India Updates File
Modeling
Yes Modeling Links
India Models U.S. Surveillance structures
Chaulia 9 Sreeram Chaulia is associate professor of world politics at the OP Jindal Global University in
Sonipat, India India caught in a terror tangle http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KL11Df05.html
The ills in India's
intelligence apparatus were highlighted recently when India's Home Minister P Chidambaram announced a new
chief for the proposed National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID) project for counter-terrorism. This is an ambitious venture to pool all
data and information relating to a person - ranging from bank accounts, rail and air travel to income tax, telephone and Internet usage.
Without being obtrusive, NATGRID is mandated to link 21 different databases for the access of 10 security agencies. While it sounds like an
innovate idea that could enable the speedy detection and interception of security threats, NATGRID is symptomatic of the troubles plaguing
India's divided state. It is the brainchild of the Home Ministry, which sees itself as a veteran in competition with the office of the National
Security Advisor (NSA) for the prized position as the lead governmental node handling strategic issues. The NSA, which falls under the allpowerful Prime Minister's Office, already has under its aegis, since 2004, the National Technical Research Organization (NTRO) - a highly
specialized technical intelligence-gathering "super-feeder agency" - to act as a clearing house for all other members of the security
establishment.
Modeled after the US National Security Agency , NTRO had until recently been dubbed "India's newest secret
agency". Now, the Home Ministry's NATGRID, or one or other of the ever-mushrooming pet creations of the vast Indian bureaucracy, might vie
for this honor as they build their own personnel, budgets and images. The
Home Ministry has also just floated the idea of
forming a National Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC), again borrowing a leaf from the American book ,
although this new body would have major overlaps in terms of technology and processes with the pre-existing NTRO. In May, just after the
ruling Congress-led coalition retained power in general elections, the politically heavyweight Home Ministry began advocating a new
Centralized Lawful Interception and Monitoring System that would "monitor all communication traffic to tighten the country's security and
surveillance set-up" and catch early warning signals of impending terrorist attacks. These tasks, again, were hitherto being managed by a fullfledged department of the NTRO. There have been 20 major terrorist strikes in India since 2001, including attacks by militants in Jammu and
Kashmir and on parliament in New Delhi, as well as bombings throughout the country. Prior to last year's attack in Mumbai, the deadliest
strikes was the bombing of several railway stations and trains in the city in July 2006, with some 180 people killed. In May 2008, bombs
exploded in crowded markets outside Hindu temples in the popular tourist destination of Jaipur, killing at least 60. In August 2008, National
Security Advisor M K Narayanan said that as many as 800 terrorist cells operated in the country. The domestic Intelligence Bureau (IB), which
comes under the purview of the Home Ministry, has also been active in the area of Internet telephony and interception of potential terrorist
conversations, adding to the plethora of trespassing mechanisms over and above the heads of existing entities. The IB is now readying for the
establishment of a new counter-intelligence center under its supervision. NTRO has struggled in other intramural battles with its notionally
allied organization in the labyrinthine state security apparatus, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), India's external intelligence
organization. The latter's failures in detecting Pakistani intrusions prior to the brief 1999 Kargil war had elicited criticism of its monopoly over
foreign intelligence-gathering and culminated in calls to detach RAW's Aviation Research Center (ARC) and merge it with NTRO as a single super
agency for technical intelligence. This handover has not been fully accomplished to date and continues to keep the scorebook of bureaucratic
wrangling open with highly wasteful expenditure and possible national security costs. Often mocked as a "soft state" that has failed to rectify
dysfunctional behavior, India can be better understood as a flabby state with far too many agencies, which work at cross-purposes and keep
the structure unprepared and uncoordinated for the next potentially devastating blow of anti-national actors. The gaps and loopholes in the
state's counter-terrorist response system have ironically grown with the proliferation of more and more agencies and projects. So
bureaucratically dense has the web of competing interests and responsibilities within the Indian state become since the Mumbai attacks that
the larger purpose of doing social good by advancing protection of citizens has been subsumed by a "me too" attitude in which everyone and
anyone who has some clout within government will press a finger into the pie. In this game of bureaucratic politics, who gets which piece of the
cake in terms of influence and counterbalancing "pull" (a uniquely Indian term referring to leveraging power) has overshadowed the core
mission of finessing state responses to multifarious threats. Indian's melee of multiplying committees, bodies and agencies scarcely boosts the
average citizen's confidence that he or she can be safer after all the revamps and "shakeups". A state is not a monolith but a vast constellation
of loosely allied institutions, organizations and centers of power. Visualized from the summit or the apex, the state reproduces itself like hydra
into smaller ramifications that carry the seal of sovereignty into the spaces that are inhabited by citizens. The give-and-take between these
state agencies and the public is theoretically based on mutual trust and need. Unfortunately, the one-upmanship games bedeviling the Indian
security structure have not done justice to this quid pro quo, which lies at the heart of contemporary political life. One
pattern
emerging from the mess of the flabby Indian state is the attempt of its top echelons to emulate the United
States in terms of merging, refurbishing or creating anew specialized agencies to tackle emerging security risks. What Indian policymakers
may have missed in the process of learning lessons from the US is that the latter has been historically bogged down with the same severe
symptoms of bureaucratic politicking.
India policy leaders emulate U.S. counterterrorism strategies
Rizvi 8 Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst, analysis: Imperatives of counterterrorism —Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi, http://archives.dailytimes.com.pk/editorial/14-Dec-2008/analysisimperatives-of-counter-terrorism-dr-hasan-askari-rizvi
The post-Mumbai strategies of India and Pakistan reflect their immediate political concerns rather than longterm, coherent and shared perspectives on counter-terrorism. India is trying to extract maximum diplomatic dividend against Pakistan
by activating multilateral channels and applying direct pressure. Pakistan is engaged in damage control in an extremely difficult diplomatic
situation created by the Mumbai attacks. Pakistan has banned the Jama'at-ud Dawa, sealed its offices and arrested several of its leaders and
activists. One wonders why the government had to wait for a UN Security Council resolution and prodding by the United States to act.
Pakistan's intelligence agencies must have enough information on the activities of hard-line and militant groups, as well as on their linkages
with the Taliban. It is also well known that a good number of non-Pakhtun Pakistanis are involved in the Pakistani Taliban movement. Similarly,
Pakistani agencies would know if JuD was a front for banned terrorist group Lashkar-e Tayba. The present Pakistani government and military
top brass view the Pakistani Taliban and other militant groups as a major threat to Pakistan's internal political and societal stability. This is a
shift from the past when General Pervez Musharraf's regime pursued a dual policy of taking some action against these groups but leaving them
enough space to continue with their activities in a low-key manner. The present government asked the military to launch the ongoing
operations against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in some tribal agencies, and the operations have made significant gains in Bajaur and Khyber.
Militants were also pushed back in Swat, though they are far from being fully contained. Given that the security forces had their hands full in
the tribal areas, the government did not want to open a new front against militants in mainland Pakistan. However, consensus at the
international level on the involvement of a Pakistan-based group in the Mumbai attacks left Pakistan with no credible option but to take
immediate action against militant groups in the mainland. These groups are transnational and use all possible means, including violence, to
pursue their agenda with total disregard to the imperatives of Pakistan as a nation-state in the comity of nations. They want Pakistan to be
subservient to their agenda, and do not respect Pakistan's sovereign status and territorial boundaries. Should these movements be allowed to
impose precarious foreign policy situations on Pakistan? If Pakistan is to function as a coherent and effective state, it cannot allow non-state
actors to engage in violent and disruptive activities inside or outside its boundaries. Pakistan's policymakers need to do some hard and realistic
thinking on the current situation and terrorism-related issues. Indian policymakers need to do the same. They need not descend into traditional
India-Pakistan polemics to deflect criticism of internal security lapses and the probability of terrorism having domestic roots. The Indian
government has not blamed the Pakistani government of direct involvement in the Mumbai attacks, but maintains that a Pakistan-based group
planned and executed them. This places indirect responsibility on the Pakistani government, given that it is seen to have allowed such a group
to use Pakistani territory for a terrorist attack abroad. However, semi- and non-official Indian circles rarely maintain this distinction and project
Pakistan as an irresponsible terrorist state. They find encouragement to adopt this position in India's official effort to extract the highest
possible diplomatic dividends against Pakistan at the international level. As citizens of a number of states were killed in the attacks, India has
found it easy to mobilise support. It is interesting to note that Indian expats in the US are fully involved in the campaign to get Pakistan
designated as a terrorist state and to get UN approval for Indian airstrikes in Pakistan. A review of this ongoing Indian diplomatic campaign
gives a strong impression that India is more interested in undermining and isolating Pakistan at the international level to further India's wider
regional agenda rather than evolving a shared regional counter-terrorism strategy. The present strategy may meet India's immediate domestic
needs, but it does not serve the long-term need of countering terrorism holistically and effectively. This long-term objective cannot be achieved
without working with Pakistan. A
large number of people in India's official and non-official circles want to
emulate the United States: the argument is that if the US can launch airstrikes in Afghanistan and invade Iraq in response to attacks
on its soil, India can do the same to counter terrorism originating in Pakistan.
India and the U.S. dialogue on counter-terrorism strategies and India seeks to learn
best practices from the U.S.
Kumar 15 Manan Kumar reporter for DNA India India prepares for bigger counter-terrorism
collaboration with US Thursday, 15 January 2015 - 6:45am IST | Place: New Delhi | Agency:
dna,http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-india-prepares-for-bigger-counter-terrorism-collaborationwith-us-2052633
India prepares to roll out red carpet to president Barack Obama as the chief guest during the Republic Day parade, Prime Minister’s Office
and union home ministry are finalising an elaborate agenda to address Indian concerns in the homeland security dialogue with
their US counterparts. Poised to share wider range of concerns amidst increasing bonhomie, the two countries are looking
forward to hold in-depth exchange of views on common areas of interest and collaboration to further mutual
counterterrorism goals that includes checking the spread of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and al Qaeda which recently
As
announced its new wing, al Qaeda in Indian Subcontinent (AQIS). Though still better off than western countries in terms of youth traction
towards ISIS, the twin threats are steadily creeping into India and the two countries are eager to learn from each other and develop joint
strategies to check their spread, government sources said. The
union home ministry is keen to learn from their US
counterparts to check proliferation of Jehadi forums in cyberspace that is gaining ground among Urban Indian youth. Recent studies done
by IB revealed thousands of Indian youth hooked to such forum thus giving rise to the fear of self indoctrination as Jehadis and possibility of
lone wolf attacks. US expertise in checking such proliferation and ways to pinpoint the source of such forums and blocking them can help us
tackle this threat in a major way, said sources adding that the talks are at an advanced stage to get the knowhow to get quicker access to block
dangerous uploads on social media sites and import of better cyber forensic techniques to crackdown on virtual Jihadis. India
is also
banking on US for building capacity in cybersecurity and critical infrastructure protection to counter threats
and keep terrorist at bay. The two countries will also hold advanced talk on law enforcement engagement
proposals include sharing lessons learned and best practices in SWAT team training and responding to mass casualty exercises,
improving both nations’ capabilities to respond to terrorist incidents and natural disasters.
India has modeled its counterterrorism model after the U.S.
Raman 12 Bahukutumbi Raman is the additional secretary (retd), cabinet secretariat, Government of
India, New Delhi, and, presently, director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the
Chennai Centre For China Studies), How PC tried to emulate US counter-terrorism centre and failed,
http://www.rediff.com/news/slide-show/slide-show-1-how-pc-tried-to-emulate-us-counter-terrorismcentre-and-failed/20120116.htm
The 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai revealed more or less the same deficiencies in our counter-terrorism architecture as the deficiencies in
the counter-terrorism architecture of the US revealed by the 9/11 terrorist strikes. Namely, inadequate intelligence and lack of co-ordinated
follow-up action even on the intelligence that was available. In his first statement to the Lok Sabha on the 26/11 terrorist strikes after taking
over as the Home
Minister P Chidambaram said that the responsibility for follow-up action on available intelligence was found to be
the US to study the working of the Department of Homeland Security
and the NCTC, both of which came into being after 9/11. He came back a strong votary of two ideas: For the creation of a
separate Ministry of Internal Security patterned after the Department of Homeland Security of the US
diffused. Shortly thereafter, he had visited
and for the creation of an NCTC patterned after its US counterpart.
India modeled their high tech surveillance after U.S. – It was created after the Indian
Home Minister visited the NSA
Indian Express 14
India’s spy agencies more toothless than ever, http://indianexpress.com/article/india/indiaothers/indias-spy-agencies-more-toothless-than-ever/
In the spring of 2009, even as municipal crews in Mumbai were still sifting through the debris of 26/11, India’s newly-appointed home
minister, P Chidambaram, was ushered into the digital heart of the United States’ war against terrorism, its
super-secret National Counter-Terrorism Centre. He gazed intently, an aide recalls, at its giant video-walls, where
information from across the world displayed in real time, and asked searching questions about the dozens of classified
databases that feed them. Later that year, Chidambaram promised a made-in-India NCTC would be up and
running “by the end of 2010”- a third of the time it had taken the United States. “India cannot afford to wait 36 months”, he
declaimed. -
Or Nah Modeling
Their modeling evidence goes the wrong direction—Even if India used the U.S. as a
model for strengthening its counterterrorism strategy they will not reverse model
reductions – India perceives itself as facing very different threats and domestic politics
would block any roll back in surveillance
Kumar 12 Vikas Kumar is Assistant Professor of Economics at Azim Premji University, Bangalore, East Asia Forum, Why the India–US counterterrorism partnership is largely symbolic 11 October 2012, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/10/11/why-the-india-us-counter-terrorismpartnership-is-largely-symbolic/ Zabiuddin Ansari, wanted among other things for the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack, was recently deported
from Saudi Arabia to India. This has been hailed as a sign of growing convergence among India, the US and Saudi Arabia on terrorism and Iran.
But B. Raman, former head of the counter-terrorism division of India’s external intelligence agency, has convincingly argued that the India–
Saudi Arabia link of the triad will remain weak. And there
are several reasons why even India–US counter-terrorism
cooperation will also continue to be largely symbolic and sporadic for the foreseeable future. Let us begin with demography.
Muslims, mostly immigrants, account for just 0.6 per cent of the US population, whereas Muslims account for more than an eighth of India’s
population and are among the country’s founding fathers and leading public and cultural figures. India
is geographically close to
the nerve centres of Islamic terrorism in South and West Asia. This proximity is a disadvantage as Pakistan-based
transnational terrorists can easily penetrate India’s porous land and maritime borders. Moreover, India,
unlike the US, has only a limited overseas capacity to counter terrorism at its source. But even if it had such a
capacity, it would be largely ineffective against nuclear Pakistan. And irrespective of the incentives India may offer Pakistan’s megalomaniac
and paranoid military-intelligence establishment, the latter will not deliver results because any letting down of the hate campaign against India
would conflict with its raison d’être. In
contrast, the US, which is geographically isolated and has a better counterterrorism capacity, is able to fight terrorism far away from its territory . India and the US also differ in their ability to
influence Islamic countries. India is hugely dependent on Middle Eastern oil and many of its workers are employed in this region. This reduces
India’s bargaining power vis-à-vis the Middle East, which is a major source of financial and ideological support for Islamic terrorist organisations
in South Asia. In contrast, given its influence over international institutions and the global financial system, the US is relatively better placed to
favourably influence the policies of Islamic countries. Last but not the least, since the early 19th century Indian Muslims have been influenced
by developments in West Asia, and since the early 20th century they have been in conflict with the majority Hindus. The Muslim–Hindu conflict
resulted in the bloody partition of India that has left behind unresolved territorial issues, and the West Asian influence has radicalised some
sectors of the Muslim community in India. As a result, the Indian policymaker and common man alike believe that terrorism is to some extent
linked to the Kashmir question and to Indian youth affected by Muslim–Hindu riots, both of which are problems internal to India. These
factors contribute to a number of differences between the counter-terrorism strategies of India and
the US. US policy makers regard terrorism as a foreign and national defence problem. There is no influential domestic lobby that radically
differs from the establishment’s views in this regard. The domestic debate in the US is largely about the logistics of
fighting terrorism and the identification of suitable international partners. Changes in counter-terrorism strategy will
not have a dramatic effect on US domestic politics. So, policymakers have sufficient freedom to
rework strategy in response to changing threat patterns. In contrast, minor changes in strategy can
disproportionately affect domestic politics in India: a strong-arm strategy will radicalise the Muslim masses, whereas a
softer strategy will validate the Hindu right’s claim that Muslims are appeased in the name of secularism. So,
unlike the drone-borne counter-terrorism efforts of the US, India’s fight against terrorism is almost entirely police-driven and backed by
potential soft cultural options. India is similarly constrained on the foreign policy front. There are three reasons for this. First, Indian policy
makers and the public view international counter-terror operations as undesirable insofar as they contribute to internationalising the Kashmir
issue and attracting international jihadi attention to India. Second, India is a net oil importer; Muslims have a much stronger political presence
in India; and mainstream political parties view the Palestine problem through the prism of decolonisation. So, on the one hand, the Indian
government cannot, for example, support Israel on the Palestine issue and benefit from US–Israel counter-terrorism expertise. On the other
hand, India cannot afford to go all out against Saudi Arabia and Iran because of the deep attachment felt by many Sunni and Shia Muslims to
holy places in these countries and because of India’s dependence on oil imports. Third, the US can bargain with countries like Pakistan over,
say, rendering terrorists like David Coleman Headley to third countries and demanding, in exchange, cooperation to detect threats against its
homeland. But India does not have access to such tradable assets. To conclude, India
and the US view Islam differently and
they face very different geo-political and domestic constraints. This in turn implies a divergence
rather than convergence of counter-terrorism strategies. Moreover, belated revision of the US’s Kashmir policy and
procrastination in banning terror groups focused on India ensure that the Indian public and policymakers continue to
distrust the intentions of the US — and a reciprocal feeling exists in this latter country. The two sides, therefore, need to
overcome historical distrust of each other. In the meantime, it is unfair to treat counter-terrorism cooperation as the bellwether of their
relationship. In fact, it would help if existing counter-terror cooperation were downplayed to knock the wind out of jihadi propaganda against
the phantom Judaeo–Christian–Hindu alliance. The India–US relationship should instead build upon common interests like the promotion of
maritime security, free trade, energy security, clean technologies, anti-proliferation regimes, human rights and democracy.
They have no reverse modeling evidence—India has explicitly rejected U.S. privacy
restrictions on surveillance
Bhatia 15 Gautam Bhatia is Advocate, Delhi High Court, STATE SURVEILLANCE AND THE RIGHT TO
PRIVACY IN INDIA: A CONSTITUTIONAL BIOGRAPHY, stsfor.org/content/changing-face-privacy-indiaanalysis
Ever since the explosive Snowden disclosures in May 2013, State surveillance
and citizens’ right to privacy have been at
the forefront of international debate. Even as the Snowden documents were revealing, detail by detail, the American and British
intelligence agencies’ extensive surveillance systems (PRISM and TEMPORA, among others) used to spy both on their own citizens, and upon
communications elsewhere, reports about Indian bulk surveillance began to trickle in. It is now known that there are at least two
surveillance regimes in India, in uncertain stages of preparation: the Central Monitoring System (CMS), which provides for the
collection of telephony metadata by tapping into the telecommunications’ companies records2; and Netra, a dragnet surveillance
system that detects and sweeps up electronic communication that uses certain keywords such as “attack”, “bomb”, “blast” or “kill”. These
programs, wide in their reach and scope, have dubious statutory backing. They also, very clearly, impinge upon basic fundamental rights. A
discussion of the legal and constitutional implications, therefore, is long overdue. This essay presents an analytical and chronological history of
the Indian Supreme Court’s engagement with the right to privacy. While discussions for a privacy statute have stagnated and are presently in
limbo3, the Court has been active for nigh on fifty years. This essay aims to achieve a comprehensive, doctrinal understanding of the
constitutional right to privacy, as evolved, understood and implemented by the judiciary. Such an understanding, indeed, is an essential
prerequisite to embarking upon a legal and constitutional critique of mass State surveillance in India. II. FOUNDATIONS Privacy is not
mentioned in the Constitution. It plays
no part in the Constituent Assembly Debates. Indeed, a proposal to
include a provision akin to the American Fourth Amendment (and the root of American privacy law), prohibiting
‘unreasonable searches and seizures’, was expressly rejected by the Assembly. The place of the right – if it
exists – must therefore be located within the structure of the Constitution, as fleshed out by judicial decisions.
The India system has not modeled existing U.S. restrictions on metadata
Lowenthal 14 Mark M. Lowenthal is the senior specialist in U.S. foreign policy at the Congressional
Research Service Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy
India has a growing cyberspace capability, which, like that of many other nations, appears to have been used against potential foes, such as China and Pakistan, and
more friendly states, like the United States. India is in the midst of deploying a Centralised (or Central) Monitoring System (CMS) that is
designed to
track all communications within India-telephone, computer, landline, mobile, and so on. Unlike the NSA program, CMS
will not have to ask providers' permission for access but will have that built into the technology of the telecom and data service
providers. (IMS will provide intelligence to foreign and domestic agencies, the police, and tax collectors-a list that some believe is too broad. Like the NSA program,
CMS appears to focus on metadata. CMS is being developed and will be run by a government technology development center that is not part of the intelligent
complex. The Ministry for Home Affairs will have the power to determine who is monitored.
India has not modeled restrictions—They have far more surveillance authority than
the U.S.
Mirani 13Leo Mirani is a reporter for Quartz, Think US snooping is bad? Try Italy, India or…Canada,
http://qz.com/92648/think-us-snooping-is-bad-try-italy-india-or-canada/
Just because something is legal doesn’t necessarily make it a good thing. So far, legality is the main rationale US officials have used to defend
the government’s PRISM spying program. It’s all perfectly legal, approved by Congress and the courts. But a more potent argument might be to
compare PRISM with the spying programs of other countries. Compared
to the data-mining that goes on elsewhere, US
intelligence agencies may be relatively constrained. Start with Canada, which many consider to be a cuddlier, saner version
of the US. The Globe and Mail reports today that the Canadian defense minister approved a plan similar to PRISM back in 2005, and renewed it
in 2011. Run by the Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC), a signals intelligence agency similar to the US’s NSA or Britain’s
Government Communication Headquarters (GCHQ), the program collects metadata from phone and internet communication. Like PRISM,
CSEC’s primary targets are said to be foreigners. But what makes the Canadian effort somewhat more sinister is that it was instituted through
the executive branch of government without legislative approval. According to the Globe and Mail, “a regime of ministerial directives—decrees
not scrutinized by Parliament—have authorized the broad surveillance programs.” At least PRISM won the approval of Congress, however
clueless the legislature may be about the details. Then there is Italy. According to Italian lawyer Fulvio Sazrana (link in Italian), a law passed
earlier this year by the outgoing Mario Monti government also skipped over court orders and other legal approvals. Instead, Monti issued a
directive laying down guidelines for the protection of cybernetics and national cyber security. In so many words, the directive gives government
agencies what the French call “carte blanche” to raid private data banks in the name of “internet security.” There will be no Italian equivalent of
Twitter, which does not participate in PRISM. In India, internet service providers are “insisting upon Indian users’ privacy to be protected from
any such misadventure of any intelligence departments.” Meanwhile, India’s
government is setting up a vast surveillance
system with the express purpose of spying on its citizens, something the NSA has been at pains to say it does
not do . For instance, the government’s Central Monitoring System gives it access to all telecom traffic,
including calls, text messages and mobile internet. According to the Hindu newspaper, another proposed “national cyber
coordination cell” plans to: Collect, integrate and scan [internet] traffic data from different gateway routers of major ISPs at a centralised
location for analysis, international gateway traffic and domestic traffic will be aggregated separately … The NCCC will facilitate real-time
assessment of cyber security threats in the country and generate actionable reports/alerts for proactive actions by the concerned agencies.
