PEDU 7206
Lecture 2
The Methodological Foundations
of EAP
Roadmap for the Explication of
Theoretical Foundation of EAP
1. Methodology: How to obtain objective
truths and facts?
2. Epistemology: What kind of knowledge has
been obtained?
3. Ontology: From what do we obtain the
knowledge?
Methodological Priority:
Ontology:
- Objectivism
- Idealism
- Constructivism
- Realism
Epistemology:
- EmpiricistPositivism
- InterpretiveHermeneutic
Tradition
- Critical
Social
Sciences
Methodology:
- Quantitative
- Qualitative
Epistemological Priority:
Ontology:
- Objectivism
- Idealism
- Constructivism
- Realism
Epistemology:
- EmpiricistPositivism
- InterpretiveHermeneutic
Tradition
- Critical
Social
Sciences
Methodology:
- Quantitative
- Qualitative
Ontological Priority:
Ontology:
- Objectivism
- Idealism
- Constructivism
- Realism
Epistemology:
- EmpiricistPositivism
- InterpretiveHermeneutic
Tradition
- Critical
Social
Sciences
Methodology:
- Quantitative
- Qualitative
From Research Methods to Methodology:
Mapping the Pathway of Social Research
What is research?
“A studious inquiry or examination; esp: critical and
exhaustive investigation or experimentation having
for its aim the discovery of new facts and their
correct interpretation, the revision of accepted
conclusions, theories, or laws in the light of newly
discovered facts, or applications of such new or
revised conclusions, theories, or laws.” (Webster
Dictionary)
Research is act of “the acquisition of reliable
knowledge concerning many aspects of the
world…and self conscious use of …method.” (Negal,
1961, p.1)
What is Research ?
Knower
(The Self)
Self conscious use of method
Known
Ontological
(The World)
Foundation
Methodological
Foundation
Knowing
Epistemological
Knowledge
Foundation
(Reliable
& Valid)
7
From Research Methods to Methodology:
Mapping the Pathway of Social Research
What is methodology?
“Methodology was an analytical approach
which examined concrete studies to make
explicit the procedures that were used, the
underlying assumptions that were made, and
the modes of explanation that we offered. It
thus involved a codification of ongoing
research procedures. Actual research was the
material from which methodology is built,
without being identical with it.” (Lazrsfield,
1972, p. xi)
From Research Methods to Methodology:
Mapping the Pathway of Social Research
Research methods courses offered in the
Faculty of Education
Curriculum structure in 1995-96
 EDM6001 Sampling Design & Survey Research
 EDM6002 Educational Research Design (Experimental
Design)
 EDM6003 Comparative-Historical Method in Educational
Research
 EDM6004 Ethnographic Analysis in Educational Research
 EDM6005 Statistical Analysis in Educational Research
 EDM6006 Advanced Statistical Analysis in Educational
Research
From Research Methods to Methodology:
Mapping the Pathway of Social Research
Research methods courses offered …
Curriculum structure in 2014-15
 PEDU 6003 Comparative-Historical Method in Educational
Research
 PEDU 6004 Ethnographic Study in Educational Research
 PEDU 6401 Quantitative methods in educational research
 PEDU 6402 Qualitative methods in educational research
 PEDU 6403 Quantitative data management & analysis in
educational research
 PEDU 6404 Quantitative analysis in classroom and school
settings
 PEDU 6405 Multi-dimensional & multi-causal analysis in
educational research
 PEDU 6406 Action research in education
From Research Methods to Methodology:
Mapping the Pathway of Social Research
Three samples of synthesis in methodology in
social sciences
 Charles C. Ragin (1994/2011) Constructing of Social
Research
 Robert R. Alford (1996) The Craft of Inquiry:
Theories, Methods &Evidence
 Jurgen Habermas (1971/1968) Knowledge and
Human Interest
Ragin (1994/2011)
Alford (1996
From Research Methods to Methodology:
Mapping the Pathway of Social Research
 Jurgen Habermas (1971/1968) Knowledge and
Human Interest
 “There are three categories of processes of inquiry
for which a specific connection between logicalmethodological rules and knowledge-constitutive
interests can be demonstrated. …The approach for
empirical-analytical sciences incorporates a
technical cognitive interest; that of the historicalhermeneutic sciences incorporates a practical one;
and the approach of critically oriented sciences
incorporates the emancipatory cognitive interest.”
(P. 308)
Historical Development of Methodological
Discourse in Social Sciences




Scientific Revolution in 17th century
Enlightenment in 18-19th century
Auguste Comte’s thesis of physics of society
Vienna-Circle movement of unity of scientific method in the
early 20th century and the emergence of the movement of
methodological monism of logical/empirical positivism
 Carl G. Hempel’s assault on the inadequacy of historical
scientific researches and their methodical approach in 1942s
 The rebuttals against Hempel’s assault from scholars of the
hermeneutic traditions and the initiation of the cultural
and/or linguist turn in social science
 The emergence of the Critical Theory and the reinstatement
of the Marxian thesis of critique of ideology
(I)
The Methodology of
Analytical-Empirical Approach
Carl G. Hempel’s General-Law
Explanatory Model
In 1942, Carl Hempel, Professor of Princeton
University, published an article in Journal of
Philosophy entitle “The Function of General
Law in History”. The primary objective of the
article is to reinstate the Vienna-Circle’s
advocation of “the methodological unity of
empirical science.” (Hempel, 1965/1942, P. 243)
Carl G. Hempel’s General-Law
Explanatory Model
Taking history (as well as other social
sciences) as an empirical science, Hempel
began his article with an outright criticism on
the historians by underlining that they have
focused their research efforts on “the
description of particular events of the past”
rather than on “the search for general laws
which might govern those events” and “it is
certainly unacceptable”. (Hempel, 1965, P. 231)
Hempel then explicate in details his explanatory
model by general law.
Carl G. Hempel’s General-Law
Explanatory Model
Deductive-nomological model: The ideal-typical
model of explanation in empirical sciences
(including both natural and social sciences) is
what he characterizes as deductivenomological model. The model is made up of
three parts.
Carl G. Hempel’s General-Law
Explanatory Model
Deductive-nomological model: …
The model is made up of three parts.
The specific events (E) to be explained, in Hempel’s
terms, the explanandum
The possible antecedent condition (C) which brings
about the occurrence of that specific events
In order to logically deduce a causal relation
between E and C, a general law covering the
occurrences of both E and C is needed. And by
general law it means a statement of universal causalconditions that has been empirically or logical
confirmed. More specifically, causal conditions may
be further differentiated into three types:
Deductive-Nomological Explanatory Model
C1,C2,…Ck
Logical
deduction
L1,L2,,...Lr
E
Statements if
antecedent
conditions
Explanans
General Laws
Description of the
empirical
phenomenon to
be explained
Explanandum
Carl G. Hempel’s General-Law
Explanatory Model
Deductive-nomological model: …
The model is made up of three parts….
….More specifically, causal conditions may be
further differentiated into three types:…
 Sufficient conditions: It refers to the kinds of conditionality
between the C and E, in which the C can exhaustively but
not universally explain the truth of the E.
 Necessary conditions: It refers to the kinds of conditionality
between the E and C, in which the C can universally but not
exhaustively explain the truth of the E.
 Sufficient and necessary conditions: It refers to the kinds of
conditionality between the E and C, in which the C can both
exhaustively and universally explain the truth of the E.
Carl G. Hempel’s General-Law
Explanatory Model
The compromised model: StatisticalProbabilistic explanation:
The statistical-probabilistic model is the type of
explanation commonly use in quantitative
researches in social sciences. It is also made up of
three parts similar to those in nomological-deductive
explanation. There are two differences in
probabilistic explanation. …..
Carl G. Hempel’s General-Law
Explanatory Model
The compromised model: StatisticalProbabilistic explanation:
The statistical-probabilistic model ….
One is that the explanatory premises is not in the
form of law-like / nomological statement of the
sufficient and necessary conditions of the truth of
the explanandum but only a probabilistic statement
specifying the likelihood of the causal relationship
between the explanans and explanandum. The
second difference is that in the conclusion, the
specific explanandum under study cannot be
exhaustive explained by the explanans but can only
be explained in probabilistic terms.
Statistical-Probabilistic Explanatory Model
C1,C2,…Ck
Logical
deduction
L1,L2,,...Lr
E
Statements if
antecedent
conditions
Explanans
Statistical Laws
Description of the
empirical
phenomenon to
be explained
Explanandum
The Constitution of the AnalyticalEmpirical Approach
Transplanting the Deductive-nomological
explanatory model from the natural science,
researchers in social sciences began to
constitute their “Language of social research”
(Lazarsfeld, et al., 1955, see also 1972). As a
result, the methodology of quantitative
research (at least in America) has been
founded. Apart from the deductive-nomological
explanatory model, two of the other principles
of this methodological foundation are the
analytical approach and empiricism.
The Constitution of the AnalyticalEmpirical Approach
….two other methodological foundation are the
analytical approach and empiricism. …
 Analytical approach: By analytical approach, it refers
the way social researchers approach their objects
under study, i.e. the social world or social reality, by
decomposing the objects into elements or properties
and then try to establish causal relations among
them. …
The Constitution of the AnalyticalEmpirical Approach
 Analytical approach: …
In Paul Lazarsfeld own words, “No science deals
with its objects of study in their concreteness. It
selects certain of their properties and attempts to
establish relations among them. The finding of such
laws is the ultimate goal of all scientific inquiries. But
in social sciences the singling out of relevant
properties is in itself a major problem. No standard
terminology has yet been developed for this task.
The properties are sometimes called aspects or
attributes, and often the “variable” is borrowed from
mathematics as most general category.” (Lazarsfeld,
1955, P. 15)
The Constitution of the AnalyticalEmpirical Approach
 Empiricism: It refers to the way social research
approach their evidences to be accepted in verifying
the propositions or more specifically hypotheses.
That is, only observations verified by sensory
experience can be accepted as evidences.
Furthermore, quantitative social researchers would
demand those sensory-observations should be
repeatable, recordable, and quantifiable into a
mathematical “variables”.
Methodological Designs in Social
Inquiries
Experimental design: Based on these three
principles, viz. deductive- nomological
explanatory model, analytical approach, and
empiricism; quantitative social researchers
could only design their studies, which is to
verify causals relation among variables, by
observing and recording the outcomes of their
experimental design. The most typical design
of a true experiment can be represented as
follows (Campbell and Stanley, 1963, Pp. 13-22)
Methodological Designs in Social
Inquiries
Experimental design:
R
R
O1
O3
X
O2
O4
Connotations:
R=Random assignment of subjects
O=Observation
X=Treatment (effects under study)
Methodological Designs in Social
Inquiries
Social-survey design: However, by the very
nature of the social world, it is basically
infeasible or even unethical to conduct
experiments on human subjects. As a result,
most of the social researchers can only
conduct their observation in naturalistic
environment of the social world. That is by
means of social survey. As a result, one of the
three primary design tools, i.e. treatment
manipulation, has to be abandoned. What is left
are the design-tools of one-short observation
and random sampling.
