OIF

[Kenneth L. Denman is apart of the Institute of Ocean Sciences in Canada, “Climate change, ocean processes and ocean ¶ iron fertilization,” http://www.econscience.org/blog/wpcontent/uploads/2008/11/mepsv364fertilizationtheme.pdf#page=7, JMak]
There are several known possible side effects of ¶ large-scale iron fertilization. but we have little lmowl¶ edge of their potential magnitudes. (1)
Increased re-
¶
mineralization, mostly within the 500 m below the
¶
euphotic zone, requires dissolved oxygen at a rate of
¶
O¢:C near 1.5:1
[mol:mol). Box models (and Sarmiento ¶ & Orr 1991) predicted wide areas of the subsurface ¶ ocean becoming anmdc under large-scale continuous ¶ fertilization. but as the magnitude of projected seques-
¶
tration has decreased, anoxic regions have been
¶
replaced by low oxygen regions. [2
] More importantly
¶ for climate change, increased remineralization results
¶
in increased denitrification and production of N10. the
¶
third most plentiful long-lived greenhouse gas affected
¶
by anthropogenic activities
. We do not yet have reli¶ able estimates of magnitudes of this source at the ¶ global scale [Law
2008, this 'I'heme Section). [3]
The
¶
productivity and structure of marine ecosystems would
¶
change.
Projections by Gnanadesikan et al. (2003), ¶ Aumont & Bopp (2006). and Zahariev et aL (2008) all ¶ indicate a reduction in primary production and in bio¶ logical export of carbon on the multi-decadal to cen¶ tury timescale, due to the reduction in available ¶ macronutrienls returning to the surface ocean. Over
¶
large scales this reduction could translate into a reduc-
¶
tion in harvestable marine resources. lron fertilization ¶ also alters the species composition of phytoplankton ¶ (at least temporarily in the short-term fertilization ¶ experiments conducted to date).
Initially, there may
¶
be an increase in smaller phytoplankton abundance,
¶ but after a week or more, the increasing biomass
¶
of diatoms dominates that of all other phyto-
¶
plankton groups
(Marchetti et al. 2006. for the 2002 ¶ Subarctic Ecosystem Response to lron Enrichment ¶
Study [SERIES]). Sustained fertilization would favour ¶ diatoms and hence. through grazing transfers, cope¶ pods over smaller micromooplankton; towards the end ¶ of the SERIES observation period. Tsuda et al. [2006] ¶ observed a migration upwards into the patch of some species of mesozooplankton, as well as an increase in
¶
nauplii and larvae of some species, hypothesized to be
¶
due to reduced grazing on them.
A shift to diatoms
¶
results in greater drawdown of silicic acid relative to
¶ nitrate (Boyd et al. 2004), a process that could not con-
¶
tinue over an extended fertilization.
¶
Production of the climate-active gas dimethylsulfide
¶
(DMS) is also altered by iron fertilization
. ll: precursor.
¶
dimethylsulfonioproprionate [DMSP], is produced by
¶
some species of phytoplankton. Some DMS outgasses
¶
to the atmosphere and is the largest natural source ¶ term in the global atmospheric sulphur budget. DMS ¶ stimulates the formation of cloud condensation nuclei ¶ (Liss et al. 2005). Several of the iron fertilization exper¶ iments showed a short-term increase in surface ocean
¶
DMS concentrations (Boyd et al. 2007), but following
¶
that increase, the SERIES experiment showed a
¶
decrease of DMS in the patch relative to concentra¶ tions outside the patch [Levasseur et al. 2006).
As the
¶
diatoms (which produce little
DMSP] out-competed
¶
other functional groups of phytoplankton, they appar-
¶
ently displaced
DMSP-producing species
[Steiner &
¶
Denman 2008
)
. Because most iron-fertilized patches
¶
have been observed for less than 1 mo, we have no
¶
information on what magnitude longer-term changes
¶
in ecosystem structure and function might be. Boyd et ¶ al. (2008) conclude that our quantitative understanding ¶ of the adaptability of phytoplankton based on observa¶ tions from field and laboratory studies is inadequate to ¶ forecast their responses to ‘slow’ changes in their envi¶ ronment. such as those forecasted for the Southern ¶ Ocean over the next 2 decades.
¶
The fourth known possible side effect of largescale
¶
iron fertilization is the issue of increasing ocean acid-
¶
ity; CO1 added to the ocean rapidly dissolves and dis-
¶
sodates into bicarbonate and carbonate ions, adding
¶
H‘ ions (Le. protons) to the oceans, thereby reducing
¶
pH and increasing addity. Stimulating increased se-
¶
questration of CO; to the oceans through widespread
¶
successful iron fertilization would increase the cumula-
¶
tive acidity more rapidly and would change the depth
¶
distribution of remineralization back to DIC
.
Argu-
¶
ments that this CO; will end up in the ocean eventually
¶
even without fertilization ignore the scientific issue of
¶
how quickly marine organisms can adapt. through
¶
diversity of species occupying an ecological niche (e.g.
¶ calcifiers such as coccolithophores). diversity within ¶ species [physiological
‘plasticity'), and through genetic
¶
mutations. The more rapidly pH decreases, either in
¶
the surface layer or at depth where there is increased ¶ remineralization due to fertilization, the more likely it ¶
is that organisms will be unable to adapt. both to the remineralization due to fertilization, the more likely it
¶
is that organisms will be

unable to adapt, both to the
¶
increased acidity and. in the subsurface zones of in-
¶
creased remineralization, to the related decrease in
¶
dissolved oxygen.
