Who Governs Choice and To What End?
Ashley Jochim
Michael DeArmond
Center on Reinventing Public Education
University of Washington Bothell
One of the most visible and controversial education reforms of the last decade has
been the expansion of charter schools (e.g., CREDO, 2009; 2013; Henig 2009). Much of
the public debate frames charters as if they are a singular policy initiative, but variation in
state and local policy has created important differences within the charter school sector
that make broad generalizations difficult (Gross, 2011; Ziebarth, 2014). Whether or not
charter schools benefit students depends in large part on the state and local rules that deal
with who can open schools, how schools are funded, how parents learn about their
options, how students enroll in schools, and the way government and parents hold
schools accountable. In other words, when it comes to charter schools, and school choice
more generally, matters of policy design loom large (Hess, 200; Hill et al, 2003; Moe,
2002).
The question about how charters and choice more generally shape public
education is an important one, especially as charter school enrollments continue to
expand and as policymakers expand the scope of chartering to include new types of
schools (Flannagan, 2012). Yet, this begs a more fundamental and pressing question:
Who is responsible for developing the rules that structure choice and to what end?
In this essay, we show that the answer to this question is no longer a monopolistic
public school district that oversees all city schools. Instead, multiple organizations and
agencies – school districts, state agencies, charter school authorizers, and non-profit
1
providers – increasingly oversee and operate public schools in U.S. cities. These groups
compete for students and often have few incentives to set aside their differences to
address cross-sector problems that ultimately shape parent opportunities. The unfortunate
result is a system of public education that can be difficult for families to navigate and for
government to oversee and improve.
Our findings suggest that ensuring charters and other forms of school choice
improve public education is as much a problem of collective action as it is of policy
design. Like other reforms, harnessing the power of markets towards public purposes will
require negotiation, bargaining, and coalition building to secure the agreement of those
with formal responsibility for public education. This process is complicated in cities
where formal governing arrangements are fragmented and dispersed across multiple
actors.
Our argument draws on data and ideas from a large, on-going study of education
governance that includes qualitative case studies of school governance in Baltimore,
Cleveland, Detroit, Denver, New Orleans, Philadelphia, and Washington DC, parent
surveys, and secondary data. The purpose of this essay is threefold: first, we present some
descriptive data on governance arrangements in American cities with significant charter
markets to show the deep and pervasive fragmentation that exists in many high-choice
cities today. Second, we discuss how this fragmentation shapes the prospects for
collective action. Third, we illustrate the impact of collective action problems for three
cross-sector areas of education policy: enrollment access, parent information, and
performance accountability. We end with a brief discussion of the implications for civic
leaders and researchers.
2
Who Governs?
Governance is a well-worn term in education and multiple definitions exist (e.g.,
Brewer & Smith, 2006; McGuinn & Manna, 2013). For our purposes, education
governance is the set of arrangements by which political actors influence the operation of
schools by setting goals, defining desired outcomes, requiring that certain processes be
followed, and forbidding (via penalties) certain behaviors (Hill & Jochim, 2014).
Understanding education governance requires more than depicting the set of authoritative
bodies that make policy, although these are important. In traditional education
governance, school boards bear much of the formal responsibility for governing but they
do not govern alone. Only by securing the agreement of private interests can government
make and carry out their decisions (Stone 1989).
Public education requires governance because the interests of different parties are
not perfectly aligned with each other or with public interests (Malen, 2006). Conflicts
between taxpayers and school employees, between school leaders and unions, and
between teachers and parents who have different aspirations for children, can never be
fully resolved, but they can be managed by securing agreements among the various actors
involved. These agreements ultimately shape how public education is delivered, by
assigning the responsibility to provide services and establishing rules that protect
beneficiaries (students) and ensure fair treatment of service providers (teachers and
schools).
The central challenge for governance is creating the conditions for collective
action (Stoker 1998). This reinforces that governance is fundamentally a political
3
exercise that involves advancing a shared understanding of policy problems and
negotiating agreements with affected interests (see May and Jochim 2013).
