WISA 2004 (23-25, Aug) Efficient Group Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol for Dynamic Groups Kui Ren*, Hyunrok Lee*, Kwangjo Kim*, and Taewhan Yoo** * IRIS, Information and Communications University, Daejeon, Korea ** Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute, Daejeon, Korea Contents Introduction EGAKA Overview Notation and Primitives EGAKA EGAKA-KE (Key Establishment) EGAKA-KU (Key Update) Complexity & Security Analysis Conclusion Q&A 2 Introduction Secure group communication A (large) group of users communicate with one another in a secure way (1/3) Ex) Teleconferencing, Collaborative work, Multiple interactive game, VPN (Virtual Private Networks), Wireless Ad-hoc Networks Dynamic Peer Groups Relatively small (~ 100 of members) No hierarchy Frequent membership changes Any member can be sender and receiver 3 Introduction (2/3) Group Key Management A group key Shared only by current group members Communication encrypted/decrypted by the group key Difficult aspect Dynamics Join Leave: Backward secrecy Allow the joining member(s) to decrypt future messages, but not previous messages Forward secrecy Prevent the leaving member(s) from decrypting future messages Burst behavior: Multiple joins and/or multiple leaves simultaneously. 4 Introduction Classification Group Key Distribution One party generates a secret key and distributes to others Not suitable for dynamic groups Group Key Agreement (3/3) Secret key is derived jointly by two or more parties Key is a function of information contributed by each member No party can pre-determine the key Motivation Need Group Key Agreement Strong security Dynamic membership management Adapt to heterogeneous environments Efficiency in communication and computation 5 EGAKA Overview (1/2) EGAKA Efficient Group Authenticated Key Agreement protocol Important Properties Can be built on any two-party authenticated key exchange protocols Distributed Fault-tolerant Efficient dynamic group membership management Mutual authentication among group members Secure against both passive and active attacks E.g. Diffie-Hellman protocol, password based protocol Achieves scalability and robustness in heterogeneous environments provides efficient member join services Low communication and computation costs, and they are constant to the group size. 6 EGAKA Overview Trust Model (2/2) Any single current member can authenticate the new members and accept them. Assumption Do not consider insider attacks The secrecy of group keys and the integrity of group membership The size of dynamics group < 200 Group members in dynamic groups have different security primitives For generating the group key Use Common two-party key exchange protocol 7 Notation and Primitives (1/4) 8 Notation and Primitives (2/4) Root node KG N 6 d 3 N11 K135 N 21 K15 B15 N 22 K123456 B135 h( K135 ) K3 l0 N12 K 246 B246 M1 K 5 N 32 M5 Key pair: Kij & Bij l 1 B4 N 23 N 24 K 26 B26 K4 l 2 B3 M3 K1 N 31 Interior node M4 K 6 N 33 K 2 N 34 M6 M2 Isolated Leaf node l 3 Leaf node 9 Notation and Primitives K G K123456 N 6 d 3 (3/4) N11 K135 B135 h( K135 ) N 21 N 22 K15 B15 K3 l0 N12 K 246 B246 CP5* = {N31, N22, N12} l 1 B4 N 23 N 24 K 26 B26 K4 l 2 B3 M3 M4 K1 N 31 K 5 N 32 K 6 N 33 K 2 N 34 M1 M5 M6 M2 l 3 KP5* = {N32, N21, N11} 10 Notation and Primitives KG N 6 d 3 N11 K135 N 21 K15 B15 N 22 K123456 B135 h( K135 ) K3 l0 N12 K 246 B246 M1 K 5 N 32 M5 l 1 B4 N 23 N K 26 B26 24 K 4 l 2 B3 M3 K1 N 31 (4/4) M4 K 6 N 33 K 2 N 34 M6 M2 l 3 M2’s view of the group which could be divided into l subgroups 11 EGAKA Two basic sub-protocol EGAKA-KE : Key Establishment Protocol EGAKA-KU : Key Update Protocol Both sub-protocols are subtle integrations of above mentioned binary key tree structure, one way functions and two-party key agreement protocol, as well as symmetric encryption algorithm. 12 EGAKA-KE EGAKA-KE includes two phases: Phase I To complete group entity authentication by applying any chosen two-party authenticated key agreement protocol Phase II The group key generation process. 13 EGAKA-KE: Phase I (1/6) Tasks to accomplish choose the two-party protocol in common generate the key tree structure perform mutual authentication according to generated tree structure establish peer-to-peer session keys among members. 