Order and Disorder: Law, Institutions, and Rogues

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LATIN AMERICA IN THE
CONTEMPORARY WORLD
ORDER AND DISORDER:
LAWS, INSTITUTIONS, AND ROGUES
OUTLINE
 International law
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Background and Compliance
Implications for Latin America
 International organizations (Where can Latin
America go?)
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United Nations
Organization of American States
 Rogues (and Quasi-Rogues)
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Russia
Iran
Venezuela?
Major Terrorist Movements
 Reflections on order and disorder
ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
 Principles reflect shared interests of states (e.g. immunity of diplomatic
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personnel, prohibition against acquisition of territory by conquest)
Provides sense of authoritative rules
Defines rights and duties, clarifying expectations…thus addressing the
“shadow of the future”
No centralized enforcement mechanism
Reasons for compliance:
 Fear of chaos
 Fear of reprisal (including punishment by states not involved in
dispute at hand)
 Reluctance to set precedents for other states
 Maintenance of reputation (“the golden rule condition”)
IMPLICATIONS FOR LATIN AMERICA
 Leveling the playing field
 Reluctance of stronger actors (i.e., the United States)
 Selective compliance
 Overwhelmed by unforeseen issues (e.g. 9/11)
INTERGOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS
 Created by two or more states (or IGOs) by a formal constitution or
instrument that establishes some form of continuous administrative
structure.
 Global
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United Nations
World Bank
International Monetary Fund
 Regional
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European Union
Organization of American States
CELAC
 Minilateral
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Mercosur
ALBA
Alianza del Pacífico
NAFTA
IGO ROLES
 Forum for interaction and consultation
 Promotion of cooperation + settlement of disputes
 Common fronts against outside actors
 Establish rules for member state behavior
 Instruments for policy interests of member states
 Key concern: sovereignty vs. cooperation
 As useful as member states want them to be; as successful as they are
perceived to be.
IGO VARIATIONS
 Focus
 Security/geopolitics
 Prosperity/geoeconomics
 Culture/education etc.
 Breadth of Membership
 Large/likely to have more capabilities
 Small/easier to reach decisions
 Degree of institutionalization/centralization
 Resources
 Dues/money
 Troops/weapons
 Basis of authority
THE UNITED NATIONS:
MEMBERSHIP
 1945
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51 (including 20 from Latin America)
1960 99
1980 154
2000 189
2011 193
 Admittance by two-thirds vote of the General Assembly upon
recommendation by the Security Council
 LAC assigned one nonpermanent seat on the Security Council (now
held by Venezuela)
THE UNITED NATIONS: STRUCTURE
 Principal agencies
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Security Council
General Assembly
Secretariat
International Court of Justice
Trusteeship Council
Economic and Social Council
 Budget share for selected members
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United States
Russia
Brazil
Mexico
Uruguay
22.0 %
2.4 %
2.9 %
1.8 %
0.05 %
THE UN AND LATIN AMERICA
 Twenty-third vote in General Assembly on U.S.
embargo of Cuba: 188 against the embargo, 2 in
favor (U.S. and Israel), with 3 abstentions by Pacific
mini-states (2014)
 Ambivalence regarding Security Council: raises
profile but also potential costs (as in vote on U.S.
invasion of Iraq, 2003)
 Long-term decline in proportion of membership
 Intra-American disputes usually resolved elsewhere
THE ORGANIZATION OF
AMERICAN STATES
 Origins: International Conference of American
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States, Washington DC, 1889-1890
Foundation: Bogotá, 1948
Purpose: to achieve among member states “an
order of peace and justice, to promote their
solidarity, to strengthen their collaboration, and to
defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity,
and their independence” (Article 1 of charter)
34 member states (plus Cuba)
“a club for the protection of incumbent presidents”
OAS, CUBA, AND THE U.S.
 1954: John Foster Dulles argues that Monroe Doctrine should
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“include the concept of outlawing foreign ideologies in the American
republics” and promotes resolution denouncing Arbenz regime in
Guatemala (approved 17-1-2, with Mexico and Argentina abstaining)
1962: Cuba expelled because of “incompatible” embrace of MarxistLeninism and Soviet Union
1965: LBJ administration obtains OAS support for U.S invasion of
Dominican Republic
1960s- : Cuba denounces OAS as tool of U.S. “Ministry of Colonies”
1990s: OAS struggles to regain legitimacy
2009: OAS suspends Honduras after coup against Zelaya; readmitted
in 2011 in wake of negotiations brokered by Chávez and Santos
2009: OAS lifts 1962 ban and approves a resolution that Cuba can
regain active membership as result of dialogue initiated by request of
the government of Cuba
ROGUE STATES
 “a nation or state regarded as breaking international
law and posing a threat to the security of other
nations”
 Cases:
 Russia
 Iran
 Venezuela (under Chávez)
 Al Qaeda and Islamic State
ELEMENTS OF PUTIN DOCTRINE
per Vladimir Ryzhkov
 1. “The Kremlin no longer considers the West as a partner deserving its trust.”
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Evidence: effort to draw Ukraine into NATO.
2. “Russia no longer considers itself part of European or even more EuroAtlantic civilization.” A democracy but “a special type.” Evidence: If nearly all
Russians support reunification of Crimea, “this decision has firm democratic
legitimacy.”