[Joe Romm is a Fellow at American Progress and is the Founding Editor of Climate Progress, which New York Times columnist Tom Friedman called "the indispensable blog" and Time magazine named one of the 25 "Best Blogs of 2010," “Yet Another
Geoengineering Scheme, Ocean Iron Fertilization, Could Backfire,” http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2013/07/10/2150931/anothergeoengineering-scheme-ocean-iron-fertilization-could-backfire/, JMak]
Can we save the planet by ruining it (even more)? Argonne National Laboratory reports that “
A new study on the feeding habits of ocean microbes calls into question the potential use of algal blooms to trap carbon dioxide and offset rising global levels
.” ¶ Four years ago, the journal Nature published a piece arguing that
“ fertilizing the oceans with iron
to stimulate phytoplankton blooms, absorb carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and export carbon to the deep sea — should be abandoned
.” ¶ Now Argonne Lab reports so-called iron fertilization “ may have only a short-lived environmental benefi t. And, the process may actually reduce over the longterm how much CO2 the ocean can trap
.” ¶ The more you know about geo-engineering, the less sense it makes (see
Science: “Optimism about a geoengineered ‘easy way out’ should be tempered by examination of currently observed climate changes”). The most “plausible” approach, massive aerosol injection, has potentially catastrophic impacts of its own and can’t possibly substitute for the most aggressive mitigation — see here. And for the deniers, geo-engineering is mostly just a ploy — see
British coal industry flack pushes geo-engineering “ploy” to give politicians “viable reason to do nothing” about global warming.
¶
Geoengineering is a problem in search of a problem. As the NY Times reported in 2011: ¶ At the influential blog Climate Progress, Joe
Romm, a fellow at the Center for American Progress, has made a similar point, likening geo-engineering to a dangerous course of chemotherapy and radiation to treat a condition curable through diet and exercise — or, in this case, emissions reduction.
¶ You can find my previous writings on geo-engineering here. See in particular Martin Bunzl on “ the definitive killer objection to geoengineering as even a temporary fix
.” ¶
Geo-engineering is a “smoke and mirrors solution,
” though most people understand that the “mirrors” strategy is prohibitively expensive and impractical. One of the few remaining non-aerosol strategies still taken seriously by some is ocean fertilization
. But it is no better than the rest
¶ As the
2009 Nature piece explained: ¶ The intended effect of ocean iron fertilization
for geoengineering is to significantly disrupt marine ecosystems
. The explicit goal is to stimulate blooms of relatively large phytoplankton that are usually not abundant, because carbon produced by such species is more likely to sink eventually to the deep ocean.
This shift at the base of the food web would propagate throughout the ocean ecosystem in unpredictable ways
.
Moreover, nutrients such as nitrogen and phosphorus would sink along with the carbon
, altering biogeochemical and ecological relationships throughout the system. Some models predict that ocean fertilization on a global scale would result in large regions of the ocean being starved of oxygen, dramatically affecting marine organisms from microbes to fish
. Ecological disruption is the very mechanism by which iron fertilization would sequester carbon.
¶ Argonne’s study finds another problem — ocean iron fertilization may have no positive climate impact and might even make things worse
: ¶ These blooms contain iron-eating microscopic phytoplankton that absorb C02 from the air through the process of photosynthesis and provide nutrients for marine life. But one type of phytoplankton, a diatom, is using more iron that it needs for photosynthesis
and storing the extra in its silica skeletons and shells, according to an X-ray analysis of phytoplankton conducted at the U.S. Department of Energy’s
Argonne National Laboratory.
This reduces the amount of iron left over to support the carbon-eating plankton
….
¶
Rather than feed the growth of extra plankton, triggering algal blooms, the iron fertilization may instead stimulate the gluttonous diatoms to take up even more iron to build larger shells
. When the shells get large enough, they sink to the ocean floor, sequestering the iron and starving off the diatom’s plankton peers.
¶
Over time, this reduction in the amount of iron in surface waters could trigger the growth of microbial populations that require less iron for nutrients, reducing the amount of phytoplankton blooms available to take in CO2 and to feed marine life
.
¶ If only there were a way to prevent catastrophic global warming that didn’t risk making things worse ….

[Long Cao is a Professor, Department of Earth Sciences, Zhejiang University doctoral tutor and works at¶ Zhejiang University, Institute of Meteorological Information and Prediction, Kenneth Caldeira is an atmospheric scientist who works at the Carnegie Institution for Science's Department of Global Ecology, “Can ocean iron fertilization mitigate¶ ocean acidification?” pp. 7-8, JMak]
We analyze extreme cases to illustrate basic logic and principles relating iron
¶
fertilization and ocean acidification.
Our results show that ocean fertilization can at
¶
best play a minor role in mitigating surface ocean acidification.
If this fertilization is
¶
used to generate credits that will allow greater carbon dioxide emissions
, there may
¶ be no benefit to upper ocean chemistry
. In all cases, ocean fertilization would lead to
¶
greater acidification of the deep ocean
. Our results have broader implications for carbon emission “offsets” schemes. If ¶ carbon is removed from the atmosphere and stored in, for example, a forest, and no ¶ carbon “offset” is generated (i.e., the storage does not lead to greater emissions),
¶
then the storage of carbon in the forest will tend to result in lower atmospheric CO2
¶ concentrations, less warming, and less ocean acidification. However, if the storage ¶ of carbon in the forest generates a carbon
“offset” that leads to greater fossil-fuel ¶ emissions, then the storage of carbon in the forest may provide economic benefits ¶ by allowing greater amounts of energy to be derived from carbon-emitting sources,
¶
but will provide no direct benefit to lowering atmospheric CO2 concentrations, ¶ diminishing warming, or reducing ocean acidification. Similarly, if the storage of ¶ carbon due to direct ocean carbon sequestration is used to generate emission credit, ¶ ocean carbon sequestration will provide no benefit to surface ocean acidification
. Of ¶ course, intermediate cases are imaginable in which each ton of carbon stored in the ¶ ocean through iron fertilization produces less than 1 ton of carbon credit, or where ¶ the existence of the ocean fertilization option somehow leads to the negotiation of ¶ more stringent limits on carbon emissions generally. Therefore, whether the carbon
¶
storage benefits the environment or the economy depends on the socio-political
¶
context in which carbon storage occurs. In summary, our study demonstrates, that ocean iron fertilization can only
¶
slightly mitigate surface ocean acidification caused by anthropogenic CO; emis-
¶
sions, and at the expense of accelerated acidification in the deep ocean
.