The Underlying Assumptions of
Research Designs in Social Inquiries
Given the principles and operations of the
methodology of quantitative researches, they
reveal that the causal relations between
variables, which quantitative researches are
supposed to have verified, are, in fact, implicated
under at least the following three assumptions
(Hirschi and Selvin, 1996)
The Underlying Assumptions of
Research Designs in Social Inquiries
…implicated under at least the following three
assumptions (Hirschi and Selvin, 1996)
 Assuming covariance as causation: In most of the
social experiments and most notably social surveys,
the observations between the cause-variable and the
effect-variable could only be in association formats.
That is the two sets of variables vary concurrently. It
could not reveal the real causal interactions between
the two set of social properties simply by
observations. As a result two other working
assumption are needed.
The Underlying Assumptions of
Research Designs in Social Inquiries
…implicated under …three assumptions….
Assuming or manipulating the temporal orderings
between the variables: One of the logical conditions
of a causation is that the cause must precede the
effect. And simple statistical covariance can never
substantiate the temporal orderings between two
sets of variables. As a result, temporal orderings
could only be built in by experimental design, that is,
to have the designed treatment carried out right
between the pretest and post-test. However, as for
one-short social survey, the temporal orderings
among various variables could only be assumed. …
The Underlying Assumptions of
Research Designs in Social Inquiries
…implicated under …three assumptions …
 Assuming or manipulating the temporal orderings
between the variables: ….
For examples, in most educational surveys, it is
assumed that parents’ education, socio-economic
status, students’ genders are precedent to students’
educational achievement.
The Underlying Assumptions of
Research Designs in Social Inquiries
…implicated under …three assumptions …
 The assumptions of ceteris paribus: It refers to the
assumption that all other possible factors in the
causal relation are being equal or unchanged. The
only design-tools available for social researchers
deal with this assumption is randomization. In
experimental design, it is the random assignments of
subjects into treatment and non-treatment group. As
for social survey, researchers could only fall back on
to random sampling.
(II)
The Methodology of
Historical-Hermeneutic Approach
The Essentials of the Methodology of
Qualitative Research
Willhelm Dilthey’s conception of the human
sciences:
“We owe to Dilthey …that the natural sciences and
the human sciences are characterized by two
scientificity, two methodologies, two
epistemologies.” (Ricoeur, 1991/1973, p. 275)
Wilhelm Dilthey’s Introduction to the Human
Sciences (1923)
(1833-1911)
41
The Essentials of the Methodology of
Qualitative Research
Willhelm Dilthey’s conception of the human
sciences: …
Dilthey in his classical work Introduction to the
Human Sciences (1991/1883) underlines that “The
sum of intellectual facts which fall under the notion
of science is usually divided into two groups, one
marked by the name ‘natural science’; for the other,
oddly enough, there is no generally accepted
designation. I subscribe to the thinkers who call this
other half of the intellectual world the ‘human
sciences’ (Geisteswissenschaften or translated as
‘the sciences of the mind’)” (Dilthey, 1991, p. 78)
The Essentials of the Methodology of
Qualitative Research
Willhelm Dilthey’s conception of the human
sciences: …
“The motivation behind the habit of seeing these
sciences as a unity in contrast with those of nature
derives from the depth and fullness of human selfconsciousness. … (A) man finds in this selfconsciousness a sovereignty of will, a responsibility
for actions, a capacity for subordinating everything
to thought and for resisting any foreign element in
the citadel of freedom in his person: by these things
he distinguishes himself from all of nature. He finds
himself with respect to nature an imperium in
imperio.” (Dilthey, 1991, p.79)
The Essentials of the Methodology of
Qualitative Research
Clifford Geertz's conception of culture and its
interpretation
Geertz in his classical work The Interpretation of
Cultures: Selected Essays (1973) underlines that
“The concept of culture I espouse … is essentially a
semiotic one. Believing, with Max Weber, that man is
an animal suspended in webs of significance he
himself has spun. I take culture to be those webs,
and the analysis of it to be therefore not an
experimental science in search of law but an
interpretative one in research of meaning.” (Geertz,
1994/1973, P. 214)
Clifford Geertz's conception of culture and
its interpretation (1973)
(1926-2006)
45
The Essentials of the Methodology of
Qualitative Research
Clifford Geertz's conception of culture and its
interpretation
“Culture is most effectively treated …purely as a
symbolic system …by isolating its elements,
specifying the internal relationship among those
elements, and then characterizing the whole system
in some general way  according to the core
symbols around which it is organized, the underlying
structures of which it is a surface expression, or the
ideological principles upon which it is based.”
(Geertz, 1994/1973, p. 222)
The Essentials of the Methodology of
Qualitative Research
Max Weber’s conception of sociology and
social research
Max Weber’s oft-quoted definition of the subject
matter of sociology and that of social sciences in
general stipulates that "Sociology is a science
concerning itself with interpretive understanding of
social action in order thereby to arrive at a causal
explanation of its course and consequence. We shall
speak of 'action' insofar as the acting individual
attaches a subjective meaning to his behavior.
…Action is 'social' insofar as its subjective meaning
takes account of the behavior of others and is
thereby oriented in its course." (Weber, 1978, p. 4)
(1864-1920)
The Essentials of the Methodology of
Qualitative Research
Max Weber’s conception of sociology and
social research
…. This definition has generated three
methodological aproia for students of sociology and
social sciences to tackle with for generations to
come.
First, it has stipulated that in studying human
actions the major concerns is to provide
“interpretive understanding” of the “subjective
meanings” underlying each and every “actions”.
This has constituted the basic research question for
qualitative research in social sciences.
The Essentials of the Methodology of
Qualitative Research
Max Weber’s conception of …
Second, the definition has also stipulate another
aporia to students in social sciences. That is, given
human actions are endowed with subjective
meanings, how can two actions be oriented into a
mutually acceptable social action? Furthermore, one
can continue to ask how society and culture be
possible in maintaining these varieties of social
actions in stable and continuous manner through
time and across considerable spatial distance?
The Essentials of the Methodology of
Qualitative Research
Max Weber’s conception of …
Third, the definition has also generated yet another
aporia by stipulating the social researchers should
also render “causal explanation” for the “course”
and “consequence” of the human action under
study. This seems to be a statement of a typical
research question for quantitative researchers. In
other words, Weber seems to expect his followers to
bridge the gap between quantitative and qualitative
approaches to social research.
The Essentials of the Methodology of
Qualitative Research
Max Weber’s conception of …
In fact, both Alfred Schutz (1967/1932) and Jurgen
Habermas (1988/1967) specifically began their books
with the same quotation of Weber’s definition of
sociology and try to resolve the aporia set forth in it.
The Essentials of the Methodology of
Qualitative Research
Jurgen Habermas in his book On the Logics of
Social Sciences (1988/1967) has suggested
there are generally three approaches to the
studies of the subjective meanings of human
and social actions. They are
The social phenomenological approach
The linguistic approach
The hermeneutic approach
The Conception of Meanings in Social
Phenomenological Perspective
Phenomenology as a school of thought in
modern philosophy was established at the
beginning of the twentieth century mainly
under the leadership and efforts of Edmund
Husserl, a German philosopher. However, it
was Alfred Schutz’s work (1967/1932) and the
work of two of his “students”, Peter Berger and
Thomas Luckmann (1966), which have brought
the phenomenological conceptions of meaning
to the studies of social action and social world.
The Conception of Meanings in Social
Phenomenological Perspective
In his now-classic work, The Phenomenology of
Social World, Schutz begins his inquiry with a
critique on Weber’s conception of subjective
meanings in human actions. He stipulates that
by applying the concepts forged by
phenomenologists in philosophy can help to
resolve these vagueness in understanding the
subjective meanings in human actions. And he
has then constructed the framework socialmeaning formation with the following
constituent concepts of social phenomenology.
(1899-1959)
57
The Conception of Meanings in Social
Phenomenological Perspective
Formation of individual subjective meanings:
Weber’s aporia No. 1
To account for the formation of subjective
meanings of individuals, Schutz introduces the
following concepts of phenomenological
philosophy to social sciences.
The Conception of Meanings in Social
Phenomenological Perspective
Formation of individual subjective meanings: …
Stream of consciousness: According to
phenomenologists, most notably Hernri Bergson,
human beings are not only living within the world of
discrete and concrete space and time, but also in the
stream of consciousness. It is within this stream of
consciousness that a man would grant his attention
and intention to an object in reality (or ‘the world’)
and elevate some of them to become a
“phenomenon” within one’s subjectivity. And
Husserl has labelled this fundamental interconnection between consciousness and objects in
reality the ‘intentioanlity’.
The Conception of Meanings in Social
Phenomenological Perspective
Formation of individual subjective meanings: …
 The concept of intentionality: “The term
‘intentionality’ is taken from the Latin intendere,
which translates as ‘to stretch forth’.” It indicates the
process of how the mind “stretching forth” into the
world and “grasping” and “translating” an object
into a phenomenon. (Spinelli, 2005, p.15)
The Conception of Meanings in Social
Phenomenological Perspective
Formation of individual subjective meanings: …
 The concept of intentionality: …
The process of intentionality has been differentiated
by Husserl into two components, namely noema and
noesis.
The concept of noema (intentional-object) indicates the
objects being intended to, conscious of and grasped, i.e. the
what;
The concept of noesis (intentional-Act) refers to the act of
intending, stretching forth and bringing to consciousness,
i.e. the how.
The Conception of Meanings in Social
Phenomenological Perspective
Formation of individual subjective meanings: …
 Concepts of perception, retention and reproduction:
 Perception: It refers to the “now-apprehension” granted to an
experience by human minds during the immediate encounter.
 Retention: It refers to the “primary remembrance” or “primary
impression” of an experience formed within the “afterconsciousness” of the encounter.
 Reproduction: It refers to the “secondary remembrance or
recollection” that emerges after primary remembrance is past.
“We accomplish it either by simply laying hold of what is
recollected … or we accomplish it in a real, re-productive,
recapitulative memory in which the temporal object is again
completely built up in a continuum of presentifications, so
that we seem to perceive it again, but only seemingly, as-if.”
(Husserl, 1964, quoted in Schutz, 1967, p. 48)
The Conception of Meanings in Social
Phenomenological Perspective
Formation of individual subjective meanings: …
 The concept of behavior: Meaning-endowing
experiences: Husserl makes a distinction between
two types of experiences “Experience of the first
type are merely ‘undergone’ or ‘suffer’.’ They are
characterized by a basic passivity. Experiences of
the second type consist of attitudes taken toward
experiences of the first type.” Husserl characterized
those experiences endowed with ‘attitude-taking Act’
as ‘behavior’. Accordingly, “Behavior is a meaningendowing experience of consciousness.” (Schutz,
1967, p. 56)
The Conception of Meanings in Social
Phenomenological Perspective
Formation of individual subjective meanings: …
 The concept of Action and Project: According to
Schutz and Husserl, we can further distinguish
behavior from action. The former are experiences
endowed with attitudes, while the latter are
experiences oriented towards the future. Most
specifically, actions are experiences endowed with
anticipation, which Husserl has characterized as
“the meaning of what will be perceived.” (Husserl,
1931, quoted in Schutz, 1967, p. 58)
The Conception of Meanings in Social
Phenomenological Perspective
Formation of individual subjective meanings: …
 The concept of Action and Project: …
Furthermore, apart from anticipation of the future,
actions are also experiences endowed with another
form of intentionality, namely intention of fulfillment.
