The Power of Institutional Legacies
Decentralization in Francophone Africa
**** May 1st, 2006****
Presentation for:
PREM Learning Week
Monday, May 1, 2006
12:30-2:00 pm
The World Bank
Presented by:
Zoé Druilhe, Helene Grandvoinnet
Kai Kaiser, Stefanie Teggemann
Africa Public Sector Group (AFTPR)
Public Sector Group (PRMPS)
Poverty Reduction and Economic
Management (PREM)
Structure of Presentation
• A. Institutional Legacies and Development Outcomes
• B. State Architectures and Decentralization
• Distinguishing Deconcentration/Devolution
• Political, Fiscal, Administrative Dimensions
• Implications for Accountability
• C. Decentralization in Francophone Africa
• D. Common institutional legacies?
• Territorial Administration/Tutelle
• Deconcentrated/Top-down administration
• E. What does this imply for how we approach
decentralization reforms to achieve development
objectives?
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A. The Power of Institutions
• Institutions shape outcomes and paths
– North
– Colonial Origins of Comparative Economic Development
• Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (2001)
– Legal Traditions, Finance, and Growth
• Roman (rule-based) versus Common Law (“organic”) traditions
• LaPorta et. al. (1997, 1998)
• Institutional legacies matter for decentralization reforms
– Explore nature of institutional legacies, forms, pathways
– Understand how these might inform operational work
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Approach of Stocktaking
•Eighteen Francophone
Countries
Spain
Tunisia
Morocco
Algeria
•Four in-depth case studies
Libya
Egypt, Administered by S udan
Chad, Claim ed by Libya
Maur itania
•Burkina Faso
Mali
Niger
Senegal
Chad
Burkina F aso
•Guinea
Sudan
Guinea
Benin
Liberia
Ghana
Ivory Coast Togo
Nigeria
•Madagascar
Djibouti
Ethiopia
Central African Republic
Cam eroon
Somalia
Uganda
Keny a
Rwanda
Dem ocratic R epublic Congo
Gabon
Congo
•Rwanda
Tanzania, United Republic of
•BNPP Supported
Malawi
Angola
N
Zambia
Mozam bique
Zimbabwe
•Collaboration with
Local/Regional Researchers
W
E
Nam ibia Botsw ana
Swaziland
S
1000
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Egypt
W ester n Sahara
0
South A fric a
1000
2000 Miles
Madagasc ar
Why Decentralization?
• If designed well, decentralization can
–
–
–
–
–
Move decision making closer to people (subsidiarity principle)
Enhance efficiency and responsiveness of service delivery
Enhance State Legitimacy/Accountability
Foster innovation/competition
Potentially help alleviate poverty
• But…
– May risk diluting accountability
• Local Capture / corruption
• Unclear assignment of responsibilities
– Lack of Capacity
• Human and fiscal resources
– Increased Disparities
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Deconcentration versus Devolution
Large variety of state structures and thus accountability models
Deconcentration
Political
Fiscal
Administrative
Heads are appointed
No fiscal
autonomy
No Control over Civil
Service (either local or
own staff)
Legislative and
Executive are elected
Local Taxation
Autonomy/Local
Budget
Preferences
Control over Civil
Service (Hiring, Firing)
Responsibilities over certain
services/functions transferred to branch
offices with greater autonomy
Devolution
Transfer of authority for decision making,
finance and management to quasiautonomous units of local government
(typically across sectors)
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The Accountability Triangle
POLICY-MAKERS
VO
POLICY-MAKERS
Local Level
DECONCENTRATION
PROVIDERS
&FRONTLINE
ORGANIZATIONS
CITIZENS
& USERS
CLIENT POWER
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S
CT
PA
M
CO
E
IC
C. Decentralization in Francophone Africa
Devolution remains limited in Africa (e.g., fiscal)
Francophone and Lusophone Africa rank particularly low
(World Bank, 2002)
History of decentralization in Francophone Africa
• Less autonomy under colonization (Direct Rule)
• After independence:
• Continuation of French public administration system
• Strong/Authoritarian States
• Wave of decentralization in early 1990s (political liberalization)
And today?
• Gradualism
• Deconcentration and Decentralization strategies in parallel
• Political resistance and lack of political will
• Inherited distrust towards decentralization?
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Political Devolution at the Commune level is incomplete
• Communes as building blocks of local government
• Full communalization in 11/18 countries
• Elections of assembly/council and executive in 11/18
Elections, communes
Population communalized
Assembly/Co
uncil Elected
Executive
elected
100%
Benin, Burkina,
Cameroon, Gabon,
Madagascar, Mali,
Mauritanie, Niger,
Rwanda, Senegal
X
X
X
Guinea
X
No
X
Cote Ivoire
X
X
X
Congo
Burundi, Chad,
DRC, RCA, Togo
No
No
X
No
No
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40-60%
-30%
X
State Structure is under construction
Creation of intermediate devolved levels
• But communalization is incomplete
• Intermediate levels are not devolved
• Intermediate levels are rarely operational
Creation of intermediate deconcentrated levels
• Administrative parallelism
• Lack of rationalization
The Example of Burkina Faso
For years, the state architecture was not clear, while the country was only half communalized.
