focused instead on preventing on-the-job impairment. They've already eased up on their restrictions before: no one who used
not have as many options, and current FBI employees who could benefit from its use may turn to more risky treatment alternatives in order to keep their jobs.
marijuana more than 15 times could be hired before the FBI changed to its current policies in 2007. What drugs someone chooses to use has nothing to do with their trustworthiness or love of
country, and we'd all do well to stop pretending it does.
New recruits are key to FBI cyber-operations---solves espionage and grid attacks
Richard P. Quinn 14, National Security Assistant Special Agent in Charge, Philadelphia Field Office, Federal
Bureau of Investigation “Statement Before the House Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on Cyber
Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies,” 4-16-14, http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/thefbis-role-in-cyber-security, DOA: 8-13-14, y2k
FBI is a threat-focused, intelligence-driven organization. Each employee of the FBI understands that to mitigate the key threats facing our
adversaries continue to evolve, so, too, must the FBI. We live in a time of
acute and persistent terrorist, state-sponsored, and criminal threats to our national security, our economy, and our communities.
Today’s
nation, we must constantly strive to be more efficient and more effective. Just as our
These diverse threats facing our nation and our neighborhoods underscore the complexity and breadth of the FBI’s mission. We remain focused on defending the United States against terrorism,
foreign intelligence, and cyber threats; upholding and enforcing the criminal laws of the United States; protecting civil rights and civil liberties; and providing leadership and criminal justice
We face cyber threats from state-sponsored
hackers, hackers for hire, global cyber syndicates, and terrorists. They seek our state secrets, our trade secrets, our
technology, and our ideas—things of incredible value to all of us. They may seek to strike our critical infrastructure and our economy. Given the
scope of the cyber threat, agencies across the federal government are making cyber security a top priority. Within the FBI, we are prioritizing high-level
intrusions—the biggest and most dangerous botnets, state-sponsored hackers, and global cyber syndicates. We want to predict and prevent attacks, rather than simply react after the fact.
FBI agents, analysts, and computer scientists are using technical capabilities and traditional investigative
techniques—such as sources and wiretaps, surveillance, and forensics—to fight cyber crime. We are working side-by-side with our federal, state,
and local partners on Cyber Task Forces in each of our 56 field offices and through the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force (NCIJTF).
services to federal, state, local, and international agencies and partners. The Cyber Threat and FBI Response
Through our 24-hour cyber command center, CyWatch, we combine the resources of the FBI and NCIJTF, allowing us to provide connectivity to federal cyber centers, government agencies, FBI
We also work with the private sector through partnerships such as the
we are training our state and local counterparts to
triage local cyber matters, so that we can focus on national security issues. In addition, our legal attaché offices overseas work to coordinate
field offices and legal attachés, and the private sector in the event of a cyber intrusion.
Domestic Security Alliance Council, InfraGard, and the National Cyber Forensics and Training Alliance. And
cyber investigations and address jurisdictional hurdles and differences in the law from country to country. We are supporting partners at Interpol and The Hague as they work to establish
to be
successful in the fight against cyber crime, we must continue to recruit, develop, and retain a highly skilled
workforce. To that end, we have developed a number of creative staffing programs and collaborative private industry partnerships to ensure that over the long term we remain focused on
international cyber crime centers. We continue to assess other locations to ensure that our cyber personnel are in the most appropriate locations across the globe We know that
our most vital resource—our people. As the committee is well aware, the frequency and impact of cyber attacks on our nation’s private sector and government networks have increased
the FBI has seen an 82 percent increase in the number of
computer intrusion investigations. Recent Successes While the FBI and our partners have had multiple recent investigative successes against the threat, we are continuing
to push ourselves to respond more rapidly and prevent attacks before they occur. One area in which we recently have had great success with our overseas partners
is in targeting infrastructure we believe has been used in distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, and preventing
that infrastructure from being used for future attacks . A DDoS attack is an attack on a computer system or network that causes a loss of service to users, typically
dramatically in the past decade, and are expected to continue to grow. Since 2002,
the loss of network connectivity and services by consuming the bandwidth of the victim network. Since October 2012, the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have released
nearly 168,000 Internet Protocol addresses of computers that were believed to be infected with DDoS malware. We have released this information through Joint Indicator Bulletins (JIBs) to more
than 130 countries via DHS’s National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC), where our liaisons provide expert and technical advice for increased coordination and
These actions have enabled our foreign partners to take action and reduced the
effectiveness of the botnets and the DDoS attacks. We are continuing to target botnets through this strategy and others. In April 2013, the FBI Cyber Division initiated an
collaboration, as well as to our legal attachés overseas.
aggressive approach to disrupt and dismantle the most significant botnets threatening the economy and national security of the United States. This initiative, named Operation Clean Slate, is the
FBI’s broad campaign to implement appropriate threat neutralization actions through collaboration with the private sector, DHS, and other United States government partners, as well as our
foreign partners. This includes law enforcement action against those responsible for the creation and use of the illegal botnets, mitigation of the botnet itself, assistance to victims, public service
announcements, and long-term efforts to improve awareness of the botnet threat through community outreach. Although each botnet is unique, Operation Clean Slate’s strategic approach to this
significant threat ensures a comprehensive neutralization strategy, incorporating a unified public/private response and a whole-of-government approach to protect U.S. interests. The impact
botnets has been significant. Botnets have caused over $113 billion in losses globally, with approximately 378 million computers infected each year, equaling more than one million victims per
Operation Clean Slate has resulted in several successes. Working with our partners, we disrupted
the Citadel Botnet. This botnet was designed to facilitate unauthorized access to computers of individuals and financial institutions to steal online banking credentials, credit card
day, translating to 12 victims per second. To date,
information, and other personally identifiable information. Citadel was responsible for the loss of over a half billion dollars. As a result of our actions, more than 1,000 Citadel domains were
Building on the
success of the disruption of Citadel, in December 2013, the FBI and Europol, together with Microsoft and other industry partners, disrupted the
ZeroAccess Botnet. ZeroAccess was responsible for infecting more than two million computers, specifically targeting search results on Google, Bing, and Yahoo search engines, and
is estimated to have cost online advertisers $2.7 million each month. In January 2014, Aleksandry Andreevich Panin, a Russian national, pled guilty to
conspiracy to commit wire and bank fraud for his role as the primary developer and distributor of the malicious
software known as Spyeye, which infected more than 1.4 million computers in the United States and abroad. Based on information received from the financial services industry,
seized, accounting for more than 11 million victim computers worldwide. In addition, working with foreign law enforcement, we arrested a major user of the malware.