In the
¶
context of a carbon-emission offset scheme, ocean iron fertilization could lead to
¶
further acidification of the deep ocean without mitigating surface ocean chemistry
¶
change.
Small-scale fertilization experiments can be useful to help understand the ¶ role of nutrients in marine biogeochemical cycles. However, as suggested by our
¶
simulations ocean iron fertilization is unlikely to be effective for either climate or
¶
ocean chemistry mitigation
.
If ocean iron fertilization is implemented in generating
¶
carbon credits which lead to a corresponding increase in fossil-fuel emissions, it
¶
would cause further pollution to the deep ocean without conferring any environ-
¶ mental benefit.
[Mongabay.com seeks to raise interest in and appreciation of wild lands and wildlife, while examining the impact of emerging trends in climate, technology, economics, and finance on conservation and development, “Eruption yields bad news for iron fertilization-based geoengineering schemes,” http://news.mongabay.com/2013/0322-iron-fertilizationfail.html#bXKxlciYqv0jJIDi.99, JMak]
Geoengineering schemes that aim to slow global warming by seeding oceans with iron to boost carbon dioxideabsorbing phytoplankton may not lead to long-term sequestration of the important greenhouse gas
, finds a new study published in the journal Geophysical Research Letters. ¶ The research looked at the impact of the 2010 eruption of
Eyjafjallajökull volcano, which released large amounts of iron in the North Atlantic near
Iceland.
Some researchers speculated that iron fertilization would lead to a large-scale plankton bloom that would absorb massive amounts of CO2 from the atmosphere, helping fight climate change. ¶ The new study however dealt another blow to those hopes. The researchers found that the iron fertilization effect quickly died out due to the rapid depletion of nitrate from the upper layers of the ocean, depriving the phytoplankton of nitrogen, a critical nutrient needed for growth
. ¶ “The additional removal of carbon by the ash-stimulated phytoplankton was therefore only 15 to 20 per cent higher than in other years making for a significant, but short-lived change to the biogeochemistry of the Iceland Basi n,” said study lead author Eric
Achterberg of the National Oceanography Centre in the U.K.
¶
The results are consistent with other research
. A 2009

study published in Nature found that carbon uptake after iron fertilization was 80 times lower than suggested by earlier research.
That study also involved the National Oceanography Centre. ¶ "You might get a different response if you shock the system by dumping a lot of iron all at once,
" Raymond Pollard of the National Oceanography Centre told Nature News at the time. "
The effect will still be much smaller than some geoengineers would wish
."
¶
"
O cean i ron f ertilization is simply no longer to be taken as a viable option for mitigation of the CO2 problem
,"
Hein de Baar, an oceanographer at the Royal Netherlands Institute for Sea Research in Texel, was quoted as saying by Nature News.
¶ In 2008 Planktos, a private firm which sought to sell carbon offsets from iron fertilization in the ocean, was thwarted by lack of funding after concerns were raised over the environmental impacts. The company's cofounder conducted an iron fertilization experiment in 2012 despite strong objections from greens.
¶
Read more at http://news.mongabay.com/2013/0322-iron-fertilizationfail.html#bXKxlciYqv0jJIDi.99
[
James Crabbe is Executive Dean of the Faculty of Creative Arts, Technologies and Science and Professor of
Biochemistry at the University of Bedfordshire, “Modelling effects of geoengineering options in response to climate change and global warming: Implications for coral,” Computational Biology and Chemistryreefshttp,
://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1476927109001054, JMak]
Iron fertilisation
of macronutrient-rich but biologically unproductive ocean waters has been proposed for sequestering anthropogenic CO2
(Buesseler et al., 2004 and Zeebe and Archer, 2005).
The first carbon export measurements in the Southern Ocean—Iron Experiment (SOFeX) yielded c. 900 tons carbon exported per 1.26 tons Fe added. Carbon cycle modelling suggested that if 20% of the world's surface ocean were fertilised 15 times per year until 2100, that would reduce atmospheric CO2 by ≤15 ppmv at an expected level of c. 700 ppmv for business-as-usual scenarios. Thus based on these results, large-scale oceanic iron fertilisation appears not to be a feasible strategy to sequester anthropogenic CO2
(Zeebe and Archer, 2005). In addition, side effects might
include a
long-term reduction in ocean productivity worldwide, alteration in marine food webs, a more rapid increase in
ocean acidity, and potentially increased production of the third most important long-lived greenhouse gas N2O
, from the increased downward export of organic carbon particles (Saito et al., 2006, Denman, 2008 and Lampitt et al., 2008).

(Vincent, assistant prof of French @ Emory Univ., Paroles En L’air: Climate Change
and the Science of Fables, diacritics Vol 41.3, 2013, pgs 60-79)//mm
The controversial human engineering proposal signed by Matthew Liao, Anders Sand berg, and
Rebecca Roache is equally demanding in that respect. In their paper “Human Engineering and
Climate Change” they explore biotechnological alternatives to programs that seek marketregulated behavioral change to address global warming, and to equally controversial
geoengineering programs that seek to cool the planet through Solar Radiation Management.