• 1998. Province is deconcentrated and devolved
• 2001. Region is deconcentrated and devolved
In 2004, the New Code des Collectivites states that BF has 2 devolved levels (Regions,
Communes) and 3 administrative levels (Regions, Provinces, departments)
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Fiscal Devolution is Limited
•
•
•
•
Low rates of fiscal devolution (<5% national fiscal rev.)
Transfers are low (or inexistent) and not timely
Transfers rarely transparent, predictable, formula- based
Investment transfers are scarce
Transfers to local governments, 2001
% of budget
(2001)
% of current
Transfers
revenue (2001) determined by
the law?
Discretionary
Amount is
conditional (C )
(D) or
according to or or unconditional
Automatic (A)
ad hoc
(Unc)
Benin
3%
2%
no
D
Ad hoc
Unc
Burkina
NA
7%
yes
D
Formula
Unc
Cote d'Ivoire
14%
15%
yes
D
Formula
both
Mali
14%
9%
yes
D
Ad hoc
Unc
Niger
4%
2%
Yes
A
Formula
Both
Senegal
9%
11%
Yes
A
Formula
Unc
Togo
0%
0%
Yes
D
Ad Hoc
Unc
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D. Common institutional legacies?
•French Legacy of Centralized State
•A uniform, unitary and centralized State
•Apparent distrust of decentralization
•Prevalence of Tutelle and Territorial Administration
•Strong emphasis on rules based controls
•Territorial administration (with Préfet playing prominent role) and
sectoral deconcentration with different geographical areas
•Mixed models of decentralization
•Bias for deconcentration over devolution?
•Financial Management practices
•Human Resource Management practices
•Ensuing state structure increases complexity of decentralization
=> top-down administration impacts incentives and capacity
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LG autonomy limited by the Tutelle
In a majority of countries, the Tutelle system operates
ex-ante over LG’s financial decisions
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Country
Tutelle authority
Benin, Burkina, Chad,
Congo, Côte d'Ivoire,
Guinea, Mauritania
Ex Ante administrative control
Cameroon, Gabon, Niger,
Togo
Ex post control (theory)
Senegal
Limited ex ante control
Madagascar
Ex-Post Control
Central African Republic
Direct administration
Financial Resource Management
Characteristics (vs. Anglophone):
• Strong involvement of MoF at every step (ordonnateur)
• Separation Ordonnateur/Comptable (multiple visas)
• System emphasizes ex-ante controls
Challenges for decentralization:
- Centralization of resources and management
– Limited transparency as to spatial incidence of public resources
– Weak capacity for budget preparation/execution at local level
– Weak ownership, autonomy and accountability at local level
-
Bottlenecks and opportunities for corruption
Decentralization: risks appear higher (amounts/capacity)
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Human Resource Management
Characteristics:
• One single scheme of service for all civil servants
• Accountability to the center
• Post not linked to geographical areas
• HRM wholly centralized
– recruitment, evaluation, sanction, salaries, career management…
Challenges for decentralization:
• Capacity often low at local level
– Concentration of staff in urban/central areas
– Difficulties in attracting/retaining quality staff, notably in remote regions
• Low downward accountability of staff
• Disincentives for staff to join the LG
– Limited trust towards new structures
– Living conditions outside capital/urban centers
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Resulting Complex State Structure
Deconcentration and Devolution
• Regional experience is varied but tendency to have parallel structures
• Dual architectures (territorial, sectoral deconcentration). Sometimes,
without coherence between levels
Challenges for decentralization:
- Proliferation of levels of administration
• Confusion or uncertainty on respective roles
• High costs of decentralizing if no parallel effort at rationalizing
- Perverse incentives
• Deconcentration perceived as a leverage towards more
decentralization, yet lack of incentives and capacity
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E. Operational Challenges for Decentralization Reforms
Political interests drive (and shape) decentralization reforms
• Strengthening democracy or appeasing opposition?
• Greater equity or preventing fragmentation of the state?
• Who drives? Champions? Winners and losers (including in
bureaucracy)
However, World Bank/donors advice mostly centered on technical aspects
• Useful to understand objectives for devolution and deconcentration
• Identify and work with champions in government but also ensure
consultation, information and participation of local communities in
formulation and execution of decentralization policy
• Knowledge gaps on both formal/informal practices and local
dynamics
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Operational Challenges for Decentralization Reforms
(cont’d)
• Deconcentration versus devolution: Accountability and Capacity
Matter
– No model inherently superior, but need to reinforce accountability and be
equipped with sufficient capacity
•
Devolution offers greater downward accountability; however, if structures are
new, not rooted in local context and have little capacity not necessarily effective
• Need to strike effective balance between upward and downward accountability
– Number of deconcentrated / devolved levels needs to be commensurate
with capacity
• Too many layers of government is inefficient
• Creation of many rural communes has significant cost implications
– Need to clarify roles and responsibilities (conventions/contracts), otherwise
accountabilities blurred
• Sequencing of reforms needs to account for institutional legacies
– Leverage both (deconcentrated and devolved levels) to build accountability
and capacity
– Deconcentrated structures can help build capacity. However, they may be
adverse to greater devolution -> Avoid future lock in
– Plan ahead for local capacity building and pace reform accordingly
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Q&A
Further Reading
Decentralizing Francophone African administrations for better service delivery:
specificities, status and challenges , Zoé Druilhe, Hélène Grandvoinnet, Kai
Kaiser, Stefanie Teggemann, draft
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