SCFI 08-09
Recruitment DA
Scholars
1
Vaccupied: The Poor Soldiers
Read Me .......................................................................................................................................................................... 2
1NC ................................................................................................................................................................................. 3
1NC ................................................................................................................................................................................. 4
Uniqueness ...................................................................................................................................................................... 5
Uniqueness ...................................................................................................................................................................... 6
Uniqueness ...................................................................................................................................................................... 7
Links: Recruitment ........................................................................................................................................................... 8
Links: Recruitment ........................................................................................................................................................... 9
Links: Social Services .................................................................................................................................................... 10
Links: Marriage Promotion ............................................................................................................................................. 11
Internal Links – Readiness............................................................................................................................................. 12
A/T Troop Quality........................................................................................................................................................... 13
Aff: Non-Unique ............................................................................................................................................................. 14
Aff: Non-unique .............................................................................................................................................................. 15
Aff: Recruitment Inevitable ............................................................................................................................................. 16
Aff: Empirically Denied ................................................................................................................................................... 17
Aff: No Link .................................................................................................................................................................... 18
Aff: No Link .................................................................................................................................................................... 19
Aff: A/T Readiness I/L .................................................................................................................................................... 20
Aff: A/T Readiness I/L .................................................................................................................................................... 21
SCFI 08-09
Recruitment DA
Scholars
2
Read Me
This disad is just a poverty good impact turn, therefore best against affs that claim to solve poverty. There are
some cards in the link section for use against affs that don’t claim to solve poverty in the 1AC but would
increase provision of social services.
The impact debate is not in this file at all – The military tradeoff file, education aff, and Anelia Special contain
all hege good/bad arguments you need. There’s not even an impact in the shell, to avoid repetition. So look
through your files and get your impact work ready!
SCFI 08-09
Recruitment DA
Scholars
3
1NC
A. Recruitment is high now because of the recession.
Daniel Carson, staff writer, The News Herald 07/13/2009 MILITARY RECRUITING: A BAD ECONOMY
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nfh&AN=2W62540908897&site=ehost-live
During this recession, more recruits are citing the ailing economy as a reason to enlist in the Air Force or other military branches, with
recruiters such as Scott hearing more stories of people affected by the stagnant economy in recent months. "If they need a job, we have a
job," Scott said, as he sat behind the desk at the Army's 23rd Street office. Scott said he has worked in the Air Force's Panama City recruiting
office since January. While most of his applicants are in the 17-19 age range, he is seeing more men and women in their 20s who were laid off
or want a more stable income. Applicants' individual economic struggles often come up during conversation, he said. "If their reason for
coming in here is the economy, that's how we'll go with it," Scott said. Bay County's unemployment rate peaked at 10 percent in January 2009,
with the county recording an 8.6 percent unemployment rate in May. Florida produced a seasonally adjusted May unemployment rate of 10.2
percent, the highest jobless level recorded in Florida since October 1975. Sgt. Galen Waddell of the U.S. Army's Panama City recruiting
station said he and his station commander have also increasingly heard from more potential recruits about the down economy and lack of area
job opportunities. "The economy is running them into our door," Waddell said. Waddell has worked at the Army's Panama City office since
November 2008.
B. Ongoing poverty is key to sustained military recruitment efforts.
Tyson 05 (“Youths in Rural U.S. Are Drawn To Military Recruits' Job Worries Outweigh War Fears” By Ann
Scott Tyson, Washington Post Staff Writer Friday, November 4, 2005; http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/11/03/AR2005110302528.html.)
As sustained combat in Iraq makes it harder than ever to fill the ranks of the all-volunteer force, newly released Pentagon
demographic data show that the military is leaning heavily for recruits on economically depressed, rural areas where youths'
need for jobs may outweigh the risks of going to war. More than 44 percent of U.S. military recruits come from rural areas,
Pentagon figures show. In contrast, 14 percent come from major cities. Youths living in the most sparsely populated Zip codes
are 22 percent more likely to join the Army, with an opposite trend in cities. Regionally, most enlistees come from the South (40
percent) and West (24 percent). Many of today's recruits are financially strapped, with nearly half coming from lower-middleclass to poor households, according to new Pentagon data based on Zip codes and census estimates of mean household income.
Nearly two-thirds of Army recruits in 2004 came from counties in which median household income is below the U.S. median.
Such patterns are pronounced in such counties as Martinsville, Va., that supply the greatest number of enlistees in proportion to
their youth populations. All of the Army's top 20 counties for recruiting had lower-than-national median incomes, 12 had higher
poverty rates, and 16 were non-metropolitan, according to the National Priorities Project, a nonpartisan research group that
analyzed 2004 recruiting data by Zip code. "A lot of the high recruitment rates are in areas where there is not as much
economic opportunity for young people," said Anita Dancs, research director for the NPP, based in Northampton, Mass. Senior Pentagon officials
say the war has had a clear impact on recruiting, with a shrinking pool of candidates forcing the military to accept less qualified enlistees -- and presumably
many for whom military service is a choice of last resort. In fiscal 2005, the Army took in its least qualified group of recruits in a decade, as measured by
educational level and test results. The war is also attracting youths driven by patriotism, including a growing fringe of the upper class and wealthy, but military
sociologists believe that greater numbers of young people who would have joined for economic reasons are being discouraged by the prolonged combat. The
Pentagon Zip code data, applied for the first time to 2004 recruiting results, underscores patterns already suggested by anecdotal
evidence, such as analysis of the home towns of troops killed in Iraq. Although still an approximation, the data offer a more
detailed portrait of the socioeconomic status of the Americans most likely to serve today.
SCFI 08-09
Recruitment DA
Scholars
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1NC
C. Internal link – recruitment key to military readiness.
Frances C. Martin, Lt Col, USAF, April 1998, UNCOMPETITIVE MILITARY COMPENSATION ADVERSELY
AFFECTS READINESS, AIR WAR COLLEGE AIR UNIVERSITY
Military strength is measured by more than hardware and weapon systems. It is measured by people and their ability to accomplish the
mission. A strong defense needs enough people with the right skills. Therefore, we need to ensure that we retain the right people in the right
jobs to sustain credible readiness. Quality of life, although intangible and difficult to measure, certainly is a factor in military members’
decisions to “stay or go”. Loss of talent and experience adversely impacts the military’s ability to accomplish the Nation’s defense and security
objectives—at home or abroad.
D. Readiness is the most important factor for US hegemony.
Perry ’96 (William Perry is a former secretary of defense, “Annual Defense Report”, chapter 4:readiness,
http://www.dod.mil/execsec/adr96/chapt_4.html)
U.S. forces are organized and trained to support the National Security Strategy. Ready forces are vital to maintaining America's leadership in
world affairs. U.S. forces must be manned, equipped, and trained to deal with diverse and challenging threats to U.S. national security. They
must be prepared for, and on occasion must engage in, operations that support the full spectrum of national interests: Fight and win the
nation's wars -- the foremost responsibility that governs all U.S. military activities and stands as the ultimate guarantor of U.S. vital national
interests. This commitment is manifested in the ability of U.S. forces to decisively fight and win two nearly simultaneous major regional
conflicts (MRCs). Deter aggression and prevent conflict -- deploy and support combat forces, ranging from strategic nuclear deterrence to
overseas presence missions where the costs and risks of engagement are commensurate with the U.S. interests at stake, most importantly to
convince potential adversaries that their objectives will be denied and that their aggression will be decisively defeated. Peacetime
engagements -- participate in activities to enhance regional stability, alleviate human suffering, improve coalition military capabilities, and
promote democratic ideals.