Governance arrangements in public education are not fixed. Policymakers and
researchers have long debated whether changing agreements that have traditionally given
authority to school boards and replacing them with agreements that give authority to
mayors or governors might improve public education governance (Wong and Shen 2001;
Wong and Shen 2003).1 But while these debates are important, they ignore a far more
foundational change to education governance: the expansion of charter schools.
Charter schools are public schools run by private groups or organizations outside
of the traditional school district bureaucracy that are authorized (contracted) to provide
public education by states, school districts, and other designated organizations (Finn,
Manno, & Vanourek, 2000). Charter schools are also a market-based reform, one that
seeks to use choice and competition as levers for improvement (Henig, 1995). The
introduction of charter schools threatens governance arrangements that benefit some
groups (e.g., public school employees, parents satisfied with their neighborhood schools,
unions) and creates new ones that may benefit other groups (e.g., independent school
operators, vendors, parents dissatisfied with their neighborhood schools).
The competitive nature of charter school reforms has, with a few exceptions
(Yatsko et al, 2013), led public debate to focus on the struggles between the charter and
traditional sectors. And yet, in many cities with large charter sectors, the two sides are
actually layered over one another, forming not separate school systems but rather a
mosaic of options that together constitute the city’s “public school system.”
1
Henig (2013) recently characterized such shifts as a movement away from specialized education
institutions (e.g., school boards) toward general-purpose government institutions (mayors and governors).
4
From 2008 to 2014 the number of students enrolled in charter schools nearly
doubled from 1.4 million to 2.5 million students (NACSA 2014). We argue this
expansion has important implications for the governance of city school systems. In the
next section, we present descriptive data on governance arrangements in American cities
with significant charter markets to show the deep and pervasive fragmentation that exists
in many high-choice cities today
A Landscape of Education Governance
To examine governance in cities with large charter markets, we used a multi-stage
sampling approach. First, we geo-coded every school in the most recent release of the
U.S. Department of Education’s Common Core of Data (CCD) (2011-12) to a
municipality using municipal boundaries from the U.S. Census Bureau. We link schools
to municipalities because we take the city, not the school district, as our primary unit of
analysis. We take a city-centric approach because families in some places may choose
from charter schools and multiple school districts and in other places traditional school
districts may serve more than one city or town. After linking schools to cities we
generated total public enrollment counts by city (traditional, magnet, and charter) and
selected the top 100 cities by enrollment. This ensured our analysis focused on cities with
large K-12 public school systems. From the 100 largest public school systems, we
selected 35 cities based on the presence of significant charter markets. This includes 30
cities with the largest charter market shares as well as five additional cities that we
handpicked because of their noteworthy public school choice programs: Houston,
Indianapolis, Memphis, New York City, and San Antonio.
5
The Market Environment in Cities with Charter Schools
Figure 1 shows 2011-12 charter school enrollment across our sample of 35 cities.
For additional context, Figure 1 includes private school enrollments counts drawn from
the 2009-2010 Private School Universe Survey (PSUS), although we did not use private
school enrollments for sample selection.
Figure 1. 35 Cities with Significant Charter Markets, 2011-2012
Sources: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD),
"Public Elementary/Secondary School Universe Survey," 2011-12; U.S. Department of Education, National
Center for Education Statistics, Private School Universe Survey (PSUS), 2009-10;
6
As Figure 1 shows, charter school enrollment varies widely across the 35 cities.
At the high end, 78% of New Orleans’ public school students attend charter schools; in
New York City, only 4% do. Twelve cities have charter school market shares above 20%
and three cities -- New Orleans, Washington DC, and Detroit – have charter enrollments
that make up more than a third of all public school students. Even cities at the bottom of
the list -- San Antonio and Indianapolis, for example -- have relatively large charter
school enrollments compared to national average of around 3.6%.2
Fragmented oversight
Figure 2 shows that education governance in these cities is a far cry from the
monopolistic bureaucracy that some might imagine when they think of urban school
systems. Figure 2 shows the number and type of agencies that oversee public schools in
each city, sized by enrollment. Each square represents the total public school enrollment
in the city across all public schools (traditional, magnet, and charter). Within each square,
the blue rectangles represent different school districts and the schools they oversee (by
enrollment, not the number of school). The green rectangles represent different charter
school authorizers and the schools they oversee. Finally, the yellow rectangles represent
charter schools authorized by traditional school districts.