More specifically, actions are not only made up of
anticipated goals or “empty protention” to the
future. They also consist of the parts of intentions to
attaining those goals in the future.
In conclusion, according to Schutz formulation, an
action is experiences endowed with meanings in the
form of “a project”, which consists of anticipated
goals and intentions and efforts to fulfill them.
The Conception of Meanings in Social
Phenomenological Perspective
Formation of individual subjective meanings: …
In summary, by applying these concepts to
Weber’s stipulation of understanding of subjective
meanings in human actions, Schutz asserts
confidently that ….
The Conception of Meanings in Social
Phenomenological Perspective
Formation of individual subjective meanings: …
“Now we are in a position to state that what
distinguishes action from behavior is that action is
the execution of a projected act. And we can
immediately proceed to our next step: the meaning
of any action is its corresponding projected act. In
saying this we are giving clarity to Max Weber’s
vague concept of the “orientation of the action.”
An action, we submit, is oriented toward its
corresponding projected act.” (Schutz, 1967, p. 61)
That is resolution to Weber’s aporia No. 1.
The Conception of Meanings in Social
Phenomenological Perspective
Configuration of meaning-context of
individuals: Schutz’s theory building about
subjective meanings of individuals does not
stop here. He further put forth two concepts.
The concept of Durée: …
The Conception of Meanings in Social
Phenomenological Perspective
Configuration of meaning-context …
The concept of Durée: Henri Bergson has coined the
concept ‘durée’ to specify the inner stream of
duration constituted within human consciousness. It
refers to, as Husserl characterized, the types of
experiences, that human minds would “transverse”
(translate or transform) into “intentional unities”,
within which “immanent time is constituted, …an
authentic time in which there is duration, and
alteration of that which endures.” (Husserl, 1964;
quoted in Schutz, 1967, p. 46)
The Conception of Meanings in Social
Phenomenological Perspective
Configuration of meaning-context …
 The concept of meaning-context: By meaningcontext, Schutz characterized it as follows
“Let us define meaning-context formally: We say
that our lived experience E1, E2, …, En, stand in a
meaning-context if and only if, once they have been
lived through in separate steps, they are then
constituted into a synthesis of a high order,
becoming thereby unified objects of monothetic
attention.” (Schutz, 1967, p.75) Schutz indicates that
meaning-context derived within one’s inner time
consciousness bears numbers of structural
features. (Schutz, 1967, p. 74-78)
The Conception of Meanings in Social
Phenomenological Perspective
Configuration of meaning-context …
The concept of meaning-context: …. bears numbers
of structural features.
 Unity: Though intentional acts and/or fulfillment-act various
meaning-endowing experiences are unified and integrated
into coherent whole within the Ego. Hence, meaning-context
generated from meaning-endowing experiences also bears
the internal structure of unity and coherence.
 Continuity: As lived experiences are set within the stream of
consciousness of duration (i.e. Durée), therefore, the
meaning-context thereby derived is internally structured
into a continuity of temporal ordering.
The Conception of Meanings in Social
Phenomenological Perspective
Configuration of meaning-context …
The concept of meaning-context: …. bears numbers
of structural features. …
 Hierarchy: Through her lived experiences in different
spheres of the life-world, individual will congifurated various
meaning-contexts for lived experiences in various spheres
of life. And these complex meaning-contexts are structured
in hierarchical order according to their degree of
meaningfulness and significance.
Internal time consciousness
Durée
Action
Anticipation & fulfillment
Behavior
Attitude-taking Act
Meaning-context
of unity and continuity
Subjective Meanings
Reproduction, Retention, Perception
Hierarchy
Meaning-context
of unity and continuity
Stream of consciousness
(Intentionality)
The
subject
Intentional-Act
Intentional
object
73
Phenomenological conceptual framework of meaning
The Conception of Meanings in Social
Phenomenological Perspective
Formation of social meanings: Weber’s aporia
No. 2
As a practicing sociologist, Alfred Schutz’s major
contribution to phenomenological studies is to
extend the study of human consciousness and
experiences from individual level to social level.
Built on phenomenological investigations of
meaning-configurations and meaning-contexts of
individuals, Schutz poses the following series of
questions: How meaning-configurations among
individuals are possible? ……
The Conception of Meanings in Social
Phenomenological Perspective
Formation of social meanings: Weber’s aporia
No. 2
…..More specifically, how meanings among different
inner consciousness of durations are able to be
corresponded, shared or even come to consensus?
And how individual thinking and acting beings come
to act harmoniously, concertedly and cooperatively
into a social entity?
The Conception of Meanings in Social
Phenomenological Perspective
Formation of social meanings….
Schutz’s concepts of meaning-context of the social
world
Schutz suggests that constructions of social meanings
within a human aggregate are possible simply because
members of a “society” share common “lived” experiences
generated from common temporal and spatial situations.
These common lived experiences have then been
accumulated geographically, historically, verbally and
textually into a “totality” of meaning-configuration and
meaning-contexts, which we now called the culture or what
Berger and Luckmann called symbolic universe.
Based on commonly-share culture, Schutz has
differentiated the process of meaning-construction into
three types
The Conception of Meanings in Social
Phenomenological Perspective
Formation of social meanings….
Social meaning construction in face-to-face
relationship
The primary base of mutual understanding between two
humans in face-to-face situation is that there are two inner
consciousnesses of durations who share similar if not the
same temporal-spatial flows, that is, each is conscious of
the other’s presence. In short, each takes the other as
intentional-object (noema) of her intentional-Act (noesis)
and vice versa.
Expressive movement and expressive act: They refer to
non-verbal gestures (body movements) which indicate the
“attitudinal-Act” of an individual implicates to an subjective
experience which she undergoes. Schutz has further
differentiates them into
The Conception of Meanings in Social
Phenomenological Perspective
Formation of social meanings….
Social meaning construction in face-to-face
relationship ….
Expressive movement and expressive act: …. Schutz has
further differentiates them into
• Expressive movement: It refers to gestures which bears no
communicative intention from the part of the initiator. As
Schutz states “expressive movements … have meaning only
for the observer, not for the person observed.” (Schutz, 1967,
p. 117)
• Expressive act: It refers to body movements “in which the
actor seeks to project outward the content of his
consciousness, whether to retain the latter for his own use
later on (as in the case of an entry in a dairy) or to
communicate them to others.” (Schutz, 1967, p. 116)
The Conception of Meanings in Social
Phenomenological Perspective
Formation of social meanings….
Social meaning construction in face-to-face
relationship ….
Sign and sign system:
• “Signs are artifacts or act-objects which are interpreted not
according to those interpretive schemes which are adequate
to them as objects of the external world but according to
schemes not adequate to them and belong rather to other
object.” (Schutz, 1967, p. 120)
• In constructing a sign, the actor undertakes the act of
signification, that is, to assign a sign to an object in the
external world.
• ….
The Conception of Meanings in Social
Phenomenological Perspective
Formation of social meanings….
Social meaning construction in face-to-face
relationship ….
Sign and sign system:
• ….
• As on the part of the reader of the sign, she has to undertake
an act of interpretation, which has been defined as the core
activities that qualitative researchers have to undertake.
Spoken and written signs in a language are the exemplary
representations of sign used by human kind.
• Accordingly, sign system refers to well established, widely
used, and universally interpreted signs disseminating and
communicating among members of a defined human
aggregate; for instance, language systems of Chinese,
English, etc.
The Conception of Meanings in Social
Phenomenological Perspective
Formation of social meanings….
Social meaning construction in face-to-face
relationship ….
Concept of externalization and objectification:
• The concept of externalization of subjectivity: It is within a
sign system, i.e. a culture and/or a cultural system, that
subjective experiences and consciousnesses of individuals
can be externalized and communicate to other members of the
corresponding language and/or cultural system.
• The concept of objectification of subjectivity: By externalizing
one’s subjectivity onto concrete artifacts, subjectivity of
mortal individual has then obtained endeavoring existence of
its own, which may out-live the originating person.
Cultural system
Durée
Durée
Sign systems
Signs
Objectifications
Externalizations
Express
Acts
Intentionality
Express
Movements
Intentionality
82
Phenomenological conceptual framework of social meaning
The Conception of Meanings in Social
Phenomenological Perspective
Formation of social meanings….
Social-meaning construction with the
contemporaries
 As individuals move farther and farther apart, such as
residents in a metropolitan such as Hong Kong, fellow
citizens of a nation such as PRC, members of a “nation”
such as the Chinese, dwellers of the same continent such
as the Asians, fellow residents of the global village, how can
they come to shared meanings?
The Conception of Meanings in Social
Phenomenological Perspective
Formation of social meanings….
Social-meaning …contemporaries…
 Concepts of ideal type and typification:
• As contemporaries, who are located in physically long distance which
does not enable them to have face-to-face confirmation of their
meanings to their counterparts, they have to then presume and rely on
the ideal-typical interpretive schema generated and established in socalled “institutional contexts”.
• For examples, the ideal-typical role-performances prescribed to
teachers and students in modern educational institutions; ideal-typical
role-performances presumed by both the husband and the wife in the
marriage institution; or sellers and buyers in international trade or
cyber-transactions.
• The act of prescribing ideal-typical roles and their corresponding roleperformances to partners in interaction has been characterized by
Schutz and his followers as “typification”.
• (To be explicated in details in Lecture 4)
The Conception of Meanings in Social
Phenomenological Perspective
Formation of social meanings….
Social-meaning …contemporaries…
 Accordingly, the concepts of institution and
institutionalization have been reformulated and used by
followers of Alfred Schuts, such as Berger and Luckmann,
and advocates of New-institutionalism in qualitative
researches in social sciences in recent decades. (To be
explicated on Topic 8)
The Conception of Meanings in Social
Phenomenological Perspective
Formation of social meanings….
 Social-meaning construction with the predecessors
 To come to agreement with the deaths: When the meaning
configurations are constructed in remotely temporal
distance and the text and relics, it poses insurmountable
difficulties to researchers who are supposed to retrieve the
“authentic” meanings because the interpretive findings can
no longer be confirmed with their “authors”. The situation
has been characterized by Ricoeur (1984) as the most acute
example of Kant’s demarcation between noumenon and
phenomenon, that historians can never bridge the past in
itself from the historical texts and relics.
The Conception of Meanings in Social
Phenomenological Perspective
Formation of social meanings….
 Social-meaning construction with the predecessors
 ….
 Schutz suggests that historians, who are to “reconstruct”
the meaning configurations of the deaths, have to presume
the notion of the stream of history in parallel to the streams
of consciousness, social institutions and cultural system
and to strive to constitute the “fusion of horizons” across
times. Most specifically, as Paul Ricoeur underlines,
historians are expected to be able to muster kinds of
“sympathetic efforts” and “temporal imagination”, that is, to
project “not merely an imaginative projection into another
present but a real projection into another human life.”