more than 10,000 bank accounts had been compromised by Spyeye infections in 2013 alone. Panin’s co-conspirator, Hamza Bendelladj, an Algerian national who helped Panin develop and
The need to prevent attacks is a key reason
the FBI has redoubled our efforts to strengthen our cyber capabilities while protecting privacy, confidentiality, and
civil liberties. The FBI’s Next Generation Cyber Initiative, which we launched in 2012, entails a wide range of measures, including focusing the Cyber Division on intrusions into
distribute the malware, was also arrested in January 2013 in Bangkok, Thailand. Next Generation Cyber Initiative
computers and networks—as opposed to crimes committed with a computer as a modality; establishing Cyber Task Forces in each of our 56 field offices to conduct cyber intrusion investigations
and respond to significant cyber incidents; hiring additional computer scientists to assist with technical investigations in the field; and expanding partnerships and collaboration at the NCIJTF.
FBI key---other actors fail
Gordon M. Snow 11, Assistant Director, Cyber Division Federal Bureau of Investigation, Statement Before the
Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism, April 12, 2011,
http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/cybersecurity-responding-to-the-threat-of-cyber-crime-and-terrorism, DOA: 813-14, y2k
As both an intelligence and law enforcement agency, the FBI can address every facet of a cyber case—from
collecting intelligence on the subjects in order to learn more about their networks to dismantling those networks and prosecuting the individual
perpetrators. The ability to take action on the information we collect is critical because what may begin as a criminal
investigation may become a national security threat. In addition, the FBI’s presence in legal attachés in 61 cities around the world assists in the critical
exchange of case-related information and the situational awareness of current threats, helping to combat the global scale and scope of cyber breaches. The FBI is also changing to adapt to the
ever-evolving technology and schemes used by cyber criminals. Intelligence now drives operations in the FBI. The Bureau is working in new ways with long-standing and new partners to
address the cybersecurity threat. Cyber Threats Against the Private Sector Cyber criminal threats to the U.S. result in significant economic losses. But the threat against financial institutions is
only part of the problem. Also of serious concern are threats to critical infrastructure, the theft of intellectual property, and supply chain issues. Cyber Threats to U.S. Critical Infrastructure
U.S. critical infrastructure faces a growing cyber threat due to advancements in the availability and
sophistication of malicious software tools and the fact that new technologies raise new security issues that cannot always be addressed
prior to adoption. The increasing automation of our critical infrastructures provides more cyber access points for adversaries to exploit. New “smart grid” and “smart home” products, designed to
provide remote communication and control of devices in our homes, businesses, and critical infrastructures, must be developed and implemented in ways that will also provide protection from
Industrial control systems, which operate
are at elevated risk of cyber exploitation
unauthorized use. Otherwise, each new device could become a doorway into our systems for adversaries to use for their own purposes.
the physical processes of the nation’s pipelines, railroads, and other critical infrastructures,
. The FBI is concerned about the
proliferation of malicious techniques that could degrade, disrupt, or destroy critical infrastructure. Although likely only advanced threat actors are currently capable of employing these
techniques, as we have seen with other malicious software tools, these capabilities will eventually be within reach of all threat actors. Intellectual Property Theft and Supply Chain Risks
Intellectual property rights violations, including theft of trade secrets, digital piracy, and trafficking counterfeit goods, also represent high cyber criminal threats, result ing in losses of billions of
dollars in profits annually. These threats also pose significant risk to U.S. public health and safety via counterfeit pharmaceuticals, electrical components, aircraft parts, and automobile parts.
Cyber crime that manipulates the supply chain could pose a threat to national security interests and U.S. consumers. Poorly manufactured computer chips or chips that have been salvaged and
repackaged infringe on intellectual property rights and could fail at critical times, posing a serious health and safety threat to U.S. citizens. Malware could be embedded on the chips to exfiltrate
information from computers and result in the theft of personally identifiable information (PII) that could then be used in future cyber crimes. As the quality of counterfeit goods increases, U.S.