India’s external intelligence agency, the armed forces, and even the local defense research establishment, among others, will have access. It is
debatable whether India, Canada or Italy’s data-acquisition and data-mining technology are as powerful as that of the NSA. But when they are,
these countries will already have laws and systems in place to abuse them.
The U.S. meta data program had legal privacy protections built in even before the
Freedom Act
Perez 13
Evan Perez reporter for Wall Street Journal, Phones Leave a Telltale Trail, Updated June 15, 2013,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324049504578545352803220058
Under the NSA phone program, the government collects domestic phone metadata without a specific
investigative lead. Trained analysts only search the database in conjunction with a terrorism investigation, authorities say. Intelligence agencies
"basically reimpose at the level of analysis the standards you might ideally have for collection," said Timothy Edgar, a former top nationalsecurity privacy lawyer in the Bush and Obama administrations. Mr. Edgar said the increasingly specific location data raises concerns about
potential violations of Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. Once a person can be located within a
building, the monitoring more closely resembles a search that would traditionally require a warrant. The
NSA program is
accompanied by privacy restrictions, Obama administration officials say. To search the database, the
government must have "reasonable suspicion" that the basis for the query is "associated with a foreign terrorist
organization," they say. Search warrants approved by the secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court are required before the
contents of the calls may be monitored.
No reverse modeling – No restrictions on surveillance that exist in the U.S. have ever
been modeled in India—India has far more access to data then the U.S. does now—
The CMS collects and listens to all calls directly—it is not limited to metadata and they
have not modeled any privacy protections
Prakash 13 Pranesh Prakash is Policy Director, The Centre for Internet and Society, Bangalore, How
Surveillance Works in India July 10, 2013, http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/07/10/how-surveillanceworks-in-india/?_r=0
When the Indian government announced it would start a Centralized Monitoring System in 2009 to monitor
telecommunications in the country, the public seemed unconcerned. When the government announced that the system, also known as C.M.S.,
commenced in April, the news didn’t receive much attention. After a colleague at the Centre for Internet and Society wrote about the program
and it was lambasted by Human Rights Watch, more reporters started covering it as a privacy issue. But it was ultimately the revelations by
Edward J. Snowden about American surveillance that prompted Indians to ask questions about its own government’s surveillance programs. In
India, we have a strange mix of great amounts of transparency and very little accountability when it comes to
surveillance and intelligence agencies. Many senior officials are happy to anonymously brief reporters about the state of
surveillance, but there is very little that is officially made public, and still less is debated in the national press and in Parliament. This lack of
accountability is seen both in the way the Big-Brother acronyms (C.M.S., Natgrid, T.C.I.S., C.C.T.N.S., etc.) have been rolled out, as well as the
murky status of the intelligence agencies. No
intelligence agency in India has been created under an act of
Parliament with clearly established roles and limitations on powers, and hence there is no public
accountability whatsoever. The absence of accountability has meant that the government has since 2006 been working on the
C.M.S., which will integrate with the Telephone Call Interception System that is also being rolled out. The cost: around 8 billion rupees ($132
million) — more than four times the initial estimate of 1.7 billion — and even more important, our privacy and personal liberty. Under their
licensing terms, all
Internet service providers and telecom providers are required to provide the
government direct access to all communications passing through them. However, this currently happens in a
decentralized fashion, and the government in most cases has to ask the telecoms for metadata, like call detail records, visited Web sites, IP
address assignments, or to carry out the interception and provide the recordings to the government. Apart from this, the government uses
equipment to gain access to vast quantities of raw data traversing the Internet across multiple cities, including the data going through the
undersea cables that land in Mumbai. With
the C.M.S., the government will get centralized access to all
communications metadata and content traversing through all telecom networks in India. This means
that the government can listen to all your calls, track a mobile phone and its user’s location, read all your text
messages, personal e-mails and chat conversations. It can also see all your Google searches, Web site visits, usernames and
passwords if your communications aren’t encrypted. You might ask: Why is this a problem when the government already had the same access,
albeit in a decentralized fashion? To answer that question, one has to first examine the law. There are no laws that allow for mass surveillance
in India. The two laws covering interception are the Indian Telegraph Act of 1885 and the Information Technology Act of 2000, as amended in
2008, and they restrict lawful interception to time-limited and targeted interception.The targeted interception both these laws allow ordinarily
requires case-by-case authorization by either the home secretary or the secretary of the department of information technology. Interestingly,
the colonial government framed better privacy safeguards into communications interception than did the post-independence democratic
Indian state. The Telegraph Act mandates that interception of communications can only be done on account of a public emergency or for public
safety. If either of those two preconditions is satisfied, then the government may cite any of the following five reasons: “the sovereignty and
integrity of India, the security of the state, friendly relations with foreign states, or public order, or for preventing incitement to the commission
of an offense.” In 2008, the Information Technology Act copied much of the interception provision of the Telegraph Act but removed the
preconditions of public emergency or public safety, and expands the power of the government to order interception for “investigation of any
offense.” The IT Act thus very substantially lowers the bar for wiretapping. Apart from these two provisions, which apply to interception, there
are many laws that cover recorded metadata, all of which have far lower standards. Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, no court order is
required unless the entity is seen to be a “postal or telegraph authority” — and generally e-mail providers and social networking sites are not
seen as such. Unauthorized access to communications data is not punishable per se, which is why a private detective who gained access to the
cellphone records of Arun Jaitley, a Bharatiya Janata Party leader, has been charged under the weak provision on fraud, rather than invasion of
privacy. While there is a provision in the Telegraph Act to punish unlawful interception, it carries a far lesser penalty (up to three years of
imprisonment) than for a citizen’s failure to assist an agency that wishes to intercept or monitor or decrypt (up to seven years of
imprisonment). To put the ridiculousness of the penalty in Sections 69 and 69B of the IT Act provision in perspective, an Intelligence Bureau
officer who spills national secrets may be imprisoned up to three years. And under the Indian Penal Code, failing to provide a document one is
legally bound to provide to a public servant, the punishment can be up to one month’s imprisonment. Further, a citizen who refuses to assist an
authority in decryption, as one is required to under Section 69, may simply be exercising her constitutional right against self-incrimination. For
these reasons and more, these provisions of the IT Act are arguably unconstitutional. As bad as the IT Act is, legally the government has done
far worse. In
the licenses that the Department of Telecommunications grants Internet service providers,
cellular providers and telecoms, there are provisions that require them to provide direct access to all
communications data and content even without a warrant, which is not permitted by the existing laws on interception.
The licenses also force cellular providers to have ‘bulk encryption’ of less than 40 bits. (Since G.S.M. network encryption systems like A5/1,
A5/2, and A5/3 have a fixed encryption bit length of 64 bits, providers in India have been known use A5/0, that is, no encryption, thus meaning
any person — not just the government — can use off-the-air interception techniques to listen to your calls.) Cybercafes (but not public
phone operators) are
required to maintain detailed records of clients’ identity proofs, photographs and the
Web sites they have visited, for a minimum period of one year. Under the rules designed as India’s data protection law (oh, the
irony!), sensitive personal data has to be shared with government agencies, if required for “purpose of verification
of identity, or for prevention, detection, investigation including cyber incidents, prosecution, and punishment of offenses.”
India has not modeled any of the privacy protections that exist in the U.S. – They have
no legislation protecting privacy
Xynou 13 Maria Xynou Maria is a Policy Associate on the Privacy Project at the CIS, FinFisher in India
and the Myth of Harmless Metadata, http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/fin-fisher-in-indiaand-myth-of-harmless-metadata
Furthermore, India
lacks privacy legislation which could safeguard individuals from potential abuse, while
Information Technology (Amendment) Act, 2008, empower Indian authorities
with extensive surveillance capabilites.[28] While it remains unclear if Indian law enforcement agencies are using FinFisher spy
sections 66A and 69 of the
products to unlawfully target individuals, it is a fact that FinFisher control and command servers have been found in India and that, if used, they
could potentially have severe consequences on individuals' right to privacy and other human rights.[
AT: CMS Economy “honey pot” scenario
Their scenario makes no sense - CMS is a data base for communication records and
telephone data—It does not connect to the banks or financial markets—Hacking the
CMS does not equal attacks on financial institutions
Cyber attacks can’t crush the economy because India’s economic infrastructure is
compartmentalized and the national data base is protected
Shukla 13 Ajai Shukla reporter for Business Standard, Cyberspace: India's digital battleground, 22nd
Jun 13 http://ajaishukla.blogspot.com/2013/06/cyberspace-indias-digital-battleground.html
India, however, has been slow in fixing its attention on cyber security. This may partly be because much of the country’s critical
infrastructure --- power grids, public transportation, nuclear power plants, defence systems --- is
controlled by manual systems, or by stand-alone computer systems that are not linked over the internet. In
that respect, India’s infrastructural backwardness has proved a useful safeguard against cyber attack. “It is not unusual to find New Delhi’s
central ministry officials using unsecured email systems, sometimes even commercial email accounts on public servers. But India’s
sensitive networks tend to be isolated, with no point of contact with the internet that would render
them vulnerable to on-line hacking. Several agencies have their own, dedicated, secure optic fibre
networks, notably the military; the Defence R&D Organisation (DRDO); and the police’s Crime and Criminal Tracking
Network System (CCTNS), the national database that is being gradually rolled out,” says Praveen Swami, the Strategic
Affairs Editor of Network 18.
Not Unique—Cyber attacks on India’s financial infrastructure are exploding now
before CMS has been completed
Athavale 14 Dileep Athavale, reporter for the Times of India. Cyberattacks on the rise in India , TNN |
Mar 10, 2014, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/tech/it-services/Cyberattacks-on-the-rise-inIndia/articleshow/31757791.cms
The ease of online banking and transactions has brought with it a significant rise in malicious attacks
on digital devices and software systems. Most of these attacks, as recent instances of online thefts have demonstrated, have
been in the banking and financial services domain. According to reports by research agencies, the problem has become
more complex with the proliferation of mobile devices and the users' preference towards transactions on the go. In addition, there is also laxity
on the part of the users when it comes to following safe practices during such transactions, coupled with a significant lack of manpower with
skills to handle the rising number of such attacks, the agencies' reports state. Arbor Networks' research report states that 2013
witnessed
a huge rise in attacks against the banking and financial services sector. Government establishments also faced such
attacks. The firm said there was a 136% increase in cyberthreats and attacks against government organizations and 126%
against financial services organizations in India. India has seen significant increase in attacks against
financials and government, with 34% and 43% of them reporting cyberthreats and attacks respectively, up from last year's 15% and 19%,
the report revealed. "From the ISP to the enterprise, IT and security teams are facing a dynamic threat landscape and very skilled and patient
adversaries," Matthew Moynahan, president of Arbor Networks, said. "Multi-layered defenses are clearly needed, but so is a commitment to
best practices for people and process," he added. Another report, from EC-Council Foundation pointed at a major gap in information security
threat handling capabilities in India, thanks mainly to the talent crisis in the country. The report shows talent levels in nine crucial segments of
information security, the implications of which could impact handling of cyberthreats in industries such as banking and economy, defence,
healthcare, information and energy among others. Close to an alarming 75% participants displayed low levels or a lack of skill in error handling,
while 73% participants were not adequately equipped with skills in file handling, the report revealed. Experts have recognized that malicious
file inclusions, malware distribution and distributed denial of service s(DDOS) attacks are known threats that can arise out of improper file
handling and such threats are often used to synchronize attacks on websites or large networks, the report stated. Anshul Abhang, managing
director and chief executive of enterprise security solutions firm Deltaproactive, told ToI that a malicious attacker now looks for high-value
targets that can benefit him financially. "Hacking is no more a satisfaction game but has become serious business. The attackers also look for
indirect financial benefits by targeting particular organizations' services and taking it down eventually. Such service outages result in financial
loss as well as goodwill and image loss in the market."
India’s banking sector is vulnerable to cyber attacks now
Kaushik 14 Ram. K. Kaushik ia a blogger for Cyber Security in India,
http://cybersecurityforindia.blogspot.com/
However, cyber
security in India is in a poor condition. Cyber security of banks in India is also required to
be strengthened. The banks operating in India are not at all serious about maintaining cyber security
of banking related transactions and this is resulting in many cyber and financial crimes in India. In the
absence of appropriate skills development and modernisation of law enforcement agencies of India, police force are finding it really difficult to
solve technology related crimes. Further, cyber security of sensitive databases like National Identity Cards would also require strong privacy
protection and cyber security compliances.
Turn, Only completing the CMS can allow the surveillance necessary to stop cyber
attacks on the financial system
GKT 15 General Knowledge Today: India’s Daily E Magazine, Feb 2015
http://www.gktoday.in/blog/developing-the-cyber-security-architecture/
Cyber warfare is the internet based conflict which arises when the information system of the strategic departments of the country are attacked
in order to get the classified information. In the modern world of digitization such politically motivated snooping is done to interrupt the
strategic affairs of the nation. Sometimes it is aimed at attacking the major infrastructures of the nation. With the shrinking world, the internet
connectivity and heavy dependence of the government functioning on internet, it is imperative to have a cyber securing framework. In
the
world of digitization critical infrastructure like banking system, financial market, power infrastructure,
and hydroelectric projects are prone to such attack. The grid failure like instances can be its consequences. Hydroelectric
projects prone to disaster, may be attacked and create disasters. 'Stuxnet' like malwares which were introduce in the centrifuge of Iran was one
such incidence. NSA's PRISM snooping incidence, Dropmier, Tempora are such other global surveillance programmes which were
operationalised to mine the data strategic to India. Hackers from different countries like Pakistan and china try to deface the Indian website are
the potential attackers. Hence
it is imperative to have in the modern times a properly tucked national
security and monitoring system to have a digital surveillance in the country protecting it from cyber
warfare and cyber espionage. India’s efforts to minimize the cyber threat With the rise of India in last some decades as a
global power and emerging economy it attracted global attention and remains vulnerable with regard to information
protection. India's cyber security architecture as of now do not provide any mass surveillance
mechanism with only few distinguished agencies like RAW, IB get access to such monitoring after the approval. India's effort include CERTIn (Computer Emergency Response Team- India) which was formed in 2002-03 to create awareness on cyber threat, understand vulnerabilities
and devise ways to mitigate them. National Technical Response Organization (N'I'R0) was given responsibility of protecting the critical
infrastructure institution and developing offensive capabilities. Amendments to the IT act 2008, raised the level of awareness about the cyber
crimes. It recognizes various ways of cyber attacks and also provides help to prosecute the cyber criminals. National cyber security policy 2013
was framed to build a secure and resilient cyber space for government, citizen and business to protect the classified information critical to
India's security. Its features include range of provisions including 24X7 mechanisms to deal with cyber threats. India
is following the path of
developing intense surveillance system which not only monitor the cyber threat to the national security but also
seems to compromise the privacy of its citizen in some cases. The Central Monitoring System (CMS) is an ambitious project that is
required to keep the national security and monitoring under surveillance. It would be a centralized mechanism
where the telecommunication and internet connections can be analyzed by Indian government and its agencies. Central and regional
database would help law enforcement agencies to monitor and intercept. Call data recordings and
data mining to identify call details of the targeted numbers. Another such Efforts is NeTRA (Network Traffic Analysis
System) will intercept and examine communication over the internet for keywords like 'attack', 'blast', 'kill'. It appears to be Indian government
first attempt of mass surveillance rather than individual targets. It will scan the activities over the social networking websites like twitter and
would scan the mails and chat transcript and even the voices in the internet traffic. India's cyber security has not only to be effectively
implemented but also to be redrawn in line with growing cvber crimes.
Turn, metadata is key to DETER cyber attacks
Michaels 13 Jim Michaels, is a military writer for USA TODAY and has covered wars around the world. He is a former Marine infantry officer
USA TODAY June 6, 2013, NSA data mining
can help stop cybercrime, analysts say The huge volume of telephone
records turned over to the U.S. government could help investigators identify and deter a range of terrorist acts, including
cyberattacks, analysts say. "Once you have this big chunk of data and you have it forever… you can do all sorts of analytics with it using
other data sources," said Joseph DeMarco, former head of the cybercrime unit in the U.S. attorney's office in New York City. "A data set like this
is the gift that keeps on giving," said DeMarco, a partner at the law firm DeVore & DeMarco.
Turn- NCCC Metadata program for preventing cyber terror attacks is modeled after
U.S. data collection and will prevent cyber attacks
Keck 13 Zachary Keck is assistant editor of The Diplomat, India Sets Up Domestic PRISM-Like Cyber
Surveillance?, http://strategicstudyindia.blogspot.com/2013/06/afghan-lessons-for-arming-syrianrebels.html
Even as the
United States’ PRISM cyber-snooping program is raising alarm across the world, India is in the midst of
setting up a similar program designed to collect intelligence via the internet domestically. The Hindu reports that the India
government is creating a centralized mechanism to coordinate and analyze information gathered from internet accounts throughout the
country. The
mechanism will be called the National Cyber Coordination Centre [NCCC]. “The federal Internet
scanning agency will give law enforcement agencies direct access to all Internet accounts , be it your e-mails, blogs
or social networking data,” the Hindu reported, referring to the NCCC. A classified government “note” that The Hindu obtained explains the
NCCC in this way: “The NCCC will collect, integrate and scan [Internet] traffic data from different gateway routers of major ISPs at a centralised
location for analysis, international gateway traffic and domestic traffic will be aggregated separately … The
NCCC will facilitate realtime assessment of cyber security threats in the country and generate actionable reports/alerts for
proactive actions by the concerned agencies” NDTV, however, reports that the NCCC will not target individuals but rather will seek to
access threats to India’s cyber infrastructure as a whole. “The new system will look for unusual data flow to identify and access cyber threats
and not individual data,” NDTV reported, citing unnamed government officials. But the Hindustan Times reports that Indian
authorities
have long used meta-data to track potential cyber threats inside the country. According to that paper, the program does
not allow Indian authorities to access actual content, but rather look for “patterns in the manner emails, phone calls and SMSes are sent and
delivered.” It’s unclear how much the NCCC would expand this authority and in which ways, if at all. One purpose of the NCCC seems to be
simply trying to coordinate the different activities of government agencies tasked with elements of cybersecurity. During a speech last month,
Prime Minister Singh briefly alluded to the then-forthcoming NCCC, “We are implementing a national architecture for cyber security and have
taken steps to create an office of a national cyber security coordinator.”
Turn, India’s metadata surveillance program will prevent cyber attacks
Jhala 14 Krishna Jhala is an associate attorney at Priti Suri & Associates, India gets ready to set up
cyber snooping agency March 2014, http://www.psalegal.com/FLASH_POPUP.php?flashID=144
India will soon be setting up a federal internet scanning agency called NCCC to spy all internet
accounts and online data. NCCC is to monitor cyber security threats and inform concerned law
enforcement agencies for proactive action to prevent crime . NCCC will collect and integrate internet traffic data from
different gateway routers of major ISPs at a centralized location for analysis. NCCC would be set up at a cost of INR 10 billion and all top
government spy and technical agencies including Department of Telecommunication, Intelligence Bureau, Research and Analysis Wing, Indian
Computer Emergency Response Team, Army, Navy, Air force, National Security Council Secretariat, Defence Research and Development
Organization will play an active role in the functioning of NCCC. PSA view - In the present internet era, cyber
attacks are on an
increase and pose as a huge threat to the safety and security of the nation. Recently, Central Bureau of
Investigation’s website had been defaced by hackers and in another case attempts were made to break into Indian Railway Website. Therefore,
NCCC is need of the hour and a step in the right direction to address the shortcoming in the cyber security.
100% FDI allowed in telecom sector In a meeting of the Department of Policy and Promotion chaired by Prime Minister on July 16, 2013, it was
announced that FDI limit in the telecom sector has been increased to 100%. The earlier limit was 74%. As per latest announcements,
investment up to 49% is allowed to come in through the automatic route and investment above 49% is required to be brought in through the
government route i.e. approval of the Foreign Investment Promotion Board. PSA view - The announcement is seen as a welcome change.
However, the policy and implementation of these announcement is what is most awaited. The increased limits are set to bring in billions of
investments in this sector. Fresh foreign investments would help catalyze growth and the process of proliferation in the telecom sector across
the country. India set to frame new testing norms for telecom equipment The Department of Telecommunications with the Department of
Electronics & IT and National Technical Research Organization are all set to frame new testing standards for telecom gear to shield networks
from potential cyber attacks. The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (“CCRA”) clearance will no longer be enough to certify global
telecom gear used in India, announced the National Security Council Secretariat, the apex agency looking into India’s political, economic and
energy and strategic security concerns. PSA view - CCRA was created ten years back by UK, US, Canada, France, Germany and the Netherlands,
Australia and New Zealand, to define a common process to evaluate security-sensitive IT & telecom products and an objective to motivate
global telecom vendors to find common processes to reduce equipment certification costs worldwide. But now India has started creating
country-specific telecom gear testing standards and adopting several measures: (i) mobile phone companies have been mandated to use
equipment deemed “safe” by an authorized testing lab in India from November 1, 2013; (ii) India is preparing a cyber security framework and a
cyber security policy; (iii) India
is setting up a National Cyber Coordination Centre to monitor metadata on
cyber traffic flows; (iv) Establish a pilot lab and a full-fledged certification center and development system; and (v) To adopt global
approaches to its procurement policies, India is reviewing its Preferential Market Access policy designed to compel foreign companies to
manufacture electronic products in India if they want to sell in India.
LeT Disad
LeT stands for Lashkar e Taiba ( sometimes called
Let - Internal Links
VOIP Links
LeT can avoid detection because it relies on VOIP communication that can’t be tracked
Sharwood 12 Simon Sharwood is a reporter for the Register Terrorists 'build secure VoIP over GPRS
network' Secret comms channel eludes Indian spooks,
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/05/01/terror_group_voip/
Terror group Lashkar-e-Taiba has developed its own VoIP network that connects its members over GPRS
networks, according to the Times of India. UK and US authorities have both declared Lashkar-e-Taiba a proscribed terror organisation. The
group's aims include India ceding sovereignty over Kashmir. Members of the organisation participated in the 2008 attacks on Mumbai. The
VoIP network is frustrating India's intelligence community, the report says, because it means they can no
longer trace the group's members as it is far harder to spy on than email or commercial VoIP services. “Earlier, we could
intercept conversations on phone or locate Lashkar cadres based on their IP addresses through their
emails,” an intelligence source told the Times. “But now we're finding it tough to gather intelligence because
Lashkar men hold audio or video conferences using private VoIP.” The network even has a name: Ibotel. The report
says Laskar-eTaiba recruited “technicians, engineers and information technology executives … intensify
its operations across India.” Some of those recruits, the report suggests, developed Ibotel as the group sought more secure methods
of communication.
