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A. Interp: The US includes the territories and land over which it has jurisdiction
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 5 (Dictionary of Military, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/United+States, 2005)
Includes the land area, internal waters, territorial sea, and airspace of the United States, including the following: a. US territories, possessions, and
commonwealths; and b. Other areas over which the US Government has complete jurisdiction and control or has exclusive authority or defense
responsibility.
Transportation infrastructure is the ultimate example of overdevelopment – civil servants reduce all of
nature into monetary and market value in the name of “industry”
Monboit 11
(George, author of The Age of Consent: A Manifesto for a New World Order and Captive State: The Corporate Takeover of Britain,
Poisoned Arrows, Amazon Watershed and No Man's Land, and Heat: how to stop the planet burning and Bring on the Apocalypse?,
June 6th 2011, “The true value of nature is not a number with a pound sign in front: Cost-benefit analysis of nature is rigged in favour
of business”, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/jun/06/monetisation-natural-world-definitive-neoliberal-triumph)
Cost-benefit analysis is systematically rigged in favour of business. Take, for example, the decision-making process for
transport infrastructure. The last government developed an appraisal method which almost guaranteed that new roads,
railways and runways would be built, regardless of the damage they might do or the paltry benefits they might deliver. The
method costs people's time according to how much they earn, and uses this cost to create a value for the development. So,
for example, it says the market price of an hour spent travelling in a taxi is £45, but the price of an hour spent travelling by
bicycle is just £17, because cyclists tend to be poorer than taxi passengers. Its assumptions are utterly illogical. For
example, commuters are deemed to use all the time saved by a new high-speed rail link to get to work earlier, rather than to
live further away. Rich rail passengers are expected to do no useful work on trains, but to twiddle their thumbs and stare
vacantly out of the window throughout the journey. This costing system explains why successive governments want to
invest in high-speed rail rather than cycle lanes, and why multibillion pound road schemes which cut two minutes off your
journey are deemed to offer value for money. None of this is accidental: the cost-benefit models governments use excite
intense interest from business lobbyists. Civil servants with an eye on lucrative directorships in their retirement ensure that
the decision-making process is rigged in favour of overdevelopment. This is the machine into which nature must now be
fed. The national ecosystem assessment hands the biosphere on a plate to the construction industry. It's the definitive
neoliberal triumph: the monetisation and marketisation of nature, its reduction to a tradeable asset. Once you have
surrendered it to the realm of Pareto optimisation and Kaldor-Hicks compensation, everything is up for grabs. These wellintentioned dolts, the fellows of the grand academy of Lagado who produced the government's assessment, have crushed
the natural world into a column of figures. Now it can be swapped for money.
Neoliberalism creates multiple structural trends towards extinction
Szentes (a Professor Emeritus at the Corvinus University of Budapest) 8
(Tamás, “Globalisation and prospects of the world society”, 4/22 http://www.eadi.org/fileadmin/Documents/Events/exco/Glob.___prospects_-_jav..pdf)
It’ s a common place that human society can survive and develop only in a lasting real peace. Without peace countries
cannot develop. Although since 1945 there has been no world war, but --numerous local wars took place, --terrorism has
spread all over the world, undermining security even in the most developed and powerful countries, --arms race and
militarisation have not ended with the collapse of the Soviet bloc, but escalated and continued, extending also to weapons
of mass destruction and misusing enormous resources badly needed for development, --many “invisible wars” are suffered
by the poor and oppressed people, manifested in mass misery, poverty, unemployment, homelessness, starvation and
malnutrition, epidemics and poor health conditions, exploitation and oppression, racial and other discrimination, physical
terror, organised injustice, disguised forms of violence, the denial or regular infringement of the democratic rights of
citizens, women, youth, ethnic or religious minorities, etc., and last but not least, in the degradation of human environment,
which means that --the “war against Nature”, i.e. the disturbance of ecological balance, wasteful management of natural
resources, and large-scale pollution of our environment, is still going on, causing also losses and fatal dangers for human
life. Behind global terrorism and “invisible wars” we find striking international and intrasociety inequities and distorted
development patterns , which tend to generate social as well as international tensions, thus paving the way for unrest and
“visible” wars. It is a commonplace now that peace is not merely the absence of war. The prerequisites of a lasting peace
between and within societies involve not only - though, of course, necessarily - demilitarisation, but also a systematic and
gradual elimination of the roots of violence, of the causes of “invisible wars”, of the structural and institutional bases of
large-scale international and intra-society inequalities, exploitation and oppression. Peace requires a process of social and
national emancipation, a progressive, democratic transformation of societies and the world bringing about equal rights and
opportunities for all people, sovereign participation and mutually advantageous co-operation among nations. It further
requires a pluralistic democracy on global level with an appropriate system of proportional representation of the world
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society, articulation of diverse interests and their peaceful reconciliation, by non-violent conflict management, and thus also
a global governance with a really global institutional system. Under the contemporary conditions of accelerating
globalisation and deepening global interdependencies in our world, peace is indivisible in both time and space. It cannot
exist if reduced to a period only after or before war, and cannot be safeguarded in one part of the world when some others
suffer visible or invisible wars. Thus, peace requires, indeed, a new, demilitarised and democratic world order, which can
provide equal opportunities for sustainable development. “Sustainability of development” (both on national and world
level) is often interpreted as an issue of environmental protection only and reduced to the need for preserving the ecological
balance and delivering the next generations not a destroyed Nature with overexhausted resources and polluted environment.
However, no ecological balance can be ensured, unless the deep international development gap and intra-society
inequalities are substantially reduced. Owing to global interdependencies there may exist hardly any “zero-sum-games”, in
which one can gain at the expense of others, but, instead, the “negative-sum-games” tend to predominate, in which
everybody must suffer, later or sooner, directly or indirectly, losses. Therefore, the actual question is not about
“sustainability of development” but rather about the “sustainability of human life”, i.e. survival of mankind – because of
ecological imbalance and globalised terrorism. When Professor Louk de la Rive Box was the president of EADI, one day
we had an exchange of views on the state and future of development studies. We agreed that development studies are not
any more restricted to the case of underdeveloped countries, as the developed ones (as well as the former “socialist”
countries) are also facing development problems, such as those of structural and institutional (and even system-)
transformation, requirements of changes in development patterns, and concerns about natural environment. While all these
are true, today I would dare say that besides (or even instead of) “development studies” we must speak about and make
“survival studies”. While the monetary, financial, and debt crises are cyclical, we live in an almost permanent crisis of the
world society, which is multidimensional in nature, involving not only economic but also socio-psychological, behavioural,
cultural and political aspects. The narrow-minded, election-oriented, selfish behaviour motivated by thirst for power and
wealth, which still characterise the political leadership almost all over the world, paves the way for the final, last
catastrophe. One cannot doubt, of course, that great many positive historical changes have also taken place in the world in
the last century. Such as decolonisation, transformation of socio-economic systems, democratisation of political life in
some former fascist or authoritarian states, institutionalisation of welfare policies in several countries, rise of international
organisations and new forums for negotiations, conflict management and cooperation, institutionalisation of international
assistance programmes by multilateral agencies, codification of human rights, and rights of sovereignty and democracy also
on international level, collapse of the militarised Soviet bloc and system-change3 in the countries concerned, the end of
cold war, etc., to mention only a few. Nevertheless, the crisis of the world society has extended and deepened, approaching
to a point of bifurcation that necessarily puts an end to the present tendencies, either by the final catastrophe or a common
solution. Under the circumstances provided by rapidly progressing science and technological revolutions, human society
cannot survive unless such profound intra-society and international inequalities prevailing today are soon eliminated. Like a
single spacecraft, the Earth can no longer afford to have a 'crew' divided into two parts: the rich, privileged, wellfed, welleducated, on the one hand, and the poor, deprived, starving, sick and uneducated, on the other. Dangerous 'zero-sum-games'
(which mostly prove to be “negative-sum-games”) can hardly be played any more by visible or invisible wars in the world
society. Because of global interdependencies, the apparent winner becomes also a loser. The real choice for the world
society is between negative- and positive-sum-games: i.e. between, on the one hand, continuation of visible and “invisible
wars”, as long as this is possible at all, and, on the other, transformation of the world order by demilitarisation and
democratization. No ideological or terminological camouflage can conceal this real dilemma any more, which is to be faced
not in the distant future, by the next generations, but in the coming years, because of global terrorism soon having nuclear
and other mass destructive weapons, and also due to irreversible changes in natural environment.
