Terrorist Takeovers
A growing threat
What we are dealing with???
Mumbai
Mumbai
History
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There have been a couple of well-known
similar incidents in Russia this decade:
Moscow Movie Theater
 Beslan
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Overview
The recent terrorist attacks in Mumbai,
India have reinforced that a small
determined terrorist team can cause
widespread killings/panic in a short
amount of time.
 Typical law enforcement tactics such as
Active Shooter may be attempted instead
of staying back and securing a perimeter
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Will to Win
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What is important is mindset. Without it,
you cannot do much good.
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Officers have training pertaining to skills
(accuracy, movement, entries, etc..) but a
will to win has to be developed.
Moscow Theater Takeover
October 2002
 Up to 50 Chechen rebels took about 600
people hostage in a movie theater
 3 day standoff
 Soft Target
 Took over and planted bombs in strategic
locations
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Moscow
Negotiations began early
 Some hostages released Friday Morning
(Total of 58 were released). Would not
release children older than 12 years old as
teenagers are not considered children.
 Allowed food and medicine to be brought
in
 Friday night made promise to start
shooting hostages
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Moscow
Terrorist started by killing two males
 Explosions and gunfire heard afterwards
 Elite officers stormed the building
 An unknown type of gas was used, killing
hostages.
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MOSCOW THEATRE SIEGE
On Wednesday, October 23, 2002, 40 Chechen terrorists seized
a crowded Moscow theatre, taking over 700 hostages and
demanding the withdrawal of Russian forces from Chechenya.
After a siege of two and a half days, the Russian government
raided the building with the assistance of knockout gas. All of the
terrorists were killed, along with about 120 of the hostages.
Beslan
September 1, 2004
 Beginning of school year
 1100 hostages
 3 day period
 334 hostages killed, 186 children
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Why Beslan?
An as yet unresolved question is why the hostage-takers targeted North Ossetia and Beslan in particular.
A number of theories have been advanced:
Practicality: It may have simply been that the attackers were only able to get as far as Beslan and were
unable to get into Russia proper.
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Opportunism: The school in Beslan undertook major building work during the summer break. It has
been reported that a Chechen company was involved, which may have given the attackers the chance to
stockpile weapons (if this did happen) in the school well in advance of the siege.
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Politics: The Ossetians are a mainly Christian people who have a history of conflict with their Muslim
neighbours. The attackers may have hoped to inflame inter-communal tension and goad the Ossetians
into taking revenge on innocent Ingush and Chechens, thereby kick-starting a cycle of revenge and blood
feuds. This would potentially plunge the North Caucasus into an all-out inter-ethnic war.
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Demands of the hostage-takers
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The hostage-takers in Beslan are reported to have at first made the following demands:
Immediate withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya.
Presence of the following people in the school:
Aleksander Dzasokhov, president of North Ossetia,
Murat Ziazikov, president of nearby Ingushetia,
Alu Alkhanov, president of nearby Chechnya,
Leonid Roshal, director of the emergency surgery department of the Pediatrics Institute.
Analysis: In Review – New facts come to light… (One year later)
Many new and additional facts have come to light since this incident was originally
reported upon in September 2004. The Center for Tactical Counterterrorism in New York
has conducted a through critique of this incident and made note of the following
additional observations:
Careful Planning Allowed Terrorists To Control 1,000 Hostages and Fight Security Forces for 10
Hours resulting in 335 People Killed: 156 Children, 727 Wounded, 260 Remain Missing.
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32 heavily armed and masked Chechen terrorists belonging to Shamil Basayev’s Second Group of
Salakhin Riyadus Shakhidi seized the school on the first day of the Russian school year
Attack also bankrolled by Abu Omar al-Saif, top al Qaeda financier in Chechnya
1,191 students, teachers and parents held in the school gymnasium. 50 children escaped by hiding
in a boiler room in the initial confusion
The school siege was well planned. Terrorists cached explosives, weapons, and food (canned goods
and chocolate) in July when school was going through renovations.
Terrorists released 26 during day 2 of the siege. Many of those were infants born in 2002 or after
Terrorists used Arab code names and remained in contact with outside support via cell phones
Hostages said that the terrorists wore NATO type camouflage, had modern assault rifles,
communications equipment and medical kits
Terrorists threatened to kill 50 children for each gunmen killed and 20 for each gunmen wounded.
