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Index
TOP LEVEL SHELLS
Adv C/P: Weaponize Space .......................................................................................................................... 3
Advantage Counterplan: Ban NMD ............................................................................................................... 4
NMD DA Shell ............................................................................................................................................... 5
NMD GOOD/SPACE MIL GOOD
NMD good- Protection ................................................................................................................................. 10
NMD good- Accomplishments ..................................................................................................................... 11
NMD Good- solves war................................................................................................................................ 17
NMD good – Diplomacy ............................................................................................................................... 18
NMDs Good – U.S. Safety ........................................................................................................................... 21
NMD Good: Protects America ..................................................................................................................... 22
NNMDs Good – Arms Race......................................................................................................................... 24
NMD Good: Rogue States ........................................................................................................................... 25
NMD decreases prolif .................................................................................................................................. 26
NMD removal leads to Asian prolif .............................................................................................................. 27
NMD key to stop EMP attack ....................................................................................................................... 28
NMD Good- Must expand ............................................................................................................................ 29
NMD Good- Russia supports ....................................................................................................................... 30
U.S. Space Militarization Good .................................................................................................................... 32
Hege Module: Space hege is key to all hege............................................................................................... 35
Space exploration Module ........................................................................................................................... 36
Space weapon ban can’t solve .................................................................................................................... 37
Space Mil inevitable..................................................................................................................................... 38
Space Mil inevitable..................................................................................................................................... 39
Space Mil Inevit ........................................................................................................................................... 40
Space= us causes china space war ............................................................................................................ 41
Space mil inevit-China ................................................................................................................................. 42
Space mil inevit-China ................................................................................................................................. 43
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NMD BAD/SPACE MIL BAD
NMD Bad- Russian Relations ...................................................................................................................... 44
NMD Bad- Russian Relations ...................................................................................................................... 45
NMD Bad: Russia ........................................................................................................................................ 46
NMD Bad: Russia ........................................................................................................................................ 47
NMD Bad- Space war .................................................................................................................................. 48
NMD Bad- Space war .................................................................................................................................. 49
NMD bad: Russia ........................................................................................................................................ 50
NMD bad: Russia Relations......................................................................................................................... 51
NMD BAD Russia, China NATO .................................................................................................................. 52
NMD Bad: China prolif ................................................................................................................................. 53
NMD Bad- Doesn’t work .............................................................................................................................. 54
NMD will lead to space arms race ............................................................................................................... 55
NMD leads to space weapons ..................................................................................................................... 56
NMD Bad:North Korea ................................................................................................................................. 57
NMD Bad: North Korea ................................................................................................................................ 58
NMD Bad: = No Disarm ............................................................................................................................... 59
NMD Bad: Accidental War .......................................................................................................................... 60
Space Mil= War ........................................................................................................................................... 61
Space weaponization= War ......................................................................................................................... 62
Exploration module- Space mil bad ............................................................................................................. 63
Uniqueness- START doesn’t preclude NMD ............................................................................................... 64
POTENTIAL DISAD LINKS OR STARTINGS FOR AN AFF
Link: Turkey ................................................................................................................................................. 65
Link: Kuwait ................................................................................................................................................. 66
Link: South Korea ........................................................................................................................................ 67
Link: South Korea ........................................................................................................................................ 68
Link: South Korea ........................................................................................................................................ 69
Link: South Korea ........................................................................................................................................ 70
Link: South Korea ........................................................................................................................................ 71
Link: Japan .................................................................................................................................................. 72
Link: Japan .................................................................................................................................................. 73
Link: Japan (Russia Internal) ....................................................................................................................... 74
Link-3-country general ................................................................................................................................. 75
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Adv C/P: Weaponize Space
Text- The United States federal government should develop and deploy offensive and
defensive space weapons.
The deployment of space weapons to protect our vital space infrastructure is key to
prevent a second Pearl Harbor in space, maintain U.S. leadership. Weaponization by
Russia and China is inevitable - failure to act carries the greatest risk of conflict.
Peter Brookes is a Heritage Foundation senior fellow, June 7, 2005, (“Militarizing Space,”http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed060705a.cfm)
The latest hysteria surrounds the Bush administration's soon-to-be-issued National Space Policy — the first NSP update since the Clinton administration's in
1996. Three years in the making, the new doctrine will reportedly permit the development of weapons to protect U.S. satellites. Without having seen the final
presidential policy decision, the arms-control fanatics are already condemning the new policy with frantic cries of "arms race," "strategic instability" and
"militarizing space." Fretting and fearmongering aside, the fact is that the "final frontier" is critical to our national defense .
We'd better make darn sure we maintain our competitive edge there. Space
is the ultimate military high ground — and critical to
maintaining the supremacy (in communications, reconnaissance and so much else) of our GIs. It doesn't take a rocket scientist to figure out that
whoever holds the upper hand there will hold the upper hand on Earth. If we don't maintain our space superiority,
others, such as the Chinese and the Russians, will gladly replace us — guaranteed. The "militarization" of space?
Already a fact. Hundreds of military-related communications, navigation and intelligence satellites are in orbit, from a number of nations. The question turns
on "weaponizing" space — that is, deploying offensive and defensive space weapons that would protect a nation's Earthand space-based interests and assets
or strike Earth-based targets. Such Star Wars-like weapons might include ground- or satellite-based lasers or kinetic-energy weapons able to incapacitate (kill)
hostile satellites and ballistic missiles en route to their targets. It might also involve space-based hypervelocity metal rods — "Rods from God" — designed to
strike ground targets at 7,200 mph (120 miles per minute) with the strength of a nuclear weapon but without the radioactive fallout. Last month, White
House spokesman Scott McClellan told reporters that the Bush NSP actually wasn't considering weaponizing space but would
advocate developing means to defend our critical — but now defenseless — space infrastructure from attack. (Left
unsaid: R&D on other space systems will surely continue.) Opponents of the new policy clamor that a space arms race will result
from even that policy shift: China, Russia, Japan and even the European Union will surely be provoked into following
our lead. But if we leave the high ground open, what's to stop others from seizing it? The critics' answer: another
U.N. arms control treaty. Arms controllers also argue that space-based weapons are inefficient and expensive
relative to conventional weapons. All these arguments are weak — at best. A new weapon system will cause an arms race? It ain't
necessarily so. Case in point: For decades, the arms controllers railed against ballistic missile defense, warning that it would
grossly destabilize relations with China and Russia and spark an arms race such as the world has never seen. Yet
the Bush administration's initial deployment of missile defense hasn't caused an arms race or made relations with
Beijing and Moscow any tougher than they already were. It has, however, improved our national security by
providing the first protection against ballistic missiles — ever. Space weapons more expensive than conventional weapons? Sure, a
satellite costs more than a tank. And a tank costs more than a cavalry horse, a rifle more than a rock. The most expensive weapon is the one that doesn't do the
job. What price are the opponents of a more forward-leaning space policy willing to put on U.S. national security? As
for the idea of any treaty
preventing the deployment of weapons into space . . . well, tell that to North Korea and Iran — nations undeterred by
the likes of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. More, the current U.N. (draft) treaty to prohibit the weaponization of space was introduced by
China and Russia — the two nations most active in space today. Only the naive would argue that Beijing and Moscow wouldn't deploy
space weapons today if they could. The treaty is merely their diplomatic gambit to buy time to develop their own
programs. That work continues apace. Last year's Pentagon report on Chinese military power says that China, in addition to improving its satellite
intelligence and reconnaissance capability, is "clearly working on, and plans to field, ASATs [anti-satellite systems]." Space is critical to American
national security. No nation relies more on space than the United States — and our potential enemies know this.
Failure to protect our space infrastructure would onlyinvite a Pearl Harbor in space, leaving us deaf, dumb and blind
— and at war. Maintaining America's military pre-eminence —in space as on land, at sea and in the air — is a
necessity.
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Advantage Counterplan: Ban NMD
Text- US should Ban development and deployment of the global missile shield.
Continued NMD development inevitably creates space-based NMD, which will trigger
humanity’s most destructive global war
Mitchell, Gordon, 2001 (“Missile Defence: Trans-Atlantic Diplomacy at a Crossroads” Gordon R Mitchell, Kevin J. Ayotte, and David Cram Helwich
http://www.pitt.edu/~gordonm/JPubs/Mitchelletal2001b.pdf)
Secretary Rumsfeld’s recent announcement that a four-star Air Force general be put, in charge of defending US space
assets paves the way for rapid pursuit of space weaponisation. However, this road is blocked legally by Article V of the ABM Treaty. This
may explain why the Bush administration invests so much diplomatic energy in discrediting the treaty. Far from being an irrelevant ‘Cold War relic ’, the ABM
Treaty is perhaps the most relevant War check there is against space weaponisation in the present milieu. As defense analyst Daniel Gonzales notes, a
prerequisite to deployment of space control weaponry ‘... may well be a determined effort to develop a national
ballistic missile defense system and a related decision to renegotiate key elements of the ABM Treaty or to abrogate the treaty entirely, Until then, it
is difficult to see how robust anti-ASAT weapon systems could be developed, tested, and fielded“ Since any US attempt to overtly seize military control of outer
space would likely stir up massive political opposition both home and abroad, defence analyst James Oberg anticipates that ‘the means by which
placement of space-based weapons will likely occur is under a second US space policy directive that of ballistic
missile defence... This could preempt any political umbrage from the world’s influential nations while positioning the US as a guarantor of defense from a
universally acclaimed threat. In this scenario, ABM Treaty breakout, conducted under the guise of missile defence, functions as a
tripwire for unilateral U S military domination of the heavens. A buildup of space weapons might begin with noble
intentions of peace through strength’ deterrence, but this rationale glosses over the tendency that Ike presence of
space weapons...will result in increased likelihood of their use ’.33 This drift toward usage is strengthened by a strategic fact elucidated by
Frank Barnaby: when it comes to arming the heavens, ‘anti- ballistic missiles and anti-satellite warfare technologies go hand-in-hand
’. The interlocking nature of offense and defense in military space technology stems from the inherent ‘dual capability’
of spaceborne weapon components. As Marc Vicîricaire, Delegation of Canada to the UN Conference on Disarmament, explains: ‘If you want
to intercept something in space, you could use the same capability to target something an land’.35 To the extent that ballistic
missile interceptors based in space can knock out enemy missiles in mid-flight, such interceptors can also be used as orbiting Death Stars
capable of sending munitions hurtling through the Earth’s. atmosphere. The dizzying speed of space warfare would
introduce intense ‘use or lose’ pressure into strategic calculations, with the spectre of split-second attacks creating
incentives to rig orbiting Death Stars with automated ‘hair trigger’ devices. In theory, this automation would enhance
survivability of vulnerable space weapon platforms. However, by taking the decision to commit violence out of human
hands and endowing computers with authority to make wax, military planners could sow insidious seeds of accidental
conflict. Sociologist Charles Perrow has analyzed ‘complexly interactive, tightly coupled’ industrial systems such as space
weapons, which have many sophisticated components that all depend on each other’s flawless performance. According
to Perrow, interlocking complexity makes it impossible to foresee all the different ways such systems could fail. As Perrow
explains, odd term “normal accident” is meant to signal that, given the system characteristics, multiple and unexpected'
interactions of failures are inevitable. Deployment of space weapons with pre- delegated authority to fire death rays or unleash killer
projectiles would likely make war itself inevitable, given the susceptibility of such systems to ‘normal accidents. It is
chilling to contemplate the possible effects of a space war, According to retired Lt. Col. Robert Bowman, ‘even a tiny projectile reentering
from space strikes Ike earth with such high velocity that it can do enormous damage even more than would be done by a nuclear weapon of the same size! ’. In
the same Star Wars technology touted as a quintessential tool of peace, defence analyst David Langford sees one of the most destabilizing offensive weapons
ever conceived: ‘One imagines dead cities of microwave-grilled people’. Given
this unique potential for destruction, it is not hard to
imagine that any nation subjected to space weapon attack would retaliate with maximum force, including use of
nuclear, biological, and/or chemical weapons. An accidental war sparked by a computer glitch in space could plunge
the world into the most destructive military conflict ever seen.
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Uniqueness and Link- Strong military presence in Afghanistan is the driving force to
global missile defense. Essential countries are on the fence and withdrawing troops
will remove reason for their support.