LeT use of VOIP is making them impossible to track down with conventional
intelligence methods
Singh 12 Aarti Tikoo Singh reporter for Times of India, Lashkar’s own Skype frazzles Indian intelligence ,
TNN | Apr 30, 2012, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Lashkars-own-Skype-frazzles-Indianintelligence/articleshow/12934037.cms
The increasing use by terror group Lashkar-e-Taiba [LeT] of Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) for communication,
and its impenetrability, is proving frustrating for Indian intelligence. In fact, Lashkar supreme commander of
operations, Zaki-ur Rehman Lakhvi, who is in a Rawalpindi jail, has been networking using a private VoIP on his smart phone with Lashkar
cadres. "Lakhvi's compound serves as Lashkar's alternative headquarters," a top intelligence source told TOI. It was his imprisonment, sources
said, that stopped Lashkar cadres from using emails and phones and restrict communication to VoIP. VoIP is a technology that delivers audio
and video messages over the internet. It's distinct from phone as it converts audio signals into binary data. VoIP also allows encryption of data,
which makes it difficult to decode messages. Senior intelligence sources in Kashmir told TOI that Muridke (Lahore) based Lashkar
known
for using technology more than any other terror group in Kashmir, has its own private VoIP, Ibotel, to
communicate with its cadres in Pakistan and Kashmir. Ibotel, Lashkar's exclusive VoIP that runs on GPRS (mobile data service on 2G or 3G
cellular communication system), was created by Lashkar's own tech team. The group began recruiting technicians, engineers and information
technology executives almost a decade ago to intensify its operations across India. Lashkar, which is headed by Hafiz Saeed against whom the
US recently announced a $10 million bounty for his alleged role in the November 2008 Mumbai attacks, started using VoIP as soon as the
technology became common in early 2000s. Lashkar's handlers used VoIP during the Mumbai attacks, intelligence sources said. "Earlier,
we
could intercept conversations on phone or locate Lashkar cadres based on their IP addresses through
their emails. But now we're finding it tough to gather intelligence because Lashkar men hold audio or
video conferences using private VoIP," said intelligence sources. "It's difficult to track their locations .
And even if we know their IP addresses and the time and date of their audio or video calls, we remain technologically handicapped because we
can't intercept what transpired between them," said a senior government official. "There may not be more than 50-odd Lashkar men. Yet, they
are a threat because they have the ability to strike in the Valley or other parts of the country. We
technology to hunt them down," said a senior J&K police officer.
need to catch up with the
CMS is key to tracking VOIP communications
Parbat 13
Kalyan Parbat, ET Bureau Dec 30, 2013, Home Ministry pushes for IB right to screen VoIP services
offered by Skype, Yahoo, GTalk, RediffBol c Dec 30, 2013,
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-12-30/news/45711413_1_interception-solutionvoip-indian-telegraph-act
Learning from the interception pilot will be used by the government to fine tune the Centralised Monitoring System (CMS), the
muchawaited national surveillance system that will be equipped to track all forms of communications, including
wireless, landline, satellite, internet and VoIP calls from next year.
A comprehensive study demonstrated that disrupting LeT is key to stopping its attacks
Dilegge 12
Dave Dilegge is Editor-in-Chief of Small Wars Journal and serves as a Director at Small Wars
Foundation. ¶ University of Maryland Scientists Develop New Methods to Combat Pakistani Terrorist
Group Lashkar-e-Taiba, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/university-of-maryland-scientists-developnew-methods-to-combat-pakistani-terrorist-group-lashk
¶
¶ Effectively reducing the likelihood and intensity of attacks by the Pakistani terrorist group Lashkar-eTaiba (LeT), the perpetrators of the November 2008 assault on Mumbai, India, requires a cocktail of
actions including fostering dissent within LeT, hampering the organization’s ability to conduct
communication campaigns or provide social services, and disrupting the links between LeT and other
Islamist terror groups, says a new study completed by an interdisciplinary research team at the
University of Maryland’s Lab for Computational Cultural Dynamics.¶ ¶ Presented at an international
symposium on Lashkar-e-Taiba held in Washington on Sep 10, 2012, the study also confirms traditional
wisdom that pressuring Pakistan to rein in its terrorist proxies and disrupt LeT terrorist training camps is
also necessary to reduce the scope of LeT attacks. The UMD research further showed that traditional
counter-terror and law-enforcement tools such as arrests, raids, and targeting the group’s field
commanders have only had a limited impact in reducing the likelihood of Lashkar-e-Taiba attacks. The
study also is being published as a book: “Computational Analysis of Terrorist Groups: Lashkar-e-Taiba”
(Springer, released Sep. 10, 2012).¶ ¶ Besides killing hundreds of civilians, LeT threatens the stability of
South Asia because its attacks heighten tensions between nuclear-armed rivals India and Pakistan.
Further, since the assault on Mumbai, information on Lashkar-e-Taiba suggests that it has increasingly
turned its attention towards attacking the West not only in Afghanistan but also in Europe and
Australia.¶ ¶ “Our study of LeT is different,” explains V.S. Subrahmanian, lead author of the study, and
director of the University of Maryland’s Laboratory for Computational Cultural Dynamics, “It is the first
in-depth analysis of a terror group that uses sophisticated data mining algorithms to learn temporal
probabilistic rules as well as new algorithms to automatically suggest set policies which are sets of
actions that should and should not be taken in order to elicit a desired behavior. Companies like Google
and Amazon use these kinds of analytic methodologies to model the behaviors of customers every day.
Decision-makers dealing with deadly threats to national security should have the same kinds of tools
available.”¶ ¶ The findings on how best to deal with LeT are based on systematically gathered monthly
data on 770 variables over a period of over 20 years. The UMD researchers mined this data for
temporal probabilistic rules that not only identify conditions under which different types of terror strikes
are carried out by LeT or its affiliates, but also the time delay with which these actions occur.. Given
these rules about the likelihood of LeT actions, a new Policy Computation Algorithm identifies sets of
actions that reduce the likelihood of LeT attacks.¶ ¶ A typical rule states that two months after 5-24
Lashkar-e-Taiba operatives were arrested and Lashkar-e-Taiba operatives were on trial in either India or
Pakistan, there was an 88 percent probability of Lashkar-e-Taiba engaging in clashes with local security
forces in which Lashkar-e-Taiba operatives are killed. The software generated hundreds of such rules
about a vast range of Lashkar-e-Taiba attacks including their targeting of civilians, professional security
forces, transportation centers, security installations, and symbolic/tourist locations.¶ ¶ Overall the rules
showed that support from Pakistan’s government for LeT (which over the years has included financial,
military, as well as operational support) is strongly correlated with almost every type of Lashkar-e-Taiba
violence, while when Lashkar-e-Taiba is suffering from internal dissension they are less likely to carry
out every type of attack.
Meta data links
India access to Meta data is key to prevent attacks orchestrated through VOIP and to
prevent terrorist attacks in India
Sharma 14
Laveesh Sharma, Graduate Student at Jindal School of International Affairs, Haryana, Changing Face of
Privacy in India: An Analysis, http://stsfor.org/content/changing-face-privacy-india-analysis
In the year of 2012, the National Security Council of India, which was headed by the former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, planned the
establishment of the National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Centre (NCIPC) that was to be created by the National Technical
Research Organization (NTRO) (Joseph, 2012). The Standing Committee on Information Technology has recommended the following apart from
the setting up of the NCIPC (Legislative, 2014): * Establishment of a protection centre; * Creation of a single centralised body dealing with
cyber-crimes; * Employment of skilled IT professionals to overcome shortage of manpower and; * Funding as well as conducting extensive
research and development. In the hindsight, the right to privacy has not been granted under the Constitution of India, although the courts
encompass it within the ‘freedom of speech and expression’ under Article 19(1) (a) and ‘right to life and personal liberty’ under Article 21.
Currently there is no dedicated legislation in place aimed at data protection or privacy. The data protection laws are a set of privacy laws and
procedures meant for minimizing intrusion of privacy, owing to surveillance and data collection. Nevertheless the Centre for Internet & Society,
an NGO based in New Delhi has researched extensively and drafted a version of the Privacy Protection Bill, 2013 (Acharya, 2013). Some
characteristics of the bill include: * It seeks to heavily penalize organisations or institutions obtaining personal data under false pretext; * It
authorizes suspension of telecom service provider’s license if it violates conditions of confidentiality mentioned in the bill; * It states that
recommendations shall be made by committee comprising the Cabinet Secretary, Secretaries of Departments of Personnel and Electronics and
IT, as well as two experts of data protection, law and finance to be nominated by the Central government. However, the National Security
Advisor (NSA) seeks to weaken the bill by reducing its scope and introducing provisions that would protect the intelligence agencies. The
current IT Act applies only on entities and persons located in India and not foreign corporations or people located abroad (Kosturi Ghosh, 2014).
It is designed to be incursive. For instance under Section 43A, the IT Act legalizes handling of sensitive personal data, and under Section 69,
the Government of India can “intercept, monitor or decrypt” any information transmitted or
generated from any computer resource in the interest of the sovereignty and integrity, defence, public order, preventing
incitement and for the security of the State (Dalmia, 2011). The impact on privacy will be hard hitting when the Central Monitoring
System (CMS) comes into action. It was fast tracked post 26/11 Mumbai attacks in which the perpetrators used
voice over internet protocol (VoIP). This system would allow the Government to access every digital
communication and telecommunication in the country. The CMS will be capable of covering text messages, online
activities, phone calls, online searches and even social media conversations! (Nandakumar, 2013). According to investigations, about 160
million users are already under the scrutiny of wide-ranging surveillance. They have further revealed that a “Lawful Intercept and Monitoring
Systems” is in place, which has been arranged by the Centre for Development of Telematics for the purpose of monitoring Skype, emails, webbrowsing and of course Internet traffic (Singh, 2013). The surveillance agency in Australia, Defence Signals Directorate (DSD) shared metadata
of its citizens with intelligence allies overseas. Prime Minister Tony Abbott defined meta-data as “essentially the billing data which is different
from the actual content of calls.” A metadata
can paint a “visual rendering” of one’s digital and physical
existence (Laughland, 2013). Owing to the trails of pieces, internet activities of an individual can be linked and
traced back. The NSA’s meta-data surveillance programme compiles the data giving a detailed picture of lives of individuals; these can
provide information about people’s political or religious affiliations and even their relationships. One of the other important phenomena has
been the rise in the number of smart phones in India. The industry has been very successful and has seen spike in the number of smart phone
users, with the market leader Android reportedly holding 62% of the market share according to a 2012 survey (Brindaalakshmi, 2013), followed
by Windows Mobile, RIM, IOS and so on. A rising consumer base for these companies is a cause of concern, as in the past these very firms had
provided direct access to the NSA. The NSA allegedly had access to over 180 million records from Yahoo, Google and Facebook. In 2013, the
percentage of obtained information from Skype rose to 248%, for Facebook, 131% and 63% for Google with DropBox being designed as a PRISM
provider (Glenn Greenwald, 2013). The recent upgrades in the Android software (Kit-Kat) make it the best spying phone that could capture
highly personal data of movements, activities, interests, internet searches and geo-locations. These smart phones use cutting-edge technology,
making them a potential spying weapon (Liss, 2014). The fact remains that such an incident can happen without anyone’s knowledge just like
the NSA snoop-gate, and governments would not even come to know unless there is another Snowden out there. The
mechanisms and
artillery adopted in the IT sector by the Indian Government may all seem too invasive of one’s own privacy but all of
these are absolute a necessity for the fight against cyber terrorism , mass-surveillance, cyber espionage and to prevent
another snoop-gate by a foreign country. The past incidents have shown how powerful and exploitative these instruments are as they hamper
freedom of speech and expression and lead to wrongful arrests for even ‘liking’ a post on Facebook or tweeting. Legal frameworks to tackle
these issues are extremely essential; at the same time amends have to be made in the IT Act.
Sophisticated social network tools can turn metadata into effective intelligence
information
Wheaton & Richey 14 Kristan J. Wheaton is an Associate Professor at Mercyhurst University and
Melonie K. Richey is a graduate student at Mercyhurst University who is currently participating in
IARPA’s Sirius Project. Metadata Analysis as an Intelligence Tool, e-International Relations January 9,
2014 , http://strategicstudyindia.blogspot.com/2014/06/metadata-analysis-as-intelligence-tool.html
The legality of the National Security Agency’s (NSA’s) use
of US citizens’ metadata to identify and track foreign
intelligence organizations and their operatives is currently a subject of much debate. Less well understood (and consequently
routinely misreported) are the capabilities and limitations of social network analysis, the methodology
often used to evaluate this metadata. One of the first causes of confusion is definitional. Social network analysis is often linked
to an inappropriate degree with social media. True, social media such as Facebook and Twitter are frequently used as rich data sources for
social network analysis, but understanding the importance of networks in the affairs of states has been around at least since Machiavelli.[1] In
addition, the first modern version of what would come to be called social network analysis was developed not by an intelligence agency or
computer scientist but by Columbia professor and psychosociologist, Jacob Moreno, in 1934. These “sociograms,” as Moreno called them were
used to graph individual preferences or relations within a small group. Little did Moreno suspect that his method for understanding the
relationships between people, when combined with graph theory and the processing power of computers, would allow for the detailed analysis
of thousands of people or organizations with hundreds of thousands of connections between them (See Fig. 2). [2] Figure 2 – Modern
social network analysis uses powerful computers and graph theory to map out the relationships
between thousands of nodes and hundreds of thousands of links. Shown here is the network of the over 6000 Twitter
users who follow the Twitter handle of the American Nuclear Society along with their over 200,000 connections. (Image Source: Melonie
Richey) Along with the undeniable power of this type of analysis comes the inevitable (and justified) concerns for privacy and constitutionality.
But just how powerful is social network analysis? What can intelligence agencies actually glean from the exabytes of data they are purportedly
collecting? Social Network Analysis, as an analytic method, has inarguable applicability to the field of intelligence and is progressively reshaping
the analytic landscape in terms of how analysts understand networks. For example, analysts
currently use SNA to identify key
people in an organization or social network, develop a strategic agent network, identify new agents
and simulate information flows through a network. Beyond this, SNA can be easily combined with other
analytic practices such as Geographic Information Systems (GIS), gravity model analysis or Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) to
create robust, predictive analyses. Identifying Key People/Organizations in a Network The most obvious use of SNA is its ability to
identify key actors and entities within a network. Centrality measures within a network are means for measuring a node’s relative importance
within the network. [3] It is well-accepted that “the ability to measure centrality in social networks has been a particularly useful development
in social network analysis.” What is more interesting, however, is the number of centrality measures that social network analysts use to reveal
different things about how key actors interact within a network. [4] For example, a node with a high degree centrality is connected to many
other nodes. In Figure 3 below, it is unsurprising that the American Nuclear Society (ANS) has the highest degree centrality in its own Twitter
network. However, a node with a high betweenness centrality is one that connects the cliques in the network. Figure 4 shows the same ANS
network, reconfigured and revisualized with an emphasis on betweenness, with a new node, Nuclear.com, emerging as the most important. For
example, by analyzing the network in accordance with different centrality measures and establishing filtering criteria (and using Carnegie
Mellon’s ORA software), [5] we were able to reduce a network representing the entire nuclear energy and non-proliferation communities on
Twitter (6000+ nodes and 200,000+ links) to the 19 most influential individuals within that network (See Figure 5). These individuals are the
nodes that would be able to disseminate information to the majority of the network within a matter of hours. Identifying New Agents
Another traditional intelligence activity that could benefit from SNA is identifying potential new
“agents” – people or organizations who might be willing or able to provide information to an
intelligence agency. For example, by using Twitter’s list feature, which allows users to establish lists of people to follow for particular
purposes, and some simple cross-referencing techniques, we were able to identify 50 new, highly reputable individuals and organizations
talking about strategic mining and minerals on Twitter. [6] While such a use by intelligence agencies may seem Orwellian, it is similar to
techniques currently used in business to identify potential customers. Likewise, a similar algorithm likely supports various friend/colleague
recommendation engines such as LinkedIn’s “People You May Know” feature. Simulating Information Flows Of all the capabilities of SNA,
simulations are likely one of the most useful. Carnegie Mellon’s ORA, for example, provides four main kinds of simulations in order to
demonstrate how money, information, disease or technology would move through a network. Pathway simulations locate the most direct or
indirect routes from one node to another. Still other simulations also indicate how a network would react to the removal of any particular node
or set of nodes (for example, how a decentralized terrorist network such as the Taliban would function if the leaders from two key cells were
killed). As an example of this feature, Figure 7, shows the effect of providing a highly relevant piece of information to the 19 individuals
identified in the Twitter network of nuclear specialists discussed above. The dots, representing individuals and organizations on Twitter, get
larger and change color as the information flows throughout the system. Variables within the simulation allow researchers to alter the level of
interest the network likely has to a particular piece of information (the information’s “virality”). Combining SNA with Other Methods These
simulations and other features of SNA provide idealized analyses that can then be combined with other techniques, such as GIS. Networks
within ORA and many other SNA tools can be visualized geospatially if coordinates are provided for each node. Running simulations through
these networks can then be represented on a map much like the simulation of Syrian refugee population movement throughout Turkey shown
in Figure 8. This, in turn, allows for powerful predictive analytics. Figure 9 reflects the outcome of the simulation in Figure 8; not only does the
image represent reality (the known locations of Syrian refugees according to the UN), [7] it also predicts where refugees are likely to move
within the next 12 to 24 months. This analysis employed SNA as the cornerstone analytic technique in conjunction with GIS and even includes
ideas from the more traditional intelligence methodology of Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield.
India has modeled metadata collection—India depends on metadata
Xynou 13 Maria Xynou Maria is a Policy Associate on the Privacy Project at the CIS, FinFisher in India
and the Myth of Harmless Metadata, http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/fin-fisher-in-indiaand-myth-of-harmless-metadata
Over the last months, it has been reported that the
Central Monitoring System (CMS) is being implemented in India,
through which all telecommunications and Internet communications in the country are being centrally
intercepted by Indian authorities. This mass surveillance of communications in India is enabled by the
omission of privacy legislation and Indian authorities are currently capturing the metadata of
communications.[30] Last month, Edward Snowden leaked confidential U.S documents on PRISM, the top-secret National Security
Agency (NSA) surveillance programme that collects metadata through telecommunications and Intenet communications. It has been reported
that through PRISM, the NSA has tapped into the servers of nine leading Internet companies: Microsoft, Google, Yahoo, Skype, Facebook,
YouTube, PalTalk, AOL and Apple.[31] While the extent to which the NSA is actually tapping into these servers remains unclear, it is certain that
the NSA has collected metadata on a global level.[32] Yet, the question of whether the collection of metadata is “harmful” remains ambiguous.
According to the National Information Standards Organization (NISO), the term “metadata” is defined as “structured information that
describes, explains, locates or otherwise makes it easier to retrieve, use or manage an information resource”. NISO claims that metadata is
“data about data” or “information about information”.[33] Furthermore, metadata is considered valuable due to its following functions:
•Resource discovery •Organizing electronic resources •Interoperability •Digital Identification •Archiving and preservation Metadata can be
used to find resources by relevant criteria, to identify resources, to bring similar resources together, to distinguish dissimilar resources and to
give location information. Electronic resources can be organized through the use of various software tools which can automatically extract and
reformat information for Web applications.
Interoperability is promoted through metadata, as describing a
resource with metadata allows it to be understood by both humans and machines, which means that
data can automatically be processed more effectively. Digital identification is enabled through
metadata, as most metadata schemes include standard numbers for unique identification. Moreover, metadata enables the archival and
preservation of large volumes of digital data.[34] Surveillance projects, such as PRISM and India's CMS, collect large
volumes of metadata, which include the numbers of both parties on a call, location data, call duration, unique identifiers, the
International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) number, email addresses, IP addresses and browsed webpages.[35] However, the fact that such
surveillance projects may not have access to content data might potentially create a false sense of security.[36] When Microsoft released its
report on data requests by law enforcement agencies around the world in March 2013, it revealed that most of the disclosed data was
metadata, while relatively very little content data was allegedly disclosed
India depends on metadata for intelligence
Lowenthal 14 Mark M. Lowenthal is the senior specialist in U.S. foreign policy at the Congressional
Research Service Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy
India has a growing cyberspace capability, which, like that of many other nations, appears to have been used against potential foes, such as
China and Pakistan, and more friendly states, like the United States. India is in the midst of deploying a Centralised (or Central) Monitoring
System (CMS) that is designed to track all communications within India-telephone, computer, landline, mobile, and so
on. Unlike the NSA program, CMS will not have to ask providers' permission for access but will have that built into the technology of the
telecom and data service providers. (IMS will provide intelligence to foreign and domestic agencies, the police, and tax collectors-a list that
some believe is too broad. Like the NSA program, CMS appears to focus on metadata. CMS is being developed and will
be run by a government technology development center that is not part of the intelligent complex. The Ministry for Home Affairs will have the
power to determine who is monitored.
Sleeper Cell Link
Domestic Surveillance in India is key—connections with internal groups in India is key
to its ability to attack
Adlakha 10 Joshua Adlakha, Graduate Student in Security Studies at Georgetown University, THE
EVOLUTION OF LASHKAR-E-TAYYIBA AND THE ROAD TO MUMBAI,
https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/.../adlakhajoshua.pdf.
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba has always required some level of support from local Indian citizens to facilitate its
operations in Kashmir and India. According to the Indian government, several Indians aided the 2008 Mumbai attacks including Arshad
Ansari, Sabahuddin Ahmad, and Syed Zabiuddin Syed Zakiuddin Ansari. LeT has also connected with local militant
movements in India to extend its operational capabilities and expand its recruiting network. One of these
groups includes the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI). While SIMI was formed in 1977, at some point in the late 1990s a militant
movement emerged out of the group. Some commentators suspect that SIMI has acted as a major conduit for LeT activities. Another
movement also associated with LeT known as the Indian Mujahideen (IM) either emerged out of SIMI or taken over its militant elements in
2007. Many analysts consider the two groups as synonymous.184 Ideologically, IM and SIMI reject Hinduism, secularism, democracy, and
nationalism.185 The 2002 Gujarat riots likely has fueled an expansion of LeT’s network into India. LeT has actively exploited the riots to expand
its network in India. Shortly following the riots, Hafiz Saeed called for the Muslims of India to rise up stating that “the riots have proved that the
Hindus are fully armed but the Muslims are badly ill-equipped to cope with such a situation.” Indeed, even some women may have joined LeT
as a result of the riots.186 Indian investigators believe that a Mumbaibased SIMI operative Rahil Sheikh was tasked with aiding the transit of
SIMI volunteers through the Iran-Pakistan border to train at LeT camps following the communal pogrom in Gujarat. Among the volunteers
included Zakiuddin Ansari, the Indian believed to have been in the control room during the 2008 Mumbai attack.187 This example may be
indicative of how LeT has utilized its existing networks with a local Indian militant group to capitalize on Muslim anger at the communal
violence.
Domestic surveillance in India is key to breaking LeT connections to domestic groups
in India and cutting off funding
Bhatia 14 Raashi Bjatia is the Co-Founder of a non-profit organization Business Alternatives for Peace,
Action and Reconstruction (BAPAR) based in New Delhi and a Graduate Student in Security Studies with
the Center of Security Studies, Georgetown University, India?s National Security Policies and the Threat
of Lashkar-e-Taiba: A Forgotten Concern Small Arms Journal Journal Article | Apr 15 2014,
smallwarsjournal.com/printpdf
Proactive steps should be taken to break Lashkar’s alliance with homegrown jihadi outfits like Indian
Mujahidin (IM) and the Student Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) who are known to provide logistical as well as
surveillance services to Lashkar. Not just domestic jihadi organizations but also their links to organized crime and mafia
leaders who provide a safe channel for money laundering should be cracked down upon. One of the
most effective ways to disrupt Lashkar’s operations is to disrupt their money flow. Further even though India
has joined the Financial Action Task Force in 2009 and has with the help of the United States declared Dawood Ibrahim an international
terrorist, but because Lashkar has such an extensive global network for fund raising as well as money laundering, it is difficult for authorities to
move through slow diplomatic channels to fully implement and stop the money flow, especially with regard to Pakistan who seems to be extra
cautious and slow while providing any kind of cooperation against Lashkar.