Movements against capitalism are possible now, our job as intellectuals is to attack the imperialist system
at every turn
Wise (Director of Doctoral Program in Migration Studies & Prof of Development Studies; Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas,
Mexico) 9
(Raúl Delgado, Forced Migration and US Imperialism: The Dialectic of Migration and Development, Crit Sociol, 35: 767, ProQuest)
The theoretical framework outlined in this article for understanding the dialectic relationship between development and
migration has four critical components. A Critical Approach to Neoliberal Globalization Contrary to the discourse
regarding its inevitability (on this see Petras and Veltmeyer, 2000), we posit that the current phase of imperialist
domination is historical and can and should be transformed. In this regard, it is fundamental to notice that ‘[t]he principal
factor generating international migration is not globalization but imperialism, which pillages nations and creates conditions
for the exploitation of labor in the imperial center’ (Petras, 2007: 51–2). A Critical Reconstitution of the Field of
Development Studies The favoring of a singular mode of analysis based on the belief that free markets work as powerful
regulatory mechanisms, efficiently assigning resources and providing patterns of economic convergence among countries
and their populations, has clearly resulted in failure. New theoretical and practical alternatives are needed, and we propose a
reevaluation of development as a process of social transformation through a multi-dimensional, multi-spatial, and properly
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contextualized approach, ‘using the concept of imperialism as an alternative explanatory framework of international
capitalist expansion and the growing inequalities’ (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2000). This integral approach requires the
consideration of the strategic and structural aspects of the dynamic of uneven contemporary capitalism development, which
should be examined at the global, regional, national, and local levels. For this purpose it is crucial to understand, inter alia,
a) the central role played by foreign investment in the process of neoliberal restructuring of peripheral economies, and b)
the new modalities of surplus transfer characterizing contemporary capitalism. The Construction of an Agent of Change
The globalization project led by the USA has ceased to be consensual: it has only benefited capitalist elites and excluded
and damaged an overwhelming number of people throughout the world. Economic, political, social, cultural and
environmental changes are all needed but a transformation of this magnitude is not viable unless diverse movements,
classes, and agents can establish common goals. The construction of an agent of change requires not only an alternative
theory of development but also collective action and horizontal collaboration: the sharing of experiences, the conciliation of
interests and visions, and the construction of alliances inside the framework of South-South and South-North relations. A
Reassessment of Migration and Development Studies The current explosion of forced migration is part of the intricate
machinery of contemporary capitalism as an expression of the dominant imperialist project. In order to understand this
process we need to redefine the boundaries of studies that address migration and development: expand our field of research
and invert the terms of the unidirectional orthodox vision of the migration-development nexus in order to situate the
complex issues of uneven development and imperialist domination at the center of an alternative dialectical framework.
This entails a new way of understanding the migration phenomenon.
Only EU solves – cooperation and US isnt a member (perm answer)
VANDERZWAAG et al 9 (David VanderZwaag ¶ Dalhousie University - Schulich School of Law¶ Timo Koivurova ¶ University
of Lapland - Arctic Centre - Northern Institute for Environmental and Minority Law, June 11, 2009 ¶ Journal of Transnational Law &
Policy, Vol. 18, No. 2, 247, 2009, http://www.law.fsu.edu/journals/transnational/vol18_2/koivurova.pdf)
The cornerstones of the current international law of the sea are¶ the LOS Convention and its two Implementing Agreements, the¶ Part
XI Deep-Sea Mining Agreement,11 and the Fish Stocks¶ Agreement.12 The current international law of the sea applies to ¶ the marine
environment of the entire globe; including, therefore,¶ the entire marine environment of the Arctic Ocean,¶ however defined.¶ The LOS
Convention’s overarching objective is to establish a¶ universally accepted, just, and equitable legal order, or “Constitution,”¶ for the
oceans that lessens the risk of international conflict¶ and enhances stability and peace in the international community. ¶ The LOS
Convention currently has 160 parties, the Part XI Deep-¶ Sea Mining Agreement has 138 parties, and the Fish Stocks¶ Agreement has
77 parties. All Arctic states are parties to these¶ three treaties, except for the United States, which is not a party to ¶ either the LOS
Convention or the Part XI Deep-Sea Mining¶ Agreement.13 The European Community (EC) is party to all three treaties. This is
important in view of the fact that Denmark, Finland, ¶ and Sweden are Member States of the European Union14 and ¶ Iceland and
Norway are parties to the European Economic Area ¶ (EEA) Agreement.15¶ The LOS Convention recognizes the sovereignty,
sovereign¶ rights, freedoms, rights, jurisdiction, and obligations of states ¶ within several maritime zones. The most important of these,
for¶ the Arctic, are internal waters, territorial sea, exclusive economic ¶ zone (EEZ), continental shelf, high seas, and the “Area.”16
Internal¶ waters lie landward of the baselines. The maximum breadth of the ¶ territorial sea is twelve nautical miles (1 nautical mile =
1,852 meters)¶ measured from the baselines. Twenty-four nautical miles is¶ the maximum breadth for the contiguous zone as is 200
nautical¶ miles for the EEZ. However, in many geographical settings these ¶ maximum breadths cannot be reached due to the proximity
of the¶ baselines of opposite states. In such circumstances, maritime ¶ boundaries have to be agreed on by the opposite states. Several
of¶ these maritime boundaries have already been established in the ¶ Arctic Ocean and negotiations on several others are still ongoing. ¶
The LOS Convention recognizes the sovereignty of a coastal¶ state over its internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial¶ sea, the
airspace above, and its bed and subsoil. Sovereignty entails ¶ exclusive access and control of living and non-living resources¶ and allencompassing jurisdiction over all human activities, unless ¶ states have in one way or another consented to restrictions thereon.¶ The
LOS Convention also recognizes specific economic and resource-¶ related sovereign rights and jurisdiction of a coastal state ¶ with
respect to its EEZ and, where relevant, outer continental ¶ shelf. Nevertheless, other states have navigational rights or freedoms¶ within
the maritime zones of coastal states and with respect ¶ to their EEZ, and, where relevant, outer continental shelf, also the ¶ freedoms of
overflight, laying of submarine cables and pipelines ¶ and “other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to ¶ these freedoms . . .