2
Nationally 3.6% of public school students enroll in charter schools: U.S. Department of Education,
National Center for Education Statistics, Core of Data (CCD), "Public Elementary/Secondary School
Universe Survey," 1999-2000 through 2010-11.
7
Figure 2. Oversight Landscape for Public Education in 35 Cities, 2011-2012
New Orleans, LA
Washington, DC
Detroit, MI
Cleveland, OH
Columbus, OH
Philadelphia, PA
Marietta, GA
Toledo, OH
St. Paul, MN
Milwaukee, WI
Oakland, CA
Minneapolis, MN
Newark, NJ
Los Angeles, CA
Baltimore, MD
Colorado Springs, CO
Kansas City, MO
Tucson, AZ
Cincinnati, OH
Mesa, AZ
Miami, FL
Denver, CO
Phoenix, AZ
Boston, MA
Chicago, IL
Baton Rouge, LA
Stockton, CA
Dallas, TX
Sacramento, CA
Chula Vista, CA
Houston, TX
Indianapolis, IN
San Antonio, TX
Memphis, TN
New York, NY
Traditional Districts
Charter Authorizers
Charters Sponsored by Districts
8
Multiple actors possess formal authority to sponsor and oversee public education
in these 35 cities. Across our sample, there are 278 unique oversight agencies. Only a
single city in our sample has just one oversight agency operating in the municipal
boundaries – Miami, Florida – where the school district’s boundaries are countywide. In
the average city, there are nearly eight agencies responsible for oversight.
Two types of “patchwork” cities deserve special mention. One is what we call
“district pluralism” in which dozens of traditional public school districts operate in a
single municipality. Each maintains its own central office, superintendent, and school
board. This is the case in Phoenix where 28 traditional public schools are responsible for
overseeing and providing public education or in Houston where 19 independent school
districts are maintained.
The other is what we call “charter pluralism” in which half a dozen or more
charter school authorizers sponsor schools. In Detroit, students are distributed across
schools overseen by one of 12 different charter school authorizers, Detroit Public
Schools, and Michigan’s statewide district, the Education Achievement Authority. In
Cleveland, students are enrolled in schools overseen by the Cleveland Public Schools and
eight different charter school authorizers.
Figure 3 suggests another layer of complexity: within each of the main categories
of oversight agency – school districts and charter schools – there are various subcategories. Some school districts have traditionally elected school boards, but others are
overseen by mayors or states; some charter school authorizers are local school districts,
but others are state education agencies, independent boards, higher education institutions,
non-profits, municipal governments. In some places, like Ohio, non-profit charter
9
authorizers may contract with for-profit organizations to manage the authorization
process.
Mobilization of Charter School Advocates
While not visible in our depiction of the formal governance arrangements, the
introduction of charter schools has also significantly expanded the range of stakeholder
groups operating in these cities. Charter schools are sometimes viewed as a market
reform in which school providers are disciplined by market incentives and are immune
from political realities. But, as discussed by Henig et. al (2003), “service providers [are]
hybrid actors who may pursue their interests not only by responding to market signals but
also by engaging in political behavior designed to elicit government support or change
the broad rules of the game in ways that provide them systematic advantages.”
Interviews with school district personnel, charter schools, and others suggest that
charter school advocates are important stakeholders in cities with choice. Charter
operators, acting alone, via membership organizations, or as part of larger coalition,
routinely press charter school authorizers, school districts, state education agencies, and
state legislatures for increases in per pupil funding, better access to facilities, and waivers
from burdensome regulations.
The mobilization of groups helps to bolster the authority of those actors with
formal governance authority (Stone 1989). Sometimes, the lines between formal
governing bodies and stakeholders are ambiguous. In Baltimore, for example, the charter
membership organization Supporting Public Schools of Choice is both an advocacy
group and a member of the advisory group that reviews all charter school applications
and renewals.