Terrorists demanded Russian withdrawal from Chechnya and the release of 30 associates arrested
during attempted uprising in Ingushetia in June 2004 that killed 90 people
Analysis: In Review – New facts come to light… (Continued…)
Tactics:
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Several of the terrorists' bodies have now been identified as the "construction workers" who remodeled the
school. The same tactic was used in the killing of Chechen President Ahmad Kadyrov in May 2004. (Note
that on 9 September, police in the Russian city of St Petersburg have found explosives, detonators and a
gun in a cinema closed for repairs—possibly a related incident)
According to hostages, within the first minutes of the siege, the terrorists made male hostages rip up the
floor, from which they extracted their contraband.
They quickly wired explosives in the gym and established an explosive ring around the school
Windows in the gym were smashed and children were forced to stand in front of open windows as
human shields to prevent police from firing into the building.
Terrorists brought dogs with them as early warning for CS (Security forces used CS in 2002 theater
siege) as well as gas masks, and positioned a sniper on the upper floors of the building.
Characteristics of the Terror Cell:
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Authorities have reported that the terror cell consists of Chechens, and Ingush (who are Muslim)
Russians, Georgians (who are Christian) and 9 Arabs. Russian security officials have since identified
10 of the Beslan school hostage-takers, confirming that six of them came from Chechnya.
4 women were seen wearing suicide bomb belts.
Some of the terrorists were arrested prior and were supposed to be doing time in jail. Authorities are
investigating why they were released. One terrorist was caught alive, 24 old, Nur-Pashi Kulaev. Kulaev
and his brother, 31-year old Han-Pashi Kulaev (killed september 3rd), were Basayev's personal
bodyguards.
There are reports stating that the terrorists quarreled - many were unhappy with the fact that the
hostages were children. According to Kulaev, Polkovnik personally shot one of the terrorists and even
blew up the two female suicide bombers (via a remote) to show that he meant business.
Analysis: In Review – New facts come to light… (Continued…)
Local Law Enforcement Response: Assault On School
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According to the Federal Security Service (FSB), the plan was to negotiate, not to storm the buildings.
A gun battle erupted at 1 p.m. local time when authorities attempted to retrieve the bodies of those killed
during the initial seizure.
The terrorists opened fire with RPG’s and small arms fire.
FSB then started its assault. Some 30 women and children broke out of the building under terrorist fire.
There are reports that it was around this time that the terrorists broke off into 3 groups: one to stay and
fight, another to escape, and the third to mix in with the hostages.
The group that stayed set off the explosives in the gymnasium, reportedly killing hundreds of hostages and
partially collapsing the roof
Terrorists were successful in killing many of the fleeing hostages, many of the children were shot in the
back as they ran out of the building.
13 terrorists escaped outside the school perimeter and found refuge in a nearby house. Authorities later
reported that this group had been dealt with.
Authorities are looking at possible aid given by some North Ossetia police officers.
According to Russian intelligence, this terrorist act was planned from abroad - Basayev received 2 million
dollars and equipment to carry out the attack from al Saif.
Analysis: In Review – New facts come to light… (Continued…)
Implications for our Schools in the United States:
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This attack reinforces the vulnerability of soft targets, especially schools.
Schools have improved security in the wake of high school shootings.
Most school districts have mandated all schools implement emergency response plans, to address terrorist
threats. Many of these plans advise schools to take specific actions depending on the level of DHS
warning then in effect.
Most plans require schools to interact with local law enforcement and emergency service providers.
Once again the involvement of Chechen women in the attacks, this time in the presence of children
Illustrates a growing trend that terrorists no longer negotiate on specific demands but now kill hostages as
the objective. In this case, the terrorists adjusted their tactics after the Moscow Theater siege, the
authorities did not.
Construction projects are key for several reasons: (1) they are a source of equipment, (2) in built up
areas they often provide access to underground systems, (3) some sites have explosives handy,
(4) unattended vehicles, or groups of people are not suspicious at odd hours.
Authorities must consider that a jihadist’s best-case scenario is their own death.
Analysis: Russia's Caucasus Quagmire
By Dr Jonathan Eyal
Military analyst
Nothing whatsoever can explain or justify the unspeakable cruelty of the terrorists, who remain solely
responsible for the wholesale massacre of children in the school in Beslan. Nevertheless, some
responsibility for the calamitous outcome also belongs to Russia's special military units which, yet again,
bungled a rescue operation and exacerbated the tragedy. The Russian Spetsnaz, or special forces, have
had a glorious reputation for decades. Indeed, as the Soviet Union collapsed, they were the only troops of