Rozoff
(Rick; Bases, Missiles, Wars: U.S. Consolidates Global Military Network Global Research, January 27, 2010
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=17221)
Afghanistan is occupying center stage at the moment, but in the wings are complementary maneuvers to expand a
string of new military bases and missile shield facilities throughout Eurasia and the Middle East. The advanced
Patriot theater anti-ballistic missile batteries in place or soon to be in Egypt, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Israel,
Japan, Kuwait, the Netherlands, Poland, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates
describe an arc stretching from the Baltic Sea through Southeast Europe to the Eastern Mediterranean Sea and the Caucasus and beyond to East Asia. A
semicircle that begins on Russia's northwest and ends on China's northeast. Over the past decade the United States has steadily (though too much of the world
imperceptibly) extended its military reach to most all parts of the world. From subordinating almost all of Europe to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization through
the latter's expansion into Eastern Europe, including the former Soviet Union, to arbitrarily setting up a regional command that takes in the African continent (and
all but one of its 53 nations). From invading and establishing military bases in the Middle East and Central and South Asia to operating a satellite surveillance
base in Australia and taking charge of seven military installations in South America. In the vacuum left in much of the world by the demise of
the Cold War and the former bipolar world, the U.S. rushed in to insert its military in various parts of the world that
had been off limits to it before. And this while Washington cannot even credibly pretend that it is threatened by any other nation on earth. It has
employed a series of tactics to accomplish its objective of unchallenged international armed superiority, using an expanding NATO to build military partnerships
not only throughout Europe but in the Caucasus, the Middle East, North and West Africa, Asia and Oceania as well as employing numerous bilateral and regional
arrangements. The pattern that has emerged is that of the U.S. shifting larger concentrations of troops from post-World War II bases in Europe and Japan to
smaller, more dispersed forward basing locations south and east of Europe and progressively closer to Russia, Iran and China. The ever-growing
number of nations throughout the world being pulled into Washington's military network serve three main purposes. First, they
provide air, troop and weapons transit and bases for wars like those against Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq, for naval operations that are
in fact blockades by other names, and for regional surveillance. Second, they supply troops and military equipment for deployments to war and post-conflict
zones whenever and wherever required. Last, allies
and client states are incorporated into U.S. plans for an international missile
shield that will put NATO nations and select allies under an impenetrable canopy of interceptors while other nations
are susceptible to attack and deprived of the deterrent effect of being able to retaliate. The degree to which these
three components are being integrated is advancing rapidly. The war in Afghanistan is the major mechanism for
forging a global U.S. military nexus and one which in turn provides the Pentagon the opportunity to obtain and
operate bases from Southeast Europe to Central Asia. One example that illustrates this global trend is Colombia. In early August the nation's vice
president announced that the first contingent of Colombian troops were to be deployed to serve under NATO command in Afghanistan. Armed forces from South America will be
assigned to the North Atlantic bloc to fight a war in Asia. The announcement of the Colombian deployment came shortly after another: That the Pentagon would acquire seven new
military bases in Colombia. When the U.S. deploys Patriot missile batteries to that nation - on its borders with Venezuela and Ecuador - the triad will be complete. Afghanistan is
occupying center stage at the moment, but in the wings are complementary maneuvers to expand a string of new military bases and missile shield facilities throughout Eurasia and the
Middle East.
On January 28 the British government will host a conference in London on Afghanistan that, in the words of what is identified as the UK Government's Afghanistan website, will be cohosted by Prime Minister Gordon Brown, Afghanistan's President Karzai and United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and co-chaired by British Foreign Minister David Miliband,
his outgoing Afghan counterpart Rangin Spanta, and UN Special Representative to Afghanistan, Kai Eide. The site announces that "The international community are [sic] coming
together to fully align military and civilian resources behind an Afghan-led political strategy." [1] The conference will also be attended by "foreign ministers from International Security
Assistance Force partners, Afghanistan’s immediate neighbours and key regional player [sic]." Public relations requirements dictate that concerns about the well-being of the Afghan
people, "a stable and secure Afghanistan" and "regional cooperation" be mentioned, but the meeting will in effect be a war council, one that will be attended by the foreign ministers of
scores of NATO and NATO partner states. In the two days preceding the conference NATO's Military Committee will meet at the Alliance's headquarters in Brussels, Belgium. "Together
with the Chiefs of Defence of all 28 NATO member states, 35 Chiefs of Defence of Partner countries and Troop Contributing Nations will also be present." [2] That is, top military
commanders from 63 nations - almost a third of the world's 192 countries - will gather at NATO Headquarters to discuss the next phase of the expanding war in South Asia and the
bloc's new Strategic Concept. Among those who will attend the two-day Military Committee meeting are General Stanley McChrystal, in charge of all U.S. and NATO troops in
Afghanistan; Admiral James Stavridis, chief U.S. military commander in Europe and NATO's Supreme Allied Commander; Pakistani Chief of the Army Staff General Ashfaq Parvez
Kayani and Israeli Chief of General Staff Gabi Ashkenazi. Former American secretary of state Madeleine Albright has been invited to speak about the Strategic Concept on behalf of the
twelve-member Group of Experts she heads, whose task it is to promote NATO's 21st century global doctrine. The Brussels meeting and London conference highlight the centrality that
the war in Afghanistan has for the West and for its international military enforcement mechanism, NATO. During the past few months Washington has been assiduously recruiting troops
from assorted NATO partnership program nations for the war in Afghanistan, including from Armenia, Bahrain, Bosnia, Colombia, Jordan, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Ukraine and
other nations that had not previously provided contingents to serve under NATO in the South Asian war theater. Added to forces from all 28 NATO member states and from Partnership
for Peace, Mediterranean Dialogue, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, Adriatic Charter and Contact Country programs, the Pentagon and NATO are assembling a coalition of over fifty
nations for combat operations in Afghanistan. Almost as many NATO partner nations as full member states have committed troops for the Afghanistan-Pakistan war: Afghanistan itself,
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Colombia, Egypt, Finland, Georgia, Ireland, Jordan, Macedonia, Mongolia, Montenegro, New Zealand, Pakistan, Singapore, South
Korea, Sweden, Ukraine and the United Arab Emirates. The Afghan war zone is a colossal training ground for troops from around the world to gain wartime experience, to integrate
armed forces from six continents under a unified command, and to test new weapons and weapons systems in real-life combat conditions. Not only candidates for NATO membership
but all nations in the world the U.S. has diplomatic and economic leverage over are being pressured to support the war in Afghanistan. The American Forces Press Service featured a
story last month about the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force's Regional Command East which revealed: "In addition to...French forces, Polish forces are in charge of
battle space, and the Czech Republic, Turkey and New Zealand manage
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provincial reconstruction teams. In addition, servicemembers and civilians from Egypt, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates work with the command, and South Korea runs a hospital in
the region." With the acknowledgment that Egyptian forces are assigned to NATO's Afghan war, it is now known that troops from all six populated continents are subordinated to NATO
in one war theater. [3] How commitment to the Alliance's first ground war relates to the Pentagon securing bases and a military presence spreading out in all directions from Afghanistan
and how worldwide interceptor missile plans are synchronized with both developments can be shown region by region. Central And South Asia After the U.S. Operation Enduring
Freedom attacks on and subjugation of Afghanistan began in October of 2001 Washington and its NATO allies acquired the indefinite use of air and other military bases in Afghanistan,
including Soviet-built airfields. The West also moved into bases in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and with less fanfare in Pakistan and Turkmenistan. It has also gained transit
rights from Kazakhstan and NATO conducted its first military exercise in that nation, Zhetysu 2009, last September. The U.S. has lobbied the Kazakh government to supply troops for
NATO in Afghanistan (as it had earlier in Iraq) under the bloc's Partnership for Peace provisions.
The Black Sea
The year after Romania was brought into NATO as a full member in 2004 the U.S. signed an agreement to gain control over four bases in Romania, including the Mihail Kogalniceanu
Air Base. The next year a similar pact was signed with Bulgaria for the use of three military installations, two of them air bases. The Pentagon's Joint Task Force-East (which operates
from the above-named base) conducted nearly three-month-long joint military exercises last summer in Bulgaria and Romania in preparation for deployment to Afghanistan. On January
24 eight Romanian and Bulgaria soldiers were wounded in a rocket attack on a NATO base in Southern Afghanistan. Three days earlier Romania announced that it would deploy 600
more troops to that nation, bringing its numbers to over 1,600. Bulgaria has also pledged to increase its troop strength there and is considering consolidating all its forces in the country
in Kandahar, one of the deadliest provinces in the war zone. Late last November Foreign Minister Rumyana Zheleva of Bulgaria was in Washington, D.C. to "hear the ideas of US
President Barack Obama's administration on the strategy of the anti-missile defense in Europe." [4] During the same month Bogdan Aurescu, State Secretary for Strategic Affairs in the
Romanian Foreign Ministry, stated that "The new variant of the US anti-missile shield could cover Romania." [5] A local newspaper at the time commented on Washington's new
"stronger, smarter, and swifter" missile shield plans that "A strong and modern surveillance system located in Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey could monitor three hot areas at once: the
Black Sea, the Caucasus and the Caspian and relevant zones in the Middle East." [6] Also last November a Russian news source wrote that "Anonymous sources in the Russian
intelligence community say that the United States plans to supply weapons, including a Patriot-3 air defense system and shoulder-launched Stinger missiles, worth a total of $100
million, to Georgia." [7] In October the U.S. led the two-week Immediate Response 2009 war games to prepare the first of an estimated 1,000 Georgian troops for counterinsurgency
operations in Afghanistan, prompting neighboring Abkhazia - which knew who the military training was also aimed against - to stage its own exercises at the same time. American
Patriot Advanced Capability-3 interceptor missiles in Georgia would be deployed against Russia, as they will be 35 miles from its border in Poland. Former head of the Pentagon's
Missile Defense Agency Lt. Gen. Henry Obering stated two years ago that Georgia and even Ukraine were potential locations for American missile shield deployments.
Middle East
Last October and November the U.S. and Israel held their largest-ever joint military exercise, Operation Juniper Cobra 10, which established another precedent in addition to the
number of troops and warships involved: The simultaneous testing of five missile defense systems. An American military official present at the war games was one of several sources
acknowledging that the exercises were in preparation for the Barack Obama administration's more extensive, NATO-wide and broader, missile interception system. Juniper Cobra was
the initiation of the U.S. X-Band radar station opened in 2008 in Israel's Negev Desert. Over 100 American service members are based there for the foreseeable future, the first U.S.
troops formally deployed in that nation. In December the Jerusalem Post quoted an unnamed Israeli defense official as saying "The expansion
of the war in
Afghanistan opens a door for us." The same source wrote "the NATO-U.S. plan to deploy a cross-continent missile shield in
Europe also represents an opportunity for the Jewish state to market its military platforms...." [8] "Meanwhile, recent months have seen several senior NATO
officials travel to Israel for discussions that reportedly focused on, among other things, how Israel could help NATO troops fight in Afghanistan." [9] Last June
Israeli President Shimon Peres led a 60-member delegation that included Defense Ministry Director-General Pinhas Buchris to Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, on
opposite ends of the Caspian Sea. A year ago "Kazakhstan's defense ministry said...it had asked Israel to help it modernize its military and produce weapons
that comply with NATO standards." [10] The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is the first Arab country to provide troops to NATO for Afghanistan. It has a partnership
arrangement with NATO under provisions of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative for Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members. Early this month a local newspaper
announced that "the UAE became the largest foreign purchaser of US defence equipment with sales of $7.9bn, ahead of Afghanistan ($5.4bn), Saudi Arabia
($3.3bn) and Taiwan ($3.2bn). "The spending included orders for munitions for the UAE's F-16 fighter jets as well as a new Patriot defensive missile system and
a fleet of corvettes for the navy." [11] Nine days later the same newspaper reported on a visit by Lt. Gen. Michael Hostage, commander of the U.S. Air Force
Central Command, to discuss "the possibility of setting up a shared early warning system and enhancing the region's ballistic-missile deterrence." Hostage was
quoted as saying "I am attempting to organize a regional integrated air and missile defense capability with our GCC partners." [12] An Emirati general added,
"The GCC needs a national and multinational ballistic missile defence (BMD) to counter long-range proliferating regional ballistic missile threats." [13] The missile
shield is aimed against Iran. Last September Pentagon chief Robert Gates said, "The reality is we are working both on a bilateral and a multilateral basis in the
Gulf to establish
the same kind of regional missile defense [as envisioned for Europe] that would protect our facilities out there
as well as our friends and allies." [14] "In a September 17 briefing, Gates said...the United States has already formed a Gulf
missile defense network that consisted of PAC-3 and the Aegis sea-based systems." The exact system soon to be deployed in the Baltic Sea and
Mediterranean and afterwards the Black Sea. In addition, the "UAE has ordered the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, designed to destroy
nuclear missiles in the exoatmosphere. "Over the last two years, the Pentagon has been meeting GCC military chiefs to discuss
regional and national missile defense programs....At the same time, the U.S. military has been operating PAC-3 in Kuwait and Qatar. The U.S.
Army has also been helping Saudi Arabia upgrade its PAC-2 fleet." [15] Turkey's Hurriyet Daily News reported at the end of last year that "Turkey is set to
make crucial defense decisions in 2010 as the U.S. offer to join a missile shield program and multibillion-dollar contracts are
looming over the country's agenda. "If a joint NATO missile shield is developed, such a move may force Ankara to join the
mechanism despite the possible Iranian reaction....U.S. President Barack Obama's administration has invited Ankara to join a Western missile
shield system...." [16]
An account of the broader strategy adds: "U.S. officials are also urging Turkey to choose the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) against Russian and
Chinese rivals competing for a Turkish contract for the purchase of high-altitude and long-range antimissile defense systems....[A]
new plan calls for
the creation of a regional system in southeastern Europe, the Mediterranean and part of the Middle East. "In phase one of
the new Obama plan, the U.S. will deploy SM-3 interceptor missiles and radar surveillance systems on sea-based Aegis weapons systems by 2011. In phase two
and by 2015, a more capable version of the SM-3 interceptor and more advanced sensors will be used in both sea-and land-based configurations. In later phases
three and four, intercepting and detecting capabilities further will be developed." [17] One of Russia's main news agencies reported on U.S.
plans to incorporate Turkey into its new missile designs, with Turkey as the only NATO state bordering Iran serving
as the bridge between a continent-wide system in Europe and its extension into the Middle East:
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"According to the Milliyet daily, U.S. President Barack Obama last week proposed placing a 'missile shield' on Turkish soil....Both Russia and Iran will perceive
that [deployment] as a threat,' a Turkish military source was quoted as saying." [18] A broader description of the interceptor missile project in progress includes:
"Obama's team has...sought to 'NATO-ise' the US plan by involving other allies more closely in its development and deployment. The idea is to create a NATO
chain of command similar to that long used for allied air defences. That
would involve a NATO 'backbone' for command-and-control
jointly funded by the allies, into which the US sea-based defences and other national assets, such as short-range
Patriot missile interceptors purchased by European nations including Germany, the Netherlands and Greece, could
be 'plugged in' to the NATO system creating a multi-layered defence shield." [19] The advanced Patriot theater antiballistic missile batteries in place or soon to be in Egypt, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Israel, Japan, Kuwait, the Netherlands, Poland, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates describe an arc stretching from the Baltic Sea through Southeast
Europe to the Eastern Mediterranean Sea and the Caucasus and beyond to East Asia. A semicircle that begins on
Russia's northwest and ends on China's northeast.
