Essay Title:
Is the East Asian Developmental State Replicable for Late Development in Other Developing
Regions?
Mark Awarded: 67
Introduction:
There are many issues that need to be taken into consideration when deliberating on whether the
East Asian ‘developmental state’ can be replicable for late development in other developing regions
in the world. In 1993 the World Bank released its report titled The East Asian Miracle, in which it
attempted to explain the region’s rapid and continual economic growth since after World War II
(Bernard, 1996: p.649). When discussed in this essay, East Asian states refer to Japan, Taiwan, South
Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore. There is a general unanimity that the state played a fundamental
role in the East Asian states’ development (Ibid, p.228). The East Asian developmental state is
characterized by authoritarianism with a high level of autonomy from societal pressures with
economic development and industrialization being the main priorities of the state.
Chalmers Johnson first coined the term ‘developmental state’ in his book MITI and the Japanese
Miracle in order to characterize the role that the Japanese state played in Japan’s ‘extraordinary and
unexpected post-war enrichment’ (Johnson, 1999: p.33). Consequently the concept of the East Asian
developmental state to be used as a model has been widely discussed in the literature and up until
the 1990s many academics in the development community have championed the developmental
state approach as a model that could be replicated elsewhere in world to assist other developing
regions. The concept of the developmental model, which goes against neo-liberal notions, became
particularly important in the context of Africa after the failure of the Structural Adjustment
Programmes; especially considering in 1960 many of the East Asian countries had been at
comparable levels of development with their African counterparts (Meyns & Musamba, 2010: p.7).
However, the East Asian model should not be viewed as a solution for late development in
developing regions. As Eun Mee Kim argues, the developmental state model needs to be carefully
considered before it is applied to other Third World nations (Kim, 1993: p.245). Not only does one
have to consider whether the East Asian developmental state can be replicated elsewhere, one also
has to speculate whether it is desirable to replicate the model or even if such a model exists that
explains East Asian economic growth in the last four decades. When these issues have been weighed
up it is obvious that the East Asian developmental state is largely problematic and cannot be applied
to other developing regions to promote late development.
Can the East Asian developmental state be replicated?
The most obvious question that needs to be considered when analysing whether the East Asian
developmental state can be used for late development in other developing regions is can the it be
replicated? This concern has been extensively debated in the literature as if the developmental state
can be replicated it could potentially solve the developmental dilemmas of areas such as Africa and
Latin America by providing a model for late development and industrialization. As Richard Boyd and
Tak-Wing Ngo recognize, the desire to replicate the developmental state is not surprising as the
theory ‘opens up possibilities to overcome the dictates of the world system and to escape the
confines of dependency and the vagaries of the marketplace’ (Boyd & Ngo, 2005: p.1). The
developmental state thesis therefore holds great appeal. However there are many features of the
theory that make the East Asian developmental state entirely unique to East Asia and therefore
make it impossible to be applicable to other states around the world.
The international context in which the East Asian developmental state emerged in the post-war
period was vital for its very existence and thus generalizing the East Asian experience so it could be
applied to other regions in the world would be, according to Ziya Onis, ‘extremely ahistorical’ (Onis,
1991: p.120). The developmental state was only able to materialise due to the very specific
conditions that were present in East Asia at the end of World War II, which would imply the
impossibility of replicating it for other regions now in the present day. The severe external threat
that confronted the East Asian states during the Cold War period which threatened their security
resulted in a heightened sense of nationalism and with it a ‘unique commitment to the long-term
transformation of the economy’ which allowed the state elites to put aside concerns over social
welfare and income distribution and focus solely on the growth of the economy (Ibid, p.116).
Furthermore as East Asian states such as Japan were within reach of the Communist threat, they
became beneficiaries of the United States which ‘enabled them to extract important advantages visà-vis the core’ (Ibid, p.121), whilst Korea and Taiwan forged relationships with both the US and
Japan. Advantageous relationships with the core along with an expansion in the US market which
could act as a recipient for increasing East Asian exports created a favourable setting for
development to occur (Brohman, 1996: p.121). As well as creating access to markets the Cold War
context further provided an ideal situation for the developmental state approach as the Western
allies overlooked the authoritarian regimes and market intervention approaches as long as the East
Asian states remained rigidly anti-Communist (Wong, 2004: p.352). Ultimately the timing of the East
Asian states reintegration into the global economy was crucial for their success and as Joseph Wong
asserts the ‘East Asian developmental state was the product of a certain time and place’ (Ibid,
p.352). This makes it clear that the developmental state model cannot be replicated in order to
encourage late development in other developing regions as it occurred in a unique international
context which is not in existence today.