.”17¶ Article 76 of the LOS Convention also recognizes that in certain ¶ circumstances the continental shelf extends beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines. This is the so-called “outer continental¶ shelf.” Coastal states that take the view that they have an outer ¶
continental shelf must submit information on their outer limits¶ on the basis of the criteria in Article 76 to the Commission on the ¶
Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS).18 “The limits of the [outer¶ continental] shelf established by a coastal state on the basis of¶
these recommendations [of the CLCS] shall be final and binding.”19 ¶ So far, only the Russian Federation and Norway have made
submissions¶ to the CLCS in relation to their outer continental shelves¶ that lie within the Arctic Ocean. The CLCS has, up until now,
only¶ made an interim recommendation in relation to the submission of¶ the Russian Federation.20 The CLCS essentially
recommended that¶ the Russian Federation make a revised submission as regards the¶ central Arctic Ocean basin.21 The Russian
Federation is expected¶ to do this in 2010. Canada, Denmark (in relation to Greenland), ¶ and the United States are all engaged in
activities to enable them¶ to make submissions to the CLCS, despite the fact that the United ¶ States is not yet party to the LOS
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Convention.22 Canada has to¶ make its submission by December 2013 and Denmark by December ¶ 2014.23 It should be noted that it
is likely that there will be two ¶ pockets of the Area in the central Arctic Ocean and one large high ¶ seas pocket.¶ In the high seas, all
states have the freedoms already mentioned ¶ above as well as the freedom to construct artificial islands¶ and other installations, the
freedom to fish, and the freedom to¶ conduct scientific research. These freedoms are all subject to conditions ¶ and obligations.24 The
Area and its resources are the “common¶ heritage of mankind” and the International Sea-Bed Authority¶ (ISA) is charged with
organizing and controlling all activities of¶ exploration for, and exploitation of, the resources of the Area.25
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EU is solves best and is key to legitimacy
VANDERZWAAG et al 9 (David VanderZwaag ¶ Dalhousie University - Schulich School of Law¶ Timo Koivurova ¶ University
of Lapland - Arctic Centre - Northern Institute for Environmental and Minority Law, June 11, 2009 ¶ Journal of Transnational Law &
Policy, Vol. 18, No. 2, 247, 2009, http://www.law.fsu.edu/journals/transnational/vol18_2/koivurova.pdf)
The competence of the EU and its Member States regarding ¶ the Arctic Ocean is determined by general international law as ¶ well as by
European Community (EC) law. It goes without saying¶ that EU Member States cannot confer more extensive competence ¶ to the EU
than they themselves possess in accordance with international ¶ law.¶ The fact that none of the current EU Member States are coastal¶
states with respect to the Arctic Ocean (not even via the EEA¶ Agreement or via Greenland, which chose in the mid-1980s to¶
withdraw from the then EEC, and hence is not part of the EC or ¶ EU) is clearly a major feature and constraint of EU policy regarding ¶
the Arctic Ocean. While neither the EU nor its Member States¶ can act as coastal states with respect to the Arctic Ocean, they can ¶ still
act in a wide range of other capacities. For instance, they may¶ act as flag states, port states, market states, or with respect to ¶ their
natural and legal persons. In a flag state capacity, the EU ¶ and its Member States are able to exercise their rights and discharge ¶ their
obligations with respect to the Arctic Ocean, most¶ notably the freedoms of the high seas in the high seas pockets in ¶ the Arctic Ocean
(e.g., marine scientific research and the laying of¶ cables and pipelines), the navigational rights and freedoms in the ¶ maritime zones of
Arctic Ocean coastal states, and the obligations¶ relating to marine living resources and the marine environment ¶ connected to these
rights and freedoms.¶ In addition to these rights and obligations, the EU and its¶ Member States may also have various user and nonuser interests¶ in the Arctic Ocean. The main user interests would be related to ¶ the exploration and exploitation of offshore
hydrocarbon resources.¶ As traditional energy resources will be of paramount importance to ¶ all EU Member States for at least the next
few decades, access to¶ the hydrocarbon resources in the Arctic will be an important security ¶ issue. The main non-user interests
include the protection and¶ preservation of the marine environment and safeguarding marine ¶ biodiversity. The EU and its Member
States could argue that they¶ want to become involved in the governance and regulation of the ¶ marine Arctic to safeguard these nonuser interests, in their own¶ right, or, together with non-Arctic states, on behalf of the international ¶ community. Such participation may
for instance be aimed at¶ monitoring and ensuring that obligations with respect to the Arctic¶ marine area are complied with.¶ In case
the EU would act, it would also need to have shared or ¶ exclusive competence. The distribution of competence between the¶ EU and its
Member States is determined by the EC Treaty, the EUTreaty,26 and other treaties concluded within the framework of the ¶ EC and the
EU. The scope and extent of EC and EU competence is ¶ governed by the principle of conferral and the use of conferred (exclusive)¶
competence is, inter alia, governed by the principles of¶ subsidiarity and proportionality.27 The distribution of competence ¶ is a
dynamic matter in which the judgments of the European Court ¶ of Justice (ECJ) play a key role. While adjustments of competence¶ can
be a consequence of increasing importance of EC legislation¶ and acts by the EC Commission, it can also be negotiated between ¶ EU
Member States. The latter adjustments can lead to more competence ¶ being conferred to the EC and EU but also to competence ¶ being
delegated back to EU Member States.¶ The spheres in which the EC has competence can be gleaned ¶ from Article 3 of the EC Treaty,
which lists the activities the EC¶ shall undertake for the purposes set out in Article 2. While Article ¶ 3 sets out the policy areas which
the EU may address, it does not¶ in itself provide a legal basis for specific legislative acts. The specific¶ measures available to the EC
are set out in other parts of the¶ EC Treaty. Included in this list are fishing, shipping (transport), ¶ and environmental protection.28 In
addition, Article 6 of the EC¶ Treaty stipulates, “[e]nvironmental protection requirements must ¶ be integrated into the definition and
implementation of the Community¶ policies and activities referred to in Article 3, in particular ¶ with a view to promoting sustainable
development.”29¶ EU Member States are generally free to pursue their own policies ¶ alongside the EU, unless the EU’s or EC’s
competence is exclusive¶ or a subject matter in shared competence is dealt with exhaustively¶ by the EU, leaving the Member States no
room for additional¶ measures. The ECJ already ruled in 1981 that the EC has ¶ exclusive competence in fisheries conservation and
management.30¶ This exclusiveness relates to community waters and probably also ¶ seaward thereof, but is also subject to some
exceptions, for instance¶ in relation to enforcement.31 The consequential external competence of the EC in the sphere of fisheries
implies that the EC¶ represents EU Member States, for instance in negotiations with ¶ non-EU Member States and in regional fisheries
management organizations¶ (RFMOs). Subject to some exceptions, EU Member ¶ States cannot become members of RFMOs alongside
the EC. One¶ of these exceptions relates to “overseas countries and territories” ¶ and enables, inter alia, Denmark to become a member
of RFMOs¶ alongside the EC on behalf of the Faroe Island, Greenland, or both. ¶ Competence with regards to shipping and
environmental protection¶ is shared between the EU and its Member States. This ¶ mixed competence also means that the EC cannot
represent EU¶ Member States in international fora, like the International Maritime ¶ Organization (IMO). So far, the EC has, as an
intergovernmental¶ organization, concluded an agreement on cooperation with ¶ the IMO.32 In areas of shared competence, agreements
are often¶ signed by the EC as well as by EU Member States (so-called¶ “mixed agreements”).33 This requires close cooperation¶
between them.