10
Figure 3. Oversight Agency Type for Charters and District
Municipal
govt.
office
(11,803)
Education
service
center
(25,214)
Non−
profit
org.
(29,077)
Indep.
charter
school
board
(79,748)
Higher
educ.
inst.
(81,894)
State
board of
education
(113,483)
CHARTER
DISTRICT
13.6%
86.4%
Local
school
district
(341,119)
Locally
elected
(2,682,073)
Note: The number of students enrolled under each governance structure is in parentheses.
11
Mayor
controlled
(1,374,253)
State
controlled
(270,846)
Implications for Collective Action
Collective action involves harnessing the resources of multiple actors towards
some common end. Although education governance has never been free from collective
action problems (e.g., Henig et. al, 1993), cities with choice face particular challenges.
Table 1 sums up how choice has affected education governance.
Table 1. Implications for Governance
Dimension
Formal
authority
Relationship
between actors
Governance in High
Choice Cities
Dispersed
Competitive
Implication
Increases veto
points and makes
agreement more
difficult
Weak incentives to
cooperate towards
common ends
Our analysis of governance arrangements in Figures 2 and 3 suggest a wide range
of actors are responsible for education governance. Not only do an increasing number of
organizations oversee and operate city schools, but they vary significantly in their kind
including types of organizational missions (e.g., non-profit boards, state education
agencies) and connection to localities. Any attempt to coordinate service delivery across
the traditional and charter sectors must confront the fact that doing so will require gaining
the cooperation of independent organizations.
This fragmentation in formal oversight structures is exacerbated by the
competitive nature of school choice. Competition for resources means that the
organizations depicted in Figures 2 and 3 have few incentives to cooperate towards
12
common ends. The scarcity of resources in many cities mean that growth in charter
schools creates pain points for district leaders including school closures and layoffs, even
as they provide an escape valve for families in struggling district schools. On the other
hand, many charter schools have limited sympathy to the struggles of traditional public
school districts and worry about maintaining enrollment as well as their operational
autonomy.
What These Challenges Mean for Beneficiaries
As charter schools enroll non-trivial shares to students, they have moved far
beyond being a niche option in many cities. In places like Washington DC, New Orleans,
and Detroit, charter schools are now firmly part of the public school system. With this
growth, charter schools have drawn attention to cross-sector issues that have important
implications for educational opportunity across an increasingly pluralistic education
landscape. In particular, the growth of charters has highlighted the need for coherent
enrollment, information, and accountability policies to support a fair and productive
system of choice schools for all students. In the next sections we suggest the importance
of these policy areas, mostly by negative example, to show the ways in which addressing
them demand collective action across sectors
Enrollment Policy
Parents in cities with choice frequently face complex and confusing enrollment
processes that vary school-by-school, which create high transaction costs for parents as
they choose schools for their children (for a recent review, see Whitehurst and Whitfield
2014). For example, prior to Denver’s well-cited common enrollment initiative
(SchoolMatch), the city’s parents faced over 60 different paths for enrolling in the city's
13
traditional and charter schools (IIPSC 2010). Many of Denver’s pre-reform enrollment
procedures were undocumented and based on informal agreements between parents and
principals. According to an outside evaluation of the district’s enrollment system at the
time, the decentralized and informal enrollment system(s) produced "many inequities and
inefficiencies in enrollment and choice" in the city (p. 5). For example, the evaluation
found that 60% of the city’s students who enrolled out of their boundary-area schools
appeared to be hand selected by schools through a process that entirely circumvented the
formal enrollment system.
Among our sample of thirty-five cities, just two had a unified enrollment system
that allowed parents to use a common application for all schools, traditional and charter,
within the city's boundaries (also see Whitehurst and Whitfield 2014). Decentralized
enrollment systems create problems not just for parents, but also for charter schools.
