Risk, Reasonableness, and Rationality
Robin Gregory
Decision Research, University of Victoria and UBC
Office address: Galiano Island, B.C. Canada
Tel: 250-539-5701
E-mail: rgregory@interchange.ubc.ca
Presentation to Risk & Rationality Conference
Queen’s College, Cambridge
March 29-31, 2007
Friday, March 30, 2007
UK Cambridge presentation
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Risk, Reasonableness, and Rationality
Introduction: Rationality vs. reasonableness
Public engagement : Structured decision making
Example 1: Treating interface fires
Example 2: Facing taboo trade-offs
Example 3: Recognizing invisible values
Discussion: What should be done?
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UK Cambridge presentation
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Risk, Reasonableness, and Rationality:
Introduction




Management of risks is a central concern of society
Highly skilled people – risk managers, scientists, elected
officials – view their job as helping citizens to make /
support more rational choices across competing riskreduction & mitigation possibilities.
In 1970’s, work of Paul Slovic, Sarah Lichtenstein, &
Baruch Fishchhoff – my Decision Research colleagues -instrumental in initiating a dialogue about the standard of
rationality that guides people’s perceptions of risk.
Expanded set of factors considered as contributors to
risk: voluntariness of exposure, familiarity, dread.
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Risk, Reasonableness, and Rationality:
Introduction
How might rational risk choices be defined?


Ignoring philosophical debates, I suggest three criteria:

Concern for risk management is higher among those
experiencing adverse consequences

People think carefully about consequential risk topics and
seek out information to become better informed

The factual base for estimating risk impacts is repeatable
and reflects observations based in “good science”
In my experience, these minimum criteria are repeatedly
violated. What does this mean?



Friday, March 30, 2007
People are irrational - no
There are other standards besides rationality - yes
Risk managers and policies need to reflect more than just
rational / cognitive responses to risk - yes
UK Cambridge presentation
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Risk and rationality:
Introduction
In this talk, I will focus on public engagement as
input to risk managers and decision makers
 Context:
 Risk problems involving multiple dimensions: economic,
social, environmental, cultural, health & safety
 Participants:
 Diverse stakeholders (public, government, industry,
academics, interest groups, indigenous populations)
 Management dilemma:
 Increases on one dimension (protection of biodiversity,
fewer illnesses ) mean decreases on another (fewer jobs,
higher costs)
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Risk and rationality:
Introduction to Structured Decision Making
One useful approach for public engagement in risk
management: Structured decision making
 Based in insights from decision analysis and behavioral
decision theory
 Widely used in stakeholder deliberations when problems are
complex and involve tough choices across multiple
dimensions of value
 Goal is insight for decision makers: show pros and cons of
risk management alternatives
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Steps in a structured
decision making approach
Define Problem
1
2
Define Issues, Objectives & Measures
3
Develop Alternatives
4
Estimate Consequences
5
Make Trade-Offs and Select
6
Implement and Monitor
Iterate as required
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Terminology
 Objectives

The things that matter in the decision
 Performance Measures (or attributes)

The specific information used to report the consequences of the
alternatives on the objectives
 Alternatives (or options)

The means of achieving the objectives
 Trade-offs (or balancing across objectives)

Differences in performance among objectives; the key to
understanding tough choices that decision makers have to make
 Constructed preferences

The recognition that for many policy options, we don’t really know
what the components are or how we feel. So we construct our
situation-dependent preferences in relation to cues.
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Example: Use of SDM to help address
management of Cultus Lake sockeye
(with G. Long, Compass Resource Mgt)
 Worked with multi-stakeholder committee (approx. 20 people)
over 1 month period (April, 2006) – but issues contentious for
over a decade!
 Key risk tradeoff:

Environmental protection (of endangered stocks) vs. Economic
(commercial fishing revenues)
 Multiple interests:

High visibility species, High importance to Conservation
(COSEWIC listed) Commercial fishers, and First Nations
 Data quality variable (and controversial)
 Multiple management options (exploitation rate, captive
breeding, predator removal) but uncertainty about
consequences of actions
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SDM Cultus Sub-committee
Objectives & Performance Measures
 Sockeye conservation
 Probability of meeting Recovery Plan objectives 1
and 2
 Returns in years 2010 and average of 2016-19
 Probability of extirpation by 2036
 % Enhanced in 2010 and average of 2016-19
 Costs
 Total costs over 12 years, levelized
 No cost allocation attempted
 Catch
 Traditional commercial catch
 Commercial TAC available upstream of Vedder
 Total First Nations FSC
 Jobs
 Employment opportunities directly related to
enhancement and freshwater projects
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SDM Cultus Sub-committee
Alternatives
 Alternatives created by assembling
‘blocks’ of options:
Cultus Exploitation Rate %
 Lates (Upstream) Exploitation Rate %
 Enhancement options
 Freshwater projects options
(Note: these included those factors considered
to be most important; fine tuning to occur at a
later time)