E. [[ hege is good impact ]]
SCFI 08-09
Recruitment DA
Scholars
5
Uniqueness
The fallen economy has increased military recruits past quotas
Christina E. Sanchez and Nicole Young ,THE TENNESSEAN staff, July 8, 2009, Economy boosts military
recruiting,
http://www.tennessean.com/article/20090708/NEWS01/907080395/1006/Economy+boosts+military+recruiting
Military recruiters are seeing a lot of Sextons walk into their offices, people looking for stable jobs and paychecks that cannot be found in other
industries because of the economy. "My business dropped way off," said Sexton, who will enter basic training Aug. 19 at Fort Knox, Ky. "My
desire took a back seat to providing for my family. My wife suggested I join, but the economy contributed to my decision." The average
recruiting age remains about 21 years old, but the pool of candidates has become more diverse: mother-daughter teams, new college
graduates, lawyers, small-business owners, scientists, among others. Many have college diplomas; some hold master's and doctoral degrees.
"We're seeing a nice mix of recent college graduates affected by the economy who can't find a job, and career switchers who find themselves
behind a desk after 10 years who don't want to do that any longer," said Maj. Christine Gupton, executive officer for the U.S. Army Nashville
Recruiting Battalion. The new brand of recruits keeps the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines replenished nationwide. The Defense
Department has missed its combined active-duty recruiting goals only three times since 1980: in 1998, 1999 and 2005. The individual service
branches have had scattered off years. Tennessee recruiters in the various branches have met or exceeded their targets. The numbers have
increased each year, partly because of a mandate handed down from Congress for all recruiters to bring more people into the service. Quotas
have gone up each year.
SCFI 08-09
Recruitment DA
Scholars
6
Uniqueness
The economy has forced people into the military for some killin’!
CHUCK CRUMBO, staff writer, Jul. 15, 2009, Recession builds large pool of Army recruits,
http://www.thestate.com/local/story/864319.html
Soldiers from Company F, 3rd Battalion, 60th Infantry Regiment, navigate the "5 Walls" element on the confidence course at Fort Jackson.
The summer surge at Fort Jackson is no more. With the down economy, people are signing up and the Army has worked out the logistics to
keep a steady flow of soldiers headed to basic training. A sagging economy, declining casualty rate in Iraq and a resurgence in the U.S.
military’s popularity appear to have contributed to a strong recruiting year, Army leaders said. And the steady training schedule at Fort Jackson
is likely to continue into next year as recruits find themselves on a waiting list to report for duty. “Shipping dates are anywhere from six weeks
to two to three months out,” said Sgt. 1st Class Jay Jenkins, who works at the Army’s downtown Columbia recruiting station on Assembly
Street. If recruiting continues at its current pace, the Army could have about 40,000 recruits in the future soldier program by Oct. 1, Army
officials said. That compares with 11,000 who were in the program a year earlier. Recruits in the program include people who want to wait until they graduate
from high school or college, and those who can’t enter until there is a seat available in a training school, said Leslie Ann Sully, spokeswoman for the Columbia Recruiting
Battalion. Those who sign up can wait up to a year before reporting for duty, Sully said. Having such a large pool of people waiting to report to Fort Jackson helps smooth out
training schedules, said Col. Kevin Shwedo, deputy commander. “The summer surge has been problematic for years,” Shwedo said, explaining additional staffing was needed for
a short period. But with thousands waiting to ship, Fort Jackson commanders can “establish a straight line” in the training schedule, Shwedo said. “You don’t have to build any
slack into your personnel training schedule.” This year’s training scene at Fort Jackson contrasts with 2005 when chow halls were closed and civilian staff were laid off because of
the low recruit numbers. Recruiting has been so heavy that many local offices have already reached their goals for the 2009 fiscal year, which ends Sept. 30, and are working
toward 2010. The Army has yet to establish a recruiting goal for 2010. Through June, the Army had enlisted 48,565 for active duty — 4 percent above its goal. The Columbia
battalion already has rolled past its 2009 goal, signing up 2,166 men and women. Its goal for the year was 1,853. The battalion recruits western North Carolina, the Charlotte and
Augusta areas, and South Carolina except for the Charleston area. Army officials say the economy, with unemployment nationally at 9.7 percent and 12.1
percent in South Carolina, has had an impact on recruiting. “With every 10 percent increase in the number of people unemployed, there’s a 6
percent boost in recruiting,” said Douglas Smith, spokesman for the Army Recruiting Command at Fort Knox, Ky.
The military is exceeding its annual recruitment because of the economy
Albert Roman, Epoch Times Staff, Jul 10, 2009, Army More Enticing During Economic Downturns Monetary
benefits greater than ever before, http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/content/view/19430/
LOS ANGELES—The United States Army has an annual mission to recruit 65,000 people. This year, it’s on track to exceed its
mission. Currently, including the 488,000 soldiers on active duty, along with the Army Reserves, the Army alone numbers
688,000. In a wartime period, why are more people joining the all-volunteer Army? We sat down with Mark Howell, Chief of
Public Affairs—Los Angeles Recruiting Battalion, to find out. Jobs Amidst Sour Economy Historically, during tough
economic times, more people join the Army. With the U.S. unemployment rate near 9.5% and California’s at 11.5%, more
people are looking for jobs, but there are fewer jobs available, so the military is an appealing option. The Army doesn’t have layoffs, for instance. Howell notes, “You’ve got job security in the Army. Now older people are joining - people in their 30s and
40s who’ve experienced foreclosures and business shutdowns.” Of course, if rules are broken or enlistees fail to do their job,
they might be discharged, he adds. The Army offers stability, competitive wages, and educational benefits, according to Howell.
SCFI 08-09
Recruitment DA
Scholars
7
Uniqueness
Military recruitment is increasing now
The Boston Globe 09 (February 19, 2009 Thursday “Faster citizenship in uniform”
http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T6984639564&format=GNBFI&sort=BOOLEAN&startDocNo=1&resul
tsUrlKey=29_T6984639567&cisb=22_T6984639566&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=8110&docNo=1)
THE MILITARY has long had a policy of offering accelerated citizenship to legal immigrants with green cards who volunteer
for service. Now it is going to offer the same inducement to immigrants who are refugees or on temporary work or student visas.
While thorough background checks will be needed to make sure the recruits aren't sleeper agents for enemy states or terrorist
organizations, the program should help the Pentagon cope with two wars and the need to be prepared for other conflicts. The
Army, which is taking the lead on the new policy, hopes to use it to draw immigrants who have medical training or linguistic
skills and familiarity with foreign cultures. The service is quick to point out that the new program is not a means of meeting
overall recruitment goals. Until the recession hit, the Army could meet its goals only by admitting higher percentages of enlistees
without high school diplomas or who need waivers for medical conditions or criminal records. The poor economy is expected to
make recruitment easier, as young people turn to the military for job opportunities. But the two wars of this decade have taught the military
how critical it is to have troops with the ability to speak languages used in the world's hot spots, from the Pushtu of Pakistan and Afghanistan to the Somali and
Swahili of East Africa. The new program also recognizes the large number of immigrant doctors and nurses working in this country, whose skills are also needed
in the military. To qualify for enlistment, the immigrants will need to have been in the United States at least two years. Once sworn in, they can immediately
apply for citizenship and can get it in as little as six months. To protect against sleeper agents, all the recruits will be subject to screening by the Department of
Homeland Security, in addition to the initial DHS screen done before they received their visas. Further checking will be done if anything questionable turns up.
Fingerprints of recruits will be checked against those picked up by US officials at terrorism sites overseas. While the new troops can qualify as "translator aides,"
none of the immigrant recruits will serve in any capacity requiring a security clearance until they have become citizens. The new policy has strong historical
roots. Non-citizen immigrants have served in all the nation's wars. Still, an official of the American Legion veterans organization, while approving careful
recruitment of visa holders, worries about any "great influx of immigrants" to the United States. Veterans - and active-duty troops - should be the first to
recognize the value of service members who can be the voice and ears of the military on unfamiliar ground. The program is a sound one that the Army should
move on as quickly as possible.