When no one is in charge of enrollment, individual charter schools must administer their
own systems (including lotteries if they are oversubscribed) and manage wait lists that
can persist well into the start of the school year, creating uncertainty about enrollment
counts and funding.
Solutions to these problems require cross-sector agreements and coordination and
collaboration. For example, in Denver, district officials and charter school leaders agreed
to a citywide common enrollment system that eliminates the need for families to keep
track of different deadlines, application requirements, and waitlists. Instead, the system
allow parents to follow a single process in which they list the schools they prefer for their
child (regardless of whether the school is a district or charter school) and receive a single
match that accounts for the family’s listed preferences and the schools’ admission
14
standards. As we argued in the prior section, coming to such agreements (whether a fullyformed common enrollment system or simply common timelines) is complicated under
the pluralistic governance arrangements shown in Figures 2 and 3.
Information Challenges
Parents in high choice cities can also struggle to find understandable and
comparable information about school programs and school performance. While several
cities – for example, Baltimore, Cleveland, Washington DC, and Detroit – are in the
process of launching school choice websites that assembled data on traditional and
charter schools in a single place, finding useful information about schools in the many of
these cities can be onerous. The search for school information may involve looking for
performance data across multiple websites, including the district, the authorizer, and the
state education agency; as Whitehurst and Whitfield (2014) show, many high choice
cities do not have information systems that allow parents to easily make side-by-side
comparisons of school performance graphically or using tables; moreover, many of these
websites have little if any information on curricular offerings or extracurricular activities.
To be sure, parents can supplement their school search by turning to state-level
report cards or third party organizations such as greatschools.org. Such resources are
useful, but the fragmented nature of oversight in some cities means that, with a few
exceptions, parents cannot go to one source to learn about schools across sectors using
metrics that go beyond simple proficiency rates on state tests and student demographics.
The result is that parents may lack sufficient knowledge about the programs and
performance in their current school and their other options to make good choices for their
children, even if they have the motivation to do so.
15
Accountability Challenges
Finally, and perhaps most fundamentally, the fragmented oversight structures
depicted in Figure 2 mean that no single agency is responsible for ensuring that all
families in a city have access to high quality schools. No one oversight agency ensures
that schools open and close where they are needed and that all neighborhoods have access
to good schools.
The divergent preferences and goals of the various actors in high choice cities can
unintentionally lead to supply challenges. For instance, charter authorizers in fragmented
systems arguably make decisions about closing and opening schools based on their own
interests and resource constraints. Since their interests are not perfectly aligned with the
goal of providing a good option to all students, and because they often face serious
resource constraints around facilities, authorizers may sometimes open schools where
they are not needed. Anecdotally, we have heard from both charter authorizers and school
district officials about charter schools that would like to open in an area of need, but are
unable to due to lack of space as well as charter schools that end up opening in areas
where they are arguably not needed (but where space was available).
Beyond these distributional concerns, systems with multiple authorizers may
create quality problems when weak authorizers are allowed to operate without sanction.
In states in which charter authorizers have historically seen little performance
accountability, such as Ohio and Michigan, low-performing schools have been known to
switch authorizers to avoid accountability pressure. For example, in 2012, the Buckeye
Community Hope Foundation did not renew the Academy of Columbus’ charter as a
result of poor performance, but instead of closing, the school applied for a charter with
16
the North Central Ohio Education Service Center, a new authorizer in Ohio, which
approved the school’s charter. While authorizer competition can ensure providers are not
arbitrarily targeted, it can also allow poor performing schools to obtain sponsorship and
remain open.
Strategies for Inducing Collective Action
Charter schools provide some families with an escape from chronically under
performing schools and have delivered improved outcomes for many children (CREDO
2013). But they have also complicated education governance. As charter schools have
matured and expanded, they raise system wide questions that are difficult to address in
cities where governance is fragmented across a multitude of agencies.
While some might use the fragmentation that exists in cities with choice as an
argument to return to the monopolistic school district, city leaders should think creatively
about strategies for inducing greater cooperation across sectors. Hierarchy is neither the
surest nor the only path towards cooperation and as with all things, coordination towards
what end is important. A highly coherent but poorly performing traditional public school
district is probably no better or worse than a highly fragmented poorly performing system
of schools.
