Oral Comps Slides
Major Ben Zweibelson
Seminar 4, SAMS
Lesson D316
Question 1: theory of war
Each student likely needs their own stuff
here.
However, pleasure and pain are only root motives for decision to act.
They would not fully explain much of human behavior in and out of war.
Schopenhauer: German
Philosopher (1788-1860)
Nietzsche: German
Philosopher (1844-1900)
PL
P
S
E
The Will to Survive (Live)
G
R
WTS
All human action relates
to a core desire to survive,
reproduce, and prosper.
The Will to Power
WTP
PA
All human action relates to a
core desire to increase one’s
power. This overrides
survival in terms of risk.
Special Theory on Actors and Organized Conflict;
The ODARR Cycle and Origin of Decisions to Act.
Includes enemy and
friendly COG analysis.
Adjust forces, values, and contextual factors
Orientation
Phase
P
L
adjust
S
P
adjust
Reflection
Phase
Decision
Phase
WTS
E
G
R
adjust
adjust
Re-Orient
Phase
All actions are
directed against
critical vulnerabilities
in the most recent
observed enemy COG.
Enemy
COGs
CC, CR, CV. COGs are
open systems
Action
Phase
P
A
Actions are also taken to
protect friendly COG
vulnerabilities in the most
recent observed friendly
COG.
Friendly
COGs
CC, CR, CV. COGs are
open systems
Our COGs are linked to our
pain/loss of prosperity
concepts as well as our
WTS/WTP gravitational
pulls. The enemy is linked
the same.
WTP
Question 2: Gaddis and
‘continuity/contingency with
history’
Gaddis: Why and How should Historians Think? (metacognition)
Continuity: historians (unlike scientists) represent what
they can never duplicate. History requires a level of
consistency that is closer to objective truth than
subjective interpretation (histiography explains how this
often occurs, and why).
History
objectivity
Gaddis: “distillation”- not every
detail is critical; historians decide
what gets relayed in narratives.
Continuity
unknown
(exteriority)
Gaddis: no time-traveling for
history- no changing it.
Linear
Time;
Space
Contingency: historians must think critically about how they
represent history- flawed processes produce faulty
expectations of what the future is. If historians follow too
abstract a path (or too detailed/pedantic), or if they give into
social biases and faulty logic, they will misinterpret history.
FUTURE
Change in
Historical
Perspectives
(Hatch’s Wheel)
Gaddis: “weighing conceptsTheories in science are
Hitler’s love of dogs and
reproducible; history does not
children is irrelevant.”
repeat (but themes occur)
Contingency
More Accurate/
Relevant History
Debatable/quasiRelevant History
Counter-Factual Arguments
(what if Barbarossa…)
Inaccurate/
irrelevant History
PRESENT
Gaddis: “path dependency”Hitler kicked out of art school
caused WWII
information
PAST
Gaddis: constructed
memories: Churchill’s
youthful portrait
subjectivity
language
event
Gaddis: historians
hide their methods
Values
Tenets
Culture
Identity
Human
Limitations in
Cognition
Known
(interiority)
Histiography
Hayden White: The Content and the Form
Peter Novack: That Noble Dream
Mary Jo Hatch: Operational Theory
Deluze/Guitari: A Thousand Plataeus
Question 3: theories of Herbst,
Kalyvas, Brinton, and Parsa
Herbst: States and Power in Africa
Follows Jared Diamond’s Guns,
Germs, and Steel thesis that biological
and geographic determinism shaped
Africa- not the traditional Euro-centric
theory of technological/genetic
determinism.
Low densities of people over massive
tracts of land- this generated a different
set of values in African leaders (use
Mary Jo Hatch wheel).
3x African costs for state expansion:
1. Cost of expanding domestic power
infrastructure. To rule a distant
location, you needed to control
military out there and transmit info
over roads.
2. The nature of national boundaries.
capitals build container/distribution
points out from central power;
colonial “new capitals” were
coastal; pre-colonial ones were not.
3. The design of state systems. –
winning wars brought slaves; there
was little organizational
infrastructure to gain. Thus, postconflict Africa differed from
European conflicts over land.
Africans had different agriculture and
industrial/economic structures; trading
for guns, mining minerals, limited
farming (migrant).
Colonial imposed boundaries remainAfrica struggles with post-imperialism.
Brinton: The Anatomy of
Revolution
Brinton covers American, French,
English, and Russian revolutions
and acknowledges that his thesis
on revolutionary cycles does not
synch with all of them.
Brinton argues that revolutions
end the worst abuses and
inefficiencies of the old regime
while bringing greater uniformity
and equality to the state system.
While man changes his mind on
many issues (hereditary
monarchy, aristocracy, classes,
civil rights, land and property
ownership, slavery) man does not
change his habits. Originally
radical ideas transition in the
revolutionary cycle into state
propaganda and national selfidentity for posterity within the
post-revolution society. Finally,
successful revolts create a
tradition of revolution within that
society.
Parsa’s: States, Ideologies, and Social Revolutions
Parsa uses states as his unit of analysis (realism
perspective). He studies Iran, Nicaragua, and the Philippines
revolutions by exploring social versus political factors.
Variables used:
Popular opposition to regime
Type of political regime
Class coalition- present or absent
Level of state intervention
Iran: centralized state power with extreme repression of
moderate opposition; class structure transformation was
moderate, and radical theocrats were in the power structure.
Outcome: social revolution.
Nicaragua: Same as Iran in power and repression; popular
opposition was high, and class coalition was present.
Revolutionary challengers were initially weak- class structure
transformation was high. Socialists in power structure;
outcome: social revolution.
Philippines: centralized power with moderate repression of
opposition. Class coalition was absent, and revolutionary
challengers were initially strong; no transformation in class
structure, reformist bourgeois were in the power structureoutcome: political revolution.
Kalyvas: The Logic of Violence in Civil War
Kalyvas asks the question “why are civil wars so violent- or perceived as such?” He defines civil war as
“armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject to a
common authority at the onset of the hostilities.”
Five factors of Civil War bias: 1. Partisan bias (taking sides); 2. Political bias (equating war with
peace); 3. Urban bias (overlooking bottom-up processes; emphasis on top-down hierarchy); 4.
Selection bias (disregarding nonviolence); 5. Over-aggregation bias (working at too high a level of
abstraction- “the will of the people”).
Crane Brinton’s The Anatomy of Revolution
“A Theory of Revolt”
Question 4:
JP 3.0, 5.0- does current doctrine
reflect systems thinking?
Positivism refers to a set of
epistemological perspectives and
philosophies of science which hold
that the scientific method is the best
approach to uncovering the processes
by which both physical and human
events occur.
Systems Thinking: a Logic of Positivism, Reductionism,
Mechanistic and Linear Procedures
•
Reverse engineer termination
criteria to objectives, COGs, and
DPs along a LOO.
Identifying desired and undesired
effects with a systems
perspective –IV-8(3) JP 3-0.
Effects: describe system
behavior
JP 3-0 LOGIC: the nature of
warfare is characterized as a
confrontation between nationstates or coalitions/alliances of
nation-states…IW is a violent
struggle between state and nonstate actors.
JP 3-0
FM 3-0
•
•
•
Operational and Mission
Variables: FM 3-0 warns
of “precise binning” but
the positivist and
reductionist procedures
are lost.
PMESII-PT centric.
Echoes JP 3-0’s
definition of ‘Unified
Action.’
Quotes Clausewitz on
uncertainty, chance, and
friction. (when your logic
creates abnormalities,
you can categorize them
under these catch-alls).
•
Traditional war and
irregular war defined
within Clausewitzian
concept.
•
12 principles of war
use Jominian
systems thinking that
use mechanistic,
reductionist, and
positivist constructs
Joint Operation
Planning Process
Centers of Gravity
•
•
JP 3-0 Foundation: Joint
operations doctrine is built upon
the bedrock principles of war and
associated fundamentals of joint
warfare.
1. Objective
2. Offensive
3. Mass
4. Economy of Force
5. Maneuver
6. Unity of Command
7. Security
8. Surprise
9. Simplicity
10. Restraint
11. Perseverance
12. Legitimacy
JOPP:
Step 1: Initiation
Step 2: Mission Analysis
Step 3: COA Dev
Step 4: COA Analysis and
wargaming
Step 5: COA Comparison
Step 6: COA Approval
Step 7: Plan/Order Development
JP 3-0 Unified Action: the
synchronization, coordination,
and/or integration of the activities
of the governmental and
nongovernmental entities with
military operations to achieve
unity of effort.
Centers of Gravity: Using Systems Thinking in a
Positivist, Reductionist, and Mechanistic Logic
FM 3-0
Quotes Clausewitz also.
The loss of a COG
ultimately results in
defeat. –this is linear
causality and reverse
engineering on a
positivist logic base.
FM 3-0 goes beyond JP
3-0 and states “COGs are
not limited to military
forces and can be either
physical or moral;
eliminating them requires
holistic integrated efforts
of all national IOPs.” 6-8.
Supports JP 3-0 and sees
a single COG at each
level of war.
The Army does not have
a COG at the tactical
level either (just USMC).
As Kem says, it is
semantics- a tactical
COG equals a decisive
point.
Clausewitz: A COG comprises the source of power that provides
freedom of action, physical strength, and the will to fight.
Dr. Kem: the COG is the thing you fear most; it is the actual
power. Also uses the Strange CC/CR/CV modeling.
Dr. Strange: CC/CR/CV modeling.
- Critical capabilities: crucial enablers for COG to function.
- Critical requirements: essential resources for CCs to work.
- Critical vulnerabilities: CRs that are vulnerable to attack or
exploitation.
* JP 3-0: the essence of operational art lies in being able to
produce the right combination of effects in time, space, and
purpose relative to a COG to neutralize, weaken, destroy, or
otherwise exploit it…to achieve military objectives.
Dr. Reilly: ‘Cognitive Map’ that reverse engineers end-states,
COGs, and lines of effort backwards in time.
JP 3-0
Quotes Clausewitz: A
COG is the source of
moral or physical
strength, power, and
resistance.
A COG is singular in
nature- JP 3-0 wants one
at each level of war.
In conventional fights, JP
3-0 prefers strategic COG
to be government or
leader; and operational
COG as the fielded
forces. No tactical COGs.
LOOs, PLOs- no LOEs.
Linear causality. Baseball
makes the runner go to
1st, then 2nd base; war
might require us to run to
3rd, then 1st, then 2nd…
Garandagangi makes the
distinction between nonminded, uni-minded, and
multi-minded systems;
COGs work for uniminded (EBO systems
based) logic.
Elements of Operational Design JP 3-0
FM 3-0
FM 3-0 does not use
‘termination’ in doctrine. It
does use ‘strategic end
state’ in 6-8. The POTUS
translates national
interests and policy into a
national strategic endstate.
FM 3-0 ties ‘end-state’ to
JP 3-0 same term.
Operational objectives
are linked to COGs, and
tactical OBJs are linked to
decisive points (which
follow LOEs to target
COG CVs. Very
systematic process.
FM 3-0 does not use
‘effects’ in JP format; D-2
states that “Army forces
DO NOT use joint
systems analysis…or
effects assessment.”
Army forces conduct
operations according to
Army doctrine.
JP 3-0
1. Termination: military operations terminate when they
achieve and preserve military objectives linked to the
national strategic end-state. 3x approaches: imposed
(threatened or actual occupation of enemy territory) or
negotiated settlement (coordinated political, diplomatic,
military, and economic actions), and the indirect approach
(when gaining legitimacy and influence over the relevant
population; this employs IW to erode an enemy’s power,
influence and will over the population.
2. End State and Objectives: developed after the termination
criteria are established (Reilly reverse engineering). The
military end-state is the point after which the President
does not require the military IOP in the lead.
3. Effects: “Combined with a systems perspective, the
identification of desired and undesired effects can help
commanders and their staffs gain a common picture. An
effect is the physical or behavioral state of a system that
results from an action, set of actions, or another effect.
1. Objectives: prescribe friendly goals.
2. Effects: describe system behavior.
3. Tasks: direct friendly action.
4. COGs: see previous slide.
5. Decisive Points: a geographic place, specific key event,
critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows a
commander to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or
contributes materially to achieving success.-IV-12, JP 3-0.
Positivism refers to a set of epistemological perspectives and
philosophies of science which hold that the scientific method is the
best approach to uncovering the processes by which both
physical and human events occur.
Positivist logic;
Clausewitzian.
Termination criteria lend
to linear causality and
reverse-engineering
within a neo-realism logic.
Linear causality: effect
occurs when A+B equals
C. Implies reverse
engineering and
positivism.
Positivist logic;
Describing instead of
explaining. This deals
with interiority instead of
exteriority!
“This holistic
understanding helps
commanders and their
staffs identify COGs, critical
factors, and decisive points
to formulate LOOs and
visualize the CONOPs.” –
IV-12 JP 3-0.