an otherwise despised and ridiculed Russian military still considered fashionable. Every street market in
Russia sells some items of their uniform or insignia, and most young Russian men - even those who will do
everything to escape military service - still wear them eagerly.
The Alpha hostage rescue unit, directly subordinated to Russia's FSB security service, is considered
an elite within the elite - the ultimate in military ruthlessness and precision. Yet, as the horror of the Beslan
school indicates, much of this reputation has been put into question. The Russian military's first failure
during this school hostage crisis was in the overall strategy. As any anti-terrorism expert knows,
not all such hostage crises are the same. If the number of hostages is relatively small, the situation
can be fairly stable, and a government has some time to negotiate with the terrorists, while
preparing its response. But if the number of hostages is large - and it was huge in the Beslan
school - the situation is inherently unstable from the start, and violence can erupt at any moment.
The reason for this is that the terrorists themselves are unsure of their situation, and the chances are
high that some of the hostages would rebel, thereby starting the shoot-out everyone is seeking to avoid.
Either way, it should have been clear from the start that, even if the Russian government ruled out a
military assault on the school - as President Vladimir Putin now claims - preparations to storm the
building at a moment's notice should have been ready. Yet nothing of the kind appears to have been
planned: when the explosions and shooting started, it caught the Russian military commanders
completely by surprise. The result was no less than 10 hours of shooting - just about the surest way
of guaranteeing heavy casualties. Ultimately, the Russian troops did what they know best: shoot in
all directions with massive firepower, rather than execute the surgical strike required in such
circumstances.
Beslan
Terrorist wore military camouflage and
black balaclavas
 Some had explosive belts
 Witnesses claim there were two groups
 Initial shootout killed 8 people
 Herded group into gymnasium
 Cell Phones confiscated
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Explosives
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Beslan
Hostages were commanded to speak in
Russian when spoken to
 One male started talking in native
language to calm hostages and was shot
dead immediately.
 Another refused to kneel and was shot
dead also.
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Gymnasium
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Bombs
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Terrorist standing on “Dead Man Switch”
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What you are up against
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Intel Gathering
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Beslan
Exerted dominance from the beginning
 No hesitation to kill
 Group of adults(15-20) identified as
possible problems taken to separate room,
when a large blast was heard
 Witness claims that a female terrorist had
a belt bomb that went off, killing her and
a second female and a male.
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Remains of Suicide Bomber….
Beslan
Witness claims that the leader remotely
set the bomb off to kill those who
disagreed about child hostages
 Surviving hostages were told to kneel and
were subsequently shot, only one lived.
 Mined the gym with explosives
 Broke out window to prevent gassing
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More Remains
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Beslan
Negotiations started, but not successful
 Eventually 26 hostages released
 No food or water was allowed
 3rd day a small explosion was heard
followed by another.
 Some believe that RPG’s were used by the
military first. Blast and fire killed a
majority of the hostages
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Signs of Battle
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Beslan
Attack was led by Russian Military forces
 Hostages used as shields, who were shot
by the military.
 Ongoing gun battles throughout night
 385+ people were killed
 334 hostages, 10 Special Forces,
10”Other”, 31 hostage takers
 200 people missing or unidentified
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Survivors
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Day Three: September 3rd
These two accounts may be reconcilable. Ruslan Aushev, a key negotiator during the siege, told the Russian
Newspaper “Novaya Gazeta” that an initial explosion was set off by an hostage-taker accidentally tripping
over a trip wire; as a result, armed civilians, some of them apparently fathers of the hostages, started
shooting. Reportedly, no security forces or hostage-takers were shooting at this point, but the gunfire
led the hostage-takers to believe that the school was being stormed; in response, they set off their
bombs.
Apparently, it was at this point that Russian special forces activated their action plan to storm the school to
rescue any possible survivors. A chaotic battle broke out as the special forces sought to enter the school and
cover the escape of the hostages. A massive level of force was used; as well as the special forces, the
regular army and Interior Ministry troops were also engaged, as were helicopter gunships and at least one