consumers may be challenged to tell the difference between authentic and fraudulent goods. Operation Cisco Raider is a joint initiative between the U.S. and Canada that targets the illegal
distribution of counterfeit network hardware manufactured by private entities in China. The use of counterfeit network components can lead to exploitation of cyber infrastructure vulnerabilities
and even network failure. Since 2006, Operation Cisco Raider has seized over 3,500 network components amounting to $3.5 million of Cisco retail products. Ten individuals have been convicted
as a result of the joint initiative. The Booming Business of Botnets Botnets are networks of compromised computers controlled remotely by an attacker. Criminals use botnets to facilitate online
schemes that steal funds or data, to anonymize online activities, and to deny access by others to online resources. The botnets run by criminals could be used by cyber terrorists or nation states to
steal sensitive data, raise funds, limit attribution of cyber attacks, or disrupt access to critical national infrastructure. Today’s botnets are often modular and can add or change functionality using
internal update mechanisms. Today’s cyber criminals are business savvy. These criminals are building businesses based on the development, management, and sale of botnets. These criminal
groups have programmers who write the malicious software, salespeople who sell the code or lease out botnet services, and, in some instances, dedicated support personnel. These criminals are
working to make botnets easier to deploy and more difficult to detect. Successful botnet development and operations use techniques similar to legitimate businesses, including the involvement of
personnel with various specialties, feature-based pricing structures, modularization, and software copy protection. The development and sale of kit-based botnets has made it easier for criminals
with limited technical expertise to build and maintain effective botnets. Botnet development and management is approached in a business-like fashion. Some criminals rent or sell their botnets or
operate them as a specialized portion of an ad hoc criminal organization. At least one botnet kit author implemented a copy protection scheme, similar to major commercial software releases,
which attempts to limit unauthorized use of the botnet kit. Botnets that specialize in data exfiltration are able to capture the contents of encrypted webpages and modify them in real time. When
properly configured, criminals can ask additional questions at login or modify the data displayed on the screen to conceal ongoing criminal activity. Criminals purchase the base kits for a few
thousand dollars and can pay for additional features to better target specific webservices. The “Not for Profit” Cyber Criminal Hacktivist groups such as Anonymous undertake protests and
commit computer crimes as a collective unit. Anonymous does not have a leader or a controlling party, but instead relies on the collective power of individual participants. Its members utilize the
Internet to communicate, advertise, and coordinate their actions. Anonymous has initiated multiple criminal Distributed Denial of Service attacks against the Recording Industry Association of
America, the Motion Picture Association of America, the Church of Scientology, and various businesses in support of WikiLeaks. Just last month, Anonymous hacked into the website of a U.S.
security firm with U.S. government contracts and stole approximately 72,000 e-mails from the company and posted them online. This attack was in response to the claim that a researcher at the
company had identified key members of Anonymous. Financial Estimates of Damages Cyber criminals are forming private, trusted, and organized groups to conduct cyber crime. The adoption of
specialized skill sets and professionalized business practices by these criminals is steadily increasing the complexity of cyber crime by providing actors of all technical abilities with the necessary
tools and resources to conduct cyber crime. Not only are criminals advancing their abilities to attack a system remotely, but they are becoming adept at tricking victims into compromising their
own systems. Once a system is compromised, cyber criminals will use their accesses to obtain PII, which includes online banking/brokerage account credentials and credit card numbers of
individuals and businesses that can be used for financial gain. As cyber crime groups increasingly recruit experienced actors and pool resources and knowledge, they advance their ability to be
successful in crimes against more profitable targets and will learn the skills necessary to evade the security industry and law enforcement. The potential economic consequences are severe. The
sting of a cyber crime is not felt equally across the board. A small company may not be able to survive even one significant cyber attack. On the other hand, companies may not even realize that
they have been victimized by cyber criminals until weeks, maybe even months later. Victim companies range in size and industry. Often, businesses are unable to recoup their losses, and it may
be impossible to estimate their damage. Many companies prefer not to disclose that their systems have been compromised, so they absorb the loss, making it impossible to accurately calculate
damages. As a result of the inability to define and calculate losses, the best that the government and private sector can offer are estimates. Over the past five years, estimates of the costs of cyber
crime to the U.S. economy have ranged from millions to hundreds of billions. A 2010 study conducted by the Ponemon Institute estimated that the median annual cost of cyber crime to an
individual victim organization ranges from $1 million to $52 million. According to a 2011 publication released by Javelin Strategy and Research, the annual cost of identity theft is $37 billion.
This includes all forms of identity theft, not just cyber means. The Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3), which aggregates self-reported complaints of cyber crime, reports that in 2010, identity
our cyber adversaries’ capabilities are at an all-time high,
combating this challenge is a top priority of the FBI and the entire government. Thanks to Congress and the administration, we are devoting
significant resources to this threat. Our partnerships within industry, academia, and across all of government have also led
to a dramatic improvement in our ability to combat this threat. The FBI’s statutory authority, expertise, and ability to combine
resources across multiple programs make it uniquely situated to investigate, collect, and disseminate intelligence
about and counter cyber threats from criminals, nation-states, and terrorists. The FBI is a substantial component of
the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI), the interagency strategy to protect our digital infrastructure as
a national security priority. Through the CNCI, we and our partners collaborate to collect intelligence, gain visibility on our adversaries, and facilitate dissemination of critical information
to decision makers. The FBI has cyber squads in each of our 56 field offices , with more than 1,000 advanced cyber-trained
FBI agents, analysts, and forensic examiners. We have increased the capabilities of our employees by selectively seeking candidates with technical skills and
enhancing our cyber training. In addition, as part of the FBI’s overall transformation to an intelligence-driven organization, the Cyber
Division has implemented Threat Focus Cells, which bring together subject matter experts from various agencies to collaborate and address specific identified
theft schemes made up 9.8 percent of all cyber crime. Addressing the Threat Although
cyber threats.
Cyber-threat is high
Jordain Carney 14, Staff @ National Journal, “Defense Leaders Say Cyber is Top Terror Threat,” 1-6-14,
http://www.nationaljournal.com/defense/defense-leaders-say-cyber-is-top-terror-threat-20140106, DOA: 8-13-14,
y2k
Defense officials see cyberattacks as the greatest threat to U.S. national security, according to a survey released Monday.