Elements of Operational Design JP 3-0
FM 3-0
FM 3-0 shares LOO with
JP 3-0, but introduces
Lines of Effort: the LOE
helps planners link
multiple tasks with goals,
objectives, and end-state
conditions; LOE follows
LOO systems approach in
linear causality and uniminded systems (COGs).
FM 3-0 uses JP 3-0’s
operational reach; the
limit of a unit’s
operational reach is it’s
culminating point (6-74).
FM 3-0 uses similar terms
as JP 3-0 with
simultaneity and depth;
and introduces ‘phases’
as a planning/execution
tool to synchronize an
operation.
FM 3-0 does not use JP
3-0’s phrasing of moral
failure; it does paint a
more holistic approachwithin a systemic
framework.
Positivism refers to a set of epistemological perspectives and
philosophies of science which hold that the scientific method is the
best approach to uncovering the processes by which both
physical and human events occur.
6. Direct versus Indirect: “In theory, direct attacks against
enemy COGs resulting in their neutralization or destruction is
the most direct path to victory.” IV-12, JP 3-0.
7. Indirect: the indirect paths are used when a JTF cannot
conduct a direct attack; they still indirectly target COG CVs
in order to set the conditions for successful direct attacks.
Once again, this uses positivist logic and linear causality.
8. Lines of Operations: a LOO describes the linkage of
various actions on nodes and or decisive points with an
operational or strategic objective.
9. Operational Reach: the distance and duration over which
a joint force can successfully employ military capabilities.
Reach is fundamentally linked to culmination; geography
may limit it- but technology offers methods for bypassing
barriers and limitations.
10. Simultaneity and Depth:
1. Simultaneity: the application of military and nonmilitary power against enemy key capabilities and
sources of strength; (JP 3-0 implies operational
shock in a Naveh-style here; even talks about moral
and or physical failure in cohesion. Simultaneity also
refers to concurrent conduct of operations at the
tactical, operational, and strategic levels.
2. Depth: overwhelming the enemy in multiple
domains- depth applies to time as well as space; this
goes into Boyd’s OODA Loop.
JP 3-0
Positivist logic;
Clausewitzian.
Termination criteria lend
to linear causality and
reverse-engineering
within a neo-realism logic.
Linear causality: effect
occurs when A+B equals
C. Implies reverse
engineering and
positivism. Direct paths
imply linear causality
again; not adaptive
complex systems.
Very EBO centric
thoughts here; that
simultaneity in action
against appropriate
enemy forces results in a
‘moral failure’ echoes
some of the British and
USAAF’s flawed ‘morale
bombing’ in WWII.
Elements of Operational Design JP 3-0
FM 3-0
Positivist logic; in FM 3-0
as well here.
Tempo: used in 6-80; FM
3-0 ties tempo to enemy
specifically.
FM 3-0 uses ‘culmination’
where there is a point in
time when a force no
longer possesses the
capability to continue its
current form of
operations. This is a landcentric logic that differs
with JP 3-0 (Air, Sea
Power).
FM 3-0 includes RISK as
well. This is
Clausewitzian logic that
addresses the fog,
friction, and “luck” – risk
relates to time and space;
“it is a potential catalyst
that fuels opportunity.”
19. Arranging Operations:
sounds like synergy, tempo,
forces and functions, and
balance. Not sure why JP 3-0
even uses this one…
Positivism refers to a set of epistemological perspectives and
philosophies of science which hold that the scientific method is the
best approach to uncovering the processes by which both
physical and human events occur.
11. Timing and Tempo: “With proper timing, JFCs can
dominate the action, remain unpredictable, and operate
beyond the enemy’s ability to react.” IV-16 JP 3-0.
12. Tempo: the rate of military action. Tempo has military
significance only in relative terms. “information
superiority facilitated by a net-centric environment enables
the JFC to dictate tempo.”
13. Forces and Functions: JFCs focus on defeating either
enemy forces or functions, or a combination of both.
1. Attacking Functions: destroys/disrupts enemy’s
ability to employ its forces;
2. Attacking Forces: self-evident.
14. Leverage: gaining, maintaining, and exploiting advantages
in combat power across all domains and the information
environment. Can be achieved through asymmetrical
actions and concentration and integration of joint force
capabilities (IV-17).
15. Balance: the maintenance of the force, its capabilities, and
its operations in such a manner as to contribute to freedom
of action and responsiveness.
16. Anticipation: JP 3-0 emphasizes description and volume
of information as the means to understanding and
anticipating what Taleeb calls ‘Black Swan’ eventsunknown-unknowns. This does not work with Design’s logic
of interiority and exteriority with complex adaptive systems.
17. Synergy: combining military forces and capabilities so that
their sum is greater than individual totals. Or, 1+1+1=5.
18. Culmination: has both an offensive and defensive
application; essentially when your chess opponent and you
have the same number of pieces…
JP 3-0
Positivist logic;
Clausewitzian.
Termination criteria lend
to linear causality and
reverse-engineering
within a neo-realism logic.
Description over
explanation represents
the systems thinking
approach of Positivists.
We had tons of
information in Iraq, yet we
did not dictate tempo in
2004-2005 at all. There is
a difference between tons
of description and the
right explanation.
How can you anticipate
this with a complex
adaptive system if your
planning logic requires
you to reverse engineer
within linear causality and
uni-minded system logic
such as EBO?
Question 5: Jomini versus
Clausewitz, Steel Cage Match
Positivist Logic
Mechanistic Logic
Jomini
Clausewitz
“War is an extension of
Politics.” -KVC
“In total war, politics
become an extension of
war”- D/G, A Thousand
Plateaus (they flip the
maxim).
Warfare is complexapplying reductionist
mathematics and
procedures does not work
well in complex war.
Clausewitz was not read
outside of Prussia until
the late 1880s- it arrived
to West Point only then
and Jomini still had a
huge hold upon the US
military.
Similarities in Warfare Theories
• Both Clausewitz and Jomini see military conflict as a perpetual
behavior by societies (nation states)- they do not subscribe to
what Anatol Rapoport (On War intro, 1968 edition) terms
‘eschatalogical war theories.’
• Clausewitz goes mechanistic in some parts of ‘On War’ by
arguing procedures and formulas for field artillery and relative
troop strengths.
• Jomini follows Machiavelli's ‘The Prince’ by crafting a process, a
checklist of war principles and formulas for a military general to
follow. Doing this in ANY conflict will deliver them victory- this is
pure mechanistic linear logic.
• Clausewitz does not follow principles of war, but he does take a
positivist leap in logic by designating the ‘enemy’s fielded forces’
as the primary thing (COG) that must be destroyed to win.
Differences in Warfare Theories
• Jomini remains tactical. He does not go operational level as
Clausewitz does. Jomini wants the politicians to get out of the
way of the military in war- Clausewitz sees the “trinity” between
government, military, and violent passions of the masses.
• Jomini applies geometry, lines, and linear causality in a highly
mechanistic fashion- Clausewitz goes further conceptually and
avoids many of the pitfalls of prescriptive procedurizing that
Jomini craves.
Follow these rules exactly
regardless of future
conflict, and you will win.
If not- you are an idiot.
The enemy is predictable
and does not adapt.
Seek the Napoleonic
victory- tactical wins that
accomplish strategic
goals. This ignores the
operational level of war.
Jomini was widely read
prior to the American Civil
War; probably carried by
most officers- geometric
considerations continued
with artillery, engineering,
and naval applications in
the 19th century.
Anatol Rapoport’s non-Clausewitzian War Philosophies
(editor and wrote the intro to the 1968 Penguin Classic “On War”
There is a final war.
Eschatological (final war)
Philosophies of War
Divine Eschatological
(religious final battle)
Religious movements
that feature an
“Armageddon plot” or
the return of a savior
with the destruction of
all non-believers follow
this logic.
A final war will, God
Willing, end human
conflict; this is predetermined (linear
causality), and the
chosen people will
reign supreme.
Example: Iran
launching WMD at
Israel to trigger
emergence of 12th
Imam.
Natural
Eschatological (planet
extinction; human
extinction)
Extreme
environmentalism
movements; antihuman movements (by
humans, oddly). Nonhuman events such as
planet destruction,
asteroid event, or
disease epidemic that
ends human (or all) life.
Example: the
dinosaurs did not
wage “war” but their
existence was
terminated this way.
Humans waging
limited war while an
asteroid hurtles
towards us makes a
similar example….
Prevent all war.
Human (messianic)
Eschatological
(people here now)
A group of people
already on the planet
that will bring about the
final battle- the Nazis,
early Soviet Party, and
other extreme nonreligious groups
followed this logic.
The Proletarian
Revolution where
workers of the world
unit.
American Manifest
Destiny during the
Great Plains Indian
Wars has components
of this logic also.
Example: Soviet Party
of the early 20th
century followed this
logic, according to
Rapoport.
Cataclysmic (world
destruction) Philosophies
of War
Ethno-centric
Cataclysmic War Theory
Rapoport claims the
Soviets switched to this
during the Cold War- the
chief difference is:
1. War is NOT a tool.
2. The outside world
wants to destroy the
unique ethnic identity of
the select people.
3. Protective measures
such as the Berlin Wall
are not for keeping
people in, but keeping
outsiders out.
4. The world will end in a
final show-down.
Example: MAD in the
Cold War fueled this
logic; Soviets sought to
preserve their state
versus Capitalist
westerners.
Global Cataclysmic
War Theory
Rapoport calls this a
system-theoretical
approach. The principles
are:
1. War is NOT a tool.
2. ALL war is bad.
3. Global government is
the answer to ending
conflict.
4. International systems
will aid in preventing
global cataclysmic war.
5. The nuclear age
advanced this logic.
Example: The United
Nations pursues
international systems
and a form of weak global
governance with the
general position that all
war is bad…NATO is not
an example of this; NATO
is an alliance under
Clausewitzian logic.
Question 6: Explain relationship
between conceptual and detailed
planning
FM 5-0 Design Doctrine (Teaching Artistry via. “Paint By Numbers”)
Initial
guidance;
end state;
time
Starting with an
‘End State’ and
working
backwards does
not work with
ill-structured
problems.
Step 1
Step 2
Create
Environmental
Frame
Create Problem
Frame
Narrative and
graphical description
Relevant actors;
interrelationsPMESII-PT
Refinement of
tensions
environmental
frame
Areas for action to
achieve end state
Step 3
Deliverables
Operational
Approach
(design frame)
1.
2.
3.
Broad actions to
achieve end state
Resources
and Risks
4.
5.
Problem Statement
Initial CDR’s Intent
CDR’s Initial Planning
Guidance
Mission Narrative
Other Products
Decisive Points*
LOOs, LOEs*
‘Environment’ bounds.
‘Ecology’ conceptually
allows distant yet relevant
inclusion into the system.
PMESII-PT bounds the
‘known’ and goes
descriptive and
deconstructive.
Problem
statement
Avoid descriptionseek explanation.
Doctrine is static.
Theory is flexible.
There is a problem
with the word
‘problem.’
Transformation requirements exceed
military capabilities; cultural change
requires extensive time and
Phenomenon persist through
resources.
feedback loops and ‘retention.’
Transformation requires
emergence and anticipation (not
prediction).
Detailed Planning Methodology: Linear Causality and Short Term Targets
Step 3
Execute action. Collect
information and reflect upon
action. Make adjustments and
continue towards end-state.
Step 2
Build COAs and “war-game”
scenarios to decide upon the
preferred action to undertake.
Build detailed integrated
instructions (OPORDs,
graphics) to direct forces.
Step 1
Frame your environment with
knowns (facts), known
unknowns (assumptions and
PIR/CCIR), and force influence
the future of your world as a
goal (end-state) to aim against.
Conceptual Planning:
Holistic Approaches (Design Theory)
Naveh (In Pursuit of…, other works also)
Kuhn’s Paradigm Shifts
Betanafly’s General Systems Theory
Organizational Theory (insert authors)
Michael Foucote “Problematization” Lectures
Linking understanding to
action…
Detailed Planning:
Positivist/Mechanistic Approaches (Systems Logic)
Clausewitzian (On War)
Jominian (principles of war)
Scientific Deduction (Kuhn, Capra,
Taleeb, Laszlo, Bosquette)
Rivals are
phenomenon
within a
complex
system.
Adaptive Metaphors (creation and destruction)
“Learning to Learn” –Naveh, Garandagangi, Foucote
“Reflective Practitioner”- Shoen
Interiority and Exteriority- Deluze and Gutari
Unknown Unknowns- Black Swans (Taleeb)
Design Deliverables
FM 5-0: operational approach
with graphic and CDR’s intent.
Narratives in theory convey
EXPLANATION not description.
Each logic uses different vocabulary, theoretical concepts, narratives, and metaphor
construction to make sense of the world (holistic in tension with positivist
reductionism)
Historic Vignette Metaphor Preference
“This is like that”
Historical Precedence
Fighting the Last Conflict (Linn)
Weigley’s American Way of War
The enemy is a
state, group,
actor, or super
powered
individual.