3. “International law is no longer a system of rules or even a system of
coordinates… [rather] a menu from which every strong country can choose
what is useful to itself.”
4. Post-Soviet space represents the “historic legacy” of Russia and “the
strategic security of Russia.” It is “the near abroad.”
5. Modification of Westphalian world: inviolability of state sovereignty applies
only to states that are able to “defend [themselves] with their own army or
military political bloc.”
6. Role of IGOs “will be sharply reduced.”
7. Changing balance of forces may lead “major non-Western countries… to be
interested” in Putin’s new rules of the game.
PUTIN vs. THE WEST
 Sources of threat : EU and NATO, in partnership with USA
 Putin: America “wants to freeze the order established after the Soviet
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collapse and remain an absolute leader, thinking it can do whatever it
likes, while others can do only what is in that leader’s interests. Maybe
some want to live in a semi-occupied state, but we do not.” Putin has a
coherent long-term plan.
Major military build-up; willing to use nuclear weapons for first strike.
Possible targets after Ukraine: former Soviet republics.
Potential political tactic: discredit NATO’s commitment to mutual selfdefense…perhaps by provoking a pro-Russian uprising in Estonia or
Latvia.
The Economist: Putin “plays by different rules; indeed, for him, there
are no inviolable rules, nor universal values, nor even cast-iron facts
(such as who shot down flight MH17).”
RUSSIA AND LATIN AMERICA
 July 2014: Putin makes weeklong visit to Brazil, Argentina, Nicaragua,
Cuba, in connection with sixth BRICS summit
 “Russia wants to counterbalance the United States, but wants to do so
together with China and other BRIC countries. Russia positions itself
as a separate pole of power, but not as a single alternative.”
 Agenda: trade (including military sales) + promotion of GLANOSS,
Russia’s alternative to U.S. government-sponsored GPS system (both
Cuba and Argentina agreed)
 Agreement with Cuba to reopen former Soviet listening station at
Lourdes (near Havana)
I
IRANIAN FOREIGN POLICY
(POST-1979)
 Post-1979
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Consolidate revolution and spread Islamic influence; under
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, sharp turn away from United States,
which imposes sanctions (later imposed by UN and EU as well);
hostage crisis a key to mutual hostility (52 Americans, 444 days)
 1980-88
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War with Iraq under Saddam Hussein; leads to “reorientation phase”
of Iranian foreign policy
 Post-1988
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Improvement of relations with EU, China, India, and Russia; refusal
to recognize Israel (+ vows to “destroy” Israel); helps organize
Hezbollah militia (and organization) in Lebanon; forges close ties
with Syria, which supported Iran in war with Iraq; hostile to Saudi
Arabia. Current president Hassan Rouhani eager to eliminate
sanctions.
IRAN: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
 Armed force for geopolitical goals
Post 9/11 gains: U.S. removal of hostile states in Iraq and Afghanistan
 Fighting against Islamic State has strengthened Iran’s position in Iraq
 Major support for Assad in Syria, influence in Lebanon
 Endorsement of terrorist actions
 Quest for nuclear weapons
 Has materials and technical capacity, declares peaceful intentions
 Strongly opposed by Israel and West
 Negotiations with P5+1 over “breakout ”time; inspections; ICBMs;
possible relocation of materials in another country
 Kenneth Waltz: “Power begs to be balanced…if Iran desires nuclear
weapons, it is for the purpose of providing for its own security, not to
improve its offensive capabilities (or destroy itself)… where nuclear
capabilities emerge, so, too, does stability.”
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IRAN AND LATIN AMERICA
 After election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005, Iran increases
number of embassies in Latin America from 5 to 11. “When the
Western countries were trying to isolate Iran, we went to the U.S.
backyard.”
 Norman Bailey, U.S. analyst: Iranian activities “designed to facilitate
and provide cover for illegal and subversive endeavors that not only
involve the Iranian government but also terrorist organizations such as
Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, the Colombian FARC and drug
cartels from Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela.”
 One key Iranian goal: gaining support for nuclear program
(forthcoming from Lula of Brazil).
 Crises in Argentina:
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1994: bombing of Jewish center in Buenos Aires; Iran a primary suspect
2015: prosecutor Alberto Nisman murdered day before presenting evidence of joint cover-up
by Argentina and Iran
VENEZUELA AS WOULD-BE ROGUE
 Breaks rules of diplomacy in “devil” speech
 Challenges U.S. with ALBA
 Close relations with Russia, Iran, Syria, other rogues
(and oil producers)
 But:
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No overt support for terrorism or drug trafficking
Economic ties to U.S.
Challenge essentially symbolic and rhetorical
Decline of profile under Maduro
MAJOR TERRORIST
ORGANIZATIONS
 Al Qaeda
 Islamic State
 No (observable) direct impact on Latin America or
its relations with major world powers
REFLECTIONS ON
ORDER AND DISORDER
 What is order?
 Maintenance of status quo?
 Acceptance of balance of power?
 Peace not war?
 Compliance with prevailing rules of the game?
 What is disorder?
 Attempt to change status quo?
 Successful attempt to change status quo?
 Rewriting rules of the game?
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