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Law of the sea solves arctic enviormental exploitation, cooperation, and scientific expeditions
VANDERZWAAG et al 9 (David VanderZwaag ¶ Dalhousie University - Schulich School of Law¶ Timo Koivurova ¶ University
of Lapland - Arctic Centre - Northern Institute for Environmental and Minority Law, June 11, 2009 ¶ Journal of Transnational Law &
Policy, Vol. 18, No. 2, 247, 2009, http://www.law.fsu.edu/journals/transnational/vol18_2/koivurova.pdf)
During the Cold War, Arctic-wide cooperation was not possible,¶ except in very limited policy areas, such as the conclusion of the ¶
1973 Polar Bear Treaty66 between the five Arctic range states. This¶ was due to the fact that the two superpowers and their allies
confronted¶ each other in the Arctic, which was estimated by many as ¶ one of the major military strategic hot spots during the Cold
War.¶ After all, NATO was a neighbor to the Soviet Union via Norway, ¶ and the United States and the Soviet Union shared a border in
the¶ Bering and Chukchi Seas. It was the perestroika and glasnost that ¶ opened up opportunities for pan-Arctic cooperation. Secretary-¶
General Gorbachev’s speech in Murmansk in 1987 proposed pan-¶ Arctic cooperation in a number of fields, one of these being the
protection¶ of the Arctic environment. Inspired by Gorbachev’s speech¶ outlining various areas for Arctic cooperation, Finland took the
initiative¶ in 1989 for pan-Arctic co-operation in one of these policy¶ areas, that of environmental protection; in 1991 the Arctic
Environmental¶ Protection Strategy (AEPS) was adopted by the eight¶ Arctic states by means of a declaration.67The AEPS achieved
one important thing. Even though the cooperation¶ itself was a fairly low-committal exercise with weak institutional¶ structure, it
enabled us to start thinking of societal and¶ environmental problems for the first time from the Arctic perspective ¶ (rather than from the
perspective of individual country’s¶ northern or Arctic region) and tackle them with policy measures.¶ The AEPS is also vastly
important for understanding the current¶ functioning of the Arctic Council,68 and the proposals to renew¶ it, since, even though the
Arctic cooperation ostensibly was transformed ¶ from the AEPS to the Arctic Council during the transitional ¶ period of 1996-1998, the
basic elements of the cooperation have¶ been in place from 1991, with only slight changes taking place. ¶ Even though there is a new
mandate on sustainable development¶ in the Council, the AEPS had a task force on sustainable development ¶ and utilization in the
Arctic, which had more ambitious¶ goals than the present Sustainable Development Working Group ¶ (SDWG).69 There are still the
same participants in the cooperation,¶ although the Declaration establishing the Council strengthened ¶ the status of Arctic indigenous
peoples’ organizations as permanent¶ participants with power to influence decision-making (they¶ were observers in the AEPS). The
same institutional structure has¶ been retained, ministerial meetings convened every two years and ¶ senior arctic officials (SAOs)
managing the day-to-day activities of¶ the Council. The four environmental protection working groups of ¶ the AEPS, namely
Conservation of Arctic Flora and Faunaand Fauna¶ (CAFF), Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME), ¶ Emergency
Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR), and¶ the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), were¶ integrated
into the structure of the Council. In addition, two new¶ working groups were established, the SDWG and the Arctic Contaminants ¶
Action Program (ACAP).To date, there is no permanent secretariat in the Council, as ¶ was the case in the AEPS, although the three
Scandinavian states¶ have agreed to maintain the secretariat in Tromsø till 2012.70 Aswas the case in the AEPS, there is no permanent,
mandatory funding¶ mechanism in the Council, although a project support instrument ¶ has been created to pool resources for funding of
individual¶ projects.71 Finally, and importantly, both the AEPS and the Arctic ¶ Council were established via a declaration as soft-law
organizations,¶ not inter-governmental organizations having binding¶ decision-making power.¶ Hence, even though many have
cherished the argument that¶ the Council can be formalized into an inter-governmental organization,¶ given that Arctic cooperation has
already once been revised ¶ in its short life-cycle, it is important to keep in mind that the foundation ¶ of the cooperation has remained
much the same, allowing¶ us to conclude that the Arctic Council is fairly resistant to ¶ change.But even though the structure has
remained much the same,¶ the Arctic Council has become a stronger forum for cooperation ¶ over the years of its existence. In addition
to the changes identified¶ above, the working groups have become stronger in status and in¶ terms of their deliverables. This is due to
the fact that it was¶ bound to take a few years before these working groups could start ¶ functioning effectively. Increasingly, their
strategies and deliverables¶ have become more ambitious. The Council ministers have ¶ also adopted important, albeit not very strong,
policy recommendations¶ connected with major scientific assessments, such as the ¶ ACIA. After the release of the ACIA, climate
change considerations¶ have become a cross-cutting issue in the Council, placing pressure ¶ on the working groups to adjust their work
to future challenges.¶ There is also more interest in the work of the Council; major states ¶ (like China) are interested in becoming
observers.