Detailed Planning Deliverables
MDMP, JOPP, MCPP all
follow procedures that create
precise and detailed
OPORDs, FRAGOs, and
other actionable products.
Military doctrine comes out
of this logic, as does AAR
and historical products.
Question 7: The relationship
between Design and Battle
(Mission) Command
Holistic Approach
Design
Mechanistic Logic
Metacognition/problematization
Naveh: Persistent Creativity
Design Theory differs from
Army Design Doctrine. Do not
confuse the two.
Positivist Logic
Linear Causality
Mission (Battle)
Command
Battle Command is the art
and science of:
Similarities between both
Understanding Design Theory seeks
explanation, not description.
Mary Jo Hatch’s Cycle of
Cultural Change is a good foil
for illustrating why Design
doctrine and Battle Command
as procedures do not really
ever challenge any core
structures or logics of the
military institution.
Battle Command borrows from
Boyd’s OODA Loop- a cycle of
leading and assessing the
process while continuing to try
to out-think and out-act the
enemy. Design theory is not so
proceduralized- complex
systems are not susceptible to
such linear causality.
Design operates on a different
logic than MDMP and detailed
planning. Battle Command
acts as an overarching
conceptual framework for
detailed planning- but it uses
the same Clausewitzian and
Positivist logic unlike Design.
• Both Design and Battle Command consider the enemy (or rival)
an adaptive and critical thinking (learning) actor instead of a
static (mechanistic Jominian) opponent.
• Design doctrine and Battle Command place the Commander at
the center (the architect) of both processes.
• Design doctrine (not theory) does suggest PEMESII-PT and
METT-TC to support environmental framing and LOEs…
• Both Design doctrine (not theory) and Battle Cmd combine
analytic and intuitive thinking…but Design theory does not limit
thinking to within interiority of system and within
positivist/reductionist logic with institutional biases.
Differences in logics
• Design Theory seeks EXPLANATION over description. Battle
Command wants description- this reinforces the positivist,
reductionist, and linear causality logic.
• Battle Command recommends PMESII-PT to understand, and
METT-TC to visualize…Design Theory avoids proceduralization.
• BC relies on ‘pattern recognition’ for anticipation; this potentially
follows Taleeb’s ‘Black Swan’ fallacy of only considering the
known knowns; Deluze/Guatari and the interiority/exteriority.
Visualizing
Describing
Directing
Leading
Assessing Forces
In order to impose a CDR’s
will on a hostile, thinking, and
adaptive enemy.
Analytic Decision
making: “approach the
problem systemically”
Intuitive Decision
making: the act of
reaching a conclusion
emphasizing pattern
recognition,
experience, knowledge”
Battle Command returns to the reverse
engineering logic of positivism: the CDR
“visualizes a desired end-state…and then a
broad concept of how to reach it.
Question 8: FM 6-22 Army
Leadership: Informal Leadership
Informal Leadership: Getting someone that is higher in
rank than you (or position of authority) to see things your
way (IF you are right) without getting a beat-down.”
Problematize towards
Cognitive Synergy
“My Big Fat Greek Wedding” Transfer of Creative
Ownership
Sua-Sponte
See Design.
Turning your idea into “what the
boss was saying all along” and
having him take ownership of the
“creation” of his idea.
Passive Aggressive
General Benedict Arnold at Saratoga; he took off
without explaining to his boss what he was
doing, and directed the battle to an upset victory
over Gentleman Johnny.
Contrast in Logic
COL xxxx and his position on COIN versus guerilla
warfare in OEF 2010-2011. XXX was investigated (and
cleared) of any insubordination.
Confrontational
General MacArthur’s actions
during the Korean War over which
he got fired by the POTUS;
McCrystal’s actions during OEF
2011.
IDF and their problems with SOD and the
Hezbollah 2006 War. Subordinate leaders like
Naveh used logic arguments on why SOD was
superior to detailed planning- they all got
sacked by senior leadership.
Question 9: complicated versus
complex
•Simple problem: Completing my six year-old’s math homework.
•Intricate problem: Completing a tough crossword puzzle. There is
only 1x right solution.
• Complicated problem: Normandy Amphibious Assault on D-day.
• Complex Problem: Accomplishing vague strategic goals that
change under limited conditions (no troops on ground) with NATO
and the Arab League in Libya while waging 2x other wars.
Complex:
Intricate:
Simple:
-Closed systems
- Known knowns
- clear actors
- linear causality
- reduction friendly
- mechanistic friendly
- principles/procedures
- reverse engineerable
- predictable
- one solution
- many steps
- time consuming
- precise
- reverse engineerable
- mechanistic
- 100% predictable
Complicated:
-Closed systems
-Known unknowns
- many actors
- often linear
- description rich
- reduction friendly
- interiority
- mechanistic prone (COGs)
- open systems
- unknown unknowns
- exteriority
- adaptive actors
- innovation
- holistic approaches
- dynamic
- explanation over description
- reduction does not explain
- mechanistic resistant
Question 10: function and utility
of narrative in Design; relation to
discourse.
unknown
Narrative:
Narrative is defined by doctrine
(FM 5-0) as: “mission
narrative”- the expression of
the operational approach for a
specified mission. It describes
the intended effects for the
mission, including the
conditions that define the
desired end-state.” It
represents the articulation of
the CDR’s visualization of the
mission (echoes battle
command).
known
emerging
current
language
Information
Problematize!
metacognition
New vocabulary
Discourse occurs here: metaphoric processes to fuse new
understanding and convey to others.
Discourse:
Design Theory: post-modern
philosophy such as Deluze and
Guatari’s A Thousand Plateaus
devote a chapter to the tension
between information
(exteriority and interiority) and
language (flawed, humanassociated with thoughts, but
not information). This is a
tough concept- needs five
more slides to really explain.
Discourse is mentioned in FM
5-0 Design Chapter 3 where
the CDR fosters an
environment where
‘problematization’ occurs- this
is the critical thinking portion of
seeking explanation (WHY
questions and BECAUSE
answers) instead of just
description (WHAT questions
with HOW, WHERE, WHEN
answers).
Narrative in Design Theory:
Naveh discusses “codification
of doctrine” and “planners are
shackled while designers
create.”
Hayden White: The Content
and the Form: history versus
histiography;
Peter Novak: That Noble
Dream: narratives are
incomplete- historians are
biased in writing them.
Humans (feminist movement,
civil rights movement) try to
take ‘ownership’ of some
narratives- the military may do
the same (“We do amphibious
assaults, not you…We do FIDyou do SFA…”)
extinct
Narrative is a product of the system logic: empirical material
explained with metaphor and language (flawed) and organized in
theoretical concepts which publish into narratives.
FM 5-0 Design does imply
some critical thinking benefits
of Design: “Design enables
commanders to view a
situation from multiple
perspectives”- this supports
the logic that complexity
requires organizational
intelligence- not a lone
Napoleon.
Question 11: Define Adaptive
Work and describe how one
leads to this effort.
Ervin Laszlo, The Systems View of the
World; a Holistic Vision for Our Time.
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson,
Metaphors We Live By.
Fritjof Capra, The Web of Life
Jeff Conklin, Wicked Problems and Social
Complexity (CogNexus Institute, 2008.
http://cognexus.org/wpf/wickedproblems.p
df Last accessed 05 January 2011) 4-5.
“This is the pattern of thinking that
everyone attempts to follow when they are
faced with a problem…this linear pattern
as being enshrined in policy manuals,
textbooks, internal standards for project
management, and even the most
advanced tools and methods being used
and taught in the organization.”
Problem: Unclear
Positivism
Reductionism
Mechanistic
Linear
Procedures
Qiao Liang, Wang Xiangsui,
Unrestricted Warfare (Beijing:
People’s Liberation Army Literature
and Arts Publishing House, February
1999) 140-141. Liang and Ziangsui
argue that over the last 20 years, the
world has grown more complex, yet
the military ignore the increased
complexity of war and instead focus
“on the level of weapons, deployment
methods and the battlefield, and the
drawn-up war prospects are also
mostly only limited to the military
domain and revel in it.”
Emergence
Innovation
Learning
Solution: Unclear
Flexible
Problematizing
Metacognition
Creation/destruction
Process
Persistent Adaptation
Gerald M. Weinberg, Rethinking Systems Analysis and Design
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1982) 12. “If our previous
experience with systems analysis proves anything, it proves that
anyone who tries to use all the information- even about the simple
systems existing today- will be drowned in paper and never
accomplish anything…The synthesist is someone who makes very
specific plans for action, and more often than not stays around
during the execution of those plans to adjust them to ongoing
reality.”
Making Sense
Linear Causality
Positivist, mechanistic Approaches
Reframe
Predetermined
END STATE
Predetermined
END STATE
Alex Ryan, The Foundation For An Adaptive Approach; Australian Army Journal For the Profession of Arms, Volume
VI, Number 3 (Duntroon: Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2009) 70. “With the industrial revolution, the planning and
decision-making process gradually built up a well-oiled machine to reduce reliance on individual genius.”
Question 12: How do you build
organizational learning to
facilitate integrated planning?
Examples of learning while in conflict:
1. US Army in Philippines 1899-1901 (Linn’s
The Philippines War
2. British in Malaya in 1956 versus US Army
in Vietnam (Nagl’s Learning to Eat Soup
with a Knife)
3. Israeli military in 1973 war with Egyptadaptation becomes necessity.
4. Washington at Battle of Trenton (raid
tactic achieved operational and strategic
requirements)
Rigid and NonLearning Organization
(Traditional,
Proceduralized)
Positivism
Reductionism
Mechanistic
Linear
Procedures
Adaptive and Critical
Thinking Organization
Flexible
Problematizing
Metacognition
Creation/destruction
Process
Persistent Adaptation
Examples of resistance to changing an
organization while in conflict:
1. US Army in Cold War (Carl Builder’s
Masks of War)
2. Linn’s Echo of Battle- peacetime
strategists reinvent themselves with
emergent technology to reinforce
worldviews.
3. Egyptian military in 1973 war with
Israel- planning phase 1 works, but
what about phase 2?
Question 13: ANP- relationship
between strategy and
operational art
Clausewitzian Theory
Neo-Realism
Strategy
Gaddis: Surprise, Security, and
the American Experience –
Gaddis sees post 9-11 where
Powell and Weinberger
doctrines (nation-state centric)
are irrelevant.
McDougall’s Promised Land,
Crusader State explains US
foreign policy as our
assumption (Hatch’s model)
that we can, should, and must
reach out to help other nations
share in the ‘American Dream.’
American values and tenets of
democracy, freedom from
government and military
intrusions (see Leach’s Roots
of Conflicts) do not equal the
military hierarchical process
and institutionalism logic.
Carnes Lord’s Crisis
Management, A Primer. Lord
presents Pearl Harbor as a
political, not a military failurethe US enacted the 1941 oil
embargo and Roosevelt sent
mixed diplomatic messagesthis drove Japan to make their
move (just as they did against
Russia in 1908).
Mechanistic Logic
Liberalism
Operational Art
Positivist Logic
Humanism
Cohesive Elements
• As Gaddis notes, western strategic form follows the hierarchy that
operational art uses. “The White House is a necessary hierarchy
because no one is the President’s equal.”
• Gaddis explains how Eisenhower built a large military industrial
complex with more hierarchy and procedures.
• McDougall implies that Americans apply western values of democracy
and the American Dream to all other societies- this is similar to how
western militaries apply Clausewitzian logic to other rivals and
enemies universally.
• Hew Strachan’s The Lost Meaning of Strategy: modern war is no
longer the ‘golden era’ of Clausewitzian state-on-state total war. It is
with non-state actors, failed states or rogues. European states now
view war as a peacekeeping requirement (Rapoport’s global
cataclysmic war theory, not Clausewitzian).
Tensions
• Operational art (western logic) relies upon hierarchy of control and
procedures for uniformity and repetition- although Eisenhower
increased this on the political side (strategy) after WWII, some
components of American Strategic culture (Weigley) are in tension
with this. Peacetime: small military;
• NSC-68 represents a tension between traditional American
strategic culture (we pick our fights) and Cold War ‘containment’
that follows a military systems-process of ‘they pick were we
fight.”
• B. Liddell Hart, Strategy. Hart sees indirect strategy as superior in the
nuclear age- this is in tension with Clausewitzian logic (destroy the
enemy directly).
Operational Art links tactical
action to the pursuit of strategic
objectives.
Clausewitzian logic guides
operational art towards
destroying the enemy to compel
a nation to obey our will.
Strachan in The Lost Meaning of
Strategy says that now, non-state
actors initiate conflict, they are
fought by civilians, and principle
victims are not soldiers but noncombatants.