Baltic Sea
Poland's Defense Ministry revealed on January 20 that the U.S. will deploy a Patriot Advanced Capability anti-ballistic missile battery and 100 troops to a Baltic
Sea location 35 miles from Russian territory. The country's foreign minister - former investment adviser to Rupert Murdoch and resident fellow of the American
Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C. -Radek Sikorski, recently pledged to increase Polish troop numbers in Afghanistan from the current 1,955. "We will be at
2,600 by April and 400 additional troops on standby, which we will deploy if there is a need to strengthen security." [20] Fellow Baltic littoral states Estonia, Latvia
and Lithuania combined have almost 500 troops in Afghanistan, a number likely to rise. The Lithuanian Siauliai Air Base was ceded to NATO in 2004 after the
three Baltic states became full members. The Alliance has flown regular air patrols in the region, with U.S. warplanes participating in six-month rotations, ever
since. Within a few minutes flight from Russia. The three nations will be probable docking sites for U.S. Aegis-class warships and their Standard Missile-3
interceptors under new Pentagon-NATO missile shield deployments.
Far East Asia
South Korea pledged 350 troops for NATO's Afghan war last year and in late December Seoul announced that it would send a ranking officer for the first time "to
attend a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) conference to seek ways to strengthen cooperation with other nations in dispatching troops to Afghanistan
and coordinate military operations there," [21] likely a reference to the January 26-27 Military Committee meeting. In the middle of January the U.S. conducted
Beverly Bulldog 10-01 exercises in South Korea which "involved more than 7,200 U.S. airmen at Osan and Kunsan air bases and other points around the
peninsula in an air war exercise" and "about 125 soldiers of the U.S. Army's Patriot missile unit in South Korea...." [22] On January 14 the new government of
Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama ended Japan's naval refuelling mission carried out in support of the U.S. war in Afghanistan since 2001. However, pressure will
be exerted on Tokyo at the January 28 conference in London, particularly by Hillary Clinton, to reengage in some capacity. On last year's anniversary of the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, December 7, the U.S. and Japan held joint war games, Yama Sakura (Mountain Cherry Blossom), on the island of Hokkaido in
northernmost Japan, that part of the country nearest Russia on the Sea of Japan. North Korea was the probable alleged belligerent. Over 5,000 troops
participated in drills that included "battling a regional threat that includes missile defenses, air defense and ground-forces operations...." "Japan's military has
been actively developing its anti-missile defenses in cooperation with the United States. It currently has deployed Patriot PAC-3 missile defenses at several
locations and also has two sea-based Aegis-equipped Kongo-class warships with anti-missile interceptors," [23] the latter having engaged in joint SM-3 missile
interceptions with the U.S. off Hawaii. If support for the war in Afghanistan is linked with deployment of tactical missile shield
installations in Israel and Poland, in the first case aimed at Iran and in the second at Russia, the case of Taiwan is
even more overt. Almost immediately after announcements that the U.S. would provide it with over 200 Patriot Advanced Capability-3 missiles and double
the amount of frigates it had earlier supplied, with Taiwan planning to use the warships for Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System upgrades, the nation's China
Times newspaper wrote that "Following a recent US-Taiwan military deal, the Obama administration has demanded that Taiwan provide non-military aid for
troops in Afghanistan....The US wants Taiwan to provide medical or engineering assistance to US troops in Afghanistan that will be increased...." [24]
Dispatching troops to Afghanistan would be too gratuitous an incitement against China (which shares a narrow border with the South Asian nation), but Taiwan
will nevertheless be levied to support the war effort there.
Wars: Stepping Stones For New Bases, Future Conflicts
The 78-day U.S. and NATO air war against Yugoslavia in 1999, Operation Allied Force, allowed the Pentagon to construct the mammoth Camp Bondsteel in
Kosovo and within ten years to incorporate five Balkans nations into NATO. It also prepared the groundwork for U.S. Navy warships to dock at ports in Albania,
Croatia and Montenegro. Two years later the attack on Afghanistan led to the deployment of U.S. and NATO troops, armor and warplanes to five nations in
Central and South Asia. The war in Afghanistan and Pakistan has also contributed to the Pentagon's penetration of the world's second most populous nation,
India, which is being pulled into the American military orbit and integrated into global NATO. The U.S. and Israel are supplanting Russia as India's main arms
supplier and U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently returned from India where his mission included "lifting bilateral military relations from a policyalignment plane to a commercial platform that will translate into larger contracts for American companies." [25] With the quickly developing expansion of the
Afghanistan-Pakistan war into an Afghanistan-Pakistan-Yemen-Somalia theater, NATO warships are in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean and the U.S. has
stationed Reaper drones, aircraft and troops in Seychelles. [On the same day as the London conference on Afghanistan a parallel meeting on Yemen will be held
in the same city.] After the 2003 invasion of Iraq the Pentagon gained air and other bases in that nation as well as what it euphemistically calls forward operating
sites and base camps in Jordan, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. In less than a decade the Pentagon and NATO have acquired strategic air bases and
ones that can be upgraded to that status in Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania and Romania.
Global NATO And Militarization Of The Planet
The January 26 Chief of Defense session of NATO's Military Committee with top military leaders of 63 countries attending - while the bloc is waging and
escalating the world's largest and lengthiest war thousands of miles away from the Atlantic Ocean - is indicative of the pass that the post-Cold War world has
arrived at. Never in any context other than meetings of NATO's Military Committee do the military chiefs of so many nations (including at least five of the world's
eight nuclear powers), practically a third of the world's, gather together. That the current meeting is dedicated to NATO operations on three continents and in
particular to the world's only military bloc's new Strategic Concept for the 21st century - and for the planet - would have been deemed impossible twenty or even
ten years ago. As would have been the U.S. and its NATO allies invading and occupying a Middle Eastern and a South Asian nation.
And the elaboration
of plans for an international interceptor missile system with land, air, sea and space components. In fact, though, all
have occurred or are underway and all are integrated facets of a concerted drive for global military superiority.
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NMD DA Shell
Impact
Continued NMD development inevitably creates space-based NMD, which will trigger
humanity’s most destructive global war
Mitchell, Gordon, 2001 (“Missile Defence: Trans-Atlantic Diplomacy at a Crossroads” Gordon R Mitchell, Kevin J. Ayotte, and David Cram Helwich
http://www.pitt.edu/~gordonm/JPubs/Mitchelletal2001b.pdf)
Secretary Rumsfeld’s recent announcement that a four-star Air Force general be put, in charge of defending US space
assets paves the way for rapid pursuit of space weaponisation. However, this road is blocked legally by Article V of the ABM Treaty. This
may explain why the Bush administration invests so much diplomatic energy in discrediting the treaty. Far from being an irrelevant ‘Cold War relic ’, the ABM
Treaty is perhaps the most relevant War check there is against space weaponisation in the present milieu. As defense analyst Daniel Gonzales notes, a
prerequisite to deployment of space control weaponry ‘... may well be a determined effort to develop a national
ballistic missile defense system and a related decision to renegotiate key elements of the ABM Treaty or to abrogate the treaty entirely, Until then, it
is difficult to see how robust anti-ASAT weapon systems could be developed, tested, and fielded“ Since any US attempt to overtly seize military control of outer
space would likely stir up massive political opposition both home and abroad, defence analyst James Oberg anticipates that ‘the
means by which
placement of space-based weapons will likely occur is under a second US space policy directive that of ballistic
missile defence... This could preempt any political umbrage from the world’s influential nations while positioning the US as a guarantor of defense from a
universally acclaimed threat. In this scenario, ABM Treaty breakout, conducted under the guise of missile defence, functions as a
tripwire for unilateral U S military domination of the heavens. A buildup of space weapons might begin with noble
intentions of peace through strength’ deterrence, but this rationale glosses over the tendency that Ike presence of
space weapons...will result in increased likelihood of their use ’.33 This drift toward usage is strengthened by a strategic fact elucidated by
Frank Barnaby: when it comes to arming the heavens, ‘anti- ballistic missiles and anti-satellite warfare technologies go hand-in-hand
’. The interlocking nature of offense and defense in military space technology stems from the inherent ‘dual capability’
of spaceborne weapon components. As Marc Vicîricaire, Delegation of Canada to the UN Conference on Disarmament, explains: ‘If you want
to intercept something in space, you could use the same capability to target something an land’.35 To the extent that ballistic
missile interceptors based in space can knock out enemy missiles in mid-flight, such interceptors can also be used as orbiting Death Stars
capable of sending munitions hurtling through the Earth’s. atmosphere. The dizzying speed of space warfare would
introduce intense ‘use or lose’ pressure into strategic calculations, with the spectre of split-second attacks creating
incentives to rig orbiting Death Stars with automated ‘hair trigger’ devices. In theory, this automation would enhance
survivability of vulnerable space weapon platforms. However, by taking the decision to commit violence out of human
hands and endowing computers with authority to make wax, military planners could sow insidious seeds of accidental
conflict. Sociologist Charles Perrow has analyzed ‘complexly interactive, tightly coupled’ industrial systems such as space
weapons, which have many sophisticated components that all depend on each other’s flawless performance. According
to Perrow, interlocking complexity makes it impossible to foresee all the different ways such systems could fail. As Perrow
explains, odd term “normal accident” is meant to signal that, given the system characteristics, multiple and unexpected'
interactions of failures are inevitable. Deployment of space weapons with pre- delegated authority to fire death rays or unleash killer
projectiles would likely make war itself inevitable, given the susceptibility of such systems to ‘normal accidents. It is
chilling to contemplate the possible effects of a space war, According to retired Lt. Col. Robert Bowman, ‘even a tiny projectile reentering
from space strikes Ike earth with such high velocity that it can do enormous damage even more than would be done by a nuclear weapon of the same size! ’. In
the same Star Wars technology touted as a quintessential tool of peace, defence analyst David Langford sees one of the most destabilizing offensive weapons
ever conceived: ‘One imagines dead cities of microwave-grilled people’. Given this unique potential for destruction, it is not hard to
imagine that any nation subjected to space weapon attack would retaliate with maximum force, including use of
nuclear, biological, and/or chemical weapons. An accidental war sparked by a computer glitch in space could plunge
the world into the most destructive military conflict ever seen.
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NMD good- Other countries developing
Iran, Japan, Russia, and China are developing ballistic missiles – Creating a security
issue for the United States
O’Reily 09 Lt. General Patrick O’Reilly, (Director of the Missile Defense Agency and General in the Army), May 21st 2009
http://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/The_Missile_Defense_Program.pdf
9:11 GMT, July 20, 2009 The possession of weapons of mass destruction and
ballistic missiles by potential adversaries is
an urgent security issue for the United States and our allies. Effective missile defences can contribute to US nonproliferation objectives by devaluing ballistic missiles in the eyes of our adversaries as a useful delivery system for
conventional munitions and WMD. Equally important, missile defence can help the country prepare for situations
where diplomacy and non-proliferation initiatives have failed by deterring aggression and, after ballistic missiles are
launched, by limiting damage locally or regionally.
Threat Assessment The proliferation of ballistic missiles of all ranges
continues. Current trends indicate that proliferation of ballistic missile systems, using advanced liquid- or solidpropellant propulsion technologies, are becoming more mobile, survivable, reliable, accurate and capable of striking
targets over longer distances. The proliferation of ballistic missiles is increasing the number of anti-access weapons available to potential regional
adversaries. These weapons could be used to reduce military options available to Combatant Commanders and
decrease the survivability of regional military assets. Iran has grown its short- and medium-range missile inventories,
while improving the lethality, deployability, and effectiveness of existing systems with new propellants, more accurate
guidance systems, and sub-munitions payloads. With the successful launch of the SAFIR Space Launch Vehicle on 2
February 2009, Iran demonstrated technologies that are directly applicable to the development of ICBMs. North
Korea deploys a NO DONG ballistic missile capable of reaching Japan and South Korea and US bases throughout
the region, and continues to develop a new intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) capable of reaching Guam and the
Aleutian Islands.
Despite the failure to place an object in orbit on 5 April 2009, North Korea successfully demonstrated
the same staging and separation technologies required to launch a two-stage TAEPO-DONG 2 ICBM capable of
reaching much of the United States. An additional concern is North Korea’s and Iran’s repeated demonstrations of
salvo launches, indicating large ballistic missile attack raid sizes must be considered in developing the BMDS
capability. Syria continues to field updated short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) systems and acquire SCUD-related
equipment and materials from North Korea and Iran. In sum, there has been an increase of over 1,200 additional
ballistic missiles over the past five years, bringing the total of ballistic missiles outside the US, NATO, Russia and
China to over 5,900 (with SRBMs making up 93% of this total and MRBMs making up 6%), with hundreds of launchers and missiles within the range of
our deployed forces today (with SRBM launchers making up 91% of this total and MRBM launchers making up 9%). Eating cocaine off of American gravestones.
