Agenda
Part 2 of 3
A holistic view
What
Why a future Army?
The Future is Now
Understanding the Environment
How
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
1
Why?
The Future is now
Capability
The “RMA”
Effect of Leader Development Not
Keeping Pace with Change
Effectiveness Index
Today
=?
Capability Overmatch
Growing 4GW Capabilities
Time
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
2
Why?
The Future is now
Exposure to
And Familiarization
Of Complex
Problems
Line equals at what point does the officer have
to deal with the particular task under the given
type of culture
2GW Time
Moving Up Experience, Earlier line (War)
Operational Art
Grand Tactics
With the use of varying
3 & 4GW
education and training
techniques described in Time line
(All)
this briefing, we will
better prepare our officers
earlier to deal with
complex tasks
2GW
Time line
(peace)
Joint Operations
Dealing w/other Cultures
Nation Building Tasks
Tactical Planning
Co/TM Tasks
Sqd & PLT Tasks
COL
LTC
Major
Captain
Lieutenant
Cadet
Individual Tasks
Given our current accessions system, we act like conditions
have not changed.
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
Time/
Career
Experience
3
Why?
The Future is now
 YES! Battlefield conditions have changed:
 Since WWII, platoon zone from yards to kilometers
 Time has compressed—instant reporting
 Now, what was last, is often first
 Zero defects =>
Society’s instant gratification
An individual-centric personnel system
 LTs today need skills to command battalions of
yesterday.
The good news: WWII's BN Cdrs were often as old as
today's LTs
We're capable today of delivering better leader development
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
4
Why?
The Future is now: Leadership
 The Army is still stuck with Frederick Taylor and Henry Ford,
where:
 Workers were simply cogs in the wheel
 Workers were easily trained, easily replaceable
 Workers were not expected to think
 In fact, thinking was discouraged
 They were simply told when to show up and what to do.
 They had no say in production or engineering
 But that model has been supplanted by W. Edwards
Deming’s and Toyota’s:
 Lowest level workers must be empowered and take initiative
 Can stop the production line, at any time, for any reason
 Most successful companies use these concepts
 But they demand professionalism and discipline
 But where is war evolving to?
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
5
Why?
Understanding the environment
1GW: Aristocratic Culture, centers on skills of one individual
Linear Tactics of Column and Line—Driven by Culture & Technology
Operational Art—Napoleon’s Time & Space to Set Up Decisive Battle
2GW: Attrition Warfare, driven by technology (U.S. Army)
Materialschlacht or industrial war of attrition
Linear Tactics—Regularity driven by technology
Operational Art—Procure success from top down
Space-Time Decisions SYNCHRONIZED (e.g., “Active Defense”)
3GW: Maneuver Warfare, driven by ideas
WE NEED TO GET HERE FIRST TO DEAL w/ 4 GW
Infiltration tactics—Blitzkrieg—USMC & OODA Loop Nonlinear Tactics
Operational Art—Penetrate his OODA loops, (Boyd))
“If we look at the development of warfare in the modern era, we see three
distinct generations … Third generation warfare was conceptually
developed by the German offensive in the spring of 1918 … Is it not about
time for the Fourth Generation to appear?”
“The Four Generations of War”
William S. Lind, Nightengale, Wilson, et al,
Marine Corps Gazette, 1989
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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Why?
Understanding the environment
 Fourth Generation Warfare is evolving along two
complimentary lines:
 One of the opponents is something other than the armed forces of
a state
 The ability to continue the conflict without coming apart at the
moral level
“The distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the
vanishing point. It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having
no definable battlefields or fronts. The distinction between 'civilian'
and 'military' may disappear.”
“The Four Generations of War,”
William S. Lind, Nightengale, Wilson, et al,
Marine Corps Gazette, 1989
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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Why?
Understanding the environment
 Despite the growing complexity of the battlefield, the Army
is proposing only incremental changes to our officer
accessions system because:
 It has become addicted to technology and technological solutions
 In our traditional view, the low-tech approaches of 4GW are the
“Tactics of the Weak"
 However, 4GW is often successful in circumventing our
military's far stronger high-tech-conventional posture.
Meanwhile, the Cadet Command vision:
“New focus requires wholesale shift in resource
allocation: Scholarships; Budgets; Advertising”
“State of Command”
U.S. Army Cadet Command (2002)
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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Why?
Understanding the environment
OODA LOOP
 John Boyd: 3 Aspects of war:
 Physical
 Mental
 Moral
OBSERVE
ORIENT
DECIDE
ACT
 We are still focused on the Physical Aspect of War
 No focus on the Mental aspect of war
 Enemy out-OODA loops us daily
 Reacting to enemy propaganda, threats, claims
 Solution to winning the GWOT: Information arrows
 Moral actions have to be above reproach, or we will lose allies
and the willing participation of our own people
 Can we recover?
Information Operations and 4GW
Greg Wilcox SRI International 23 February 2005
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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Why?
Understanding the environment
 Calls for extremely capable leaders that must:
Have a cultural knowledge of the area, including
familiar with the language
Understand that intelligence and knowledge,
NOT just information, is key – getting beyond just
kinetics, rethinking intelligence, information,
“targets” & “weapons”
Consider non-lethal alternatives
“The values, attributes, actions and skills most often mentioned as
key to success as a junior officer Decision-making; particularly the
ability to make complex and rapid decisions while fatigued and in a
chaotic, ambiguous and time-constrained environment. The
demands of the digitally-enhanced battlefield of the future will place
a premium on these skills”
“Future Lieutenants Study”
U.S. Army Cadet Command (2000)
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
10
Why?
Understanding the environment
 Insurgents have an affinity for urban terrain and populations;
future leaders have to understand they must:
 Separate insurgents from the population that provides support
 Separate insurgents from media exposure
 Go where they are not (get in behind morally, mentality,
psychologically, and physically)
 Influence zones from where insurgents previously operated (don’t
want to occupy)
 Turn the population against the insurgents
 Coordinate actions over a wide area and for a long time
“The capacity to eliminate irrelevant information is one of the most critical skills
that junior officers will need on the digitally enhanced battlefield of the future. In
addition, junior officers must be comfortable with ambiguity and pressure and
possess the ability to make rapid decisions under conditions of uncertainty and
stress. Without these attributes and skills, the officer will be unable to see
through the ‘fog of war.’”
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
“Future Lieutenants Study”
U.S. Army Cadet Command (2000) 11
Copyright@2005DonVandergriff
Why?
Strategic Model
Senior leaders, professional
journals, and “experts”:
“Change the culture”
 What happens when we define “what” and
understand “why” but not “how”?
Continue to allow
internal factors to
impact effectiveness
distract from true
focus
The Culture
Present-Strategic
Personal
Efforts from
Below not
Enough must
Have support
From top
Future
Army ?
Reform Officer Education
and Training=New ROTC
Go in with
Less than
required
Some lower level
Leaders, Soldiers
Units do adaptthis is climate, not
culture change
These veterans will help
But full potential not tapped
Due to unchanged culture
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
Current and future
operating environments
Emerging technology
Opponents
Technology
Global conditions
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“Why”
Conclusion
 What this does for the Army:






We have justified what we need to change, and why
War is more complex
War is more than just capturing the other guys’ capital
The enemies are going to avoid direct confrontation with U.S.
The enemy relies on smaller and decentralized groups
Possible traditional enemies will also learn to merge all techniques
to counter U.S. technology and firepower
 The Army understands “why” now is time to develop the
“how” not only to win in the future, but a “how” to get us by
the “what.”
© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff
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