Military Recruitment is at its highest in decades
Moran 09 (Published Jun 17, 2009 by ■ Matthew Moran “Applications surge at U.S. military academies
Applications surge at U.S. military academies” http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/274314)
Amid the midst of an economic downturn, the three U.S. military academies have seen a sharp upturn in the number of
applications for admission. But military officials say, there may be more to it than just a bad economy. The lure of free college
and a secure job have people applying to West Point, the U.S. Naval Academy and the U.S. Air Force Academy in large
numbers, reports the Associated Press. As of this week, the U.S. Naval Academy was out in front with a 40 percent increase in
applications compared with last year. Annapolis received about 15,300 applications for about 1,230 positions — the highest
number of applications the academy has received since 1988. The U.S. Military Academy at West Point, N.Y., and the U.S. Air
Force Academy in Colorado Springs, Colo., also have seen increases. Applications are up 10 percent for the class of 2013 at the
Air Force Academy, from 9,001 to 9,890 for 1,350 positions. West Point received 11,106 applications for the class of 2013, up
from 10,132 the year before, or a 9 percent increase, said Col. Deborah McDonald, director of admissions. The rise is in
correlation with the United States' economic downturn and an increase in military recruiting efforts. Graduates of U.S. military
academies usually obtain higher ranks upon entry into the service. Military officials stress it's the opportunities, not necessarily the bad economy, that have more
people applying. For example, Stephen Gast, a Maryland student who will graduate from the Air Force Academy in 2013 said he just wants to fly. "I've always
seen that as the best place to get a pilot's slot when I graduated," Gast told the AP. Increased recruiting efforts could also play a role. The U.S. Naval Academy's
summer seminar allows high-school rising seniors to attend camp at the academy for six days. There have been three times as many applications for the summer
camp than spots available. All three schools have stepped up efforts to recruit younger students and to diversify. This includes talking to eighth and ninth
graders and recruiting more in inner-city neighborhoods like Brooklyn, New York. This year is not just a spike either. The academies are already reporting an
increase in applications for fall of next year.
SCFI 08-09
Recruitment DA
Scholars
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Links: Recruitment
Poverty is necessary for military recruitment
MacGregor 03(Published on Saturday, April 5, 2003 by the Globe & Mail/Canada “ Poverty, Military Service
Seem to Go Hand-in-Hand” by Roy MacGregor, http://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/0405-01.htm)
All three have something else in common with her. They saw the military as a way out of circumstance, an opportunity not to be
passed up. It is no surprise to any of them that Jessica Lynch joined up the same day as her 21-year-old brother, Greg, and no surprise that her 18-year-old sister,
Brandi, has also signed up and will report for duty in August. That's just the way it has always gone in Wirt County. "There's no jobs around here,"
Pettry says. "There's no employment. Most of them go into the service because they know the government will pay well and
they'll come out of it with some training." "There has never been a lot of work here," adds Reynolds. "People who didn't leave
during the Depression are still stuck in the Depression if they stayed." There has long been a link between poverty and the U.S.
military, even between poverty and heroism. The last great American war hero -- winner of the Medal of Honor in the Second
World War -- was Texas's Audie Murphy, the sixth of nine children born to sharecroppers so poor the family often lived in
abandoned boxcars. Jessica Lynch is unique in that she is a teenager and a woman, and not even the military can figure out the last time an American
PoW was rescued. But she is also from a poor background, and in that she is not unique at all. The song from the musical Hair suggested that Vietnam was
"white people sending black people to fight yellow people to protect the country they stole from red people," but the lyrics are not entirely accurate. The
popular myth is that blacks died in far greater proportions in Vietnam than whites, but while this was true in the early stages of the ground war, by war's end,
blacks had suffered 12.5 per cent of the total deaths in Vietnam, slightly less than their proportion in the overall population. Today, there are 1.4 million
Americans in the military and the Pentagon maintains that the demographics are quite representative of the population as a
whole, especially given the increasing number of Hispanics who have joined in recent years. A strong sense remains, however,
that the poor soldiers so vastly outnumber the well-off that New York Democratic Representative Charles Rangel has said: "It's
just not fair that the people that we ask to fight our wars are people who join the military because of economic conditions,
because they have fewer options." Oddly enough, Jessica's sudden fame has brought some trappings of wealth -- offers of new cars, college
scholarships -- but the experience has been rather overwhelming to the Lynches.
to the end of the lane to talk.
"They are exhausted," U.S. military spokesman Randy Coleman says, coming
Recruiters for the military focus on impoverished areas
Parnass 05 ( LARRY PARNASS STAFF WRITER, New Hampshire Gazette, ”Project offers data on military
recruitment” Saturday, November 12,
2005http://www.dailyhampshiregazette.com/storytmp_v6.cfm?id_no=111201212005)
NORTHAMPTON - A Northampton research group is getting new attention for its efforts to give sprawling policy issues a hometown dimension. The National
Priorities Project recently posted data on its Web site that reveals the extent of military recruiting in 18,000 American high schools in 2004. In the week since
the material has been available, the nonprofit group received more media inquiries than for any project in its 22-year history, said Greg Speeter, its executive
director. The Washington Post reported on the findings in a front-page story Nov. 3. Bob Hebert, a columnist for the New York Times, wrote about the figures
Thursday. And the New York Daily News used data from the site to contrast military recruitment in wealthy and poor Manhattan neighborhoods. Publications in
Houston, Miami and Seattle have run articles using research from the project's site. Anita Dancs, the group's research director, is the first person quoted in the
Washington Post article, which focused on recruitment in the rural Virginia county of Martinsville. The county had an unemployment
rate of 12 percent last year, with more than 17 percent of its population living in poverty. It proved to be a top recruiting area for
the military last year. "A lot of high recruitment rates are in areas where there is not as much economic opportunity for young
people," Dancs told the newspaper. The data on recruitment was obtained through Freedom of Information Act requests pursued
by Peacework Magazine, a publication of the American Friends Service Committee. The National Priorities Project analyzed the
data and prepared a way to present it on its site. Nearly two-thirds of all recruits in 2004, the figures show, came from counties
with median household incomes below the U.S. median. Speeter said he believes high school students in rural areas, and from
lower- and middle-income families, are being targeted for recruitment. "I think it's important to know who's being asked to fight
this war - and who's not being asked to fight this war," Speeter said. He said media response to the new data has snowballed
since the material was posted a little more than a week ago. "It's an indication of how once you bring information down to the
local level, how much people grab onto it," he said.
SCFI 08-09
Recruitment DA
Scholars
9
Links: Recruitment
Military Recruitment is centralized in poverty-stricken areas
UPI 05 (UPI November 1, 2005 Military recruits most from poorer areas
http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T6984950787&format=GNBFI&sort=BOOLEAN&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=2
9_T6984950790&cisb=22_T6984950789&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=8076&docNo=2)
The military attracts most of its new recruits from counties with household incomes lower than the national median. According
to data collected by a non-profit organization, 64 percent of all recruits hailed from counties with median household incomes
below the U.S. median. A little over one-third were from counties with a higher median household income, according to data collected by the National
Priorities Project and Peacework Magazine for the year 2004. NPP found that the top 20 counties for military recruiting had a median household income below
the national median household income, and 19 of them were lower than their state median incomes. Fourteen states account for the top 20 counties: Colorado,
Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Texas and Virginia. Median incomes are
derived from listing all the household incomes from highest to lowest and selecting the one exactly in the middle. It is different from an average. According
to NPP, 15 of the top 20 counties had higher poverty rates than the national average, and 18 of the top 20 had higher poverty
rates than the state average. The military is often considered a viable career path in places where economic opportunities are
limited, including money for college. Service in the military makes recruits eligible for federal educational assistance and other
benefits. U.S. military officials involved with recruiting contend money is not the only reason people join the military. Military service also attracts those
looking for an opportunity for public service, travel, and structure and discipline.
