Agenda Part 2 of 3 A holistic view What Why a future Army? The Future is Now Understanding the Environment How © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff 1 Why? The Future is now Capability The “RMA” Effect of Leader Development Not Keeping Pace with Change Effectiveness Index Today =? Capability Overmatch Growing 4GW Capabilities Time © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff 2 Why? The Future is now Exposure to And Familiarization Of Complex Problems Line equals at what point does the officer have to deal with the particular task under the given type of culture 2GW Time Moving Up Experience, Earlier line (War) Operational Art Grand Tactics With the use of varying 3 & 4GW education and training techniques described in Time line (All) this briefing, we will better prepare our officers earlier to deal with complex tasks 2GW Time line (peace) Joint Operations Dealing w/other Cultures Nation Building Tasks Tactical Planning Co/TM Tasks Sqd & PLT Tasks COL LTC Major Captain Lieutenant Cadet Individual Tasks Given our current accessions system, we act like conditions have not changed. © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff Time/ Career Experience 3 Why? The Future is now YES! Battlefield conditions have changed: Since WWII, platoon zone from yards to kilometers Time has compressed—instant reporting Now, what was last, is often first Zero defects => Society’s instant gratification An individual-centric personnel system LTs today need skills to command battalions of yesterday. The good news: WWII's BN Cdrs were often as old as today's LTs We're capable today of delivering better leader development © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff 4 Why? The Future is now: Leadership The Army is still stuck with Frederick Taylor and Henry Ford, where: Workers were simply cogs in the wheel Workers were easily trained, easily replaceable Workers were not expected to think In fact, thinking was discouraged They were simply told when to show up and what to do. They had no say in production or engineering But that model has been supplanted by W. Edwards Deming’s and Toyota’s: Lowest level workers must be empowered and take initiative Can stop the production line, at any time, for any reason Most successful companies use these concepts But they demand professionalism and discipline But where is war evolving to? © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff 5 Why? Understanding the environment 1GW: Aristocratic Culture, centers on skills of one individual Linear Tactics of Column and Line—Driven by Culture & Technology Operational Art—Napoleon’s Time & Space to Set Up Decisive Battle 2GW: Attrition Warfare, driven by technology (U.S. Army) Materialschlacht or industrial war of attrition Linear Tactics—Regularity driven by technology Operational Art—Procure success from top down Space-Time Decisions SYNCHRONIZED (e.g., “Active Defense”) 3GW: Maneuver Warfare, driven by ideas WE NEED TO GET HERE FIRST TO DEAL w/ 4 GW Infiltration tactics—Blitzkrieg—USMC & OODA Loop Nonlinear Tactics Operational Art—Penetrate his OODA loops, (Boyd)) “If we look at the development of warfare in the modern era, we see three distinct generations … Third generation warfare was conceptually developed by the German offensive in the spring of 1918 … Is it not about time for the Fourth Generation to appear?” “The Four Generations of War” William S. Lind, Nightengale, Wilson, et al, Marine Corps Gazette, 1989 © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff 6 Why? Understanding the environment Fourth Generation Warfare is evolving along two complimentary lines: One of the opponents is something other than the armed forces of a state The ability to continue the conflict without coming apart at the moral level “The distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point. It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definable battlefields or fronts. The distinction between 'civilian' and 'military' may disappear.” “The Four Generations of War,” William S. Lind, Nightengale, Wilson, et al, Marine Corps Gazette, 1989 © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff 7 Why? Understanding the environment Despite the growing complexity of the battlefield, the Army is proposing only incremental changes to our officer accessions system because: It has become addicted to technology and technological solutions In our traditional view, the low-tech approaches of 4GW are the “Tactics of the Weak" However, 4GW is often successful in circumventing our military's far stronger high-tech-conventional posture. Meanwhile, the Cadet Command vision: “New focus requires wholesale shift in resource allocation: Scholarships; Budgets; Advertising” “State of Command” U.S. Army Cadet Command (2002) © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff 8 Why? Understanding the environment OODA LOOP John Boyd: 3 Aspects of war: Physical Mental Moral OBSERVE ORIENT DECIDE ACT We are still focused on the Physical Aspect of War No focus on the Mental aspect of war Enemy out-OODA loops us daily Reacting to enemy propaganda, threats, claims Solution to winning the GWOT: Information arrows Moral actions have to be above reproach, or we will lose allies and the willing participation of our own people Can we recover? Information Operations and 4GW Greg Wilcox SRI International 23 February 2005 © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff 9 Why? Understanding the environment Calls for extremely capable leaders that must: Have a cultural knowledge of the area, including familiar with the language Understand that intelligence and knowledge, NOT just information, is key – getting beyond just kinetics, rethinking intelligence, information, “targets” & “weapons” Consider non-lethal alternatives “The values, attributes, actions and skills most often mentioned as key to success as a junior officer Decision-making; particularly the ability to make complex and rapid decisions while fatigued and in a chaotic, ambiguous and time-constrained environment. The demands of the digitally-enhanced battlefield of the future will place a premium on these skills” “Future Lieutenants Study” U.S. Army Cadet Command (2000) © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff 10 Why? Understanding the environment Insurgents have an affinity for urban terrain and populations; future leaders have to understand they must: Separate insurgents from the population that provides support Separate insurgents from media exposure Go where they are not (get in behind morally, mentality, psychologically, and physically) Influence zones from where insurgents previously operated (don’t want to occupy) Turn the population against the insurgents Coordinate actions over a wide area and for a long time “The capacity to eliminate irrelevant information is one of the most critical skills that junior officers will need on the digitally enhanced battlefield of the future. In addition, junior officers must be comfortable with ambiguity and pressure and possess the ability to make rapid decisions under conditions of uncertainty and stress. Without these attributes and skills, the officer will be unable to see through the ‘fog of war.’” © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff “Future Lieutenants Study” U.S. Army Cadet Command (2000) 11 Copyright@2005DonVandergriff Why? Strategic Model Senior leaders, professional journals, and “experts”: “Change the culture” What happens when we define “what” and understand “why” but not “how”? Continue to allow internal factors to impact effectiveness distract from true focus The Culture Present-Strategic Personal Efforts from Below not Enough must Have support From top Future Army ? Reform Officer Education and Training=New ROTC Go in with Less than required Some lower level Leaders, Soldiers Units do adaptthis is climate, not culture change These veterans will help But full potential not tapped Due to unchanged culture © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff Current and future operating environments Emerging technology Opponents Technology Global conditions 12 “Why” Conclusion What this does for the Army: We have justified what we need to change, and why War is more complex War is more than just capturing the other guys’ capital The enemies are going to avoid direct confrontation with U.S. The enemy relies on smaller and decentralized groups Possible traditional enemies will also learn to merge all techniques to counter U.S. technology and firepower The Army understands “why” now is time to develop the “how” not only to win in the future, but a “how” to get us by the “what.” © 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff 13