(Ricoeur, 1984, p. 28)
The Conception of Meanings in Social
Phenomenological Perspective
Formation of social meanings….
Taking together all the concepts relating to the
formation of social meanings in face-to-face
situations, with contemporaries across space, and
predecessors across times, we may conclude that
Schutz with his students Berger and Luckmann have
rendered a resolution to Weber’s aporia No. 2.
Institutional context
of the predecessors
Fusion of
horizons
Typiifcation
Institutionalization
Typiifcation
Institutionalization
Institutional context of the contemporaries
Phenomenological conceptual framework of social-meaning
construction with contemporaries and predecessors
89
The Conception of Meaning in
Linguistic Approach
Language as expressive system of meanings:
 As Schutz has indicated, one of the tools that
humans have invented and used to express their
consciousness and subjective meanings is
language. Hence, language can be taken as one of
the major system invented and institutionalized by
humans to externalize, objectivate and communicate
their subjective meanings.
 Lingustics as discipline studying languages can
therefore be conceived as one of approaches to
acquire interpretive understanding of subjective
meanings endowed in social action.
The Conception of Meaning in
Linguistic Approach
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s linguistic pluralism:
Ludwig Wittgenstein has been chosen by Habermas
as the primary reference in the linguistic approach in
helping him to construct his logic of the social
sciences.
Habermas has specifically made a connection
between phenomenological and linguistic
approaches in interpreting social meanings in the
following manner. …
The Conception of Meaning in
Linguistic Approach
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s linguistic pluralism:
…connection between phenomenological and
linguistic approaches …
"The problem of language has taken the place of the
traditional problem of consciousness: the
transcendental critique of language takes the place
of that of consciousness. Wittgenstein's life forms,
which correspond to Husserl's lifeworld, now follow
not the rules of synthesis of a consciousness as
such but rather the rules of the grammar of language
games." (Habermas, 1988, p. 117) More specifically,
the connection and comparison between the two
approaches can be summarized as
The Conception of Meaning in
Linguistic Approach
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s linguistic pluralism:
…connection between phenomenological and
linguistic approaches …
…More specifically, the connection and comparison
between the two approaches can be summarized as
 Consciousness——Language
 Rules and structures of consciousness ——Rules of
grammar of a language
 Lifeworld ——Life forms
The Conception of Meaning in
Linguistic Approach
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s linguistic pluralism:
 The two approaches in fact can further be compared
in their developmental stages:
Developmental stages of
Wittgenstein's linguistic
approach
The linguistic
transcendentalism in Tractatus
Logico-philosophicus (1922)
The linguistic pluralism in
Philosophical Investigations
(1953)
Developmental stages of
social phenomenological
perspectives
Husserl's transcendental
phenomenology
Schutz's phenomenology
of the social worlds
The Conception of Meaning in
Linguistic Approach
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s linguistic pluralism:
 Language games in linguistic pluralism: According
to the perspective of linguistic pluralism, each
linguistic communities with their own grammatical
rules and life forms will construct their meanings
and lifeworld accordingly. As a result, each will
constitute its own “language game”.
 The subsequent development of the linguistic
approach in qualitative research in social sciences,
which has been characterized as the “linguistic turn
in social research” has triggered diverse
perspectives and approaches on “post-modern”
fashion, which will not to be explored in this course.
The Conception of Meaning in
Hermeneutic Tradition
The meanings of hermeneutics:
The origin of the hermeneutic tradition, as Martin
Jay has specified, is “originally a Greek term, it
referred to the god Hermes. The sayer or announcer
of divine messages ― often, to be sure in oracular
and ambiguous form. Hermeneutics retained its early
emphasis on saying as it accumulated other
meanings, such as interpreting, translating, and
explaining.” (Jay, 1982, P. 90)
The Conception of Meaning in
Hermeneutic Tradition
The meanings of hermeneutics:
Paul Ricoeur’s provides a working definition of
hermeneutics as follow:
“Hermeneutics is the theory of the operations of
understanding in the relation to the interpretation of
texts.” (Ricoeur, 1981a, p.43)
The Conception of Meaning in
Hermeneutic Tradition
The meanings of hermeneutics:
"What is hermeneutics? Any meaningful
expression—be it an utterance, verbal or nonverbal,
or an artifact of any kind, such as tool, an institution,
or a written document—can be identified from a
double perspective, both as an observable event and
as an understandable objectification of meaning. We
can describe, explain, or predict a noise equivalent
to the sounds of a spoken sentence without having
the slight idea what this utterance means. ….
The Conception of Meaning in
Hermeneutic Tradition
The meanings of hermeneutics:
“….. To grasp (and state) its meaning, one has to
participate in some (actual or imagined)
communicative action in the course of which the
sentence in question is used in such a way that it is
intelligible to speakers, hearers, and bystanders
belonging to the same speech community."
(Habermas, 1996, p. 23-24)
The Conception of Meaning in
Hermeneutic Tradition
Levels of hermeneutic inquiries: With reference
to the meanings retrieved from the “texts”,
hermeneutic studies can be classified into
different levels:
Hermeneutics at literal level: Decoding the authentic
meanings embedded in literal texts or in utterances
in dialogues
Hermeneutics at ontological level:
Encoding and decoding meanings from the ontological
condition of the author
Encoding and decoding meanings from the ontological
condition of the world referred in the text
The Conception of Meaning in
Hermeneutic Tradition
Levels of hermeneutic inquiries: ….
 Hermeneutics at historical and cultural level:
Encoding and decoding meanings from the historical
and cultural context within which the text was
produced
 Hermeneutics at the existential level:
Hermeneutic experience as “the corrective by means of
which thinking reason escapes the prison of language” ."
(Gadamer, 1975, Quoted in Habermas, 1988, p. 144)
Hermeneutics as the “fusion of horizons” of that of the
author and reader.
The Conception of Meaning in
Hermeneutic Tradition
Levels of hermeneutic inquiries: ….
Hermeneutics at critical level:
 Encoding and decoding “meanings” from the perspective of
human interests
 Encoding and decoding “meanings” from the perspective of
systemic distortions of institutional context
 Encoding and decoding “meanings” from the perspective of
ideology of given cultural hegemony
The Conception of Meaning in
Hermeneutic Tradition
Paul Ricoeur’s literal hermeneutics as bridging
of the distanciations in the text
 Paul Ricoeur, French Philosopher, defines that “A
text is any discourse (speech act) fixed in writing.”
(Ricoeur, 1981a, p.145) As fixations of speech acts
text enables the speech to be conserved, i.e.
durability of text.
Paul Ricoeur’s literal hermeneutics
1913-2005
104
The Conception of Meaning in
Hermeneutic Tradition
Paul Ricoeur’s bridging of the distanciations….
Hermeneutics is therefore needed as a means to
bridge the distance created by the text between the
two sides of the speech accts, namely writing and
readings. This bridging efforts has been called
distanciation functions of hermeneutics by Ricoeur.
Ricoeur has differentiated distanciation functions
into five levels
The Conception of Meaning in
Hermeneutic Tradition
Paul Ricoeur’s bridging of the distanciations….
Distanciation as bridging efforts between two
separate language events (i.e. discourse), namely
writings and readings. It is the most elementary of
distanciation and “the core of the whole hermeneutic
problem.” (Ricoeur, 1981a, p. 134)
The Conception of Meaning in
Hermeneutic Tradition
Paul Ricoeur’s bridging of the distanciations….
Taken text as work, in which the author has specific
intent to make the effort to put down his meanings
into text or even “work”. Accordingly “hermeneutics
remains the art of discerning the discourse in the
work; but this discourse is only given in and through
the structures of the work. Thus interpretation is the
reply to the fundamental distanciation constituted by
the objectification of man in work of discourse, an
objectification comparable to that expressed in the
products of his labour and his art.” (Ricoeur, 1981a,
P. 138)
The Conception of Meaning in
Hermeneutic Tradition
Paul Ricoeur’s bridging of the distanciations….
Taken the contexts of the text production and
interpretation into consideration,
both the acts of production and interpretation of the text are
performed in specific contexts;
as a result, “the text must be able to…’decontextualise’
itself in such a way that it can be ‘recontextualise’ in a new
situation ― as accomplished …by the act of reading.”
(Ricoeur, 1981a, p. 139)
The Conception of Meaning in
Hermeneutic Tradition
Paul Ricoeur’s bridging of the distanciations….
Text as fixation of discourse, can and should be
understood in terms of the referent and reality which
it intends to designate or even signify. Ricoeur has
characterized it as “the world of thee text”.
Accorrdingly, the effort of distanciation can be
construed at the level of bridging two “worlds of the
text” designated by the authors and readers. Ricoeur
has underlined that “the most fundamental
hermeneutical problem … is to explicate the type of
being-in-the world (life-world) unfolded in front of the
text.” (Ricoeur, 1981a, p.141)
The Conception of Meaning in
Hermeneutic Tradition
Paul Ricoeur’s bridging of the distanciations….
Finally, the effort of distanciation-bridging can also
be taken as “self-understanding in front of the
work”. In the process of reading, the readers can and
in act are applyig ‘the world of the work’ to the
present situation of the reader. ….
The Conception of Meaning in
Hermeneutic Tradition
Paul Ricoeur’s bridging of the distanciations….
. ….In Ricoeur’s own words,
"To understand is to understand oneself in front of the text.
It is not a question of imposing upon the text our finite
capacity of understanding, but of exposing ourselves to the
text and receiving from it an enlarge self." (Ricoeur, 1981a,
p. 143)
“As a reader, I find myself only by losing myself. Reading
introduces me into the imaginative variations of the ego.
The metamorphosis of the world in play is also the playful
metamorphosis of the ego." (Ricoeur, 1981a, p.144)
The Conception of Meaning in
Hermeneutic Tradition
Hans-Georg Gadamer’s existential
hermeneutics (philosophical hermeneutics) as
fusion of horizons
Existential understanding of language:
Following the teaching of his teacher Heidegger, Gadamer
sees that “all human reality is determined by its
linguisticality. …Because human beings are thrown into a
world already linguistically permeated, they do not invent
language as a tool for their own purposes. It is not a
technological instrument of manipulation. Rather, language
is prior to humanity and speaks through it. Our infinite as
human beings is encompassed by infinity of language.”
(Jay, 1982, P. 94)
1900-2002
The Conception of Meaning in
Hermeneutic Tradition
Hans-Georg Gadamer’s existential
hermeneutics as fusion of horizons
Existential understanding of language:
…
Accordingly, human existence is a linguistically encoded
existence, which is made up of all the preconceptions or
what Gadamer called “prejudices” accumulated and
sustained in a particular cultural-linguistic “tradition. Hence,
as human agents speak and act, they are speaking and
acting within a prison house of language.
The Conception of Meaning in
Hermeneutic Tradition
Gadamer’s existential hermeneutics …
Gadamer’s conception of hermeneutic experience:
In order to liberate oneself from such a prison,
Gadamer suggests that human agents have to
undertake the hermeneutic experience.
