UNCLASSIFIED
A System Dynamics model of the FM 3-24
COIN Manual
CAPT Brett Pierson
Warfighting Analysis Division
J8/WAD
1
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Assess the Full Range of Military Operations
• Warfighting analysis – assess proficiency
– Multiple scenarios
– Wide range of variables within scenarios
– Alternative CONOPs
– Alternative campaign objectives
– Force equivalencies/force substitution
– Multiple analytical models
• Other force structure requirements – assess sufficiency
– Day–to–day demands: Forward basing, forward presence, lesser
contingencies, homeland defense, theater security cooperation
– Peak demand of overlapping warfights
– Sustained surge demand of post-hostilities operations
– Force equivalencies/force substitution
• Analysis of Irregular Warfare challenges
2
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Analysis Framework
Tools
• Workgroups
• Mission Analysis
• Data
• Models
• Scenarios
• Metrics
• Wargaming
• Interagency partners
• Senior Leader reviews
Methodologies
• Intellectual approach
• Rationale
• Physical assumptions
Study Objective
• Philosophical assumptions
• Senior Leader insights
• Tank guidance
• SPG tasks
• Peer reviews
• Partner nations
3
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Comparison of Traditional and Non-Traditional Analysis
Conventional Campaigns
Non-Traditional Campaigns
System Dynamics, AgentBased Models, Wargames, ….
JICM, ITEM, Thunder, …
Characteristics
“Victory” clearly defined, quickly
understood, well-established
Metrics
Focused on Phase III Operations,
approved MSFDs (MCOs)
Scenarios
More than Phase III Operations, draft
vignettes, wargames for event list
Data
Perishable, culturally relevant, “soft”
aspects, questionable reliability, noJMEM equivalent
Physics based, authoritative
sources identified, JMEM
(historical, published, formatted)
DoD centric, generally accepted;
historic, repeatable validation
Physical warfight outcomes,
measurable and explainable
4
Interactively complex; global focus;
human, social, cognitive domain,
means integrate all elements of
National Power (DIME)
Structurally complex, limited
geographic focus, kinetic domain,
means are predominately Military
Many on-going efforts to define
“Victory” (JCS J5, SOCOM J3/J5)
Models
Expertise outside DoD; exploring nonDoD models; still in research mode;
structural validation, “useful/credible”
Results
Identify “High Leverage” areas and
trends; insights on capabilities
“backed-out” and often not DoD
4
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Analysis in Irregular Warfare
Triangulation Search in the Physical World
Sensor 1
Uncertainty Space in the Analytic World
Sensor 2
SME and
Theory Experts
Sensor 3
Historic Analogy
Analytic
Models and
Wargames
Uncertain distance with known error
Uncertain error with known distance
Efforts to refine the solution risk missing a fleeting opportunity to attack
5
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Why System Dynamics Modeling?
• Characteristics of systems problems include:
– Dynamic—changes over time and inherent system delays
– Tendency to overshoot and crash or oscillate
– Frequent over-reactions that drive exponential growth in costs
– Multiple players, diverse interests
– Interdependencies across borders and across disciplines
– Proposed solutions that appear simple and are usually wrong
– Very difficult to communicate!
• System Dynamics Modeling can add value in several areas. It
provides a platform for…
– Effectively framing issues and problems.
– Representing the essence of the interdependencies that underlie system
performance; minimize policy resistance
– Reliably inferring the dynamics associated with a set of initiatives
– Communicating—creating a single “sheet of music” to play
Excerpts from “An Introduction to Dynamic Modeling with STELLA & iThink” Workshop
6
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
System Dynamics Disclaimer
• Various software and consultants being used within DOD
– STELLA / iTHINK – modeling software
– VENSIM – modeling software
– PA Consulting / Boeing / VMASC / MIT – consultants using a mix of
commercial and proprietary software to develop SD solutions
Excerpts from “An Introduction to Dynamic Modeling with STELLA & iThink” Workshop
7
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
System Dynamics Software
• STELLA / iTHINK – isee systems – Barry Richmond
• Language of stocks and flows, graphics user interface
• Innovator in application to social systems – “STELLA in the
classroom” to study Hamlet in High School
8
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Building a Simple STELLA Model
Savings account
• Stock – savings
• Flows in – deposits and interest
• Flows out – withdrawals
• Simulation – what is the effect of various interest rates? How about deposits and
withdrawals? Where is my leverage?