tank. Many local civilians also joined in the battle, having brought along their own weapons.
Day Two: September 2nd
During the siege, the terrorists video taped themselves and the hostage situation inside the gymnasium.
After the siege, the video tape was recovered. It shows adults and children packed into the school
gymnasium as heavily-armed, masked men walk around the room. Explosives, apparently wired and
ready for use, lie on the floor while others are looped around basketball hoops at either end of the gym.
Russia's NTV network aired the footage several days after the siege had ended. The network did not
explain how it obtained the video. Shown below are several still images taken from the video.
Day Three: September 3rd
During the battle, a group of hostage-takers, said by the government to number thirteen, broke through
the military cordon and took refuge nearby. Two of those thirteen were reportedly women who allegedly
attempted to blend into the crowd and escape disguised as health personnel. The military cordon had
been compromised by permitting the passage of hostages' relatives, dressed in civilian clothing and, in
some cases, bearing firearms.
A few of the escapees were said to be cornered in a residential two story house within 40 metres
from the gym. Whether or not they had hostages is unknown. The house was destroyed using
tanks and flame throwers by 23:00 September 3.
Day Four: September 4th
Deputy Prosecutor General Alexander Fridinsky states that 31 of 32 attackers had been confirmed dead and
one had been seized. One suspected hostage-taker was beaten to death by the fathers of hostages when
he was injured and driven to the hospital. According to official data 331 civilians and 11 soldiers died. At
least one surviving female hostage committed suicide after returning home. Many other survivors remained
in severe shock. Some injured died in hospitals.
Day Three: September 3rd
The hostage-takers set off more large explosions, totally destroying the gym and setting much of the building
on fire, while the special forces commandos blew holes in walls to allow hostages to escape. By 15:00, two
hours after the assault began, Russian troops claimed control of most of the school. However, fighting was
still continuing in the grounds as evening fell, and three gunmen were located in the basement along with a
number of hostages. They were eventually killed, along with the hostages they were holding.
Survivor
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Expect Horrific Scenes
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Victims
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Victims
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The Aftermath:
Dead Terrorist
Eyewitness accounts
"We heard a powerful explosion, and the snipers who had been posted to keep an eye on things said the gym had
blown up. Shooting began straight away... The hostages started running in our direction... We could hear the
characteristic crack of bullets over our heads - they were firing from the direction of the school...I saw children
with gunshot wounds being dragged. There were about 12 children who started running out. About four of our lads
immediately, without waiting for orders, formed a human shield, and kept the windows [of the school] in their
sights... All the entrances were barricaded from inside with desks, chairs and all sorts of rubbish they could
gather... So we had to go in through the canteen window. When we went in, we had nowhere to tread on the floor there were too many hostages, women and children... A gunman sprang out from a small utility room - it was a
dead end, so he tried to break out. He shot one of our men at point-blank range and immediately threw a powerful
grenade among the hostages. He was immediately killed by another of our men, who was injured by the fragments
of that same grenade. It also killed several hostages. There was a dark corridor in front of us, and they were firing
from there all the time. We stood a bit to the side, so as not to be hit. I shouted 'Throw a grenade in there!' but the
lads said 'How can we? There are children in there!'... There were so many grenades being thrown at us, so much
firing - what could we do, with all the children there? We could not throw grenades there or do anything. So that's
how it was."
Unnamed officer in special unit of Federal Security Service (FSB) in Russia TV interview
"Throughout the three days that we were held hostage we were virtually on top of each other. There
were about 1,100 of us crammed in there. Periodically gunmen came in and for a joke ordered all of us to
stand up or sit down. It went on like that all day long. They put a huge explosive device in the middle about 50cm by 50cm - controlled by a trigger mechanism. One of the terrorists kept squeezing it with his
foot. When they got tired they put a pile of books on the button. The children behaved very calmly - much
more so than the adults. The adults were talking to each other and because of that the gunmen shot
many of them. They were all prepared for death, especially on the second and third days, because
the gunmen were saying nobody would be able to enter the school and also that people outside didn't give
a damn about them. ‘They don't even want to give you water or food,' they said. They said nobody had
contacted them and nobody had requested anything from them. Sometimes they took the boys' clothes,
soaked them in a bucket used for the floor mop, then threw the clothes at us, saying 'drink that!'"
Marina Kozyreva, mother of schoolgirl Diana, spent the whole time in the school