Indian domestic surveillance is key to prevent attacks--The LeT is a massive threat to
India through sleeper cells in India activated through internet communications
Bhatia 14 Raashi Bjatia is the Co-Founder of a non-profit organization Business Alternatives for Peace,
Action and Reconstruction (BAPAR) based in New Delhi and a Graduate Student in Security Studies with
the Center of Security Studies, Georgetown University, India?s National Security Policies and the Threat
of Lashkar-e-Taiba: A Forgotten Concern Small Arms Journal Journal Article | Apr 15 2014,
smallwarsjournal.com/printpdf
Lashkar- e- Taiba which translates into the ‘Army of the Pure’ is the most robust and powerful terrorist group
operating out of Pakistan and a prominent threat to India. Lashkar has proved its capability for planning and executing
highly sophisticated attacks like the one in Mumbai in 2008 where the operatives used maritime insertion, GPS navigation and satellite phones
for real time monitoring and as well as for communication with their leaders in Pakistan. Lashkar-e-Taiba has also been the pioneer for
introducing Fedayeen attacks in India, their first recorded attack was in Kashmir in 1993. LeT has
infiltrated and built an
extensive network of sleeper cells and associations with other jihadi groups in the sub-continent,
which if not dealt with can and most probably will result in more Mumbaistyle attacks. If we look at Lashkar’s expenditure
for the Mumbai attacks, the biggest operation Lashkar has planned and successfully executed, they spent around $200,000 which when
compared with LeT’s overall annual budget (probably in the $50 million or more range), it is evident that terrorism remains a low-cost
endeavor.[i] The
group also has a robust above ground infrastructure that may be used as a first point of
contact for would be jihadists.[ii] It has a sophisticated website named after its social wing- Jamaat-ud-Dawa and has an
active presence on social media like Facebook and Twitter. Despite Lashkar being connected to various other attacks in
Mumbai before November 26, 2008 as well as in other incidents across India which also involved a large number of casualties, the Mumbai
attacks in 2008, which claimed 164 lives and injured 308, brought to attention Lashkar’s global jihad ideology. For the first time after 9/11
foreign tourists, the Jewish community and luxury hotels were specifically targeted in Mumbai and the event forced national security
authorities all across the world to rethink their preparedness as well as the possibility of another ‘Mumbai style attack’. Also, since its formation
Lashkar has shared very special relationship with Al-Qaida. It is widely believed that Osama Bin Laden was the one to provide seed funding for
the establishment of Lashkar’s headquarters in Muridke, Pakistan. The affiliation grew stronger with time especially after 9/11 when it became
impossible for Lashkar to ignore global jihad. Dr. Bruce Hoffman, as RAND Director of the Washington office, said in an interview, “LeT is
increasingly transforming itself from a localized group to one that is not only an al-Qaida surrogate but a global jihadist group. This is part of alQaida’s strength: exploiting a group and getting them to buy into the global jihadist imperative.”[iii] Al-Qaeda’s core strategy aims at distracting
and exhausting adversaries, creating divisions between counter-terrorism allies, forging close ties and assisting local affiliates, planning major
international or global attacks and monitoring western security and defense systems.[iv] The only difference in Lashkar’s core strategy is that
the jihad they wage is directed towards India. Furthermore, not only they share a strong alliance but also similarities can be seen in their tactics
and modus operandi. Many experts believe that the Mumbai attacks showed an uncanny resemblance to attacks carried out by Al- Qaida. The
Mumbai gunmen were well-prepared and trained. The terrorists had done their reconnaissance and planning, which would have taken months
to coordinate. They knew the terrain and locations. They had worked out the internal infrastructure and layout of the buildings and moved with
stealth, combing their way through 10 locations and creating devastation along the way;[v] much like how Al-Qaida likes to conduct their
operations.
LeT is growing a network of cells inside India
Adlakha 10 Joshua Adlakha, Graduate Student in Security Studies at Georgetown University, THE
EVOLUTION OF LASHKAR-E-TAYYIBA AND THE ROAD TO MUMBAI,
https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/.../adlakhajoshua.pdf.
Furthermore, the
involvement of local Indians in both the attack planning as well as the operation itself
suggest that LeT may have an expanding network of support cells in India. Indian authorities charged two
detained Indian nationals—Fahim Arshad Ansari and Sabahuddin Ahmad— with preparing the maps and videotapes that aided the Lashkar
militants to their targets during the Mumbai attack in February 2009. This marked the first official acknowledgement by the Indian government
that Indians had participated in the attacks.16 Furthermore, the intercepted communications between the Mumbai attackers and their
controllers in Pakistan revealed that one of the controllers spoke Hindi. The Hindi-speaking Lashkar control was later identified by Indian
intelligence agencies as Syed Zabiuddin Syed Zakiuddin Ansari from Maharashtra state in India.17 His role in the control room during the attack
raises the question of whether LeT has begun to concede to greater Indian involvement in its operations. The remainder of this paper will seek
to resolve some of the issues raised by Mumbai attack and discern the factors that have fueled LeT’s evolution leading into the attack.
Uniqueness
India is solving LeT terror threats now
IE 5/13 — Indian Express, 2015. (“Government successful in dealing with terror threats: Kiren Rijiju”,
May 5th, 2015, Available Online at: http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/governmentsuccessful-in-dealing-with-terror-threats-kiren-rijiju/)
Government on Wednesday said it has been successful in dealing with threats to coastal security in
the recent past, but did not disclose details on security grounds. Replying to a question on terrorists
sneaking through the sea route, Minister of State for Home Kiren Rijiju said “I can tell this august House
that in the last 11 months, we have been successful in dealing with all the threats we have. “I don’t
want to claim credit for that. It is the duty of the government to secure the country and we are
committed to that.” He refused to divulge details on grounds of security. To a specific question
regarding Mumbai, Rijiju said besides Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), “there are many other terrorist groups
which are working on destroying the peace and tranquility of this country. They are a threat to our
national security. “They have Indian affiliates also, which are banned under the relevant laws. All the
steps are being taken and I am very confident that it is paying dividend also. There is no need to really
worry and say that we are not taking enough steps to secure Mumbai.” He also listed out the steps to
beef up security in the coastal areas of the country and added that whole security system has been
“synergised”. To another question, Rijiju’s ministerial colleague Haribhai Parathibhai Chaudhary said the
government receives intelligence inputs relating to attack plans by LeT on targets in the coastal areas
from time to time and shares it with respective state governments. “However, further details in this
matter cannot be disclosed in the interest of national security,” he said in a written reply. He was asked
whether it is a fact that according to an intelligence report, Pakistan-based LeT terrorists might sneak
into Mumbai via the sea route to carry out terror attacks.
We control uniqueness, India is preventing LeT attacks now but continued vigilance is
essential
Bhatia 14 Raashi Bjatia is the Co-Founder of a non-profit organization Business Alternatives for Peace,
Action and Reconstruction (BAPAR) based in New Delhi and a Graduate Student in Security Studies with
the Center of Security Studies, Georgetown University, India?s National Security Policies and the Threat
of Lashkar-e-Taiba: A Forgotten Concern Small Arms Journal Journal Article | Apr 15 2014,
smallwarsjournal.com/printpdf
The most successful of all countermeasures though has been the arrest of key Lashkar-e-Taiba
operatives. In 2013, Indian security officials arrested Abdul Karim Tunda- an expert bomb maker for the
terrorist outfit. In 2012 approximately 61 operatives were killed in encounters with Indian security
forces including Lashkar Division and District Commanders. Around 48 were arrested and 8 sleeper cells
were neutralized. [xxiv] The arrests included key recruiter for Lashkar from India and Nepal Mohammad
Omar Madni and Chief Coordinator for Jammu and Kashmir Manzoor. Looking at the numbers, it
certainly seems like the intelligence community is successful in gathering critical information as well as
preventing further attacks but in my opinion they still have a long way to go. In 2013 itself, there has
been a record of 254 infiltration bids made by terrorists along the India- Pakistan border. In 133 cases,
the terrorists were made to ‘return’ to Pakistan territory, while they successfully crossed over in 84
cases.[xxv] The operatives that crossed over in these 84 cases could well be planning another Mumbai.
India has prevented LeT attacks designed to crush the economy
Press Trust of India 12
Fake currency pushed at behest of Pak intel agencies, Lashkar-e-Taiba: Cops Delhi | Press Trust of India |
Updated: April 15, 2012, http://www.ndtv.com/delhi-news/fake-currency-pushed-at-behest-of-pakintel-agencies-lashkar-e-taiba-cops-476737
The Delhi police has told a court here that a consignment of over Rs. 1.18 crore fake currency notes, seized by it in
January, had been sent from Pakistan at the behest of its intelligence agency and banned terror outfit Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)
to destabilise the Indian economy. The police made this claim in its charge sheet, filed in the court of Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate Vinod Yadav and indicting five Indians, arrested along with the fake currency note consignment on January 12. The seizure of the
counterfeit notes with a face value of over Rs. 1.18 crore, concealed in 33 cloth bundles and loaded in two tempos, was made from near a
godown at Dabri in West Delhi. The police has named Zeeshan Khan, a resident of Dabri, Ash Mohammad of Uttar Pradesh, Ghulam Ahmed,
Yakoob Ali and Mohd Rafiq from Jammu and Kashmir as accused. All of them are presently in judicial custody.
Impacts
India/Pakistan War
Future LeT attacks are the most likely trigger for a nuclear war between India and
Pakistan
Adlakha 10 Joshua Adlakha, Graduate Student in Security Studies at Georgetown University, THE
EVOLUTION OF LASHKAR-E-TAYYIBA AND THE ROAD TO MUMBAI,
https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/.../adlakhajoshua.pdf.
A better understanding of LeT’s evolution carries major implications for U.S. policy since the group poses major challenges to U.S. security
interests. First and foremost, stability in South Asia is a key U.S. security interest and will continue to remain so as long as it remains entrenched
in Afghanistan. LeT
attacks have, on occasion, brought India and Pakistan to the brink of war and the group
remains one of the most likely catalysts to war between the two nuclear-armed countries. At the very
least,
LeT acts as a major source of contention between the two countries and keeps Pakistan’s national security
establishment focused on India. This, in turn, distracts Pakistan from stabilizing its tribal regions on its border with Afghanistan complicating
U.S. and NATO operations in that country. At worst, a
future LeT attack could precipitate in a major war between the
two countries that would carry the frightening risk of becoming the world’s first nuclear war . Second, LeT
has targeted U.S. forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan. While its foray into Iraq was relatively short-lived, since at least 2006, it has begun to
actively support and participate in the insurgency in 2 Afghanistan. The group has been implicated in several attacks against U.S. forces in
Afghanistan and coalition forces consider Lashkar militants among the most effective fighters in the region.1 Though the group has had little
impact on the insurgency thus far, its presence in Afghanistan will likely continue to expand.
Future LeT attack triggers nuclear war
Zarete 11 Juan Zarete, senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, An
alarming South Asia powder keg Sunday, February 20, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2011/02/18/AR2011021807465.html
In 1914, a terrorist assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo - unleashing geopolitical forces and World War I. Today, while the United
States rightly worries about al-Qaeda targeting the homeland, the most dangerous threat may be another terrorist flash point on the horizon.
Lashkar-i-Taiba holds the match that could spark a conflagration between nuclear-armed historic
rivals India and Pakistan. Lashkar-i-Taiba is a Frankenstein's monster of the Pakistani government's creation 20 years ago. It has
diverse financial networks and well-trained and well-armed cadres that have struck Indian targets from Mumbai to Kabul. It collaborates with
the witches' brew of terrorist groups in Pakistan, including al-Qaeda, and has demonstrated global jihadist ambitions. It
is merely a
matter of time before Lashkar-i-Taiba attacks again. Significant terrorist attacks in India, against Parliament
in 2001 and in Mumbai in 2008, brought India and Pakistan to the brink of war. The countries remain deeply distrustful of
each other. Another major strike against Indian targets in today's tinderbox environment could lead to a broader,
more devastating conflict. The United States should be directing political and diplomatic capital to prevent such a conflagration. The
meeting between Indian and Pakistani officials in Bhutan this month - their first high-level sit-down since last summer - set the stage for
restarting serious talks on the thorny issue of Kashmir. Washington has only so much time. Indian officials are increasingly dissatisfied with
Pakistan's attempts to constrain Lashkar-i-Taiba and remain convinced that Pakistani intelligence supports the group. An Indian intelligence
report concluded last year that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate was involved in the 2008 Mumbai attacks, and late last year the
Indian government raised security levels in anticipation of strikes. India is unlikely to show restraint in the event of another attack. Lashkar-iTaiba may also feel emboldened since the assassination in early January of a moderate Punjabi governor muted Pakistani moderates and
underscored the weakness of the government in Islamabad. The group does not want peace talks to resume, so it might act to derail progress.
Elements of the group may see conflict with India as in their interest, especially after months of unrest in Kashmir. And the Pakistani
government may not be able to control the monster it created. A war in South Asia would be disastrous not just for the United States. In
addition to the human devastation, it would destroy efforts to bring stability to the region and to disrupt terrorist havens in western Pakistan.
Many of the 140,000 Pakistani troops fighting militants in the west would be redeployed east to battle Indian ground forces. This would
effectively convert tribal areas bordering Afghanistan into a playing field for militants. Worse, the Pakistani government might be induced to
make common cause with Lashkar-i-Taiba, launching a proxy fight against India. Such a war would also fuel even more destructive violent
extremism within Pakistan. In the worst-case scenario, an
attack could lead to a nuclear war between India and
Pakistan . India's superior conventional forces threaten Pakistan, and Islamabad could resort to nuclear weapons were a serious conflict to
erupt. Indeed, The Post reported that Pakistan's nuclear weapons and capabilities are set to surpass those of India.
A future LeT attack will force India to attack Pakistan destabilizing all of Southeast
Asia
Adlakha 10 Joshua Adlakha, Graduate Student in Security Studies at Georgetown University, THE
EVOLUTION OF LASHKAR-E-TAYYIBA AND THE ROAD TO MUMBAI,
https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/.../adlakhajoshua.pdf.
Second, India will need to vastly improve its anti-terrorism measures as indicated by the effectiveness of the 2008 Mumbai attacks in which its
security forces were clearly ill-prepared. India will need to invest heavily in its internal security including training, human capital, and
equipment. Since stability in South Asia is a key U.S. priority, the U.S. might also assist India in these efforts through the provision of funds and
anti-terrorism equipment and training. Domestic
opinion in India may force India to respond much more harshly
against Pakistan should a future devastating terrorist attack occur potentially destabilizing the whole
of South Asia. Thus, it would be beneficial to both U.S. and Indian interest to limit the impact from a future mass casualty terrorist attack.
LeT terrorism is the unique threat of India Pakistan war risking a nuclear conflict
Blank 13 Jonah Blank1 The RAND Corporation Lashkar-e Taiba and the Threat to the United States of a
Mumbai-Style Attack* Before the Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism
and Intelligence House of Representatives June 12, 2013
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT300/CT390/RAND_CT390.pdf
Fourth, LeT has a unique potential to precipitate a major war between India and Pakistan. Due to its
traditional sponsorship by Pakistan's military, an attack by LeT is regarded by India as nearly
synonymous with an attack by the state of Pakistan. At least twice in the recent past- after the 2008
Mumbai attack, and after the 2001 attack on India's Parliament- New Delhi came very close to
launching a military strike across the border in response to an attack attributed to LeT. As the 1999
Indo-Pakistani combat at Kargil demonstrated, any serious military engagement between these two
rivals runs the risk of nuclear escalation: During the Kargil episode, the Pakistani military began
mobilizing the nation's nuclear assets without the knowledge of the civilian prime minister.10 Apart
from the risk to tens of thousands of American citizens in India and Pakistan, the threat of a nuclear
exchange anywhere in the world would obviously have a monumental impact on US strategic and
economic interests.
Future terror attacks on India risk Indo Pak nuclear war
Markey 10 Daniel Markey is adjunct senior fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia at the Council on
Foreign Relations, Terrorism and Indo-Pakistani Escalation, www.cfr.org/.../CPA_contingencymemo_6
India faces the real prospect of another major terrorist attack by Pakistan-based terrorist organizations in the near
future. Unlike the aftermath of the November 2008 attack on Mumbai, in which 166 people died, Indian military
restraint cannot be taken for granted if terrorists strike again. An Indian retaliatory strike against
terrorist targets on Pakistani soil would raise Indo-Pakistani tensions and could even set off a spiral of
violent escalation between the nuclear-armed rivals. Given Washington’s effort to intensify pressure on al-Qaeda, the
Taliban, and associated militants operating from Pakistani territory, increased tensions between India and Pakistan would harm U.S. interests
even if New Delhi and Islamabad stop well short of the nuclear threshold because it would distract Pakistan from counterterror and
counterinsurgency operations, jeopardize the U.S. mission in Afghanistan, and place new, extreme stresses on Islamabad.
Future LeT attack will lead to Indo-Pak war
Indian Express 15 3/6/15 Talking terms India and Pakistan have broken their silence. But it will
require focused effort to break the impasse http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/talkingterms/
The short-term purpose of these talks, it doesn’t take much to see, isn’t to solve intractable problems. Instead, the fact of diplomatic
engagement adds a crisis-management cushion to the arsenals of both governments. For months now, Pakistan
has feared that a
terrorist attack against India could lead Prime Minister Narendra Modi to order military counter-strikes
— catching it at a moment of special vulnerability, when a large part of its armed forces are tied down fighting terrorists in its northwest. Now,
it hopes, Delhi will first address its problems through diplomatic channels, making rapid escalation of conflict less likely. For both countries, this
is a pragmatic step. In the throes of severe economic challenges, India can ill afford a conflict, and near-bankrupt Pakistan can do so even less.
But it would be dangerous to mistake this diplomatic breathing space for bedtime. Islamabad has scaled back jihadist operations in Kashmir,
and placed restraints on organisations
targeting India. It hasn’t, however, dismantled the infrastructure of groups like the
Lashkar-e-Toiba — leaving open the prospect of a future attack sparking off a crisis . The last two years have,
notably, seen the first uptick of violence in Kashmir in over a decade. Delhi, for its part, has not unveiled just what it is willing to bring to the
diplomatic table. The engagement of Kashmiri secessionists in dialogue, the demilitarisation of Siachen, and the settlement of the Sir Creek
issue — the government’s position on all these remains unclear. Barring focused effort, this latest engagement could also end in that
depressing place both know so well — impasse.
Collapse Indian Economy
LeT attacks would target IT sector and crush India’s economy
Saxena 5 Sudhir Saxena Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis, The rise of fiscal terror March 25,
2005 http://www.idsa.in/idsastrategiccomments/Theriseoffiscalterror_SSaxena_250305.html
By targetting the IT industry, terrorists are revealing that the Indian economy may increasingly be
their target, The elimination of the Delhi based Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) cell on 6 March 2005, could possibly
indicate a new trend in Pakistan-based terror operations in India. Preliminary reports indicate that these terrorists
were intending to strike against the Indian Military Academy (IMA) and the IT infrastructure especially in Bangalore
using the network of the banned Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI). A couple of issues emerge from the episode. First, is this an
indication of widening of the area of operations by the LeT and similar groups away from Jammu and Kashmir and North India to relatively untouched peninsular India? Secondly, do the plans of the captured terrorist suggest a change in the nature of targets from tactical to strategic,
indicating increasing complexity of conceptual planning and hence institutional involvement? Jammu and Kashmir is undergoing a rather harsh
and prolonged winter snow fall season. Like the tsunami, unpredictable mother nature seems to have purged any possibility of an escalation of
terrorist activity. Further, the Indo-Pak Composite Dialogue Process (CDP) process (agreed to in January 2004) has shrunk the political space for
high-intensity, high-frequency terror operations. It is quite possible that the political and geo-climactic factors may have forced the terrorists to
shift areas of operation southwards and if possible perform a repeat of the 12/13 attack on the Parliament. Though, there have been sporadic
incidents involving J&K terrorist (like LeT) operating in areas like Hyderabad, the phenomenon could not be termed as wide spread, possibly
due to logistical reasons. The
planned future intentions of the LeT cell captured in Delhi may indicate just such a
spread. The choice of targets certainly raises a new warning. It is known that the IT industry has been one of the success
stories contributing to the growing vitality of the Indian economy. The amount of RDX captured (10.5 kgs along with
detonators) provides clues to the nature and explosive power of the planned operation. However, a pertinent question needs to be answered was blowing up few buildings of the Polaris company the only aim of the now failed operation, or was there a larger objective? A
strike
against a leading IT company and its aftermath would have no doubt lead to many tactical counter-operational and intelligence
measures. But it would have also left a certain wariness in the investor market, particularly in the FDI sector, which is very
sensitive about security of its assets give the experience in Iraq, Afghanistan and certain African locations. A planned strike at IMA, Dehradun is
indicative of similar operations by the Zarqawi group in Iraq.
LeT attacks can collapse Indian democracy
Adlakha 10 Joshua Adlakha, Graduate Student in Security Studies at Georgetown University, THE
EVOLUTION OF LASHKAR-E-TAYYIBA AND THE ROAD TO MUMBAI,
https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/.../adlakhajoshua.pdf.
Since 2002, LeT has also begun to shift its focus increasingly into the Indian hinterland. Several factors may
account for this. To begin with, the Indian government completed a 700- kilometer border fence along the Jammu and Kashmir border in 2004
making infiltration increasingly difficult. The Indian army claimed the fence reduced infiltration of militants by 80%.123 In addition, militants
stopped receiving cover fire and infiltration support from the Pakistani army following the ceasefire between the two countries in 2003. These
factors have made it much more difficult to infiltrate into Kashmir and has made infiltration through transit by third countries more attractive
which also increases access to the other parts of India. In addition, the predominantly Punjabi militants of LeT could likely blend in much easier
in the larger and more cosmopolitan cities of the hinterland where they would not stand out among the more diverse population of these
areas. Furthermore, the effectiveness of Fidayeen attacks in Kashmir may have also had diminishing returns as the Jammu and Kashmir Police
developed more effective tactics to counter them. According to the Indian journalist Praveen Swami who has followed LeT closely for years,
between 1999 and 2002, the worst years of LeT fidayeen attacks, less than 200 people died in them.124 Finally, Kashmiris may simply have
becoming increasingly exhausted from the militancy and bloodshed in the region and may have become to harder to recruit for support. The
2002 Gujarat riots—in which Muslims bore the greater brunt of the bloodshed— generated willing volunteers for LeT and provided new
opportunities to expand its network into India. During the riots, LeT put images of the riot victims on its website and called for jihad to avenge
the bloodshed. Recruiting Muslims from outside Pakistan and Kashmir could also persuade Kashmir residents that they have no future in
India.125 By
stoking the flames of Hindu-Muslim violence, LeT could discredit India as a democracy and
reinforce its belief that Hindus cannot justly govern Muslims. Indeed, Hindu-Muslim violence tears at the very fabric of
Indian society and has the potential to destabilize large swathes of India. In September of 2002, only a few months
after the Gujarat riots ravaged the province, two heavily armed fighters carried out a fidayeen attack on the Akshardham temple in
Gandhinagar, Gujarat. The attack turned into a nearly 14 hour hostage siege and the resulted in 33 dead including a commando and a state
police officer along with 70 others wounded. Given the sophisticated nature of the attack and the heavy firepower the attackers carried, the
attack contained the hallmarks of a typical LeT attack and made it unlikely the attack resulted as retaliation by local Muslims for the earlier
communal violence—at least without external support.126 Indeed, shortly following the Gujarat riots, Indian intelligence officials had
estimated at least as many as 40 local Gujarati Muslims may have travelled to train in Lashkar camps as a result of the communal violence and
LeT may have viewed an attack on the Akshardham temple attack as an opportunity to provoke further communal violence if they indeed did
carry out the attack.127 Given the timing and target of the attack, the objective was clearly to provoke Hindu-Muslim violence.