Most of the things that concern people are entities that accumulate
or dissipate over time – and we are concerned with trends. Unlike
the simple example above, most don’t have a closed-form solution
9
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Using a STELLA-Based Presentation
• Begin with a cause and effect relationship diagram
• Expand into a model structure that captures all elements and
assigns assumptions about relationships
• “Troubleshoot” model structure and validate against some sort of
truth data…historical data, research, or in this case doctrinal
theory
10
UNCLASSIFIED
Potential
Fractiousness
of Society
Support for
Insurgency
Neutral
Populace
COIN operations must accomplish three tasks
simultaneously:
• Influence insurgent-minded individuals to adopt a neutral
disposition.
• Influence neutral-minded individuals to adopt a
supportive disposition.
• Retain supportive individuals.
These operations are conducted in an environment where
tensions and hostilities between groups may destabilize a
society and provide opportunities for insurgents
• This environment may suggest courses of action aimed
at reinforcing or widening seams
Support for HN
Government
• An increase in Coalition funding will influence
economic investment and development.
Coalition
Funding
• A strengthened economy will influence movement
from the insurgent- and neutral-minded groups
toward the supportive group.
Economic
Investment
Potential
Fractiousness
of Society
Support for
Insurgency
Economic
Development
Neutral
Populace
Support for HN
Government
Developing and
Restoring Essential
Services
Breakdown of
Essential Services
Essential
Services
Time to Develop
Essential Services
Coalition
Funding
Satisfaction with
Essential Services
Economic
Investment
Expectations for
Essential Services
Potential
Fractiousness
of Society
Support for
Insurgency
• An increase in Coalition funding will significantly
impact the restoration of essential services.
• Improvements in the provision of essential services
will influence movement from the insurgent- and
neutral-minded groups toward the supportive
group.
Economic
Development
Neutral
Populace
Support for HN
Government
Developing and
Restoring Essential
Services
Breakdown of
Essential Services
Time to Develop
Governance
Psychological
Operations
Effectiveness
Governance
Potential
Fractiousness
of Society
Support for
Insurgency
Economic
Development
Neutral
Populace
Support for HN
Government
Available
Workforce
Perceived
Security
External Material
Support
A government that is established, recognized, and
that maintains a secure environment is in a position to
• Send a positive, credible message of success to
the populace.
• Provide an environment that enhances stable
employment of the workforce.
• Persuade insurgents and neutrals to consider
becoming supporters.
Coalition
Funding
Economic
Investment
Expectations for
Essential Services
Essential
Services
Time to Develop
Essential Services
Satisfaction with
Essential Services
Insurgent Acts of
Violence
Developing and
Restoring Essential
Services
Breakdown of
Essential Services
Expectations
for
• The restoration
of essential services.
Essential Services
Governance
• The populace’s perception
of security.