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EU arctic policy key to cooperation and resource management
VANDERZWAAG et al 9 (David VanderZwaag ¶ Dalhousie University - Schulich School of Law¶ Timo Koivurova ¶ University
of Lapland - Arctic Centre - Northern Institute for Environmental and Minority Law, June 11, 2009 ¶ Journal of Transnational Law &
Policy, Vol. 18, No. 2, 247, 2009, http://www.law.fsu.edu/journals/transnational/vol18_2/koivurova.pdf)
In connection with its climate policy work, the EU also pro-posed to revisit the governance framework applicable to the Arctic ¶ marine
area.103 The Climate Change and International Security¶ paper identified one policy option to “[d]evelop an EU Arctic policy¶ based
on the evolving geo-strategy of the Arctic region, taking into ¶ account, [inter alia], access to resources and the opening of new¶ trade
routes.”104 The EU is also developing its Arctic policy as part¶ of its newly adopted integrated maritime policy wherein the
Commission¶ (DG Mare) promises to produce a report “on strategic issues¶ relating to the Arctic Ocean” within the year 2008.105Most
recently, the Commission issued its Arctic Communication. ¶ 106 In the Introduction to the thirteen page document, the ¶ Commission
sets out EU interests and proposes action for EU¶ Member States and institutions around three main¶ policy objectives:¶ • Protecting
and preserving the Arctic in unison with¶ its population¶ • Promoting sustainable use of resources¶ • Contributing to enhanced Arctic
multilateral governance107¶ The Communication is structured along these three main policy¶ objectives. One of the salient features
within “[p]romoting sustainable¶ use of resources” is the proposal to extend the spatial¶ scope of the NEAFC Convention (see
subsection IV.B.). As the section¶ “[c]ontributing to enhanced Arctic multilateral governance” is¶ of most interest for this paper, some
more attention is devoted to ithere. As a general comment, it should be noted that the section ¶ contains quite a few sentences that
would raise the eyebrows of¶ international lawyers and would have benefited from more accurate ¶ drafting. The section contains the
following policy objectives:¶ • The EU should work to uphold the further development ¶ of a cooperative Arctic governance system
based¶ on the UNCLOS which would ensure:¶ o security and stability¶ o strict environmental management, including¶ respect of the
precautionary principle¶ o sustainable use of resources as well as open¶ and equitable access¶ • The full implementation of already
existing obligations,¶ rather than proposing new legal instruments¶ should be advocated. This however should not preclude¶ work on
further developing some of the frameworks, ¶ adapting them to new conditions or Arctic specificities.¶ • The EU should promote broad
dialogue and negotiated¶ solutions and not support arrangements which¶ exclude any of the Arctic EU Member States or Arctic ¶ EEA
EFTA countries.¶ • Arctic considerations should be integrated into wider ¶ EU policies and negotiations.108¶ Subsequently, a list of
policy actions is offered. These include:¶ • Explore the possibility of establishing new, multi-sector¶ frameworks for integrated
ecosystem management. This¶ could include the establishment of a network of marine protected ¶ areas, navigational measures and
rules for ensuring¶ the sustainable exploitation of minerals.¶ • Enhance input to the Arctic Council in accordance with the ¶
Community’s role and potential. As a first step, the Commission ¶ will apply for permanent observer status in the ¶ Arctic Council.¶ . . . .¶
• Explore all possibilities at international level to promote¶ measures for protecting marine biodiversity in areas¶ beyond national
jurisdiction, including through the pursuit ¶ of an UNCLOS Implementing Agreement.Work towards the successful conclusion of
international negotiations¶ on marine protected areas on the high seas.109
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Spending
Arctic Cooperation Now
Economist 2012 (The Economist Print Edition, “, June 16, 2012, http://www.economist.com/node/21556797,)
Far from violent, the development of the Arctic is likely to be uncommonly harmonious, for three related reasons. One is the profit motive. The
five Arctic littoral countries, Russia, the United States, Canada, Denmark and Norway, would sooner develop the resources they
have than argue over those they do not have. A sign of this was an agreement between Russia and Norway last year to fix their
maritime border in the Barents Sea, ending a decades-long dispute. The border area is probably rich in oil; both countries are now racing to get
exploration started. Another spur to Arctic co-operation is the high cost of operating in the region. This is behind the Arctic
Council’s first binding agreement, signed last year, to co-ordinate search-and-rescue efforts. Rival oil companies are also
working together, on scientific research and mapping as well as on formal joint ventures. The third reason for peace is equally
important: a strong reluctance among Arctic countries to give outsiders any excuse to intervene in the region’s affairs. An illustration is the stated willingness
of all concerned to settle their biggest potential dispute, over their maritime frontiers, according to the international Law of the Sea (LOS). Even the United
States accepts this, despite its dislike for treaties—though it has still not ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, an anomaly many of its
leaders are keen to end.
(Russia card) Unilateral action caues other countries to stop cooperating
Davis et al 11 (Darrin D. Davis¶ Lieutenant, United States Navy¶ B.A., University of New Mexico, 2006, Approved by: Anne L.
Clunan¶ Thesis Co-Advisor¶ Mikhail Tsypkin¶ Thesis Co-Advisor¶ Daniel Moran, PhD¶ Chair, Department of National Security
Affairs, ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY DISPUTES: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY IN THE HIGH NORTH)
As discussed in Chapter II, states are generally setting cooperation as a policy priority in the Arctic. However, regional military
cooperation has been limited. In the meantime, states are preparing to operate in the “new ocean.” The military certainly has a role in
the Arctic. However, as the thesis describes, the degree in which the region is ¶ 70¶ militarized (even in the absence of outright conflict)
shapes the Arctic in ways that realists predict. Russian Lieutenant General Vladimir Shamanov of the Ministry of Defense justified his
decision to create an Arctic Spetsnaz unit by citing U.S. exercises in Alaska in 2008, which involved 5,000 military personnel.163
This summer saw additional exercises and attention to the Arctic by the U.S. Navy. Acknowledging that unilateral military operations
may be sub-optimal is a natural outgrowth of this research. The military has a role to play, doing the expensive and dangerous
business of opening the Arctic frontier. However, an emphasis should be placed on operating in a multilateral military environment,
including annual international exercises to continue a cooperative spirit and to avoid unnecessary security competition. ¶ As we look
toward the future of the Arctic it is important to understand the fallibility of predictions.164 Even recent articles discussing the
“future” of the arctic with regard to shipping and resource exploration are rapidly becoming out of date. As of Summer 2011, Exxon
and Rosneft signed a deal to begin developing Arctic oil resources, the sea ice reached another near record minimum, and several
ships transited the northern sea route to from Murmansk to the far East. The future of the Arctic is here, now.