gym and was later interviewed by the Russian newspaper “Kommersant”.
Eyewitness accounts
"Initially we were escorted to the toilet together, then they stopped doing that, and only took the little
kids. All the time the explosives were hanging above us - they used adhesive tape to fix it there. Before the
assault the bandits started arguing with each other about something. I've spent a long time in Chechnya, I
know the Chechen language, and they weren't speaking Chechen - they were just speaking a strange
language like Arabic, and also Ingush. One of the gunmen was reading the Koran constantly, and I counted
exactly 23 gunmen altogether. The leader was on the roof the whole time with a sniper's rifle. We
realized that, because the others went to him for advice. The older pupils were forced to carry desks to
barricade the windows. When the assault started one of the bandits shouted 'I'll save you'. Everybody
ran towards him and then he blew himself up, killing many people. The whole time they never let
anybody sleep - if somebody dozed off they would shake him awake again, saying 'no sleeping!' The
explosion took place under the roof - there was no external explosion. When the assault came I pulled two
girls out with me.”
Marat Khamayev, 15, also spoke to the Russian newspaper “Kommersant”
"It took us all by surprise. We were told there would be talks and we were ordered to lie face down [in
the gym]... Then there was an explosion in the yard. Then there was shooting... [My sister and I] stayed
where we were, lying on the floor. But suddenly there was another explosion above us and part of the
ceiling fell in. People were screaming, there was panic. I looked up and saw some children lying on the
floor covered in blood and not moving. There was a dead lady lying beside me. Torn-off arms and legs were
lying everywhere. There were bombs hanging on the rope they'd strung up between the basketball hoops,
across the gym. And now these bombs began going off, one after the other, coming closer and closer to us.
Anyone who could get up ran screaming to the windows and the back entrance corridor. Alina and I were
near a window [both sisters managed to escape unscathed]."
Diana Gadzhinova, 14-year-old girl hostage, speaking to Izvestiya newspaper
"I woke up under the debris and all was covered in sand - my ears, nose and eyes - and I could not see
anything. Then we were taken to the dining room. There we were given water, then explosions started. And
then we jumped out of the window and we were taken to the hospital."
Irina, girl hostage
Eyewitness accounts
"There was this thin tall man of about 35, a typical Chechen, his right hand bandaged. He was the
angriest of our captors, he was threatening us all the time and firing into the ceiling. It was so stuffy I was
unwell, I fainted several times, so my mum asked him to take me to the corridor for a while to take a breath
of air. To my surprise he agreed. In the corridor I was nearly sick, my legs gave way, and sat on a rucksack
lying by the wall. But he said: 'Don't sit on this one, there are mines in it, sit on that one instead'... I asked
him 'Will you at least let the children go?' He said: 'No - why? Your Russian troops in Chechnya catch
children just like you and cut their heads off. I had a daughter, about your age, and they killed her,' he said."
Survivor Santa Zangiyeva, 15, spoke to the Russian newspaper “Izvestiya”
"I saw a wounded gunman fall out of the [school] window during the fighting. Solidiers were evacuating
children nearby. When they saw the gunman, they tore him to bits within seconds. I did not even
have time to realize what was happening. I'll be honest: not even for a second did I think - I am
witnessing the killing of a human being. It felt like a venomous snake was being trampled... They
were scum. Professional, well-trained scum. Their actions were highly skilful, their shooting was
first-class - you could not raise your head... The only thing they did badly was booby-trapping the
building. It was not a good idea to let the hostages assemble explosive devices."
Moskovskaya Gazeta interviewed Oleg Tideyev, whose son escaped from the besieged school
"We broke in, and saw piles of men and women, and children too. The children were naked from the
waist up. There was nowhere for us to tread, but we had to go in, so we did. I pulled four people out. Many
people were thrown to the corners by the blast, or maybe they crawled there themselves. Few were alive.
We had to find those who were still alive, but how? I made two mistakes myself. When I pulled one
young girl out, there was another explosion. Just before that, two girls shouted and waved to us
from a window, one was about seven, the other a bit older. I waved back to show I'd come for them
right now, and they laughed they were so happy! Then there was an explosion, and I never saw
these girls again. I'll keep looking for them in the school..."
Kommersant interviewed Anzor, a rescuer who helped in the smaller of the school's gyms
New report tries to lay blame on local police (Washington Post; 29 Dec 2005)
"The counterterrorist operation was plagued by shortcomings. . . . Many law enforcement officers
did not know how to act in an emergency situation."
By Peter Finn, Washington Post Foreign Service
MOSCOW, Dec. 28 -- In the month before the Beslan school siege in which 331 hostages were killed last year, Russian
security services received intelligence that terrorists might try to seize a school in the region on the first day of classes, but