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NMD good- Protection
The Missile Defense Agency protects the US and our allies
O’Reily 09 Lt. General Patrick O’Reilly, (Director of the Missile Defense Agency and General in the Army), May 21st 2009
http://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/The_Missile_Defense_Program.pdf
Missile Defence Approach and Strategy
The mission of the Missile
Defense Agency (MDA) is to develop defences to protect
the US homeland, deployed forces, Allies and friends against ballistic missiles of all ranges and in all phases of flight.
Given the unique characteristics of short-, medium-, intermediate-, and intercontinental ballistic missiles, no one missile
defence interceptor or sensor system can effectively counter all ballistic missile threats. Warfighters are not only faced with the challenge of
intercepting relatively small objects at great distances and very high velocities, but they may have to counter large
raid sizes involving combinations of SRBMs, MRBMs, IRBMs, and ICBMs and, in the future, countermeasures associated with
sophisticated ballistic missile attacks. While countermeasures can be developed to degrade the performance of
autonomous missile interceptor systems, it is much more difficult to develop countermeasures that degrade
fundamentally different missile defence interceptor systems operating together in different phases of a ballistic
missile’s flight. Thus, the most operationally effective missile defence architecture is a layering of endo-atmospheric
and exo-atmospheric missile interceptor systems with ground and space sensors connected and managed by a
robust Command and Control, Battle Management and Communication (C2BMC) infrastructure. Moreover, the most
cost-effective missile defence architecture is one that emphasises early intercepts during a threat missile’s ascent
phase of flight before countermeasures can be deployed and before the remainder of the BMDS architecture is
required to track and kill a threat re-entry vehicle and associated objects.
Global missile shield is effective and ready to deploy.
Rick Rozoff, September 11, 2009 Rick Rozoff is a frequent contributor to Global Research
U.S. Expands Global Missile Shield Into Middle East, Balkans http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2009/09/11/u-s-expands-global-missile-shield-into-middle-eastbalkans/
To demonstrate how close the Pentagon is to completing plans for an international interceptor missile system that
can be used for blackmailing other nations into submission and laying the groundwork for a “winnable” war against
major powers like Russia and China – by being able to neutralize missiles surviving a first strike and so an adversary’s ability to retaliate – the
new head of the Missile Defense Agency, U.S. Army Lieutenant General Patrick O’Reilly, recently boasted that his
agency’s missile interceptions have proven 86% successful and that “The Defense Department recently committed
an additional $900 million toward fielding the Army’s theater high-altitude-area defense mobile missile defense
system. The agency has finished seven of eight required tests of the system.” O’Reilly added that he “expects to see
it in the field next year.” [8]
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NMD good- Accomplishments
The Missile Defense Agency is achieving accomplishments now
O’Reily 09 Lt. General Patrick O’Reilly, (Director of the Missile Defense Agency and General in the Army), May 21st 2009
http://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/The_Missile_Defense_Program.pdf
During FY 2008 and FY 2009, the Missile Defense Agency achieved many accomplishments, including:
* The
execution of successful AEGIS STANDARD Missile (SM)-3 Block IA and SM-2 Block IV interceptor salvo flight tests
and delivery of 28 additional SM-3 Block IA interceptors (including deliveries to Japan);
* A Ground-based Midcourse
Defence (GMD) intercept test utilising the entire sensor and command and control suite deployed in the Pacific;
*
Emplacement of two GBIs and refurbishment of two GBIs at Fort Greely, Alaska;
* Deployment of a AN/TPY-2 radar
to Israel;
* The execution of an experiment involving the closest data collection to date of a boosting missile from a
satellite;
* The safe destruction of a malfunctioning US satellite; * Repeated demonstration of the atmospheric laser
beam compensation during Airborne Laser (ABL) flights;
* Delivery of the first THAAD unit for testing; and,
* Three
THAAD intercepts, including the launching of a salvo of two THAAD interceptors using operational firing doctrine.
In early May 2009, we also
successfully placed in orbit the Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) Advanced Technology Risk
Reduction satellite to serve as a pathfinder for next-generation space sensor technology. However, in addition to our
successes, we also faced challenges developing the BMDS. During FY 2008 and FY 2009 to date, we experienced eight significant flight test delays, four target
failures out of 18 target launches, and one interceptor failure in flight. These and other contributing factors have resulted in $264 million of cost growth. Further,
we have incurred over $252 million in unplanned costs and 25 weeks of schedule revisions due to unplanned operational deployments of our systems under
development. In response to those challenges, we have worked with our leadership and stakeholders to enhance our management oversight, strengthen our
relationship with the warfighter community, and improve BMDS acquisition and test planning. We have adopted a series of initiatives to improve acquisition and
oversight of the contracts we will award over the next 18 months. We are also institutionalising MDA and Service roles and responsibilities for elements of the
BMDS that the Deputy Secretary of Defense has designated a lead Service. Eating cocaine off of American gravestones.
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NMD good- Detects threats
The Missile Defense Agencies’ technological advancements in detecting threats
prove to be effective
O’Reily 09 Lt. General Patrick O’Reilly, (Director of the Missile Defense Agency and General in the Army), May 21st 2009
http://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/The_Missile_Defense_Program.pdf
A robust advanced missile defence technology development programme is part of our strategy
to hedge against future threat uncertainties. MDA is intensifying its focus on enabling the capability to intercept a
threat missile early in its flight, prior to its apogee. A missile defence architecture that emphasizes an early intercept
capability places a premium on persistent surveillance of threat missile launches in specific regions of interest.
Likewise, the emerging architecture will emphasise the forward positioning of mobile and transportable flexible
missile defence assets, which would include sensors for early detection, a highly responsive and reliable C2BMC
infrastructure, and energetic and agile weapons. For FY 2010, we are requesting $180 million for the Space
Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) to demonstrate the technology to track threat objects from space by using
two STSS demonstration satellites to be launched this summer. Sensors on STSS satellites could provide fire control
quality tracking data for engagements of threat re-entry vehicles and, when combined with radar data, will provide
improved threat object discrimination. Following launch of the STSS, we will enter into a six-month on-orbit check-out
period, after which we plan to use both targets of opportunity and dedicated targets to demonstrate STSS
capabilities. Knowledge point-based lessons learned from these demonstrations will guide our decisions on the
development of an affordable, continuously available operational precision track space sensor constellation.
The
Near Field Infrared Experiment (NFIRE) satellite launched in April 2007 continues to operate in good health. We
Technology Development
conducted NFIRE test mission 2B in September 2008 to collect first-of-a-kind high resolution plume and hard body data of a boosting missile at approximately 8
km range from a boosting missile. In this test, we collected multiple frames of data in multiple wavebands, which will help anchor plume to hard body handover
algorithms for boost phase intercept applications. We continue to collect data on other targets of opportunity. We also demonstrated very
high capacity laser communications on board the NFIRE satellites.
Our boost phase intercept technologies include the Airborne Laser (ABL) and Net Centric
Airborne Defense Element (NCADE) technology programmes. We are requesting $187 million for FY 2010 to further develop these technologies. In FY 2008 we
verified ABL can acquire, track, and perform atmospheric compensation in flight against a non-cooperative target and completed installation of the high power
laser on the aircraft. We achieved first light through the Beam Control/Fire Control and successfully fired the complete high energy laser weapon system from the
aircraft on the ground in November 2008. While we will cancel the planning for Tail #2 aircraft, we will maintain Tail #1 and continue ABL research and
development to address many of the programme’s affordability, technical, and operational challenges. We are focusing the ABL programme on achieving
repeated shoot-downs of missiles in their boost phase in FY 2010. We are requesting funding for two lethal shoot-downs in the first half of FY 2010, retaining
critical skills needed for optics and fire control, and continuing test flights. We are also prepared to de-commission the Tail #1 aircraft if the shoot-downs are
unsuccessful. We addressed an optics contamination issue which delayed the return to flight, but we currently flying a fully integrated ABL today and are on track
for a shoot-down of a ballistic missile later in 2009. In 2008 we also demonstrated the NCADE, a promising air-launch missile defence concept that uses a
modified AIM-9X seeker to intercept a boosting missile target. Plume-to-hard body aim point transition was completed, and sensors on-board an F-15 aircraft
successfully detected, acquired, and tracked three stages of a boosting missile target. We are requesting $3.5 million for FY 2010 for continued work on NCADE
technologies and to study the concept further. Eating cocaine off of American gravestones.
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The Missile Defense Agency is taking an international Coalition Approach in order to
deter proliferation with several countries -- US, Japan, Russia, countries within NATO
and more
O’Reily 09 Lt. General Patrick O’Reilly, (Director of the Missile Defense Agency and General in the Army), May 21st 2009
http://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/The_Missile_Defense_Program.pdf
global proliferation of MRBMs and IRBMs warrants an international coalition
approach to deter further acquisition of these offensive missiles and employ an operationally effective missile
defence that significantly contributes to deterrence. Therefore, under the guidance of Office of the Secretary of
Defense, MDA works closely with Combatant Commanders, the US Department of State, and other government
agencies to support their missions and goals. As a result, MDA has significant cooperative missile defence
technology development efforts, including six “framework” agreements, signed by the Secretary of Defense, to
facilitate BMD cooperative research with Japan, the United Kingdom, Australia, Denmark, Italy, and, most recently,
the Czech Republic. Cooperative activities are under consideration with several other nations. With the purchase of
AEGIS BMD and PAC-3 assets, Japan is fielding a multi-layered system that is capable of being interoperable with
the US system. Japan’s C2BMC (JADGE) system will integrate Japanese BMD sensors and interceptors and will be
capable of exchanging information with US missile defences, including the forward-based X-band radar at Shariki
and US AEGIS BMD ships in the region. The X-band radar at Shariki provides precise early detection and tracking to increase the probability we
International Cooperative BMD Activities
The
will destroy any lethal target launched by North Korea.
MDA’s C2BMC will continue leading the integration of the BMDS with NATO command and control. In
November 2008 and January 2009, we completed initial tests confirming integration between the NATO ALTBMD programme office and our C2BMC.
MDA
also continues to support Administration efforts to propose transparency and confidence-building measures,
technology development programmes, and missile defence architectures to collaborate with the Russian government.
Additionally, we have invited Russian representatives to view our test flights, which they have attended in the past,
and participate in our annual Multinational Missile Defence Conference. I visited the Russian radar at Gabala, Azerbaijan, and
personally assessed its valued contribution to US and NATO missile defence efforts. Furthermore, we have been able to identify several potential areas of
cooperative technology development such as sensor netting, propulsion, and high energy lasers, collaborative testing, and information-sharing initiatives such as
remain
committed to working with our NATO partners to address the growing threat from ballistic missiles. In the Summit
declaration issued on 4 April 2009, all NATO Heads of State and Government reaffirmed the conclusions of the
Bucharest Summit, that “(b)allistic missile proliferation poses an increasing threat to Allies’ forces, territory, and
populations. Missile defence forms part of a broader response to counter this threat.” As part of this response, NATO
agreed that “a future United States’ contribution of important architectural elements could enhance NATO elaboration
of this Alliance effort.” The DoD has previously proposed to field sensors, interceptors, communications, and the
C2BMC infrastructure needed to improve protection of the United States and, for the first time, with the United
Kingdom and Denmark, extend upper-tier, ICBM and IRBM, defence coverage to all European NATO allies
vulnerable to long-range ballistic missile attack from the Middle East. The NATO Active Layer Theatre Missile Defence (ALTBMD)
the Joint Data Exchange Centre. These areas of cooperation are under review by the DoD. European IRBM and ICBM Defence Capability
We
programme will develop the lower-tier, MRBM and SRBM, defence necessary for complete defence of NATO against all missiles of all ranges launched from the
Middle East.
The previously proposed upper-tier European Capability focuses on relocation of the upgraded midcourse X-band radar, currently located at the
Kwajalein test site, to the Czech Republic and the establishment of a midcourse interceptor field in Poland, pending ratification of signed missile defence
agreements with both governments. We have signed a BMD Agreement and a supplemental Status of Forces Agreement with the Czech Republic. We have
signed a BMD Agreement with Poland and continue to negotiate a supplemental Status of Forces Agreement. Whether Poland or the Czech Republic will ratify
these agreements remains unclear. In the meantime, we will continue to work closely with both nations and NATO, and we will continue to assess potential
missile defence architectures for optimum effectiveness. To accommodate the discussions and the architecture assessment we have deferred the fielding of ten
GBIs at the European Interceptor Site in Poland and the European Midcourse Radar in the Czech Republic to beyond FY 2010. We will continue planning and
design activities as allowed under the FY 2009 National Defense Authorization Act to preserve our opportunity to move forward with the start of military
construction and site activation activities at both European Capability sites.