Forty-five percent of respondents to the Defense News Leadership Poll named a cyberattack as the single greatest threat—nearly 20
percentage points above terrorism, which ranked second. The Defense News Leadership Poll, underwritten by United Technologies, surveyed 352 Defense News
subscribe
rs, based on job seniority, between Nov. 14 and Nov. 28, 2013. The poll targeted senior employees within the
White House, Pentagon, Congress, and the defense industry. "The magnitude of the cyber problem, combined with
declining budgets, will challenge the nation for years to come," said Vago Muradian, the editor of Defense News. It's not the first time cyber has ranked at or near
the top of a list of security concerns. Seventy percent of Americans called a cyberattack from another country a major threat in a Pew Research Center survey released last month. Defense
FBI Director James Comey, Rand Beers, the then-acting secretary for
the Homeland Security Department, and Gen. Keith Alexander, director of the National Security Agency, each voiced their
concerns before Congress last year. And House Intelligence Committee Chairman Mike Rogers, R-Mich., called it the "largest national
security threat to the face the U.S. that we are not even close to being prepared to handle as a country."
Department officials, for their part, have warned about the increasing threat.
Grid attacks wipe-out the US military---causes nuclear war
Robert Tilford 12, Graduate US Army Airborne School, Ft. Benning, Georgia, “Cyber attackers could shut down
the electric grid for the entire east coast” 2012, http://www.examiner.com/article/cyber-attackers-could-easily-shutdown-the-electric-grid-for-the-entire-east-coa
To make matters worse a
cyber attack that can take out a civilian power grid, for example could also cripple the U.S. military.¶
grids that supply cities and towns, stores and gas stations, cell towers and heart monitors also
power “every military base in our country.”¶ “Although bases would be prepared to weather a short power outage with
backup diesel generators, within hours, not days, fuel supplies would run out”, he said.¶ Which means military command and control
centers could go dark.¶ Radar systems that detect air threats to our country would shut Down completely.¶ “Communication
between commanders and their troops would also go silent. And many weapons systems would be left without either fuel or
electric power”, said Senator Grassley.¶ “So in a few short hours or days, the mightiest military in the world would be
left scrambling to maintain base functions”, he said.¶ We contacted the Pentagon and officials confirmed the threat of a
cyber attack is something very real.¶ Top national security officials—including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Director of the
National Security Agency, the Secretary of Defense, and the CIA Director— have said, “preventing a cyber attack and improving the nation’s electric
grids is among the most urgent priorities of our country” (source: Congressional Record). ¶ So how serious is the Pentagon taking all this?¶ Enough to start,
or end a war over it, for sure.¶ A cyber attack today against the US could very well be seen as an “Act of War” and could be met
with a “full scale” US military response.¶ That could include the use of “nuclear weapons”, if authorized by the President.
The senator notes that is that the same power
Cyber-terror causes accidental nuclear war
Jason Fritz 9, Former Captain of the U.S. Army, July, Hacking Nuclear Command and Control,
www.icnnd.org/Documents/Jason_Fritz_Hacking_NC2.doc
The US uses the two-man rule to achieve a higher level of security in nuclear affairs. Under this rule two authorized personnel must be present and in agreement
during critical stages of nuclear command and control. The President must jointly issue a launch order with the Secretary of Defense; Minuteman missile operators
must agree that the launch order is valid; and on a submarine, both the commanding officer and executive officer must agree that the order to launch is valid. In the
US, in order to execute a nuclear launch, an Emergency Action Message (EAM) is needed. This is a preformatted message that directs nuclear forces to execute a
specific attack. The contents of an EAM change daily and consist of a complex code read by a human voice. Regular monitoring by shortwave listeners and videos
posted to YouTube provide insight into how these work. These are issued from the NMCC, or in the event of destruction, from the designated hierarchy of command
and control centres. Once a command centre has confirmed the EAM, using the two-man rule, the Permissive Action Link (PAL) codes are entered to arm the
weapons and the message is sent out. These messages are sent in digital format via the secure Automatic Digital Network and then relayed to aircraft via singlesideband radio transmitters of the High Frequency Global Communications System, and, at least in the past, sent to nuclear capable submarines via Very Low
Frequency (Greenemeier 2008, Hardisty 1985). The technical details of VLF submarine communication methods can be found online, including PC-based VLF
potential “electronic back door into the US Navy’s system for
broadcasting nuclear launch orders to Trident submarines” (Peterson 2004). The investigation showed that cyber terrorists could
potentially infiltrate this network and insert false orders for launch. The investigation led to “elaborate new instructions for validating
reception. Some reports have noted a Pentagon review, which showed a
launch orders” (Blair 2003). Adding further to the concern of cyber terrorists seizing control over submarine launched nuclear missiles; The Royal Navy announced in
2008 that it would be installing a Microsoft Windows operating system on its nuclear submarines (Page 2008). The choice of operating system, apparently based on
This may attract hackers and narrow the necessary reconnaissance
to learning its details and potential exploits. It is unlikely that the operating system would play a direct role in the signal to launch, although this is
far from certain. Knowledge of the operating system may lead to the insertion of malicious code, which could be used to
Windows XP, is not as alarming as the advertising of such a system is.