Recruiters for the military focus on impoverished areas
Mariscal 07 (Jorge Mariscal, UCSD Literature Department Faculty, ”The Making of an American Soldier: Why
Young People Join the Military” Sojourners. Posted June 26, 2007, http://www.alternet.org/story/52233)
In reality, Kerry's "botched joke" -- Kerry said he was talking about President Bush and not the troops -- contained a kernel of truth. It is not so much that one
either studies hard or winds up in Iraq but rather that many U.S. troops enlist because access to higher education is closed off to them. Although they may
be "plenty smart," financial hardship drives many to view the military's promise of money for college as their only hope to study
beyond high school. Recruiters may not explicitly target "the poor," but there is mounting evidence that they target those whose
career options are severely limited. According to a 2007 Associated Press analysis, "nearly three-fourths of [U.S. troops] killed
in Iraq came from towns where the per capita income was below the national average. More than half came from towns where
the percentage of people living in poverty topped the national average." It perhaps should come as no surprise that the Army
GED Plus Enlistment Program, in which applicants without high school diplomas are allowed to enlist while they complete a
high school equivalency certificate, is focused on inner-city areas. When working-class youth make it to their local community
college, they often encounter military recruiters working hard to discourage them. "You're not going anywhere here," recruiters
say. "This place is a dead end. I can offer you more." Pentagon-sponsored studies -- such as the RAND Corporation's
"Recruiting Youth in the College Market: Current Practices and Future Policy Options" -- speak openly about college as the
recruiter's number one competitor for the youth market. Add in race as a supplemental factor for how class determines the propensity to enlist and
you begin to understand why communities of color believe military recruiters disproportionately target their children. Recruiters swear they don't target by race.
But the millions of Pentagon dollars spent on special recruiting campaigns for Latino and African-American youth contradicts their claim. According to an
Army Web site, the goal of the "Hispanic H2 Tour" was to "Build confidence, trust, and preference of the Army within the Hispanic community." The "Takin' it
to the Streets Tour" was designed to accelerate recruitment in the African-American community where recruiters are particularly hard-pressed and faced with
declining interest in the military as a career. In short, the nexus between class, race, and the "volunteer armed forces" is an unavoidable fact. *** Not all
recruits, of course, are driven by financial need. In working-class communities of every color, there are often long-standing traditions of military service and
links between service and privileged forms of masculinity. For communities often marked as "foreign," such as Latinos and Asians, there is pressure to serve in
order to prove that one is "American." For recent immigrants, there is the lure of gaining legal resident status or citizenship . Economic pressure,
however, is an undeniable motivation -- yet to assert that fact in public often leads to confrontations with conservatives who ask,
"How dare you question our troops' patriotism?" But any simplistic understanding of "patriotism" does not begin to capture the
myriad of subjective motivations that often coexist alongside economic motives. Altruism -- or as youth often put it, "I want to
make a difference" -- is also a major reason a significant number of people enlist.
SCFI 08-09
Recruitment DA
Scholars
10
Links: Social Services
Social services decrease poverty rates
Steve Kangas, Liberalism Resurgent Editor, DATE, Myth: Welfare Increases Poverty, July 1, 2009
The historical evidence is clear: welfare reduces poverty, and the lack of it increases it. In the 1920s, fully half of all Americans could not make
ends meet. Roosevelt's New Deal programs had reduced poverty to about 20 percent in the 50s. Johnson's Great Society reduced this to 11.1
percent by 1973. Since the rise of the corporate special interest system in 1975, individual welfare benefits have been shrinking, and poverty
has been steadily rising, to over 15 percent today.
The government using social services solves for poverty
James Weil, President of the Food Research and Action Center, Clearinghouse Review Journal of Poverty Law and Policy,
May–June 2006, “The Federal Government—the Indispensable Player in Redressing Poverty”, http://www.frac.org/pdf/Weil06.pdf
When Attacking Poverty, the Federal Government Often Is Very Effective That the business sector, state
and local governments, and charity are inadequate to the task of redressing poverty and ensuring
opportunity would not mean that the federal government should play an important role if the federal
government also were unsuccessful or institutionally incapable. But the federal government possesses the
resources and has proven itself as an actor—the most successful actor—in these arenas, especially when (as
discussed earlier) it moves both economic and spending policy in the same positive direction. When it did
that in the 1960s and the late 1990s, progress was substantial. Separately in this issue Peter Edelman
addresses the canard (from Ronald Reagan among others) that “we fought a war on poverty and poverty
won.”49 The fact is that many federal initiatives from the last seventy years have been extraordinarily
successful. Their impact has been incomplete but still formidable.
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Recruitment DA
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11
Links: Marriage Promotion
Marriage Promotion reduces poverty
LORRIE GOLDSTEIN The Toronto Sun 6/4/2009 (lexis)
And further, that when marriages break down, it's the women and children who are most likely to end up in
poverty. Indeed, "marriage breakdown" today essentially means absentee fathers. Walberg and Mrozek
estimate the cost of family breakdown to taxpayers at $7 billion annually and argue if we could cut that rate
in half, society would save almost $2 billion a year. They use $2 billion, rather than half of $7 billion, or
$3.5 billion, to account for the fact that even if the family breakdown rate was cut in half, many of those
still-intact families would remain below the poverty line. Cost savings In other words, the authors are being
very conservative about the potential cost savings. Further, as they note, lower crime and school drop out
rates among the young, less drug abuse and fewer unwanted pregnancies would result from lowering the
rate of family breakdown. Walberg and Mrozek argue our falling marriage rate (in 1961, 92% of all
Canadian families were headed by married couples, compared to only 69% today) isn't a neutral statistic,
but a negative one.
SCFI 08-09
Recruitment DA
Scholars
12
Internal Links – Readiness
Decline in military personal is devastating to US military readiness
Jack Spencer, Policy Analyst for Defense and National Security in the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis
Institute for International Studies at The Heritage Foundation, September 15, 2000, “The Facts About Military
Readiness”, http://www.heritage.org/research/missiledefense/bg1394.cfm
The reduction in forces of the U.S. armed forces began in the early 1990s. After the end of the Cold War,
the Bush Administration began to reduce the size of the military so that it would be consistent with postCold War threats. 12 Under the Clinton Administration, however, that reduction in forces escalated too
rapidly at the same time that U.S. forces were deployed too often with too little funding. The result was
decreased readiness as personnel, equipment, training, and location suffered. Since the Persian Gulf War in
1991, the U.S. military has been deployed on over 50 peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations. 13
Yet the resources available to fund these missions have steadily decreased: The number of total active
personnel has decreased nearly 30 percent, and funding for the armed services has decreased 16 percent.
The strain on the armed forces shows clearly now as the reduced forces deploy for too long with
insufficient and antiquated equipment. The result is indisputable: Readiness is in decline. Because the
security of the United States is at stake, it is imperative to present the facts about military readiness: FACT
#1. The size of the U.S. military has been cut drastically in the past decade. Between 1992 and 2000, the
Clinton Administration cut national defense by more than half a million personnel and $50 billion in
inflation-adjusted dollars. 14 (See Table 1.) The Army alone has lost four active divisions and two Reserve
divisions. Because of such cuts, the Army has lost more than 205,000 soldiers, or 30 percent of its staff,
although its missions have increased significantly throughout the 1990s. In 1992, the U.S. Air Force
consisted of 57 tactical squadrons and 270 bombers. Today the Air Force has 52 squadrons and 178
bombers. The total number of active personnel has decreased by nearly 30 percent. In the Navy, the total
number of ships has decreased significantly as well. In 1992, there were around 393 ships in the fleet,
while today there are only 316, a decrease of 20 percent. The number of Navy personnel has fallen by over
30 percent. In 1992, the Marine Corps consisted of three divisions. The Corps still has three divisions, but
since 1992, it has lost 22,000 active duty personnel, or 11 percent of its total. The Clinton Administration
also cut the Marine Corps to 39,000 reserve personnel from 42,300 in 1992. Effect on Readiness. In spite
of these drastic force reductions, missions and operations tempo have increased, resulting in decreased
military readiness. Because every mission affects far greater numbers of servicemen than those directly
involved, most operations other than warfare, such as peacekeeping, have a significant negative impact on
readiness.