FM 3-0 chapter 3, FSO: “Army
forces combine offensive,
defensive, and stability or civil
support operations
simultaneously as part of an
interdependent joint force to
seize, retain, and exploit the
initiative…” the goal of FSO is to
apply landpower as part of
unified action to defeat the
enemy on land.
FM 3-0 uses ‘operational
variables’ to describe the
operational environment in terms
that describe military aspects of
the system, but the population’s
influence on it. This means that
FM 3-0 doctrinal logic uses
reductionism for PMESII-PTthey do consider strategic
(DIME) factors.
Question 14: ANP- What is
deterrence? What is the
military’s role?
Figure 1a: Zweibelson Political Science Theory on 21 st Century Irregular Warfare
Trends Regarding Nuclear-armed Nations
= victory
= undetermined
= failure
Super-power nations
Large complex militaries
Cuban Missile Crisis 1962
Conflict in the Q1 is not
direct; Nuclear nations
use proxy conflicts in Q4
for indirect action
Japan 1945
Germany 1945
Berlin Air Lift 1947
Q1
Conflict in the Q2 is the
golden era for most western
military cultures-
Q2
Korean War
Limited War
Low Intensity
Conflict
Vietnam War (RNA)
Afghanistan 1988 (USSR)
Vietnam War (Viet Cong)
Afghanistan 2001present
Conflict in the Q4 is where
weaker nations and actors
seek to exploit super-power
nations on terms that are
better than in Q3.
Total war
High Intensity
Conflict
Panama 1989
Iraq 1990
Iraq 2003
Q4
Q3
Iran-Iraq War 1988 (Iraq)
Bosnia 1999
Libya 1985
Iraqi Civil War 2004present
Lebanon 2006 (Israel)
Failing nations
Rogue state
Conflict in the Q3 is between
non-nuclear nations or with
one nuclear (usually superior)
power.
Advanced Nations
Complex Military IOPs
USSR (Cold War)
Cuban Missile Crisis 1962
Berlin Air Lift 1947
Germany 1945
Japan 1945
Korea 1953
Q1
Low
Intensity
Conflict
Q2
Vietnam 1974 (Chinese &
Soviet Aided)
Vietcong Irregular Forces
French in Algeria 1956
Iraq 2003+
French utilized D2DE for air
power with tactical success
(strategic failure)
Q4
North Vietnam (subpar
military IOP)
Iraq 2003
Somalia 1994
Afghanistan 2001+
Failing or Failed States
Non-State Actors; Weak military IOPs
Q3
High
Intensity
Conflict
Iraq 1991
Libya 1985
Kosovo 1999
Panama 1989
Haiti 1994
Planned; not executed
US Victory
Undetermined Outcome
US Failure
French Example 1
Figure 1: D307 Cold War Arms Escalation Gravity Pipe
U.S. now looks from atop the nuclear
gravity pipe; from here it attempts to
prevent other nations from rising up.
GDP ratio
GDP ratio
Post-Cold War: U.S. downsizes nuclear
arsenal while maintaining first strike
capability for hostile actors.
USSR obsolete. Russian Federal
Republic rises from ashes and
secures existing nuclear
infrastructure. Attempts to maintain
nuclear superpower status.
GDP ratio
GDP ratio
Cold War ending; USSR unable to fund
their nuclear military IOP. Efforts now
towards nuclear non-proliferation and
reduction.
START Treaty
1980s: President Reagan begins ‘Star
Wars program.
SALT 2 Treaty
SALT 1 Treaty
Soviets challenged to
match MIRV quality;
react with IBCM
quantity for MAD.
1970s: U.S. begins MIRV warheads.
GDP ratio
GDP ratio
1969: First man on moon; space race
won by United States
1957: Sputnik: first space satellite
Soviet military maintains large
ground forces; closed market
economy (Socialist) does not grow
as rapidly as U.S. free market; USSR
spends higher ratio to balance.
U.S. reframing: NASA and space race
increased due to Soviet satellite success
Smaller ground forces; USAF SAC takes
lead on nuclear option; NASA space race.
GDP cost ratio acceptable. 1950s
perceived missile gap with Moscow.
GDP ratio
GDP ratio
Reframe: expand nuclear
delivery to IBCM, bomber, and
submarine capabilities.
1940 Manhattan Project;
1945 Hiroshima/Nagasaki
1945+ secret atomic program;
1949 atomic bomb
USSR
WWII Nazi missile technology/scientists
United States
Question 15: ANP- American
Foreign Policy Traditions:
American Foreign
Policy: U.S.
Strategic Culture
over 300 years
(1711-2011)
Conventional War
against China
Uni-polar 21st
Century Gulf War I
Panama
Final Soviet Battle
in Western Europe
Military Industrial Complex
Air Power, Nuclear Age
Total War (global threat)
End of Imperialism
Clash of Ideologies
America= defender of democracy
World “Policeman”
Peacetime small army
Fear of European invasion
Coastal forts and navy
Monroe Doctrine foreign policy
Avoid European wars
JIB/JAB for democracy
American Civil War
Entering the
World Stage
WWI
Civil War
Mex-Amer. War
Isolationist
Early America
War 1812
Impressment
Colonial ‘sub-status’
Amer. Revolution
Troop quartering
Taxes, economics
French Indian War
Colonial
Period
Leach’s Roots of Conflict
Paine’s Common Sense
Locke, Hume, Age of Enlightenment
Cold War
WWII
Golden Era
Span-Amer. War
Jomini’s Principles of War
Teddy Roosevelt and the navy
Linn’s Guardians and Heroes
(Echo of Battle)
Mahan and Naval strength
equals economic strength
Monroe Doctrine, Manifest
Destiny (messianic
eschatological)
PME establishment (West
Point)
Korea
Berlin Airlift
Kennan’s Long
Telegram
NCS-68
UN resolutions
Brinksmanship
Proxy Wars
Détente
Glasnost
Builder’s Masks of
War
Weigley’s American
Way of War
Somalia
Philippines 1899
Vietnam
Cuba
Iraq?
Libya?
Discarded
Conflicts
Contras
Afghanistan?
Triggering Powell Doctrine:
we need an exit strategy.
Blackhawk Down: send
enough combat power with
right mission.
Avoid COIN.
“Training tomorrow’s
enemies to help us Today”
Question 16: Historical Example
of Military Force and Diplomacythe American Civil War
Interwar Theorists (pre-Civil War)
Clausewitz
Winfield Scott
Napoleon (Legacy)
Jomini
Mahan
Prussian Staff
Mass Armies
Defensive
superiority
Mexican War
Army requires
resources
Frontal Assault
West Point
Smaller
population
Crimean War
Confederate Army
Doctrine
Rifled muskets
Steam engines
Trains
Telegraph
Armor
Screw propellers
Balloons
Artillery
Slave based agricultural
economy
Logistics
Union Naval
Blockade
History
Geography in
Mississippi
Southern fixation
on States Rights
Tactics
State-centric ‘gentlemen’
caste
Union Army
New Technology
Siege mentality
Confederate
prosperity
Tobacco and
Cotton Trade
Resources
South lacked
infrastructure
South lacked
international trade
Hagerman (The
American Civil War)
Confederacy
divided
Political nepotism
and corruption
Vicksburg
Politics
Mississippi- key
waterway
President Davis in
Richmond
South unable to industrialize
faster than North
Kuhn (Paradigm Shifts)
Wiegley (American Way
of War)
Linn (Echo of Battle)
Historian Interpretation (post-Civil War reflective)
Divergent Cognitive Diagram for Confederate Commander Problems 1861-1863
Interwar Theorists (pre-Civil War)
Clausewitz
Winfield Scott
Jomini
Prussian Staff
Centers of
Gravity
Union organized
some staff
specialization
Napoleon (Legacy)
Napoleonic
Wars
Offensive
frontal assaults
Napoleonic tactics
must adapt with
paradigm shift in
technology
Mahan
Naval Armor
Tactics
Rifled Muskets
History
Industrialization
Steam Engine
Constitution
Outdated
Army (active)
Terrain
Small Officer
Corps
JIB/JAB
Pre-industrial Warfare
(tactical)
Post-Industrial Warfare
(multiple campaigns)
Hagerman (The
American Civil War)
Speed and Mass
increased
Theory
Forces
Inter-war period
discourse on tactics
Screw
propellers
Telegraph
Military’s
Role
3/5 slave
votes
Mexican War
Artillery
dominates
Doctrine
Manifest
Destiny
Defensive
advantage
New technology
Kuhn (Paradigm Shifts)
Western
Territories
Infrastructure
in North and
South
Increased
casualties
Post Mexican War standdown
US distrusts large
standing army
State Rights
Defensive
advantages
Inter-war theorists
unable to discourse new
technology vs old tactics
Wiegley (American Way
of War)
Historian Interpretation (post-Civil War reflective)
Inability to C2
Linn (Echo of Battle)
Figure C: Fishbone Diagram for Confederate Commander Problems 1861-1863
Confederate
supply lines
lack rail
Various
caliber
firearms
require
munitions
Confederate
supply
dispersed
across states
President
Davis lacked
influence and
leadership
1
Logistics
Dependent
on water
transit
Telegraph
vulnerable
Confederates
interior lines
critical
Spies littered
message
couriers
Confederacy
organized
around states
Davis was removed
from local
environment
South lacked
international
trade partners
State-centric
mindset
hamstrung
strategy
C2 & ISR
Calvary sent
north
Failed
Discourse
Mexican War given
too much credit;
Clausewitz and
Crimean War not
enough.
(tactics vs. emerging
technology) South lacked
industrial base of
North
Siege mentality
lacked recon
American value on
life; militia factor
Jomini and
Napoleon favored
frontal assaults
Vicksburg isolated
by river; a strength
was also a
weakness
Rifled muskets
Steam engines
Trains
Telegraph
Armor
Screw propellers
Balloons
Artillery
Problem:
failure to
supply forces
Armies too large to
maneuver quickly
without signal
conditions optimal
Mahan led West
Pointers but Jomini
and Mexican War
veterans steered
tactics
Artillery of 1820s
outranged by
muskets of 1860s
2
Problem:
failure to
coordinate
tactics and
strategy
3
Problem:
failure to
apply violence
effectively to
accomplish
ENDS.
Question 17: How Economic
Theory can Influence Military
Operations
Figure 1a: Musings on Political Science Theories
Anarchy is not the cause of conflict.
Free trade and interdependent
democracies will reduce conflict.
Legitimacy in tension with cost to act.
Liberalism
Nation-state
primary actors
Humans are anarchistic
naturally; individual liberty is
trumped by state survival
Zero-sum game for power;
balance of power
Statism, Survivalism, Self-Help
Q1
Compatible in
some aspects
Realism
Q2
Compatible in some aspects
Implicitly
Peaceful World
Implicitly
Chaotic World
Compatible in some aspects
Q4
Social
Constructivists
Changing values and perceptions will change
government and society; meta-cognition and
game theory works here.
Q3
Compatible in some aspects
Individuals
comprise actors
Ideology not compatible
with others.
Marxists;
Communists;
Socialists
Ideological; counter-capitalist; individual
worker is the power- the state serves the
worker; final battle vs. capitalism;
Non-marxist nations will always threaten
Marxist ones.
Economy: Capitalist (realism; Smith) or liberal (global trade)
Anatol Rapoport’s non-Clausewitzian War Philosophies
(editor and wrote the intro to the 1968 Penguin Classic “On War”
There is a final war.
Eschatological (final war)
Philosophies of War
Divine Eschatological
(religious final battle)
Natural
Eschatological (planet
extinction; human
Economy: Islamic (ideological)
extinction)
Prevent all war.
Human (messianic)
Eschatological
(people here now)
Economy: Marxist Socialist
Religious movements
that feature an
“Armageddon plot” or
the return of a savior
with the destruction of
all non-believers follow
this logic.
A final war will, God
Willing, end human
conflict; this is predetermined (linear
causality), and the
chosen people will
reign supreme.
Example: Iran
launching WMD at
Israel to trigger
emergence of 12th
Imam.
Extreme
environmentalism
movements; antihuman movements (by
humans, oddly). Nonhuman events such as
planet destruction,
asteroid event, or
disease epidemic that
ends human (or all) life.
Example: the
dinosaurs did not
wage “war” but their
existence was
terminated this way.
Humans waging
limited war while an
asteroid hurtles
towards us makes a
similar example….
A group of people already on
the planet that will bring
about the final battle- the
Nazis, early Soviet Party, and
other extreme non-religious
groups followed this logic.
The Proletarian Revolution
where workers of the world
unit.
American Manifest Destiny
during the Great Plains Indian
Wars has components of this
logic also.
Example: Soviet Party of
the early 20th century
followed this logic,
according to Rapoport.
Cataclysmic (world
destruction) Philosophies
of War
Ethno-centric
Cataclysmic War Theory
Global Cataclysmic
War Theory
Economy: Marxist Socialist
Economy: Capitalist Liberal
Rapoport claims the
Soviets switched to this
during the Cold War- the
chief difference is:
1. War is NOT a tool.
2. The outside world
wants to destroy the
unique ethnic identity of
the select people.