Essential
Services
Time to Develop
Essential Services
Coalition
An appropriate
Satisfactionforce
with mix, and correct operational
Funding
Time to Develop
tempo,Essential
timing,Services
and synchronization
will
have
very
Governance
significant impacts on
Psychological
Operations
Effectiveness
• The
Government’s and COIN forces’ credibility in
Potential
their communications efforts with the populace. Economic
Fractiousness
Support for
Insurgency
Impact of
Illegitimate Actions
Appropriate Mix of
Effort and Use of Force
Individual Competence,
Judgment, and Ability
to Execute
Appropriate
Strategic Emphasis
Insurgent to Force
Density Ratio
Understanding and
Knowledge of Social
Structures
Economic
Investment
of Society
Development
Neutral
Populace
Support for HN
Government
Available
Workforce
Perceived
Security
External Material
Support
Insurgent Acts of
Violence
Total Force
Density
Coalition Force
Density
Intelligence
Time to Develop HN
Security Forces
Host Nation
Security Forces
Host Nation
Force Density
Developing and
Restoring Essential
Services
Satisfaction with
Essential Services
Breakdown of
Essential Services
Time to Develop
Essential Services
Psychological
Operations
Effectiveness
Appropriate Mix of
Effort and Use of Force
Individual Competence,
Judgment, and Ability
to Execute
Appropriate
Strategic Emphasis
Insurgent to Force
Density Ratio
Economic
Investment
Understanding and
Knowledge of Social
Structures
Governance
Potential
Fractiousness
of Society
Support for
Insurgency
Impact of
Illegitimate Actions
Time to Develop
Governance
Expectations for
Essential Services
Essential
Services
Coalition
Funding
Economic
Development
Neutral
Populace
Support for HN
Government
Available
Workforce
Perceived
Security
External Material
Support
Insurgent Acts of
Violence
Total Force
Density
Coalition Force
Density
Intelligence
Time to Develop HN
Security Forces
Host Nation
Security Forces
Host Nation
Force Density
Developing and
Restoring Essential
Services
Satisfaction with
Essential Services
Breakdown of
Essential Services
Time to Develop
Essential Services
Psychological
Operations
Effectiveness
Appropriate Mix of
Effort and Use of Force
Individual Competence,
Judgment, and Ability
to Execute
Governance
Economic
Development
Neutral
Populace
Support for HN
Government
Available
Workforce
Perceived
Security
External Material
Support
Insurgent Acts of
Violence
Appropriate
Strategic Emphasis
Insurgent to Force
Density Ratio
Economic
Investment
Potential
Fractiousness
of Society
Support for
Insurgency
Impact of
Illegitimate Actions
Time to Develop
Governance
Expectations for
Essential Services
Essential
Services
Coalition
Funding
Total Force
Density
Understanding and
Knowledge of Social
Structures
Coalition Force
Density
The Logical Lines of Operations from FM 3-24
Intelligence
Time to Develop HN
Security Forces
Host Nation
Security Forces
Host Nation
Force Density
Developing and
Restoring Essential
Services
Satisfaction with
Essential Services
Breakdown of
Essential Services
Time to Develop
Essential Services
Psychological
Operations
Effectiveness
Appropriate Mix of
Effort and Use of Force
Individual Competence,
Judgment, and Ability
to Execute
Appropriate
Strategic Emphasis
Insurgent to Force
Density Ratio
Economic
Investment
Understanding and
Knowledge of Social
Structures
Governance
Potential
Fractiousness
of Society
Support for
Insurgency
Impact of
Illegitimate Actions
Time to Develop
Governance
Expectations for
Essential Services
Essential
Services
Economic
Development
Neutral
Populace
Support for HN
Government
Available
Workforce
Perceived
Security
External Material
Support
Insurgent Acts of
Violence
Total Force
Density
Coalition Force
Density
The Basic Information Ops Loop
Coalition
Funding
Intelligence
Time to Develop HN
Security Forces
Host Nation
Security Forces
Host Nation
Force Density
Developing and
Restoring Essential
Services
Satisfaction with
Essential Services
Breakdown of
Essential Services
Time to Develop