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NMD good- Solvency
NMD solves for Proliferation and missile attacks
O’Reily 09 Lt. General Patrick O’Reilly, (Director of the Missile Defense Agency and General in the Army), May 21st 2009
http://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/The_Missile_Defense_Program.pdf
Proven missile defences can enhance protection by dissuading potential adversaries from acquiring them,
deterring against their use, and defending against a ballistic missile attack. Proven missile defence assets can
contribute to strategic non-proliferation and counter-proliferation objectives by undercutting the value of offensive
ballistic missiles and dissuading foreign investment in them. Deployed missile defences can bolster deterrence and
give confidence to our allies and friends by reducing opportunities for adversarial intimidation or coercion and
creating uncertainty in the minds of the potential adversaries of the effectiveness of an attack on US or allied
retaliatory military power. A robust research and development programme focused on API can provide a significant “hedge” against
advanced threats.
If hostilities break out, missile defences can limit damage to US and allied critical infrastructure,
population centres, and military capabilities for responsive operations.
The FY 2010 missile defence budget was the result of a
Conclusion
comprehensive assessment of available and reasonably achievable capabilities, war fighter requirements, and development risks. It also provides a hedge
against future uncertainty. With the $7.8 billion requested, MDA will implement a programme strategy to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of developing
we are addressing challenges, our record of 16 of 18 successful intercept attempts over the past three
years sends a clear message to potential adversaries considering the acquisition of ballistic missiles. But more work is
the BMDS.
While
needed to improve our oversight, collaboration with Combat Commanders and the Services, test planning, and programme execution.
Missile defence is
expensive, but the cost of mission failure can also be very high _ the system must be affordable and effective. Integration of stand-alone missile defence systems
into an integrated BMDS helps us achieve cost and operational efficiencies by improving protection with increased defended area and performance without
incurring additional force structure costs. The Department is proposing a balanced programme to develop, rigorously test, and field an integrated BMDS
architecture to counter existing regional threats, maintain our limited ICBM defence, develop new technologies to address future risks, and become more
operationally and cost-effective as we prepare to protect against the more uncertain threats of the future.
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NMD Good- National Defense Policy Budget
The United States should commit a national defense budget because it is imperative
to our security
Talent 09 (“A Defense Budget to Recapitalize the U.S. Military with Next-Generation Platforms”) (Published on July 14, 2009 by Jim Talent a
Distinguished Fellow at The Heritage Foundation, where he specializes in military readiness and welfare reform issues.)
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/07/A-Defense-Budget-to-Recapitalize-the-US-Military-with-Next-Generation-Platforms
For three years, The Heritage Foundation has been advocating the "4 percent for Freedom" solution as national
defense policy. This 10-year commitment would affirm the principle that the regular defense budget, through which
the government prepares and sustains the American military (not including the cost of ongoing conflicts like
Afghanistan), should be at least 4 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). Heritage believes that our leaders
should commit to spending at least one out of every 25 dollars of America's wealth each year on the national
defense. Ensuring a robust defense and a strong military should not be controversial. Many Americans believe the
federal government already spends much more than 4 percent of GDP on the military. After all, the United States
government's first priority is supposed to be the national defense; therefore, that obligation should have the first claim
on taxpayer dollars. Moreover, the government historically has spent far more on defense, as a percentage of GDP,
than Heritage is now advocating as a floor. The average defense budget since World War II has been over 5 percent of GDP. Maintaining a
commitment to fund the defense budget at sufficient levels for the next five to 10 years is even more compelling now
than it was when first proposed. China, for example, has opened a huge nuclear submarine base and is acquiring
carrier-killer missiles. Russia invaded Georgia last December, and Iran gets closer to nuclear status every day. North
Korea is developing a longer-range missile. Meanwhile, the bipartisan Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of
Mass Destruction unanimously found last December that terrorists would have a nuclear or bioweapon within five
years. Our neighbors in northern Mexico are growing closer to anarchy because of drug cartels, and the piracy threat has become a major concern. Now is
the time for Congress to restate the need for adequate funding for national defense. The current condition of the
American military demands no less than a defense budget of 4 percent of GDP if the United States is to maintain the
qualitative superiority of its military.
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NMD Good- Solvency
Without NMD capabilities, the United States cannot solve for terrorism or regional
conflicts
Talent 09 (“A Defense Budget to Recapitalize the U.S. Military with Next-Generation Platforms”) (Published on July 14, 2009 by Jim Talent a
Distinguished Fellow at The Heritage Foundation, where he specializes in military readiness and welfare reform issues.)
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/07/A-Defense-Budget-to-Recapitalize-the-US-Military-with-Next-Generation-Platforms
The Current Condition of America's Military After the Cold War ended, the Clinton Administration believed an era of peace was at hand. Consequently, it cut both
the size of the military and the funding for procurement and modernization far below what was necessary to sustain American capabilities. Under President
Clinton, the active duty Army was reduced to 10-division strength--a decision that virtually everyone now agrees was a mistake. Acquisition of vital equipment
was reduced as well. In some cases, the Pentagon cut by 80 percent to 90 percent the number of platforms (ships, planes, and tracked vehicles) purchased,
compared to what was procured on average from 1975 to 1990. In effect, the Clinton Administration forced the military to take a procurement "holiday."
President George W. Bush increased spending on the military, but not nearly enough to make up for the failures of the 1990s. As a result, the military's capital
inventory has become dangerously outdated. For example, in 1973, at the end of the Vietnam era, the average age of Air Force aircraft was approximately nine
years. Twenty years later, the average age of the inventory was just under 15 years. Today, the average age has risen to nearly 25 years. The other services are
in similar condition. America is in danger of losing vital capabilities. Without adequate numbers of new F-22 fighter aircraft,
America will not be able to maintain air superiority over the Taiwan Strait. Without a larger Navy and enhanced airlift
and refueling capability, America cannot project power quickly. If the submarine fleet drops below minimum
requirements, the Navy cannot gather intelligence or protect its carriers. Without vehicles and tanks that are less
vulnerable and computer-linked, the Army cannot win regional conflicts decisively or conduct counterterrorism
missions with minimal loss of life. There is no question that planned modernization budgets are inadequate for the
military to sustain the capabilities on which America depends. At Heritage, we have documented that the shortfall is
roughly $50 billion per year. Other experts, including those at the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), believe the
shortfall is much higher. Supporting adequate and stable defense budgets is the only solution that will allow the
military to upgrade and recapitalize its inventory of ships, planes, and aircraft.
Extension of missile shield is part of the overall geostrategic plans of the US to
spread its military presence.
Rick Rozoff, September 11, 2009 Rick Rozoff is a frequent contributor to Global Research
U.S. Expands Global Missile Shield Into Middle East, Balkans http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2009/09/11/u-s-expands-global-missile-shield-into-middle-eastbalkans/
The extension of American global missile shield designs into the Middle East and Southeastern Europe is an integral
part of global geostrategic plans which were summarized concisely and penetratingly by a Bangladeshi writer last
November:
“The current NMD [National Missile Defense] project involves using radars in Alaska and California in the US and at Fylingdales in the UK, and in Greenland. The
latest plan of deploying a radar base in the Czech Republic is basically relocating the existing radar base at the Kwajalein Atoll [in the] Marshall Islands. Besides,
the US plans to install 10 more interceptors in silos in Poland.
“Even after 1991, [the U.S.] did not go for closing down its military bases scattered around the world, but rather
continued expanding the network in many strategic positions.
“In Eastern Europe it basically filled the vacuum created by the end of the Warsaw Pact.
“Moreover, Central Asia, a very crucial passageway in the global oil supply chain, also came under the purview of US
dominance. These deliberate moves created lots of irritation among regional powers like Russia and China.
“Surely the proposed radar base in the Czech Republic and missile interceptors in Poland are not to protect the US from Iran or North Korea’s missiles but are to
ensure the US plan to establish and exercise stringent control over the world using its prevailing 725 military bases.” [28]
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NMD Good- solves war.
NMD is affordable – and it also solves for totalitarian regimes and war
Talent 09 (“A Defense Budget to Recapitalize the U.S. Military with Next-Generation Platforms”) (Published on July 14, 2009 by Jim Talent a
Distinguished Fellow at The Heritage Foundation, where he specializes in military readiness and welfare reform issues.)
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/07/A-Defense-Budget-to-Recapitalize-the-US-Military-with-Next-Generation-Platforms
An Adequate Defense Budget Is Fully Affordable Is the 4 percent benchmark affordable? This year, in quick order, Congress
has passed the TARP legislation, which cost $700 billion; the stimulus package, which cost $800 billion; and the
fiscal 2009 budget, which added $1.2 trillion to the debt. Congress also approved a fiscal 2010 budget resolution that
will increase the debt by another $800 billion. The stimulus bill increased expenditures on programs like Pell Grants
and Medicaid. If extended, they will add another $3.3 trillion to the debt over the next 10 years. All told, the CBO has
said that these spending measures will add $10 trillion to the national debt over the next 10 years.
For just 5 percent of that money, the government could have recapitalized the military with the next generation of
platforms that will sustain America's technological superiority against any foreseeable threat. After the frenzy of
government spending over the past few months, those who do not want to sustain the diverse capabilities of the
armed services should at least be intellectually honest enough not to hide behind budgetary reasons as an excuse.
Conclusion Support for increased defense spending is a practical position rather than an ideological one. The global leadership role that America
adopted after World War II, though not without its downsides, has successfully prevented the two worst disasters that could
befall the world: totalitarian domination and another general war. In the process, a great deal of good has resulted.
The United States has prospered for three generations, Europe has resolved the age-old conflicts that divided it, democracies have sprung
up all over the world, and billions of people who were living in despair now have the hope of freedom. It would be the
height of folly--a strategic mistake of the first order--to imperil those achievements by failing to make the modest
sacrifices necessary to sustain the military power that made them possible.
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NMD good – Diplomacy
Ballistic Missile Defense supports U.S. diplomacy and defense
Rose 10
“Ballistic Missile Defense System Joint/Combined Warfighter Conference 10-1” Frank A. Rose: Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Verification, Compliance,
and Implementation Schriever Air Force Base, CO March 16, 2010 http://www.state.gov/t/vci/rls/138554.htm
reviewing the role missile defense plays in the broader U.S. international security strategy. Missile
defense supports diplomacy and defense, two of the three pillars of international security strategy (the third pillar
being development). Missile defenses assure our allies and partners that the United States has the will and the
means to deter and, if necessary, defeat a ballistic missile attack against our allies and our forward deployed troops and
assets. Missile defenses also provide U.S. and allied forces with freedom of maneuver by helping to negate the
ability of regional actors to inhibit or disrupt U.S. military access and operations in the region. Less obvious, perhaps,
is the role of missile defense in supporting our diplomatic objectives. Our potential adversaries use ballistic missiles
in peacetime as a tool to support their diplomatic objectives and sometimes to intimidate or coerce their regional
neighbors. By offering missile defenses as a means of regional protection, we enhance the credibility of U.S.
extended deterrence commitments for our allies and friends, which in turn enables us to build coalitions for
accomplishing shared objectives. Our friends and allies are therefore free to respond diplomatically or, if necessary,
militarily, to these threats because they have confidence that an effective missile defense strategy is in place. Missile
defenses also provide more options, including time, for the peaceful resolution of disputes, thereby enhancing
regional stability and extended deterrence. Missile defenses also give us the ability and time to pursue diplomatic
solutions to crises that we do not want to allow to escalate. With that as background, let me next discuss how the new U.S. approach to
Let me begin by
missile defense fits and how it was developed. This new U.S. approach has been driven by growth in the regional ballistic missile threat and new technology
opportunities offered by increasingly capable missile defense systems such as sea-based Aegis SM-3 interceptors and new forward-based sensors for detecting
and tracking missiles. The overwhelming ballistic missile threat to U.S. deployed forces and our friends and allies around the world comes from short- and
medium-range ballistic missiles. That said, states like North Korea and Iran also continue to pursue technologies to support long-range missile development,
such as space launch vehicles, but there remains uncertainty about when a missile threat to the U.S. homeland will mature. As a result of these two key
the United States has rebalanced the missile defense program to focus greater attention on countering the
current threat to U.S. forces, Allies, and partners while maintaining our ability to defend the homeland. This rebalancing of
factors,
the missile defense program began in the Fiscal Year 2010 budget. In that budget, funding for regional missile defense systems, such as the Aegis Ballistic
Missile Defense and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense systems, was increased by almost $1 billion. This trend toward increased funding for regional
missile defense systems has continued in the President’s Fiscal Year 2011 budget. The Administration also made a number of other adjustments to the program
(many of which you’ll hear discussed at this conference). For example, the decision to cap the number of long-range interceptors based in Alaska and California
at 30 instead of 44 is based on our expectations that 30 interceptors are sufficient to counter the likely long-range missile threat to the United States in the
foreseeable future. That said, in the FY11 budget, the United States is maintaining and improving our effective capability against long-range threats to the United
States by continuing to invest and ensure that the system is well-tested and operationally effective. This approach was crystallized in the Ballistic Missile Defense
Review report, or BMDR, which was directed by the President and Congress and submitted to Congress last month. The BMDR comprehensively considered
U.S. ballistic missile defense policy, strategy, plans, and programs. The BMDR endorses aligning the missile defense posture with the nearterm regional threat while sustaining and technically enhancing our ability to defend the homeland against a limited long-range attack.
Furthermore, it recommends pursuing region-by-region approaches to missile defense. As outlined in the BMDR, three principles will guide the
development of regional approaches: First, the United States will strengthen regional deterrence architectures by building them on a solid foundation of strong
cooperative relationships and appropriate burden sharing with our allies. Second, the United States will pursue a phased adaptive approach within each region
that is tailored to the threats unique to that region, including their scale, scope and pace of their development, and the capabilities available and most suited for
deployment. Third, as demand for missile defense assets within each region is expected to exceed supply, the United States will develop capabilities that are
mobile and can be relocated in times of crisis. This should help deter would-be adversaries in all regions from thinking they can gain some long-term advantage.