LeT seeks collapse of India
Karim 12 Maj Gen Afsir Karim War against Lashkar-e-Taiba
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/war-against-lashkar-e-taiba/
The LeT follows the radical Wahhabi ideology, which advocates global jihad against all infidels and moderate
Muslims. Although the primary area of operations of the LeT in India is Kashmir, its main aim is the destabilisation of India
and it has not confined its disruptive activities only to Jammu and Kashmir. The LeT has repeatedly claimed through its
journals and websites that its main aim is to destroy the Indian republic and to annihilate Hinduism and Judaism.
Bioweapons
LeT has ability and will use bioweapons
Nanjappa 13
Vicky Nanjappa reporter for Refiff India Abroad, India faces real threat of biological warfare
January 01, 2013 http://www.rediff.com/news/report/india-faces-real-threat-of-biologicalwarfare/20130101.htm
As far as India is concerned, a possible bioterrorism tactic would appeal to Pakistan based Lashkar-eTayiba and other Kashmir centric groups. LeT is aware about the potential utility of bio weapon
pathogen as it had observed the large-scale disruptions during the US anthrax letter cases. Also, it does
not have to recruit or employ microbiologists or life scientists to carry out bioterrorist attacks. ¶ As a
matter of fact it has the most robust medical and path lab network in Pakistan and many of its
activists are trained medical professionals. (eg Ad Dawa medical missions, Taiba Hospitals and Path
Labs in Lahore, Karachi and number of mobile dispensaries). ¶ Potentially the infrastructures and the
manpower at the disposal of LeT/ Jamaat ud Dawa (JuD) can be modified to develop bio weapon
pathogens without any large investments or at least spreading bioscare if the leadership wish to resort
to the tactic.
LeT has ability and motive to use bioweapons
Nanjappa 9 Vicky Nanjappa reporter for Refiff India Abroad Bio weapons could be the next big terror
threat: IB | March 27, 2009, http://www.rediff.com/news/2009/mar/27bio-weapons-could-be-the-nextbig-terror-threat-ib.htm
Rogue outfits such as the Lashkar-e-Tayiba [Images] and the Al Qaeda are constantly planning various
ways to attack India. While there were intelligence intercepts following the Mumbai [Images] attack that
the next attack could be from the sea, reports now point to the fact that the next on the agenda of
terror outfits would be biological warfare.¶ Intelligence Bureau officials say that the Inter-Services
Intelligence has helped these terror outfits set up bases in Afghanistan way back in the late 1990s to
build laboratories to manufacture biological weapons. ¶ The first of such labs was established in 1998 in
Kandahar where chemical and radiological weapons were being manufactured. ¶ There is also a
laboratory set up to manufacture biological weapons in Muzzafarabad in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir.
This lab which belongs to the Lashkar-e-Tayiba is known as the electronics laboratory. Apart from
manufacturing detonators for bombs and weapons, this laboratory has also a full fledged unit to
manufacture biological weapons.¶ Several scientists were recruited exclusively for this purpose and
have been working on the manufacture of these weapons since the past ten years. Intelligence Bureau
sources they expect that terror groups would try and use biological warfare when all other means are
exhausted.
LeT will use bioweapons
Chandran 05 D Suba Chandran Assistant Director, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Looking
Beyond Bio-Weapons and Bio-Terrorism in South Asia http://www.ipcs.org/article/terrorism/lookingbeyond-bio-weapons-and-bio-terrorism-in-south-asia-1750.html
Militant groups fighting for non-political purposes are more likely to use biological weapons in South
Asia, especially the Lashkar-e-Toiba and the Jaish-e-Mohammad. Both these organizations are fighting
for a religious cause and are not bothered about popular support in India. The radical right wing
groups are more likely to use such weapons. The fact that the Aum Shinrikyo, a religious cult group, used
biological weapons in the past need to be reckoned with. Al Qaeda search for chemical and biological
weapons also need to be taken into account from this perspective.
Nuclear weapons
A close study of LeT reveals it has the ability and will to use nuclear weapons and will
use any means to annihilate India
Sharma 12 Surinder Kumar Sharma consultant for Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses LeT:
Terror incorporated The Caliphate's Soldiers: The Lashkar-e-Tayyeba's Long War by Wilson John
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/NB04Df04.html
LeT is likely the world's most powerful and resourceful multinational terror consultancy firm, keeping
a rolodex of multinational terrorists, trainers and a massive support network. ¶ The author documents
LeT's expansion extensively in the book. David Headley, a Pakistani-American who pleaded guilty in the
US for his role in the Mumbai attacks, was working closely with the LeT commanders and facilitators in
India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Saudi Arabia, US and Muscat. Then, attacks were being planned on three
different countries simultaneously - India, Bangladesh and Denmark - in a clear indication of the LeT's
growing capability to organize transnational attacks independent of al-Qaeda networks. ¶ This book also
details how the LeT has become a hub for training terrorists in using the latest weapons, explosives and
communications devices. The emergence of the Salafi group in the Maldives has considerably helped the
LeT expand its recruitment drive in the country. The author warns that what makes the LeT's growing
influence on the Maldives more worrisome is the possibility that the group will use the island nation
for attacks against India, or block strategic sea communication lines in the Indian Ocean. ¶ The LeT has
also been using Nepal as a transit point for terrorists travelling to and from Bangladesh and Pakistan
while routing money and weapons for attacks in India. Instead of operating its own units in Nepal, as has
done in the past, the ISI has been keen on establishing networks with Maoist and Muslim organizations
for anti-India operations. ¶ A closer study of Hafiz Saeed's speeches and writings and other published
works complied by the author lay out a roadmap of global jihad with surprising clarity: once Kashmir is
liberated, the group plans to work towards disintegrating India in whatever manner possible. ¶
Interestingly, the book also reveals that the LeT is not averse to using nuclear weapons to achieve its
goals. LeT has not only trained cadres in chemical and radiological weapons (dirty bombs), it also has
links with nuclear scientist Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan, who is a frequent visitor to the LeT's annual
congregation in Muridke. ¶
LeT with nuclear weapons could not be deterred
Yingling 11 PAUL L. YINGLING: An Absence of Strategic Thinking – On the Multitude of Lessons Not
Learned in Afghanistan, http://cpost.uchicago.edu/blog/
The future of Pakistan is more difficult to predict. It could limp along as a failing state, or suddenly fail
with little warning. The West knows so little about the internal dynamics of the country that virtually any
significant change will come as a surprise. Although the exact timing and extent of state failure in
Pakistan is difficult to predict, the consequences of such failure are not. Partial or total state failure of a
nuclear Pakistan would pose a grave threat to the United States. In such a scenario, the White House
would not know who controlled Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. A nuclear-armed al Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Taiba,
or other extremist group would be difficult if not impossible to deter.
AT: No ability for high tech weapons
LeT has ability to access science and technology and pull off complex attacks
Tellis 12
Ashley J. Tellis¶ Senior Associate¶ South Asia Program¶ Tellis is a senior associate at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/03/13/menace-that-islashkar-e-taiba/a2hn
Seventh, LeT is an effective terrorist group that is adept at exploiting science and technology, extranational social links, and state vulnerabilities in order to advance its political aims. The attacks in
Mumbai unambiguously demonstrated LeT’s sophistication in a way that few previous attacks had
done. The meticulous planning, the enormous resources committed to a complex mission across great
distances and long periods of time, and the burdens of a difficult sea-land operation all confirmed
LeT’s capacity to execute increasingly difficult terrorist attacks. This mission involved months of
training in Pakistan and extensive reconnaissance of targets in Mumbai; after these tasks were
complete, the terrorists left Karachi on local craft, hijacked a fishing trawler on the high seas, and, upon
reaching India’s territorial waters, transferred to inflatable
General threat evidence
LeT is a global threat that risks terror attacks on India and the United States
Tellis 12 Ashley J. Tellis¶ Senior Associate¶ South Asia Program¶ Tellis is a senior associate at the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/03/13/menacethat-is-lashkar-e-taiba/a2hn
It is clear that after al-Qaeda, LeT is the most dangerous terrorist group operating in South Asia
because of its:¶ 1.Global vision and international ambitions ¶ ¶ 2.Distinct ideology that underwrites
Islamic revanchism, justifying collaboration with other terrorist groups ¶ ¶ 3.Loyalty to Pakistan and
willingness to protect its patron state against domestic opponents ¶ ¶ 4.Diversified network for
mobilizing resources, promoting its international presence, and recruiting members, which minimizes its
dependence on the state ¶ ¶ 5.Involvement in terrorism and social development concurrently, which
limits Pakistan’s ability to target the group even if it were so inclined ¶ ¶ 6.Cohesive and hierarchic
organizational structure that is effective at both the conduct of violence and the delivery of social
programs ¶ ¶ 7.Proficiency at exploiting science and technology, extra-national social links, and state
vulnerabilities in order to advance its political aims¶ ¶ LeT is a formidable and highly adaptable
adversary with a genuinely global reach and the ability to grow roots and sustain operations in
countries far removed from its primary theater of activity in South Asia. Though India’s proximity to
Pakistan has resulted in New Delhi absorbing most of the blows unleashed by LeT, the carnage in
Mumbai demonstrates that the terrorism facing India is not simply a problem for New Delhi alone. An
attack could even reach U.S. soil.¶ ¶ The only reasonable objective for the United States is the
permanent evisceration of LeT and other vicious South Asian terrorist groups—with Pakistani
cooperation if possible, but without it if necessary.
The LeT is a massive global threat to India and the U.S.
Tellis 12 Ashley J. Tellis¶ Senior Associate¶ South Asia Program¶ Tellis is a senior associate at the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/03/13/menacethat-is-lashkar-e-taiba/a2hn
Given the interaction of LeT’s ideology and its sources of Pakistani state support, it is not surprising
that Hafiz Mohammed Saeed, LeT’s emir, wholeheartedly endorsed the objective of destroying India
writ large. Asserting in a 1999 interview that “jihad is not about Kashmir only,” he went on to declare
that “about fifteen years ago, people might have found it ridiculous if someone told them about the
disintegration of the USSR. Today, I announce the break-up of India, Insha-Allah. We will not rest until
the whole [of] India is dissolved into Pakistan.” In a later 2001 statement he reaffirmed the proposition
that “our struggle will continue even if Kashmir is liberated. We still have to take revenge for East
Pakistan.” In accordance with his declaration that Kashmir was merely a “gateway to capture India,”
Saeed then directed his LeT cadres to focus their attention on capturing the Muslim-dominated areas
outside of Jammu and Kashmir, such as Hyderabad, Junagadh, Munabao, and West Bengal, which he
argued were forcibly occupied by India in 1947.¶ ¶ Judging from LeT’s operational record, Saeed has
¶
been as good as his word. The earliest LeT presence in India was detected in 1993, when a cohort of the
group’s Punjabi cadres crossed the Line of Control that separates the Pakistan-controlled from the
Indian-controlled portions of Jammu and Kashmir. The organization’s presence, however, was not
publicly recognized until early 1996 when a group of LeT terrorists massacred sixteen Hindus in Barshalla
in Kashmir’s Doda District. Since then, hundreds of terrorist attacks involving LeT militants have
occurred throughout India. LeT was implicated in plots like the terrorist attacks in New Delhi in October
2005; in Bangalore in December 2005; in Varanasi in March 2006; in Nagpur in June 2006; and in the July
2007 train bombings in Mumbai.¶ ¶ Through these myriad efforts, LeT has attempted—consistent with
both its own ideology and the interests of its state supporters—to cripple India’s economic growth,
destroy national confidence in its political system, attack its open society, and provoke destabilizing
communal rivalries. All the while, the group has tried to send a message that India will remain an
adversary because its successes make it a hindrance to LeT’s larger cause.¶ ¶ It took, however, the
devastating November 2008 Mumbai attacks—a bloodbath that claimed the lives of over 150 people,
including 26 foreigners of fifteen nationalities—for the international community to recognize that LeT’s
ambitions, transcending India, were actually part of a larger war with the West and with liberal
democracies more generally. The barbarity in Mumbai thus represents the ugly face of a brand of
Islamist terrorism that threatens India, the United States and its allies, the larger international system,
and, though often missed, Pakistan as well.¶ ¶ ¶ LeT’s universal ambitions simply do not permit the group
to confine itself only to South Asia. As Saeed has unequivocally declared, LeT intends to “plant the flag
of Islam in Washington, Tel Aviv and New Delhi.” Such statements are not simply grandiose. That LeT
has by no means restricted itself to keeping only India in its sights, even if it has focused on the latter
disproportionately thus far—thanks to ISI objectives and support—is now acknowledged even by those
who were initially skeptical of the group’s larger ambitions.¶ ¶ ¶ Like many other radical Islamist groups,
the LeT leadership has on numerous occasions singled out the Jewish community and the United
States as being among the natural enemies of Islam. Saeed warned, for example, that although his
outfit may be presently consumed by the conflict with India, “Our struggle with the Jews is always
there.” This enmity with the Jewish people is supposedly eternal and ordained by God himself. When
Saeed was asked in the aftermath of the tragic 2005 earthquake in Pakistan whether then-president
Pervez Musharraf’s solicitation of aid from Israel was appropriate, he had no hesitation in declaring
forthrightly that Pakistan “should not solicit help from Israel. It is the question of Muslim honor and selfrespect. The Jews can never be our friends. This is stated by Allah.”¶ ¶ This twisted worldview found
grotesque expression during the November 2008 atrocities when the group deliberately targeted the
Jewish Chabad center at Nariman House in Mumbai. Justifying this attack as reprisal for Israeli security
cooperation with India, LeT did not simply murder the Jewish hostages at Nariman House but
humiliated and brutally tortured them before finally killing them during the three-day siege.¶ ¶ Outside
of al-Qaeda, LeT today therefore represents the most important South Asian terrorist group of “global
reach.” Indian intelligence currently estimates that LeT maintains some kind of terrorist presence in 21
countries worldwide with the intention of either supporting or participating in what Saeed has called the
perpetual “jihad against the infidels.” LeT has declared that it would provide free training to any Muslim
desirous of joining the global jihad, and the group has since delivered on that promise, as now
corroborated by the testimony in the cases involving the “Virginia paintball jihad network.” In that
instance, a group of ¶ extremists played paintball in anticipation of the launch of a global jihad against
the West. After offering support to LeT, several members of the group attended an LeT camp and
received combat training to prepare for war against American soldiers in Afghanistan. Rather than being
an isolated incident, the Virginia paintball jihad network is emblematic of LeT’s larger ambitions. LeT’s
operatives have now been identified as engaging in:¶ •liaison and networking with numerous terrorist
groups abroad, particularly in Central and Southeast Asia and the Middle East; ¶ ¶ •the facilitation of
terrorist acts, including in, but not restricted to, Chechnya and Iraq; ¶ ¶ •fundraising in the Middle East,
Europe, Australia, and the United States; ¶ •the procurement of weapons, explosives, and
communications equipment for terrorist operations from both the international arms markets and
Pakistani state organizations such as the ISI; ¶ ¶ •the recruitment of volunteers for suicidal missions in
South Asia as well as the Middle East; ¶ ¶ •the creation of sleeper cells for executing or supporting
future terrorist acts in Europe, Australia, and likely the United States; and ¶ ¶ •actual armed combat
in at least India, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq.
Al Qaida Impact
India breaking the LeT is key to breaking Al Qaeda as well
Bhatia 14 Raashi Bjatia is the Co-Founder of a non-profit organization Business Alternatives for Peace,
Action and Reconstruction (BAPAR) based in New Delhi and a Graduate Student in Security Studies with
the Center of Security Studies, Georgetown University, India?s National Security Policies and the Threat
of Lashkar-e-Taiba: A Forgotten Concern Small Arms Journal Journal Article | Apr 15 2014,
smallwarsjournal.com/printpdf
India also proactively needs to end the cycle of radicalization and recruitment of youth by building strong confidence building programs and
programs which counter jihadi propaganda. Further, India also needs to invest in technology which helps the security agencies combat
terrorism and secure porous borders. Moreover, Lashkar
has always shared a very special relationship with Al-Qaida
and destroying Lashkar’s strength is not only an important step for India’s national security but also a
step towards limiting Al- Qaida’s brand name and the global jihad phenomenon. Hence, how the Indian
authorities respond to Lashkar plays a very critical role.
AT: Empirically denied-Mubai
In a future attack India will be forced to retaliate—The restraint shown after Mubai
won’t happen again
Yusef 14 Moeed W. Yusuf is director of South Asia programs at the U.S. Institute of Peace. , Pakistan's
Counterterrorism Challenge p, 16-7
Compounding these internal dynamics, Pakistan's delicate and dysfunctional relationship with its traditional rival, India, allows militant groups
to register a significant threat to Pakistan’s regional security. As was the case in the December 2001 attack on the Indian parliament by the
Pakistan-based militant outfit ]aish-E-Mohammed (]eM), and again in the November 2008 Mumbai carnage orchestrated by Lashkar-e-Taiba
(LeT), such episodes cause Pakistan to be the object of tremendous international condemnation.' They also risk escalating
IndiaPakistan tensions. Should a similar, future attack in India occur, some Indian strategists argue that the
government in New Delhi will face too much public pressure to be able to exercise the restraint it
showed following the 2008 Mubai attacks.' Indeed, armed nonstate organizations based in Pakistan are in the unusual, and
perilous, position of being able to undermine peace between two nuclear armed neighbors.
Future attacks will trigger war – Past restraint won’t be repeated
Jan 11 Reza Jan was an Analyst and the Pakistan Team Lead for the Critical Threats Project at the
American Enterprise Institute, Indo-Pak Talks Survive Mumbai Attack July 28, 2011,
http://www.criticalthreats.org/pakistan/jan-india-pakistan-talks-survive-mumbai-attack-july-28-2011
Yesterday, the foreign ministers of Pakistan and India met as part of a series of talks between the two nuclear-armed neighbors five months
after they officially resumed bilateral dialogue. Relations between the two countries appear to be well on the mend following the devastating
2008 Mumbai attacks in which 166 people were killed by the Pakistan-based terrorist organization, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). The two sides
discussed “confidence-building measures, including cross-border trade and visa protocols.” Yet the talks could just as easily have been
scuppered before they began by the recent terrorist attack in Mumbai. On July 13, a series of deadly bomb blasts ripped through India’s
financial capital, killing 23 people and wounding over 130. Unlike in the case of many previous attacks, however, there were no verbal barbs
hurled across the border, no wild speculation from official sources regarding Pakistani involvement and no cancellation or delay of talks. Given
the history of Indian reactions to terrorist attacks on its soil, this “non-reaction” is, by itself, noteworthy. Indian authorities and official
functionaries have exhibited uncharacteristic restraint so far in declaring who they believe to have been behind the recent bomb attacks in
Mumbai. Whereas in the past, authorities have been quick to point the finger at groups based in Pakistan, such as LeT, or Indian organizations
with links to Pakistani terror groups, such as the Indian Mujahideen (IM), top officials in India have stated that they do not want to speculate on
who might be responsible until investigations of the attacks are complete and more is known. Part of this hesitancy may be due to the fact that
they are simply unsure of who is responsible. Monsoon rains on the night of the attack have complicated efforts to gather forensic evidence at
the bomb sites. Then again, even though the pattern of the attack closely resembles that of previous attacks by IM, speculation to the fact
remains muted. This is likely for two reasons. First, in
the aftermath of the 2008 Mumbai attacks, any indicators that
inside Pakistan had some role to play in a future attack would put tremendous
pressure on the Indian government to take some sort of action. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
and India’s ruling Congress party were able to stave off such pressure in 2008 by a hair’s breadth. They are
highly unlikely to be able to do so a second time, especially if they are seen to be soft on a threat to which they themselves
Pakistan or groups
draw attention. Avoiding the pressure to take risky or uncomfortable action will only benefit the government.
U.S. Attack scenario
The LeT will use sleeper cells to attack the U.S.
Tellis 12 Ashley J. Tellis¶ Senior Associate¶ South Asia Program¶ Tellis is a senior associate at the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/03/13/menacethat-is-lashkar-e-taiba/a2hn
¶ Given the interaction of LeT’s ideology and its sources of Pakistani state support, it is not surprising
that Hafiz Mohammed Saeed, LeT’s emir, wholeheartedly endorsed the objective of destroying India
writ large. Asserting in a 1999 interview that “jihad is not about Kashmir only,” he went on to declare
that “about fifteen years ago, people might have found it ridiculous if someone told them about the
disintegration of the USSR. Today, I announce the break-up of India, Insha-Allah. We will not rest until
the whole [of] India is dissolved into Pakistan.” In a later 2001 statement he reaffirmed the proposition
that “our struggle will continue even if Kashmir is liberated. We still have to take revenge for East
Pakistan.” In accordance with his declaration that Kashmir was merely a “gateway to capture India,”
Saeed then directed his LeT cadres to focus their attention on capturing the Muslim-dominated areas
outside of Jammu and Kashmir, such as Hyderabad, Junagadh, Munabao, and West Bengal, which he
argued were forcibly occupied by India in 1947.¶ ¶ Judging from LeT’s operational record, Saeed has
been as good as his word. The earliest LeT presence in India was detected in 1993, when a cohort of the
group’s Punjabi cadres crossed the Line of Control that separates the Pakistan-controlled from the
Indian-controlled portions of Jammu and Kashmir. The organization’s presence, however, was not
publicly recognized until early 1996 when a group of LeT terrorists massacred sixteen Hindus in Barshalla
in Kashmir’s Doda District. Since then, hundreds of terrorist attacks involving LeT militants have
occurred throughout India. LeT was implicated in plots like the terrorist attacks in New Delhi in October
2005; in Bangalore in December 2005; in Varanasi in March 2006; in Nagpur in June 2006; and in the July
2007 train bombings in Mumbai.¶ ¶ Through these myriad efforts, LeT has attempted—consistent with
both its own ideology and the interests of its state supporters—to cripple India’s economic growth,
destroy national confidence in its political system, attack its open society, and provoke destabilizing
communal rivalries. All the while, the group has tried to send a message that India will remain an
adversary because its successes make it a hindrance to LeT’s larger cause.¶ ¶ It took, however, the
devastating November 2008 Mumbai attacks—a bloodbath that claimed the lives of over 150 people,
including 26 foreigners of fifteen nationalities—for the international community to recognize that LeT’s
ambitions, transcending India, were actually part of a larger war with the West and with liberal
democracies more generally. The barbarity in Mumbai thus represents the ugly face of a brand of
Islamist terrorism that threatens India, the United States and its allies, the larger international system,
and, though often missed, Pakistan as well.¶ ¶ ¶ LeT’s universal ambitions simply do not permit the group
to confine itself only to South Asia. As Saeed has unequivocally declared, LeT intends to “plant the flag
of Islam in Washington, Tel Aviv and New Delhi.” Such statements are not simply grandiose. That LeT
has by no means restricted itself to keeping only India in its sights, even if it has focused on the latter
disproportionately thus far—thanks to ISI objectives and support—is now acknowledged even by those
who were initially skeptical of the group’s larger ambitions.¶ ¶ ¶ Like many other radical Islamist groups,
the LeT leadership has on numerous occasions singled out the Jewish community and the United
States as being among the natural enemies of Islam. Saeed warned, for example, that although his
outfit may be presently consumed by the conflict with India, “Our struggle with the Jews is always
there.” This enmity with the Jewish people is supposedly eternal and ordained by God himself. When
Saeed was asked in the aftermath of the tragic 2005 earthquake in Pakistan whether then-president
Pervez Musharraf’s solicitation of aid from Israel was appropriate, he had no hesitation in declaring
forthrightly that Pakistan “should not solicit help from Israel. It is the question of Muslim honor and selfrespect. The Jews can never be our friends. This is stated by Allah.”¶ ¶ This twisted worldview found
grotesque expression during the November 2008 atrocities when the group deliberately targeted the
Jewish Chabad center at Nariman House in Mumbai. Justifying this attack as reprisal for Israeli security
cooperation with India, LeT did not simply murder the Jewish hostages at Nariman House but
humiliated and brutally tortured them before finally killing them during the three-day siege.¶ ¶ Outside
of al-Qaeda, LeT today therefore represents the most important South Asian terrorist group of “global
reach.” Indian intelligence currently estimates that LeT maintains some kind of terrorist presence in 21
countries worldwide with the intention of either supporting or participating in what Saeed has called the
perpetual “jihad against the infidels.” LeT has declared that it would provide free training to any Muslim
desirous of joining the global jihad, and the group has since delivered on that promise, as now
corroborated by the testimony in the cases involving the “Virginia paintball jihad network.” In that
instance, a group of ¶ extremists played paintball in anticipation of the launch of a global jihad against
the West. After offering support to LeT, several members of the group attended an LeT camp and
received combat training to prepare for war against American soldiers in Afghanistan. Rather than being
an isolated incident, the Virginia paintball jihad network is emblematic of LeT’s larger ambitions. LeT’s
operatives have now been identified as engaging in:¶ •liaison and networking with numerous terrorist
groups abroad, particularly in Central and Southeast Asia and the Middle East; ¶ ¶ •the facilitation of
terrorist acts, including in, but not restricted to, Chechnya and Iraq; ¶ ¶ •fundraising in the Middle East,
Europe, Australia, and the United States; ¶ •the procurement of weapons, explosives, and
communications equipment for terrorist operations from both the international arms markets and
Pakistani state organizations such as the ISI; ¶ ¶ •the recruitment of volunteers for suicidal missions in
South Asia as well as the Middle East; ¶ ¶ •the creation of sleeper cells for executing or supporting
future terrorist acts in Europe, Australia, and likely the United States; and ¶ ¶ •actual armed combat
in at least India, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq.