Essential Services
Psychological
Operations
Effectiveness
Appropriate Mix of
Effort and Use of Force
Individual Competence,
Judgment, and Ability
to Execute
Appropriate
Strategic Emphasis
Insurgent to Force
Density Ratio
Economic
Investment
Governance
Potential
Fractiousness
of Society
Support for
Insurgency
Impact of
Illegitimate Actions
Time to Develop
Governance
Expectations for
Essential Services
Essential
Services
Coalition
Funding
Understanding and
Knowledge of Social
Structures
Economic
Development
Neutral
Populace
Available
Workforce
Perceived
Security
External Material
Support
Insurgent Acts of
Violence
Total Force
Density
Coalition Force
Density
The Comprehensive Information Loop
Support for HN
Government
Intelligence
Time to Develop HN
Security Forces
Host Nation
Security Forces
Host Nation
Force Density
Developing and
Restoring Essential
Services
Satisfaction with
Essential Services
Breakdown of
Essential Services
Time to Develop
Essential Services
Psychological
Operations
Effectiveness
Appropriate Mix of
Effort and Use of Force
Individual Competence,
Judgment, and Ability
to Execute
Appropriate
Strategic Emphasis
Insurgent to Force
Density Ratio
Economic
Investment
Governance
Potential
Fractiousness
of Society
Support for
Insurgency
Impact of
Illegitimate Actions
Time to Develop
Governance
Expectations for
Essential Services
Essential
Services
Coalition
Funding
Understanding and
Knowledge of Social
Structures
Economic
Development
Neutral
Populace
Available
Workforce
Perceived
Security
External Material
Support
Insurgent Acts of
Violence
Total Force
Density
Coalition Force
Density
The Comprehensive Information Loop
Support for HN
Government
Intelligence
Time to Develop HN
Security Forces
Host Nation
Security Forces
Host Nation
Force Density
Developing and
Restoring Essential
Services
Satisfaction with
Essential Services
Breakdown of
Essential Services
Time to Develop
Essential Services
Psychological
Operations
Effectiveness
Appropriate Mix of
Effort and Use of Force
Individual Competence,
Judgment, and Ability
to Execute
Appropriate
Strategic Emphasis
Insurgent to Force
Density Ratio
Economic
Investment
Governance
Potential
Fractiousness
of Society
Support for
Insurgency
Impact of
Illegitimate Actions
Time to Develop
Governance
Expectations for
Essential Services
Essential
Services
Coalition
Funding
Understanding and
Knowledge of Social
Structures
Economic
Development
Neutral
Populace
Available
Workforce
Perceived
Security
External Material
Support
Insurgent Acts of
Violence
Total Force
Density
Coalition Force
Density
The Comprehensive Information Loop
Support for HN
Government
Intelligence
Time to Develop HN
Security Forces
Host Nation
Security Forces
Host Nation
Force Density
Developing and
Restoring Essential
Services
Satisfaction with
Essential Services
Breakdown of
Essential Services
Time to Develop
Essential Services
Psychological
Operations
Effectiveness
Appropriate Mix of
Effort and Use of Force
Individual Competence,
Judgment, and Ability
to Execute
Appropriate
Strategic Emphasis
Insurgent to Force
Density Ratio
Economic
Investment
Governance
Potential
Fractiousness
of Society
Support for
Insurgency
Impact of
Illegitimate Actions
Time to Develop
Governance
Expectations for
Essential Services
Essential
Services
Coalition
Funding
Understanding and
Knowledge of Social
Structures
Economic
Development
Neutral
Populace
Available
Workforce
Perceived
Security
External Material
Support
Insurgent Acts of
Violence
Total Force
Density
Coalition Force
Density
The Comprehensive Information Loop
Support for HN
Government
Intelligence
Time to Develop HN
Security Forces
Host Nation
Security Forces
Host Nation
Force Density
Developing and
Restoring Essential
Services
Satisfaction with
Essential Services
Breakdown of
Essential Services
Time to Develop
Essential Services
Psychological
Operations
Effectiveness
Appropriate Mix of
Effort and Use of Force
Individual Competence,
Judgment, and Ability