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NMD good – NATO Cooperation
Ballistic Missile Defense contributes to our commitment to NATO
Rose 10 “Ballistic Missile Defense System Joint/Combined Warfighter Conference 10-1” Frank A. Rose: Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Verification,
Compliance, and Implementation Schriever Air Force Base, CO March 16, 2010 http://www.state.gov/t/vci/rls/138554.htm
On that note, let me say a few things about missile defense cooperation with NATO. Anchoring the new U.S. approach
to missile defense in
a strong NATO foundation is a key objective of the United States. The new system is designed to reinforce and
demonstrate our strong commitment to NATO’s Article 5 which states that an attack on one NATO ally will be
considered an attack on all allies. We believe our new approach is fully consistent with the Alliance’s approach to
missile defense. In their April 4, 2009, Strasbourg/Kehl Summit Declaration, Alliance Heads of State and Government
stated that: “We judge that missile threats should be addressed in a prioritized manner that includes consideration of
the level of imminence of the threat and the level of acceptable risk.” More recently, the December 2009 Foreign
Ministerial statement acknowledged that missile defense plays an important role as part of the Alliance’s response to
ballistic missile threats. NATO also welcomed the PAA, which further reinforces NATO’s central role in missile
defense in Europe. Accordingly, NATO indicated that should the Alliance develop a territorial missile defense system,
the PAA would provide a valuable national contribution to such a system. As we move toward the next Alliance Heads of State and
Government Summit in November in Lisbon, the United States believes the Alliance should endorse the idea of protecting its
territory and population centers from ballistic missile threats. We would also like to see the Alliance continue to fund the Active Layered
Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense (or ALTBMD, in shorthand) command and control system to defend its forces and eventually to perform the territorial defense
mission. The U.S. contribution to a NATO territorial BMD mission will be the PAA, and we will not ask NATO to fund PAA assets. Additionally, should the
ALTBMD system be expanded to include territorial defense, other NATO allies will be able to contribute their assets to the defense of Europe. The more allies
NATO and U.S. combined defense efforts will thus be complementary and
interoperable, expanding opportunities for alliance-building and burden-sharing between the United States and our
NATO partners.
that participate, the greater the defense of Europe will be.
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NMD’s – No Link to Russia ADV
U.S. National Missile Defense does not threaten Russia
Rose 10 “Ballistic Missile Defense System Joint/Combined Warfighter Conference 10-1” Frank A. Rose: Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Verification,
Compliance, and Implementation Schriever Air Force Base, CO March 16, 2010 http://www.state.gov/t/vci/rls/138554.htm
As we have made clear numerous times, our ballistic missile defense capabilities, particularly those in Europe but also those deployed in the
represent no threat to Russia. On January 29, Secretary of State Clinton delivered a speech on the Future
of European Security in Paris. She said, and I quote, “We are engaged in productive discussions with our European
allies about building a new missile defense architecture that will defend all of NATO territory against ballistic missile
attack. And we are serious about exploring ways to cooperate with Russia to develop missile defenses that enhance
the security of all of Europe, including Russia. Missile defense, we believe, will make this continent a safer place.
That safety could extend to Russia, if Russia decides to cooperate with us. It is an extraordinary opportunity for us to work
together to build our mutual security.” As the Secretary noted, the United States and Russia face similar threats from
the proliferation of ballistic missiles, and so the United States would welcome the opportunity to cooperate with
Russia on missile defense. We also believe that Russia has the ability to affect the threat from Iran by working with
us through the P5+1 process. (The P5-plus-1 refers to the five permanent U.N. Security Council members – Britain,
China, France, Russia and the United States – plus Germany. These nations are engaged in talks with Iran regarding
international concerns about Iran’s nuclear program.) At the July 2009 Moscow Summit, the United States and
Russia agreed to conduct a Joint Threat Assessment – JTA for shorthand – to exchange our respective analyses,
resolve, if possible, our differences but, at minimum, provide each other the underlying threat perspectives. To that
end, we have established an interagency JTA Working Group, which met most recently in late December in
Washington, D.C., and will meet again in the coming months. Additionally, in the Arms Control and International
Security Working Group under the U.S.-Russia Joint Presidential Commission, the United States has tabled a
number of proposals for bilateral missile defense cooperation, and we welcome Russia’s suggestions as well. We
also are interested in exploring the mutual benefits of joint monitoring and early warning from threats in the Middle
East, including pre-notification of ballistic missile and space launch vehicle launches. In addition to our bilateral efforts, the United States also supports efforts
to foster cooperation between NATO and Russia in the missile defense area. At the 60th anniversary of NATO held last spring in
Strasbourg-Kehl, NATO leaders reaffirmed their support for increased missile defense cooperation with Russia and
their readiness to explore the potential for linking U.S., NATO, and Russian missile defense systems. To paraphrase
NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s remarks at the October 2009 Defense Ministerial in Bratislava,
“this is good for the Alliance, it is good for solidarity, and it is important for the defense of Europe.”
United States,
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NMDs Good – U.S. Safety
90% of American public agrees - NMD production prevents unauthorized missile
launches, protects homeland
Kouri ’09 (Jim, vice-president of the National Association of Chiefs of Police, July 20, 2009, “Security: Obama, Gates gamble with American lives,”
http://www.enterstageright.com/archive/articles/0709/0709security.htm)
While President Obama and the Democrat-run US Congress spend trillions of dollars, Secretary Robert Gates and Obama's Administration have requested a
drawdown of 32 percent in the 2010 fiscal year budget for the long-range ballistic missile defense system -- a specific reduction from 44 ground based
interceptors to 30 ground based interceptors -- to protect the United States of America from long range ballistic missiles, according to Riki Ellison, the Chairman
and Founder of Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, a non-profit national security think tank. Ellison states that he believes that the current position of the
Secretary of Defense places the security of the United States from current and future long-range ballistic missile threats to the nation and population at a much
higher risk then it should be after the $13 billion US tax dollar investment in this system. "Ellison, like many Americans, is concerned over President Obama's
cavalier attitude about national security. His national security team, including his Secretary for Homeland Security Janet Napolitano and his Attorney General Eric
Holder, appear more concerned with American dissenters and patriots than with genuine enemies of the United States," said former police detective and US
Marine intelligence officer Ben Cardoza. "While spending trillions of taxpayer bucks on failed social and economic programs, Obama and his people are seeking
to balance the budget by cutting protection and putting millions of American at risk," he added. Ellison pointed out the following in a report to the 14,000-
The threat from North Korea and Iran remains consistent. The ballistic missile
launches from these two countries this year and has given them greater understanding and confidence. The
countries are proceeding at a steady pace to improve their systems range, payload, staging and accuracy. They are
making progress and are consistent with previous Department of Defense threat assessments that directed an acceptable risk of
interceptors needed for the protection of the United States. Nothing has changed this assessment and calculus to reduce the long range
member National Association of Chiefs of Police:
ballistic threat capability to the United States. Reducing the Shot Doctrine 'look-shoot-look': the amount of interceptors that are needed to fire at one incoming
missile to assure success, reliability and confidence of the missile defense system. This number has been as high as four or more GBIs to one incoming missile
to insure 90 percent plus confidence in a not fully mature system (GBI) that has been initially deployed while still being tested for its capabilities during its
deployment. Nothing in the past year with the confidence in the reliability of the GBI system and its testing has shown the need to reduce the shot doctrine from a
high number to a low number. A reduced shot doctrine of two shots or less to one ballistic missile has been suggested as a reason to reduce the 44 interceptors
to 30 interceptors, thus significantly increasing the risk that assured destruction of a long range ballistic missile by the GBIs and potential anomalies of that
system would be successful What amount of risk is the Department of Defense taking against a known enemy and relying on a deterrent value of the long-range
ballistic missile system rather than in the systems war fighting capability? In every war game using missile defenses that the current US military war fighters have
participated in, every
participating US military war fighter has requested more defensive missiles. Iran has achieved a
successful space launch earlier this year placing a satellite into orbit. North Korea this year has come close to attaining a space launch but
failed in its attempt in the third stage. Once these countries gain maturity on the technology and the correct design on longrange ballistic missiles, mass production of these production designs becomes eminent. The Department of Defense and the
intelligence community do not know what those numbers could be and cannot control production of these missiles. Accidental
launch capability against unauthorized long-range ballistic missile launches needs to be factored in the overall calculus for amount of GBIs needed. There are
more countries that will have more ballistic missiles and these countries may not have the controls to prevent
unauthorized launches. United States tax dollars have paid approximately $13 billion for the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system. The
cost of deploying the remaining 14 missiles in silos on missile field at Fort Greely, Alaska is approximately $116 million. It is just 1 percent of the total expenditure
to complete the system as designed. "This is a matter of determining what risk is acceptable and tolerable to our nation by not fully completing the deployment of
the ground-based interceptors to protect us against future long range ballistic missile threats," said Ellison. "The American public continues to
show overwhelming support at close to 90 percent for the need for missile defense and protection of their homeland.
It would be risky business to put our nation at risk and not listen to the American public."
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NMD Good: Protects America
Without NMDs, 70% to 90% of Americans at risk of nuclear death and economic
devastation
Holmes, ’09
(Kim, Vice President, Foreign and Defense Policy Studies, and Director, The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International
Studies, June 30, 09, “What Americans Need to Know About Missile Defense: We're Not There Yet” http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/06/WhatAmericans-Need-to-Know-About-Missile-Defense-Were-Not-There-Yet)
In 33 minutes or less, life as we know it in America could end. That's how long it would take for an enemy ballistic
missile launched from the other side of the world to hit the United States. If it carried and detonated a nuclear
weapon high over the center of the country, the electromagnetic pulse (EMP) would literally fry the nation's electrical grid and all of the
circuitry that powers our homes, businesses, hospitals, phones, cars, planes, traffic lights, ATMs, water supplies, and anything else not "hardened" against such
attacks. The
EMP Commission chairman has testified that, within just one year of such an attack, 70 percent to 90
percent of Americans would be dead from starvation and disease.[1] This is not science fiction. We know the devastating impact of a
direct nuclear attack. We know the dire results from an EMP, thanks to U.S. and Soviet nuclear tests in the 1960s. Yet Washington policymakers still bicker over
the need for defenses that make such weapons pointless. The Obama Administration has put on hold agreements that the U.S. signed with the Czech Republic
and Poland to deploy missile defenses for Europe. The President is cutting missile defense spending by over $1 billion even as he plans to spend a similar
amount just to get "clunkers" off the road. He has decided not to deploy all of the ground-based interceptors already funded and to cancel programs that could
enable us to destroy missiles very shortly after launch. All of this makes no sense at the same time that North Korea is testing nuclear weapons
and short- and long-range ballistic missiles to deliver them and when Iran may be just one year away from producing its first
nuclear weapon. Should these regimes succeed in gaining the capabilities they seek before we have deployed adequate missile
defenses, they could hold America and the free world hostage merely by threatening an attack. Washington's reluctance also
makes little sense because Americans overwhelmingly support missile defense. The problem is that too many of us still think we already have all we need. We
don't. Yes, we have made tremendous progress technologically in the past eight years, but there are portions of the United States that cannot be defended today
against all threats. Americans need to understand what defenses we have and what we still need. These answers to common questions aim to provide the basic
facts. For additional information and arguments, please visit www.33minutes.org and our missile defense reader at
the
United States military today cannot protect all of our citizens or all of our territory--or, for that matter, all of our troops,
allies, and friends abroad--from the range of possible ballistic missile attacks. Despite recent progress and technological advances,
http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/2006/pdf/SDI_reader.pdf. Question: Don't we already have all the missile defenses we need? No. The truth is that
we do not yet have what we need. We probably could shoot down ten or so ballistic missiles launched from North Korea, or from Iran should it gain long-range
capabilities, but not if they coordinated an attack. And we have no protection from Russia's or China's ballistic missiles or any short-range or Scud missiles
launched from ships off our coast. To shoot down ballistic missiles, especially shortly after launch to prevent the greatest loss of life and property, we need an
array of defensive interceptors and radar systems on land, at sea, and in space. The Missile Defense Agency calls this an "integrated ballistic missile defense
system."[2] Currently, we have 26 ground-based interceptors (GBIs) stationed in Alaska and California to defend against long-range missile attacks.[3] The
Missile Defense Agency expects to have 28 in place by the end of 2009. Regrettably, the President's budget eliminates plans to deploy
44 GBIs by 2011, which would enable us to defend against even more missiles and warheads. The U.S. Navy has equipped
21 Aegis warships with sea-based interceptors and long-range surveillance and tracking systems; many are stationed in the Pacific and the Sea of Japan. Their
interceptors can take out short- and medium-range missiles in mid-flight. Equipping additional Aegis cruisers will enable us to patrol America's coasts as well.
Supporting all of our defenses are long-range or transportable radar systems located in California, the United Kingdom, Greenland, and Japan; an upgraded
radar in the Aleutian Islands; and one that is being deployed in Israel. Because Iran's missiles can now reach portions of Europe and because of our treaty
obligation to our allies there, we signed agreements in 2008 to station additional radar and interceptors in the Czech Republic and Poland, but the Obama
Administration has put these agreements on hold. Obama's missile defense cuts also put promising boost-phase systems such as the Airborne Laser (ABL) on
hold. Mounted on modified Boeing 747s, ABLs would enable us to knock down long-range missiles soon after launch, before the warheads could be deployed.
