Huiming Ren
Shandong University of China
What we could learn
from the case of veridical
perceptions
1.
2.
3.
4.
By having a veridical perception, I am (directly)
aware of the real (objective) properties of the
object (ordinary, mind-independent) of the
perception.
By having any non-veridical perception, since
either the object of the perception doesn’t have
the properties that it seems to have or there is
no object, I am not (directly) aware of any
properties in either case.
By having any perception, I am not (directly)
aware of anything other than the real properties
of the object of the perception.
There are no apparent properties; therefore,
there is no appearance.
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If I am not directly aware of the real
properties of the object of the perception by
having a perception, but something else,
there would be no sense in which we could
claim that my perception is veridical.
◦ By “a veridical perception” I mean a perception
through which I apprehend the real properties of
the object of the perception, directly or indirectly;
in other words, if I make a perceptual judgment
directly based on the perception, my judgment
would be correct.
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The sense-datum theory holds that by having
a veridical perception, I am not directly aware
of the real properties of the object of the
perception—what I am directly aware of is the
properties of sense-data, which are apparent
properties.
In what sense could we claim that my
perception is veridical?
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I am indirectly aware of the real properties of
the object of the perception by being directly
aware of the properties of sense-data.
The veridicality of the perception consists in
the correspondence between the real
properties of the object and the properties of
sense-data.
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By being directly aware of the apparent
properties of sense-data, I might be
indirectly aware of any real properties of
any object. That is to say, the perception
could be a non-veridical one of any object.
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We might say that there is a certain kind of
causal relation between the instantiation of
the properties of sense-data and the
instantiation of the real properties of the
object of the perception.
1.
2.
3.
We don’t usually say that by being directly aware
of the properties the instantiation of which is an
effect, I am indirectly aware of the properties
the instantiation of which is the cause.
Being indirectly aware of the temperature by
directly being aware of the readings of a
thermometer is different—this sense of indirect
awareness is special, it is an inference.
No causal relation could warrant a
correspondence between the properties of
sense-data and the real properties of the object
of the perception. Quite the contrary, usually
different properties are instantiated in the cause
and the effect. (readings are different from
temperature)
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If I am only indirectly aware of the real
properties of the object of the perception by
being directly aware of the properties of
sense-data in having a veridical perception,
then in order to make sense of the claim that
my perception is veridical, we have to have
(1) and (2).
1. There is a certain kind of relation (probably
causal) between the instantiation of the real
properties of the object of the perception and
the instantiation of the properties of sensedata that I am directly aware of in having the
perception so that it is appropriate to say that
my perception is of this object instead of other
objects;
2. The sense-data instantiate the same properties
as are instantiated by the object of the
perception.
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But then why do we need sense-data?
◦ We need them in order to explain illusions and
hallucinations.
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We don’t have to, as would be explained
below.
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According to the adverbial theory of
perception, in a perception, what we are
directly aware of is the properties of the
perceptual experience.
It has the same problem as the sense-datum
theory, namely, in no sense could we say that
the perception is veridical.
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If we are directly aware of the real properties of
the object of the perception when we have a
veridical perception, then the phenomenality of
veridical perceptual experiences would provide
us with no reason to postulate apparent
properties.
Since illusions and hallucinations could share the
same phenomenality with veridical perceptions,
the phenomenality of illusions and hallucinations
provides with us no reason to postulate apparent
properties.
There are no apparent properties, therefore there
is no appearance.
Part 1: analyze phenomenality
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The distinction between P-consciousness and
A-consciousness.
Our perceptual experiences obviously are or
could be A-conscious, and in this sense, we
are aware of them. Call this kind of awareness
“A-awareness”.
They are also P-conscious, and in this sense,
we are aware of the objects of them. Call this
kind of awareness “P-awareness”
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We are only P-aware of the object of an
experience by having the experience; we are
not P-aware of the experience itself (either its
intrinsic or its relational properties) when
having the experience.
◦ The phenomenality of an experience is how things
appear (to a subject) in the experience, not how the
experience appears (to the subject).
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It might be thought that by introspection we
could come to know what an experience is like
(whatever that means), so an experience would
appears in a certain way to the subject when the
subject introspect on the experience.
But,
◦ The description of how an experience is like is
essentially the same as description of how things
appears in the experience.
◦ The only difference consists in the self-awareness of the
subject and probably also awareness of the existence of
the experience qua a mental state—I am checking up my
experience and this is how my experience is like.
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A queer question.