to Execute
Appropriate
Strategic Emphasis
Insurgent to Force
Density Ratio
Economic
Investment
Governance
Potential
Fractiousness
of Society
Support for
Insurgency
Impact of
Illegitimate Actions
Time to Develop
Governance
Expectations for
Essential Services
Essential
Services
Coalition
Funding
Understanding and
Knowledge of Social
Structures
Economic
Development
Neutral
Populace
Available
Workforce
Perceived
Security
External Material
Support
Insurgent Acts of
Violence
Total Force
Density
Coalition Force
Density
The Comprehensive Information Loop
Support for HN
Government
Intelligence
Time to Develop HN
Security Forces
Host Nation
Security Forces
Host Nation
Force Density
Developing and
Restoring Essential
Services
Satisfaction with
Essential Services
Breakdown of
Essential Services
Time to Develop
Essential Services
Psychological
Operations
Effectiveness
Appropriate Mix of
Effort and Use of Force
Individual Competence,
Judgment, and Ability
to Execute
Appropriate
Strategic Emphasis
Insurgent to Force
Density Ratio
Economic
Investment
Governance
Potential
Fractiousness
of Society
Support for
Insurgency
Impact of
Illegitimate Actions
Time to Develop
Governance
Expectations for
Essential Services
Essential
Services
Coalition
Funding
Understanding and
Knowledge of Social
Structures
Economic
Development
Neutral
Populace
Available
Workforce
Perceived
Security
External Material
Support
Insurgent Acts of
Violence
Total Force
Density
Coalition Force
Density
The Comprehensive Information Loop
Support for HN
Government
Intelligence
Time to Develop HN
Security Forces
Host Nation
Security Forces
Host Nation
Force Density
Developing and
Restoring Essential
Services
Satisfaction with
Essential Services
Breakdown of
Essential Services
Time to Develop
Essential Services
Psychological
Operations
Effectiveness
Appropriate Mix of
Effort and Use of Force
Individual Competence,
Judgment, and Ability
to Execute
Governance
Economic
Development
Neutral
Populace
Support for HN
Government
Available
Workforce
Perceived
Security
External Material
Support
Insurgent Acts of
Violence
Appropriate
Strategic Emphasis
Insurgent to Force
Density Ratio
Economic
Investment
Potential
Fractiousness
of Society
Support for
Insurgency
Impact of
Illegitimate Actions
Time to Develop
Governance
Expectations for
Essential Services
Essential
Services
Coalition
Funding
Total Force
Density
Understanding and
Knowledge of Social
Structures
Coalition Force
Density
The Logical Lines of Operations from FM 3-24
Intelligence
Time to Develop HN
Security Forces
Host Nation
Security Forces
Host Nation
Force Density
UNCLASSIFIED
26
The STELLA Model - Interfaces
26
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
The STELLA Model - Structure
Population
Essential Services
Governance
Host Nation
Security Forces
Economic
Development
Security
27
27
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
The STELLA Model
Support for
Insurgency
28
Neutral
Populace
28
Support for HN
Government
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Using the Model in Analysis
COA Option – Adjust Mix of Effort and use of Force to focus totally on security
– Technology-driven and reactive cost imposing strategy
– Ignores FM 3-24 recommended effort on non-security LLOs
1: Support f or Gov ernment
1:
2:
3:
1:
2:
3:
2: Support f or Insurgency
1: Support f or Gov ernment
3: Neutral
1:
2:
3:
100
50
1:
2:
3:
1
3
2: Support f or Insurgency
50
3
2
3
2
3
1
3
2
2
3: Neutral
100
2
1
1
1
3
1
2
1:
2:
3:
1:
2:
3:
0
1.00
Page 1
31.00
61.00
Months
91.00
0
1.00
121.00
Page 1
2:35 PM Wed, Oct 24, 2007
31.00
61.00
Months
91.00
121.00
4:31 PM Wed, Oct 24, 2007
Untitled
Untitled
Appropriate mix of effort set to a balanced
focus on all Logical Lines of Operation
All effort focused on Perceived Security and
Host Nation Security Forces, others zero
Waiting to start on the Non-Security LLOs until Security is established is an inherently
flawed and self defeating strategy. The LLOs are too interdependent.