instructions for tightened security were ignored, according to preliminary findings of a parliamentary investigation released
Wednesday.
Although the Russian Interior Ministry sent warning telegrams to regional authorities, the investigation found, only a single
unarmed policewoman was stationed outside Beslan's School No. 1 when at least 32 terrorists stormed it on Sept. 1, 2004.
She was taken hostage, too. Citing numerous failings by local and regional officials before the attack, the report found
"negligence and carelessness in facing a real terrorist threat." The assault by local police, armed civilians and federal troops
that ultimately ended the siege was marked by "a whole number of blunders and shortcomings," the commission's chairman,
Alexander Torshin, said in presenting the report to parliament Wednesday. Torshin, who is deputy speaker of the upper house
of parliament, also lambasted officials at the scene for initially lying about the number of hostages taken, which infuriated both
the terrorists inside the school and hostages' relatives outside. Overall, the report faulted local officials, leading to some
criticism that it whitewashed mistakes by high-level members of the government of President Vladimir Putin. During the crisis,
command centers at the scene were in constant contact with Moscow.
The report "is an attempt to put the blame on regional and local law enforcers and not on the leaders of federal ministries, who
in my view bear responsibility for what happened," Vladimir Ryzhkov, an independent member of parliament, told the
Associated Press. "They didn't take preventive measures. They didn't check how their orders were being carried out." The
attacks "can only be compared with Nazi atrocities," Torshin said. "The hostages who were held in the besieged school were
deprived of food, medicines and water. They had to drink their own urine. They were forced to mine the building, and when
they tried to escape, they got bullets in their backs." The three-day siege ended in a storm of fire and bullets. Of the 331
hostages killed, 186 were children. In addition, 31 out of 32 fighters died; the survivor is on trial. There have been three
separate official inquiries, with sometimes conflicting findings. One conducted by the regional parliament found numerous
failings by law enforcement authorities. An initial report by federal prosecutors, released Tuesday, said security services were
not to blame for the outcome. That report angered relatives of the victims, but they generally welcomed the tone and thrust of
Wednesday's report, which was based on interviews with more than 1,000 people. "The very fact that this commission exists
is a precedent for Russia, and we think that Torshin understands that he can't use the usual doublespeak," said Anyeta
Gadieva, a spokeswoman for the Beslan Mothers' Committee. She noted that Putin had initially resisted the establishment of
an investigative commission. (Continued…)
Mumbai
Most recent hostage takeover
 At least 164 dead
 Planned some time in advance
 Involved detailed planned assault from
water
 2,3,4 man teams
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Locations Affected
Mumbai
Why from water?
 Traffic sucks in Mumbai during rush hour
 Train stations heavily monitored
 Direct from abroad (Pakistan)
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Mumbai
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Two Tactics used:
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Hit and Run and Seize and Hold
Hit and Run
Attacked quickly with AK-47s and
grenades
 Looked for large groups
 Withdrew from security areas when
confronted by police
 Tactics used at a hospital and cafe , CST
Terminal.
 Hit hospital as a “drive-by”
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CST Terminal
CST Terminal
CST Terminal
CST Terminal
Seize and Hold
Gained entry and immediately began to
fire anywhere
 Hostages possibly taken
 Had prior knowledge of building to make it
easier to navigate through
 Made strong points for defense
 Used at Taj Mahal Hotel, Nariman House
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Planned to have a “rooftop” stand-off but
couldn’t find the access to the roof
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Allegedly was to contact handler and then
make demands once hostages were
secured
Terrorist
Terrorist
Brazen
Terrorist
Seize and hold
Rounded up hostages and took to a good
location to defend.
 Some walked through halls looking for
people to shoot.
 Room to room battles with police
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New Terrorist Tactics??
These tactics are not new.
 Munich 1973
 Looked for soft targets, had innovative
infiltration, and local knowledge
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Target Analysis
Western Targets
-Five-Star hotels that cater to international
businesses
-Popular restaurants for backpackers and
Western Travelers
-Jewish Compound
-Crowded Transportation Terminals
Terrorists
Hyderabad Deccan Muhjahideen
claimed attack
 Claimed to defend Indian Muslims
 Lashkar-e-Tayyiba denied it, although
they have used similar tactics.
 Lone survivor claims to have been trained
by Laskar-e-Tayyiba(terrorist group
outlawed by Pakistan)
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Terrorist
Reports of Mauritius IDs captured
 20-30’s in age
 Indian Press claims they were Pakistanis
 Terrorist received lectures of India
Security and intelligence agencies and
how to evade security forces.