But it seems obvious that it is reflection that
makes us self-aware and aware of the
existence of an experience, not introspection.
Then, what is introspection?
It would be explained below.
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In a veridical perception, the object of the
perception also appears to me as so-andsuch; nonetheless, I am directly aware of the
real properties of the object, not any
apparent properties.
So, it seems that we have to account for the
phenomenality of a veridical perceptual
experience without appealing to the apparent
properties (instantiated by sense data). But
How?
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The subjectivity of experience: one can only
perceive from a certain point of view—the
subjective point of view.
The perspective to which an object appears is
constitutive of the object’s appearing to be soand-such.
◦ An object appears to be so-and-such only when
appearing to a certain point of view.
◦ When being perceived from a certain point of view, an
object appears to be so-and-such.
◦ How an object appears co-varies with the perspective.
◦ No object appears to be so-and such without appearing
to a perspective.
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Would a cubic object appears the same to a bat
as it appears to me when the bat and I take the
same spot when perceiving the object?
One might think that the answer is negative, for
the perceptual apparatus of bats is different from
the perceptual apparatus of humans.
But what if both of the bat’s perception and my
perception are veridical? The cubic object has to
appear cubic to the bat in order for its perception
to be veridical, likewise in my case.
Perceptual apparatus makes no difference on
how things appear to the subject.
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A perspective is located in a certain
environment in which things are present.
◦ Since one has to perceive from a perspective, when
one perceives, one perceives things as present.
◦ Further, things are perceived as present in an
environment.
◦ Any change in the environment that affects the
perspective would also cause a change on how
things appear: angle, lighting condition, etc.
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The phenomenal presence—vividness, etc.—
is thus explained by the perspective.
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Two key elements of phenomenality—things
appear to be so-and-such and things are
perceived as present—results from the
subjectivity of experience.
The Chinese translation of the term ‘phenomenal’
is very revealing—现象. ‘现’means presently
appear, ‘象’means so-and-such.
Phenomenality consists in things presently
appearing to be so-and-such. (“Presently” is in
fact redundant as “selective” in “selective
attention.)
Part 2: motivate intentionalism
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In a veridical perception, a red object appears red
to me. But under abnormal lighting conditions, it
might appear orange to me, in which case I
would have a non-veridical perception.
In both cases, it seems that my perceptual
experiences are of the object, even though it
appears differently.
If there is no distinction between appearance and
reality, as I have argued, I would not be aware of
the redness of the object in the non-veridical
perception even though I am aware of it in the
veridical perception.
If I am not aware of the redness of the object,
how does it appear orange to me?
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The natural answer is: I perceive it as orange.
Or, I perceptually represent it as orange.
That an object appears so-and-such to me
means that I perceptually represent the object
as so-and-such.
“So-and-such” is a description of the
representational content of my perception.
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It is obvious that our perceptual judgments
have representational content.
It is obvious that we make perceptual
judgments based on our perceptual
experiences, that is, perceptual experiences
are the way through which perceptual
judgment reach the world.
If our perceptual experiences have no
representational content, it would be
mysterious how our perceptual judgments
acquire representational content.
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Perception consists in representing from the
subjective point of view.
The phenomenality consists in the
representational content pertained to the
subjective point of view.
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If I am right, then a picture would have
phenomenality, as it represents from a
certain point of view.
This is, I believe, true.
But notice that this doesn’t mean a picture
appears so-and-such to us. A picture on it’s
own right has phenomenality, it doesn’t have
to appear to anything else in order to be
phenomenal.
What is introspection?
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When the object appears orange to me, I am
certainly aware of something, orange-ness or
something’s being orange.
If I am aware of something, that something
has to exist.
I am experiencing the nature of my
perceptual experience, I directly know it.
This nature is left unexplained by
functionalism or its ilk.
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How do I come to know that I am aware of
something in the case of an illusion?
By introspection?
If introspection is looking into one’s own mind,
then it cannot be introspection by which one
come to know that one is aware of something.
In order to know that one is aware of something,
one has to know that one stands a certain
relation to another object and therefore, one has
to know oneself, the object, and the relation.
Introspection cannot do that.
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It is by reflection that one comes to know that
one stands a certain relation to other things.
That I am aware of something in my
perceptual experience is equivalent to that I
have an experience, whose representational
content is so-and-such with ‘so-and-such’
describing the something.
Introspection helps provide the
representational content of the experience to
the perceptual judgment, and therefore to
knowledge by reflection.