3. Protective measures
such as the Berlin Wall
are not for keeping
people in, but keeping
outsiders out.
4. The world will end in a
final show-down.
Example: MAD in the
Cold War fueled this
logic; Soviets sought to
preserve their state
versus Capitalist
westerners.
Rapoport calls this a systemtheoretical approach. The
principles are:
1. War is NOT a tool.
2. ALL war is bad.
3. Global government is the
answer to ending conflict.
4. International systems will
aid in preventing global
cataclysmic war.
5. The nuclear age advanced
this logic.
Example: The United
Nations pursues
international systems and a
form of weak global
governance with the general
position that all war is
bad…NATO is not an
example of this; NATO is an
alliance under Clausewitzian
logic.
Fuzzy Cognitive Map on Kirkpatrick Victory Plan Problem 1941: national prosperity
vs. entropy
Resources available to nation
vs. global resources
Training a military requires
Environment
Economic Factors USSR population and
time/resources/technology
U.S. possesses
massive
resources and
industry.
UK was losing
resources and
troops at a
rapid rate.
Limited Time
(NLT 1943)
U.S. has a large
military age
population
pool.
Soviet Union
as a German
buffer.
UK as a
German
buffer.
U.S. National
resources
T=time
Threat to
world (WW2)
Current (1941) US
military inadequate
to achieve goals
America
located across
oceans from
WW2.
Z= goals
U.S. national
goals in WW2.
inter-war
military for U.S.
downsized
Pro-German lobby.
Pro-Allies lobby
Ethnic/Social
Ethnic and social national identity seeks
prosperity and power
resources mobilized
slowly.
Global trade
empowered US
economy
Technology
advancements
empowered
military action
X (means) + y (ways) = z (ends)
How to get x= t (time) / r
(resources)/ enemy
R= s (society) + e / p (political
structure)
Military decisions require
political and public discourse
American
Isolationism
Failure of League
of Nations
Fascism
diametrically
opposes
Democracy
American
independence
American
Democracy
U.S. democracy will
function with 10%
population draft
Political Structure
Political threat (internal and
external)
German
fascism
resulted from
WWI and LoN
failures.
Question 18: American Foreign
Policy Traditions and Small Wars
Figure 1a: Zweibelson Political Science Theory on 21 st Century Irregular Warfare
Trends Regarding Nuclear-armed Nations
= victory
= undetermined
= failure
Super-power nations
Large complex militaries
Cuban Missile Crisis 1962
Conflict in the Q1 is not
direct; Nuclear nations
use proxy conflicts in Q4
for indirect action
Japan 1945
Germany 1945
Berlin Air Lift 1947
Q1
Conflict in the Q2 is the
golden era for most western
military cultures-
Q2
Korean War
Limited War
Low Intensity
Conflict
Vietnam War (RNA)
Afghanistan 1988 (USSR)
Vietnam War (Viet Cong)
Afghanistan 2001present
Conflict in the Q4 is where
weaker nations and actors
seek to exploit super-power
nations on terms that are
better than in Q3.
Total war
High Intensity
Conflict
Panama 1989
Iraq 1990
Iraq 2003
Q4
Q3
Iran-Iraq War 1988 (Iraq)
Bosnia 1999
Libya 1985
Iraqi Civil War 2004present
Lebanon 2006 (Israel)
Failing nations
Rogue state
Conflict in the Q3 is between
non-nuclear nations or with
one nuclear (usually superior)
power.
Question 19: Operational Art
Development from 18th to 21st
Centuries- theories, doctrine,
tech, politics, culture.
Interwar Theorists (pre-Civil War)
Clausewitz
Winfield Scott
Napoleon (Legacy)
Jomini
Mahan
Prussian Staff
Mass Armies
Defensive
superiority
Mexican War
Army requires
resources
Frontal Assault
West Point
Smaller
population
Crimean War
Confederate Army
Doctrine
Rifled muskets
Steam engines
Trains
Telegraph
Armor
Screw propellers
Balloons
Artillery
Slave based agricultural
economy
Logistics
Union Naval
Blockade
History
Geography in
Mississippi
Southern fixation
on States Rights
Tactics
State-centric ‘gentlemen’
caste
Union Army
New Technology
Siege mentality
Confederate
prosperity
Tobacco and
Cotton Trade
Resources
South lacked
infrastructure
South lacked
international trade
Hagerman (The
American Civil War)
Confederacy
divided
Political nepotism
and corruption
Vicksburg
Politics
Mississippi- key
waterway
President Davis in
Richmond
South unable to industrialize
faster than North
Kuhn (Paradigm Shifts)
Wiegley (American Way
of War)
Linn (Echo of Battle)
Historian Interpretation (post-Civil War reflective)
JIB/JAB refinement
Global Middle Class
Politics
International Law/Governance
GRIN tech
Complexity
Resource Competition
Post Cold-War
Urban Populations
Gay Rights
Theory
Deterrence
Civil Rights II
Design
Naveh
Pentamic Army
UAVs
Kennan
Limited Conflict
Post-Imperialism Sayid Qtub
TH Lawrence
Space
Monroe Doctrine
Imperialism
Information Revolution
Lenin
Stealth Tech
Schliffen
Marx
Colonialism
Submarines
Assembly Line
Jomini
Military Industrial Complex
Airplanes
Clausewitz
democracies
Rifled barrel
Tanks
Combustion Engine
Steam Engine
Industrial Revolution
Machiavelli
satellites
ICBMs
Mahan
Civil rights (race)
worms
Cyberspace
American Exceptionalism
Manifest Destiny
biometrics
Unrestricted Conflict
Scientific Revolution (17-18th century)
Resources
Technology
Question 20: Element of
Operational Art- explain with
historic example (COGs)
Koniggratz
Centers of Gravity: Using Systems Thinking in a
Positivist, Reductionist, and Mechanistic Logic
FM 3-0
Quotes Clausewitz also.
The loss of a COG
ultimately results in
defeat. –this is linear
causality and reverse
engineering on a
positivist logic base.
FM 3-0 goes beyond JP
3-0 and states “COGs are
not limited to military
forces and can be either
physical or moral;
eliminating them requires
holistic integrated efforts
of all national IOPs.” 6-8.
Supports JP 3-0 and sees
a single COG at each
level of war.
The Army does not have
a COG at the tactical
level either (just USMC).
As Kem says, it is
semantics- a tactical
COG equals a decisive
point.
Clausewitz: A COG comprises the source of power that provides
freedom of action, physical strength, and the will to fight.
Dr. Kem: the COG is the thing you fear most; it is the actual
power. Also uses the Strange CC/CR/CV modeling.
Dr. Strange: CC/CR/CV modeling.
- Critical capabilities: crucial enablers for COG to function.
- Critical requirements: essential resources for CCs to work.
- Critical vulnerabilities: CRs that are vulnerable to attack or
exploitation.
* JP 3-0: the essence of operational art lies in being able to
produce the right combination of effects in time, space, and
purpose relative to a COG to neutralize, weaken, destroy, or
otherwise exploit it…to achieve military objectives.
Dr. Reilly: ‘Cognitive Map’ that reverse engineers end-states,
COGs, and lines of effort backwards in time.
JP 3-0
Quotes Clausewitz: A
COG is the source of
moral or physical
strength, power, and
resistance.
A COG is singular in
nature- JP 3-0 wants one
at each level of war.
In conventional fights, JP
3-0 prefers strategic COG
to be government or
leader; and operational
COG as the fielded
forces. No tactical COGs.
LOOs, PLOs- no LOEs.
Linear causality. Baseball
makes the runner go to
1st, then 2nd base; war
might require us to run to
3rd, then 1st, then 2nd…
Garandagangi makes the
distinction between nonminded, uni-minded, and
multi-minded systems;
COGs work for uniminded (EBO systems
based) logic.
Austria-Hungary
Prussia
Strategic Level
Bismark
Operational Level
Moltke
Moltke was brilliant, but his
General Staff operated quickly
and efficiently.
Strategic Level
xxx
Operational Level
Benedek
No staff- Benedek made all
decisions- C2 was chaotic.
Tactical Level
Tactical Level
DP: Battle of Koniggratz
Moltke splits his force
and conducts double
envelopment of enemy.
Operational COG
Operational Center of
Gravity:
- Prussian Fielded Forces
(250,000 troops)
Critical Requirements:
- Supplies; log train
- Accurate intelligence
- Superior Terrain
- Maneuverability
- Fires support (cannon)
Critical Capabilities:
- General Staff Model
- Breach-loading needle guns
- common language (troops)
- Excellent education level
- Home region units (homogeneity)
- Not tied to line formations of old
(breach rifle advantage)
Critical Vulnerabilities:
- Artillery corps less experienced
with rifled cannon than Austrians
- Austrians in position on terrain first
- Austrians field artillery were more
experienced and accurate
Austrians
compressed into
8 square mile
area with 1x
good road.
Operational COG
Critical Capabilities:
- Rifled cannon (artillery corps)
- Muzzle loading rifles
- 9x languages and cultures fused
- Line formations and traditional
tactics
Critical Vulnerabilities:
- Muzzle loading guns (rate of fire)
- Many languages and cultures (9)
- Poor education level
- No general staff- Genius of CDR
only- chaotic C2 climate
- Relied on muzzle-centric line
formations for infantry
Operational Center of
Gravity:
- Austro-Hungarian Fielded
Forces (240,000 troops)
Critical Requirements:
- Supplies, log train
- Accurate intelligence
- Superior Terrain
- Maneuverability
- Fires support (cannon)
Question 21: Historical Example
of Mission Command- how
CDR/staff developed and
conducted a successful
campaign.
Mission Command Applied to xxx
CDR’s intent
Subordinates’
Initiative
Mission
Orders:
Resource
Allocation
Concept of
operations
Successful
Action
Minimum control
measures
xxx
Insert info
Insert info
Insert info
Insert info
Question 22: Challenges of CMD
at Operational Level- how do
they differ from Tactical CMD?
Positivism refers to a set of
epistemological perspectives and
philosophies of science which hold
that the scientific method is the best
approach to uncovering the processes
by which both physical and human
events occur.
Operational CMD
FM 3-0
•
Reverse engineer termination
criteria to objectives, COGs, and
DPs along a LOO.
Identifying desired and undesired
effects with a systems
perspective –IV-8(3) JP 3-0.
Effects: describe system
behavior
JP 3-0 LOGIC: the nature of
warfare is characterized as a
confrontation between nationstates or coalitions/alliances of
nation-states…IW is a violent
struggle between state and nonstate actors.
JP 3-0 Unified Action: the
synchronization, coordination,
and/or integration of the
activities of the governmental
and nongovernmental entities
with military operations to
achieve unity of effort.
Tactical CMD
MDMP
•
•
•
Operational and Mission
Variables: FM 3-0 warns
of “precise binning” but
the positivist and
reductionist procedures
are lost.
PMESII-PT centric.
Echoes JP 3-0’s
definition of ‘Unified
Action.’
Quotes Clausewitz on
uncertainty, chance, and
friction. (when your logic
creates abnormalities,
you can categorize them
under these catch-alls).
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
12 principles of war
use Jominian
systems thinking that
use mechanistic,
reductionist, and
positivist constructs
Joint Operation
Planning Process
Centers of Gravity
Operational CMD: Joint, and interagency; Tactical CMD can be
“ground-centric” and avoid some
DIME and IGO/NGO/OGA
considerations. “Stay in your lane” and
“that is someone else’s problem”
come to mind as comments made by
BDE CDR individuals.
Vas De Sege: SWJ Article on
Operational Level of War- uses
metaphor of explorer in unknown
lands.
TPPs, SOPs
JP 3-0
•
12 principles of war
still used;
Relies upon
procedures,
uniformity, and
repetition of effect
Linear Causality
Reductionismemphasis on
description (PIR,
MCOO, DPs)
End-States; LOOs,
DPs- linked
Operational CMD: Joint, and interagency; Tactical CMD can be
“ground-centric” and avoid some
DIME and IGO/NGO/OGA
considerations. “Stay in your lane” and
“that is someone else’s problem”
come to mind as comments made by
BDE CDR individuals.
•
•
•
•
Tactical Unit specific
Institutionalism is
strong at tactical level
Naveh uses the term
“tacticization”
Tactical CMD- battle
centric; decisive
points, there are no
tactical COGs in
Army doctrine.
Tactical Level of War: violence
or threat of violence in action to
pursue strategic objectives as
orchestrated and synergized by
the Operational CDR’s vision.
Question 23: Operational CMD
relationship in conventional and
COIN conflicts
Operational Command Relationships in Conventional Conflicts Using
Mission Command
Clear linear logicClausewitzian
and Jominian:
destroy the
enemy force.