Mark Beeson has compared the Japanese and Chinese experiences and has concluded that despite
their very different national histories China was still able to adopt the developmental state model
(Beeson, 2009: p.12), which would suggest that the developmental state can be replicated for other
countries. Since 1978 the Chinese Communist Party has put into action a series of reforms which
have brought about huge economic growth. However Shaun Breslin has argued that despite the
similarities between China’s reform experiment and the East Asian developmental states, China has
not been fully emulating the developmental state model and instead ‘China’s developmental
trajectory has been to a large extent dysfunctional’ (Breslin, 1996: p.689). Breslin cites three factors
as responsible for this which are incompatible with the developmental state model - political
demands which have prevented the establishment of a productive and convincing national economic
development strategy; a redistribution of economic decision-making power from central to local
level authority and finally external economic interests which have influenced developmental policies
and processes (Ibid, p.689). These factors have resulted in the central state having weakened control
which is not an element of the developmental state model. Furthermore Breslin sees them as
‘obstacles to effective long-term economic policy making’ (Ibid, p.704). This proffers the notion that
China is not a developmental state and therefore is not evidence of the model being replicated.
Another element that makes the developmental state unique to Asia and therefore impossible to
replicate are the cultural factors that are specific to the region. According to Steven Hood Confucian
values that dominate East Asian society have meant that ‘Asian societies have always been more
concerned with the welfare of the group over the individual’ (Hood, 1998: p.854). These values are
vital for the developmental state to exist as in the quest for economic growth the state does so at
the cost of the welfare of its citizens. Confucianism has also created a respect for a hierarchical
society and this along with its citizens’ willingness to make personal sacrifices and compromises in
order for the state to follow its developmental goals are fundamental to the developmental state
model. These regionally specific factors – Confucianism and the international context in which the
developmental state came into existence indicate that the model cannot be replicated in other
regions.
Not only do the regionally specific factors hinder the prospects of replicating the developmental
state model in other areas of the world, along with the unique international context at the time of
the emergence of the developmental state, the current international context would further prevent
the possibility. The changing global conditions that face aspiring newly industrialized countries have
meant that it is even more difficult to emulate the developmental state model. Increasing
advancements in productive technologies have resulted in production returning to the core – as a
result of this less labour is required which is disadvantageous to developing countries with large
productive capabilities (Brohman, 1996: p.121). In addition to this the strengthening of regional
trading blocs such as the North American Trade Agreement and the European Union has made it
much more difficult for newly industrializing states to enter the global market (Ibid, p.121). Overall
Onis is sceptical about whether the developmental state model can be successfully replicated in ‘a
less favourable environment typified by growing protectionism and declining growth in world trade’
(Onis, 1991: p.122). Whilst this was undeniable when Onis was writing in the early 90s, it holds even
truer in the present global economic climate.
Is it even desirable to attempt to replicate the model?
Although it has already been established that the developmental state model cannot be easily
replicated for development in other regions in the current international context, one has to also
assess whether it is even desirable to replicate the East Asian developmental state in the first place.
There are many characteristics of the developmental state that would not be considered acceptable
or desirable in the present day such as its authoritarian nature and oppression of labour.
Furthermore the problems that the East Asian developmental states are currently facing also reduce
the desirability to replicate the model.
Possibly the most important concern when considering whether the developmental state can and
should be replicated for other regions is the authoritarian nature of the East Asian model and
whether it could be compatible with democracy. This is problematic as for developing regions
democratisation is perceived to be desirable in order to allow for long term development. Thandika
Mkandawire has proposed that the developmental state can be compatible with democracy and has
found it remarkable that there has been such an insistence on the ‘impossibility of developmental
states in Africa’ in particular (Mkandawire, 2001: p.289). Mkandawire claims that developmental
states are not completely alien to Africa and cites Botswana and Mauritius as examples of
democratic developmental states (Ibid, p.310). However, democratic developmental states would
result in economic goals being encompassed along with broader political reforms and in addition to
this the demands of various groups would need to be addressed (Kim, 1993: p.243), therefore
sidelining the main objective of economic growth. The developmental state is inherently
incompatible with democratic governance and the example of South Korea can provide evidence for
this. In South Korea the democratization movement led to the emergence of powerful groups such
as the chaebol and labor, both of which have made demands for significant changes in the state’s
structure and goals. As the state has democratized and therefore is obligated to address such
demands there has been confusion over what new economic direction the state should assume (Ibid,
p.243). Kim argues that it is this very reason – democratization and the breakdown of the
authoritarian regime - that has resulted in the South Korean state facing more problems than Japan
(Ibid, p.242). As outlined previously, the separation of the state from societal pressures is
instrumental in allowing the developmental state to achieve its main objective – economic growth. It
is the absence of autonomy which has proved to be a hindrance in the states of Latin America and
post-colonial Africa (Wong, 2004: p.352) and which has restricted their capacity to develop.