The suggestions range from the distribution of pharmaceutical patches to induce a meat intolerance that enables individuals to become vegetarians and thus participate actively in the reduction of livestock farming, and oxytocin treatment to enhance altruism and empathy— precious qualities in times of scarcity—to more radical genetic modifications. These measures, insist the authors, would not be forced upon a population but would be encouraged through tax breaks or sponsored healthcare incentives.49 I am not quite sure what to say about this text, or how to respond to it, other than with a yes, no, or perhaps, based on a review of its assessment of risks and benefits. But this reaction would only concern the suggested measures, not the
form of the proposal itself in its inventiveness. Any answer to the question of what biotechnology can or cannot do based on the rationale of risk assessments is already part, if not
the product, of the bioethicist machine . These measures belong to the corpus of modern panoplies accomplishing the transformability, reformability, and reasoning of bodies through a
scriptural machine . Conspicuously remodeling the bios involved in bioethics, biopolitics , and biotechnology, the transformations Liao’s measures promote are taking place in a time when, much like in Lyotard’s fable of biotechnological escalation , there would be no fundamental difference between a Bildung project and a slow—too slow according to Liao—self-formation process cultivating human potential through the arts and humanities, along with the bio- chemical facilitation that accelerates behavioral change.50 This reformative effort, writes de
Certeau, preceded the historical form that writing has taken in modern times. It will outlive this particular form. It is interwoven into this form and determines it like a continuing archaeology whose name and status we are unable to determine. What is at stake is the relation between the law and the body—a body is itself defined, delimited, and articulated by what writes it.51 In that sense, when it comes to the bioengineering proposal, the only thing I can talk about concerns “the relation between the delimitation of a field . . . or a system . . . and what it constitutes as its outside or its remainder” or, in other words, the relation between human engineering as a field of operations and the desire or the need “to make our bodies the emblems of an identifying law.”52 I cannot stop the machine but I can say that Liao and his coauthors renew a kind of belief in the history of fables translating discursive surplus into
manageable values . They renew the form of an expertise in fiction. By doing so, they create a system of constraints along with a domain of possibilities. They come up with a new range of

answers to Foucault’s question: “How can one reduce the great peril, the great danger with which fiction threatens our world?”53 Almost apologetic, Liao, Sandberg, and Roache write: We are well aware that our proposal to encourage having smaller, but environmentally- friendlier human beings is prima facie outlandish, and we have made no attempt to avoid provoking this response. There is a good reason for this, namely, we wish to highlight that examining intuitively absurd or apparently drastic ideas can be an important learning experience, and that failing to do so could result in our missing out on opportunities to address important, often urgent, issues.54 Liao’s bioengineering proposal is contained in a box made of competing proposals and options (Solar Radiation Management, ocean fertilization , carbon pricing, etc.). It is not yet approved, or even welcomed as the best possible, or least risky, option; and yet it has not been rejected either. I am not in a position to open the box, in the same way that I cannot tell the offposition from the on-position in Schrödinger’s experiment, but I can intensify the proposal by
reading for its scriptural plot while resituating it in a culture of fiction and the history of the science of fables. The proposal itself functions as one of these theoretical fictions that “tell us that there is no entry or exit for writing, but only the endless play of its fabrications,”55 fictions among which de Certeau placed Kafka’s “In the Penal Colony,” Raymond Roussel’s Locus Solus, and Marcel Duchamp’s celibate machines. In Kafka’s story, access is granted to an antiquated judiciary mechanism designed to enforce /write/project/engrave/inscribe/prescribe the law
directly into the flesh of those who have been found guilty , and to write it in such a way that the body brought before the law perishes in the process, without a trial, unaware of the
charges .56 “In the Penal Colony” grants Lyotard access to a problematization of morals and politics, and by extension to the question of the penitentiary within civil society. I leave aside much of Lyotard’s elaboration of the innocence and infancy of this body before it entered the
(time of the) law and was reclaimed by the legal/lethal apparatus, to jump ahead to the ending and to the return of a certain form of exacting cruelty. The old machine destroys itself before the eyes of the visitor who had been granted access to it, thus making room for the representational machine of politics, an enlightened machine that, unlike the previous one, would permit trials and deliberations. But like the previous one, the new machine would convene a community around its proceedings. The original machine was already old, and its mode of operation in question. The visitor was preparing to report back on its cruelty and spread outrage in the nascent public space of the colony that had sought his services and granted him access to the machine. The narrative feat that brings about the demise of the machine only brings to the fore, and for the naked eye so to speak, what was meant to happen, and may have in fact already happened. As Lyotard remarks at the beginning of his
“intervention,” Kafka’s text doesn’t call for any commentary, which would only diminish both its clarity and its violent quality. One could also argue that there is nothing radically new in
principle in the bioengineering proposal , and again nothing much to say about it, nor to read into it. Liao’s proposal restarts the old moral machine that had been stopped in Kafka’s story. In the updated version, the judicial function is almost entirely absent but the communal spectacle that at once embodies and engineers the obligation, responsibility, prescription, and a certain sense of Anthropocenic citizenship is more pronounced than ever (even if it is blood- less). In a normative world that only knows procedures, technical rationality, and values, an ethics of responsibility ends up being performed by the return of Kafka’s machines. What is left of cruelty if sanguis is not shed to become cruor?57 With Liao, it is not about the body anymore, nor about its indifference regarding the law and the law’s exacting timeliness, even when one of the

proposed measures exposes the unborn, through pre- implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), to select shorter children. That which stands before the cruel machine has been relocated, and cruelty is thus redirected toward a timeless and unmitigated future that does not include us—“a future beyond the grasp of historical sensibility”—to be reclaimed by a moral apparatus.58
