Chapter 1
Financial Goals
and Corporate
Governance
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The Multinational Enterprise (MNE)
• A multinational enterprise (MNE) is defined as
one that has operating subsidiaries, branches or
affiliates located in foreign countries.
• The ownership of some MNEs is so dispersed
internationally that they are known as
transnational corporations.
• The transnationals are usually managed from a
global perspective rather than from the
perspective of any single country.
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Multinational Business Finance
• While multinational business finance
emphasizes MNEs, purely domestic firms also
often have significant international activities:
– Import & export of products, components and
services
– Licensing of foreign firms to conduct their foreign
business
– Exposure to foreign competition in the domestic
market
– Indirect exposure to international risks through
relationships with customers and suppliers
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Global Financial Management
• There are significant differences between
international and domestic financial
management:
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Cultural issues
Corporate governance issues
Foreign exchange risks
Political Risk
Modification of domestic finance theories
Modification of domestic financial instruments
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The Goal of Management
• Maximization of shareholders’ wealth is
the dominant goal of management in the
Anglo-American world.
• In the rest of the world, this perspective
still holds true (although to a lesser
extent in some countries).
• In Anglo-American markets, this goal is
realistic; in many other countries it is not.
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The Goal of Management
• There are basic differences in corporate
and investor philosophies globally.
• In this context, the universal truths of
finance become culturally determined
norms.
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Shareholder Wealth Maximization
• In a Shareholder Wealth Maximization
model (SWM), a firm should strive to
maximize the return to shareholders, as
measured by the sum of capital gains and
dividends, for a given level of risk.
• Alternatively, the firm should minimize
the level of risk to shareholders for a
given rate of return.
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Shareholder Wealth Maximization
• The SWM model assumes as a universal truth
that the stock market is efficient.
• An equity share price is always correct because
it captures all the expectations of return and
risk as perceived by investors, quickly
incorporating new information into the share
price.
• Share prices are, in turn, the best allocators of
capital in the macro economy.
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Shareholder Wealth Maximization
• The SWM model also treats its definition of
risk as a universal truth.
• Risk is defined as the added risk that a firm’s
shares bring to a diversified portfolio.
• Therefore the unsystematic, or operational risk,
should not be of concern to investors (unless
bankruptcy becomes a concern) because it can
be diversified.
• Systematic, or market, risk cannot however be
eliminated.
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Shareholder Wealth Maximization
• Agency theory is the study of how shareholders can
motivate management to accept the prescriptions of the
SWM model.
• Liberal use of stock options should encourage
management to think more like shareholders.
• If management deviates too extensively from SWM
objectives, the board of directors should replace them.
• If the board of directors is too weak (or not at “armslength”) the discipline of the capital markets could
effect the same outcome through a takeover.
• This outcome is made more possible in AngloAmerican markets due to the one-share one-vote rule.
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Shareholder Wealth Maximization
• Long-term value maximization can conflict
with short-term value maximization as a result
of compensation systems focused on quarterly
or near-term results.
• Short-term actions taken by management that
are destructive over the long-term have been
labeled impatient capitalism.
• This point of debate is often referred to a firm’s
investment horizon (how long it takes for a
firm’s actions, investments and operations to
result in earnings).
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Shareholder Wealth Maximization
• In contrast to impatient capitalism is
patient capitalism.
• This focuses on long-term SWM.
• Many investors, such as Warren Buffet,
have focused on mainstream firms that
grow slowly and steadily, rather than
latching on to high-growth but risky
sectors.
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Stakeholder Capitalism Model
• In the non-Anglo-American markets, controlling
shareholders also strive to maximize long-term
returns to equity.
• However, they are more constrained by other
powerful stakeholders.
• In particular, labor unions are more powerful than
in the Anglo-American markets.
• In addition, Governments interfere more in the
marketplace to protect important stakeholder
groups, such as local communities, the
environment and employment.
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Stakeholder Capitalism Model
• The SCM model does not assume that equity
markets are either efficient or inefficient.
• The inefficiency does not really matter,
because the firm’s financial goals are not
exclusively shareholder-oriented, because they
are constrained by the other stake-holders.
• The SCM model assumes that long-term
“loyal” shareholders – those typically with
controlling interests – should influence
corporate strategy, rather than the transient
portfolio investor.
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Stakeholder Capitalism Model
• The SCM model assumes that total risk – i.e.
operating and financial risk – does count.
• It is a specific corporate objective to generate
growing earnings and dividends over the long
run with as much certainty as possible.
• In this case, risk is measured more by product
market variability than by short-term variation
in earnings and share price.