gain accelerating privileges, tracking, valuable information, and deception that could subsequently be used to
initiate a launch. Remember from Chapter 2 that the UK’s nuclear submarines have the authority to launch if they believe the central command has been
destroyed.¶ Attempts by cyber terrorists to create the illusion of a decapitating strike could also be used to engage faildeadly systems. Open source knowledge is scarce as to whether Russia continues to operate such a system. However
evidence suggests that they have in the past. Perimetr, also known as Dead Hand, was an automated system set to launch a mass scale
nuclear attack in the event of a decapitation strike against Soviet leadership and military.¶ In a crisis, military officials
would send a coded message to the bunkers, switching on the dead hand. If nearby ground-level sensors detected a nuclear attack on
Moscow, and if a break was detected in communications links with top military commanders, the system would send low-frequency signals over underground
antennas to special rockets. Flying high over missile fields and other military sites, these rockets in turn would broadcast attack orders to missiles, bombers and, via
radio relays, submarines at sea. Contrary to some Western beliefs, Dr. Blair says, many of Russia's nuclear-armed missiles in underground silos and on mobile
launchers can be fired automatically. (Broad 1993) ¶ Assuming such a system is still active, cyber
terrorists would need to create a crisis
situation in order to activate Perimetr, and then fool it into believing a decapitating strike had taken place . While this is
not an easy task, the information age makes it easier. Cyber reconnaissance could help locate the machine and learn its inner
workings. This could be done by targeting the computers high of level official’s —anyone who has reportedly worked on such a
project, or individuals involved in military operations at underground facilities, such as those reported to be located at Yamantau and Kosvinksy mountains in the
central southern Urals (Rosenbaum 2007, Blair 2008) ¶ Indirect Control of Launch¶ Cyber
terrorists could cause incorrect information to be
transmitted, received, or displayed at nuclear command and control centres, or shut down these centres’ computer
networks completely. In 1995, a Norwegian scientific sounding rocket was mistaken by Russian early warning
systems as a nuclear missile launched from a US submarine. A radar operator used Krokus to notify a general on duty who decided to alert
the highest levels. Kavkaz was implemented, all three chegets activated, and the countdown for a nuclear decision began. It took eight minutes
before the missile was properly identified—a considerable amount of time considering the speed with which a nuclear response must be decided upon (Aftergood
2000).¶ Creating
a false signal in these early warning systems would be relatively easy using computer network
operations. The real difficulty would be gaining access to these systems as they are most likely on a closed network. However, if they are transmitting
wirelessly, that may provide an entry point, and information gained through the internet may reveal the details, such
as passwords and software, for gaining entrance to the closed network . If access was obtained, a false alarm could be
followed by something like a DDoS attack, so the operators believe an attack may be imminent, yet they can no longer verify it. This could
add pressure to the decision making process, and if coordinated precisely, could appear as a first round EMP burst.
Terrorist groups could also attempt to launch a non-nuclear missile, such as the one used by Norway, in an attempt to fool the
system. The number of states who possess such technology is far greater than the number of states who possess
nuclear weapons. Obtaining them would be considerably easier, especially when enhancing operations through
computer network operations. Combining traditional terrorist methods with cyber techniques opens opportunities
neither could accomplish on their own. For example, radar stations might be more vulnerable to a computer attack, while
satellites are more vulnerable to jamming from a laser beam, thus together they deny dual phenomenology. Mapping
communications networks through cyber reconnaissance may expose weaknesses, and automated scanning devices
created by more experienced hackers can be readily found on the internet. ¶ Intercepting or spoofing communications is a highly
complex science. These systems are designed to protect against the world’s most powerful and well funded militaries. Yet, there are recurring gaffes, and the very
nature of asymmetric warfare is to bypass complexities by finding simple loopholes. For example, commercially available software for voice-morphing could be used
to capture voice commands within the command and control structure, cut these sound bytes into phonemes, and splice it back together in order to issue false voice
commands (Andersen 2001, Chapter 16). Spoofing could also be used to escalate a volatile situation in the hopes of starting a nuclear war. “ [they cut off the
paragraph] “In June 1998, a group of international hackers calling themselves Milw0rm hacked the web site of India’s Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) and
put up a spoofed web page showing a mushroom cloud and the text “If a nuclear war does start, you will be the first to scream” (Denning 1999). Hacker
web-page defacements like these are often derided by critics of cyber terrorism as simply being a nuisance which causes no significant harm. However, web-page
defacements are becoming more common, and they point towards alarming possibilities in subversion. During the 2007 cyber attacks against Estonia, a counterfeit
letter of apology from Prime Minister Andrus Ansip was planted on his political party website (Grant 2007). This took place amid the confusion of mass DDoS
attacks, real world protests, and accusations between governments.
Cyber-espionage undermines missile defense and fuels global arms modernization
John Reed 13, a national security reporter for Foreign Policy, “Here's How Foreign Spies Are Now Getting U.S.
Weapons Tech,” 7-23-13, http://complex.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/07/23/heres_how_foreign_spies_are_now_getting_us_missile_tech, DOA: 8-14-14, y2k
foreign spies want to acquire
America's latest weapons technology, they just hack into networks and steal the digital designs. 2012 marked
the the first time, overseas intelligence agencies used cyber espionage - rather than the old-fashioned kind -- as their number one
way to pilfer information on U.S. weapons. That's according to a new report by one of Pentagon branches responsible for preventing such spying. Not
Forget the shady middlemen; never mind the students just a little too eager to find out the particulars of engines and warheads. Today, when
coincidentally, perhaps, half of all successful incidents in 2012 of espionage against American defense contractors originated in Asia, up from 43 percent the previous year. THis report
cyber attacks are steadliy replacing -- or at least complementing -- attempts to flat-out
purchase U.S. defense technology or simply ask for more information about it as the top MO of industrial intelligence operators. This shift from overt attempts at
higlights what plenty of us have come to grasp intuitively,
collecting information on U.S. weapons to cyber theft means that it may become more difficult to detect when a rival is trying to gain access to America's defense secrets. It also shows why
the Obama administration has been in such a tizzy of China's alleged industrial espionage.