"Hermeneutic experience is the corrective by means
of which thinking reason escapes the prison of
language, and it is itself constituted linguistically ….
Certainly the variety of languages presents us with a
problem. But this problem is simply how every
language, despite its difference form other
languages, is able to say everything it wants. …
The Conception of Meaning in
Hermeneutic Tradition
Gadamer’s existential hermeneutics …
Gadamer’s conception of hermeneutic experience:
“. …We then ask how, amid the variety of there
forms of utterance, there is still the same unity of
thought and speech, so that everything that has
been transmitted in writing can be understood."
(Gadamer, 1975, Quoted in Habermas, 1988, p. 144)
The Conception of Meaning in
Hermeneutic Tradition
Gadamer’s existential hermeneutics …
Gadamer’s redefinition of hermeneutic inquiry:
Within Gadamer’s framework of existential linguistics,
hermeneutics is no longer simply an act of empathetic
bridging other distanciations within the text, particularly
historical text, revealing what actually happened in the past,
as Ranke advocated; but to “fuse” the horizons of the
reader and the author. This is what Gadamer calls “fusion of
horizons”.
By horizon, Gadamer defines it as “the range of vision that
includes everything that can be seen from a particular
vantage point.” (Gadamer, 1975, Quoted in Jay, P. 95)
However, Individual horizons are partial and incomplete.
Furthermore, they “are open, and shift; we wander into them
and they in turn move with us.” (Habermas, 1988, P. 147)
The Conception of Meaning in
Hermeneutic Tradition
Gadamer’s existential hermeneutics …
Varieties of hermeneutic experiences and inquiries:
Accordingly, such a fusion of horizons may take
varieties of forms
Hermeneutic experiences of the translator striving to bridge
two languages
Hermeneutic experience of the historian attempting to
bridge two epochs
Hermeneutic experience of the anthropologist trying to
bridge two cultures
Hermeneutic experience of the sociologist trying to bridge
two classes, status groups and political parties
Hermeneutic experience of the comparative-historical
researcher striving of bridge big structures, large process
and great communities across times and spaces
The Conception of Meaning in
Hermeneutic Tradition
Gadamer’s existential hermeneutics …
Gadamer’s concepts of authority and tradition:
The notion of “legitimate prejudice”: According to
Gadamer, human agents could only approach the world with
preconceptions or “prejudices” of accumulated and
sustained in a particular cultural-linguistic community.
However, in hermeneutic experiences and inquiries, the
fusion of horizons may not be smooth and armonious but in
contradictions or even conflicts. As a result, prejudices and
their constituent horizons must be justified in situations
where encounters and fusions of horizons take place. That
brings about Gadamer’s the concept of authority and the
issue of “legitimate prejudice”.
The Conception of Meaning in
Hermeneutic Tradition
Gadamer’s existential hermeneutics …
Gadamer’s concepts of authority and tradition: …
Gadamer contends that the legitimacy of individual
horizons and its prejudices are gained in daily-life practices
of speech acts, discourse and understanding within a
prevailing cultural-linguistic community. While the
legitimate “prejudices” at social level can also establish
their authority in dialogues, social interactions and
institutional practices. Therefore, Gadamer contends that
“authority, properly understood, has nothing to do with
blind obedience to a command. Indeed, authority has
nothing to do with obedience, it rests on recognition.”
(Gadamer, 1975, Quoted in Ricoeur, 1991, P. 279) ……
The Conception of Meaning in
Hermeneutic Tradition
Gadamer’s existential hermeneutics …
Gadamer’s concepts of authority and tradition: …
…….. By recognition, Gadamer refers to “that the other is
superior to oneself in judgment and insight and that for this
reason his judgment takes precedence, i.e. it has priority
over one’s own.” (Gadamer, 1975, Quoted in Ricoeur P. 278)
“This is the essence of the authority, claimed by the
teachers, the superior, the expert.” (Gadamer, 1975, Quoted
in Ricoeur 991, P. 279)
The Conception of Meaning in
Hermeneutic Tradition
Gadamer’s existential hermeneutics …
Gadamer’s concepts of authority and tradition: …
As these “legitimate prejudices” sustained and spread their
authority within a linguistic community, they establish what
Gadamer calls their “effective-historical” status and become
the “tradition”. “This is precisely what we call tradition: the
ground of their validity…. tradition has a justification that is
outside the arguments of reason and in large measure
determines our attitudes and behavior.” (Gadamer, 1975,
Quoted in Ricoeur, 1991, P. 279)
The Conception of Meaning in
Hermeneutic Tradition
Jurgen Habermas’ Critical Hermeneutics
The Gadamer-Habermas debate: The focus of
contention between on Gadamer and Habermas is
exactly on the difference in the authority of prejudice
and conception of tradition. Habermas disagrees to
Gadamer’s treatment of the tradition and its
authority of prejudices in a given cultural-linguistic
community as normative imperatives derived out of
practical speech acts, discourses and fusions of
horizons. Instead Habermas underlines the power
and domination that are at work in all human
relationships including linguistic communications.
….
The Conception of Meaning in
Hermeneutic Tradition
Jurgen Habermas’ Critical Hermeneutics
The Gadamer-Habermas debate:
….. In Habermas own words, “This metainstitution of
language as tradition is evidently dependent in turn
on social processes that are not in normative
relationship. Language is also medium of
domination and social power.” (Habermas, 1977,
Quoted in Jay, 1982, P. 99)
The Conception of Meaning in
Hermeneutic Tradition
Jurgen Habermas’ Critical Hermeneutics
From the stance of the Critical Theory of the
Frankfurt School as well as of Marxism, Habermas
criticizes Gadamer of neglecting the frozen ideology,
hypostatized power, and systemic distortion that
may have been prevailed in cultural-linguistic
traditions as well as in its supporting institutions.
The Conception of Meaning in
Hermeneutic Tradition
Jurgen Habermas’ Critical Hermeneutics
Critical hermeneutics and critique of ideology:
According to Habermas’ critique on Gadamer’s
existential hermeneutics, Habermas has elevates
hermeneutic inquiry yet to another level, namely
critical hermeneutics.
First of all, Habermas criticizes Gadamers’ conception of
authorities of “prejudices” and tradition of neglecting the
notion of power that is supposed to be at work behind all
these authority. This brings out one of the basic concept in
the Critical Theory, i.e. the hypostatized power, which is at
work in all human relationships and discourses.
Accordingly, this hypostatized will impose systemic
distortions to human relationships and discourses.
The Conception of Meaning in
Hermeneutic Tradition
Jurgen Habermas’ Critical Hermeneutics
Critical hermeneutics and critique of ideology:
….
One of these systemic distortions, which
manifests in individual horizon, fusion of
horizons, prejudices, and tradition, is the
ideological elements frozen in these culturallinguistic representations.
The Conception of Meaning in
Hermeneutic Tradition
Jurgen Habermas’ Critical Hermeneutics
Critical hermeneutics and critique of ideology:
….
One of these systemic distortions, which
manifests in individual horizon, fusion of
horizons, prejudices, and tradition, is the
ideological elements frozen in these culturallinguistic representations.
Explaining Social Actions:
Weber’s Aporia No. 3
Under the domination of methodological
monism of the analytical-empiricism and the
deductive-nomological explanation, historicalhermeneutic approach has been criticized as
unable to render any valid explanations for
human actions. It was Georg H. von Wright, an
Oxford Professor of Philosophy, who led the
counter-attack for the historical-hermeneutic
approach by putting forth the distinction
between causal and teleological explanations.
Explaining Social Actions:
Weber’s Aporia No. 3
(1916-2003)
Explaining Social Actions:
Weber’s Aporia No. 3
 He stated in his book Explanation and
Understanding (1971) that
“It is…misleading to say that understanding
versus explanation marks the difference
between two types of scientific intelligibility.
But one could say that the intentional or nonintentional character of their objects marks the
difference between two types of understanding
and of explanation.” (von Wright, 1971, p.135)
Explaining Social Actions:
Weber’s Aporia No. 3
Georg H. von Wright…distinction…
Causal explanation: It refers to the mode of
explanation, which attempt to seek the sufficient
and/or necessary conditions (i.e. explanans) which
antecede the phenomenon to be explained (i.e.
explanandum). Causal explanations normally point
to the past. ‘This happened, because that had
occued’ is the typical form in language.” (von Wright,
1971, p. 83) It seeks to verify the antecedental
conditions for an observed natural phenomenon.
Explaining Social Actions:
Weber’s Aporia No. 3
Georg H. von Wright…distinction…
Teleological explanation: It refers to the mode of
explanation, which attempt to reveal the goals and/or
intentions, which generate or motivate the
explanadum (usually an action to be explained) to
take place. “Teleological explanations point to the
future. ‘This happened in order that that should
occur.’” (von Wright, 1971, p. 83)
Explaining Social Actions:
Weber’s Aporia No. 3
Intentional explanation: This type of
explanation is the typical mode of explanation
employed by social scientists. In fact, as Jon
Elster underlines, its feature "distinguishes the
social sciences from the natural sciences."
(Elster, 1983, p. 69) It focuses on revealing the
intentions, motivations, meanings, desires, and
believes working behind human actions both at
individual and social levels. Within the mode of
intentional explanation, we may distinguish
numbers of perspectives, they are
Explaining Social Actions:
Weber’s Aporia No. 3
Intentional explanation: ….
Intentional explanation in social phenomenological
perspective: As Schutz suggested, human actions
should be allocated within with its “corresponding
projected act” to seek for explanation. While social
actions can also be explained with reference to the
rational-choice theory.
Explaining Social Actions:
Weber’s Aporia No. 3
Intentional explanation: ….
Rational-choice explanation: To avoid the diversity
in human intentions and idiosyncrasy of subjective
meaning, rational-choice theorists have made the
working assumption that all men are rational.
Subsequently rational-choice theorists have
formulated their explanatory models in different
formats.
 Elster’s model: According to Jon Elster’s formulation
(Elster, 1982, 1994, 2007, 2009), by rational choice,
men conduct their actions consistently with the best
evidence available. (Elster, 2009).
Elster’s Rational-Choice Explanatory Model (1993)
Evidence
Cognition
Action
Desire
Elster’s Rational-Choice Explanatory Model (2009)
Information
Cognition
because-of explanation
Action
in-order-to explanation
Desire
Explaining Social Actions:
Weber’s Aporia No. 3
Intentional explanation: ….
Rational-choice explanation: …
 Economic-man model: In accordance with the
economic-man assumption commonly made by
economists, the rational choice made by humans are
in much more aggressive terms that they will conduct
their actions with the objective that maximized returns
will be guaranteed in their means-ends or even costbenefit calculations.
(To be discussed in greater details in Topic 6 of the course)
Explaining Social Actions:
Weber’s Aporia No. 3
Quasi-teleological explanation (functional
explanation):
It is the type of teleological explanation most
commonly used in biology. It "takes the form of
indicating one or more functions (or even
dysfunctions) that a unit performs in maintaining or
realizing certain traits of the system to which the unit
belongs." (Nagel, 1979, p. 23) For example, in
explaining why human being has lung, the typical
explanation in biology is that lung performs the
function of breathing, i.e. provide oxygen to the of the
proper maintenance of the system of a human body.