Unilateral action pushes relations over the brink (also a LOS solvency card)
Asia News 12 (News Agency, no author given, http://www.bakutoday.net/arctic-policy-between-the-united-statesand-russia-rivalry-and-cooperation.html, July 6, 2012 5:08 pm)
Contradictions (explicit and implicit) between Russia and the United States on Arctic exist on several fronts. Like many other States,
United States aspire to the status of the Northern sea route, passing along the Arctic coast of Russia, became international. In case of
realization of these plans, RUSSIA will lose significant income not only for the use of the route of other States, it is objectively raise
military-strategic vulnerability with North direction. ¶ Differently by Moscow and Washington are the leading regional organization,
the Arctic Council. If Russia is interested in expanding the powers of the Council, in 2009, the Directive expressly states that the
United States believed Council only forum for discussion and oppose giving it the status of an international organization, a gauntlet
that produces binding decisions.¶ On the other hand, the United States strongly supported the intensification of NATO in the Arctic,
effectively pushing out other international organizations (the Arctic Council and the Council of the Barents Euro-Arctic region where
the United States is not involved). When an existing relationship between NATO and Russia such moves will have negative
consequences for Russia, which has no reliable allies in the Arctic. ¶ Until the United States has not ratified the UN Convention on the
law of the sea, it remains possible aggravation of disputes with Russia on distinguishing lines in Arctic seas and on the edge of the
shelf. It should be remembered that the United States would belong to RUSSIA’s attempts to extend his shelf by Lomonosov Ridge
and Mendeleev-raising. In 2001, the Department of State under pressure at the UN Commission on the limits of the continental shelf,
his application was rejected. Russia has not ratified the Treaty with the United States on the boundary line in the Bering Sea.¶ But in
the United States and Russia have relations and the considerable potential for cooperation in the Arctic. Its foundation many experts
see a declaration signed by the “Arctic five ‘ in the town of Ilulissat in May 2008, which suggests that the legal basis for dividing lines
is recognized by the 1982 Convention on the law of the sea, and the parties intend to solve the problem through negotiations. In line
with the common aspiration of Barack Obama to reset relations with Russia and the President’s statements, the United States and the
Secretary of State’s intention to cooperate with Russia in the Arctic. However, most likely, cooperation should be expected only on
areas where the United States cannot do without Russian participation. ¶ In particular, this concerns the safety of marine and aviation
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operations in Arctic latitudes, as in May 2011, Member States of the Arctic Council, signed the agreement. Each of the signatories
undertook to create assets to ensure security in its segment and the rapid exchange of information. ¶ Planned large-scale cooperation in
the development of the Russian Arctic resources. The Russian company “Rosneft” and American Exxon-Mobil “in April 2012, signed
an agreement on cooperation in the exploration and development of oil and gas resources in the Kara Sea. ¶ Russia is attracting scarce
financial resources (capitalization of Exxon-Mobil-400 billion) and modern technologies for exploration and drilling in the northern
latitudes. Another joint project by Rosneft and the American company Conoco-Phillips “in Nenets autonomous district, where a
promising Ardalinskoe deposit and investment is expected to increase from the American side. ¶ Another area of cooperation is the
development of the Transantarctic routes for flights involving infrastructure development and maintenance, modernization and
construction of new airports in the territory of Russia. This segment is considered to be the fastest growing air travel market. ¶ Mutually
beneficial cooperation has been and remains the United States and Russia in the scientific research and environmental protection in the
Arctic. It is obvious that any decisions relating to the economic development of the far North must rely on scientific analysis of the
vulnerability of Northern nature and difficult weather, social, domestic and other conditions. In this respect Russia can offer the
icebreaker fleet and rich experience of Arctic expeditions. ¶ In military-political dimension in relations between Washington and
Moscow could strengthen the mutual confidence in the Arctic in the military and political fields. Such measures should include mutual
warning about plans to move military forces at fleets “sensitive” areas, limiting the military presence in the Arctic. ¶ At the moment it is
difficult to predict how the relationship United States and Russia in the Arctic. This will depend, first, on the overall mood in u.s.Russian relations that might change with the coming to power in the United States the Republicans. Secondly, the efficiency of the
Russian economic policy in the Arctic to attract foreign investment and technology. And there are already a number of positive steps.
Thirdly, whether the United States will remain at the current course predominantly unilateral actions in the region, or they will make a
choice in favour of multilateral cooperation.
Arctic conflict is more probable than any other scenario
Joyner (managing editor of the Atlantic Council) ‘9
(James Joyner, managing editor of the Atlantic Council, “Arctic Thaw Brings NATO Security Risks,”
http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/arctic-thaw-brings-nato-security-risks)
NATO leaders said yesterday that an Arctic thaw will create new security concerns for the Alliance — and they don't mean
"security" in a postmodern sense in which any concern is labeled one of security to help argue for increased funding. David
Stringer reports for AP: An Arctic thaw will open up sea routes and competition for lucrative energy reserves in a
multinational scramble sure to pose new security threats, NATO's chief said Thursday. NATO commanders and lawmakers
meeting in Iceland's capital said a military presence in the region will eventually be needed as standoffs between powerful
nations unfold. "I would be the last one to expect military conflict — but there will be a military presence," NATO
Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer told delegates. "It should be a military presence that is not overdone, and there is
a need for political cooperation and economic cooperation." The NATO chief said negotiations involving Russia, NATO
and other nations are the key to preventing a future conflict. De Hoop Scheffer is expected to meet Russian Deputy Prime
Minister Sergei Ivanov next week to discuss such issues. The opening up of Arctic sea routes once only navigable by
icebreakers threatens to complicate delicate relations between countries with competing claims to Arctic territory —
particularly as once inaccessible areas become ripe for exploration for oil and natural gas. The United States, Russia and
Canada are among the countries attempting to claim jurisdiction over Arctic territory alongside Nordic nations. Analysts
say China is also likely to join a rush to capture oil and gas trapped under the region's ice. "Several Arctic rim countries are
strengthening their capabilities, and military activity in the High North region has been steadily increasing," de Hoop
Scheffer said. Strategists expect territorial disputes to become increasingly aggressive as the world's energy demands
increase. "Climate change is not a fanciful idea, it is already a reality, a reality that brings with it certain new challenges,
including for NATO," said de Hoop Scheffer, acknowledging that an upsurge of energy exploration would likely require a
larger NATO presence in the Arctic. Some scientists predict that Arctic waters could be ice-free in summers by 2013,
decades earlier than previously thought. De Hoop Scheffer said trans-Arctic routes are likely to become an alternative to
passage through the Suez or Panama canals for commercial shipping. "The end of the Cold War resulted in a marked
reduction in military activity in the High North — Iceland would like it to stay that way," Iceland's outgoing Prime Minister
Geir Haarde told the conference. Haarde tendered his resignation Monday amid the country's economic crisis and said the
one-day conference was among his final duties before he steps down on Saturday. Lee Willett, head of the maritime studies
program at the Royal United Services Institute, a London-based military think tank, said that as routes open up, warships
from nations seeking to defend claims to possible energy resources are will follow. "Having lots of warships, from lots of
nations who have lots of competing claims on territory — that may lend itself to a rather tense situation," Willett said. "We
may see that flash points come to pass there more readily than elsewhere in the world." Russia and Canada have already
traded verbal shots over each other's intentions in the Arctic. Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper said he'll firm up
control of the disputed Northwest Passage, while Russian President Dmitry Medvedev seeks to lay claim to Arctic territory
equivalent to the size of France. This is not an issue that has gotten much attention, especially in national security circles,
where most of us focus on more traditional military concerns. It's something we'll be keeping a close eye on at the Atlantic
Council.