Broad surveillance under patriot has been key to stopping LeT attacks on the U.S.
Carafano et al 12 James Jay Carafano, PhD, is Deputy Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International
Studies and Director of the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Davis Institute, at The Heritage
Foundation. Steve Bucci, PhD, is a Senior Research Fellow for Defense and Homeland Security in the Allison Center for Foreign Policy at the
Heritage Foundation. Jessica Zuckerman is a Research Associate in the Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage FoundationFifty
Terror Plots Foiled Since 9/11: The Homegrown Threat and the Long War on Terrorism Fifty Terror Plots Foiled Since 9/11: The Homegrown
Threat and the Long War on Terrorism, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/04/fifty-terror-plots-foiled-since-9-11-thehomegrown-threat-and-the-long-war-on-terrorism?lfa=Protect-America%2CProtect-America%2CProtect-America%2CProtect-America In 2007,
The Heritage Foundation became the first and only organization to track thwarted terrorist attacks against the United States. That year,
Heritage reported that at least 19 publicly known terrorist attacks against the United States had been foiled since 9/11. Today, that number
stands at 50. The
fact that the United States has not suffered a large-scale attack since 9/11 speaks to the
country’s counterterrorism successes. But, one year after the death of Osama bin Laden, the long war on terrorism is far from
over. Reviewing the terrorist plots that have been foiled since 9/11 can provide valuable information
for understanding the nature of the threat, as well as best practices for preventing the next attack. The
U.S. must also be ready to adapt its security strategies—such as to counter terror attacks by an increasing number of homegrown terrorists.
After the death of Osama bin Laden on May 2, 2011, many worried that al-Qaeda would try to carry out another large-scale attack against the United States as an act of revenge. Indeed since bin Laden’s
death, at least nine publicly known Islamist-inspired terror plots against the United States have been foiled, bringing the total number of foiled plots since 9/11 to at least 50. Ultimately, none of the plots foiled since bin Laden’s
death proved to be of the scale that many feared, with the vast majority of the plots lacking major international connections. Instead, many of these plots could be categorized as homegrown terror plots—planned by American
citizens, legal permanent residents, or visitors radicalized predominately in the United States.[1] Combating this continued threat of homegrown terrorism requires not only continued reliance on existing counterterrorism and
intelligence tools, such as the PATRIOT Act, but also enhancing cooperation among federal, state, and local authorities as well as mutual trust and partnerships with Muslim communities throughout the United States. Likewise, the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Congress must continue to plug gaps to halt terrorist travel, and create a lawful detainment framework for the incapacitation and interrogation of suspected terrorists. Continued
Threat of Homegrown Terrorism Since 9/11, terrorist networks have been dismantled, training camps have been dispersed, and the terrorist leadership largely decimated. Internationally, al-Qaeda has become more decentralized,
leading to a greater dependence on its affiliates and allies. At the same time, since increased domestic security has made it harder for terrorists to plan and carry out attacks, terrorists must increase their baseline skills and
capabilities needed for a successful attack in the United States.[2] With the global operating environment for terrorist networks having become increasingly hostile, homegrown terrorism has become more appealing to al-Qaeda
and other terrorist networks. Homegrown terrorist actors can often bridge the divide between the United States and the other regions of the world in which terrorist networks operate, frequently possessing the cultural and
linguistic skills to easily move between the two. It is this “duality” for instance, that served Najibullah Zazi in his attempt to bomb the New York City subway system, with Zazi “being able to operate with facility in environments as
starkly different as New York and Peshawar.”[3] The value
for terrorist networks also often lies in the ability of
homegrown terrorists to more easily travel back and forth and work within the United States without
raising suspicion. Of course, it is also these same abilities that can make it more challenging for U.S. intelligence
and law enforcement to detect homegrown terrorist plots. Similarly, difficulties in detecting attempted homegrown
attacks are also present in the fact that homegrown terror plots tend to involve significantly fewer actors and connections to terrorist networks
at home and abroad. The frequency of lone wolf actors, radicalized independent of direct connections to terrorist networks either through the Internet or social
circles, can further elevate these challenges. Yet, lacking the support of broader terrorist networks, violent extremists may lack a profound understanding of such specialized skills as bomb making, as well as financing, support
networks, and training, causing them to be reluctant or even unable to carry out a large-scale, highly destructive attack independently.[4] This same lack of training and resources may also open up homegrown terror plots for
detection by U.S. intelligence and law enforcement by affording more room for error on the part of the terrorist. Ultimately, while some signals of homegrown terror plots have gone unnoticed—most notably in the cases of Major
Nidal Hasan’s 2009 deadly attack on Fort Hood, the near-successful attempts in 2009 of Christmas Day bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, and in 2010 of Times Square bomber Faisal Shahzad—the vast majority of attempted
attacks against the United States have been thwarted in their early stages through the concerted efforts of U.S. law enforcement and intelligence. For the individual homegrown terrorist, personal motives may vary greatly. It could
be a desire for collective revenge against the U.S. for the purported “war on Islam,” poverty or social alienation, or brainwashing. There is no one path to radicalization. As DHS’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis has indicated,
motives and paths to radicalization can vary significantly depending on one’s ideology and religious beliefs, geographic location, or socioeconomic condition.[5] Nevertheless, trends do seem to exist among those attempted
homegrown terror plots thwarted since 9/11, most significantly a seeming aversion to suicide or martyrdom.[6] 50 Plots Foiled Since 9/11 Compiled by The Heritage Foundation since 2007, the following list outlines those publicly
known terrorist plots against the U.S. that have been foiled since 9/11.[7] Based on Heritage’s research, at least 50 publicly known Islamist-inspired terror plots targeting the United States have been foiled since 9/11. Of these, at
least 42 could be considered homegrown terror plots. While three of the 50 known plots were foiled by luck or the quick action of the American public, the remaining 47 were thwarted due to the concerted efforts of intelligence
and law enforcement. 1. Richard Reid—December 2001. A British citizen and self-professed follower of Osama bin Laden who trained in Afghanistan, Richard Reid hid explosives inside his shoes before boarding a flight from Paris to
Miami on which he attempted to light the fuse with a match. Reid was caught in the act and apprehended aboard the plane by passengers and flight attendants. FBI officials took Reid into custody after the plane made an
emergency landing at Boston’s Logan International Airport.[8] In 2003, Reid was found guilty on charges of terrorism, and a U.S. federal court sentenced him to life in prison.[9] He is currently incarcerated at a federal maximumsecurity prison in Colorado. Saajid Badat, a supporter to Reid, has been sentenced to 13 years in jail for planning to blow up a passenger plane. The 26-year-old, a religious teacher from Gloucester, England, was sentenced after he
admitted conspiring with fellow Briton Reid. Badat pled guilty in February 2005 to the plot to blow up the transatlantic flight on its way to the U.S. in 2001.[10] 2. Jose Padilla—May 2002. U.S. officials arrested Jose Padilla in May
2002 at Chicago’s O’Hare airport as he returned to the United States from Pakistan, where he met with 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and received al-Qaeda training and instructions.[11] Upon his arrest, he was
initially charged as an enemy combatant, and for planning to use a dirty bomb (an explosive laced with radioactive material) in an attack in the U.S.[12] Along with Padilla, Adham Amin Hassoun and Kifah Wael Jayyousi were
convicted in August 2007 of terrorism conspiracy and material support. It was found that the men supported cells that sent recruits, money, and supplies to Islamic extremists worldwide, including al-Qaeda members. Hassoun was
the recruiter and Jayyousi served as a financier and propagandist in the cell. Before his conviction, Padilla had brought a case against the federal government claiming that he had been denied the right of habeas corpus (the right of
an individual to petition his unlawful imprisonment). In a five-to-four decision, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the case against him had been filed improperly.[13] In 2005, the government indicted Padilla for conspiring against
the U.S. with Islamic terrorist groups. In August 2007, Padilla was found guilty by a civilian jury after a three-month trial. He was later sentenced by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida to 17 years and four
months in prison.[14] In September 2011, an appellate court ruling deemed Padilla’s original sentence to be too lenient.[15] Padilla is being held at the same penitentiary as Richard Reid and is awaiting resentencing. 3. Lackawanna
Six—September 2002. When the FBI arrested Sahim Alwan, Yahya Goba, Yasein Taher, Faysal Galab, Shafal Mosed, and Mukhtar al-Bakri in Upstate New York, the press dubbed them the “Lackawanna Six,” the “Buffalo Six,” and the
“Buffalo Cell.” Five of the six had been born and raised in Lackawanna, New York.[16] All six are American citizens of Yemeni descent, and stated that they were going to Pakistan to attend a religious camp, but attended an alQaeda training camp in Afghanistan instead. The six men pled guilty in 2003 to providing support to al-Qaeda. Goba and al-Bakri were sentenced to 10 years in prison, Taher and Mosed to eight years, Alwan to nine and a half years,
and Galab to seven years.[17] Goba’s sentence was later reduced to nine years after he, Alwan, and Taher testified at a Guantanamo Bay military tribunal in the case against Osama bin Laden’s chief propagandist, Ali Hamza alBahlul.[18] Recent reports indicate that Jaber Elbaneh, one of the FBI’s most wanted and often considered to be a seventh member of the Lackawanna cell, has been captured in Yemen. It remains to be seen whether he will be
tried in the U.S., since the U.S. does not have an extradition treaty with Yemen.[19] 4. Uzair and Saifullah Paracha—March 2003. Uzair Paracha, a Pakistani citizen with permanent residency status in the U.S., was arrested in March
2003 and charged with five counts of providing material and financial support to al-Qaeda. Uzair attempted to help another Pakistani, Majid Khan, an al-Qaeda operative, gain access to the United States via immigration fraud. Khan
is said to have been in contact with 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheik Mohammed and planned to bomb underground storage tanks at Maryland gas stations.[20] Uzair was convicted and sentenced to 30 years in prison. Saifullah
Paracha, Uzair’s father, a 64-year-old citizen of Pakistan and resident alien of the U.S., is currently being held at Guantánamo Bay awaiting trial. Paracha was arrested in Bangkok, Thailand, in July 8, 2003, through the efforts of the
FBI and information provided by his son. He is believed to have had close ties to Khalid Sheik Mohammed, and Mohammed’s nephew Ammar al-Baluchi. Saifullah is said to have used his international business connections to help
al-Qaeda procure chemical and biological explosives and assist in their shipment to the U.S., along with the shipment of ready-made explosives.[21] 5. Iyman Faris—May 2003. Iyman Faris is a naturalized U.S. citizen, originally from
Kashmir, who was living in Columbus, Ohio. He was arrested for conspiring to use blowtorches to collapse the Brooklyn Bridge, a plot devised after meetings with al-Qaeda leadership, including Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.[22] The
New York City Police Department learned of the plot and increased police surveillance around the bridge. Faced with the additional security, Faris and his superiors called off the attack.[23] Faris pled guilty to conspiracy and
providing material support to al-Qaeda and was later sentenced in federal district court to 20 years in prison, the maximum allowed under his plea agreement.[24] 6. Ahmed Omar Abu Ali—June 2003. Ahmed Omar Abu Ali is an
American citizen of Jordanian descent who was arrested in Saudi Arabia on charges that he conspired to kill President George W. Bush, hijack airplanes, and provide support to al-Qaeda. He was arrested while attending Medina
University, where he had joined an al-Qaeda cell. His plans, according to authorities, were to kill President Bush and then establish an al-Qaeda cell in the United States, with himself as the head.[25] He was convicted by an
American
court on November 22, 2005, and sentenced to life in prison on July 27, 2009, overturning a 2006 sentence of 30 years that was ruled to
be too lenient.[26] 7. Virginia Jihad Network—June 2003. Eleven men were arrested in Alexandria, Virginia, for weapons counts
and for violating the Neutrality Acts, which prohibit U.S. citizens and residents from attacking countries with which the United States is at
peace. Four of the 11 men pled guilty. Upon further investigation, the remaining seven were indicted on additional charges of conspiring to
support terrorist organizations. They
were found to have connections with al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Lashkar-e-
Tayyiba, a terrorist organization that targets the Indian government. The authorities stated that the Virginia men had used paintball games
to train and prepare for battle. The group had also acquired surveillance and night vision equipment and wireless video cameras.[27] Two more
men were later indicted in the plot: Ali al-Timimi, the group’s spiritual leader, and Ali Asad Chandia. Ali al-Timimi was found guilty of soliciting individuals to assault the
United States and was sentenced to life in prison. Ali Asad Chandia received 15 years for supporting Lashkar-e-Tayyiba.[28] Randall Todd Royer, Ibrahim al-Hamdi, Yong Ki Kwon, Khwaja Mahmood Hasan, Muhammed Aatique, and
Donald T. Surratt pled guilty and were sentenced to prison terms ranging from three years and 10 months to 20 years. Masoud Khan, Seifullah Chapman, and Hammad Abdur-Raheem were found guilty and later sentenced to
prison terms ranging from 52 months to life.[29] Both Caliph Basha Ibn Abdur-Raheem and Sabri Benkhala were acquitted at trial.[30] 8. Nuradin M. Abdi—November 2003. Nuradin M. Abdi, a Somali citizen living in Columbus,
Ohio, was arrested and charged in a plot to bomb a local shopping mall. Abdi was an associate of convicted terrorists Christopher Paul and Iyman Faris and admitted to conspiring with the two to provide material support to
terrorists. Following his arrest, Abdi admitted to traveling overseas to seek admittance to terrorist training camps, as well as meeting with a Somali warlord associated with Islamists. Abdi has since pled guilty to conspiracy to
provide material support to terrorists, one of the four counts for which he was indicted. He was subsequently sentenced to 10 years in jail per the terms of a plea agreement.[31] 9. Dhiren Barot—August 2004. Seven members of a
terrorist cell led by Dhiren Barot were arrested for plotting to attack the New York Stock Exchange and other financial institutions in New York, Washington, D.C., and Newark, New Jersey. They were later accused of planning
attacks in England. The plots included a “memorable black day of terror” that would have included detonating a dirty bomb. A July 2004 police raid on Barot’s house in Pakistan yielded a number of incriminating files on a laptop
computer, including instructions for building car bombs.[32] Barot pled guilty and was convicted in the United Kingdom for conspiracy to commit mass murder and sentenced to 40 years.[33] However, in May 2007, his sentence
was reduced to 30 years.[34] His seven co-conspirators were sentenced to terms ranging from 15 to 26 years on related charges of conspiracy to commit murder and conspiracy to cause explosion.[35] 10. James Elshafay and
Shahawar Matin Siraj—August 2004. James Elshafay and Shahawar Matin Siraj, both reportedly self-radicalized, were arrested for plotting to bomb a subway station near Madison Square Garden in New York City before the
Republican National Convention.[36] An undercover detective from the New York City Police Department’s Intelligence Division infiltrated the group, providing information to authorities, and later testified against Elshafay and
Siraj.[37] Siraj was convicted and sentenced to 30 years in prison. Elshafay, a U.S. citizen, pled guilty and received a lighter, five-year sentence for testifying against his co-conspirator.[38] 11. Yassin Aref and Mohammad Hossain—
August 2004. Two leaders of a mosque in Albany, New York, were charged with plotting to purchase a shoulder-fired grenade launcher to assassinate a Pakistani diplomat.[39] An investigation by the FBI, the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, and local police contributed to the arrest. With the help of an informant, the FBI set up a sting that lured Mohammad Hossain into a fake terrorist conspiracy. Hossain brought Yassin Aref, a
Kurdish refugee, as a witness. The informant offered details of a fake terrorist plot, claiming that he needed the missiles to murder a Pakistani diplomat in New York City. Both Aref and Hossain agreed to help.[40] Aref and Hossain
were found guilty of money laundering and conspiracy to conceal material support for terrorism and were sentenced to 15 years in prison.[41] 12. Hamid Hayat—June 2005. Hamid Hayat, a Pakistani immigrant, was arrested in
Lodi, California, after allegedly lying to the FBI about his attendance at an Islamic terrorist training camp in Pakistan. Hamid was found guilty of providing himself as “material support” to terrorists and three counts of providing false
statements to the FBI.[42] In interviews with the FBI, he stated (correctly) that he specifically requested to come to the United States after receiving training in order to carry out jihad.[43] He was sentenced to 24 years in
prison.[44] 13. Levar Haley Washington, Gregory Vernon Patterson, Hammad Riaz Samana, and Kevin James—August 2005. The members of the group were arrested in Los Angeles and charged with conspiring to attack National
Guard facilities, synagogues, and other targets in the Los Angeles area. Kevin James allegedly founded Jamiyyat ul-Islam Is-Saheeh (JIS), a radical Islamic prison group, and converted Levar Washington and others to the group’s
mission. The JIS allegedly planned to finance its operations by robbing gas stations. After Washington and Patterson were arrested for robbery, police and federal agents began a terrorist investigation, and a search of Washington’s
apartment revealed a target list.[45] James and Washington pled guilty in December 2007. James was sentenced to 16 years in prison and Washington to 22 years. Patterson received 151 months, while Samana was found unfit to
stand trial and was initially detained in a federal prison mental facility. He was later sentenced to 70 months in jail.[46] 14. Michael C. Reynolds—December 2005. Michael C. Reynolds was arrested by the FBI and charged with
involvement in a plot to blow up a Wyoming natural gas refinery; the Transcontinental Pipeline, a natural-gas pipeline from the Gulf Coast to New York and New Jersey; and a Standard Oil refinery in New Jersey.[47] He was
arrested while trying to pick up a $40,000 payment for planning the attack.[48] Shannen Rossmiller, his purported contact, was a Montana judge and private citizen working with the FBI. Rossmiller posed as a jihadist, tricking
Reynolds into revealing his plan. The FBI later found explosives in a storage locker in Reynolds’s hometown of Wilkes–Barre, Pennsylvania.[49] Reynolds claimed that he was doing much the same as Rossmiller, and was working as a
private citizen to find terrorists.[50] Reynolds was convicted of providing material support to terrorists, soliciting a crime of violence, unlawful distribution of explosives, and unlawful possession of a hand grenade. He was
sentenced to 30 years in prison.[51] 15. Mohammad Zaki Amawi, Marwan Othman El-Hindi, and Zand Wassim Mazloum—February 2006. Amawi, El-Hindi, and Mazloum were arrested in Toledo, Ohio, for conspiring to kill people
outside the United States, including U.S. Armed Forces personnel serving in Iraq.[52] The men also conspired to train and arm for a violent jihad against the United States, both domestically and abroad.[53] Training involved use of
materials including those found on secure and exclusive jihadist websites, downloaded and copied training videos, and materials for jihad training sessions. The men also were found to have provided material support to terrorist
organizations and to have verbally threatened attacks on President George W. Bush.[54] The investigation was begun with the help of an informant who was approached to help train the group.[55] In June 2008, the three men
were convicted of conspiring to commit acts of terrorism against Americans overseas, including U.S. military personnel in Iraq, and other terrorism-related violations. Amawi was sentenced to 20 years, El-Hindi to 13 years, and
Mazloum to approximately eight years.[56] 16. Syed Haris Ahmed and Ehsanul Islam Sadequee—April 2006. Ahmed and Sadequee, from Atlanta, Georgia, were accused of conspiracy, having discussed terrorist targets with alleged
terrorist organizations. They allegedly met with Islamic extremists in the U.S. and gathered video surveillance of potential targets in the Washington, D.C., area, including the U.S. Capitol and the World Bank headquarters, and sent
the videos to a London Islamist group. Ahmed is said also to have traveled to Pakistan with the goal of joining Lashkar-e-Tayyiba.[57] Both men were indicted for providing material support to terrorist organizations and pled not
guilty.[58] In June 2009, a federal district judge found Ahmed “guilty of conspiring to provide material support to terrorists here and overseas.”[59] Ahmed was subsequently sentenced to 13 years in jail. Sadequee was also found
guilty and sentenced to 17 years.[60] 17. Narseal Batiste, Patrick Abraham, Stanley Grant Phanor, Naudimar Herrera, Burson Augustin, Lyglenson Lemorin, and Rotschild Augustine—June 2006. Seven men were arrested in Miami
and Atlanta for plotting to blow up the Sears Tower in Chicago, FBI offices, and other government buildings around the country. The arrests resulted from an investigation involving an FBI informant. Allegedly, Batiste was the
leader of the group and first suggested attacking the Sears Tower in December 2005.[61] All of the suspects pled not guilty. On December 13, 2007, Lemorin was acquitted of all charges, but the jury failed to reach a verdict on the
other six.[62] The second trial ended in a mistrial in April 2008.[63] In the third trial, the jury convicted five of the men on multiple conspiracy charges and acquitted Herrera on all counts. On November 20, 2009, the five were
sentenced to prison terms ranging from six to 13.5 years, with Batiste receiving the longest sentence.[64] 18. Assem Hammoud—July 2006. Conducting online surveillance of chat rooms, the FBI discovered a plot to attack
underground transit links between New York City and New Jersey. Eight suspects, including Assem Hammoud, an al-Qaeda loyalist living in Lebanon, were arrested for plotting to bomb New York City train tunnels. Hammoud, a selfproclaimed operative for al-Qaeda, admitted to the plot.[65] He was held by Lebanese authorities but was not extradited because the U.S. does not have an extradition treaty with Lebanon. In June 2008, Lebanese authorities
released him on bail.[66] In February 2012, Hammoud was convicted in a Lebanese court. He was sentenced to two years in prison, which he had already served.[67] 19. Liquid Explosives Plot—August 2006. British law enforcement
stopped a terrorist plot to blow up 10 U.S.-bound commercial airliners with liquid explosives.[68] Twenty-four suspects were arrested in the London area. The style of the plot raised speculation that al-Qaeda was behind it, but no
concrete evidence has established a link. The United Kingdom initially indicted 15 of the 24 arrested individuals on charges ranging from conspiring to commit murder to planning to commit terrorist acts.[69] Eventually, in April
2008, only eight men were brought to trial. In September, the jury found none of the defendants guilty of conspiring to target aircraft, but three guilty of conspiracy to commit murder.[70] The jury was unable to reach verdicts on
four of the men. One man was found not guilty on all counts.[71] 20. Derrick Shareef—December 2006. Derrick Shareef was arrested on charges of planning to set off hand grenades in a shopping mall outside Chicago. Shareef
reportedly acted alone and was arrested after meeting with an undercover Joint Terrorism Task Force agent. FBI reports indicated that the mall was one of several potential targets, including courthouses, city halls, and government
facilities. Shareef, however, settled on attacking a mall in the days immediately preceding Christmas because he believed it would cause the greatest amount of chaos and damage.[72] Shareef was also found to have connections
to convicted terrorist Hassan Agujihaad, who was charged with attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction and later sentenced to 35 years in prison.[73] 21. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed—March 2007. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed,
captured in Pakistan in 2003, was involved in a number of terrorist plots and is one of the most senior bin Laden operatives ever captured.[74] He is being held at the U.S. military detention facility in Guantanamo Bay. In March
2007, Mohammed admitted to helping plan, organize, and run the 9/11 attacks. He also claimed responsibility for planning the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center and the 2002 bombings of nightclubs in Bali and a Kenyan
hotel. He has stated that he was involved in the decapitation of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl and took responsibility for helping to plan the failed shoe-bomb attack by Richard Reid, along with plots to attack Heathrow
Airport, Canary Wharf, Big Ben, various targets in Israel, the Panama Canal, Los Angeles, Chicago, the Empire State building, and U.S. nuclear power stations. He had also plotted to assassinate Pope John Paul II and former President
Bill Clinton. In December 2008, Mohammed and his four co-defendants (Ramzi Binalshibh, Mustafa Ahmad al-Hawsawi, Ali Abd al-Aziz Ali, and Walid Bin Attash) told the military tribunal judge that they wanted to confess and
pleaded guilty to all charges.[75] The judge has approved the guilty plea of Mohammed and two co-defendants but has required mental competency hearings before allowing the other two conspirators to plead guilty. In
November 2009, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder announced that Mohammed would be relocated to the United States to face a civilian trial in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.[76] That decision has
now been reversed and the Administration announced that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and the other Guantanamo Bay detainees would be prosecuted in military tribunals at Guantanamo.[77] The date for the arraignment of Khalid
Sheikh Mohammed and his co-defendants has been set for May 5, 2012, beginning the long-awaited legal proceedings for the five men.[78] 22. Fort Dix Plot—May 2007. Six men were arrested in a plot to attack Fort Dix, a U.S.