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Usually when we are not reporting about our
perceptual experiences, we make perceptual
judgments directly based on them, like: The
apple is orange.
Perceptual judgments incorporate the
representational content of perceptual
experiences based on which they are made,
encoding them in lexical form. I also call it
the process of conceptualization.
The process of incorporation is introspection.
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In order to report about our perceptual
experiences, we have to conceptualize the
representational content of them, we have to
introspect.
In this sense, the representational content of
perceptual experiences is available for
perceptual judgments and what follows.
Our perceptual experiences are A-conscious.
We are A-aware of them.
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When we see a picture, if we don’t pay
attention to the fact that we are looking at a
picture, it would seem that we are looking at
the thing pictured. But we are only aware of
the picture, or the pictured thing, not the
thing pictured.
Even if we do pay attention, given the
representational fact, namely, that a picture
represents phenomenally, we might confuse
the pictured thing with the thing pictured.
The same occurs to perceptual experiences.
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We have to introspect from the same point of
view as that of perceptual experiences.
So, how the things appear in perceptual
experiences, which involves a point of view,
would be accessed as is without any
adjustment in accord with the point of view.
If you looking at a picture from the exact
same point of view as the picture is taken
from, the phenomenality of your experience
of the pictured thing would be exactly the
same as of that of the thing pictured.
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When one introspect, one doesn’t represent
the perceptual experiences, or their content.
This is not like when one looks at a picture,
as then one is perceptually represent the
pictured thing.
Introspection has no phenomenality, it might
seem to have, but that is because it
incorporates the representational content of
perceptual experiences from the exact same
perspective as that of perceptual experiences.
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When one so claim, one has already reflected,
and therefore, introspected.
By introspection, one accesses the
representational content of one’s perceptual
experiences.
The representational content of one’s
perceptual experiences would make it seem
that there is something presented in
experiences, that is the phenomenality.
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The funny thing is, whenever one is trying to get clear
what one’s experience is like, one would reflect
without noticing that one is reflecting.
One would then introspect.
Given the transparency of experience, it would seem
that one is P-aware of things, as one is indeed Paware of things in the case of veridical perceptions.
One is only A-aware of the represented things, which
results from one’s P-awareness of things represented
in the case of veridical perceptions.
In the case of non-veridical perceptions, since they
may share the same phenomenality with a veridical
perception, the same thing happens.
Part 1: openness to the
world
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One can represent something as so-and-such
without the thing being so-and-such.
If perception represents, there seems to be
no necessity that it has direct contact with
the outside world.
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The necessity is located in the very notion of
representation.
◦ The state of a sensory system could realize a
perceptual representation only it has evolved in an
environment such that there is a normative
connection established between a state of the world
and the representation.
◦ The normativity consists in that the system ought to
produce veridical perceptions when it is functioning
well.
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Illusions and hallucinations are
representations only in a derivative sense.
They are realized by the same sensory states
that would realize veridical perceptions when
the system is functioning well.
Part 2: qualia
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A red object may appear red to X but appear
green to Y while both X and Y would judge
that the object is red.
RED as a sensory concept vs. RED as a public
concept.
The very hypothesis is problematic: Are both
X and Y’s perceptions of the object is
veridical?
They are, but they have different feelings.
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What are these feelings?
Have you already begged the question
against intentionalism?
Notice that the nature of perceptual
experience is representing from the
subjective point of view, not representing per
se.
So the familiar argument for there being
feelings, namely representing per se is
different from perceptual experience, doesn’t
work.
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It might be possible that a kind of creatures
has a sensory system one of whose states is,
physiological speaking, the same as the state
of our sensory system that realizes an
experience representing red but would be
triggered by green objects normally.
Since it is the same state as our sensory state
representing red, which is triggered by red
objects normally, we might believe that green
objects would appear red to these creatures,
as red objects appear red to us.
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The underlying presumption, namely the
same sensory state would realize an
experience with the same phenomenality is
either problematic or begging the question
against intentionalism.
◦ If phenomenality of an experience is exhausted by
its representational content, then since the same
sensory state doesn’t necessarily have the same
representational content, the physiological
possibility doesn’t prove that green objects would
appear red to those creatures.
◦ If not, the presumption begs the question.
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The subjectivity of experience, qua a
perspective, is a brute fact, but not a nonphysical fact
Representation is not brute. But physicalistic
stories could be told about it.
Phenomenality consists in the essential
combination of subjectivity and
representation.
Physicalists could be at rest.