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This escalates to nuclear war
Wallace & Staples (Professor Emeritus of the University of British Columbia President of the Rideau Institute ) ‘ 10
(Michael Wallace, Professor Emeritus of the University of British Columbia; Steven Staples, President of the Rideau Institute;
“Ridding the Arctic of Nuclear Weapons: a task long overdue,” Canadian Pugwash Group, Rideau Institute, March 2010,
http://www.arcticsecurity.org/docs/arctic-nuclear-report-web.pdf)
The fact is, the Arctic is becoming a zone of increased military competition. Russian President Medvedev has announced
the creation of a special military force to defend Arctic claims. Last year Russian General Vladimir Shamanov declared that
Russian troops would step up training for Arctic combat, and that Russia’s submarine fleet would increase its “operational
radius.”55 Recently, two Russian attack submarines were spotted off the U.S. east coast for the first time in 15 years.56 In
January 2009, on the eve of Obama’s inauguration, President Bush issued a National Security Presidential Directive on
Arctic Regional Policy. It affirmed as a priority the preservation of U.S. mil7itary vessel and aircraft mobility and transit
throughout the Arctic, including the Northwest Passage, and foresaw greater capabilities to protect U.S. borders in the
Arctic.57 The Bush administration’s disastrous eight years in office, particularly its decision to withdraw from the ABM
treaty and deploy missile defence interceptors and a radar station in Eastern Europe, have greatly contributed to the
instability we are seeing today, even though the Obama administration has scaled back the planned deployments. The
Arctic has figured in this renewed interest in Cold War weapons systems, particularly the upgrading of the Thule Ballistic
Missile Early Warning System radar in Northern Greenland for ballistic missile defence. The Canadian government, as
well, has put forward new military capabilities to protect Canadian sovereignty claims in the Arctic, including proposed icecapable ships, a northern military training base and a deep-water port. Earlier this year Denmark released an all-party
defence position paper that suggests the country should create a dedicated Arctic military contingent that draws on army,
navy and air force assets with shipbased helicopters able to drop troops anywhere.58 Danish fighter planes would be tasked
to patrol Greenlandic airspace. Last year Norway chose to buy 48 Lockheed Martin F-35 fighter jets, partly because of their
suitability for Arctic patrols. In March, that country held a major Arctic military practice involving 7,000 soldiers from 13
countries in which a fictional country called Northland seized offshore oil rigs.59 The manoeuvres prompted a protest from
Russia – which objected again in June after Sweden held its largest northern military exercise since the end of the Second
World War. About 12,000 troops, 50 aircraft and several warships were involved.60 Jayantha Dhanapala, President of
Pugwash and former UN under-secretary for disarmament affairs, summarized the situation bluntlys. : “From those in the
international peace and security sector, deep concerns are being expressed over the fact that two nuclear weapon states – the
United States and the Russian Federation, which together own 95 per cent of the nuclear weapons in the world – converge
on the Arctic and have competing claim These claims, together with those of other allied NATO countries – Canada,
Denmark, Iceland, and Norway – could, if unresolved, lead to conflict escalating into the threat or use of nuclear
weapons.”61 Many will no doubt argue that this is excessively alarmist, but no circumstance in which nuclear powers find
themselves in military confrontation can be taken lightly. The current geo-political threat level is nebulous and low – for
now, according to Rob Huebert of the University of Calgary, “[the] issue is the uncertainty as Arctic states and non-Arctic
states begin to recognize the geo-political/economic significance of the Arctic because of climate change.” 62
1NC frontline
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Sqo no problem but gets solved anyways
Russia is making lanes now
Konovalov 12 (Alexei Konovalov, Candidate of Sciences, head of the World’s Ocean Center at the State Research Institution,
http://arctic.ru/expert-opinions/issues-and-prospects-expanded-arctic-transportation-network, 5/1/12)
It is common knowledge that the Arctic abounds in natural resources. However, Russia’s Arctic zone contains tremendous oil, gas
and other strategic mineral deposits, the most attractive export items. Apart from an immensely rich natural-resource base, Russia’s
location facilitating the active use of Arctic territories has paramount importance for the subsequent sustained development of
Russia and its Arctic zone. The underused potential generated by spatial factors implies Russia’s unique transportation and logistics
capabilities. Russia can become a competitive transit state with developed service option. Russia’s Arctic zone has an opportunity to
alter its foreign-trade specialization in the next 10-12 years, to discard its narrow specialization prioritizing hydrocarbons extraction,
reduce the commodity bias of its economy and eliminate many disproportions in its development. ¶ The realization of Russia’s
transportation potential through a system of international transport corridors passing through Russian territory and waters
but remaining under Russia’s jurisdiction, as well as its incorporation into the global network, may be-come a very promising
prospect. Today, a unique opportunity for the cost-effective use of the high-latitude Northern Transport Corridor, Russia’s
national trans-Arctic route that combines the Northern Sea Route (NSR) with river and railway lines is opening up.
Murmansk and Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, the route’s remotest trans-port hubs, are called on to load consignments aboard
ice-resistant vessels, to facilitate the maintenance of the icebreaker fleet and to support transit by means of feeder routes.
Moreover, it is becoming increasingly more efficient to establish reduced-scheduled routes for transpolar traffic, including air routes,
because these projects link the Earth’s Eastern and Western Hemispheres via the shortest routes, and to build a transcontinental route
which tunnels under the Bering Strait.¶ The Northern Sea Route possesses some obvious competitive advantages. Suffice it to compare
the length of the standard Yokohama–Hamburg run between the southern and northern routes. The NSR is free from high-seas
terrorism and piracy. Regardless of the technical difficulties of Arctic navigation, the NSR is the shortest geographical trajectory
linking Europe with the rapidly developing Asia-Pacific region and North America’s west coast. This route can handle transit
consignments and Russian exports now being delivered to South East Asia via the Suez Canal.
SQ solves your impacts – other actors fill in
Hobson 12 (Margaret Kriz Hobson, E&E reporter¶ EnergyWire: Wednesday, June 27, 2012,
http://www.eenews.net/public/energywire/2012/06/27/1)
Shell, which paid $2.1 billion in 2008 for leasing rights in the U.S. Arctic waters, is the first of several multinational oil companies
that have lined up to explore for oil and gas in the region. ConocoPhillips and Statoil are also planning to move into the region during
the next two years.¶ Canada, Norway, Russia and other Arctic nations are also encouraging oil and gas drilling off their northern
shores. Norway, where interest in Arctic energy drilling is booming, yesterday announced plans to award oil and gas exploration
permits next year in 72 blocks in the Barents Sea.¶ In Alaska, the sparsely populated northern communities will be dramatically
affected if Shell's exploration is successful, said Charles Ebinger, director of the Brookings Institution's Energy Security Initiative. ¶ "If
Shell finds the mother lode, you will see a stampede," he said. "And I'm not sure that's good." ¶ Yesterday, Salazar made it clear that
change is coming to the American Arctic. Speaking to reporters, Salazar said the government will soon release its five-year plan for
oil and gas that will allow leasing in the Beaufort Sea in 2017 and the Chukchi Sea in 2016. ¶ The U.S. Geological Survey estimates
that the Beaufort and Chukchi seas combined could hold as much as 27 billion barrels of oil and 132 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.¶
Oil development is only one facet of the changes coming to the Arctic, noted Alaska Sen. Mark Begich (D). "It's not just energy," he
said. "It's also transportation, the visitor industry, scientific research, military. Some are looking at the mineral potential. When you
put it all together, we see this a frontier that I think people underestimate." ¶ With global warming causing Arctic waters to remain icefree for longer stretches each summer, transportation companies plan to cut shipping costs by moving cargo through the Arctic Ocean.