CDR’s intent
Conventional Conflict
Detailed Planning logic
provides procedures
and
uniformity/repetition
that works.
Subordinates’
Initiative
Mission Command
PLOs, LOOs, LOEslinked to COG CVs and
DPs. Doctrine suited for
conventional
task/purpose and
reverse-engineered
ENDs-ways -means
Mission
Orders:
Resources tied to
traditional
employment of
troop/equipment.
Units do their
METL tasks the
way they train for.
Resource
Allocation
Concept of
operations
Minimum control
measures
COIN Conflict
The enemy is unclearillusive. Clausewitz
alone fails- Sun Tzu
and Design provide
additional
understanding.
Considerations:
hierarchical (top-down)
may be cumbersome.
Air power (penny
packets vs. CCDE)
-Div. resistance of
Awakening Movement
Linear logic may be
problematic. C2 needs
decentralization and
self-organization that
tailors to SPECIFIC
areas; populationcentric.
Many units perform
roles they are
unfamiliar with or
untrained on. New
resources neededadaptation and
innovation is critical.
Conventional conflicts
feature distinct military
termination criteria often
associated with clear
national goals- defeating a
nation-state; unconditional
surrender; or an enemy
force retreating from
contested territory.
Conventional conflicts place
the military IOP as the
uncontested lead element.
Successful
Action
COIN and IW conflicts are
more ambiguoustermination criteria are
illusive and often shift as
conditions change. Nonstate actors intermingle with
nation states and groups;
successful UW morphs into
COIN or IW- and
populations are generally
key. The military IOP may
not be the lead element
even when combat occurs.
Question 24: Is operational art
relevant for COIN/small wars or
just MCO?
Answer: Yes. Next Question.
Just kidding. See next slide.
Figure 1a: Zweibelson Political Science Theory on 21 st Century Irregular Warfare
Trends Regarding Nuclear-armed Nations
= victory
= undetermined
= failure
Super-power nations
Large complex militaries
Cuban Missile Crisis 1962
Conflict in the Q1 is not
direct; Nuclear nations
use proxy conflicts in Q4
for indirect action
Japan 1945
Germany 1945
Berlin Air Lift 1947
Q1
Q2
Operational Art in deterrence is less neededWMD enabled nations use diplomacy and
strategic-level actions or proxy wars through
surrogates to accomplish goals.
Total war
High Intensity
Conflict
Vietnam War (RNA)
Afghanistan 1988 (USSR)
Vietnam War (Viet Cong)
Afghanistan 2001present
Operational Art in COIN or IW is
necessary to orchestrate all IOPs
efficiently in a limited conflict that
will require longer time and
domestic long-term support. This is
where 21st century conflict is
trending- we need to adapt.
Operational Art needed
here for threat of violencealthough we won’t fight this
way again.
Korean War
Limited War
Low Intensity
Conflict
Conflict in the Q4 is where
weaker nations and actors
seek to exploit super-power
nations on terms that are
better than in Q3.
Conflict in the Q2 is the
golden era for most western
military cultures-
Panama 1989
Iraq 1990
Iraq 2003
Q4
Q3
Iran-Iraq War 1988 (Iraq)
Bosnia 1999
Libya 1985
Iraqi Civil War 2004present
Lebanon 2006 (Israel)
Failing nations
Rogue state
Conflict in the Q3 is between
non-nuclear nations or with
one nuclear (usually superior)
power.
Operational Art needed here for threat of violence- and
the application of it. When mis-matched forces wage war
in MCO, the need for operational art remains a given
necessity. But- how many more Saddams will fight us like
this?
Question 25: Given the EOA
course, what is your definition of
Operational Art? How would you
change FM 3-0’s definition?
Personal Definition of Operational Art
US Army FM 3-0:
Operational Art: the application of creative imagination
by commanders and staffs- supported by their skill,
knowledge, and experience- to design strategies,
campaigns, and major operations and organize and
employ military forces. Operational art integrates ends,
ways, and means across the levels of war. (JP 3-0)
•
•
•
FM definition remains within institutional
interiority
Ends-Ways-Means reflects linear
causality, reverse engineering, positivism,
and mechanistic reductionism.
Levels of war represents bounding.
Choice of words reflects different military logic
•
•
•
My definition emphasizes
exteriority and interiority
Learning and critical thinking are
essential
Synergy and pursuing strategic
aims represents a holistic approach
to evolving and emerging national
goals as a complex system
transforms.
My Definition:
Operational Art: the application of persistent creativity
and innovation by commanders and staffs- supported
by their knowledge, experience, and critical thinkingto design strategies, campaigns, and major operations
and organize and employ military forces. Operational
art synergizes tactical action with the pursuit of
strategic aims for optimum effectiveness and
perpetual adaptation.
Question 26: Discuss tension
between strategy, operations,
and tactics- provide 1x EOA
example from course.
EOA Conflict: The American Revolution (EOA 1)
From General Gage and the British Perspective
Strategy
British government wanted
American colonies suppressed
and British colonial dominance
restored through military force.
Economic measures such as the
Stamp Act, the Intolerable Acts
aka- the Coercive Acts (Gage’s
ideas)and economic positioning to
ensure colonial dependence on
British refined goods (thus
maintaining a dependency
relationship with the colonies at a
disadvantage).
Taxation covered expensive
European Wars.
Sending fielded forces over the
Atlantic was expensive- and risky
with European enemies
maneuvering. Gage only had
3,000 soldiers- he wanted 10,000.
Tensions
Operations
Tensions
Gage appointed Royal Governor
of Massachusetts by King.
Boston was viewed as the
Colonial strategic “center of
gravity” while militia arms and
powder mills were considered the
operational COGs.
Gates echoed a Herbst: States
and Power in Africa theory and
considered the cheap and
available land as part of the
problem in the colonies- too many
people could move beyond the
practical reach of the law.
Gates followed the law strictly.
Gates’ logic (and the British in
general) framed the conflict with
the wrong logic. They projected
British logic onto an American one.
Puritanism, anger over Imperialism
(Leach’s Roots of Conflict), and
frontier isolationism changed
Americans.
Tactics
Redcoats conducted forced
impressment of colonial sailors and
citizens into their armed forces.
Redcoats on mainland used forts as
well as local homes for quartering of
troops against colonial wishes.
Military patrols in Boston caused
tensions- “The Boston Massacre”
British naval blockades impacted
trade. The Coercive Acts closed the
port of Boston by Gage.
Seizure of weapon caches and
powder mills reduced militia
capabilities (in theory).
British values over the right to bear
arms differed from a frontiersman.
DDR was not feasible.
Colonial militia were educated and
religious men; British troops were
from the dregs of society and
illiterate.
Question 27: EOA- Moltke said
st
no plan survives 1 contact with
enemy- support or disagree.
On Moltke: Metaphors do not translate into Narratives
Moltke espouses Clausewitzian
political war theory by embracing
the concepts of fog, friction, and
chance in warfare. While genius
may rise above all other rules
and processes, the best efforts
(a plan) is no match for real war
complexity and uncertainty.
Therefore, planning prepares a
military organization for thinking
about war- but it does not
substitute for actual war conduct
and execution where plans are
discarded as new ones replace
them.
Moltke says “no plan survives first contact.”
Metaphor: a plan “survives” as a living thing
instead of a concept.
First contact with the enemy- when first shots fired,
the “plan” dies. This implies that the enemy always
is more complex than a reductionist plan can
anticipate.
Moltke takes empirical
material and deals with his
interiority (known) in tension
with exteriority (unknown)as in, military conflicts
involve tactical action of
forces in environments
where violence occurs for
political aims. Experience
counts, but each new
conflict is unique and even
the best plan cannot
prepare for the chaos of the
future battlefield.
Moltke’s comment is just a metaphor- an observation, a maxim that explains how fog and friction make any Jominian attempt at being
a positivist or mechanistic reductionist in preparation for war is a waste. One cannot predict a conflict and build a plan that covers
every contingency- war does not obey principles and mechanistic logic. As a narrative, one should not take Moltke’s comment as
dogma any more than Moltke recommends against building a plan that becomes dogma for a future conflict. Like any initial plan, many
maxims uttered by wise military men become casualties as well during the first shot of the next conflict.
Question 28: TCC- choose 1x
form of warfare discussed in TCC
505-511; how does this develop
in next 20-25 yrs, and how will it
interact with other forms of
future warfare?
How Radical Evolution Impacts Conventional War
International Law/Governance
Large Aging Populations
Technology
Multi-polar Environment
Genetic Modification
Politics
Artificial Intelligence
Global Middle Class
Urban Populations
JIB/JAB refinement
GRIN tech
Gay Rights
Integrated Planning
Resource Competition
GRIN tech will…
Complexity
Post Cold-War
Design
biometrics
Uni-polar Environment
Resources
Naveh
Deterrence
Pentamic Army
UAVs
Kennan
Sayid Qtub
Civil Rights II
Limited Conflict
EBO
Cyberspace
Unrestricted Conflict
Space
ICBMs
Post-Imperialism
worms
satellites
Information Revolution
Military Industrial Complex
Stealth Tech
Theory
On Unrestricted Warfare by Liang and Xiangsui
Qiao Liang, Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare (Beijing: People’s Liberation Army Literature and Arts Publishing House, February
1999) 19. Liang and Xiangsui take an eastern perspective on western warfare. “We still cannot indulge in romantic fantasies about
technology, believing that from this point on war will become a confrontation like an electronic game, and even simulated warfare in a
computer room similarly must be premised upon a country’s actual overall capabilities…”
P8. “Technology is like ‘magic shoes’ on the feet of mankind, and after the spring has been wound tightly by commercial interests, people
can only dance along with the shoes, whirling rapidly in time to the beat that they set.” Without understanding the importance of metaphor
in eastern culture, it is easy to dismiss Liang and Xiangsui’s position on technology and society as ‘mad’ or ‘illogical.’ When we use our
own logic to disregard others, we are using ‘madness’ as an excuse to ignore the alternate methods that their logic employs.
P10. Liang and Xiangsui criticize western emphasis on techno-centric logic with, “people have long been accustomed to blindly falling in
love with the new and discarding the old…the endless pursuit of new technology has become a panacea to resolve all of the difficult
questions of existence…In this way, the irrational expansion of technology causes mankind to continually lose his goals in the complex
ramifications of the tree of technology, losing his way and forgetting how to get back.”
P13-14. “Some of the traditional models of war, as well as the logic and laws attached to it, will also be challenged. The outcome of the
contest is not the collapse of the traditional mansion but rather one portion of the new construction site being in disorder.” Liang and
Xiangsui present a non-western perspective on how a paradigm shift in military thinking in the 21st century does not destroy the old
entirely, but reorganize an old structure into a new one; some parts remain useful while others go to the intellectual scrap heap.
P140-141. Liang and Ziangsui argue that over the last 20 years, the world has grown more complex, yet the military ignore the increased
complexity of war and instead focus “on the level of weapons, deployment methods and the battlefield, and the drawn-up war prospects
are also mostly only limited to the military domain and revel in it.”
P141. “The enemy will possibly not be the originally significant enemy, and the weapons will possibly not be the original weapons, and
the battlefield will also possibly not be the original battlefield. Nothing is definite. What can be ascertained is not definite. The game has
already changed, and what we need to continue is ascertaining a new type of fighting method within various uncertainties.”
P181. Americans “would rather treat war as the opponent in the marathon race of military technology and are not willing to look at it more
as a test of morale and courage…they believe that as long as the Edisons of today do not sink into sleep, the gate to victory will always
be open to the Americans.”
P95. “It is not so much that war follows the fixed race course of rivalry of technology and weaponry as it is a game field with continually
changing direction and many irregular factors.”
Question 29: What is the utility
of scenario planning for future
operations?
Scenario Planning and the Mexico Cartel Design Model
Benefits of Scenario Planning:
1.
2.
Merges well with Design’s
conceptual planning…works as a
potential intermediate step between
conceptual and detailed planning.
Generates options that reflect logicnot just wild speculation about the
future; and avoids the cookie-cutter
mentality of dealing only with
“known-knowns” projected into the
future (the economics of carriage
companies in 1900 when
automobiles entered the market).
High Corruption
High Violence
Legitimate
Economy
Prosperity
This model features an
improving Mexican legitimate
economy with a booming illicit
commodity- violence will
increase as Mexico buys more
security capabilities while drug
cartels can also purchase more
lethal hardware and
mercenaries/influence.
Low Corruption
Low Violence
This model features an
improving Mexican legal
economy with a declining illicit
economy; positive feed-back
loops funnel greater security
resources against a diminishing
rival criminal enterprise. Best
possible future scenario.
Illicit
Economy
Entropy
Illicit
Economy
Prosperity
Detriments of Scenario Planning:
1.
2.
3.
Easy to misuse this tool. This is
not a crystal ball. It generates
options for planning- it does not
make predictions.