29
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Optimizing a Solution
1: Support f or Gov ernment
1:
2:
3:
1:
2:
3:
2: Support f or Insurgency
3: Neutral
100
1
50
3
3
1
3
1
2
2
2
1:
2:
3:
0
1.00
31.00
61.00
Page 1
Months
91.00
121.00
7:49 AM Tue, Oct 30, 2007
Untitled
with balanced
of effort on LLOs
“One of the mostResults
important
lessons inmix
Afghanistan
and incombined
Iraq is that military
with slightOur
reduction
External
anddevelopment,
success is not sufficient.
effortsinmust
alsoMaterial
addressSupport
economic
slightthe
reduction
Potential
Fractiousness
Society
institution building,
rule ofinlaw,
promoting
internalofreconciliation,
good or at
least decent governance, public services, training and equipping indigenous
security forces, effective, strategic communications, and more.”
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, 29 January 2008
30
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Coalition Input – Optimized 3-24 case
Manning and Funding held sufficient through the entire period
A sustainable peace – we remain involved and remain invested as intervener
31
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Coalition Input – Kilcullen case
Manning and Funding get ramped down as Host Nation capacity increases
A durable peace – one left to thrive as a better version of itself with less cost to us
32
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Coalition Input – Ramped up effort case
Manning and Funding get ramped up as needed to face crises
No peace – mired in strife at the same cost to us as Kilcullen case over the period
33
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Coalition Input – the long slow grind
Eventually the corner is turned – assuming no return to major hostilities
Requires persistent sufficient investment many times longer despite greater losses
34
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Is It Working?
“..in this agrarian area where date
palms outnumber buildings…”
(Knowledge and Understanding of
Social Structure)
“..four IED attacks…”
(Insurgent Acts of Violence)
“…he will renew the
contracts…”
(Economic Development)
“…is distrustful of the
government…”
(Psychological Operations
Effectiveness)
“…concerned citizens are
being paid…”
(Economic Development)
(Governance)
“...they will become members of
the Iraq security Forces.”
(Host Nation Security Force
Development)
“They are making their
community safe”
(Perceived Security)
“..it is a security program, not
an attempt to create armed
militias…”
(Perceived Security)
“…install security among all
tribes, not just Sunni…”
(Potential Fractiousness)
“…political infighting…”
(Governance)
“…counter false perceptions…”
(Psychological Operations
Effectiveness)
“…the money they receive…”
(Economic Development)
Christian Science Monitor – October 2nd 2007: “Violence dropped dramatically”
Credit for success is given to efforts that directly map to FM 3-24
35
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Contextual Mapping
Perceived Security
Desired Outcome 3: xxx.xxxx
Metric(s)
Bella
Overall Status
Significant Activities
Status/Trend
Large gray SUV with a great
Governance
number of ameneties
Desired Outcome 3:Brand
xxx.xxxx
Overall
new Ducati that goes
veryStatus
Anna
fastActivities
Metric(s)
Significant
Status/Trend
Old 1974 Camaro that has been
Large
gray
Old
White
Dog SUV with a great
Essential
Services
Bella
around for a number of years
number of ameneties
A very nice Harley Davidson
Desired OutcomeOld
3:Brand
xxx.xxxx
Overall
veryStatus
Bluenew Ducati that goes
Anna
that I bought from my Dad
fast
Metric(s)
Significant Activities
Status/Trend
Old
1974
Camaro that has been
Large
gray
with
a great
Old
White
Dog SUVForces
Security
BellaHost Nation
around for a number of years
number of ameneties
A very nice Harley Davidson
Desired OutcomeOld
3:Brand
xxx.xxxx
Overall
veryStatus
Bluenew Ducati that goes
Anna
that I bought from my Dad
fastActivities
Metric(s)
Significant
Status/Trend
Old 1974 Camaro that has been
Large
gray
Old
White
Dog SUV with a great
Development
Bella Economic
around for a number of years
number of ameneties
A very niceOverall
Harley
Davidson
Desired OutcomeOld
3:Brand
xxx.xxxx
veryStatus
Bluenew Ducati that goes
Anna
that I bought from my Dad
fast
Metric(s)
Significant Activities
Status/Trend
Old
1974
Camaro that has been
Large
gray
SUV
with
a great
Old
White
Dog
Bella
around for a number of years
number of ameneties
A very nice Harley Davidson
Brand
Old
Bluenew Ducati that goes very
Anna
that I bought from my Dad
fast
Old White Dog
Old Blue
Contextual Mapping helps metrics
point towards the appropriate LLOs
Old 1974 Camaro that has been
around for a number of years
A very nice Harley Davidson
that I bought from my Dad
What can you say about these except
“I hope they start getting greener”
To be useful, metrics need a contextual mapping, which infers a framework
36
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Campaign Design
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500
“Commander’s Appreciation and
Campaign Design”
• Commander’s Appreciation
– Need to develop a shared understanding of
complex operational problems
– Structured problem framing (and re-framing!)