Terrorist

Possible Home-Grown terrorist with
extensive training, planning, and support
from somewhere else.

Targets Westerners, Jews, and economic
sites that suggest links to worldwideIslamic groups.
Police response
Police blocked roads, set up barricades
 Some police engaged terrorist, which the
terrorist then evaded and went after new
targets.
 Army units cleared buildings
 Cautious approach to limit injuring
hostages

Police
Police allegedly had outdated firearms
with little or no ammo.
 -WWII Enfields (bolt-actions, limited
ammo capacity).
 Witnesses claim police did not attack, but
were overwhelmed.
 Plenty of opportunities to fight back, but
nothing happened.
 Photographer could have shot terrorist

Intelligence

U.S. had told India that a possible attack
was imminent from the water, but not
much security enhancements were done.
Response
Typical past response patterns are to set
up perimeters in such incidents.
 Active Shooter type-training can be
utilized, but firepower may be limited.
- Not everyone may have a rifle
-Going up against well-armed people with
explosives (grenades, RPG’s).

Active Shooter

Traditional Active Shooters will kill until
cornered.

Once cornered, they realize it is over and
usually kill themselves

Want to make an individual statement
Terrorist
Will not stop
 Will fight until death
 Likely be better armed and trained
 The more horrific the killings, the better
 Idealogically and Religiously driven
 Will place materials in location prior to
event happening

From Al Queda Manual

Issue 10 of “Al Batter”
Kidnapping Guide
Capability to endure psychological
pressure
 Capability to take control of adversary
 Capable physical fighting skills
 Good physical fitness
 Good awareness
 Ability to use different types of weapons

Taught to be aware of stalling, execute
hostages if stalling is suspected so
adversary will know the seriousness and
resolve of the kidnappers
 Stalling indicates an attack is coming
 Be careful who is released
 Verify any food brought in is good
 Avoid looking at women

Kidnapping Instructions
Kill all male hostages capable of resistance
 Separate hostages into groups of children,
women, elderly.
 Immediately wire a perimeter with
explosives
 Prohibit any stalling by killing hostages at
first sign.
 Beware of diversion attacks

Kidnapping Instructions
When children cry, kill an adult and
place the body in front of the child
 Clothing exchange with hostages

Terrorist Group Breakdown
Protection Group to protect abductors
 Guarding/Control Group to seize control of
hostages and get rid of them if needed
 Negotiator-relays Mujahideens message

Response
If terrorist are allowed to barricade, they
will be able to re-enforce their position, kill
more hostages, and kill more police
responders as they are defending instead
of attacking.
 Recent history shows that if allowed to
barricade, there will be many deaths, from
the beginning to the end.

Response

Typical amount of terrorist range
anywhere from 10-30+, depending on the
location they choose to defend.

Hostages can be expected to be killed as
time goes by.
Delays

In Beslan, Moscow Movie Theater, and
Mumbai, each took 3 days to resolve.

On the third day, police/military attacked
the stronghold

Coincidence or not?
Initial Responders
Can arrive and form 4-5 man Teams using
Active Shooter tactics they have learned
 Communicate with supervisors their
location and manpower.
 Can expect Teams to act individually at
first without coordination. Won’t have time
to set up Command Post and wait for
instructions.