14 EGAKA-KE: Phase I M2 M3 Hello, here is the key tree structure Hello, I want to use DH protocol, and M4 can be the one to generate the key tree structure M1 M7 (2/6) M6 M4 M5 M4 M2 M1 M5 M3 M 2 M 3 M 5 M1 M1 M 7 M7 M2 M6 M 3 M1 M 4 M 6 M2 15 EGAKA-KE: Phase I r 2 r M2 r 3 (3/6) M3 1 M1 M4 M7 M6 M5 16 EGAKA-KE: Phase I (4/6) M2 r S M3 rS 2 12 3 13 M1 r S 4 24 rS 7 37 M7 M4 rS 6 26 M6 rS 5 15 M5 17 EGAKA-KE: Phase I (5/6) M4 K 24 M1 K12 , K13 , K15 M5 M 3 M7 M2 M6 K 26 Session Key K ij ri r j K15 K13 , K 37 K 37 K12 , K 24 , K 26 Execution Results of EGAKA-KE: Phase I 18 EGAKA-KE: Phase I (6/6) Rounds = 2 (except for protocol negotiation step) Two-party key exchange protocol executes exactly n-1 times to finish the entity authentication among group members 19 EGAKA-KE: Phase II round 1 M1 B15 (1/5) round 3 round 2 M5 M3 M7 M2 B15 B37 B37 B26 M 1 : {B15 }K13 M 3 : {B37 }K13 M 2 : {B26}K 24 M 4 : {B4 }K 24 M6 B26 M4 M4 M4 B4 B4 B26 B4 B26 B1357 M1 M5 M3 M7 M2 B15 B37 B246 B15 B37 B37 B15 B37 B15 M 1 : {B37 }K15 ,{B1357 }K12 M 2 : {B4 }K 26 ,{B246 }K12 B26 B4 B1357 M6 B26 B4 M 3 : {B15 }K 37 M1 M5 B15 B37 B246 B15 B37 B246 M3 B37 B15 B246 M 1 : {B246 }K1357 M7 M2 B37 B15 B246 B37 B4 B1357 M6 B26 B4 B1357 M 2 : {B1357 }K 246 K G h( BK1357 || BK 246 ) 20 EGAKA-KE: Phase II (2/5) KG M1 needs to compute M1 yet to know Round 1 B246 B1357 B15 M1 knows M4 B37 M1 M5 M3 M7 M2 M6 M1’s view of the group 21 EGAKA-KE: Phase II M1 needs to compute (3/5) KG Round 2 M1 yet to know B246 B1357 M1 knows B15 M1 M5 M4 B37 M3 M7 M2 M6 M1’s view of the group 22 EGAKA-KE: Phase II (4/5) KG Round 3 M1 compute B246 B1357 M1 knows M1 M5 M4 B37 B15 M3 M7 M2 M6 M1’s view of the group K G h( BK 1357 || BK 246 ) 23 EGAKA-KE: Phase II (5/5) Rounds = d, where d equals to of the group. , n is the size No computational expensive operation is needed in this phase. 24 EGAKA-KU: Member Join Protocol round 2 round 1 M 6 broadcasts : (1/5) r , join 6 subgroup M4 M3 M1 M5 subgroup M2 Sponsor M5 M1 M6 M4 M2 M3 Sponsor subgroup M 3 computes : r S , K 36 r3r6 , B36 h( K 36 ), 3 36 B1356 h( h( B15 || B36 )) M 3 broadcasts : {B1356 || M 3}K G ,{B36 || M 3}K135 , {B15 || B24 || M 3}K 36 , r3S36 M 6 computes : K 36 , B36 , K G' h( B1356 || B24 ) M i (i [1,5]) computes : K G' h( B1356 || B24 ) 25 EGAKA-KU: Member Join Protocol (2/5) 26 EGAKA-KU: Member Leave Protocol (a) (3/5) (b) Sponsor Sponsor M2 K12 , K 24 K12 , K13 M1 M5 M6 M3 M 7 M4 K12 , K13 , K15 K15 K 36 K13 , K 36 K 47 K 47 , K 24 M2 M1 M5 Leaving M6 M3 M 7 subgroup M4 subgroup M7 M1 M5 M6 subgroup M3 M4 subgroup M2 Leaving 27 EGAKA-KU: Member Leave Protocol (4/5) 28 EGAKA-KU (5/5) In Member Join Protocol: only fixed 6 exponential operations are needed for any member to be added to the group and update the group key. Moreover, this cost is constant to group size. This property is very useful in scenarios with frequent member additions. Member Leave protocol is not as efficient as member join protocol, but it’s robust and faulttolerant. 29 Complexity and Security Analysis Complexity Analysis Comparison between EGAKA and other well known key establishment protocols Communication and computation costs A-DH is used as the underlying two-party authenticated key agreement protocol in order to provide a quantificational comparison. Security Analysis Provide informal security analysis. (Formal analysis is undergoing) Secure against both passive and active attacks Do not consider insider attacks Provide forward and backward secrecy 30 Comparison 31 Conclusion In this paper, we propose EGAKA (Efficient Group Authenticated Key Agreement) protocol Distributed Fault-tolerant Efficient dynamic group membership management Mutual authentication among group members Secure against both passive and active attacks Can be built on any two-party authenticated key exchange protocols E.g. Diffie-Hellman protocol, password based protocol Achieves scalability and robustness in heterogeneous environments provides efficient member join services Low communication and computation costs, and they are constant to the group size. Support fault-tolerant property to achieve robustness in member leave service 32 Thank you for your attention Q&A 33