Black Swans are notoriously hard
to anticipate. Scenario planning
probably only captures white and
grey swans…
Special folks are necessary for
this to work. Highly educated
personnel can contribute- military
organizations generally lack those
types.
This model features a booming
illicit commodity with a
declining legal economy. With
limited resources for security
costs, Mexico will lose
legitimacy and face state
failure without outside
intervention. Cartel growth
and robust black markets will
hasten this collapse.
High Corruption
High Violence
This model features a declining
legal and illegal economy in
Mexico. With less legal
enterprise options and no rival
illicit economy, Mexico will
slide into a collapsed state
condition where extreme
poverty occurs. Violence will
be moderate due to limited
illicit options.
Legitimate
Economy
Entropy
High Corruption
Moderate Violence
Question 30: Describe the
Concept of Ops our group didwhat implications does this have
for future force structure?
More to follow. I need to download
our groups’ deliverable on Brazil.
In oral comps, I would want to steer
this conversation towards Mexico
instead and run with some of the
Design products from that.
Question 31: What is the
difference between war and
warfare? What does this matter
for the 21st century and the US?
Question 32: What trends will
influence the future operating
environment for the next 20-25
yrs?
How Radical Evolution Impacts Conventional War
International Law/Governance
Large Aging Populations
Technology
Multi-polar Environment
Genetic Modification
Politics
Artificial Intelligence
Global Middle Class
Urban Populations
Integrated Planning
JIB/JAB refinement
GRIN tech
Gay Rights
Resource Competition
GRIN tech will…
Complexity
Post Cold-War
Design
biometrics
Uni-polar Environment
Naveh
Deterrence
Pentamic Army
UAVs
Kennan
Sayid Qtub
Civil Rights II
Limited Conflict
EBO
worms
Cyberspace
Unrestricted Conflict
Space
ICBMs
Post-Imperialism
satellites
Information Revolution
Military Industrial Complex
GRIN: genetic,
robotic,
informational,
and nano-tech
Stealth Tech
Theory
Resources
Question 33: FM 3-0 does
offensive, defensive, and stability
ops as a central theme for US
operational concept- what is the
value of a concept that needs 3x
simultaneous operations?
More to follow.
Question 34: FG officers- explain
your future role as a staff officer
on a general staff.
Answer: Making coffee and building pretty slides.
Question 35: You are a BDE CDRwhat is your role in MDMP- how
do you ensure your staff meets
your intent and HHQ’s mission
requirements?
MDMP
Step 1: Receipt of
Mission
Step 2: Mission
Analysis
Step 3: COA
Development
Step 4: COA
Analysis (wargaming)
Guidance must get
staff looking at the
problem from the right
perspectives.
Analysis must lead to
synthesis. Example:
what does the weather
data mean in relation
to time, maneuver, and
purpose?
COA development
should be done without
compartmentalizing too
much with small staff
groups-
Step 5: COA
comparison
War-gaming should not
be lock-step; it also
should not be without
time hacks and a
strong ref.
Step 6: COA
Approval
Step 7: Orders
Production
CDR’s intent
Subordinates’
Initiative
Mission Command
Mission
Orders:
Concept of
operations
Minimum control
measures
Design is not just for
the first step of MDMPit should be continuous
and help refine each
step of the MDMP
process with the CDR
as the lead designer.
Resource
Allocation
Question 36: JP 5-0 and FM 5-0
explain a through mission
analysis…
More to follow.
Summarize ANP Course:
(Applied Elements of National
Power)
Applied Elements of National Power
Course Outline:
Historic Contexts:
ANP explains how the US functions
in the international arena, how
foreign policy and strategy evolved
over time, with a focus on the
strategic context for operational
art.
Strategic History (WWI mostly) with
B.H. Liddell Hart’s Strategy.
Collin Gray’s War, Peace, and
International Relations.
1. Analyze strategy and strategic
history.
2. Analyze the intellectual
foundations of American foreign
policy.
3. Apply conceptual campaign
planning to historic strategic
contexts.
4. Examine the relationships
among diplomacy, information,
economics, and military force
(DIME).
Henry Hendrix’s Theodore
Roosevelt’s Naval Diplomacy (turn
of 20th century); the importance of
Mahan on US strategic culture.
Linn’s Echo of Battle would place
both Mahan and TR as ‘guardians.’
Henry Gole’s The Road to
Rainbow: this book covered preWWII peacetime planning with
plans Orange (Japan) and others;
UK was an enemy in one;
Cold War Era: the Deterrence Age.
McDougall’s Promised Land,
Crusader State.
Bernard Brodie’s The Anatomy of
Deterrence.
Kenneth Osgood’s Total Cold War
Yergin and Stanislaw: The
Commanding Heights
Post-Cold War to War on Terror:
McDougall’s Promised Land…
Gaddis’ Surprise, Security, and the American
Experience
David Ucko’s New Counterinsurgency Era
Improvements:
Leach’s Roots of Conflict: spans
the century prior to the
Revolutionary War; how American
culture grew away from British
colonial values and tenets.
Cold War Era: the Deterrence Age.
Keenan’s The Long Telegram
NCS-68
The Berlin Airlift (1957)
Cuba Missile Crisis (1963?)
Builder’s The Masks of War: the
services fought over relevance and
sought golden-era conflicts.
Is McDougall’s book appropriate for
SAMS? He is writing history for
historians- many folks were lost.
Summarize Design Course:
Applied Elements of National Power
Course Outline:
Design did…
Historic Contexts:
Enter readings
Improvements:
Enter readings
Summarize SDM Course:
Applied Elements of National Power
Course Outline:
SDM did…
Historic Contexts:
Enter readings
Improvements:
Enter readings
Summarize TCC Course:
Applied Elements of National Power
Course Outline:
TCC did…
Historic Contexts:
Enter readings
Improvements:
Enter readings
Process Modeling
Process Modeling
Process modeling uses a flowchart format to graphically depict complex
interrelationships. This should help understand what Dr. Ryan’s article from D315
referred to concerning complexity: the variety of actors and the interconnectivity
between them reflect complexity in the system.
Warning: process modeling lends itself to engineering and a Jominian ‘Industrial
Revolution’ mindset. Intricate and complicated processes such as a Model-T Ford
assembly plant are not complex, but would plot well in a process modeling
diagram.
Linn’s Echo of Battle uses the ‘managerial’ guardian concept to help describe this
faulty manner of approaching military problems.
Process modeling strikes me as a tool that, if wielded dangerously in the
conceptual stage of design, will send your framing down a road of description,
deconstructionism, and tunnel vision where influencing one actor will “solve the
problem.”
Process Modeling
Process Modeling and Mexico
Mexican rival actors (Army, politicians, elites, cartels, majority population, extreme
poor, Religious Leaders) are not mechanical.
Input and output in a complicated closed system (car plant) exists and lend well to
a diagram like the previous slide. Input and output in an open system need to
consider positive and negative feedback loops, cooperation and competition
between various actors, and sources of difference within the design frame.
This makes process modeling “messy” for the Mexican design frame.
The following slide attempts to conduct process modeling with Mexico.
Figure 3: Process Modeling in Mexico 2010
Sources: ‘me over us’
‘Drugs are a Valuable Resource’
‘corruption is persistent.’
‘Elites over poor.’
Some Change occurs
Gradual Erosion of
Change
Mexican system
resists action
System
Compensation:
resist change
System resists change.
System restored to observed
state with corruption cycles
and drug problem
Stabilization after
Military Action
Attempt Change
LOE
LOE
Mexican
System
changed
Short Term Changes degrade
over time (problem
unsolved)
Positive Feedback resisting changes
Loop
Acceptable
violence and
corruption
LOE
ENERGY
US military enters
system
Observed System: there
is difference between OS
and desired state.
Drug cycle and
corruption
continues with
restoration of
violence and
corruption
tolerances
‘flooding’ the positive
feedback loop to change it
Too much
violence and/or
corruption
Corruption exceeds System
Carrying Capacity
New power structure with
new elites.
Problem remains; reassignment of actors occurs
Civil
War
Positive feedback loops
are fragile.
Majority rejects current
elite structure of power
Rival relevant
actors vulnerable
Figure 3: Process Modeling in Mexico 2010
Sources: ‘me over us’
‘Drugs are a Valuable Resource’
‘corruption is persistent.’
‘Elites over poor.’
Some Change occurs
Gradual Erosion of
Change
Mexican system
resists action
System
Compensation:
resist change
System resists change.
System restored to observed
state with corruption cycles
and drug problem
Stabilization after
Military Action
Attempt Change
LOE
LOE
Mexican
System
changed
Short Term Changes degrade
over time (problem
unsolved)
Positive Feedback resisting changes
Loop
Acceptable
violence and
corruption
LOE
ENERGY
US military enters
system
Observed System: there
is difference between OS
and desired state.
Drug cycle and
corruption
continues with
restoration of
violence and
corruption
tolerances
‘flooding’ the positive
feedback loop to change it
Too much
violence and/or
corruption
Corruption exceeds System
Carrying Capacity
New power structure with
new elites.
Problem remains; reassignment of actors occurs
Civil
War
Positive feedback loops
are fragile.
Majority rejects current
elite structure of power
Rival relevant
actors vulnerable
Rugged Landscapes
MAJOR BEN ZWEIBELSON, SEMINAR 4 SAMS
Figure 1a: Rugged Landscape Information Modeling Improvement (adding the quad chart)
A hypothetical Iraqi Model for 2010:
Kurdish
Prosperity
Stable
Shiite
Sunni
Entropy
Volatile
Hatch’s Model of Cultural
Transformation
Figure 1: Hatch’s Cultural Dynamic Model adapted by Zweibelson with Mexico 2010
11. When Mexican society promotes
anti-elitist leadership from outside
the political process (religious leaders,
Cartel leaders, or other asymmetrical
leader), this new value manifests
itself by challenging common
assumptions about Mexico and
elitism/corruption.
12. If alternate leadership
valued as a new symbolic
artifact in Mexico (a religious
leader rises to power), this
challenges existing
assumptions.
Mexican society
places elites above
the law
Values
3. Organization (Mexico) begins influencing
action by manifesting values opposing elitist
corruption.
2. Perceptions of elitist action supporting assumption
of Mexican corruption.
1. World expects high levels of elitist corruption and
crime in Mexico.
4. Value-based action
produces cultural
artifacts concerning
corruption and elitism.
• Judicial reform
Artifacts
• Alternate Political Parties
• New Leaders
• Military employed in areas Police are
corrupted
Assumption
6. Symbols lead to interpretation
and questioning assumptions.
• Mexican history, ideology, and
culture gravitate towards
charismatic elites; wealth is
given back to masses to absolve
sins of the elite. Can some level
of elitism remain culturally
acceptable in Mexico?
10. Mexican society that previously
endorsed new political parties for
change now realize that the
corruption cycle absorbs all elected
leaders. For change, society must
now value alternate leadership
functioning outside the political
process.
5. Some of these Mexican
artifacts gain symbolic meaning
in communication with others.
9. New leaders do not
reflect anti-elitism if
elected within the
established political
process. For new
leadership artifacts to
become symbols of elitist
reform, they must gain
power in a manner
outside the established
political process.
• Presidents Fox and Calderon represent
change.
• Capture/killing Cartel leaders
demonstrate resolve against elitism.
Symbols
Interpretation
initiates CHANGE.
7. Presidents from new political parties may
get elected on platforms of reform; but they
also can perform the traditional role of elitist
and function above the law.
8. Some artifacts in Mexican anti-elitism
require refinement because their symbolic
interpretation conflicts with rival aspects in
Mexican culture and history.
Figure 2: Hatch’s Cultural Dynamic Model adapted by Zweibelson with American Civil War (D324)
11. When Southern society promotes proWhite Southern leadership that promotes
Southern preservation of power in postwar reconstruction, this new value
manifests itself by challenging original
assumptions that non-whites are unequal,
yet preserves white prosperity in a nonslave based economy by valuing political
intimidation of black Southern voters.
12. If alternate white Southern
value of voter intimidation/blacks
are unnecessary in post-war
economy as new symbolic
artifacts in the South (a change
from active military resistance),
this challenges existing
assumptions.
Slaves are unequal
to Whites and
necessary for
southern economic
prosperity
Values
3. North conducts military action against
Southern States in rebellion.
2. Technological improvements and industrial
revolution in 1850s will not impact slave economies in 4. Value-based action
produces cultural artifacts
the foreseeable future.
1. Southern continuation of slave-based economy will
continue uninterrupted unless militarily defeated.
6. Symbols lead to interpretation
and questioning assumptions.
Interpretation
initiates CHANGE.
concerning continued
enslavement of non-whites
and tobacco/cotton economy
• Slavery
Artifacts
• Southern Military
• Attempts at Sovereignty
• Cotton and Tobacco valued by world
Assumption
• White Southern history,
ideology, and culture gravitate
towards valuing non-whites as
sub-human; slave-based
economies prosper in the preindustrial revolution era. Why is
ethnic inequality so pervasive in
the South, and can it change?
