David Ambrosetti
(CNRS – Université Paris Ouest Nanterre)

A) 1. Biafra (1967-1970)
Nigeria Abuja Ibo
Lieutenant-colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu
Joint Church Aid – 55 000 tons of supplies
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) – 22 000 tons
Bernard Kouchner
Jacques Foccart
Félix Houphouët-Boigny
Markpress (Genève)
Médecins sans frontières (1971)
Nuclear test in Reggane (déc. 1960)
Léopold Sédar Senghor (Sénégal)

2. Ethiopia (1984-1985)
Wollo (nord)
Band Aid (nov. 1984)
1 200 000 tons of aid
The Derg charity business Bob Geldof
Live Aid (juil. 1985)
Mengistu Haïle-Mariam
Tigrean People’s Liberation Front
Eritrean People’s Liberation Front
Forced displacements of 600 000 persons, 200 000 died

1. ONUC: a turn
2. The post Cold War renewal (1988-1993)
3. Blazing failures and withdrawal (1993-1999)
4. The current unprecedented rise of UN peace operations (2000 decade, till now)

1. The ONUC (1960-1964)
Congo-Léopoldville / République démocratique du Congo
(RDC) / Zaïre (Congo-Kinshasa)
Patrice Lumumba Katanga
Dag Hammarskjöld ( † en sept. 1961)
Moïse Tshombé
Resolution 143 of the UNSC  withdrawal of Belgian forces
19 500 personals
30 contributor states (Africa and Asia)

2. The end of the Cold War and the renewal of peace operations (1988-1993)
Perestroïka
Namibia Angola Mozambique
Somalia : Restore Hope
(ONU / March 93 – March 95)
28 000 personals
(UNITAF / Dec. 92- March 93) et ONUSOM II
Mohamed Farah Aideed
June 1993 (24 Pakistani blue helmets)
3 October 1993 (18 US Marines and one UN Malaysian)
US Congress (Jesse Helms)
Boutros Boutros-Ghali UN Secretary-General
Kofi Annan Deputy-UNSG Chief of the DPKO

3. Blazing failures and withdrawal (1993-1999)
MINUAR in Rwanda (5 October 1993)
General R. Dallaire
Michael Barnett – US delegation to the UN
President J. Habyarimana ( † 6 April 1994)
Rwandan Patriotic Front (P. Kagamé)
Hutu Power Col. Théoneste Bagosora
Resolution 925 – withdrawal of 2 000 Blue Helmets in the heart of the genocide (« g »-word)
500 000 to one million died
Then Bosnia - Zaïre 1996-1997
Withdrawal: 70 000 UN personals in 1993, 13 000 in February 1998.
Budget decline (from 3,6 billion $ to 1 billion $)

4. The current unprecedented rise (decade 2000)
Lakhdar Brahimi report (July 2000)
Peace building, even state building
Security Sector Reform
Regionalization ( African ownership )
UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone (1999-2005)
UK leader, rescuing the UN in May 2000
Revolutionary United Front (RUF)
President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah

African dossiers = some 70-75 % of the UNSC agenda
In 2010, Africa
= half of the UN operations deployed around the world (8 out of 16)
= three-quarters (73 500) out of the 100 000 personals in uniform deployed around the world
Sudan alone = a third (30 000, 20 000 for Darfur and 10 000 for South
Sudan)
DRC = 20 000 Liberia = 11 000 Côte-d’Ivoire = 8500
Pakistan, Bangladesh and India (3 major troop contributors) = 28% of the total
9 African states among the 20 major contributors
Negligible financial contributions: Zambia and Somalia = 0,001% of the
UN budget each ; South Africa = 0,29%

A)
Some figures: a call for modesty
B)
Strategic learning from African actors
C)
The « Africanization » of peace and security matters in Africa: towards a new peace and security architecture in Africa

1. The decrease of death tolls due to armed violence in
Africa

Human Security Center: Death tolls related to armed conflicts regularly increased from 1960 to 1990.
Decreasing since then.

In 1960, Africa = 68 % of the total of people killed in armed conflicts around the world ;
13 % in 2005 (African bank for development).

Proposed causes : transformations of the forms of violence and improvement of sanitary conditions and humanitarian relief.

2. Engaged means remain modest
Multidimensional operations, very intrusive
 Security Sector Reform (Sierra Leone, RDC, Liberia, Côte-d’Ivoire)
But limited means:

UN peace operations = 7,7 billion $ per year around the world;

UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone (750 million $ per year in 2002 for 17
500 personals in uniform)
Comparison : arms trade around the world = 30 billion $ per year; and the total of state military budgets around the world =

800 billion $ per year.
20 000 personals in uniform to cover the whole Darfur (size of
France, very divided habitat, rudimentary or inexistent infrastructures)
Weak strategic commitment, short-term objectives, improvisation, personal professionalization improved but still insufficient
 scandal of sexual abuses (Sierra Leone, Liberia, DRC)


Commitment of African states in peace operations

Access to foreign currencies, opportunities for training (Burundi),
“risky” military kept away, multilateral visibility as a regional power

Sidelining and direct opposition strategies


Political weakness of international forces rapidly analyzed and exploited (Somalia 93, Rwanda 94, Sierra Leone 2000, UA au
Darfur 2004-2007)
Obstacles, UN (Western) personal expelled (Eritrea and the border commission for Badme 2005 ; Sudan and Jan Pronk 2006
; Chad et MINURCAT 2010)

Medias, humanitarian action and military strategies

Kamajors and LURD (Danny Hoffman)

1. Context

Pan-African Movement  Organization of the African Unity (OAU, May
1963)

Bilateral interferences from ex colonial powers  20 French armed operations from 1963 to 1983.

First OAU peace operation in Chad in 1981. Withdrawn in June 1982 on a failure.

OAU Mechanism for prevention, management and resolution of conflict in 1990 (military observation missions in Rwanda, Burundi, Comoros)

Continental integration weakened by a rapid process of sub-regional cooperation  seven regional organizations in Africa today
 ECOMOG by ECOWAS in Liberia (1990-1997) and Sierra Leone
(1991-1999)

2. The African Union (AU) in 2002

Innovations

Inspired by the European Union (Commission) and the UN (PSC)


Article 4 of the constitutive Act
Department of Peace and Security

Operations in Burundi, Darfur and Comoros

The African Stand By Force and the Continental Early
Warning System (AU and the five Regional Economic
Communities): in progress

3. Limits

External:





Strong commitment of foreign partners:
Peace Facility of the EU, then the Europe / Africa Partnership in Lisbon, financial support from the G8  « a rush among donors » in the context of a “new scramble for African mineral resources”
Donor conditionality: strong presence of foreign (Western) experts in
Addis Ababa surrounding these projects
AU used in a ad hoc way, selectivity according to the interests of the foreign powers with important projection forces in Africa (US, France,
UK)
Reluctance to provide the African forces with better military equipment

Internal:



Weak political commitment of the African states  only when competition for regional hegemony
Military contributors: Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Uganda
Financial contributors: Ethiopia, Libya, Kenya

Difference to make between « Africanization » and « ownership » (Benedikt
Franke)