According to the report from the Defense Security Service, these spies
were particularly interested in gathering information on U.S. electronics; worldwide collection attempts in this sector spiked
94 percent from the year before. A "substantial" number of those electronics were radiation-resistant electronics that can be used
in nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, aerospace and space programs, according to the report. "Foreign entities, especially
those linked to countries with mature missile programs, increasingly focuses collection efforts on U.S. missile
technology, usually aimed at particular missile subsystems," reads the report. Why are nations with mature missile programs trying to steal secrets about
American missile parts? To make their missiles even more deadly, of course. "After a country masters the chemistry and physics required to launch a missiles,
scientists and engineers can focus on accuracy and lethality, the desired characteristics of modern missiles," the report notes. Getting their hands on U.S. missile parts
will also help these countries defend against American weapons. "Reverse-engineering would probably give East Asia and
the Pacific scientists and engineers a better understanding of the capabilities of the targeted and acquired technology to develop
countermeasures to U.S. weapons systems," reads the document. Overall, foreign spies' top four American targets were "information systems; electronics;
lasers, optics and sensors; and aeronautic systems technologies," according to the report. All of these are crucial parts of the weapons that have given
the U.S. a clear advantage on battlefields for the last 20 years. Information systems are how the US military passes
massive amounts of intelligence and communications data. Meanwhile optics, lasers and sensors are key
technologies that help American drones spy on enemies and that guide its smart weapons onto targets. Aeronautic
systems technologies, as you know, are the parts that make up the Pentagon's next-generation rockets, stealth drones and fighters -exactly the types of weapons that nations like China are trying to replicate. The report doesn't specifically call out China as the home of
these spies. But let's be honest, the vast majority of espionage attempts originating from Asia are likely coming from China. "DSS continues to take the politically correct route and hide
China within the ‘East Asia and Pacific' category, disappointing," Richard Bejtlich, chief security officer of the cybersecurity firm Mandiant, told Killer Apps after reading the report. The
Defense Security Service document was published on July 17, two days before David Shedd, deputy director of the Defense Intelligence Agency told Killer Apps that his agency is
constantly finding new attempts by foreign government to install spyware on U.S. weapon systems. (In 2011, a Senate investigation found that tons of counterfeit electronic parts made in
Far East countries -targeted everything from the Standard Missiles and Ground Based
Interceptors used for missile defense to TOW antitank missiles, Trident Submarine launched nuclear missiles,
Tomahawk cruise missiles and Patriot anti-aircraft missiles and Harpoon anti-ship missiles. It's bad enough that U.S.
China were making their way into U.S. weapons; these parts could hide spyware or ‘back doors' allowing enemies to take over or disable the weapons.)
who accounted for 54 percent of the interest in American missile tech --
intelligence officials are constantly discovering new plans to insert spyware and back doors into the Defense Department's supply chain. But what may be worse is that American analysts
"Our
adversaries are very active in trying to introduce material into the supply chain in ways that threaten our security
from the standpoint of their abilities to collect [intelligence] and disrupt" U.S. military operations, said David
Shedd, deputy director of the Defense Intelligence Agency during a speech at the Aspen Security Forum in Colorado on July 19. DIA is finding more and more plots to deliver these
are only discovering indirect evidence of this infiltration, according to a senior DOD intelligence official. The back doors themselves remain maddeningly hard to find.
parts through front companies that are "the instrument of the hostile service that's guiding and directing them," Shedd told Killer Apps during the forum. "My concern is that our adversaries
-- and they're multiple in the supply chain context -- have been very active for a very long time," David Shedd, deputy director of the Defense Intelligence Agency told Killer Apps at the
Aspen Security Forum in Colorado. "We're finding things, not in the supply chain itself but plans and intentions through" front companies posing as legitimate DOD parts suppliers. This is
hardly a new threat. (Yours truly has written about the epidemic of counterfeit parts poisoning DOD supply chains since 2008.) A 2011 Senate investigation discovered an unbelievable
amount of fake semiconductors in brand new DOD weapons such as the Navy's P-8 Poseidon sub-killing plane and anti-ICBM missiles used by the Missile Defense Agency. Perhaps
In addition to the obvious safety threat posed by say, fake aircraft bolts or wiring
one of the main dangers to the supply chain is that spyware or back doors can be built into critical electronic
circuits. Spyware and backdoors could allow an enemy to easily monitor U.S. operations or even disable American
weapons systems. Israel is rumored to have used digital back doors planted in the software of Syrian air defenses to disable their radars during its 2007 air strike against the
unsurprisingly, the vast majority of the parts were found to come from China.
harnesses,
Dayr as-Zawr nuclear facility. Just as scary as the fact that this kind of espionage has been going on for years, is the fact that the massive advantage the U.S. military has in hardware and
manpower doesn't exist in the digital world. "As we learn more about our own cyber requirements and needs, we have a better understanding that the world is a flatter world in terms of
what our adversaries can do in the supply chain," Shedd told Killer Apps.
a little bit that
While DOD has poured counterintelligence resources at the problem, "I sense
it's insufficient" said Shedd during his speech.