Those sudden shifts only happen in fiction, and particularly in fictions that write themselves as fictional machines. The illegible praescripta to be inscribed on the body of the convict become lethal only when the machine reads them; a button is red only if pressed. The machine targets
a scriptural and legal effort that, turning one last time to de Certeau, “preceded the historical form that writing has taken in modern times” and that “will outlive this particular form.” This machine we call fiction stands for that which does, operates, and intervenes without having to be observed doing, operating, and intervening. It is its own archive even when access has been granted to it. For this reason, any machine would dream of being a doomsday device that will keep on ticking, not necessarily indefinitely, but at least until—doomsday or not—there is nothing left to register its movement or notice its fading rustle anymore.59 James Watt’s steam engine achieved that status in a post hoc fashion thanks to Paul Crutzen.60 Even if all working steam engines have disappeared by the time the last observer expires, Watt’s invention will have still been a doomsday device for those who are not there on doomsday to recall the instrument of their demise. Having created “ the future prospects of a genetic genocide ,” Liao and his colleagues may just have set such a machine in motion , for, as George Annas contends,
“given the history of humankind, it is extremely unlikely that we will see the better [or for that matter the shorter] babies . . . as equal in rights and dignity to us, or that they will see us, the
‘naturals,’ as their equals.”61 And so it may be with geoengineering proposals — Alan Robock confides his fears in the same issue of Ethics, Policy and Environment where Liao published his proposal: “
worse scenarios, including
unilateral
.”62 But it is also in light of Liao’s device and its splicing of evolutionary, biotechnological, and historico-legal timelines that normative differentials, such as human rights, may endure in the conjectural ecologies of the
Anthropocene.63 Policy relevance is very much a new frontier in the humanistic and social humanistic culture of research. And it is so perhaps because of the way it adjusts forms of inquiry to meet demands for meaning. It is new as far as “the future appears as a contingent set of possibilities about which decisions are demanded; decisions are demanded because the
future appears as something about which we must do something .”64 As such—and because adjustments entail delays, mishaps, and replays—the historicity of policy relevance, as an
object of discourse and an object of desire, must not be ignored by literary scholars even if they cannot decide on the definitional status of policy relevance within relations of power.
However, when it comes to policy relevance in its modalities of existence, as well as its nondefinitional dimension and exteriority relative to the reality it seeks to transform, protocols of intervention and renunciation remain to be invented, textual competencies to be conceived. It is less a plea to make literary criticism policy relevant, or a praise of its functional policy irrelevance in a knowledge economy driven by risk management, and more a memorandum of understanding for what the governance of futurity invests in—or attaches to—the cultivation of difference in forms of inquiry, and for the kind of comparative work, notional distinctions, and forms of life that might sanction the description of emergent orders of difference. If there is a definitional outcome to this Anthropocenic sequencing of artifacts, it may be found in the

distinction between survival techniques and what Freud in Civilization and Its Discontents calls
“techniques of living.” A policy-relevant view of Svalbard, Liao’s proposal, and demands for sustainability would see each of these as survival techniques necessary for the management of life after good life. Seen from the perspective of those “systemics of development” that, according to Bill Readings commenting on “Oikos,” are now “the general horizon under which . .
. all forms of life are being subsumed,”65 Svalbard, Liao’s biotech proposal, and their respective demands for sustainability, are all techniques of living. They “stylize [our] capacity for sensefeeling and awareness.”66 They manner sentience—where insentience is “not necessarily the nonawareness of a dead thing [but] also the opacity, to us, of the inhuman structures that structure the human, and emerge in our artifacts.”67 And through this operation, they define zones of interest in life, rather than ways “to keep death—or the wrong kind of death—at bay.”68 It is in this manner that the Anthropocene project leaves us with something interesting to read. Policy relevance relies on the ability to “imagine the calibration of exchange by means of abstract instruments,”69 and on the particular regulatory, authoritative exchange of forms of expertise. But what is of interest is precisely the relation of policy relevance “to the living,
which is to say dying, beings who create them ,”70 especially as it mediates their life interests.
Likewise, what systemics of development will leave us with, “if we are sent to space after the
explosion of the sun ”71 in a final send-off, is less a matter of carbon life, finitude, and survival, than of an obligation toward the philologies and those other techniques, disciplines, institutions, architectures, proposals, policies, and narratives of the “once we had been sent to space,” that interest us in our fables.

“There is a convergence in commercial and scientific interests when it comes to geoengineering in general.
When it comes to OIF, I think the case is less strong. You have responsible experiments done by respectable scientists, such as the Lohafex experiments which are closely regulated, and then you have the so-called rogue geoengineer Russ George who is out there doing things, which don’t have very much scientific merit and are motivated by making money
. Some of the respectable scientists involved in geoengineering research are horrified at Russ George because it brings them into disrepute.” ¶ “Science is not a monolithic thing.
There isn’t 'no science' or 'more science'. There are different kinds of science. [...] Science that is asking an engineering question are hypotheses driven by 'does this prototype work
?' [...] but, that is not the same kind of science as ‘how does the ocean work?’
And so, to say, yes, 'we need more science', and to have that coming from a private company investing money in trying to make money from this, I don’t buy it. And I question that. Yes, I question the profit motive.
” ¶ I live in Stanford, most of the other people around me are engaged in start-ups. They want to start their businesses. They want to start them as entrepreneurs to develop things that people need and will buy so that they can make money. And that’s great, and that’s how capitalism works and I have problems with capitalism but that’s how that system functions.
¶ “Now, when we start looking at that from the perspective of iron fertilization, understanding more fundamentally about how iron biogeochemistry works in the ocean is not a start-up idea. That is a ‘how does the ocean work?’ question. And we should do more science along those lines
.”