Boost-phase defenses like this are precisely what we need to defend against nuclear-armed missiles. Another defensive system falling by the budget wayside is
the Multiple Kill Vehicle that could destroy multiple incoming warheads and decoys. It isn't fully developed yet, but there aren't any major issues standing in its
way. The same can be said for the Space Tracking and Surveillance System (SSTS) sensor program that would help our defenders distinguish between real
warheads and decoys in space that are meant to overwhelm our missile defenses. Missile defense needs such capabilities to stay ahead of
our enemies' game. Question: Are we really at risk of missile attack? Yes. Millions of Americans are at risk of attack from a growing
number of states as well as non-state terrorist organizations. Today, there are nine states in the once-exclusive nuclear club, and Iran--with its hostile
regime and its long record of supporting terrorists--is knocking at the door. Moreover, there are growing concerns that anti-American Islamist radicals in Pakistan might seize control of
the government and its nuclear weapons. In addition, 28 countries have ballistic missile capabilities. Some, with help from other states, are rapidly improving their arsenals. China has
shown that it is capable of targeting U.S. satellites with ballistic missiles, destructive lasers, and EMP warheads. North Korea has over 1,000 missiles and is selling missiles and
technology to other countries.[4]It has tested over 25 missiles with ranges of up to 1,200 miles that could hit South Korea and Japan.[5]It is working on a Taepodong-2 with a range of
3,000 to 3,700 miles that could one day hit Alaska and some parts of Hawaii if it functioned at its full capacity. As this paper is being written, many in Washington worry that North Korea
may launch a long-range missile toward Hawaii on July 4th. We know that Iran is one of North Korea's biggest customers for long-range ballistic missile technology. Tehran, which has
tested over 35 missiles since 1998, has one of the largest ballistic missile inventories in the Middle East.[6] Its last successful test this past May was of a multiple-stage surface-tosurface missile that could not only target Israel, but also reach parts of Europe.[7] The U.S. Air Force National Air and Space Intelligence Center recently predicted that, at this pace and
with sufficient foreign assistance, Iran may be able to threaten the United States with a missile strike by 2015.[8] It also is test-launching missiles vertically from ships in harbors,
suggesting that it might try to detonate a weapon in space to cause a destructive EMP attack. The threat of an EMP attack is worrisome. As the EMP Commission reported in 2004,
some countries "employ EMP as the primary or sole means of attack. Indeed, as recently as May 1999, during the NATO bombing of the former Yugoslavia, high-ranking members of
the Russian Duma, meeting with a U.S. congressional
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……….Continued from above, no text deleted
delegation to discuss the Balkans conflict, raised the specter of a Russian EMP attack that would paralyze the United States."[9] The commission also has
pointed out that, because the U.S. is so heavily dependent on electronics and modern technology, EMP attacks may be more appealing to terrorists and state
actors who possess relatively unsophisticated missiles. The need to be able to shoot down any ballistic missile that threatens America or its allies is vital and
increasing rapidly. Question: What missile defenses do we still need? The U.S. Constitution obligates the President and Congress to provide for the common
defense. To fully protect America and its allies from missile attack, we need to continue expanding and restore and fully fund the Missile Defense Agency's
budget. We need to continue improving our current ground-based, sea-based, and air-based capabilities. And we need to invest in current and future spacebased technologies such as STSS and directed-energy weapons such as ABLs. To protect our allies in Europe against Iran's long-range missiles, the
Administration should fully implement our 2008 agreements with the Czech Republic and Poland as soon as their parliaments ratify them. We should also
consider additional foreign sites for missile defense deployments to protect our allies, which would require additional funding from Congress. Question: Do
missile defenses really work? Those who want to constrain missile defense spending until we can prove that systems "work" are implying that they do not now
work. This is wrong. Since the December 2002 decision to pursue missile defense, the U.S. military has had a 97 percent testing success record.[10] Of its 38
complete tests of current ground-based, sea-based, and air-based defensive systems, only one resulted in a "miss." In 2008, we tested the system in a real-world
scenario: We destroyed a malfunctioning satellite in space before it could come crashing down to earth. Missile defense not only works, but works well. Our "hitto-kill" systems using non-explosive interceptors can hit a missile within inches of where they are aimed. According to General "Trey" Obering, "we've gotten
beyond being able to hit a bullet with a bullet. We are now able to hit a spot on a bullet with a bullet."[11] Regrettably, the Missile Defense Agency under
President Obama is beginning to slow all the progress we've made in developing even more effective defenses. It is adopting a spiral development strategy: We'll
build a little, then test a little, then build a little and test a little. This is unwise. Every day that the fielding of state-of-the-art missile defenses is delayed in this way
is one more day that Americans and our allies stay vulnerable to attack. Question: Isn't the cost of missile defense prohibitive? There are two ways to answer
this question: We can compare what we have spent with other U.S. government expenditures, or we can compare it with the probable damage costs if one
ballistic missile should get through. Since 1985, the United States has invested about $138 billion in missile defense--an average of $5.8 billion or so per year. In
2008, the Missile Defense Agency invested over $8 billion, or less than 1/70th of our total spending on defense. To put these amounts in perspective, consider
that the 9/11 attacks on New York City, which did not involve a nuclear weapon, caused about $83 billion in damages. In the first 12 months following the 9/11
attack, U.S. economic activity is estimated to have fallen by as much as $225 billion. Or consider that the President plans to spend $399 billion--$1 billion per
day--of the stimulus package in 2010 alone[12] and that he approved over 8,000 earmarked pork-barrel projects in his first spending bill last March that will cost
$7.6 billion.[13]Such amounts dwarf our investment in critical missile defense systems. The reality becomes even more worrisome when we consider that the
President's $1.4 billion cuts in the Missile Defense Agency budget come even as the threat grows.[14] Russia is upgrading its missile bases and positioning
short-range missiles on its border with Poland to target U.S. defensive interceptors. China now has 1,500 missiles positioned on the shore opposite Taiwan.
North Korea is testing missiles and conducting underground nuclear tests. Iran is testing newly modified long-range missiles and enriching uranium. Diplomacy is
not lessening these threats. In fact, it may actually play into others' hands as they try to drive wedges between the U.S. and its allies, lessen its influence in their
regions, and dictate U.S. policy. The President's cuts make even less sense given that $1.4 billion is a mere 0.04 percent of his total proposed federal budget,
and the roughly $10 billion we spend on missile defense each year amounts to only 13 percent of what local, state, and federal government agencies pay for first
responders. It is quite small if we compare it to the cost of an attack: A
study for the Department of Energy in 2006 estimated that if just
one 13-kiloton bomb hit New York City, cleanup and recovery costs could "approach the level of the entire U.S. gross
domestic product in 2005...the entire output of the U.S. economy, every factory, store and business, for a full
year."[15] Failing to protect ourselves could have consequences and costs that are immeasurably greater than the
cost of missile defense.
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___ of ___
NMDs Good – Arms Race
NMDs prevent arms race
Holmes, ’09
(Kim, Vice President, Foreign and Defense Policy Studies, and Director, The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International
Studies, June 30, 09, “What Americans Need to Know About Missile Defense: We're Not There Yet” http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/06/WhatAmericans-Need-to-Know-About-Missile-Defense-Were-Not-There-Yet)
Question: Won't we start a new arms race by insisting on missile defenses? If anything, the opposite is likely: Missile
defenses may actually
prevent a new arms race. After years of negotiation and diplomacy, the arms race around the world has intensified, thanks primarily to the illicit
proliferation of weapons and technologies by actors like Pakistan's father of nuclear weapons, A. Q. Khan, and states like Iran and North Korea that want greater
regional influence and international "respect." Since missile defenses are entirely defensive, studies show that they actually have
a stabilizing effect on an otherwise fragile security environment.[16] Hostile countries will not invest in costly weapons
that probably will not reach their targets. Any defenses that could destroy a ballistic missile in flight, particularly
before it reaches space, take away the very reason our enemies want those missiles it the first place. China and Russia,
with their large missile arsenals, understand this. That's why they are pushing the U.S. to negotiate a new treaty, the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space
Treaty, which could be used to prevent us from deploying defenses in space. Collegially
constraining our own defenses to keep others
happy merely encourages them to move ahead at full speed with their own weapons programs.
Eating cocaine off of American gravestones.
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Sloths! Sloths!
___ of ___
NMD Good: Rogue States
Without NMD, the US will be vulnerable to an unexpected nuclear, chemical, and
biological attack from North Korea and Iran
Yonhap 2010 (Source: Yonhap news agency, Seoul, in English 1559 gmt 20 Apr 10)
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2010/04/21/26/0301000000AEN20100421000200315F.HTML
North Korea and Iran pose a major missile threat to the United States with their push to develop long-range missiles
that can reach the continental US, a senior US official said Tuesday. "The threat to the US homeland from states like North Korea and Iran
continues to develop," James Miller, principal deputy undersecretary of defence for policy, told a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing. "Neither has yet
acquired ICBMs that could reach the United States, but both are working to acquire and/or develop long-range ballistic missile capabilities, including spacelaunched vehicles, which include many of the necessary technologies. ICBM stands for intercontinental ballistic missile. North Korea's first ballistic missile was
launched in the summer of 1998 in the skies over Japan before falling into waters off Alaska, shocking both the Japanese and Americans. Pyongyang has since
launched several long-range missiles, most recently in April last year, which the North claimed was part of a peaceful space programme to put a satellite into
orbit. While the launch was deemed a failure by the international community, it invited strong UN sanctions. In response to the sanctions, Pyongyang detonated
a nuclear device, the second of its kind after another blast in 2006, and boycotted the six-party talks on ending its nuclear weapons programmes, demanding the
sanctions be lifted. Miller expressed concerns about the North's missile capability. "Both
Iran and North Korea present a significant regional
missile threat," he said. "The ballistic missile threat today is increasing both quantitatively and qualitatively and is likely
to continue to do so over the next decade. Several states are also developing nuclear, chemical and/or biological
warheads for their missiles." The official's remarks are in line with the Ballistic Missile Defence Review 2010 report released by the Pentagon in
February to assess the US government's missile defence policy in the coming years. The report said that North Korea "successfully tested many
technologies associated with an ICBM despite the most recent launch's failure in its stated mission of orbiting a small communications satellite."
The report also said, "If there are no major changes in its national security strategy in the next decade, it will be able to mate a
nuclear warhead to a proven delivery system." US missile defence focuses on North Korea and Iran rather than on Russia or China, Miller said.
"The top priority for US missile defence efforts is to defend the United States from the threat of missile attack by
regional actors such as North Korea or Iran," he said. "The United States does not intend for missile defence to affect the strategic balance with
Russia or China." "Through our missile defence programmes, the United States seeks to dissuade states such as North
Korea or Iran from developing an ICBM, and, failing this, to deter them from using it, or if necessary, to defeat their
attacks," the official said.
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NMD decreases prolif
NMD is absolutely key to protecting the US and its allies, as well as promoting nonproliferation by making ballistic missiles obsolete.
Patrick O’Reilly 2009
(Lieutenant General Patrick J. O’Reilly is the Director of the Missile Defense Agency. This article is a condensed version of Gen.
Reilly’s testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Strategic Forces Subcommittee on 21 May 2009. “US Missile Defence – The Way Forward”
http://www.defpro.com/daily/details/358/)
The possession of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles by potential adversaries is an urgent security
issue for the United States and our allies. Effective missile defences can contribute to US non-proliferation objectives
by devaluing ballistic missiles in the eyes of our adversaries as a useful delivery system for conventional munitions
and WMD. Equally important, missile defence can help the country prepare for situations where diplomacy and nonproliferation initiatives have failed by deterring aggression and, after ballistic missiles are launched, by limiting
damage locally or regionally. Threat Assessment: The proliferation of ballistic missiles of all ranges continues. Current trends
indicate that proliferation of ballistic missile systems, using advanced liquid- or solid-propellant propulsion technologies, are becoming more mobile, survivable,
reliable, accurate and capable of striking targets over longer distances. The proliferation of ballistic missiles is increasing the number of anti-access weapons
available to potential regional adversaries. These weapons could be used to reduce military options available to Combatant Commanders and decrease the
survivability of regional military assets. Iran has grown its short- and medium-range missile inventories, while improving the
lethality, deployability, and effectiveness of existing systems with new propellants, more accurate guidance systems,
and sub-munitions payloads. With the successful launch of the SAFIR Space Launch Vehicle on 2 February 2009, Iran demonstrated technologies
that are directly applicable to the development of ICBMs. North Korea deploys a NO DONG ballistic missile capable of reaching
Japan and South Korea and US bases throughout the region, and continues to develop a new intermediate-range ballistic missile
(IRBM) capable of reaching Guam and the Aleutian Islands. Despite the failure to place an object in orbit on 5 April 2009, North Korea
successfully demonstrated the same staging and separation technologies required to launch a two-stage TAEPO-DONG 2 ICBM capable of reaching much of the
United States. An additional concern is North Korea’s and Iran’s repeated demonstrations of salvo launches, indicating large ballistic missile attack raid sizes
must be considered in developing the BMDS capability. Syria continues to field updated short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) systems and acquire SCUD-related
equipment and materials from North Korea and Iran. In sum, there has been an increase of over 1,200 additional ballistic missiles over the past five years,
bringing the total of ballistic missiles outside the US, NATO, Russia and China to over 5,900 (with SRBMs making up 93% of this total and MRBMs making up
6%), with hundreds of launchers and missiles within the range of our deployed forces today (with SRBM launchers making up 91% of this total and MRBM
launchers making up 9%). Missile Defence Approach and Strategy The mission of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is to develop defences to protect the US
homeland, deployed forces, Allies and friends against ballistic missiles of all ranges and in all phases of flight. Given the unique characteristics of short-, medium, intermediate-, and intercontinental ballistic missiles, no one missile defence interceptor or sensor system can effectively counter all ballistic missile threats.