….
Explaining Social Actions:
Weber’s Aporia No. 3
Quasi-teleological explanation (functional
explanation):
Accordingly functional explanation consist of the
followings
 X perform the function of Y to the system of Z
 Y therefore explains the existence of X or Z's
possession of X.
Explaining Social Actions:
Weber’s Aporia No. 3
Quasi-teleological explanation (functional
explanation):
However, there is a basic logical setback in this
functional-explanatory structure. That is, since X
performs Y, therefore X must be an antecedent of Y.
However in the cause-effect explanatory structure,
the existence of an effect (Y) could not have
anteceded that of its cause (X). Therefore, Y could
not have been the cause of X.
Explaining Social Actions:
Weber’s Aporia No. 3
Quasi-teleological explanation (functional
explanation):
Nevertheless, in biology this setback can be
compensated by the mechanism of natural selection
in the theory of evolution. That is the seemingly
temporal ordering mismatch between X and Y can be
explained away within the much longer timeline in
the evolutionary process of species. G.A. Cohen has
called this requirement in functional explanation
"consequence law" (Cohen, 1978, p.250)
Explaining Social Actions:
Weber’s Aporia No. 3
Quasi-teleological explanation (functional
explanation):
Debate on functional explanation in social sciences
The focal point of the debate is that there is no commonly
accepted "consequence law" available for the functional
explanation of the origin and existence of social
phenomena, such as education, available in social sciences.
Unless we accept the thesis of social Darwinism that there
is natural selection principle at work in social world,
otherwise we may have to accept Jon Ester suggestion that
functional explanation is not applicable in social science.
…
Explaining Social Actions:
Weber’s Aporia No. 3
Quasi-teleological explanation…
Debate on functional explanation in social sciences….
One resolution or qualification offered by Philip Pettit (2002)
and Harold Kincaid (2007) is that instead to use functional
explanation and trace to origins of species as biologists do,
social scientists could restrain themselves to explain the
origins of social institutions and instead simply applying
functional explanation to account for the resilient patterns or
persistent regularities in social world. Such a qualification or
reservation can release social scientists of the burden of proof
of tracing the history of actual selection and evolution of the
resilience of a social institution. Instead social scientists can
simply base on a "virtual selection" assumption and focus on
the accounting for the persistence of a given phenomenon.
Explaining Social Actions:
Weber’s Aporia No. 3
Quasi-teleological explanation…
Debate on functional explanation in social sciences
....
 Accordingly, functional explanation can be employed to
account for the existence, especially its resilience,
continuity, and regularity, of social institutions, such as
institutions of education and family in human societies.
(To be discussed in greater details on Topic 8 of the course)
Functional Explanation of
the Persistence of Institutions
Other Factors
Social Function at T0
.
.
.
Social Function at Tn
Social Actions
Institution
Contexts
Persistence
Representations: The Fields of
Historical-Hermeneutic Studies
Taking together the precedent discussions on
the methodology of the historical-hermeneutic
approach, meanings of human and social
actions may appears in a varieties of forms,
which can be characterized as “representations.
They includes
Texts: It refers to literal representations, in which
meanings expressed in speech acts (discourse) are
fixed in written forms.
Narratives: It represents the efforts of individuals or
human aggregates to arrange their experiences in
meaningful (consistent, coherent, and continuous)
manners.
Representations: The Fields of
Historical-Hermeneutic Studies
…..“representations…include
Relics and historical documents: It refers to the
representations meanings form the past.
Ethnographic sites: It refers to forms of
representations which reveal the meanings embedded
in human activities and routines, such as rituals and
organizations.
Institutions: It refers to the “rules of the games”
(North, 1990), which represents the meanings typified
and legitimized in sets of rules governing particular
kind of human activities, such as exchange (i.e.
market), resolutions of conflicts (i.e. the state), and
reproduction (i.e. family and education)
Representations: The Fields of
Historical-Hermeneutic Studies
…..“representations…include
Discourse (in Foucaultian sense): It refers to the
“totalities” of “technologies of power”, which
subjugate human bodies and minds within human
societies.
(II)
The Methodology of
Critical Social Science
Traditions of Critical Theory: A Brief
Account
Immanuel Kant’s critical theories in
transcendental idealism:
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) may be considered
as the first critical theorist of the modern
philosophy
Traditions of Critical Theory: A Brief
Account
Kant’s critical theories …
 In his famous essay on “What is Enlightenment?”
(1784), Kant celebrates the human capacities of
liberating from dogmatism and tutelage and to reason
independently and self-reflectively.
"Enlightenment is man's release from his self-incurred
tutelage. Tutelage is man's inability to make use of his
understanding without direction from another. Selfincurred is this tutelage when its cause lies not in lack
of reason but in lack of resolution and courage to use
it without direction from another. Sapere aude (Dare to
know)! 'Have courage to use your own reason!' - that
is the motto of enlightenment." (Kant, 1996/1784)
Traditions of Critical Theory: A Brief
Account
Kant’s critical theories …
Accordingly, Kant had produced a series of books to
apply his formulation of critical reasoning to different
domains of human intellectualities, namely theoretical
reasons seeking truth, practical reasons seeking
ethical-moral goods, and aesthetic-teleological
reasons seeking judgment on beauty and substantive
ends. Accordingly, he published three books
respectively entitled
Critique of Pure Reason (1781)
Critique of Practical Reason (1788), and
Critique of Judgment (1790)
Traditions of Critical Theory: A Brief
Account
Kant’s critical theories …
 Taking together the three critiques, Kant attempts to
elevate human reasons to the transcendental and
universal level. That is to seek the transcendental
principles guiding human reasons in epistemological
enquiries, in ethic-moral practices, and aestheticteleological judgments. Kant’s critical project has
been characterized in philosophy as transcendental
idealism. That is because he has built his three
critical projects on separate sets of transcendental
ideas, which will not be explicated in details in this
course.
Traditions of Critical Theory: A Brief
Account
Karl Marx’s critical theory in historical
materialism
Karl Marx (1818-1883) is one of the prominent
critical theorists of the nineteenth century. He
directs his reflective and critical reason on one
specific aspect of human society in the
nineteenth century’s Europe, namely the
capitalistic-industrial mode of production. As a
result, Marx has produced a series of strong
critique of the political-economy of capitalism in
the nineteenth–century’s Western Europe.
Traditions of Critical Theory: A Brief
Account
Karl Marx’s critical theory in historical
materialism
…Most notably, his critiques on
The exploitative nature of the class relationship of
capitalism
The alienating and reifying effects of the
commodification process on human existence in the
capitalistic mode of production
The ideological and hegemonic distortions on cultural
context of capitalism
Traditions of Critical Theory: A Brief
Account
Max Weber’s critical theory on Rationalism:
Max Weber (1864-1920) is one of the founding
father of sociology and a critical theorist of the
late-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
His critical theory is mostly built on his critique
of the rationalization of Western European
societies. For example, (To be expounded in
details in Topic 6)
The domination or even hegemony of the
instrumental rationality; and
The reified iron cage upon the existence of the
modern man.
The Critical Theory of the Frankfurt
School
Critical Theory of the Institute of Social
Research in Frankfurt School: Critical Theory (in
capital letter) is commonly designated to the
theoretical and methodological orientations
initiated by a group of scholars in the Institute of
Social Research in the University of Frankfurt.
The Institute was founded in 1923. As the Nazi
assumed power in Germany in January 1933, the
institute was forced to leave Germany and finally
settled in New York and affiliated with Columbia
University in 1934.
The Critical Theory of the Frankfurt
School
Critical Theory of the Institute of Social
Research in Frankfurt School:
….
Work produced by the leading scholars of the
Institute, such as Max Horkheimer, Theodor W.
Adorno and Herbert Marcuse focused mainly on
critical examination of human reason and its
potentiality as well as fallibility.
Theodor Adorno
(1903-1969)
Herbert Marcuse
(1898-1979)
Max Horkheimer
(1895-1973)
The Critical Theory of the Frankfurt
School
Critical Theory of Frankfurt School: …
Max Horkheimer’s distinction between Traditional
Theory and Critical Theory:
Horkheimer, as the founding director of the Institute
for Social Research, has explicitly laid down the
methodological and epistemological differences
between Critical Theory, the research orientation of
which the Institute of Social Research has identified
with, and what Horkheimer labelled Traditional
Theory, which dominates the intellectual scenery of
Western Europe in the twentieth century.
(Horkheimer, 1982, Pp. 188-252) …
The Critical Theory of the Frankfurt
School
Critical Theory of Frankfurt School: …
…distinction between Traditional &Critical Theory:
 Traditional Theory: Horkheimer points out that according to
the epistemological orientation of Traditional Theory, theory is
a configuration of interconnected propositions stipulating a
specific aspect of the world. The validity of the theory depends
on whether the contents of its propositions finds
correspondence and consonance with the actual facts in the
external world. The methodological assumption of the
Traditional Theory presuppose that the nomological
regularities verified in empirical-analytical science are
objectively existed and given. ….
The Critical Theory of the Frankfurt
School
Critical Theory of Frankfurt School: …
…distinction between Traditional &Critical Theory:
 Traditional Theory: ….
At the same time it is assumed that the interpretations and
meanings revealed from historical-hermeneutic studies are
necessary and authentic representations of the lifeworld.
Hence, in Traditional Theory, knowledge is taken as ahistorical,
decontextual and interest-neutral products of human reasons.
The Critical Theory of the Frankfurt
School
Critical Theory of Frankfurt School: …
…distinction between Traditional &Critical Theory: …
 Critical Theory: In opposite to the epistemological orientation
of the Traditional Theory, Critical Theory views theory and its
propositions as intellectual products embedded in particular
historical and socio-economic contexts. “The critical theory of
society…has for its object men as producers of their own
historical way of life in its totality. The real situations which are
the starting-point of science are not regarded simply as data to
be verified and to be predicted according to the law of
probability. Every datum depends not on nature alone but also
on the power man has over it. Objects, the kind of perception,
the questions asked, and the meaning of the answers all bear
witness to human activities and the degree of man’s power.”
(Horkheimer, 1982, P. 244) …..
The Critical Theory of the Frankfurt
School
Critical Theory of Frankfurt School: …
…distinction between Traditional &Critical Theory: …
 Critical Theory: ….
Accordingly, the social world to be studied is no longer
assumed as given or fixed. “The critical theory in its concept
formation and in all phases of its development very
consciously makes its own that concern for the rational
organization of human activities which it is its task to illumine
and legitimate. For this theory is not concerned only with goals
already imposed by the existent way of life, but with men and
all their potentialities.” (Horkheimer, 1982, P. 245) Therefore,
critical theory “never aims simply at an increase of knowledge.