¶
“Without a doubt
, the commercial angle was a central focus
and a central objection
[to OIF],
coming from the fact that geoengineering itself was generally objected to by many folks. The commercial angle certainly didn't help. I’m not quite sure exactly if I understand why that happened. When you look at other things, we have no problem using commercial vehicles to fund wild forestries and many of the other carbon reductions are funded under
CDM are commercial in nature. It was really this notion of geoengineering at scale and some of the things that were done early on
[like Russ George] that put the wrong light and led to a high level of scrutiny. ” ¶ “The carbon market was seen as an acceptable way of reducing GHG emissions, because people don’t like rigid judicial frameworks. The EU Commission defended and promoted carbon market. [...] The only thing we managed to do is to attract malicious people that exploited the flaws of the carbon market. Now, nobody wants to respect the rules of the game and prices are too low. But we don’t have many choices: geoengineering or judicial framework.” ¶ “
Ocean iron fertilization is a great place to look at that, the results of all the studies that have happened so far loudly and clearly say that this is not a technique that works, it’s not safe and that this is not a technique that we should follow
. However, there are commercial interests who do not want to accept that and that have been organizing to keep the debate open
. In the case of Climos, which was one of the private companies which wanted to get carbon credits, they ended up creating science venture to move ahead with open air experimentation and make that a norm.
So they have commerce organizing science ultimately to get back to their business model. Again, this was the same that happened with Russ George and his claim about restoring salmon population in Canada and managed to raise money from the indigenous people.”

— Mike Hulme, School of Environmental Science, UEA, Norwich and Tyndall Centre for
Climate Change Research, 2008 (“The conquering of climate: discourses of fear and their dissolution,” The Geographical Journal, February 22th, Vol. 174, Iss. 1, Available Online at doi: 10.1111/j.1475-4959.2008.00266.x, pg. 12-13, Accessed 07-19-14)
Conquering climate through mastery A number of prospective routes for conquering climatic change are conventionally held out to us, all of them variants on the idea of
‘engineering’– geo-engineering, political engineering and social engineering – and all of them with connotations of global control and mastery of the climatic future.5 The idea of large-scale deliberate intervention in the functioning of the Earth's climate system to engineer a desirable climate outcome has a long history which is well explored in
Fleming (2006a). He identifies three cycles of promise and hype – of seeking mastery over the climate – starting in the nineteenth century and culminating in the ideas of geo-engineering our way out of global warming mooted in recent years (e.g. Morton
2007). Various schemes have been proposed – for example fertilising the southern oceans to enhance carbon uptake, deflector mirrors in orbit around the Earth, aerosol emissions into the stratosphere – and some have even been evaluated formally inside climate models (e.g. Crutzen 2007). All of these schemes carry an element of hubris and: by emphasising the purely technical or economic aspects of strategies of weather and climate control, bypassing understanding and prediction and neglecting the human dimensions . . . we are in danger of entering a new cycle of discourse saturated with hype, the heirs of an impoverished debate. Fleming (2006a, 15) A second variant of the engineering route out of the discourse of catastrophe involves a systematic attempt to align the institutions of international science, environmental management, governance and diplomacy to find rational alliances of interest which can deliver a global climate regime – what we might call ‘geopolitical engineering’. This brings together the insights of Earth system scientists and technologists (e.g. the vision outlined by Hall and
O’Connell 2007) with those of political scientists and economists to yield a system which Frank Biermann has labelled ‘Earth system governance’ (Biermann 2007). This vision (implicitly) underpins the structure of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, the subsequent Kyoto Protocol, the Stern Review and the new round of international negotiations and diplomacy seeking a new post-2012 global climate change settlement. The framing of climate change as a problem of ‘climate stabilisation’ is an outcome of this way of thinking (as traced by Boykoff et al. 2008; also Oels 2005). A successful outcome to this governance project demands a degree of optimism unfounded on the evidence of progress achieved to date. If geopolitical engineering is a top-down route for averting climate catastrophe, then it is perhaps complemented by a third engineering route, namely the purposeful manipulation of lifestyles and consumption habits – bottom-up ‘social engineering’. Social marketing campaigns (e.g. by Defra in the UK; see Linder
2006) are attempts to change individual behaviour and social consumption habits in favour of lower carbon emissions. The call for mass participation in global events, such as Live Earth (July 2007), is further demonstration of a desire to achieve climatic goals through social engineering. Social movements, such as the international Cities for Climate Protection campaign (Slocum 2004) and the Stop Climate Chaos campaign in the UK, are also part of these purposeful attempts to defuse climate catastrophe, as is Paul
Hawken's book Blessed unrest (2007). The limits to this type of mass social engineering, however, are revealed through work in social and behavioural psychology (see Baron 2006; Weber 2006). Reading climate change through culture These three caricatures of
‘engineering’ approaches for defusing the discourse of climate catastrophe –
geo-engineering, geopolitical engineering, social engineering – all bear the language of control and mastery over climate. This mastery is exercised over, respectively, the planet directly, the institutions of governance or the choices and behaviour of individuals. These approaches suggest that climate is an objective reality to be manipulated through material

intervention. They imply an unambiguous separation between Nature and culture.
Taken at face value these projects all echo the hubris of Ellsworth Huntington from 1915: ‘If we can conquer climate, the whole world will become stronger and nobler’ (1915/2001, 294). It seems unlikely that any of these global mega-engineering projects will offer the salvation that is sought (Fleming 2006b). An alternative way to appreciate our fears about the climatic future, and hence to suggest an un-engineered route out of these fears, is to read climate through culture (e.g. O’Riordan and Jordan 1999; Golinksi 2007). The fear of unknown climatic causes was dissolved through Enlightenment rationality and the fear of unknown climatic places was dissolved through the collapse of the Imperial project. If we can read our contemporary discourse of climate catastrophe as embedded in, and shaped by, contemporary culture, might we thus offer the prospect of re-situating these fears about the climatic future as cultures change? It is perhaps in this direction that Steve Yearley is pointing when he distinguishes between the
‘substantivist’ position on environmental risks and those who take a symbolic reading of them (Yearley 2006). The former position would see the fears associated with prospective climate change as material and dominant, whereas the latter would place these fears as symbolic and recessive, situated in a psychological deficit, as we see our intuitive sense of Nature – in this case our sense of natural climate – dissembled. For Yearley, ‘we need to read the cultural message [of climate change] for its underlying content’
(2006, 14). Two such cultural readings most immediately present themselves. Andrew Ross (1991) was one of the first commentators to put global warming into the context of the globalising tendencies of the post-1980s, tendencies which have recently been caricatured as the ‘creative destruction’ of neo-liberalism by Harvey (2006). We noted earlier the significance of the collapse of Communism in 1989 for the emergence of the discourse of climate catastrophe – fears were transferred from nuclear apocalypse to climate apocalypse – but Ross extends his analysis further by suggesting that the very construction of the idea of a
‘global climate’ in the 1980s, one that could be measured and monitored, was contingent upon the wider globalisation movement.