SCFI 08-09
Recruitment DA
Scholars
13
A/T Troop Quality
The level of “high-quality recruits” is inevitably tanked because of the war - empirically no impact
Mark Thompson, Time Magazine Editor, 2008, “Army Recruiting More Dropouts”
Even as the U.S. Army seems to be enjoying increasing success in Iraq, the war itself seems to be driving down the quality of the fresh recruits
the U.S. military needs to continue the campaign. A new analysis of Pentagon data shows that only 71% of Army recruits in 2007 earned highschool diplomas, extending a downward trend that began in 2004, the first full year of the Iraq war, and well below the Army's goal of 90%.
The report says that there is not just a qualitative factor involved in the educational level of the recruits but consequences in terms of cost and
expense. While all recruits must have a high-school diploma or a general equivalency degree (GED), Army studies show that about 80% of
those with diplomas complete their first term of enlistment — usually three years — compared to only half of those with a GED. The higher
dropout rate means those missing soldiers must be replaced, which drives up military spending because of the need to spend money
recruiting, outfitting and training new troops; the cost of getting a new recruit — before he or she even arrives at basic training — has risen
from $15,000 to $21,000 over the past five years. The share of new recruits — those without military prior service — with high-school diplomas
was 83.5% in 2005 and 73.1% in 2006. The share of new recruits labeled "high quality" by the Army — those with at least a high-school
diploma and who rank in the top half of the military's qualification test — has also dropped markedly since the Iraq war began, from 56.2% in
2005 to 44.6% last year. Recruits from families with annual incomes below $60,000 are over-represented in uniform, the study says, while
those from families earning more are under-represented. The higher-income, better-educated recruits are especially prized by the Army
because they have the skills needed to master the increasingly complex equipment that now accompanies a military force onto the battlefield.
Army officials have acknowledged the steady slide in recruit quality, but insist that no unqualified soldiers are being sent into combat.
Troop quantity doesn’t matter, equipment does
John Murtha and David R. Obey, United States congressmen, in Sept. 13, 2006, “United States Army Military Readiness”, Globalsecurity.org,
accessed at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2006_rpt/060913-murtha-obey_army-readiness.htm on July 18, 2009
Of all the short-term issues confronting the Army, the need to reset and recapitalize battle-worn equipment is what concerns its leaders most.
As of today, some 20 to 30 percent of all Army equipment is not in service, either in transit or undergoing maintenance. Senior Army officials
understand that the reset and recapitalization programs are the linchpin to improving Army readiness now (“turning red to green”) and
sustaining the Army for the near future. This is the reason why General Schoomaker, the Army Chief of Staff, recently and forcefully testified
about the need for additional funding in FY 2007 for these programs. All told Gen. Schoomaker testified that the Army needs an additional
$17.1 billion for reset ($6.5 billion), recapitalization ($8.5 billion), and replacing battle losses ($2.1 billion). One of the bright spots on the
Army’s otherwise darkened horizon has been its repair parts and supply operations. Though initially challenged at the start of the Iraq war,
supply operations have improved to the point that virtually all Army units are reporting peak readiness for repair parts and supply levels. This
has a direct, positive effect on field level maintenance. Unfortunately, the Army’s maintenance depots here at home have not been able to
keep pace with demands created by the war. This has occurred for two principal reasons: 1) inadequate planning precluded the Army from
establishing early on procedures for cycling equipment from the theater, to the depots, to home bases, and then back to battle; 2) though the
Army has established better procedures for managing equipment flow, funding levels have not been adequate to meet the growing depot
maintenance workload. This has resulted in significant repair backlogs at the Army depots for many of the service’s most important weapons
systems. Army leaders were quick to point out that, had it not been for Congressional initiatives to increase funding for equipment
maintenance (and address new equipment shortages), the Army would be in worse shape than it is currently.
SCFI 08-09
Recruitment DA
Scholars
14
Aff: Non-Unique
Uniqueness overwhelms their link - the military is already exceeding their end strength
Gerry J. Gilmore, staff writer for the American Forces Press Service, on Feb. 10, 2009, “Military Services Meet
or Exceed January Recruiting Needs”, American Forces Press Service, U.S. Department of Defense, accessed
at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=53028 on July 18, 2009
All active duty U.S. military services and reserve components met or exceeded their January recruiting needs , Defense Department
officials reported today. The Army signed up 9,658 new active-duty soldiers, 107 percent of its target number of 9,000 enlistees. The Navy signed up 2,948 new active-duty
sailors, 100 percent of its target number. The Marine Corps signed up 3,720 new active-duty Marines, 109 percent of its target number of 3,406 enlistees. The Air Force signed up
2,600 new active-duty airmen, 100 percent of its target number. The
active Army, Marines, Air Force and Navy also met or exceeded their retention
goals for January, officials said. Guard and reserve forces met or exceeded their January recruiting needs. The Army Reserve signed up
3,223 new soldiers for 103 percent of its target number of 3,128 enlistees. The Navy Reserve signed up 712 new sailors, meeting 100 percent of its goal. The Marine Corps
Reserve signed up 879 new Marines, for 155 percent of its target number of 567 enlistees. The Air National Guard signed up 896 new airmen, for 127 percent of its target number
of 703 enlistees. The Air Force Reserve signed up 683 new airmen, meeting 100 percent of its goal. The Army National Guard signed up 4,913 new soldiers in January. Although
that number is listed as 88 percent of the monthly goal, there’s more to the story, a National Guard Bureau official said. “It’s not just about the monthly recruiting goal,” Randy
Noller, a Guard Bureau spokesman, said. “Right now, we are over our end strength and can slow down on recruiting.” The Army National
Guard now has 366,009 soldiers in its ranks, which exceeds its authorized end strength of 358,200 troops, Noller said. Since the Army
National Guard is recruiting fewer new soldiers each month, it can “increase the quality of people coming in,” Noller said. Attrition losses in all reserve components are within
acceptable limits, officials said.
All branches of the armed forces are over exceeding their active duty recruitment goals
Aaron Smith, staff writer for CNNMoney.com, on March 16, 2009, “Military recruitment surges as jobs
disappear”, CNNMoney.com, Accessed at
http://money.cnn.com/2009/02/10/news/economy/military_recruiting/?postversion=2009021013 on July 18,
2009
Fresh recruits keep pouring into the U.S. military, as concerns about serving in Iraq and Afghanistan are eclipsed by the terrible civilian job market.
The Department of Defense said Tuesday that all branches of the armed forces, including the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine
Corps, met or exceeded their active duty recruiting goals for January, continuing a trend that began with a decline in the U.S. job
market. This is despite more than 4,800 American soldiers, Marines and sailors dying in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.
It wasn't always like this. In the past, when the economy was strong, the military struggled to fill its ranks. But since fiscal year 2006, the DOD has consistently met
or exceeded its recruitment goals. This occurred even as the Navy, Marines and Air Force raised the bar on their goals.
SCFI 08-09
Recruitment DA
Scholars
15
Aff: Non-unique
Military Recruitment is low now because of poor morale
SIA 08 (Staten Island Advance (New York) May 11, 2008 Sunday
http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T6986719284&format=GNBFI&sort=BOOLEAN&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=2
9_T6986719287&cisb=22_T6986719286&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=308105&docNo=5)
Tom Dernback wrote on April 13 that our commander-in-chief (with an approval rating of 31 percent) is doing a great job and that military
morale is high. He praises Bush for liberating two countries and crushing the Taliban. Indeed, thousands of thousands of innocent Iraqis have
been liberated through death: 2 million liberated Iraqis have lost their homes and are now refugees inside their own country; 2.5 million have
liberated themselves by escaping violence and fleeing to Jordan, Syria and Egypt; hundreds have been liberated from each other as
neighborhoods have been ethnically cleansed, while concrete walls are being constructed. Bush's obsession with Iraq took his eye off the ball
in Afghanistan after we defeated the Taliban. While our too-few troops mired in Iraq, we have now seen the resurgence of the Taliban, as
President Karzai escapes their assassination attempt. Military morale? The majority of our troops want out. This president has so strained the
military and recruitment is so low that "morale" waivers have been issued to allow convicted felons, rapists and drug addicts to enlist.