• Problem structure
– well structured (structurally complex, linear):
professionals agree on how to proceed –
apply the Science of War
– ill-structured (interactively complex, nonlinear): professionals disagree on how to
solve this problem – apply the Art of War
Topic of Army ‘Stand-To’ e-newsletter, 1 Feb 2008
To access TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500 go to: http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pamndx.htm
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A System Dynamics View of Campaign Design
Commander's Appreciation
and Campaign Design
Understanding is not a matter of
capturing reality sufficiently correctly,
[it is a matter of] constructing an
interpretation that is sufficiently
useful in dealing with reality
Art of War
Link near-term
actions to the
strategic aim of the
campaign
Intuition and Genius
(harmonious combination of
courage, powers of intellect,
and strength of will)
Gap in "State of Affairs"
between what is and what
ought to be
Concern to lessen or a
Military Action to achieve
an end state
Campaign plans at each
level should nest in the
same way that tactical
orders do
Operational Art
Complex Operational
Problem (unstructured
problem)
Reframing as
understanding expands
Detailed series of executable
missions that directly affect allies,
adversaries, and the environment
Operational Problem
(well or medium
structured)
linear phenomena
that can be controlled
professional soldiers
can agree
professional consensus
and authoritatively
prescribed in doctrine
Agreement on a
Shared Starting
Hypothesis
doctrine, training, and
leader development
1) Seeks to explain the qualitative
relationships embedded within
complex problems
2) Arranges operations is space
and time and identifies
capabilities and resources
Giving a Complex
Problem enough structure
so that further planning
can lead to useful action
Simultaneously building and
understanding of the problem
through the creation of a
conceptual solution or design
Commander's Appreciation
Operational
Design
An iterative process that integrates ends, ways,
and means across the levels of war
Resolving the natural tension
between the formulation of
strategy and the planning for
its implementation
Problem framing—and its military use
during a campaign
Mutually respectful
competition of opposing ideas
(candid and free)
Analysis of the Mission
(breaking it down into specified,
implied, and essential tasks)
1
2
Action(s) to be
Taken
Detailed plan for
action (blueprint)
Operational
Engineering
Science of War
easy to control through technical
reduction and a systematic
method-based solution
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A Framework for Success
Three Completely Different entities – The DoD; The USIP; and Dr. Paul Collier,
an Oxford Economist with a lifetime of working aid issues in Africa
Safe and Secure Environment
Security
Rule of Law
Laws and Charters
Stable Democracy
Trade
Sustainable Economy
Aid
Social Well Being
Security
Host Nation Security Force Development
Governance
Economic Development
Essential Services
Since these disparate groups can agree on the problem statement and solution path,
how are we in the USG working together to operationalize the answer?
39
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The STELLA Model – Demo/Questions
“Success will be less a matter of imposing one’s will and more a function of
shapingwill
behavior
friends,ofadversaries,
and will
mostand
importantly,
the of
“Success
be less of
a matter
imposing one’s
more a function
people in
between.”
shaping
behavior
of friends, adversaries, and most importantly, the
people
in between.”
Secretary
of Defense Robert Gates, 10 October 2007
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, 10 October 2007
“You don't kill or capture your way out of an industrial strength
insurgency.”
Gen. David Petraeus, 14 September 2008
Support for
Insurgency
40
Neutral
Populace
40
Support for HN
Government
UNCLASSIFIED