Army post in New Jersey. The plan involved using assault rifles and grenades to attack and kill U.S. soldiers. Five of the alleged conspirators had conducted training missions in the nearby Pocono Mountains. The sixth helped to
obtain weapons. The arrests were made after a 16-month FBI operation that included infiltrating the group. The investigation began after a store clerk alerted authorities after discovering a video file of the group firing weapons
and calling for jihad. The group has no known direct connections to any international terrorist organization.[79] In December 2008, five of the men were found guilty on conspiracy charges but were acquitted of charges of
attempted murder.[80] Four were also convicted on weapons charges. The five men received sentences ranging from 33 years to life plus 30 years. The sixth co-defendant pled guilty to aiding and abetting the others in illegal
possession of weapons and was sentenced to 20 months in jail.[81] 23. JFK Airport Plot—June 2007. Four men plotted to blow up “aviation fuel tanks and pipelines at the John F. Kennedy International Airport” in New York City.
They believed that such an attack would cause “greater destruction than in the Sept. 11 attacks.” Authorities stated that the attack “could have caused significant financial and psychological damage, but not major loss of life.”[82]
Russell Defreitas, the leader of the group, was arrested in Brooklyn. The other three members of the group—Abdul Kadir, Kareem Ibrahim, and Abdel Nur—were detained in Trinidad and extradited in June 2008. Kadir and Nur have
links to Islamic extremists in South America and the Caribbean. Kadir was an imam in Guyana, a former member of the Guyanese Parliament, and mayor of Linden, Guyana. Ibrahim is a Trinidadian citizen and Nur is a Guyanese
citizen.[83] In 2010, Kadir was found guilty on five counts and sentenced to life in prison. In February, both Defreitas and Nur were also found guilty. Defreitas was sentenced to life in prison, while Nur was sentenced to 15
years.[84] The final conspirator, Kareem Ibrahim, was convicted in May 2011 and has been sentenced to life in prison.[85] 24. Hassan Abujihaad—March 2008. Hassan Abujihaad, a former U.S. Navy sailor from Phoenix, Arizona,
was convicted of supporting terrorism and disclosing classified information, including the location of Navy ships and their vulnerabilities, to Babar Ahmad and Syed Talha Ahsan, the alleged administrators of Azzam Publication
websites (the London organization that provided material support and resources to terrorists). Abujihaad was arrested in March 2007 and pled not guilty to charges of supporting terrorism in April 2007. In May 2008, he was
convicted by a jury and sentenced to 10 years in prison.[86] In 2010, his conviction was upheld in a federal court of appeals.[87] Both Babar Ahmad and Syed Talha Ahsan are being held in Britain on anti-terrorism charges and are
fighting extradition to the U.S.[88] 25. Christopher Paul—June 2008. Christopher Paul is a U.S. citizen from Columbus, Ohio. He joined al-Qaeda in the 1990s and was involved in conspiracies to target Americans in the United States
and overseas. In 1999, he became connected to an Islamic terrorist cell in Germany, where he was involved in a plot to target Americans at foreign vacation resorts. He later returned to Ohio and was subsequently arrested for
conspiracy to use a weapon of mass destruction—specifically, explosive devices—“against targets in Europe and the United States.” Paul pled guilty to the charges and was sentenced to 20 years in prison.[89] 26. Bryant Neal
Vinas—November 2008. Bryant Neal Vinas is an American citizen of Hispanic descent who converted to Islam in 2004.[90] In 2007, Vinas left home telling his parents he wanted to study Islam and Arabic. He then traveled to
Pakistan where he was trained by and joined the Taliban. During his time in Pakistan, Vinas assisted with unsuccessful attacks on American forces and provided al-Qaeda with extensive information regarding the Long Island Rail
Road for a potential attack.[91] He was arrested by Pakistani forces and sent back to the United States, where he pleaded guilty and began cooperating with authorities. He is currently in the custody of the U.S. Marshals and is
awaiting sentencing.[92] 27. Synagogue Terror Plot—May 2009. On May 20, 2009, the New York Police Department announced the arrest of James Cromitie, David Williams, Onta Williams, and Laguerre Payen for plotting to blow
up New York-area Jewish centers and shoot down planes at a nearby Air National Guard Base.[93] The four had attempted to gain access to Stinger missiles and were caught in the act of placing bombs in the buildings and in a car.
(The bombs were duds, because undercover agents sold the four defendants fake explosives as part of an ongoing sting operation). All four men were found guilty. In June 2011, James Cromitie, David Williams, and Onta Williams
were sentenced to 25 years in prison.[94] In September 2011, Laguerre Payen received the same sentence.[95] 28. Raleigh Jihad Group—July 2009. A group of seven men in North Carolina were arrested on charges of conspiring to
support terrorist groups abroad, engage in terror attacks abroad and plotting an attack on the U.S. Marine base at Quantico, Virginia.[96] Their ringleader, Daniel Patrick Boyd, is believed to have a long association with radical
groups, dating from his time living in Pakistan. In Pakistan, he is believed to have been an active member of Hezb-e-Islami (Party of Islam). The Raleigh group also raised funds and trained extensively in preparation to wage attacks
both at home and abroad. [97] The men were denied bail and are awaiting trial.[98] 29. Najibullah Zazi—September 2009 . Najibullah Zazi, a 24-year-old Afghan, was arrested after purchasing large quantities of chemicals used to
make a TATP bomb, the same type of weapon used in the 2005 bombing of the London Underground and the 2001 shoe-bomb plot. Zazi had traveled to Pakistan, where he received instruction in bomb making and attended an alQaeda training camp. Zazi allegedly planned to detonate TATP bombs on the New York City subway.[99] It has since been found that the plot was directed by senior al-Qaeda leadership in Pakistan.[100] Najibullah Zazi’s father,
Mohammed Wali Zazi, was also indicted for obstructing justice, witness tampering, and lying to the FBI in attempts to help his son cover up plans for his attack.[101]A cousin of Zazi, Amanullah Zazi, also publicly admitted that he
played a role in Zazi’s 2009 plot. Amanullah pled guilty in secret and agreed to become a government witness in federal court in Brooklyn against Najibullah’s father.[102] The father has since been found guilty and sentenced to
four and a half years in prison.[103] Najibullah Zazi pled guilty, as the result of a plea bargain, and remains in jail. He is currently awaiting sentencing.[104] At least three other individuals have since been arrested on allegations of
conspiring to carry out the attack with Zazi. One of them, New York religious leader Ahmad Afzali, has pled guilty to charges of lying to federal agents about informing Zazi that he was being investigated by authorities. [105] As part
of a plea deal, Afzali was sentenced to time served and ordered to leave the country within 90 days.[106] A second man, Zarein Ahmedzay has also pled guilty to conspiring to use weapons of mass destruction in the foiled plot and
lying to investigators. Adis Medunjanin has pled not guilty to conspiracy to commit murder in a foreign country and to receiving terrorist training.[107] Ahmedzay and Medunjanin are thought to have traveled to Pakistan with Zazi,
and to have met with wanted al-Qaeda operative Adnan El Shukrijumah, who has also been charged in the plot.[108] A fourth individual, Abid Nasser, has also been implicated in the plot led by Zazi, as well as other plots in England
and Norway. He is currently in the United Kingdom facing extradition to the United States.[109] Also charged in the plot are, Tariq Ur Rehman, and a fifth defendant known as “Ahmad,” “Sohaib,” or “Zahid.” Both El Shukrijumah
and Rehman are not in custody.[110] 30. Hosam Maher Husein Smadi —September 2009. Smadi, a 19-year-old Jordanian, was apprehended in an attempt to plant a bomb in a Dallas skyscraper. Originally identified through FBI
monitoring of extremist chat rooms, Smadi was arrested and charged after agents posing as terrorist cell members gave Smadi a fake bomb, which he later attempted to detonate.[111] Smadi was found guilty and sentenced to 24
years in prison.[112] 31. Michael Finton —September 2009. Michael Finton, an American citizen, was arrested on September 23, 2009, by undercover FBI agents after attempting to detonate a car bomb filled with what he believed
to be close to one ton of explosives outside the Paul Findley Federal Building and Courthouse in downtown Springfield, Illinois. The blast was also intended to destroy the nearby office of Representative Aaron Schock (R–IL).[113]
Evidence presented against Finton has shown that he expressed a desire to become a jihadist fighter and was aware that his planned attack would cause civilian injuries. He has been arrested on charges of attempted murder of
federal employees and attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction. Finton pled guilty and was sentenced to 28 years in prison.[114] 32. Tarek Mehanna and Ahmad Abousamra—October 2009. Tarek Mehanna, previously
indicted for lying to the FBI about the location of terrorist suspect Daniel Maldonado, was arrested on October 21, 2009, on allegations of conspiracy to kill two U.S. politicians, American troops in Iraq, and civilians in local shopping
malls, as well as conspiracy to provide material support to a terrorist organization.[115] Mehenna and Ahmad Abousamra, his co-conspirator, were indicted on charges of providing and conspiring to provide material support to
terrorists, conspiracy to kill Americans in a foreign country, and conspiracy to provide false information to law enforcement.[116] The two men are not believed to be associated with any known terrorist organization.[117]
Mehanna has pled not guilty to charges held against him and has since been convicted, while Abousamra remains at large in Syria.[118] 33. The Christmas Day Bomber—2009. Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a 23-year-old Nigerian
engineering student living in London, boarded a plane from Nigeria to Amsterdam and then flew from Amsterdam to the U.S. It was on this second flight when he attempted to detonate a bomb hidden in his underwear as the
plane began to land. The device ignited but did not detonate, and passengers quickly stopped Abdulmutallab from trying again, leading to his arrest by U.S. authorities upon landing in Detroit. The bomb, containing the explosives
PETN and TATP, was similar to the failed device used by Richard Reid in his shoe in 2001. Media accounts following the plot indicate that Abdulmutallab admits involvement with al-Qaeda in Yemen and has pleaded not guilty to
charges including conspiracy to commit an act of terrorism and attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction.[119] In February 2012, Adulmutallab was sentenced to life in prison following his conviction.[120] 34. Raja Lahrasib
Khan—March 2010. Chicago taxi driver Raja Lahrasib Khan, a naturalized U.S. citizen from Pakistan, was arrested by the Chicago FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force on two counts of providing material support to a foreign terrorist
organization. According to the charges, Khan was affiliated with Ilyas Kashmiri, leader of the al-Qaeda-linked extremist group Harakat ul-Jihad-I-Islami in Kashmir, and has previously been indicted in the U.S. on terrorism
charges.[121] Khan originally transferred $950 to Pakistan, to be delivered to Kashmiri, and later attempted to send around $1,000 provided to him by an undercover agent to Kashmiri by having his son carry the money to England,
where Khan then planned to rendezvous with him and carry the money the rest of the way to Pakistan. His son was stopped by government agents at Chicago’s O’Hare airport before leaving the country. The criminal complaint
filed against Khan also alleges that he had discussed plans to bomb an unnamed sports stadium in the United States. Khan has since pleaded guilty as part of a plea deal recommending a sentence of five to eight years. His
sentencing has been scheduled for May 30, 2012.[122] 35. Faisal Shahzad—May 2010. Faisal Shahzad, a naturalized citizen from Pakistan, attempted to detonate explosives in an SUV parked in Times Square. After explosives
training in Pakistan, he is said to have received $12,000 from entities affiliated with the terrorist organization Tehrik-e-Taliban to fund the attack. Following the failed bombing attempt, Shahzad attempted to flee the country to
Dubai, but was arrested before the flight was able to leave New York’s JFK airport.[123] Shahzad pled guilty to 10 counts, including conspiracy to commit an act of terrorism and to use a weapon of mass destruction.[124] He was
sentenced to life in prison and is being held at the same Colorado maximum-security prison as Richard Reid and Jose Padilla.[125] 36. Paul G. Rockwood, Jr., and Nadia Piroska Maria Rockwood—July 2010. Paul G. Rockwood, Jr., an
American citizen, became an adherent to Anwar al-Awlaki’s ideology of violent jihad after converting to Islam. In studying al-Awlaki’s teachings, Rockwood came to believe it was his religious responsibility to seek revenge against
anyone who defiled Islam. He created a list of 15 individuals to be targeted for assassination, including several members of the U.S. military. Rockwood is said to have researched explosive techniques and discussed the possibility of
killing his targets with a gunshot to the head or through mail bombs. Nadia Piroska Maria Rockwood, Paul’s wife, knowingly transported the list to Anchorage, Alaska, to share with an unnamed individual who apparently shared
Rockwood’s ideology. The list then made it into the hands of the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force in Anchorage. Paul was charged with making false statements to the FBI in a domestic terrorism charge, while Nadia was charged
with making false statements to the FBI in connection to the case against her husband. Paul was sentenced to eight years in prison, while his wife was sentenced to five years probation.[126] 37. Farooque Ahmed—October 2010.
Pakistani-American Farooque Ahmed was arrested following an FBI investigation into plots to attack the Washington, D.C., subway. Ahmed is said to have conducted surveillance on the D.C. Metrorail system on multiple occasions,
and was in contact with undercover FBI agents whom he believed to be individuals affiliated with al-Qaeda.[127] According to an unsealed affidavit, Ahmed wanted to receive terrorist training overseas and become a martyr. The
affidavit also indicates that he sought to specifically target military personnel in his bombing attempt.[128] Ahmed pled guilty to charges of material support and collecting information for a terrorist attack on a transit facility. He
was then immediately sentenced to 23 years in prison.[129] 38. Air Cargo Bomb Plot—October 2010. Two packages shipped from Yemen to Chicago-area synagogues were discovered to contain explosive materials of the same type
used by Richard Reid and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab in previously thwarted bombing attempts.[130] The packages contained printer cartridges filled with the explosive material and were identified with the help of intelligence
tips from Saudi Arabian authorities while in transit on cargo planes in the United Kingdom and Dubai.[131] While no arrests have been made, the Yemen-based Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has claimed responsibility
for the failed attack. 39. Mohamed Osman Mohamud—November 2010. Mohamed Osman Mohamud, a 19-year-old Somali-American, was arrested after attempting to detonate a car bomb at a Christmas tree lighting ceremony in
Portland, Oregon. The bomb was composed of inert explosives given to him by undercover FBI agents. Mohamud had previously sought to travel overseas to obtain training in violent jihad. Having failed in that attempt, he wanted
to commit an attack that would cause mass casualties to individuals and their families.[132] Mohamud has pled not guilty to the charges.[133] 40. Antonio Martinez—December 2010. Antonio Martinez, a 21-year-old American
citizen also known as Muhammad Hussain, planned to bomb a military recruiting center in Maryland. The FBI learned of the plot from an unnamed informant. Martinez was arrested after attempting to detonate a fake explosive
device supplied by FBI agents. He has been charged with attempted murder of federal officers and employees, as well as attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction.[134] He has pled not guilty and awaits further trial.[135] 41.
Khalid Ali-M Aldawsari—February 2011. Khalid Ali-M Aldawsari, a Saudi citizen studying in Lubbock, Texas, was arrested by the FBI after placing an order for the toxic chemical phenol. Both the chemical supplier and the freight
shipping company became suspicious of the order, which could be used to make an improvised explosive device (IED), and alerted the FBI and local police. Surveillance of Aldawsari’s e-mail turned up a list of potential “nice
targets” including dams, nuclear power plants, military targets, a nightclub, and the Dallas residence of former President George W. Bush. The search also recovered plans to acquire a forged U.S. birth certificate and multiple
driver’s licenses. Aldawsari seems to have considered using these documents to obtain rental cars for use in vehicle bombings. He has pled not guilty to charges of attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction and faces up to life
in prison.[136] 42. Ahmed Ferhani and Mohamed Mamdouh—May 2011. Ahmed Ferhani of Algeria, and Moroccan-born Mohamed Mamdouh, a U.S. citizen, were arrested by the New York Police Department after attempting to
purchase a hand grenade, guns, and ammunition to attack an undetermined Manhattan synagogue. The men planned on disguising themselves as Orthodox Jews in order to sneak into the synagogue.[137] Reports have also cited
the Empire State Building as a possible second target.[138] Both men face charges of conspiracy to commit a crime of terrorism and conspiracy to commit a hate crime, as well as criminal possession of a weapon.[139] 43. Yonathan
Melaku—June 2011. On June 17, 2011, Yonathan Melaku, an Ethiopian and a naturalized U.S. citizen and former Marine Corp reservist, was arrested at Fort Myer near Arlington National Cemetery, where he was found with a
backpack filled with ammonium nitrate, spray paint, and spent ammunition rounds. The discovery led authorities to unravel a series of mysterious events from the fall of 2010, when shots had been fired at night from the street at
various military buildings, including the Pentagon, causing over $100,000 in damages. After searching his bag and house, authorities found video of Melaku shooting at the buildings and providing commentary, a series of notebooks
written in Arabic with references to terrorism, and a list of equipment needed to make a timed explosive device. He has since pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 25 years in prison.[140] 44. Abu Khalid Abdul-Latif and Walli
Mujahidh—June 2011. In a raid on a warehouse in Seattle, the FBI arrested Abu Khalid Abdul-Latif and Walli Mujahidh. The two suspects had arranged to purchase weapons from an anonymous informant in contact with the Seattle
Police Department. They were seeking to purchase automatic machine guns and grenades in preparation for an attack on a military recruiting station in Seattle. Since the arrests have been made, authorities have learned that
Abdul-Latif, a felon and Muslim convert, had initially planned to attack the Joint Base Lewis–McChord with his friend, Los Angeles resident Mujahidh. The target was later changed to the Seattle Military Entrance Processing Station
for undisclosed reasons.[141] The men have been charged with conspiracy to murder officers and employees of the United States government, conspiracy to use a weapon of mass destruction, and possession of firearms in
furtherance of crimes of violence. Abdul-Latif has also been charged with two counts of illegal possession of firearms and is awaiting further trial.[142] Mujahidh has pled guilty and faces up to 32 years in prison.[143] 45. Emerson
Winfield Begolly—August 2011. Begolly, a moderator and supporter for the internationally known Islamic extremist Web forum Ansar al-Mujahideen English Forum (AMEF), was arrested on charges of terrorist actions involving
solicitation to commit a crime of violence and distribution of information in relation to explosives, destructive devices, and weapons of mass destruction. Through his profile on AMEF, the Pennsylvania-born man solicited others to
engage in violent acts of terrorism against post offices, water plants, military facilities, bridges, train lines, and Jewish schools. Begolly also used the website to post a downloadable 101-page document that contains information on
how to create, conduct, and manufacture chemical explosives. The instructional document is loosely linked to al-Qaeda’s former top chemical and biological weapons expert Abu Khabbab al Misri. Begolly pled guilty to counts of
soliciting others to engage in acts of terrorism within the U.S., and attempting to use a 9-mm semi-automatic handgun during an assault upon inquiring FBI agents. He is currently awaiting further trial.[144] 46. Rezwan Ferdaus—
September 2011. Ferdaus, a self-radicalized 26-year-old U.S. citizen, was arrested for trying to provide material support to terrorist organizations when he gave a modified cell phone to someone he believed to be an al-Qaeda
operative.[145] He did so believing the man would use the cell phone to detonate improvised explosive devices against American soldiers. The alleged al-Qaeda operative was an undercover FBI agent. Ferdaus also sought to use
small drone aircraft laden with explosives to attack the Pentagon and U.S. Capitol, followed by a ground attack carried out by armed men with automatic rifles. He had already purchased some items, including C4 and AK-47s,
toward this goal from an undercover agent.[146] He is being held awaiting trial.[147] 47. Iranian Terror Plot -October 2011. On October 11, 2011, Manssor Arbabsiar, an Iranian-born U.S. citizen, was arrested for plotting to
assassinate the Saudi Arabian ambassador to the U.S., as well as bomb the Saudi and Israeli embassies in Washington, D.C. He claims he was working for the Iranian Quds Forces, a special unit of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. On
behalf of the Quds Forces, Arbabsiar is said to have contacted members of a Mexican drug cartel with the goal of hiring them to assassinate the Saudi ambassador. The two parties allegedly agreed on a payment of $1.5 million,
with a down payment of $100,000 that Arbabsiar wired to members of the cartel, supposedly from the Iranian government. The plot was uncovered because the supposed members of the cartel he approached were informants for
the Drug Enforcmeent Agency.[148] He was arrested at JFK airport in New York, has pleaded not guilty, and is currently awaiting trial.[149] Another man, Gholam Shakuri, is an Iranian citizen who is wanted in connection with the
plot; he is believed to be in Iran.[150] This is the first publicly known post-9/11 Islamist-inspired terror plot aimed at the United States specifically linked to state-sponsored terrorism. 48. Jose Pimentel -November 2011. On
November 20, 2011, Jose Pimentel, a naturalized U.S. citizen from the Dominican Republic, was arrested on charges of planning to use pipe bombs to attack targets throughout New York City. His proposed targets included police
stations, post offices, and U.S. soldiers. He was a homegrown radical inspired by Anwar al-Awlaki. Pimentel also managed his own radical website espousing his beliefs in violent jihad.[151] The plot was uncovered by an informant
and Pimentel was arrested by the NYPD. He has pleaded not guilty and awaits trial.[152] 49. Sami Osmakac—January 2012. On January 7, 2012, Sami Osmakac, a naturalized U.S. citizen from the Kosovo region of the former
Republic of Yugoslavia, was arrested on charges of planning attacks against night clubs, businesses, and a sheriff’s office.[153] He came to the attention of the authorities when a source alerted them that Osmakac had asked how
to locate an al-Qaeda flag. He planned to conduct a multi-pronged attack against his proposed targets with vehicle-born explosives. He also wished to take hostages. He was introduced to an undercover FBI agent who he believed
was an arms dealer and procured disabled AK-47s and explosives from him.[154] He was arrested by the FBI’s Tampa office and has since pleaded not guilty.[155] 50. Amine El Khalifi—February 2012. Amine El Khalifi, a Moroccan
citizen illegally in the United States, was arrested on charges of plotting to attack the U.S. Capitol. He was arrested as he left his parked car with guns and a bomb. He did not know that the weapons had already been rendered
inoperable, as they had been provided to him by FBI agents he believed to be al-Qaeda operatives. Before choosing the Capitol building as a target, El Khalifi had proposed targets including D.C. office buildings, restaurants, and
synagogues.[156] He is currently being held in federal custody in Alexandria, Virginia, awaiting trial. 50 Terrorist Plots Foiled Since 9/11Preventing the Next Terrorist Attack The death of Osama bin Laden marked an important
victory in the long war on terrorism. The war, however, is not won. Terrorists, including those radicalized in the United States, continue to seek to harm the U.S. and its people.