Furthermore, there has been a significant increase in military officers abandoning careers once fulfilling commitments. Let's not forget the
increasing number of suicides, most of which are hidden from the press, nor the lawsuits against the VA for improper care. Or the 300,000 who
suffer post traumatic stress disorder and the 30,000 that have been wounded, many severely. April saw the worst death toll for American
troops since September, as battles continue. Let's not forget the 4,059 who have died, half of whom are under the age of 24, and those who
will continue to die for lies and mistakes. Six years into this war, mission has not been accomplished, but unraveling. A report by a former
Pentagon official for the Institute for National Strategic Studies sums it up: Iraq is a major war and a major debacle whose outcome is doubtful.
General Petraeus confirms that security gains are fragile and reversible. George Walker Bush is one of the worst presidents in U.S. history.
SCFI 08-09
Recruitment DA
Scholars
16
Aff: Recruitment Inevitable
The Military will always have recruits due to the participation of immigrants – it is empirically
proven
The Boston Globe 09 (February 19, 2009 Thursday “Faster citizenship in uniform”
http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T6984639564&format=GNBFI&sort=BOOLEAN&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=2
9_T6984639567&cisb=22_T6984639566&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=8110&docNo=1
THE MILITARY has long had a policy of offering accelerated citizenship to legal immigrants with green cards who volunteer for service. Now it
is going to offer the same inducement to immigrants who are refugees or on temporary work or student visas. While thorough background
checks will be needed to make sure the recruits aren't sleeper agents for enemy states or terrorist organizations, the program should help the
Pentagon cope with two wars and the need to be prepared for other conflicts. The Army, which is taking the lead on the new policy, hopes to
use it to draw immigrants who have medical training or linguistic skills and familiarity with foreign cultures. The service is quick to point out that
the new program is not a means of meeting overall recruitment goals. Until the recession hit, the Army could meet its goals only by admitting
higher percentages of enlistees without high school diplomas or who need waivers for medical conditions or criminal records. The poor
economy is expected to make recruitment easier, as young people turn to the military for job opportunities. But the two wars of this decade
have taught the military how critical it is to have troops with the ability to speak languages used in the world's hot spots, from the Pushtu of
Pakistan and Afghanistan to the Somali and Swahili of East Africa. The new program also recognizes the large number of immigrant doctors
and nurses working in this country, whose skills are also needed in the military. To qualify for enlistment, the immigrants will need to have
been in the United States at least two years. Once sworn in, they can immediately apply for citizenship and can get it in as little as six months.
To protect against sleeper agents, all the recruits will be subject to screening by the Department of Homeland Security, in addition to the initial
DHS screen done before they received their visas. Further checking will be done if anything questionable turns up. Fingerprints of recruits will
be checked against those picked up by US officials at terrorism sites overseas. While the new troops can qualify as "translator aides," none of
the immigrant recruits will serve in any capacity requiring a security clearance until they have become citizens. The new policy has strong
historical roots. Non-citizen immigrants have served in all the nation's wars. Still, an official of the American Legion veterans organization,
while approving careful recruitment of visa holders, worries about any "great influx of immigrants" to the United States. Veterans - and activeduty troops - should be the first to recognize the value of service members who can be the voice and ears of the military on unfamiliar ground.
The program is a sound one that the Army should move on as quickly as possible.
SCFI 08-09
Recruitment DA
Scholars
17
Aff: Empirically Denied
The Neg’s impacts should have happened. The war in Iraq and Afghanistan have already destroyed our
readiness
The National Security Network, founded in June 2006 to revitalize America's national security policy, bringing
cohesion and strategic focus to the progressive national security community, 5-13-08 “The progressive
approach: The Military restore American military Power” http://www.nsnetwork.org/node/850
Our military is second to none, but eight years of negligence, lack of accountability, and a reckless war in Iraq have left our
ground forces facing shortfalls in both recruitment and readiness. Every service is out of balance and ill-prepared. We need a
new strategy to give the military the tools it needs for the challenges we face today. And we need leadership that meets our
obligations to the men and women who put their lives on the line. Overview The U.S. military is a fighting force second to
none. It didn’t get that way by accident – it took decades of careful stewardship by civilian as well as military leaders in the
Pentagon, the White House, and on Capitol Hill. But eight years of Administration recklessness, and a lack of oversight from
conservatives on Capitol Hill, have put the military under enormous strain. Active-duty generals at the highest levels have said
that “the current demand for our forces is not sustainable… We can’t sustain the all-volunteer force at the pace that we are going
on right now” (Army Chief of Staff George Casey, April 2008); that in terms of readiness, many brigades being sent back to
Afghanistan and Iraq were “not where they need to be” (Army Vice-Chief of Staff Richard Cody, SASC subcommittee hearing,
April 14, 2008); and that “we cannot now meet extra force requirements in places like Afghanistan” (Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Mullen on National Public Radio, April 2008). The war in Iraq, and the Administration’s failure to adequately
prepare the military for it, has pushed our ground forces to the brink: recruitment and retention in crucial areas are down, and
low readiness and response levels are threatening our troop safety abroad, and impairing our National Guard at home. Readiness
and Response: Two-thirds of the Army – virtually all of the brigades not currently deployed to Afghanistan or Iraq – are rated
“not combat ready.” The dramatic equipment shortages of a few years ago have been improved but not completely remedied.
The Army has been forced repeatedly to violate its own policy of 24 months “dwell time” for every 12 months deployed. Activeduty soldiers are currently serving five months deployed for every four at home. This means individual soldiers cannot rest, and
whole units cannot fully re-equip or re-train for new missions. The Administration has said it will return to a policy of 12 months
out for every 12 months deployed – but this will likely require reactivating National Guard units that are themselves
overstretched and under-equipped. These Administration policies are completely out of line with the military’s own structure and
institutions. They create a significant risk that the U.S. military would be unable to respond to another crisis, and have already
impaired our ability to respond to the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan.
SCFI 08-09
Recruitment DA
Scholars
18
Aff: No Link
Upper class groups join the military far more than the poor
Tim Kane, Heritage Foundation researcher, and James Jay Carafano, Heritage Foundation researcher,
November 2005, Debunking The Myth of the Underprivileged Soldier,
http://www.fromtheinside.us/perceptions/mythofunderprivileged.htm
According to a comprehensive study of all enlistees for the years 1998-99 and 2003 that The Heritage
Foundation just released, the typical recruit in the all-volunteer force is wealthier, more educated and more
rural than the average 18- to 24-year-old citizen is. Indeed, for every two recruits coming from the poorest
neighborhoods, there are three recruits coming from the richest neighborhoods. Yes, rural areas and the South
produced more soldiers than their percentage of the population would suggest in 2003. Indeed, four rural states - Montana, Alaska, Wyoming
and Maine - rank 1-2-3-4 in proportion of their 18-24 populations enlisted in the military. But this isn't news. Enlistees have always come from
rural areas. Yet a new study, reported in The Washington Post earlier this month, suggests that higher enlistment rates in rural counties are
new, implying a poorer military. They err by drawing conclusions from a non-random sample of a few counties, a statistically cloaked
anecdote. The only accurate way to assess military demographics is to consider all recruits. If, for example, we consider the
education of every recruit, 98% joined with high-school diplomas or better. By comparison, 75% of the
general population meets that standard. Among all three-digit ZIP code areas in the USA in 2003 (one can
study larger areas by isolating just the first three digits of ZIP codes), not one had a higher graduation rate
among civilians than among its recruits. In fact, since the 9/11 attacks, more volunteers have emerged from
the middle and upper classes and fewer from the lowest-income groups. In 1999, both the highest fifth of
the nation in income and the lowest fifth were slightly underrepresented among military volunteers. Since
2001, enlistments have increased in the top two-fifths of income levels but have decreased among the
lowest fifth.