Initial Response

Can expect police casualties

May have to perform rescues for trapped
officers or staff. Decision will have to be
made by responders as they see fit.

Must ignore injured civilians
Initial Response

Be aware of women terrorist who have
bombs on them. Usually have two
switches, one for them and a remote for
the handler.

DON’T STAND BY A DEAD TERRORIST
WEARING AN EXPLOSIVE BELT!!!!
Attack or Hold?

If allowed to continue, the terrorist will
keep killing more and more people, and
will likely barricade in a stronghold, where
an assault will be difficult, if not deadly.

Do officers have the authority to press the
attack themselves?
Attack or Hold
Is it wise to attack given the
circumstances?
 Will you become more casualties or do
you have a good chance to succeed?
 Can you withdraw if needed?
 Can you kill a few at a time at a distance?
 Look for booby-traps
 HOW MUCH AMMO DO YOU HAVE?

Preparedness
Firepower
Think about capturing terrorist weapons
when you come across them.
 Take ammo/magazines from dead terrorist
to supplement your own firepower.
 Take injured officers firearms as well.
 Can you operate the terrorists
weapons(AK-47’s, SKS, RPG’s???)

Firepower
Sidearms (most officers carry 3 magazines
 Shotguns (buckshot and Slugs)Department shotguns hold 4 in the tube, 1
in the chamber, and 6 on the side saddle
 Rifles-Minimum requirements are three
magazines.
 Ammo management will be crucial to your
survival.
 Will it be enough??

Attack or Hold?

If attacked quickly, the terrorist will have
less time to develop their stronghold and
set booby-traps.

No matter what, people are going to die.
It boils down to casualty mitigation: How
many more people will die if we hold
position?
Attack or Hold

How many can be saved if the attack is
pressed?
Military Response

Military response will be hours away.

Nellis AFB will be limited. Likely can’t
bomb locations or strafe with 20-30mm
cannon.

Federal Response hours away as well
(FBI)
Response

Local police agencies will have to take
initial action.

Coordination will be non-existent at first.

Time will be wasted as ICS/NIMS
command structure is established.
Response Tactics
Cross and Rolls
 Dynamic or Deliberate searching?
 Long gun coverage?
 Communicate with someone as to where
your team is. Try to find out where others
are.

Response Tactics
Night Vision Capability?
 Use of Stun Grenades to flush out
Terrorists or cover your movement
 CS/OC Irritants?
 Multi-Blast devices to keep terrorists head
down while moving.
 Level IV Plates available??
 Protective Helmets?

Terrorist Mindsets
They are willing to die
 They will have no mercy
 They may be on drugs for courage
 They believe that they will be rewarded
 They want to kill as many people as
possible
 They want press coverage

Terrorist Mindsets
They will be ruthless
 They will look for the stronger hostages
first and kill them.
 They have no respect for children
 They will torture hostages
 They may rig themselves with explosives

Officer Mindset
Must have will to win
 Must be able to think clearly
 Must be able to develop tactics on the fly
 Must be able to go by injured civilians
 Must focus on what needs to be done
 Must know the terrorists have to be
stopped.

Will this be you?

Or will this be you?
In Harms Way…
Officers MUST be able to put themselves
in harms way.
 Supervisors MUST be able to put their
officers in harms way.


Supervisors should know who they can put
into the fight and who they cannot.

People will die.

Officers will likely die
Questions

The questions are:

How many don’t have to die?

How many can we save?

The storm is growing: Are we prepared?
Lest we forget
“The only thing necessary for the
triumph of evil is for good men to
do nothing."

“People sleep peaceably in their beds at
night only because rough men stand ready
to do violence on their behalf. “
-George Orwell-
The Community will ask for a few officers
to protect it. Those few officers will bring
the courage of the whole Department to
defend it.
Biblio
Numerous Associated Press Articles
 Wikipedia
 Pratt, Larry “Lesson Learned from Beslan
School Massacre” September 10, 2004
 Badkhen, Anna “Russia Ends Theater
Siege,” San Francisco Chronicle October
26th, 2002
 National Tactical Officers Association

Bibliography
Al Queda Training Manual
 LA County Sheriffs Dept: September 2004


“Radical muslims enjoy blowing
themselves up, and we enjoy blowing
them up. You'd think we'd get along
better... “
-Unknown-