Tourist boats are popping up in Barrow and other Native communities along Alaska's northern shores.
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Countries will fill in for lack of US capabilities
Bert 12 (Captain Melissa Bert, USCG, Military Fellow, U.S. Coast
Guard,http://www.institutenorth.org/assets/images/uploads/articles/A_Strategy_to_Advance_the_Arctic_Economy__Council_on_Foreign_Relations.pdf)
The United States needs to develop a comprehensive strategy for the Arctic. Melting sea ice is generating ¶ an emerging Arctic
economy. Nations bordering the Arctic are drilling for oil and gas, and mining, ¶ shipping, and cruising in the region. Russia, Canada,
and Norway are growing their icebreaker fleets and ¶ shore-based infrastructure to support these enterprises. For the United States, the
economic potential¶ from the energy and mineral resources is in the trillions of dollars—based upon estimates that the Alaskan¶ Arctic
is the home to 30 billion barrels of oil, more than 220 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, rare earth ¶ minerals, and massive renewable
wind, tidal, and geothermal energy. However, the U.S. government is¶ unprepared to harness the potential that the Arctic offers. The
United States lacks the capacity to deal with¶ potential regional conflicts and seaborne disasters, and it has been on the sidelines when
it comes to¶ developing new governance mechanisms for the Arctic. To advance U.S. economic and security interests¶ and avert
potential environmental and human disasters, the United States should ratify the UN Law of the ¶ Sea Convention (LOSC), take the
lead in developing mandatory international standards for operating in ¶ Arctic waters, and acquire icebreakers, aircraft, and
infrastructure for Arctic operations.
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Econ answers
No causal relationship between economic decline and war.
Ferguson 6 [Niall, MA, D.Phil., is Laurence A. Tisch Professor of History at Harvard University and William Ziegler Professor of
Business Administration at Harvard Business School. He is also a Senior Research Fellow at Jesus College, Oxford University, and a
Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Foreign Affairs, Sept/Oct, “The Next War of the World”]
Nor can economic crises explain the bloodshed. What may be the most familiar causal chain in modern historiography links
the Great Depression to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of World War II. But that simple story leaves too much out.
Nazi Germany started the war in Europe only after its economy had recovered. Not all the countries affected by the Great
Depression were taken over by fascist regimes, nor did all such regimes start wars of aggression. In fact, no general
relationship between economics and conflict is discernible for the century as a whole. Some wars came after periods of
growth, others were the causes rather than the consequences of economic catastrophe, and some severe economic crises
were not followed by wars.
Economic decline doesn’t cause war.
Jervis 11 [Robert, Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Politics in the Department of Political Science, and a Member of
the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. Force in Our Times Saltzman Working Paper
No. 15 July 2011 http://www.siwps.com/news.attachment/saltzmanworkingpaper15-842/SaltzmanWorkingPaper15.PDF]
Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise.
Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes?
45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be
a worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy,
and bring back old-fashioned beggar-thy-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that
the conflicts could be great enough to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so
much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were more
internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if the
more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see how without building on
a pre-existing high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could
prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that
people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does
not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very
fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution
shows that even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war thinkable.
Diplomacy solves escalation
Betsy Baker, Sept 14 2008 Visiting Associate Professor, Vermont Law School, teaching "The Arctic, the Law of the Sea and the
Environment" at VLS http://arctic-healy-baker-2008.blogspot.com/2008/09/conflict-in-arctic-tenacity-of-media.html
Other existing legal and diplomatic structures provide an imperfect but solid basis for Arctic states to resolve potential
disagreements. The Arctic Council is a cooperative forum for states and the Inuit Circumpolar Conference to address a range of
environmental and economic problems in the region. The Ilulissat (Greenland) Declaration, signed in May 2008, confirms the will of
the five coastal Arctic states – Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the United States – to strengthen existing cooperation based
on mutual trust and transparency. Treaties in force in the Arctic cover issues ranging from polar bear protection to pollution by
dumping from vessels to biological diversity. Activists and diplomats alike should be concerned and asking hard questions about
whether these agreements will be sufficient, or sufficiently enforced,to protect the Arctic, but to pretend that it is a lawless region up
for grabs ignores the facts.
States will seek multilateralism – solves your impacts
Betsy Baker, Sept 14 2008 Visiting Associate Professor, Vermont Law School, teaching "The Arctic, the Law of the Sea and the
Environment" at VLS http://arctic-healy-baker-2008.blogspot.com/2008/09/conflict-in-arctic-tenacity-of-media.html
The territorial disputes referenced in the NYT editorial are also resolved not by conflict but by diplomacy. In June 1990 Russia (then
still the Soviet Union) and the United States signed a brilliantly conceived single maritime boundary treaty that precludes the need to
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renegotiate the boundary once the extended continental shelf limits are determined. Canada’s recent announcement that it plans to
extend enforcement jurisdiction from 100 to 200 miles beyond its shores should raise concern. But it must also be viewed within the
context of the long-standing friendship and shared interests of the United States and Canada on such matters as environmental
protection, trade (ca. $1.5 billion daily) and common security. Their disagreement over the Northwest Passage has never flared out
of control and continues to be the subject of diplomatic attention.
International law solves
Betsy Baker, Sept 14 2008 Visiting Associate Professor, Vermont Law School, teaching "The Arctic, the Law of the Sea and the
Environment" at VLS http://arctic-healy-baker-2008.blogspot.com/2008/09/conflict-in-arctic-tenacity-of-media.html
Just hours after I returned, a week ago, from my trip to the Arctic Ocean, I was dismayed to open the New York Times and find on
its editorial page hyperbole verging on that which other media sources use to perpetuate the myth of "fierce disputes over territory
and natural resources" in the Arctic. ("Arctic in Retreat", September 8, 2008). As the sea-ice retreats, states are turning not to arms
but to existing legal structures and a tradition of scientific and and diplomatic cooperation to address common problems as well as
dis- agreements. Immediately after transporting our mapping crew to shore last week, The Healy turned right around and began
breaking ice for a Canadian icebreaker, the Louis Saint Laurent. This month-long joint mission to map parts of the Arctic Ocean
floor is scientific and diplomatic cooperation at its international best. Like the Russian mapping the NYT mentions in its editorial,
the US and Canada are gathering data in preparation not for conflict but for submission in a staid and stable legal process designed
to provide certainty for all states involved. The Law of the Sea Convention establishes this orderly mechanism of rigorous scientific
vetting for states seeking to extend their authority over larger portions of the continental shelf. The United States is the only Arctic
state not party to the Convention but is nonetheless mapping for its potential shelf extension in keeping with procedures agreed by
the international community.
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Research answers
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