As the first anniversary of the
death of bin Laden approaches, Congress and the Administration should be mindful of what is needed to continue to combat the threat of
terrorism at home and abroad. In
order to prevent the next terrorist attack, lawmakers should: · Preserve
existing counterterrorism and intelligence tools, such as the PATRIOT Act. Support for important
investigative tools, such as the PATRIOT Act, is essential to maintaining the security of the United States and
combating terrorist threats. Key provisions in the act, such as the roving surveillance authority and business
records provisions, have proven essential in thwarting numerous terror plots. For instance, the PATRIOT Act’s
information-sharing provisions were essential for investigating and prosecuting homegrown terrorists, such as the Lackawanna Six. This case,
along with others, demonstrates that national
security investigators continue to require the authorities provided
by the PATRIOT Act to track leads and dismantle plots before the public is put in danger. Bearing this fact in
mind, Congress should not let key provisions of the PATRIOT Act expire, and instead, should make them permanent.
LeT attack on the U.S. would trigger U.S. war with Pakistan
Tellis 12
Ashley J. Tellis¶ Senior Associate¶ South Asia Program¶ Tellis is a senior associate at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/03/13/menace-that-islashkar-e-taiba/a2hn
This is because the most vicious entities now engaged in attacks on India, like LeT, have objectives that
go way beyond Kashmir itself. They seek to destroy what is perhaps the most successful example of a
thriving democracy in the non-Western world, one that has prospered despite the presence of crushing
poverty, incredible diversity, and a relatively short history of self-rule. India’s existence as a secular and
liberal-democratic state that protects political rights and personal freedoms—despite all its failures and
imperfections—thus remains a threat to groups such as LeT, with their narrow, blighted, and destructive
worldviews. It is also a threat to other praetorian and antidemocratic institutions such as the Pakistan
Army and the ISI. India, accordingly, becomes an attractive target, while its mistakes, inadequacies, and
missteps only exacerbate the opportunities for violence directed at its citizenry.
It would be a gross error, however, to treat the terrorism facing India as simply a problem for New Delhi
alone. When viewed from the perspective of the United States, it is safe to say that LeT has long
undermined U.S. interests in the global war on terror. It threatens U.S. soldiers and civilians in
Afghanistan and has now killed U.S. citizens in Mumbai. Thus far it has not mounted any direct attacks
on the American homeland, but that is not for want of motivation. Given the juicier and far more
vulnerable U.S. targets in South Asia, LeT has simply found it more convenient to attack these (and U.S.
allies) in situ rather than overextend itself in reaching out to the continental United States, especially
when al-Qaeda still remains focused on that task. An LeT attack on the U.S. homeland would also lead
Washington to target the ISI and the Pakistani state directly, problems that the Pakistani military can
do without at a time when groups like LeT and its regional partners are more than amply successful in
advancing the Pakistan Army’s aims by undermining larger U.S. and coalition investments in
Afghanistan.
LeT operatives have been stopped in the U.S.
Adlakha 10 Joshua Adlakha, Graduate Student in Security Studies at Georgetown University, THE
EVOLUTION OF LASHKAR-E-TAYYIBA AND THE ROAD TO MUMBAI,
https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/.../adlakhajoshua.pdf.
Several LeT operatives have also been arrested in the United States. These include a network of
jihadists in northern Virginia known as the Virginia Jihad Network. Ali al-Timimi, an American born Islamic scholar popular among a
group of young Muslim men in Virginia, was convicted of advocating war against the U.S. He exhorted his followers to join the Taliban following
the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. While none of them ever did join the Taliban, four of them ended up receiving training from LeT.195 Ali Asad
Chandia, a resident of College Park, Maryland and third grade teacher, was convicted of aiding a British member of LeT, Mohammed Ajmal
Khan, with acquiring military equipment for LeT.196 Nine other members of the network were convicted in 2003 and 2004 variously for
providing material support to LeT, assisting others in gaining entry into LeT training camps, and for obtaining training to wage war against the
United States.197 The most notable American operative of LeT is David Headley. As previously noted, the American-born Headley had legally
changed his name from Daoud Gilani to make travel easier and moved effortlessly between the U.S., Pakistan, and India for nearly seven
years.198 According to Headley’s plea agreement, he made at least five trips to Mumbai between 2006 and 2008 to scout locations for attacks
and scouted targets in Pune and Goa in India. While in Mumbai, he made videos of the targets, collected coordinates with a GPS device, and
scouted the landing site for the attackers. Between 2002 and 2005, Headley had trained at Lashkar camps on at leave five occasions. During this
training he learned the use of explosives, small arms and countersurveillance techniques.199
U.S. has been preventing domestic LeT attacks on U.S. homeland
Jones 11 Seth G. Jones is director of the International Security and Defense Policy Center at the RAND
Corporation, The Future of Al Qa’ida CT-362 May 2011,
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=12&ved=0CCUQFjABOApqFQoTC
KrvpZ-H-MYCFcc4iAod78KHw&url=http%3A%2F%2Farchives.republicans.foreignaffairs.house.gov%2F112%2Fjon052411.pdf&ei
=E20VeqZN8fxoATv36v4AQ&usg=AFQjCNH28hzNYeUrTDQ2grEJvGW46_6aRQ&sig2=OwaEnNRKOptgEs7Kiw
Qs3Q
In September 2009, for example, Najibullah Zazi was arrested for planning attacks on the New York City subway.
Zazi pleaded guilty in U.S. District Court to “conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction” and “providing material support for a foreign
terrorist organization” based in Pakistan.11 Several al Qa’ida operatives, including Saleh al-Somali and Adnan el Shukrijumah, were involved in
the plot. According to U.S. government documents, Zazi’s travels to Pakistan and his contacts with individuals there were pivotal in helping him
build an improvised explosive device using triacetone triperoxide (TATP), the same explosive used effectively in the 2005 London subway
bombings. In October 2009, Chicago-based David Coleman Headley (aka Daood Sayed Gilani) was arrested for involvement in terrorist activity.
He is a Pakistani-American who had cooperated with Lashkar-e Tayyiba and senior al Qa’ida leaders to conduct a
series of attacks, including the November 2008 Mumbai attack and a plot to attack a newspaper in Copenhagen that had published a cartoon of
the Prophet Muhammad. His
base in Chicago made him ideally suited for a future attack in the U.S.
homeland.
LeT is a global threat that risks terror attacks on India and the United States
Tellis 12 Ashley J. Tellis¶ Senior Associate¶ South Asia Program¶ Tellis is a senior associate at the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/03/13/menacethat-is-lashkar-e-taiba/a2hn
It is clear that after al-Qaeda, LeT is the most dangerous terrorist group operating in South Asia
because of its:¶ 1.Global vision and international ambitions ¶ ¶ 2.Distinct ideology that underwrites
Islamic revanchism, justifying collaboration with other terrorist groups ¶ ¶ 3.Loyalty to Pakistan and
willingness to protect its patron state against domestic opponents ¶ ¶ 4.Diversified network for
mobilizing resources, promoting its international presence, and recruiting members, which minimizes its
dependence on the state ¶ ¶ 5.Involvement in terrorism and social development concurrently, which
limits Pakistan’s ability to target the group even if it were so inclined ¶ ¶ 6.Cohesive and hierarchic
organizational structure that is effective at both the conduct of violence and the delivery of social
programs ¶ ¶ 7.Proficiency at exploiting science and technology, extra-national social links, and state
vulnerabilities in order to advance its political aims¶ ¶ LeT is a formidable and highly adaptable
adversary with a genuinely global reach and the ability to grow roots and sustain operations in
countries far removed from its primary theater of activity in South Asia. Though India’s proximity to
Pakistan has resulted in New Delhi absorbing most of the blows unleashed by LeT, the carnage in
Mumbai demonstrates that the terrorism facing India is not simply a problem for New Delhi alone. An
attack could even reach U.S. soil.¶ ¶ The only reasonable objective for the United States is the
permanent evisceration of LeT and other vicious South Asian terrorist groups—with Pakistani
cooperation if possible, but without it if necessary.
AT: HUMINT Turn
Human intel can’t work for India—They have massive shortages of human spy
personnel and don’ have the ability to train enough human spys
Indian Express 14
India’s spy agencies more toothless than ever, http://indianexpress.com/article/india/indiaothers/indias-spy-agencies-more-toothless-than-ever/
Indians waited that, and longer-and while they did, the foundations on which India’s
intelligence services have been rotting. The
Intelligence Bureau, highly-placed government sources said, is over 30% short of staff-particularly critical mid-level executive
positions. For its part, the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW), tasked with securing Indian interests across the world, has
desperate shortages of specialists in languages and the sciences-deficits that are running as high as 40% in
critical departments. Later this year, Prime Minister Narendra Modi is expected to make his first appointment to lead the Intelligence
Bureau. He is expected to choose from among Ashok Prasad, who helped build the organisation’s counter-terrorism data-hub, the Multi-Agency
Centre, D P Sinha, a veteran of anti-terror operations, and Dineshwar Sharma, a quiet but highly respected analyst, who won his spurs when he
volunteered to serve in Jammu and Kashmir in the early 1990s. The Prime Minister will also have to find a leader to rebuild R&AW-devastated
by internal feuds, staff shortages and technology deficits. He is expected to choose between Rajinder Khanna, the leader of R&AW’s counterterrorism efforts in recent years, and Arvind Saxena, a veteran with long experience of Pakistan, the United States and organisational
management. Too few spies Figures released to Parliament by the United Progressive Alliance government show that even as Chidambaram’s
efforts to create new institutions became the focus of official efforts, staffing
deficits became endemic across the
intelligence services. In March 2013, then Minister of State for Home R P N Singh told Parliament that the IB had 18,795 personnel on
its rolls, against a sanctioned strength of 26,867 – in other words, a shortfall of over 30 per cent, and that based on manpower
requirements drawn up in the 1970s. The effects are evident across the states: dedicated counterterrorism groups set up by National Security Advisor Ajit Doval, while he was Intelligence Bureau chief, have been sucked into routine
duties. The Intelligence Bureau’s operations hub in New Delhi has just 30-odd executive staff. Intelligence Bureau chief Asif Ibrahim has cut the
shortfall to some 7,000 people-taking in as many as the service’s overstretched training facility can handle. It’s proved just too little though and
not because of lack of trying. In 2009, Chidambaram authorised the hiring of 6,000 personnel. However, the
IB’s existing training
facilities can process just 600 to 700 staff in a year, which barely -covers attrition from retirements
and resignations. “There’s another problem, too”, notes a senior Intelligence Bureau officer. “Let’s say we, by some miracle, find the
6,000-odd people we need in one go. They’ll need to be promoted from time to time-and there just won’t be positions for them. The
government needs to do a thoroughgoing review of staffing, and the last one just wasn’t interested”. R&AW, estimated to have some 5,000
personnel, faces a similar shortage. The organisation is short of some 130 management-level staff, the sources said, particularly cutting-edge
under-secretaries and deputy secretaries. R&AW is also short of personnel with specialist language and area knowledge, particularly Arabic,
Chinese and minor Pakistani languages. –
They no longer have a pool to recruit sufficient human intelligence—Indian states
won’t let their best police get recruited intelligence
Indian Express 14
India’s spy agencies more toothless than ever, http://indianexpress.com/article/india/indiaothers/indias-spy-agencies-more-toothless-than-ever/
Long years of neglect, intelligence officials said, had contributed to the staffing crisis at the R&AW and the IB.
“The intelligence services,” a senior officer said, “had always relied on young Indian Police Service officers,
recruited early in their careers, to serve in middle and senior-management roles. The overall shortfall in the IPS’s
strength, though, has meant states are loath to allow their best officers to serve in - New Delhi on
deputation.” The R&AW’s internal cadre, the Research and Analysis Service, for its part, froze recruitment from the 2004-2005 batch to the
2009-2010 batch, and in other years, cut hiring to a trickle. Last year, bulk recruitment to fill the deficits was agreed on, but a debate about
whether needs would be best met through Union Public Service Commission-run examinations or campus recruitment rages on. –
Answers to LeT
Even if India gets intelligence data it won’t be effectively used to stop terrorism
because of inaction and corruption
Bhatia 14 Raashi Bjatia is the Co-Founder of a non-profit organization Business Alternatives for Peace,
Action and Reconstruction (BAPAR) based in New Delhi and a Graduate Student in Security Studies with
the Center of Security Studies, Georgetown University, India?s National Security Policies and the Threat
of Lashkar-e-Taiba: A Forgotten Concern Small Arms Journal Journal Article | Apr 15 2014,
smallwarsjournal.com/printpdf
Actionable intelligence is the first thing that comes to mind when one thinks about disrupting a terrorist plot. Although its primary function is
strategic intelligence, the Indian Intelligence Bureau has an excellent record in providing tactical support to state police forces- within
reasonable limits. Between 1998 and 2003, it reportedly neutralized 250 ISI- backed jihadist cells across India, excluding Jammu and Kashmir
and the North Eastern states. This neutralization rate of approximately one terrorist cell per week has been maintained even after the current
spate of jihadist violence erupted in 2005. Where problems have arisen is not so much in the IB’s response to pan-Islamist terrorism, but in that
of the political leadership. Put simply, there
has been no policy response to ample warnings from the intelligence
community since 2002 that Pakistan planned to target the Indian heartland.[xxxvi] Before the Mumbai attacks there
were reports of at least 20 intelligence reports provided to the Mumbai Police Department specially warning them
about Fedayeen attacks or sea borne infiltrations. The Intelligence Bureau of India had also received two specific warnings about the
Taj hotel. One concerned a possible attack on 24 May and the other on 11 August, both prompted by tip offs from a source in Pakistan said to
be inside Lashkar. [xxxvii] The hotel was made aware of the tip offs but nothing was really done to beef up security or improve the current
measures in place, like CCTV cameras and security guards on the front gate. Prem Mahadevan writes in his book ‘The Politics of
Counterterrorism in India’, “Such inaction (failure
to act on intelligence) stems from four factors, two of which are political
lack of political consistency and consensus, and a lack of operational
capacity and coordination. Between them, these constraints ensure that decision- makers in the Indian
political and security establishments fail to act on initial warnings provided by intelligence
agencies.”[xxxviii] Additionally, the security agencies as well as the people in the position of responsibility have an attitude problem. Till the
time everything is right and nothing goes wrong the attitude is simply ‘Chalta hai’ – Everything works. Any amount of intelligence is
of no use till the time it is taken seriously and acted upon. Despite such specific intelligence inputs, as mentioned before,
and two operational. The factors are: a
Mumbai’s Joint Police Commissioner Rakesh Maria said in an interview that it was a ‘failure of imagination’ on the part of the police
department. This clearly shows the lack of seriousness attributed to the importance of intelligence in counterterrorism. To overcome this,
personnel in state police departments need to go through rigorous training for intelligence gathering as well as to deal with the gathered
intelligence inputs. A committee set up to find the loopholes in the response to the Mumbai attacks, The Pradhan Committee, found out that
“well set out procedures for handling intelligence and ‘crisis management’ were overlooked and the Commissioner of Police Mumbai Hasan
Gafoor did not exhibit adequate initiative in handling the multi-pronged attack and remained at one spot near Trident Hotel throughout the
operations.[xxxix] There is an urgent need for proper Standard Operating Procedures in place and not just on paper but for them to be enforced
through drills and simulation games. There is also a need a for a centralized command and control, so that in an event of an attack, forces on
the ground know who they are taking orders from and remain coordinated in their efforts. Most importantly, it is necessary to be practical
about countermeasures being put in place, most
of the steps taken by Indian authorities remain non-operational
and useless. In the end everything boils down to resource allocation and in India where every official must have his ‘cut’
at every step of the process, it becomes increasingly difficult to implement any policies. It is
imperative that a strong anti-corruption system comes in place, especially where authorities are working for
national or state security for a speedy and proper implementation of counter terrorism policies.
Analysis tools for meta data empirically fail
Wheaton & Richey 14 Kristan J. Wheaton is an Associate Professor at Mercyhurst University and
Melonie K. Richey is a graduate student at Mercyhurst University who is currently participating in
IARPA’s Sirius Project. Metadata Analysis as an Intelligence Tool, e-International Relations January 9,
2014 , http://strategicstudyindia.blogspot.com/2014/06/metadata-analysis-as-intelligence-tool.html
Caveat Emptor Like
all analytic techniques, SNA is imperfect and comes with a number of caveats for researchers new to the
of the authors sought
to use SNA to locate terrorists using social media. SNA and social media seemed like a good place to start, even though it
seemed unlikely that many such individuals would self identify as a “radical extremist” or “Al-Qaeda affiliate.” Ultimately though, the effort
failed because there was just too much of what social network analysts like to call “white noise,” or extraneous
method. SNA, while widely applicable, is by no means universally applicable. For example, in early 2013, one
information picked up through a comprehensive scraping of the Internet. Our search for radical extremists returned journalists, university
students of international relations and politics, and a slew of ordinary people just keeping up with current events and Tweeting about it.
Another issue with SNA has to do with the nature of relationships. In the real world, they are often messy and convoluted. Just because two
people work together and do so often, does not necessarily mean that they like each other. Similarly, the best way to describe the relationship
between two businesses might not be the number of contracts the two have signed together. SNA works best, however, with clearly definable
relationships and where one factor in the relationship correlates well with other factors important in a relationship. Modern intelligence
problems, which often contain, political, economic, military, tribal, geographic, personal, and historical relationship data require the application
of advanced SNA techniques and, even then, may yield little of real use to decisionmakers. Finally, SNA is fundamentally a mathematical tool
but is most useful in the decisionmaking process when the networks are visualized. It is, without doubt, the visualization of these networks that
tends to capture the most attention from the policymakers that intelligence units typically support. This is both a blessing and a curse. While it
is easy to capture attention, explaining why the charts and graphs look the way they do is an art. All too often, the initial excited reaction to
these diagrams turns to boredom and confusion as analysts bog the decisionmakers down with the arcana of SNA. In addition, creating these
complex visualizations often stresses even the most powerful personal computers (the images of the simulation in Figure 8 above took
approximately 2 hours to produce using a powerful desktop PC with two high end graphics cards). Like every analytic technique, SNA has great
utility for the right question. Within its limits, SNA is unmatched and can be usefully applied to identify key individuals or organizations within a
network, generate new leads and simulate the flows of information or money throughout a network. SNA, however, remains just ana nswer,
not the answer. Used inappropriately or without a full understanding of the limits of the method and analysts will only be finding new and more
technically sophisticated ways to fail. That, then, is the primary job of the modern day analyst: making the judgment call of which techniques to
use and when. Equally as important as knowing when to use SNA is knowing when not to use it.
Surveillance fails — even if countries have the data, it doesn’t translate into
preemptive polities
NYT 14 — New York Times, 2014. (“In 2008 Mumbai Attacks, Piles of Spy Data, but an Uncompleted
Puzzle”, James Glanz, December 21st, 2014, Available Online at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/22/world/asia/in-2008-mumbai-attacks-piles-of-spy-data-but-anuncompleted-puzzle.html Accessed 7-22-15)
In the fall of 2008, a
30-year-old computer expert named Zarrar Shah roamed from outposts in the northern
mountains of Pakistan to safe houses near the Arabian Sea, plotting mayhem in Mumbai, India’s commercial
gem. Mr. Shah, the technology chief of Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Pakistani terror group, and fellow
conspirators used Google Earth to show militants the routes to their targets in the city. He set up an
Internet phone system to disguise his location by routing his calls through New Jersey. Shortly before an
assault that would kill 166 people, including six Americans, Mr. Shah searched online for a Jewish hostel and two luxury
hotels, all sites of the eventual carnage. But he did not know that by September, the British were
spying on many of his online activities, tracking his Internet searches and messages , according to former
American and Indian officials and classified documents disclosed by Edward J. Snowden, the former National Security Agency contractor. They
were not the only spies watching. Mr.
Shah drew similar scrutiny from an Indian intelligence agency, according
to a former official briefed on the operation. The United States was unaware of the two agencies’ efforts, American
officials say, but had picked up signs of a plot through other electronic and human sources, and warned
Indian security officials
several times in the months before the attack.
Indian domestic surveillance not key — US international solves
ET 14 — The Economic Times, 2014. (“US alerts India of possible terror attack by Lashkar-e-Taiba,
capital on high-alert”, Aman Sharma, Decemeber 12th, 2014, Available Online at:
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-12-12/news/56990498_1_delhi-police-terror-strikerepublic-day-function)
It was the
United States which alerted India of an impending major terror strike in Delhi by Pakistanbased Lashkar-e-Taiba, triggering a comprehensive security review of the national capital by the Delhi
Police and Intelligence Bureau. "The alert came directly from US intelligence agencies...it was not a
pin-pointed information and did not specify any place or time of attack but the input said there was
clear intelligence with the US of a big terror strike somewhere in Delhi by LeT," a senior Home Ministry official
told ET. The government has decided to take no chances as the said tip-off from the US came shortly
after the visit of US President Barack Obama to India was confirmed for being the chief guest at the Republic Day. Sources
in the home ministry said that besides taking extra steps to secure Delhi, IB has also begun a "coordination
exercise" with neighbouring states like UP and Rajasthan, sensitising them of the terror threat and asking them to be on alert for any terror
module in their jurisdictions which may target Delhi. "Many meetings have been held between state authorities and IB since. Delhi Police
Commissioner BS Bassi has also met National Security Advisor Ajit Doval to brief him of the security measures taken for Delhi.