It’s not how many troops you have its how you use ‘em
Phillip Carter, attorney and former Army captain, and Paul Glastris, editor in chief, March 2005, The Case for
the Draft, http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2005/0503.carter.html
But there's a deeper problem, one that any president who chose to invade a country the size of Iraq would
have faced. In short, America's all-volunteer military simply cannot deploy and sustain enough troops to
succeed in places like Iraq while still deterring threats elsewhere in the world. Simply adding more soldiers
to the active duty force, as some in Washington are now suggesting, may sound like a good solution. But
it's not, for sound operational and pragmatic reasons. America doesn't need a bigger standing army; it needs
a deep bench of trained soldiers held in reserve who can be mobilized to handle the unpredictable but
inevitable wars and humanitarian interventions of the future. And while there are several ways the allvolunteer force can create some extra surge capacity, all of them are limited.
SCFI 08-09
Recruitment DA
Scholars
19
Aff: No Link
The middle class is the main contributor to recruitment levels not the poor!
Tim Cavanaugh, contributing editor, March 2006, “Middle-Class Warfare, Military recruits and poverty.’,
http://www.reason.com/news/show/33276.html
If there's any subject where Marxist theories about economic exploitation still hold sway in America, it's
military recruiting. In different ways, Democrats and Republicans both subscribe to the notion that recruits
are poor kids driven to enlist by desperate financial conditions. Most recently, it's been an argument for the
draft: Impose conscription, the idea goes, and it won't just be poor kids going to war. Now the conservative
Heritage Foundation has analyzed enlistee demographics by looking at household incomes in the zip codes
recruits come from. The results indicate a pool of recruits drawn mainly from the middle class. The largest
group of new recruits in 2003--18 percent--came from neighborhoods with average annual household
incomes of $35,000 to $40,000, compared to a median household income of $43,318. In all, the top two
income quintiles (comprising households with incomes starting at $41,688) produced 45 percent of all
recruits in 2003. A mere 5 percent came from neighborhoods with average incomes below $20,000 per
household. The Heritage findings make sense: While the military offers some attractions in terms of
education, training, and life experience, the effort and commitment required are so great that service in the
enlisted ranks will always lose a cost/benefit comparison with even the most humble minimum-wage job.
Noneconomic, nonrational motivations such as patriotism, self-esteem building, or just the desire to change
one's life are more compelling factors in the decision to join up. But the concept of the poor man's war, like
the specter of Karl Marx, is hard to exorcise. Referring to the same set of data Heritage analyzed, but
relying on a selective sampling by the National Priorities Project, The Washington Post turned out a
Guthriesque front-page story with the subhead "Recruits' Job Worries Outweigh War Fears."
SCFI 08-09
Recruitment DA
Scholars
20
Aff: A/T Readiness I/L
High recruitment means nothing to readiness - we can’t hold onto good soldiers ensuring military failure
LTC Michael J. Johnson, U.S. Army, 2008, RESISTANCE TO PARADIGM CHANGE: Potential Crisis for the U.S.
Army and the All-Volunteer Force, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA485605&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf
The U.S. Army has met its reenlistment goals since the War on Terror started; however, it has had to implement new policies in order to
maintain its end strength, decreasing the quality of the force. The U.S. Army has significant anomalies retaining quality individuals as it has
increased reenlistment bonuses, extended soldiers involuntarily beyond their enlistment contracts, and increased promotion rates for
noncommissioned officers and officers. Reenlistment is a bright spot for the U.S. Army as it struggles to maintain the All-Volunteer Force. Even in 2005, when the U.S. Army failed to meet its recruiting goals, it
met all of its reenlistment objectives.48 Deployments do not seem to hurt reenlistment; in fact, they help. In 2005, General Richard Cody, U.S. Army Vice Chief of Staff, commented that even after a combat tour and heading back to Iraq,
the 3rd Infantry Division had a reenlistment rate double that of the U.S. Army as a whole.49 This trend continued. The 25th Infantry Division, after 15 months in Iraq, had a one hundred fifty percent reenlistment rate for FY2007. Despite
tremendous reenlistment rates in combat zones, the U.S. Army has implemented additional measures to increase retention. One of these measures was to increase selective reenlistment bonuses (SRB). The U.S. Army uses SRB to
These bonuses and special programs help the U.S. Army keep good soldiers in and move
soldiers to special skills or units requiring more manpower. Reenlistment bonuses have reached very high levels. An example of this program
was the drive to keep special operations soldiers in the force. In 2005, the U.S. Army approved a budgetary plan of $168 million over a threeyear period aimed at retaining special operations forces. These incentives ranged from $8,000 to an extraordinary $150,000 in bonuses for
soldiers to remain in the special operations field. At the time, many were calling for an increase in special forces personnel to fight the War on
Terror but these bonuses were not necessarily about increasing end strength. U.S. Army spokesman LTC Joe Richard stated, “It is about keeping the ones we
encourage quality soldiers to make a rational choice and stay in the military.
already have.”50 In 2007, the U.S. Army spent $600 million on SRB programs.51 These programs have been very successful, especially in combat zones, because bonuses
received there are tax-free. It is hard to determine if the U.S. Army would have made its reenlistment goals without increased, targeted SRBs. In addition to increased SRB
programs the U.S. Army has implemented and changed other policies. One policy designed to keep end strength as high as possible is the policy of “stop
loss.” This policy extends soldiers on active duty beyond their service obligation. Many soldiers who are kept in the service for deployments
due to the “stop loss” policy end up reenlisting. Since they had to deploy, soldiers decide to take the tax-free bonus money and reenlist. In 2003,
the U.S. Army began implementing the “stop loss” policy for units deploying to Iraq. This policy has continued. With units deploying just about every other year, many soldiers get caught in the “stop loss” program and must deploy just prior
to when they would have departed the U.S. Army. This keeps them on active duty for another fifteen to eighteen months. In May of 2006, a typical deployment month in the War on Terror, the U.S. Army had 9,800 soldiers on active duty
The U.S. Army cannot afford to discontinue the “stop loss” policy or it would be 9,000 soldiers
short within its ranks. Successful reenlistment and recruitment should have made “stop loss” unnecessary years ago. Keeping this policy in
place indicates a problem maintaining end strength for the U.S. Army. Another method of maintaining end strength is changing promotion
criteria for both noncommissioned and commissioned officers. The U.S. Army has increased promotions to keep attrition rates as low as
possible. For enlisted soldiers, it has implemented the automatic list integration policy. This policy changed the old system of soldiers being
promoted based on performance and quality to one based on time in service. Under the old system, soldiers had to appear before local
promotion boards, earn promotion points, and then were promoted based on the needs of the U.S. Army. Now soldiers eligible for promotion to
sergeant are automatically promoted, unless the unit formally requests that a soldier not be promoted. The U.S. Army is about to extend this
policy in 2008 to promotions for staff sergeant.53 This new policy ensured that more soldiers will stay on active duty. Poor performers, who
under the old system would not have been promoted and would have been required to leave the U.S. Army at their retention control point, are
now promoted and continue to serve. This change in policy lowers the quality of the force placing low quality noncommissioned officers in
charge of soldiers. It appears that the U.S. Army is willing and has the need to keep as many soldiers as possible by promoting all soldiers to
staff sergeant. Officer promotion rates are also increasing, allowing more officers to stay in the U.S. Army. Promotion rates for captains,
majors, and lieutenant colonels are at all time highs. Established promotion rate goals are ninety five percent for captain, eighty percent for major, and seventy
serving under “stop loss.”52 That number remains relatively constant each year.
