Subprime Lending Crisis Conference Banking Regulation, Oversight and Enforcement Kevin F. Barnard White & Case LLP March 18, 2008 Banking Regulation, Oversight and Enforcement Introduction Regulatory Guidance on Subprime Mortgage Lending Likely Focus of Potential Future Regulatory Enforcement Actions Recommended Practices and Strategies Summing Up KEVIN F. BARNARD BANKING REGULATION, OVERSIGHT AND ENFORCEMENT WHITE & CASE LLP March 18, 2008 2 Banking Regulation, Oversight and Enforcement Regulatory Guidance on Subprime Mortgage Lending Interagency Guidance on Subprime Mortgage Lending (1999) Expanded Guidance on Subprime Mortgage Lending (2001) Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Risks (2006) KEVIN F. BARNARD BANKING REGULATION, OVERSIGHT AND ENFORCEMENT WHITE & CASE LLP March 18, 2008 3 Banking Regulation, Oversight and Enforcement Interagency Statement on Subprime Mortgage Lending (2007) Statement on Subprime Mortgage Lending of the CSBS, AARMR, NACCA (2007) Statement on Subprime Mortgage Lending of Various States (2007) KEVIN F. BARNARD BANKING REGULATION, OVERSIGHT AND ENFORCEMENT WHITE & CASE LLP March 18, 2008 4 Banking Regulation, Oversight and Enforcement Back to the Future . . . ? Nine years ago this month – “ . . . recent turmoil in the equity and asset-backed securities market has caused some non-bank subprime specialists to exit the market, thus creating increased opportunities . . ..” BUT . . . KEVIN F. BARNARD BANKING REGULATION, OVERSIGHT AND ENFORCEMENT WHITE & CASE LLP March 18, 2008 5 Banking Regulation, Oversight and Enforcement “If the risks associated with this activity are not properly controlled, the agencies consider subprime lending a high risk activity that is unsafe and unsound.” (emphasis added) Interagency Guidance on Subprime Mortgage Lending (March 1, 1999) KEVIN F. BARNARD BANKING REGULATION, OVERSIGHT AND ENFORCEMENT WHITE & CASE LLP March 18, 2008 6 Banking Regulation, Oversight and Enforcement Essential Elements Board of Directors and Management Should Consider Capitalization Risk Management Program Critical risk issues: attracting/retaining qualified personnel technology investments after-the-fact assessment of underwriting performance KEVIN F. BARNARD BANKING REGULATION, OVERSIGHT AND ENFORCEMENT WHITE & CASE LLP March 18, 2008 7 Banking Regulation, Oversight and Enforcement specific lending policy for subprime including: pricing and profitability analysis covering all associated costs including servicing, expected chargeoffs and capital collateral evaluation and appraisal standards correspondent/broker approval process purchase considerations high upfront fees financed into the loan (may be an incentive for high volume/low quality by originator) special care on loans from outside lender’s area (specific risk for fraud or misrepresentation) KEVIN F. BARNARD BANKING REGULATION, OVERSIGHT AND ENFORCEMENT WHITE & CASE LLP March 18, 2008 8 Banking Regulation, Oversight and Enforcement stringent loan administration procedures securitization and sale carries inherent risks, including interim credit risk and liquidity risk loss of investor appetite – unsold pools forced into deep discount sales should have contingency plan: back-up purchasers/servicers; alternate funding sources; capital raising measures complexity of valuation decisions KEVIN F. BARNARD BANKING REGULATION, OVERSIGHT AND ENFORCEMENT WHITE & CASE LLP March 18, 2008 9 Banking Regulation, Oversight and Enforcement Likely Focus of Potential Future Regulatory Enforcement Actions KEVIN F. BARNARD BANKING REGULATION, OVERSIGHT AND ENFORCEMENT WHITE & CASE LLP March 18, 2008 10 Banking Regulation, Oversight and Enforcement Report of the Senior Supervisors Group to the Financial Stability Forum (March 6, 2008) Assess which risk management policies worked well and which did not “Strategic decision” by some firms to retain large exposures to super-senior tranches of collateralized debt obligations KEVIN F. BARNARD BANKING REGULATION, OVERSIGHT AND ENFORCEMENT WHITE & CASE LLP March 18, 2008 11 Banking Regulation, Oversight and Enforcement Exposures “far exceeded the firm’s understanding of the risks inherent in such instruments, and failed to take appropriate steps to control or mitigate such risks.” (emphasis added) Major losses taken on these holdings with substantial implications for earnings performance and capital positions Risk management and pricing for off-balance sheet obligations were seriously deficient KEVIN F. BARNARD BANKING REGULATION, OVERSIGHT AND ENFORCEMENT WHITE & CASE LLP March 18, 2008 12 Banking Regulation, Oversight and Enforcement “. . . some firms failed to price properly the risk that exposures to certain off-balance sheet vehicles might need to be funded on the balance sheet precisely when it became difficult or expensive to raise such funds externally. “ KEVIN F. BARNARD BANKING REGULATION, OVERSIGHT AND ENFORCEMENT WHITE & CASE LLP March 18, 2008 13 Banking Regulation, Oversight and Enforcement The better positioned firms had comprehensive, firm-wide risk management capability focused on quantitative and qualitative information gathering and analysis also exhibited a disciplined approach in how complex or potentially illiquid positions were valued. Adaptive (not static) risk measurement processes that could rapidly alter underlying assumptions An agenda is emerging to strengthen supervisory oversight in critical areas. KEVIN F. BARNARD BANKING REGULATION, OVERSIGHT AND ENFORCEMENT WHITE & CASE LLP March 18, 2008 14 Banking Regulation, Oversight and Enforcement Recommended Practices and Strategies Risk Management Underwriting Standards and Loan Terms Control Systems Consumer Disclosure/Consumer Protection KEVIN F. BARNARD BANKING REGULATION, OVERSIGHT AND ENFORCEMENT WHITE & CASE LLP March 18, 2008 15 Banking Regulation, Oversight and Enforcement Summing Up KEVIN F. BARNARD BANKING REGULATION, OVERSIGHT AND ENFORCEMENT WHITE & CASE LLP March 18, 2008 16