Global modernization causes nuclear war
C.D. Haney 14, Admiral and Commander of the US Strategic Command, “Statement Before the Senate
Committee on Armed Services, 2-27-14, http://www.stratcom.mil/files/2014_Posture_Statement.pdf, DOA: 8-1414, y2k
The current security environment is more complex, dynamic and uncertain than at any time in recent history. Advances
of significant nation state and non-state military capabilities continue across all air, sea, land, and space domains—as well as in
cyberspace. This trend has the potential to adversely impact strategic stability. Nation states such as Russia and China
are investing in long-term and wide-ranging military modernization programs to include extensive modernization of their strategic
capabilities. Nuclear weapons ambitions and the proliferation of weapon and nuclear technologies continues, increasing risk
that countries will resort to nuclear coercion in regional crises or nuclear use in future conflicts. A number of actors are
improving their existing Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) capabilities while others are pursuing new capabilities along with the technologies
to deliver deadly agents against targets of their choice. These include nations as well as non-state Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs).
Missile defense solves nuclear war and checks A2/AD capabilities
Richard Weitz 13, director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis and a Senior Fellow at the Hudson
Institute, “The Geopolitics of Missile Defense: Many nations already have, or are acquiring, short- and medium-
range missiles. The United States is leading the efforts to negate such threats,” 4-5-13,
http://thediplomat.com/2013/04/the-geopolitics-of-missile-defense/?allpages=yes, DOA: 8-14-14, y2k
The United States finds itself at the heart of the international politics of missile defense. Its leading global role in developing
and deploying BMD technologies and its worldwide network of alliances both empower and oblige the United States to defend much
of the world from missile attack. These same alignments also provide the ties the Pentagon needs to construct a globally linked network of BMD sensors and facilities. For
this reason, Washington has lobbied its friends and allies to cooperate with U.S. regional BMD initiatives as a means to strengthen mutual defense capabilities and to supplement traditional U.S.
nuclear and conventional deterrence guarantees with missile defenses. The Obama administration has also used its strong investments in missile defense to reassure countries concerned by the
missile defenses
complement deterrence by causing potential aggressors to doubt that any attack could succeed as well as providing
a hedge should deterrence fail. More than 30 countries already have, or are acquiring, short- and medium-range missiles able
to deliver conventional payloads at great speed and distance. Some are trying to develop longer-range missiles that can
carry warheads armed with various weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, and biological). The 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review
(BMDR) predicts that the missile threats to the United States and its allies will grow in quantity and quality as
antagonistic states increase the size and capabilities of their ballistic missiles. With respect to the latter, ballistic missile systems are becoming more
flexible, mobile, reliable, survivable, accurate, and able to fly longer and farther. In principle, U.S. BMD systems make several critical contributions to U.S.
security. They can: · defend the American homeland, U.S. forces and citizens located overseas, and U.S. friends and allies · deter such
attacks by enhancing both the capacity and the perceived will of the defender to thwart any aggression · dissuade potential
aggressors from seeking to acquire and deploy ballistic missiles or nuclear warheads by reducing their perceived
value · reassure U.S. friends and allies about the U.S. will and commitment to defend them, which contributes to other U.S. goals such as dissuading them from obtaining nuclear or other
destabilizing retaliatory weapons · overcome anti-access/area-denial (A2AD) and other asymmetric tactics that use missiles to try to negate
U.S. conventional advantages Under both the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations, the United States has employed a variety of tools to address these
administration’s desire to downplay the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. foreign policy. U.S. officials have persuaded most allied governments that
missile threats. U.S. officials have engaged in bilateral and multilateral diplomacy in an effort to persuade North Korea and Iran to end their nuclear weapons programs and refrain from the
further testing of ballistic missiles. They have also used declaratory policy by repeatedly warning these countries against developing, testing, or using these capabilities. Additionally, the United
States has provided security assistance to help U.S. allies enhance their own defense capabilities. The Pentagon also bases or deploys large numbers of U.S. troops in each region, with an
impressive range of conventional and unconventional capabilities, reinforced by U.S.-based assets with global reach, such as long-range strategic bombers. The United States has offered many of
the United States has
been constructing missile defense architectures in each region as well as globally to counter Iranian and North Korean missile
threats. These include short-range missile defense systems such as PAC-3 batteries, theater defenses such as THAAD
and Aegis-equipped naval vessels, and the ground-based midcourse interceptors based in Alaska and California.
these countries diverse security guarantees, including implicit and sometimes explicit pledges to potentially employ U.S. nuclear capabilities to protect them. Finally,
A2/AD causes Chinese expansion in the SCS
Hicks et al 12, Rear Admiral Hicks, USN (Ret.), former commanding officer of the Aegis cruiser USS Cape St.
George (CG 71) and former Program Director, Aegis BMD, is Vice President, Naval Surface Radars, Lockheed
Martin MS2—AND—Captain Galdorisi, USN (Ret.), is director of the Corporate Strategy Group at the Space and
Naval Warfare Systems Center Pacific—AND—Dr. Truver is Director, National Security Programs, Gryphon
Technologies LC. He also serves on the editorial board of the Naval War College Review. “THE AEGIS BMD
GLOBAL ENTERPRISE,” Naval War College Review, Summer 2012, Vol. 65, No. 3, A “High End” Maritime
Partnership, DOA: 8-15-14, y2
China also is crafting an antiaccess/area-denial
strategy for the western Pacific based in part on the operational-level use of ballistic missiles. As underscored recently in these pages, “China
seeks the capacity to find U.S. aircraft carriers roughly a thousand miles from the mainland and to attack them with homing ASBMs (antiship
Iran and North Korea are not alone in leveraging this aspect of potential ballistic- missile employment.
ballistic missiles).”12 The most prominent aspect of this threat is China’s development of the world’s first “carrier killer” ballistic missile, the DF-21D. Another commentator has declared, “The
The Pentagon has described China’s programme as ‘the
most active land-based ballistic- and cruise-missile programme in the world.’ Missiles are good value. Compared with a fully equipped aircraft-carrier, which might cost $15
billion–20 billion, a missile costs about $1m. . . . And American strategists are closely watching an experimental anti-ship ballistic missile with a manoeuvrable
warhead, which could make it hard for American fleets to approach the Chinese shore.”14 A January 2011 New York Times editorial
captured the level of concern regarding China’s emerging capabilities: Beijing’s drive to extend its military and territorial reach is making
America’s close allies in the region nervous and raising legitimate questions about American diplomacy and future military procurement. The commander of America’s
Pacific forces recently revealed that China could soon deploy a ballistic missile capable of threatening American aircraft carriers in the region.