 Make use of strategy tables to encourage
creative thinking. Two examples:
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Building Alternatives – A Strategy Table
Alternative 1: “Status Quo 2005”
Cultus Exp Rate
Lates Harvest Differential
Location
Enhancement
FW Projects
5
0, As Cultus
SQ – Downstream Only
None
None
10-12 (2005)
10
Mixed
Current: Captive Brood
Current Milfoil
20
20
UpRiver (Vedder)
Current Ongoing
Moderate Milfoil
30
30
Double Current Smolt
Full Milfoil
40
Unconstrained
Max Enhancement
Current Pikeminnow (<5%)
Ongoing dbl current cap
Moderate Pikeminnow (520%)
Full Pikeminnow (+20%)
Hire Stewardship Coordinator
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Building Alternatives – A Strategy Table
Alternative 6: “Spread the Pain 2”
Cultus Exp Rate
Lates Harvest Differential
Location
Enhancement
FW Projects
5
0, As Cultus
SQ – Downstream Only
None
None
10-12 (2005)
10
Mixed
Current: Captive Brood
Current Milfoil
20
20
UpRiver (Vedder)
Current Ongoing
Moderate Milfoil
30
30
Double Current Smolt
Full Milfoil
40
Unconstrained
Max Enhancement
Current Pikeminnow (<5%)
Ongoing dbl current cap
Moderate Pikeminnow (520%)
Full Pikeminnow (+20%)
Hire Stewardship Coordinator
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SDM Cultus Sub-committee
Alternatives
 Exploration of alternatives through iterative SDM
process: creation, analysis, elimination

Step 1
 created 6 alternatives

Step 2
 Reviewed these 6 and created 3 more

Step 3
 reviewed all 9, eliminated 6 because they were
dominated (others the same or better on objs)
 agreed on several key components for all altsf
 Focused on one, favoured alternative and created 6
new simpler variations
Use of VISTA (G. Long): Displays objectives &
alternatives in consequence matrices, highlighting
tradeoffs (pros and cons)
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SDM Cultus Sub-committee
Trade-Off Analysis
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Cultus Lake:
SDM trade-off analysis
 Participants examined how well different
alternatives “satisfied” the objectives
 Recognition that some objectives are easily &
cheaply met – common sense to retain these
“low-hanging fruit” in all alternatives
 Recognition of need to simplify the decision
problem through elimination of relevant objectives
and alternatives. Do this via exploration of


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Redundancy: where performance measures do not
vary across alternatives
Dominance: where one alternative is better than or
equal to all (or, by collective agreement, nearly all)
aspects of another
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SDM Cultus Sub-committee
Trade-Off Analysis
 Three alternatives remained at the end of this process:
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Establish/communicate areas of
agreement and disagreement
 One alternative favoured by group (8)
 Agreement on common features:



Full predator-removal program
Full habitat-improvement program
Employ habitat stewardship coordinator
 Bound & deliberate on remaining issues:


Degree of enhancement (100-150k)
Exploitation rate (20% - 40%)
 Provide information on areas of agreement and
disagreement to decision makers, also provide
process recommendations
 Current status: discussions continuing !!!
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Risk and rationality: SDM and insights
 SDM / risk engagement assumes there is a
problem to be addressed, that it can be
characterized in terms of values and measurable
attributes, and that people’s preferences for
management options will reflect their values.
 New research in behavioral decision making
suggests otherwise:



Friday, March 30, 2007
The role of emotions (pre-cognitive) (Damasio &
Loewenstein & Hsee)
The importance of affect (judgements of good and bad)
(Slovic & Peters)
The role of judgemental heuristics (Kahenman &
Tversky, Thaler & Knetsch)
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Risk v. reasonableness: Role of affect
 Four roles of affect (Peters, 2006)




As Information: feelings act as information to
guide the judgment or decision process
As a spotlight: focusing us on different
information (e.g., numerical cues)
As motivator: we can take action or devote
more attention to aspects of tasks
As common currency: facilitates the
comparison of unlike options
 Affect is thus an active component in the
construction of preferences:
Friday, March 30, 2007

conditions more delayed cognitive responses

works in parallel with cognition
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Rationality v. reasonableness:
Examples
 This tension between affect and cognition
is a challenge for decision aiding
approaches that seek to assist in the
development of risk policies through
public engagement (prescriptive)
 Three examples:



Friday, March 30, 2007
Interface fires (public engagement) - Canada
Facing taboo choices (experimental) – US
Recognizing invisible values (NSF, science
and local / aboriginal knowledge) – Canada,
US, Thailand, New Zealand
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Example 1: Interface forest fires -- the
role of emotions (with Joe Arvai)
 Context:

public groups and surveys in aftermath of severe forest
fires in western Canada
 Goal:

aid risk managers in making fire management
decisions (fuels, “speed bumps,” evacuation plans,
replanting, harvest timing, equipment)
 Analysis:

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starting point was structured dialogue with
stakeholders, asking: What do you think are key
sources of risk? What might be done to reduce risks?
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Risk and rationality: Interface fires
 Factual result:


Most high risk areas remain so, even after burning. In some
cases, risks increase.
Expected finding: Wake-up call

people in high-risk fire areas, having already experienced losses,
will seek added protection & risk reduction (e.g., US after 9/11)
 Actual result: Letdown

people in high-risk areas feel safer – the low-probability event
already has happened, and “lightning doesn’t strike twice in the
same place.”
Source: Arvai, Gregory et al. 2006. Letdowns, wake-up calls, and
constructed preferences: People’s responses to wildfire risks.
Journal of Forestry 104: 173-181.
Friday, March 30, 2007
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Risk and rationality: Interface fires
Post exposure wake-up call vs. post-exposure letdown
Kelowna
SURVEY ITEM
Vernon
P
X
SE
X
SE
1. Calm vs. Upset (1=very upset, 7=very calm)
2.80
0.16
2.62
0.26
ns
2. Safe vs. At Risk (1=very much at risk, 7=very safe)
3.58
0.25
2.62
0.30
0.05
3. Confident vs., Unconfident (1=not at all confident,
7=very confident)
3.51
0.22
2.86
0.27
0.05
4. Optimistic vs. Pessimistic (1=very pessimistic, 7=very
optimistic)
5.67
0.21
4.08
0.32
<0.0001
5. At Ease vs. Worried (1=very worried, 7=very at ease)
3.80
0.24
2.68
0.22
0.001
6. Level of Concern about Future Fires (1=low,
7=extreme)
5.51
0.19
6.16
0.19
0.05
7. Level of Motivation (1=low, 7=high)
4.89
0.21
6.11
0.20
<0.0001
Homeowners’ self-ratings of affect (items 1-5; midpoint = “neutral” in all cases), and levels of concern and motivation in an
exposed (Kelowna) and unexposed community (Vernon). Responses were provided on seven-point Likert scales.
Comparisons between the two samples were made using a 2-sample t-test.
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Risk and Rationality: Interface Fires
Practical implications of affective response
 Little demand for risk mitigation in many
high-risk communities – people feel more
safe than they really are
 Homeowners in high-risk areas not willing
to undertake risk mitigation – not at
threshold of risk identification
 High level of trust (unfounded) in
protection efforts
 Emphasis on context & history-specific
construction of preferences for
management actions: what? and who?
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Example 2: Facing taboo choices
(with J. Irwin and S. Lichtenstein)
 Context:

some decision situations are so difficult or repugnant
that people dislike or refuse to make a choice.
 Literature refers to these as “taboo” choices
(Tetlock), “protected values” (Baron), or “protest
votes”’ (CVM)
 From standpoint of SDM / DA, it’s important to
distinguish choices that are difficult or confusing
– provide help? -- from those that truly are taboo
– respect (and leave alone?).
Source: S. Lichtenstein, R. Gregory, J. Irwin. What’s Bad is Easy: Taboo Values, Affect,
and Cognition. Ms. under editorial review.
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Risk and rationality: facing taboo
choices as part of public engagement
 Examples:



Do not eat foods containing modified genes
Do not make choices that will increase risks to
one’s own children
Do not jail citizens on basis of DNA profiling
 Characteristics of such values:



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Quantity insensitivity: 10 deaths = 20
Agent relativity: it matters who makes the TO
Moral obligation: a social, as well as personal,
reference (effects beyond the individual)
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Risk and rationality: Taboo choices
 Study goals:
 distinguish mere disapproval from protest and
from taboo values
 understand reasons for disapproval
 develop rules for public engagement: when to
probe or educate vs. when to leave alone
 Study design:
 22 brief scenarios, covering range of issues. Ex:
 Cut old-growth trees to assist in development
of new drugs
 Transplant organs from patients in deep
coma to help otherwise terminal patients.
 16 reasons, both affective (this plan disgusts me)
and cognitive (this plan is complex)
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Risk and rationality: Taboo choices
Note U-shape of figure:
scenarios judged most
difficult to think about
are intermediate in
affect, whereas
scenarios judged
lowest and highest in
affect are judged easy
to think about.
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Risk and rationality: Taboo choices
The worst and the best
scenarios are the
easiest to think about.
Thus it may be difficult
to get people to accept
assistance in thinking
through tough decisions:
What’s bad is easy!
Leads to polarization as
part of engagement.
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Example 3: Recognizing invisible values
(with L. Failing, M. Harstone, N Turner, T. Satterfield)
 Risk management choices should reflect
the “best available knowledge” – few
would disagree
 But in the context of public deliberations
about risks, What does this mean?
 Typically, three sources of knowledge:



Science (technical)
Community (local)
Aboriginal (indigenous – First Nations / First
Peoples)
Source: L. Failing, R. Gregory, M. Harstone. Integrating Science and
Local Knowledge in Environmental Risk Management: A DecisionFocused Approach. Ecological Economics. (In press)
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Recognizing invisible values –
the limitations of science
 Typical link is from knowledge to facts: a
“rational” approach to identifying risk
consequences leads to the examination
of factual evidence.
 But this assumption may be too limiting:



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Knowledge of local communities includes
concerns such as pride, integrity, lifestyle
Knowledge of Aboriginal communities includes
spiritual and ceremonial concerns, also
impacts on ancestors
Access to knowledge and values remains
closed until basic level of trust is established
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Recognizing invisible values-- the
limitations of science
 Effective risk management thus must also look to
values as a source of knowledge. In some cases,
key impacts may be unobservable by “neutral”
participants. Examples:
 In Alaska: impacts of oil/gas exploration on
visible walrus populations vs. “Great” walrus
 In British Columbia, impacts of development
on grizzly bear populations vs. “Spirit” bears
 In New Zealand, impacts of GMO foods on
Maori culture (T. Satterfield)
 In Thailand, impacts of development on
“spirits” of forest and on “ghosts” of historical
inhabitants
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Invisible values: the limitations of
science
Practical implications for risk engagement
 Requires expansion of measures of value in
assessing risks. Food contamination (GMOs) –
health impacts, also spiritual, ceremonial, social
relations impacts
 Brings focus to affective and emotional
considerations: worry, shame, fear, reverence
 Brings focus to constructed preferences / TOs
 Leads to questions about tradeoffs: cultural
survival, transmission of knowledge across
generations
 Leads to questions about elicitation: how to
conduct “public” engagement with Elders
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Rationality v. Reasonableness in Risk
Management: What should be done?
 Issues of fact are typically resolvable:

new studies, more deliberation, better models
 Issues of value are usually not resolvable:

no reason to expect that values will align
 Usual tools – rational, decompositional,
analytical – may not work well in contexts
where emotions and culture underlie risk
exposure and risk management choices
 This leaves those of us working on public
engagement in risk management with several
(wonderful & perplexing) challenges
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Challenge 1: Developing useful
performance measures / attributes
 Best measures of risk are natural, easily understood: e.g.
lives, dollars, kilometers. But often need to use casespecific “constructed” measures:




ecological health
Inter-generational knowledge transmission
degree of cultural or lifestyle change
worry or shame or fear
 How can different measures best be used to capture
dimensions of value without overstepping limitations of
analysis (compartmentalization)?
 What are criteria for distinguishing successful from
inappropriate measures / attributes?
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Challenge 2: Public engagement in
highly affective situations
 “Rational” risk management may make sense to
experts but not to stakeholders:


don’t want too little risk reduction: initiatives
overturned by post-exposure letdown
don’t want too much risk reduction: initiatives
inflated by affective worry or fear
 Reasonable suggestions:





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Employ affect in risk communication (markers)
Use non-traditional measures of risk
Use risk language of local participants
Address affective issues as prelude to risk
reduction
Recognize influence of affect on other judgements
(e.g., assessment of probabilities & consequences)
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Challenge 3: Applying RA or SDM
techniques in other cultures
 Engagement need to reflect culturally
“reasonable” tools of analysis – stories,
qualitative analyses, narrative
 Engagement needs to be flexible






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Where cultural worldviews are more holistic
Where spiritual values are more important
Where trust in “outside” experts is missing
Where key tradeoffs include invisible beings
Where stakeholder expression of values is
unusual (taboo to speak to outsiders)
Where key populations are marginalized or
unapproachable (thus speaking out is unsafe)
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Risk, Rationality and Reasonableness:
Conclusions
 Reasonable risk tradeoffs are informed by both
rationality and emotion / affect
 Preferences for risk management options will be
informed by culture and values as well as by factual
knowledge – science plus community/local knowledge
 Structured engagement methods need to work with
expanded set of concerns and make use of constructed
attributes / measures to incorporate diverse values
 Successful public engagement needs to recognize
constructed nature of preferences
 Successful facilitators need to adapt tools (probability
assessments with Elders?) and learn new ways to
probe or question (stories? narrative? walks?)
 Establishment of trust may be precursor to actions
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