Our early experiences observing cities struggling with these issues suggest four
possible approaches for gaining the requisite actions in environments in which no single
actor has the authority, capacity, or credibility to manage the entire system (Table 2):
self-organizing cooperation; financial incentives; mandates; regulating participation.
17
Table 2. Designing a Better System is Possible
Lever
Example
Requires
High levels of civic capacity –
common problem definition,
coalition leader(s)
Willingness to set-aside competitive
interests
Boundary spanners who connect
across organizations and sectors
Self-organizing
coordination.
Coalition of charter and
district leaders voluntarily
adopt common enrollment
system
Create financial
incentives for actors
to cooperate
District provides local levy
Authoritative action by government
money to charter schools who or other actors to incent the behavior
cooperate on key initiatives
Mandate
coordination via a
change in rules
Require participation in
common enrollment system.
Change who is a
party to the
negotiation
Reduce the number of entities Authoritative action by state
with authority to charter
government.
schools
Authoritative action by local or state
government
Self-organizing cooperation strategies are the most informal and flexible. They
can be adapted for different city contexts, size groups, and issues. But, they require that
actors come to a common understanding of the problem and solution. When that
agreement is absent, reform leaders – mayors, advocacy groups, and community
organizers – can play an important role reframing problems and finding common ground.
In the District of Columbia, for example, an official in the mayor’s office who had stints
in both the charter and district sectors was instrumental in getting the Public Charter
School Board and District of Columbia Public Schools to come to a common
18
understanding about the need for a common enrollment system that would span both
sectors. Such mobilization strategies are, of course, hard to implement when reform
leadership is weak or lacks the support of one or more actors, as in Detroit where the
formal actors in the city – the district, charter authorizers, and the EAA -- lack the
legitimacy to create the requisite shared understanding.
Incentives take a more instrumental approach to collective action, imposing costs
or providing benefits to those who agree to cooperate. For example, leaders in Columbus
have proposed giving local levy money to high performing charter schools that agree to
locate in under-served neighborhoods (the proposal suffered voter defeat). Similarly,
district leaders in Cleveland offer levy funds to charter schools that choose to partner
with the district, even if they are authorized by another agency. While incentives offer
the advantage of “hidden hand” coordination and rely upon voluntary actions, someone –
a lead agency or coalition of groups – must decide to offer the incentives and then secure
the required resources.
In contrast to using self-organization and incentives to produce coordination,
mandates and formal governance changes both require someone with authority – usually
state government – to act. To return to the example of common enrollment, the Recovery
School District in New Orleans used its authority to mandate the bulk of charter schools
in the city to participate in a common enrollment system. Similarly, states have mandated
that schools across sectors teach to the Common Core State Standards and use particular
assessments, such as the Partnership for Assessment of Readiness for College Careers
(PARCC). In these cases, rather than secure agreement through persuasion and
negotiation, lead agencies were able to use mandates and top-down decision making to
19
coordinate across schools and sectors.
As the governance landscape shown in Figure 3 reveals, many American cities
confront a variety of actors responsible for oversight of city schools. These actors can
include both a multitude of school districts and charter school authorizers. In some cases,
formal governance change may be necessary to solve the collective action problems that
plague public education, in essence by reducing the number of actors involved. This is
especially true in cases where civic capacity is weak, rendering more informal means of
partnership nearly impossible. At the same time, formal governance change is clearly not
a panacea. In Baltimore, for example, the district’s centralized decision-making
apparatus has not led to a cross-sector enrollment system that streamlines choice for
parents.
Conclusion
In this essay we have documented the substantial fragmentation in education
governance that exists in cities with significant charter markets. The reality facing many
cities today suggests that analyses that focus only on school districts or charter schools
belies a far more complex and layered reality. In many cities today, education governance
involves and is determined by many different actors. Only by extending our focus to
include the system of public schools will we be able to identify solutions to the collective
action problems that matter most to the parents who must navigate it.
20
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