DF-21D is the ultimate carrier-killer missile.”13 Indeed, as The Economist has pointed out, “
The Pentagon has a long history of hyping the Chinese threat to justify expensive weapons purchases, and sinking welldefended ships with ballistic missiles is notoriously hard. But what should
China seems increasingly intent on challenging
United States naval supremacy in the western Pacific. At the same time it is aggressively pressing its claims to disputed offshore islands
in the East and South China Seas. Washington must respond, carefully but firmly. The Pentagon must accelerate efforts to make American naval
forces in Asia less vulnerable to Chinese missile threats by giving them the means to project their deterrent power from further offshore.15 Some would
downplay the threat posed by China and the DF-21D missile, arguing that—as a result of the “Walmart Factor” that
intertwines the two economies —state-on-state conflict with China is not likely.16 However, China needs only to make
rightly concern American military planners is not so much the missile but the new Chinese naval strategy behind it.
the likely cost to the United States of intervening in western Pacific affairs— to counter Chinese threats against Taiwan or
bullying of neighbors over disputed claims in the South China Sea—high enough to render intervention no longer
a reasonable deterrent.17 Moreover, China’s increasing dependence on Mideast oil creates plausible scenarios in which it would export the DF21D to countries like Iran. Given the marginal success of ongoing nonproliferation efforts, DF-21Ds could find their way to yet other governments or even to transnational or terrorist groups with
To counter the most pressing part of this spectrum of ballistic-missile threats— states already
possessing WMD-armed ballistic missiles—the United States has fielded an initial national-level BMDS, integrating land,
sea, air, and space elements. The first priority of the BMDS implementation strategy—establishing a limited defensive capability against North Korean ballistic missiles—has
animus toward the United States, its allies, or friends.
largely been achieved, with Patriot Advanced Capability–3 (PAC-3) batteries, the Ground- Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, the forward-deployed AN/TPY-2 radar, and Aegis BMD
ships for long-range search, cueing, and engagement.
Causes nuclear war over the West Philippines
The Manila Times 13, citing Stratfor, “The West Philippine Sea: A nuclear flashpoint?” 11-3-13,
http://www.manilatimes.net/the-west-philippine-sea-a-nuclear-flashpoint/50175/ DOA: 8-15-14, y2k
The analytical piece of Stratfor on China’s grand plan to beef up its submarine-based nuclear arsenal shines new light on
Beijing’s intentions in the West Philippine Sea. China has long staked a claim on the small islands, atolls and rocky outcrops
that dot the West Philippine Sea (which is how the South China Sea is now referred to by Philippine officialdom). The popular perception is that the Chinese want to tap its vast
oil, gas and mineral deposits and rich fishing grounds. But at least four other countries, the Philippines included, also want to partake of the West Philippine Sea’s bounty, and
consider China as encroaching in their territory. The border dispute has churned up a political maelstrom that threatens
to engulf the entire region. Lately, China has become more forceful in asserting its claim and has increased its naval
presence in the contested zone. Last week, the New York Times reported that a general in the Chinese army has revealed that Beijing plans to set up a naval blockade around the Panatag Shoal and other disputed areas and
starve out the remote outposts of rival claimants. Stratfor sees China’s aggressiveness as more than just an attempt to help itself to the West
Philippine Sea’s resources. The Asian superpower wants to secure the area for its missile-equipped nuclear submarines and
eventually provide the subs access to the Pacific Ocean, “to enhance its deterrent potential against other nuclear powers, especially the US, Russia and India,” according to Stratfor. A recent Reuters report puts
China’s “blue-water” expansion into sharper prospective. It quoted Japanese and Western naval experts as saying Chinese shipyards “are turning out new nuclear and conventional submarines, destroyers, missile-armed patrol boats
This is a disturbing development for the Philippines. It already has its hands full
fending off Chinese incursions into its waters; now it faces the grim prospect of getting caught in the middle of a nuclear
conflict between superpowers. China’s daring designs on the West Philippine Sea come at a time when the United States is shifting 60 percent of its naval forces to the Pacific, a move that many
and surface ships at a higher rate than any other country.”
interpret as Washington’s way of blunting Beijing’s seaward thrust. A key component of the US pivot is the stationing of American troops in the Philippines on a rotating basis and equipping the Armed Forces with coastal radar
The US and China may be on a
collision course just off our shores, unless a diplomatic balance brings about de-escalation. But Beijing has gone on a diplomatic offensive as well, trying to win over Asian
facilities. With the revelation of the Chinese general, the US will no doubt include aircraft and surface vessels that could detect and destroy submarines.
countries by dangling the economic carrot. For the moment, Malacanang is treading cautiously, not wanting to be drawn into a new confrontation with Beijing over the Chinese general’s pronouncement. “We won’t comment on that
yet because we don’t want to automatically attribute such statement to the Chinese government. It would be better for us not to comment on that matter which is already sensitive as it is,” presidential spokesman Abigail Valte said.
But
expect the West Philippine Sea to continue to be a flashpoint in the years to come.
Plan
The United States should legalize marihuana and remove it from the Controlled Substances
Act.