10. Southern society that
previously endorsed military revolt
from Union now accept that slaves
are unavailable for economic
prosperity; the Southern economy
(and social castes) will change. For
change, society must now value
alternate values that accept nonwhite changed status without
weakening White Southern values
or prosperity.
Freedom versus Slavery;
Human Rights versus
Economic Prosperity
5. Some of these Southern
artifacts gain symbolic meaning
in communication with others.
• Southern military leadership fights for
southern values and southern prosperity;
slave-based economy becomes symbolic of
rival concepts of ‘freedom’
Symbols
7. The military defeat of the south is only one
step in the process of cultural transformation
9. Emergent Southern
action post-conflict in a
loss must adjust Southern
values but prevent
destruction of Southern
identity/culture. For new
leadership artifacts to
become symbols of
human equality and
economic reform, slaves
must become unnecessary
for southern prosperity.
8. Some artifacts in Southern values require
refinement because their symbolic
interpretation conflicts with rival (Northern)
values on ‘equal rights’ and economic
prosperity.
Swarming
Figure 2: Zweibelson Swarming Model
Principles of Swarming:
1. Collective Orientation: move in
same direction
2. Collective Proximity: remain close
to neighbors
3. Avoid Entropy: avoid collision with
neighbors
14
19
7
14 and 19 are ‘blitzing’ outside the
swarm and will either join a swarm
group, or locate a swarm objective
(food, enemy, etc).
6
8
2
9
Example of swarm principle: 3 and 2 are
within 1’s collision ring; 1 must decide
either to move towards grouping 3-9-87 or towards larger grouping 4-5-10-1112-13. 1 moves towards larger grouping
(swarm) while a smaller grouping
attracts 3 and 2.
1
3
5
11
4
10
15
12
13
18
17
16
Political Science Considerations
Figure 1a: Musings on Political Science Theories
Anarchy is not the cause of conflict.
Free trade and interdependent
democracies will reduce conflict.
Legitimacy in tension with cost to act.
Liberalism
Nation-state
primary actors
Humans are anarchistic
naturally; individual liberty is
trumped by state survival
Zero-sum game for power;
balance of power
Statism, Survivalism, Self-Help
Q1
Compatible in
some aspects
Realism
Q2
Compatible in some aspects
Implicitly
Peaceful World
Implicitly
Chaotic World
Compatible in some aspects
Q4
Social
Constructivists
Changing values and perceptions will change
government and society; meta-cognition and
game theory works here.
Q3
Compatible in some aspects
Individuals
comprise actors
Ideology not compatible
with others.
Marxists;
Communists;
Socialists
Ideological; counter-capitalist; individual
worker is the power- the state serves the
worker; final battle vs. capitalism;
Non-marxist nations will always threaten
Marxist ones.
Interiority and Exteriority in
Design Theory
Black Swans
Exteriority
Design Ontological
Adaptive Innovative
Creative
System of Logic
“Knowing about the Unknown”
in tension with “Knowing the
Known”
Q1
Linking Design’s System of Logic with
Detailed Planning’s System of Logic
Q2
Unknown Unknowns
Middle East Collapse
9-11
Internet Bubble Burst
Housing Collapse
Unexpected Threats
Known
Unknown
Reducing
Tensions
White Swans
Reductionist
Mechanistic Positivist
System of Logic
Q3
Shattering
expectations
of the future
Gray Swans
Unconventional Threats
Known Unknowns
Known knowns
Disease Epidemics (AIDs)
Energy and Resource Limits
Population Growth
Geography
Q4
Conventional Threats
Interiority
Earthquakes occur at fault
lines (Japan, Haiti, Chile)
Fuzzy Cognitive Maps
Fuzzy Cognitive Map on Kirkpatrick Victory Plan Problem 1941: national prosperity
vs. entropy
Resources available to nation
vs. global resources
Training a military requires
USSR population and
Environment
Economic Factors
time/resources/technology
U.S. possesses
massive
resources and
industry.
UK was losing
resources and
troops at a
rapid rate.
Limited Time
(NLT 1943)
U.S. has a large
military age
population
pool.
Soviet Union
as a German
buffer.
UK as a
German
buffer.
U.S. National
resources
T=time
Threat to
world (WW2)
Current (1941) US
military inadequate
to achieve goals
America
located across
oceans from
WW2.
Z= goals
U.S. national
goals in WW2.
inter-war
military for U.S.
downsized
Pro-German lobby.
Pro-Allies lobby
Ethnic/Social
Ethnic and social national identity seeks
prosperity and power
resources mobilized
slowly.
Global trade
empowered US
economy
Technology
advancements
empowered
military action
X (means) + y (ways) = z (ends)
How to get x= t (time) / r
(resources)/ enemy
R= s (society) + e / p (political
structure)
Military decisions require
political and public discourse
American
Isolationism
Failure of League
of Nations
Fascism
diametrically
opposes
Democracy
American
independence
American
Democracy
U.S. democracy will
function with 10%
population draft
Political Structure
Political threat (internal and
external)
German
fascism
resulted from
WWI and LoN
failures.
Gravity Pipe Metaphors
Figure 1: D307 Cold War Arms Escalation Gravity Pipe
U.S. now looks from atop the nuclear
gravity pipe; from here it attempts to
prevent other nations from rising up.
GDP ratio
GDP ratio
Post-Cold War: U.S. downsizes nuclear
arsenal while maintaining first strike
capability for hostile actors.
USSR obsolete. Russian Federal
Republic rises from ashes and
secures existing nuclear
infrastructure. Attempts to maintain
nuclear superpower status.
GDP ratio
GDP ratio
Cold War ending; USSR unable to fund
their nuclear military IOP. Efforts now
towards nuclear non-proliferation and
reduction.
START Treaty
1980s: President Reagan begins ‘Star
Wars program.
SALT 2 Treaty
SALT 1 Treaty
Soviets challenged to
match MIRV quality;
react with IBCM
quantity for MAD.
1970s: U.S. begins MIRV warheads.
GDP ratio
GDP ratio
1969: First man on moon; space race
won by United States
1957: Sputnik: first space satellite
Soviet military maintains large
ground forces; closed market
economy (Socialist) does not grow
as rapidly as U.S. free market; USSR
spends higher ratio to balance.
U.S. reframing: NASA and space race
increased due to Soviet satellite success
Smaller ground forces; USAF SAC takes
lead on nuclear option; NASA space race.
GDP cost ratio acceptable. 1950s
perceived missile gap with Moscow.
GDP ratio
GDP ratio
Reframe: expand nuclear
delivery to IBCM, bomber, and
submarine capabilities.
1940 Manhattan Project;
1945 Hiroshima/Nagasaki
1945+ secret atomic program;
1949 atomic bomb
USSR
WWII Nazi missile technology/scientists
United States
Design and the MCPP exercise:
Applying Critical Thinking to
“Indalyasia”
Figure 1: Emergent Propensity for OBSERVED SYSTEM
1. Nationalism over Traditional Island Diversity
2. Conquest over Cooperation/Competition
3. Social Justice to restore Island Traditional Balance
1. Seizing
Singapore =
Economic
Prosperity
Economic
Disparities
VALUES
MIOP holds Singapore
Capital
Straits
Wealth
ARTIFACTS
ASSUMPTIONS
2. UW success
in RNI =
ethnocentric
hegemony
2006: Indonesian
Economic Crisis
Conventional
ATTACK
SYMBOLS
Democratic
Republic of
Indolaysia
1. Nationalism of
‘Greater Indalaysia
2. Region Hegemony
3. Economic Broker
(Straits)
Ethnic &
Cultural Ties
Sources:
Jared Diamond (G,G,S; Collapse)
Mary Jo Hatch’s Cultural Wheel
Deluze/Gutarrai’s ‘A Thousand Plateaus’
Hogbin’s Experiments in Civilization
Naveh’s collected readings and writings
Clausewitz
Anatol Rapaport
Republic of
Singapore
UW and indirect
ATTACK
1985:
Malaysia and
Indonesia
merger
Republic of
Northern
Indolaysia
1. Regional Hegemony
2. Nationalism beyond
Interiority island
boundaries
3. Anti-Western (Rival)
position of
COMPETITION over
COOPERATION.
4. Social Justice restores
wealth balance to
‘islandism’ cycle of
tradition.
Figure 2: Explanation of Observed System (WHY)
Beginning
Mainland
Civilization
Advancement
Middle
End
Mainland
Civilization
Advancement
Mainland
Parity
Imperialism
Industrial Revolution
Tension
Globalization
Metallurgic Revolutions
limited to Island
Resources and
Specialization Limits
Native Island
Sociological
Development
‘islandism’
Native Island
Sociological
Development
Tension
islandism: Design requires operational
vocabulary and new terminology to
convey deep understanding. In this open
system, this term covers the sociological
development of micro-civilizations
bounded by the topographic realities of
island formations.
Naveh: “When doing design, you are in a process of creating and
inventing new things…things that old words are incapable of
explaining. You must invent new words, new things, to explain
what you gain in understanding….” (personal interview Jan 2011)
Hybrid Island
Nationalism and
State Parity
‘de-islandism’
De-islandism: While ‘islandism’ explains
the beginning and middle of this design
narrative for the environmental frame, it
does not explain the rival phenomenon in
the observed system (why we are looking
at it). This term explains how the
exteriority of island micro-systems
transforms and is in tension with the
global ecological frame.
Sources:
Jared Diamond (G,G,S; Collapse)
Mary Jo Hatch’s Cultural Wheel
Deluze/Gutarrai’s ‘A Thousand Plateaus’
Hogbin’s Experiments in Civilization
Naveh’s collected readings and writings
Clausewitz
Anatol Rapaport
Figure 3: Explanation of ‘islandism’
By departing ‘interior’- decedents of
new colony form separate interiority
distinct from parent.
Smooth versus Striated
Exterior versus Interior
Nomad versus Farmer/Merchant
Nomadism
and
Colonization
Faction departs
island (interior) to
find more smooth
space to striate.
Emergent rivals
Physical
Boundaries of
Islands
islandism continues cycle
with origin element
Competition
and
Cooperation
Patterns
Tension
Warring Raids against ‘rivals’
on island or neighboring
island; returning prosperity to
source tribe
Define interiority and
exteriority for artifacts and
symbols based on cultural
VALUES
Smooth-Striated
Tension of Islands
Cooperation and
competition
Selforganization
adaptation
Interiority of Tribe
through values
and structure
Magic explains; No science.
Trade with rivals to
prosper when conflict
produces entropy
Self Organization
and Seek
Prosperity
Group Collective is superior to individual
Wealth equated to family and food sources
Decentralized Power Structure; no nationalism;
local ‘man of importance’
Figure 4: Explanation of ‘De-islandism’
1.
2.
Renaissance
Scientific Revolution
3. Imperialism
Smooth Space of Ocean
boundaries now striated.
4. Industrial Revolution
War Raids and
Nomadism replaced
by Permanent
Conquests
Tension
Conceptual
Boundaries of
Nationalism
5. Globalization
Nomadism
and
Colonization
Competition
and
Cooperation
Patterns
Competition with
non-neighbors
drives adaptation
of ‘mainlandism’
National Leader disrupts
decentralized ‘local man
of importance’ concepts
Tension
Centralizing
over
Decentralizing
Tension
Physical
Boundaries of
Islands
islandism Cycle
Interiority of Tribe
through values
and structure
Who is interior? ‘Us’ is
nationalized.
Interiority
Flexible; SelfIdentity
Threatened
Tension
Self Organization
and Seek
Prosperity
Tension
Tension
Exteriority
threatens nonadaptive
Interiority
The war-machine of
globalization (and
predecessors) threatens
the prosperity of noncompliance
Occupation of capital
island of rival mirrors
their own actions
with Singapore;
promotes “swap.”
Figure 5: Exploiting the Environment to
Accomplish Goals
3. Imperialism
4. Industrial Revolution
War Raids and
Nomadism replaced
by Permanent
Conquests
Tension
Blockade in straits;
filter nonaggressor trade
until compliance
Competition with
non-neighbors
drives adaptation
of ‘mainlandism’
Conceptual
Boundaries of
Nationalism
5. Globalization
Nomadism
and
Colonization
Competition
and
Cooperation
Patterns
Tension
Centralizing
over
Decentralizing
Tension
Physical
Boundaries of
Islands
islandism Cycle
Interiority of Tribe
through values
and structure
Self Organization
and Seek
Prosperity
Tension
Tension
Blockade and
threaten National
Capital. Capital
defines
Nationalism of deislandisation.
Exteriority
threatens nonadaptive
Interiority
Interiority
Flexible; SelfIdentity
Threatened
Tension
Rival expects
Coalition to
attempt to regain
Singapore;
anticipates
Amphibious
Ops/Air/Naval.