percent for lieutenant colonel. In FY 2005, the U.S. Army far exceeded these numbers with rates of over ninety eight percent, ninety seven percent, and eighty eight percent
respectively.54 Along with increased promotion rates, the U.S. Army has implemented new policies to keep officers in the service. Traditionally, the hardest officers to
retain have been those in the rank of lieutenant and captain who have completed their initial service obligation. The FY2006 loss rate for
lieutenants and captains was 7.9 percent, just under the ten year (1995-2005) average of 8.5 percent.55 This appears to be good news;
however, current attrition rates are artificially low and are still too high to adequately man the force. As discussed earlier in this section, the
policy of “stop loss” is keeping some officers who wish to depart in the service. Once these officers are allowed to depart, the junior officer
attrition rate will increase. There is also a shortfall of officers in year groups 1990 to 2002. Maintaining an attrition rate close to the ten-year average will not help alleviate
the immediate problem of officer year group shortages. The U.S. Army is 3,000 officers short and experiencing what the Congressional Research Service called, “Acute shortfalls
in “senior” captains and majors with 11 to 17 years of service.” 56 The minimum fill rate for officers in this grade is eighty five percent, however, projections for FY 2007 were
eighty two percent.57 Finally, for the first time ever, the U.S. Army has implemented a monetary retention bonus for officers, specifically targeting captains. This bonus gave
captains a $25,000 to $35,000 critical skills bonus in return for three additional years of service. Other incentives included fully funded graduate schooling, ranger school
attendance, and branch, functional area, or post of choice.58 There are anomalies retaining quality soldiers in the U.S. Army. The U.S. Army has increased
SRB money and made its reenlistment goals each year. Despite this good news, the U.S. Army has had to continue the “stop loss” policy,
keeping soldiers involuntarily on active duty to fill deploying units. It cannot fill critical officer positions in the junior grade levels of captain and
major. The U.S. Army also made the choice to dramatically increased promotion rates to maintain end strength. Soldiers who were not
qualified to serve in the U.S. Army before the War on Terror, are now fully qualified. The result is lower quality noncommissioned officers and
officers leading soldiers in combat
SCFI 08-09
Recruitment DA
Scholars
21
Aff: A/T Readiness I/L
Quality equipment, not troop levels, is key to military readiness
Government Accountability Office (GAO), no author given, on October 25, 2005, “Military Readiness: DOD Needs to Identify and Address
Gaps and Potential Risks in Program Strategies and Funding Priorities for Selected Equipment”, U.S. Government Accountability Office,
accessed at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-141 on July 18, 2008
While the fleet-wide condition of the 30 equipment items GAO selected for review varied, GAO's analysis showed that reported readiness rates declined
between fiscal years 1999 and 2004 for most of these items. The decline in readiness, which occurred more markedly in fiscal years 2003 and 2004, generally
resulted from (1) the continued high use of equipment to support current operations and (2) maintenance issues caused by the advancing ages and complexity
of the systems. Key equipment items--such as Army and Marine Corps trucks, combat vehicles, and rotary wing aircraft--have been used well beyond normal
peacetime use during deployments in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. DOD is currently performing its Quadrennial Defense Review, which will
examine defense programs and policies for meeting future requirements. Until the department completes this review and ensures that condition issues for key
equipment are addressed, DOD risks a continued decline in readiness trends, which could threaten its ability to continue meeting mission requirements. The
military services have not fully identified near- and long-term program strategies and funding plans to ensure that all of the 30 selected equipment items can
meet defense requirements. GAO found that, in some cases, the services' near-term program strategies have gaps in that they do not address capability
shortfalls, funding is not included in DOD's 2006 budget request, or there are supply and maintenance issues thatmay affect near-term readiness.
Additionally, the long-term program strategies and funding plans are incomplete for some of the equipment items GAO reviewed in that future requirements
are not identified, studies are not completed, funding for maintenance and upgrades was limited, or replacement systems were delayed or not yet identified.
Title 10 U.S.C. 2437 requires the military services to develop sustainment plans for equipment items when their replacement programs begin development,
unless they will reach initial operating capability before October 2008. However, most of the systems that GAO assessed as red had issues severe enough to
warrant immediate attention because of long-term strategy and funding issues, and were not covered by this law. As a result, DOD is not required to report
sustainment plans for these critical items. For the next several years, funding to sustain or modernize aging equipment will have to compete with other DOD
priorities, such as current operations, force structure changes, and replacement system acquisitions. Without developing complete sustainment and
modernization plans and identifying funding needs for all priority equipment items, DOD may be unable to meet future requirements for defense capabilities.
Furthermore, until DOD develops these plans, Congress will be unable to ensure that DOD's budget decisions address deficiencies related to key military
equipment.
Equipment issues hinder military readiness
John Murtha and David R. Obey, United States congressmen, in Sept. 13, 2006, “United States Army Military Readiness”, Globalsecurity.org,
accessed at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2006_rpt/060913-murtha-obey_army-readiness.htm on July 18, 2009
Army military readiness rates have declined to levels not seen since the end of the Vietnam War. Roughly one-half of all Army units (deployed and nondeployed, active and reserves) received the lowest readiness rating any fully formed unit can receive. Prior to 9/11, only about 20 percent of the Army received
this lowest rating – a fact driven almost exclusively by shortfalls in the reserves. Army units in either Iraq or Afghanistan generally are at peak readiness levels,
as they should be. At issue are the non-deployed units – those based in the United States and Europe. It is these units that are critically short of equipment
and personnel, causing the vast majority of them to be rated at the lowest readiness levels. Equipment and personnel shortfalls in non-deployed units limit
their ability to fully train for combat. Army units spend the time between combat deployments undertaking a series of progressively larger and more complex
training exercises. It is the larger, more complex training exercises that are adversely affected by shortfalls. As a result, Army leaders have witnessed a
marked decline in Army heavy combat brigade performance at its National Training Center exercises – the key test for any Army unit prior to deployment.
Ultimately, under-trained units are likely to experience higher casualty and accident rates in theater. Moreover, the Army’s non-deployed units make up its
strategic reserve. These are the units that would be called on to go to war in North Korea, Iran, or elsewhere. The degradation of Army readiness here at
home has effectively eliminated the United States ground force strategic reserve. Key Facts: Of the 16 active-duty, non-deployed combat brigades in the
United States managed by the Army’s Forces Command, the vast majority of them are rated at the lowest readiness ratings. These ratings are caused by
severe equipment shortages. Of particular concern is the readiness rates of the units scheduled to deploy later this year, particularly the 1st Cavalry Division.
This division and its 4 brigades will deploy to Iraq in October at the lowest level of readiness because of equipment shortfalls. To meet its needs, this unit – like
virtually all other units that have recently deployed or will soon deploy to Iraq – must fall-in on equipment in theater. Operating unfamiliar, battle weary
equipment increases the potential for casualties and accidents. Again, the situation facing the Army Guard and Reserve is comparatively worse. Of all the
Guard units not currently mobilized, about four-fifths received the lowest readiness rating. Conversely, only about 1 in 10 received the highest or second
highest ratings for readiness, which are the ratings traditionally required for a unit to be considered capable of deploying and completing its mission. The same
is true for the Army Reserve; about four-fifths of non-mobilized Army Reserve units received the two lowest readiness ratings; only one in 10 received the two
top ratings. Personnel shortages are the major reason behind the decline in Guard and Reserve readiness – shortages created, for the most part, by
mobilizations having lapsed or personnel having been pulled from units to augment others in theater. The Army’s difficulties here at home have been
compounded by funding shortfalls in and mismanagement of its base operations and building maintenance budget. Army bases around the country were
unable to pay utility and commercial services bills for many months during the current fiscal year. Custodial and dining hall operations also were curtailed. The
$800 million shortfall in base operations and building maintenance funding was recently corrected through a major transfer of funds from key readiness
accounts, such as training and equipment maintenance programs. Nonetheless, officials at various installations around the country believe that the Army’s
woes will continue until the newly-created Army Installation Management Activity (IMA) can resolve significant management shortcomings.