‘Instead of feeling the weather as we have felt it historically, as part of a shared local, or even national culture, we are encouraged to think of it globally’ (Ross 1991, 25). This interconnectedness between globalisation, ideology and the global environment has also been explored by Dalby (2007), and for him the discourse of global climate catastrophe cannot be understood outside this particular geopolitical and cultural setting. A second cultural reading of contemporary climate change would use the idea of ecological modernisation as introduced by Hajer (1995). For Hajer, anthropogenic global climate change is an emblematic example of a phenomenon constructed through the interaction of three trends – a material change in environmental conditions, a heightened
ecological consciousness affecting public values, and the growing institutional managerialism of capitalist economies. For Hajer – as for later commentators from science and technology studies (e.g. Millstone 2005; Oels 2005; Demeritt 2006) – an emerging discourse of climate catastrophe reveals more about the struggle for ascendancy between the institutions of science, government, business and civil society than it does about a physical reality waiting to strike
. The contemporary discourse of climate catastrophe may also be tapping into a deeper and non-negotiable human anxiety about the future, an anxiety which is merely attaching itself at the current time to the portended climates of the future – future climates offered up to society by the predictive claims of science. Science has never before offered such putative knowledge of the far future, complete with uncertainty ranges, tipping points and probabilities, and so our fragile and nervous human psyche has latched onto such pronouncements with vigour. ‘Today our expertise and our worries turn towards the weather because our industrious know-how is acting, perhaps catastrophically, on global nature’ (Serres 1995, 27). Climate change provides
a conduit, a lightening rod, for materialising our immaterial angst. Yearley (2006) explores these ‘phenomenology of nature’ worries as exemplified in Bill McKibbin's classic book The end of nature (McKibbin 1989), and as more recently articulated in Jules
Pretty's series of essays The Earth only endures (Pretty 2007).

http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/increase in·crease verb \in-ˈkrēs, ˈin-ˌ\ in·creasedin·creas·ing
Definition of INCREASE intransitive verb
1: to become progressively greater (as in size, amount, number, or intensity)
2: to multiply by the production of young transitive verb
1: to make greater : augment
2 obsolete : enrich
vol 20A p 381
“Increased,” as used in West’s Ann.Cal. Const. art 12, §11, providing that the stock and bonded indebtedness of corporations shall not be increased without the consent of the person holding the larger amount of the stock, does not include or apply to the first creation of bonded indebtedness. To give it such a meaning would be to inject into the provision the word “create.” Union Loan & Trust Co. v.
Southern California Motor Road Co., 51 F 840,850
Dr K V Swaminathan, Waterfalls Institute of Technology Transfer (WITT)
February 2003 Ocean Vistas http://www.witts.org/Ocean_wealth/oceanwealth_01_feb03/wista_oceanwealth_feture.htm
The oceans cover nearly two-thirds of the world's surface area and have profoundly influenced the course of human development. Indeed the great markers in man’s progress around the world are in a large measure the stages in his efforts to master the oceans. Nations and people who are conscious of the almost limitless potential of the oceans. Those who have sought to comprehend its deep mysteries, processes and rhythms and have made efforts to explore and utilize its resources , stand in the van of progress, while those who have been indifferent to the critical role that oceans play in human life and its development, have remained mired in stagnation and backwardness.

[Jeremy Elton Jacquot was a dentist but then he quit, became a reporter for treehugger.com, and got a Ph.D. in
Marine¶ Environmental Biology, with an emphasis on environmental policy and¶ sustainable management, “Giving Geo-Engineering
Another Go: Dumping Limestone into the Oceans to Fight Acidification,” http://www.treehugger.com/clean-technology/giving-geoengineering-another-go-dumping-limestone-into-the-oceans-to-fight-acidification.html, JMak]
Unlike iron fertilization, whose intended aim is to stimulate large phytoplankton blooms in the hopes of increasing atmospheric carbon dioxide draw-down, the main objective of the
University of Toronto's Danny Harvey seems far simpler
(hewing closely to basic chemistry principles): to neutralize increased ocean acidity by adding a base, limestone
. To do so, he proposed dumping huge quantities of powdered limestone -- around 4b tons every year -- into the oceans
; his findings were just published in the Journal of Geophysical Research (h/t Discovery News' Jessica Marshall). A self-regulating carbonate buffering system normally helps keep the ocean's pH constant -- around 8.1 -- by maintaining an equilibrium between the four forms of dissolved carbon dioxide: the gas itself, carbonate ions, bicarbonate ions and carbonic acid. This delicate balance allows the oceans to absorb large amounts of carbon dioxide without much variation in seawater chemistry.
¶
However, the rapid buildup in carbon dioxide levels over the last few decades now threatens to overwhelm the system, with some scientists projecting that pH levels could drop 0.5 units by 2100 -- wiping out most of the world's coral reefs and adversely affecting the majority of marine organisms.