The developmental state approach was extremely successful at increasing economic growth in the
East Asian states however; the state elites’ ambitions to promote economic development came at a
cost, the cost being human development and the welfare of its citizens. One of the core approaches
of the developmental state was the withdrawal of workers rights, which was established through
repressing labour conditions to keep wages low and therefore attract investment (Rapley, 2002:
p.199). The ability to provide cheap and docile labour to corporations was imperative to the
developmental state. In many East Asian newly industrialized countries workers were faced with
‘hazardous and unhealthy working conditions and long work hours’ (Brohman, 1996: p.125). Not
only were workers repressed generally, but in particular women were systematically exploited in the
export sectors of the developmental states. In South Korea the number of women increased 14-fold
between 1963 and 1980 – the time when South Korea was industrializing – however in 1989 their
wages were only just over half of what male wages were (Ibid, p.126). Onis asserts that in the East
Asian countries ‘the welfare state function has been virtually absent. The state has assumed no
responsibilities outside the domains of production and capital accumulation...’ (Onis, 1991: p.113).
Based on the aforementioned it is apparent that the developmental state is not a feasible option for
developing countries as the state has a duty to provide its citizens with a level of welfare however
the approach leaves no room for this as its sole focus is on economic growth.
Considering the current problems many of the East Asian countries have been confronted with and
notably the 1997 financial crisis when essentially the developmental state stopped fulfilling its
purpose, the developmental state approach becomes less desirable. As a result of the financial crisis
the East Asian states formerly associated with economic success have became associated with
‘stagnation and decline’ (Boyd & Ngo, 2005: p.4) and it raises the question whether replicating the
developmental state approach would only bring about short-term success. Moreover the
‘impossibility theorem’, the notion that the approach is not viable for other parts of the world has
gained much impetus since the crisis and many consider the developmental state concept to have
died (Meyns & Musamba, 2010: p.31). Japan since the 1990s has had a particularly poor growth
record – as one of the leading developmental states in East Asia this is cause for concern, especially
when many scholars advocate using the developmental state model for late development in other
regions.
Does the ‘developmental state’ even exist?
Finally a very important consideration that needs to be taken into account is does the
‘developmental state’ that the theory proposes even exist? If it does not, then attempts to replicate
it in other regions would be futile. Johnson is confident that the developmental state that he has
proposed exists and is in the ‘process of altering the world balance of power’; evidence for this he
places in the replication of the Japanese model for South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong
(Johnson, 1999: p.36). However, portrayals that the East Asian model has already been replicated
across the region, for instance in the cases Johnson has mentioned, are according to Mitchell
Bernand, ‘profoundly misleading and methodologically flawed’ (Bernard, 1996: p.650). Therefore
any evidence that has been put forward by advocates of the developmental state model that
highlights successful replication of the model on to other East Asian countries is invalid, and
furthermore if the theory cannot be wholly replicated for countries in the same region then it can
hardly be promoted for late development in other regions.
Boyd and Ngo point out that the developmental state is no longer just a theory, ‘it has become a
stylized fact’, yet they believe this is flawed and that the notion of the theory ‘entails a certain
romanticization of the Asian experience’ (Boyd & Ngo, 2005: p.2). Ultimately Bernard asserts that
identifying a model that then in theory can be replicated elsewhere ignores the political economy of
the country in question, which is far more complex (Bernard, 1996: p.663). Boyd and Ngo concur,
stating that the ‘developmental state thesis distorts and misrepresents the political economy of Asia’
(Boyd & Ngo, 2005: p.2).
Conclusion:
This essay has comprehensively demonstrated that the East Asian developmental state cannot be
successfully replicated for late development in other developing regions and furthermore neither is
it desirable to do so as the developmental state and its features do not tie in with other
developmental goals such as democratization, fundamental human rights and gender equality. The
developmental state is unique to East Asia and proposals to replicate it completely ignore the history
and international context within which it came into existence. Although the East Asian model cannot
and should not be replicated, there are elements that could be applied to promote development in
other regions. Amsden has advised that further research to ‘explore and analyse systematically
which of East Asia’s supporting institutions has served investment, education and exports especially
well with an eye toward what must be done to modify these institutions to make them work
elsewhere’ (Amsden, 1994: p.628). However, one must take caution with this approach as an
adapted model may not be as effective in producing economic growth as was the original for the
East Asian states, which goes against the very purpose of the developmental state.
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