Its goal is man’s emancipation from slavery.” (Horkheimer,
1982, p. 246)
The Critical Theory of the Frankfurt
School
Critical Theory of Frankfurt School: …
 Max Horkheimer’s critique on pure reason and formal
logic: Taking the assumption that human reasons are
embedded in particular historical-social contexts and
at the same time embodied in specific subjectivities,
Horkheim accordingly wages his critiques on pure
reason and formal logic. …
The Critical Theory of the Frankfurt
School
Critical Theory of Frankfurt School: …
 …critique on pure reason and formal logic: …
 Max Horkheimer critique on Immanuel Kant's famous theses
on “critique of reason” by asserting that the assumptions on
" transcendental ego", “decontextualized self” and "pure
reason" are spurious in the light of Critical Theory. He
emphasizes that "it is the human being who thinks, not the
Ego or Reason…. [And that] is not something abstract, such
as the human essence, but always human beings living in a
particular historical epoch." (Horkheimer, 1968, p.145; quoted
in Hoy and McCarthy, 1995, p.9) Accordingly, critical theorists
must strive to guard against the “impure reason” that may be
spawned from particular historical and social contexts in
which thinkers and researchers embedded.
The Critical Theory of the Frankfurt
School
Critical Theory of Frankfurt School: …
 …critique on pure reason and formal logic: …
 By the same taken, Horkheimer also waged his critique on
formal logic. He argued that human reason should not merely
rely on formal logic but must include the part on substantive
logic. “Horkhiemer wrote: ‘Logic is not independent of
content.’ (Horkhiemer, 1934)…Formalism characteristic of
…bourgeois logic, had once been progressive, but it is now
served only to perpetuate the status quo. True logic, as well
as true rationalism, must go beyond form to include
substantive element as well.” (Jay, 1973, p. 55)
The Critical Theory of the Frankfurt
School
Critical Theory of Frankfurt School: …
Dialectic of Enlightenment: One of the exemplar
research of the Critical Theory is the study conducted
by Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno is to
analyze how human reason has fallen into the Nazi
rule. The research project commenced at the end of
the WWII with its objective as follows:
The Critical Theory of the Frankfurt
School
“The dilemma that faced us in our work proves to be the
first phenomenon for investigation: the self-destruction
of the Enlightenment. ...The fallen nature of modern man
cannot be separate from social progress. On the one
hand the growth of economic productivity furnishes the
conditions for greater justice; on the other hand it
allows the technical apparatus and the social groups
which administer it a disproportionate superiority to the
rest of the population. The individual is wholly devalued
in relation to the economic powers, which at the same
time press the control of society over nature to hitherto
unsuspected heights.” (Horkhiemer and Adorno,
1986/44, p.xiii-xv)
The Critical Theory of the Frankfurt
School
Critical Theory of Frankfurt School: …
The project of “Studies in Prejudice”: Fronted by the
“facts” produced by the Nazi’s project of AntiSemitism, members of the Frankfurt School migrated
to the US launched a large scale empirical project
“Studies in Prejudice” to investigate how individual as
well as social reasons are distorted and biased. The
project had produced five publications.
The Critical Theory of the Frankfurt
School
Critical Theory of Frankfurt School: …
The project of “Studies in Prejudice”: …The project
had produced five publications.
 Adorno, Theodor W., E. Frenkel-Burnswick, D.J. Levinson and
R.N. Sanford (1950) The Authoritarian Personality. New York:
Harper & brothers.
 Bettelheim, Bruno and M. Janowitz (1950) Dynamics of
Prejudice. New York: Harper & brothers.
 Ackerman and M. Jahoda (1950) Anti-Semitism and Emotional
Disorder. New York: Harper & brothers.
 Massing, Paul (1949) Rehearsal for Destruction. New York:
Harper & brothers.
 Lowenthal, Leo and N. Guterman (1949) Prophets of Deceit.
New York: Harper & brothers.
The Critical Theory of the Frankfurt
School
Jurgen Habermas’ critical social science: As a
prominent members of second generation of
Critical Theorists of the Frankfurt School,
Jurgen Habermas in his Frankfurt inaugural
address in 1965 summarized the development of
research projects of Critical Theory of the
Frankfurt School, which he renamed as the
“critical social science” as follows.
The Critical Theory of the Frankfurt
School
Jurgen Habermas’ critical social science: …
“Critical social science …is concerned with going
beyond this goal to determine when theoretical
statements grasp invariant regularities of social
action as such and when they express ideologically
frozen relations of dependence that can in principle
be transformed. To the extent that this is the case, the
critique of ideology, as well, moreover, as
psychoanalysis, take into account that information
about lawlike connections sets off a process of
reflection in the consciousness of those whom the
law are about. ….
The Critical Theory of the Frankfurt
School
Jurgen Habermas’ critical social science: …
“. ….Thus the level of unreflected consciousness,
which is one of the initial conditions of such laws, can
be transform. Of course, to this end a critically
mediated knowledge of laws cannot through reflection
alone render a law itself inoperative, but it can render
it inapplicable.
The Critical Theory of the Frankfurt
School
Jurgen Habermas’ critical social science: …
“The methodological framework that determines the
meaning of the validity of critical propositions of this
category is established by concept of self-reflection.
The latter releases the subject from dependence on
hypostatized powers. Self-reflection is determined by
an emancipatory cognitive interest.” (Habermas, 1971,
P. 310)
The Critical Theory of the Frankfurt
School
The distinctiveness of the critical social science:
With references of precedent discussion, we
may conclude that the critical social science has
developed into an independent methodological
approach and epistemological perspective
distinct itself from the analytical empirical
science and historical hermeneutic traditions in
numbers of significant ways.
The Critical Theory of the Frankfurt
School
The distinctiveness of the critical social science:
In contrast with the analytical-empirical science on
the research outcomes of finding nomological or
probabilistic regularities of the social world, critical
social scientists will not settle with these regularities
as they are but will strive to reveal the possible power
hypostatized within these regularities and social
structure. Furthermore, they will try to reveal the
possible social inequality, bias, distortion, and
oppression, which have been institutionalized and
legitimatized by these social regularities and
structures.
The Critical Theory of the Frankfurt
School
The distinctiveness of the critical social science:
Critical social science agree with historicalhermeneutic tradition on the research outcomes of
retrieving the meanings encoded in different
representations. Critical social scientists would even
accept the existence of meaning configurations
constituted in the forms of institutions, traditions, and
cultures, which perpetuate resiliently and
continuously. ….
The Critical Theory of the Frankfurt
School
The distinctiveness of the critical social science:
….However, they will not settle within interpretations
at this level, but will try to reveal the possible ideology
and false consciousness underlying these meaning
configurations. Furthermore, they will attempt to
reveal the possible distortion, alienation and
reification, which have been frozen and legitimatized
in these meaning configurations.
The Critical Theory of the Frankfurt
School
The distinctiveness of the critical social science:
Accordingly, critical social scientists will not satisfied
with providing correct predictions about social
regularities or rendering understanding about social
practices, they will try to develop human
potentialities, to emancipate them from slavery, and to
seek possibility for social betterments.
The Critical Theory of the Frankfurt
School
The paradigm of the critical social science:
Given the above explications of the
methodological approach to critical social
science, we may summarize the approach into
the following research questions.
The Critical Theory of the Frankfurt
School
The paradigm of the critical social science:
Critique of the impurity and fallibility of reason: One
of the primary research questions confronting the
critical social scientists is to go beyond the selfconfident or even self-complacent belief in human’s
own reason and rationality, and reflectively confront
the fallibility or even detrimental effects of reason on
humanity and the lifeworld.
Habermas has summarized the efforts of critical
theorists’ reflections on human‘s own reason and
rationality and especially its fallible and detrimental
efforts as “rationalization as reificaion” (Habermas,
1987/1981, P. 379)
The Critical Theory of the Frankfurt
School
The paradigm of the critical social science:
Critique of the impurity and fallibility of reason:….
….They include
Karl Marx’s critique on rationalization of mode of production
by the bourgeoisie, which led to the rise of capitalism and its
reification of human labor and alienation of human
production.
Max Weber’s extended the critique on Occidental
rationalization by not only examining its effects on
production but reflecting on modern society at large. This is
especially significant in Weber’s examine the reifying effects
of bureaucratization of human organization in general, which
Weber has characterized as the constitution of the “iron
cage”.
The Critical Theory of the Frankfurt
School
The paradigm of the critical social science:
Critique of the impurity and fallibility of reason:….
….They include
The first-generation critical theorists of the Frankfurt School
have further developed this line of critique on rationalization
in modern society by empirically inquiring into the
detrimental effects of rationalization manifested during the
two World Wars.
The Critical Theory of the Frankfurt
School
The paradigm of the critical social science:
Critique of the impurity and fallibility of reason:….
….They include
Jurgen Haberma, in his two-volume work The Theory of
Communicative Action (1984 & 1987) has summarized the
general effects of Occidental rationalization into the
constitutions of the capitalist market and the modern state.
He has further underlined the two imperatives that both the
market and the state have imposed upon human existence
and their communal lives (the Lifeworld), namely the money
steering and power-steering imperatives. Habermas finally
stipulates that these two systemic imperatives have not only
colonized the Lifeowrld but have also reified the very
communicative rationality that men possess.
The Critical Theory of the Frankfurt
School
The paradigm of the critical social science:
Critique of human subjects and their subjectivity:
Based on the assumption of the embeddedness of
human reasons in their historical and social context,
critical social scientists stipulate that one should turn
their critical examinations to the inquirers themselves.
That is because “knowing and acting subjects are
social and embodied beings, and the products of their
thought and action bear ineradicable traces of their
situations and interests.” (McCarthy, 1991, P. 44) …..
The Critical Theory of the Frankfurt
School
The paradigm of the critical social science:
Critique of human subjects and their subjectivity: …
Accordingly, one line of inquiry within the criticaltheory tradition is to reflect and examine the
reification of the subjectivity and consciousness of
the “modern man”. Follow the lead of Freund’s
psychoanalysis, the first generation of the critical
theorists such as Eric Fromm and Herbert Marcuse
have produced a series of work on the reification of
subjectivity of the modern man
Eric Fromm (1941) Escape from Freedom, and
Herbert Marcuse (1964) One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the
Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society
The Critical Theory of the Frankfurt
School
The paradigm of the critical social science: …
 Critique of transcendental truth and the emphasis on
the practical truth:
 Under the epistemological assumption that both the knowers
and their attained knowledge are historically and socially
embedded, critical social scientists refute the concept of truth
of transcendental idealism formulated by Kant. That is truths
are no longer conceived as essences in human knowledge
which universally, permanently and transcendentally exist.