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Operational Goals for MNEs
• The MNE must determine for itself proper
balance between three common operational
financial objectives:
– maximization of consolidated after-tax income;
– minimization of the firm’s effective global tax
burden;
– correct positioning of the firm’s income, cash flows,
and available funds as to country and currency.
• These goals are frequently incompatible, in that
the pursuit of one may result in a less-desirable
outcome in regard to another.
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Corporate Governance
• Although the governance structure of any
company – domestic, international, or
multinational – is fundamental to its very
existence, this subject has become a lightning
rod for political and business debate in the past
few years.
• Spectacular failures in corporate governance
have raised issues about the very ethics and
culture of the conduct of business.
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Corporate Governance
• The single overriding objective of corporate
governance is the optimization over time of the
returns to shareholders.
• In order to achieve this goal, good governance
practices should focus the attention of the
board of directors of the corporation by
developing and implementing a strategy that
ensures corporate growth and improvement in
the value of the corporation’s equity.
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Corporate Governance
• The most widely accepted statement of good
corporate governance practices are established
by the OECD:
– The corporate governance framework should
protect shareholders rights.
– The corporate governance framework should ensure
the equitable treatment of all shareholders.
– Stakeholders should be involved in corporate
governance.
– Disclosure and transparency is critical.
– The board of directors should be monitored and
held accountable for what guidance it gives.
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Failures in Corporate Governance
• Failures in corporate governance have become
increasingly visible in recent years.
• In each case, prestigious auditing firms missed the
violations or minimized them, presumably because of
lucrative consulting relationships or other conflicts of
interest.
• In addition, security analysts urged investors to buy the
shares of firms they knew to be highly risky (or even
close to bankruptcy).
• Top executives themselves were responsible for
mismanagement and still received overly generous
compensation while destroying their firms.
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Corporate Governance Reform
• Within the United States and the United Kingdom, the
main corporate governance problem is the one treated
by agency theory: with widespread share ownership,
how can a firm align management’s interest with that
of the shareholders?
• Because individual shareholders do not have the
resources or the power to monitor management, the
U.S. and U.K. markets rely on regulators to assist in
the agency theory monitoring task.
• Outside the U.S. and U.K., large, controlling
shareholders are in the majority – these entities are able
to monitor management in some ways better than the
regulators can.
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The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
• This act was passed by the US Congress, and signed by
President George W. Bush during 2002 and has three major
requirements:
– CEOs of publicly traded companies must vouch for the
veracity of published financial statements;
– corporate boards must have audit committees drawn from
independent directors;
– companies can no longer make loans to corporate directors,
and
– Companies must test their internal financial controls against
fraud
• Penalties have been spelled out for various levels of failure.
• Most of its terms are appropriate for the US situation, but
some terms do conflict with practices in other countries.
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Additional Corporate Governance
Issues
• Board structure and compensation issues
• Transparency, accounting and auditing
• Minority shareholder rights
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Currency Terminology
• Foreign Currency Exchange Rate – the
price of one country’s currency in units
of another currency of commodity.
– Can be fixed or floating
• Spot Exchange Rate – the quoted price
for foreign exchange to be delivered at
once, or in two days for interbank
transactions.
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Currency Terminology
• Forward Rate – the quoted price for foreign exchange
to be delivered at a specified date in the future.
– Can be guaranteed with a forward exchange
contract
• Forward Premium or Discount – the percentage
difference between the spot and forward exchange rate.
– Calculated as
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Spot – Forward x 360 x 100
Forward
n
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Currency Terminology
• Devaluation of a Currency – refers to a drop in
foreign exchange value of a currency that is
pegged to gold or another currency.
– The opposite is revaluation
• Weakening, deterioration, or depreciation of a
Currency – refers to a drop in the foreign
exchange value of a floating currency.
– The opposite is strengthening or appreciation
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Currency Terminology
• Soft or Weak – describes a currency that is
expected to devalue or depreciate relative to
major currencies.
– Also refers to currencies being artificially sustained
by their governments
• Hard or Strong – describes a currency that is
expected to revalue or appreciate relative to
major trading currencies.
• Eurocurrencies – are domestic currencies of
one country on deposit in a bank in a second
country.
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Mini-Case Questions: Enron
• Which parts of the corporate governance
system, both internal and external, do you
believe failed Enron the most?
• Describe how you think each of the individual
stakeholders and components of the corporate
governance system should have either
prevented the problems at Enron or acted to
resolve the problems before they reached crisis
proportions?
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Mini-Case Questions: Enron
(cont’d)
• If all publicly traded firms in the United
States are operating within the same
basic corporate governance system as
Enron, why would some people believe
this was an isolated incident, and not an
example of many failures to come?
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