¶
Adding limestone (or calcium carbonate) would have the dual effect of mitigating the process of ocean acidification and increasing carbon sequestration, Harvey discovered, though the latter would predominate
. The reason is that the limestone, by bolstering the carbonate buffering system, allows the surface waters to take up more carbon dioxide. As more is drawn down, however, the neutralizing effect of the calcium carbonate begins to diminish -- resulting in an overall slight decrease in acidity.
¶ This process would take a long time: According to Harvey, it could take several decades (and many hundreds of billions of tons of limestone) before the limestone accomplishes its objective -- and that's assuming everything goes according to his predictions
. Adding the limestone to regions of active upwelling could eventually lead to the sequestration of an additional 0.3b tons of carbon a year, he claims
.
¶
Even assuming its ecological side effects are relatively benign (a big "if"), the scheme has little chance of being implemented, says Ken Caldeira of Stanford
University's Carnegie Institution, who described Harvey's plan as "unrealistic" and a mere "theoretical possibility."
[
James Crabbe is Executive Dean of the Faculty of Creative Arts, Technologies and Science and Professor of
Biochemistry at the University of Bedfordshire, “Modelling effects of geoengineering options in response to climate change and global warming: Implications for coral,” Computational Biology and Chemistryreefshttp,
://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1476927109001054, JMak]
It might be possible to enhance the absorption of CO2 from the atmosphere by adding calcium carbonate
(CaCO3) powder to the ocean and of partially reversing the acidification of the ocean and the decrease in calcite supersaturation resulting from the absorption of anthropogenic
CO2.
¶
CaCO3 could be added to the surface layer in regions where the depth of the boundary between supersaturated and unsaturated water is relatively shallow (250–500 m) and where the upwelling velocity is large
(30–300 m a−1) (Kheshgi, 1995).
The CaCO3 would dissolve within a few 100 m depth below the saturation horizon, and the dissolution products would enter the mixed layer within a few years to decades, facilitating further absorption of CO2 from the atmosphere.
This absorption of

CO2 would largely offset the increase in mixed layer pH and carbonate supersaturation resulting from the upwelling of dissolved limestone powder.
However, if done on a large scale, the reduction in atmospheric CO2 due to absorption of CO2 by the ocean would reduce the amount of CO2 that needs to be absorbed by the mixed layer, thereby allowing a larger net increase in pH and in supersaturation in the regions receiving CaCO3. The reduction in atmospheric pCO2 would cause outgassing of CO2 from ocean regions not subject to addition of CaCO3
, thereby increasing the pH and supersaturation in these regions as well. Geographically optimal application of 4 billion tons of CaCO3 a−
1 (0.48 Gt C a−1) could induce absorption of atmospheric CO2 at a rate of 600 Mt CO2 a−1 after 50 years, 900 Mt CO2 a−1 after 100 years, and 1050 Mt CO2 a−1 after 200 years
One mitigation approach
suggested by ¶ researchers involves
sequestering carbon on ¶ the ocean floor by fertilizing certain ocean
¶
regions with iron
, which can be a limiting ¶ nutrient in these areas. Pollard et al examined ¶ an area of the
Southern Ocean with high ¶ nutrients and low chlorophyll (HNLC) and ¶ found that influxes of terrestrial iron led to ¶ rises in primary productivity (Pollard et al
¶
2009). The resulting phytoplankton blooms
¶
produce more carbon-containing molecules
¶
that then travel through carbon flux and sink ¶ down to be sequestered on the sea floor.
¶ The observation of this phenomenon has ¶ led to proposals from private industry to ¶ utilize iron fertilization as a carbon offset ¶ on a global carbon market. A review of this ¶ plan's effects and side effects is therefore of
¶
timely importance (Cullen & Boyd 2008).
¶
Cullen and Boyd enumerate the main points
¶
of iron fertilization: it will increase primary ¶ productivity in areas of the ocean where ¶ large amount of macronutrients are currently ¶ unused, and thus send more organically-
¶
formed carbon-containing molecules down
¶
into the depths of the ocea n where they
¶
are sequestered as particulates.
Along with
¶
this intended result, these will also occur:
¶
macronutrients will be collected in the deep
¶
ocean with carbon, and become unavailable
¶
downstream in the nutrient flow from the site
¶
of iron fertilization; and oxygen levels at mid-
¶
level depths will decrease as heightened levels
¶
of organic material decompose, and release
¶
CO2.
Iron fertilization could have negative
¶
feedbacks that lessen some of the carbon
¶ capture, and could negatively effect ocean
¶
ecosystem functioning
(Cullen and Boyd ¶ 2008). The addition of powdered limestone
¶
to ocean water to react with carbon dioxide
¶
and form bicarbonate has also been proposed
¶
(Rau and Caldiera 1999; Harvey 2007).
This
¶
would neutralize the acidity of the added
¶
carbon dioxide, as well as push the oceanic
¶
carbon equation towards carbonic acid and ¶ allow for more calcium carbonate to stay
¶
undissolved in the shells of marine life.
The ocean has a large, untapped ability to hold ¶ dissolved bicarbonate, if enough calcium ¶ carbonate (limestone) is made available for ¶ the reaction (Rau et al 2006
). This process
¶
would essentially increase the buffering
¶
capacity of the ocean, by adding carbonate
¶ ion to offset the carbon dioxide absorbed by
¶
the ocean.
Rau et al (2006) calculate that the ¶ ocean could hold enough bicarbonate that ¶ all the carbon in existing fossil fuel stores ¶ could be sequestered.
In fact, this is how past
¶
rises in atmospheric carbon were eventually
¶
modulated, gradually, over millennia
. They
¶
suggest accelerated weathering of limestone at
¶
locations of CO2 production. Harvey (2007)
¶
investigates adding powdered limestone to
¶ areas that would carry it in upwelling current
.
¶
This method could be especially cheap and
¶
effective, and no negative side effects have
¶
been found
, but these issues have not been
¶
thoroughly examined.