Instead, the reality of social world is conceived as the outcomes
of human practices which have been vindicated, validated,
accumulated and even legitimatized in daily social interactions
across time and space with a “Lifeworld”. …
The Critical Theory of the Frankfurt
School
The paradigm of the critical social science: …
 ….emphasis on the practical truth:
 As a result, the truth claims of any knowledge about any
aspects of a social world must be tested against the practical
validity, which is to be found in the correspondent social
interactions within the relevant aspects of a specific
“Lifeworld”. Hence, truths are no longer to be sought after as
something universal and transcendental, but must be revealed
from social practices within particular historical and social
contexts. The traditional oppositions between theory and
practice, theoretical science and practical science, facts and
values, and more specifically the primacy of theory over
practice, are therefore invalid demarcations to critical social
scientists. (McCathy, 1991, Pp. 44-45)
The Critical Theory of the Frankfurt
School
The paradigm of the critical social science:
Critique of prevailing social reality and emphasis on
social possibilities and potentialities: For critical
social scientists, social world is configuration
produced by human efforts, therefore it is assumed
that there may be “power hypostatized” and “ideology
frozen” within this seemly permanent social
structures and regularities. As a result, two of the
major areas of inquiry of critical social sciences are
Critical inquiry of social power (To be explicated in details on
Topic 6)
Critical inquiry of ideology and hegemony (To be explicated
in details on Topic 6)
The Critical Theory of the Frankfurt
School
The paradigm of the critical social science:
Critique of prevailing social reality and emphasis on
social possibilities and potentialities: …
Along these two lines of inquiry, one the primary
objectives of critical social inquiries is to reveal the
possible systemic distortions and biases prevailing in
existing social structures and representations.
Subsequently, critical social scientists are obliged to
seek out possible way to emancipate human
potentialities that are trapped and suppressed by
these systemic distortions.
PEDU 7206
Lecture 3
The Epistemological Foundations
of EAP
Introduction to the Epistemological
Foundation of EAP
In light of the three methodological approaches
discussed in precedent lecture, we can proceed
to explicate the theories of knowledge each of
these methodological approaches is intend to
achieve. By epistemology or the theorization of
knowledge, it refers to the intellectual efforts to
analyze the following aspect of a given system
of knowledge:
Introduction to the Epistemological
Foundation of EAP
 The assumptions of the object of inquiry: It refers to
analyzing the assumptions that each methodological
approach presume upon the natures and features of
the social reality that they are to enquire
The conception of the knowledge constituted: It refers
to analyzing the knowledge that each methodological
approach has conceptualized and has intended to
attain.
Introduction to the Epistemological
Foundation of EAP
 The human interest to be constituted: Habermas has
introduced the concept of knowledge-constitutive
interests in his book Knowledge and Human Interests
(1971) He states that “I term interests the basic
orientations rooted in specific fundamental conditions of
the possible reproduction and self-constitution of the
human species, namely work and interaction.
…Knowledge-constitutive interests can be defined
exclusively as a function of the objectively constituted
problems of existence as such. Work and interaction by
nature include processes of learning and arriving at
mutual understanding.” (1971, P. 196) Accordingly, this
aspect of epistemological analysis will trace the primary
human interests that a system of knowledge is
supposed to pursuit.
The Epistemological Foundation of
Analytical-Empirical Science
The assumptions of the object of inquiry:
Transplanting the logical/empirical positivism
prevailing in natural scientific enquiry, the
analytical-empirical science presumes that there
is no essential difference between natural and
social worlds. As a result, it presumes the
following features upon the social reality it is to
enquire.
The Epistemological Foundation of
Analytical-Empirical Science
The assumptions of the object of inquiry: …
 Analytical approach: By analytical approach, it refers
to the working assumption that social scientists
impose upon their objects under study. They assume
that the social world or social reality can be
decomposed into elements or properties. They further
assume that these elements are causally related into
structure of antecedent causes and consequent
effects. Accordingly, the task of social researchers is
to select the most significant and relevant
components in social reality and to verify the causal
structures among them.
The Epistemological Foundation of
Analytical-Empirical Science
The assumptions of the object of inquiry: …
 Empirical grounded: It refers to the existential
assumption that social researcher presume upon the
social world, from which social researchers are
supposed to find evidences in verifying or falsifying
their propositions or more specifically hypotheses.
That is, it is assumed that evidences existing in social
world are observable by sensory experiences.
Moreover, the features recorded in these evidences
are objectively and externally exist and will not be
affected by the sensory observations themselves.
Accordingly these sensory-observations can be
objectively retainable, recordable, and quantifiable
into a mathematical “variables”.
The Epistemological Foundation of
Analytical-Empirical Science
The assumptions of the object of inquiry: …
 Universal and permanent nomology in features: In
correspond with natural science, social scientists
assume that phenomena in social reality persistent
and permanent in features. They are also universally
the same across time and space as natural
phenomena.
The Epistemological Foundation of
Analytical-Empirical Science
The assumption of the knowledge constituted:
The knowledge to be constituted and verified by
social scientists in analytical-empirical science
are presumed to bear the following features:
They are coherent sets of verbal propositions (or
even numerical formula) describing the nomological
features of a specific domain the social world.
These verbal propositions are objective statements in
form. That is, they are interest-neutral and value-free
verbal statements recording the objective features of
the social phenomena in point.
The Epistemological Foundation of
Analytical-Empirical Science
The assumption of the knowledge constituted:
…
These objective statements of social phenomena, as
a rule, must be verified with relevant empirical
evidences. They must comply with the so-called
“correspondence principle”, that is, the descriptions
in the statements must find its correspondent
evidences in the empirical world.
The Epistemological Foundation of
Analytical-Empirical Science
 The implied knowledge-constitutive human interest:
Given its causal-law structure and universal and
permanent features, analytical-empirical knowledge
can be used for prediction of future events. It can be
technically applied for enhancing the occurrence of
desirable outcomes and for preventing undesirable
events from happening. According to Habermas’
formulation, the knowledge-constitutive human
interest that analytical-empirical knowledge is to
serve is the “technical-cognitive interest” embedded
in “work” in general and material production in
particular. (Habermas, 1971, P. 196).
The Epistemological Foundation of
Analytical-Empirical Science
 The implied knowledge-constitutive human interest:
…. With well work-out analytical-empirical
knowledge or what Habermas termed “technically
exploitable knowledge” (Habermas, 1971, P. 191),
human beings are supposed to be able to control
how the social world works. It can help human to
“engineer” and “domineer” the social world.
The Epistemological Foundation of
Historical-Hermeneutic studies
The assumptions of the object of inquiry:
Contrary to analytical-empirical science,
historical-hermeneutic studies assume that the
social world to bear numbers of features which
are quite opposite to those in analyticalempirical science.
The Epistemological Foundation of
Historical-Hermeneutic studies
The assumptions of the object of inquiry: …
Meaning-laden and value-laden: It is assumed that
social phenomena are loaded with meanings and
values. In fact, it is exactly the features of meaningladen and value-laden that lend a social activity and
social institution its regularity, resilience and
consistency. And this is exactly the task of social
researchers to reveal the meanings and values at
work underlying each and every social phenomenon.
The Epistemological Foundation of
Historical-Hermeneutic studies
The assumptions of the object of inquiry: …
 Meaning coherence and meaningful whole: Apart from
the feature of meaning-laden, historical-hermeneutic
studies also assumes the meanings and values at work
in social phenomena and institutions are configured in
coherent and integral forms. At individual levels, these
meaning integrals usually appear in narrative identities;
at societal level, they are constituted in different forms
of integrative and enduring instituions; at cultural level,
these meaningful wholes take the forms of effective
practices of cultural tradition and heritages; and at
historical level, the meaning configurations usually
passed on in the forms of historical narratives of nations
or civilizations.
The Epistemological Foundation of
Historical-Hermeneutic studies
The assumptions of the object of inquiry: …
Persistent but transformable in structure: In historicalhermeneutic studies, though the meaning laden social
phenomena are subjective and/or intersubjective in
nature, yet they are not so idiosyncratic and ephemeral
in appearance that they make them unobservable, nonrecordable and non-researchable. It is assumed that
most of the meaning configurations are regular and
persistent in forms, but of course they are not universal,
permanent and nomological in form as the natural
phenomena. Therefore, they are presumed to be
contextualized with particular historical and societal
aggregates and to be subject to vary and change with
times, spaces and human efforts.
The Epistemological Foundation of
Historical-Hermeneutic studies
The assumption of the knowledge constituted:
The knowledge to be constituted and accepted
in historical-hermeneutic studies has been
characterized as descriptions. They can be
discerned in the following elements:
The Epistemological Foundation of
Historical-Hermeneutic studies
The assumption of the knowledge constituted:
…
The deep and thick descriptions: They refer to the
descriptive “field notes” recording the meanings
endowed into the social practices by their indigenous
participants, mostly the respondents in the studies.
They may take on varieties of formats and
representations, such as text, historical
documentations and relics, narrative story-line,
ethnographic situations, and “discourse” (in
Foucaultian sense).
The Epistemological Foundation of
Historical-Hermeneutic studies
The assumption of the knowledge constituted: ..
 The interpretation: It refers to the meanings attributed
by participants and then by the researchers to the
“data”. These interpretations of course cannot be
“verified or falsified” empirically and analytically as
those in analytical-empirical sciences, yet they can
still be “confirmed” in terms of their “effective
practices” in the correspondent “Lifeworld” from
which the data were initially retrieved. Furthermore,
the “validity” of the interpretations, especially those
imputed by the researchers can also be cross
examined by other researchers in the field in the form
of hermeneutic criticism or historical criticism.
The Epistemological Foundation of
Historical-Hermeneutic studies
The assumption of the knowledge constituted: ..
Intentional and institutional-functional explanations:
Given the descriptions and interpretations obtained,
historical-hermeneutic researchers may render
explanations for human actions, interactions, and
institutional regularities in intentional and/or
institutional-functional explanatory modes, which
have been explicated in Topic 2.
The Epistemological Foundation of
Historical-Hermeneutic studies
The assumption of the knowledge constituted: ..
 The practical truth: Accordingly, one of the primary
differences between analytical-empirical sciences and
historical-hermeneutic studies is their conception
about the idea of truth. In natural sciences, the truth in
scientific knowledge must be test externally against
the facts found in the natural and material world, i.e.
compliance with the “correspondence principle”. On
the other hand, in historical-hermeneutic studies,
truth must be sought after the very practices
embedded in the historical-hermeneutic field and/or
embodied among participants within socio-cultural
situations. Hence, Habermas has termed it as the
“practical truth”.
The Epistemological Foundation of
Historical-Hermeneutic studies
The implied knowledge-constitutive human
interest: Given the nature and features of the
historical-hermeneutic knowledge, the
knowledge-constitutive human interest to be
served, according to Habermas’ formulation, is
“practical cognitive interest” effective
embedded in human communications,
interactions and more generally communal
practices. (Habermas, 1971, P. 196) …
The Epistemological Foundation of
Historical-Hermeneutic studies
The implied knowledge-constitutive human
interest: …It is therefore implied that with the
well-grounded historical-hermeneutic knowledge,
or what Habermas termed “pratcial effective
knowledge” (Habermas, 1971, P. 191) humans are
able to understand, to communicate, to bridge
distances across historical and socio-cultural
communities (or in Gadamer’s terms “fusion of
horizons), and finally arrive at consensus. In
Habermas conception, it means to achieve
“communicative rationality”. (To be explicated in
details in Topic 7)
The Epistemological Foundation of the
Critical Social Science
To be explicated in details
at the end of Topic 4 & 5
Topic 2-3
Methodological & Epistemological Foundations of EAP
End