Warfighters are not only faced with the challenge of intercepting relatively small objects at great distances and very high velocities, but they may have to counter
large raid sizes involving combinations of SRBMs, MRBMs, IRBMs, and ICBMs and, in the future, countermeasures associated with sophisticated ballistic missile
attacks. While countermeasures can be developed to degrade the performance of autonomous missile interceptor systems, it is much more difficult to develop
countermeasures that degrade fundamentally different missile defence interceptor systems operating together in different phases of a ballistic missile’s flight.
Thus, the most operationally effective missile defence architecture is a layering of endo-atmospheric and exo-atmospheric missile interceptor systems with
ground and space sensors connected and managed by a robust Command and Control, Battle Management and Communication (C2BMC) infrastructure.
Moreover, the most cost-effective missile defence architecture is one that emphasises early intercepts during a threat missile’s ascent phase of flight before
countermeasures can be deployed and before the remainder of the BMDS architecture is required to track and kill a threat re-entry vehicle and associated
objects.
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NMD removal leads to Asian prolif
Japan and South Korea want a strong US determent policy, removal of this could
result in an arms race in Asia
Christian Science Monitor Board, May 28, 2009, (“Why Obama can't be soft on North Korea; Japan and South Korea already see him as
eroding the US military posture in Asia.”, Lexis,
http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T9806736057&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=
151&resultsUrlKey=29_T9806736060&cisb=22_T9806736059&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=7945&docNo=152)
It was President Clinton who actually spoke those threatening "hard power" words - within earshot of North Korean soldiers - in 1993. At the time, Pyongyang
was revving up its nuclear-bomb program. Mr. Clinton knew something back then that Obama is learning on the job: Tough talk
against an enemy is
sometimes needed simply to reassure America's allies that the US will live up to its defense promises. Those
commitments include its unique role to provide nuclear deterrence, or promised retaliation, if an ally is attacked. By
his actions and his words, Obama is sending worrisome signals to Japan and South Korea that they might be left
alone in a confrontation with North Korea or even perhaps China. It's an impression he needs to correct quickly with
credible reassurance. Beyond Obama's lackluster response so far to North Korea's first successful atomic blast, Japan and South Korea worry
that the president's focus on his big domestic agenda will erode the US military posture in Asia and the will of
Americans to defend allies. They see Obama's pullout of troops from Iraq and the calls by some in the Democratic Party to set a timetable for a US
retreat from Afghanistan. They worry that his proposed cuts in ballistic-missile defense would leave Asian allies vulnerable
while his cuts in F-22 fighter jets would harm Japan's ability to build a similar plane to defend itself against China. They
watch as Obama cuts the US Navy's plans to build more ships to counter China's growing submarine fleet. They worry about US willingness to defend Taiwan as Bill Clinton did in 1996 - against a hostile confrontation with China. That worry stems from Beijing's recent success in luring Taipei's leaders toward closer ties
with the mainland, thus weakening US support for Taiwan's sovereignty and its military strength. Tokyo also notices that Obama has appointed a Democratic
Party fund-raiser as US ambassador to Japan and not a professional diplomat with Japanese experience.
And both Seoul and Tokyo are
worried about signals that Obama will hold direct talks with North Korea without including them. All these moves help
explain recent steps in Japan and South Korea to prepare for an Obama era of American retrenchment. Many
legislators in Seoul now want to delay the planned 2012 hand-over of the wartime operational control of South
Korean troops from the US. With North Korea soon able to place a nuclear weapon on a missile, they prefer the US
keep its hand on a military response. South Korea also decided this week to join the US-led global effort to interrupt air or sea deliveries by North
Korea of unconventional weapons or missile parts. In Japan, officials are so worried about the reliability of the US nuclear umbrella
that the ruling Liberal Democratic Party is debating whether to develop a capability to strike North Korea - "in order
not to sit and wait for death," as an LDP committee stated this week. Some LDP officials even want Japan to openly consider
acquiring its own nuclear-weapons capability. They cite polls showing a drop in trust of the US by the Japanese public, caused in part by its
weak stance toward North Korea. Coincidentally, a US Council on Foreign Relations report released Tuesday warned Obama that if he
doesn't reaffirm the US nuclear deterrence, "some US allies may decide in the future to acquire nuclear weapons."
Obama must not let North Korea's nuclear weapons ignite an arms race in Asia. The world must not again witness
the kind of military rivalry between Japan and China that led to World War II. In both words and deeds, the president must reaffirm a
strong, long-term US military commitment to its many allies in the region.
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NMD key to stop EMP attack
NMD is key to prevent the deaths of millions of US resident and nearly complete US
destruction. The impact is an EMP over the continental US, which is worse than
nuclear war.
Holmes 2009
(What Americans Need to Know About Missile Defense: We're Not There Yet Published on June 30, 2009 by Kim R. Holmes, Ph.D. , James
Carafano, Ph.D. , Peter Brookes and Baker Spring http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/06/What-Americans-Need-to-Know-About-Missile-DefenseWere-Not-There-Yet)
In 33 minutes or less, life as we know it in America could end. That's how long it would take for an enemy ballistic
missile launched from the other side of the world to hit the United States. If it carried and detonated a nuclear
weapon high over the center of the country, the electromagnetic pulse (EMP) would literally fry the nation's electrical
grid and all of the circuitry that powers our homes, businesses, hospitals, phones, cars, planes, traffic lights, ATMs,
water supplies, and anything else not "hardened" against such attacks. The EMP Commission chairman has testified that, within
just one year of such an attack, 70 percent to 90 percent of Americans would be dead from starvation and disease.[1]
This is not science fiction. We know the devastating impact of a direct nuclear attack. We know the dire results from an EMP, thanks
to U.S. and Soviet nuclear tests in the 1960s. Yet Washington policymakers still bicker over the need for defenses
that make such weapons pointless. The Obama Administration has put on hold agreements that the U.S. signed with the Czech Republic and
Poland to deploy missile defenses for Europe. The President is cutting missile defense spending by over $1 billion even as he plans to spend a similar amount
just to get "clunkers" off the road. He has decided not to deploy all of the ground-based interceptors already funded and to cancel programs that could enable us
to destroy missiles very shortly after launch. All of this makes no sense at the same time that North
Korea is testing nuclear weapons and
short- and long-range ballistic missiles to deliver them and when Iran may be just one year away from producing its
first nuclear weapon. Should these regimes succeed in gaining the capabilities they seek before we have deployed adequate missile defenses, they could
hold America and the free world hostage merely by threatening an attack. Washington's reluctance also makes little sense because Americans overwhelmingly
support missile defense. The problem is that too many of us still think we already have all we need. We don't. Yes, we have
made tremendous progress technologically in the past eight years, but there are portions of the United States that
cannot be defended today against all threats. Americans need to understand what defenses we have and what we still need. These answers to
common questions aim to provide the basic facts. For additional information and arguments, please visit www.33minutes.org and our missile defense reader at
http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/2006/pdf/SDI_reader.pdf. Question: Don't we already have all the missile defenses we need? No. The truth is that
the United States military today cannot protect all of our citizens or all of our territory--or, for that matter, all of our
troops, allies, and friends abroad--from the range of possible ballistic missile attacks. Despite recent progress and technological
advances, we do not yet have what we need. We probably could shoot down ten or soballistic missiles launched from North Korea, or from Iran
should it gain long-range capabilities, but not if they coordinated an attack. And we have no protection from Russia's or China's ballistic missiles or any shortrange or Scud missiles launched from ships off our coast. To shoot down ballistic missiles, especially shortly after launch to prevent the greatest loss of life and
property, we
need an array of defensive interceptors and radar systems on land, at sea, and in space. The Missile Defense
of Americans are
at risk of attack from a growing number of states as well as non-state terrorist organizations. Today, there are nine states in the
once-exclusive nuclear club, and Iran--with its hostile regime and its long record of supporting terrorists--is knocking at the door. Moreover, there are
growing concerns that anti-American Islamist radicals in Pakistan might seize control of the government and its
nuclear weapons. In addition, 28 countries have ballistic missile capabilities. Some, with help from other states, are rapidly improving their arsenals.
China has shown that it is capable of targeting U.S. satellites with ballistic missiles, destructive lasers, and EMP
warheads. North Korea has over 1,000 missiles and is selling missiles and technology to other countries.[4]It has tested over 25 missiles with ranges of up to
Agency calls this an "integrated ballistic missile defense system."[2] Question: Are we really at risk of missile attack? Yes. Millions
1,200 miles that could hit South Korea and Japan.[5]It is working on a Taepodong-2 with a range of 3,000 to 3,700 miles that could one day hit Alaska and some
parts of Hawaii if it functioned at its full capacity. As this paper is being written, many in Washington worry that North Korea may launch a long-range missile
toward Hawaii on July 4th. We know that Iran is one of North Korea's biggest customers for long-range ballistic missile technology. Tehran, which has tested
over 35 missiles since 1998, has one of the largest ballistic missile inventories in the Middle East.[6] Its last successful test this past May was of a multiple-stage
surface-to-surface missile that could not only target Israel, but also reach parts of Europe.[7] The U.S. Air Force National Air and Space Intelligence Center
recently predicted that, at this pace and with sufficient foreign assistance, Iran
may be able to threaten the United States with a missile
strike by 2015.[8] It also is test-launching missiles vertically from ships in harbors, suggesting that it might try to detonate a weapon in space to cause a
destructive EMP attack. The threat of an EMP attack is worrisome. As the EMP Commission reported in 2004, some countries "employ EMP as
the primary or sole means of attack. Indeed, as recently as May 1999, during the NATO bombing of the former Yugoslavia, high-ranking members
of the Russian Duma, meeting with a U.S. congressional delegation to discuss the Balkans conflict, raised the specter of a Russian EMP attack that would
paralyze the United States."[9] The commission also has pointed out that, because the U.S. is so heavily dependent on electronics and modern technology, EMP
attacks may be more appealing to terrorists and state actors who possess relatively unsophisticated missiles. The
any ballistic missile that threatens America or its allies is vital and increasing rapidly.
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need to be able to shoot down
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NMD Good- Must expand
NMD is frighteningly inadequate to ensure defense against a ballistic missile attack,
and we need to continue international expansion to ensure global security.
Holmes 2009
(“Security: Obama, Gates gamble with American lives” By Jim Kouriweb posted July 20, 2009, Jim Kouri, CPP is currently fifth vicepresident of the National Association of Chiefs of Police and he's a staff writer for the New Media Alliance (thenma.org). In addition, he's the blog editor for the
House Conservatives Fund's weblog. Recently, the editors Examiner.com appointed him as their Law Enforcement Examiner. Kouri also serves as political
advisor for Emmy and Golden Globe winning actor Michael Moriarty. He's former chief at a New York City housing project in Washington Heights nicknamed
"Crack City" by reporters covering the drug war in the 1980s. In addition, he served as director of public safety at a New Jersey university and director of security
for several major organizations. He's also served on the National Drug Task Force and trained police and security officers throughout the country. Kouri writes
for many police and security magazines including Chief of Police, Police Times, The Narc Officer and others. He's a news writer for NewswithViews.com and
PHXnews.com. He's also a columnist for AmericanDaily.Com, MensNewsDaily.Com, MichNews.Com, and he's syndicated by AXcessNews.Com. He's
appeared as on-air commentator for over 300 TV and radio news and talk shows including Oprah, McLaughlin Report, CNN Headline News, MTV, Fox News,
etc.)
While President Obama and the Democrat-run US Congress spend trillions of dollars, Secretary Robert Gates and
Obama's Administration have requested a drawdown of 32 percent in the 2010 fiscal year budget for the long-range
ballistic missile defense system -- a specific reduction from 44 ground based interceptors to 30 ground based
interceptors -- to protect the United States of America from long range ballistic missiles, according to Riki Ellison, the Chairman
and Founder of Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, a non-profit national security think tank. Ellison states that he believes that the current position of
the Secretary of Defense places the security of the United States from current and future long-range ballistic missile
threats to the nation and population at a much higher risk then it should be after the $13 billion US tax dollar
investment in this system. "Ellison, like many Americans, is concerned over President Obama's cavalier attitude about national security. His national
security team, including his Secretary for Homeland Security Janet Napolitano and his Attorney General Eric Holder, appear more concerned with American
dissenters and patriots than with genuine enemies of the United States," said former police detective and US Marine intelligence officer Ben Cardoza. "While
spending trillions of taxpayer bucks on failed social and economic programs, Obama and his people are seeking to balance the budget by cutting protection and
putting millions of American at risk," he added. Ellison pointed out the following in a report to the 14,000-member National Association of Chiefs of Police:
*
The threat from North Korea and Iran remains consistent. The ballistic missile launches from these two countries this year and has given
them greater understanding and confidence. The
countries are proceeding at a steady pace to improve their systems range,
payload, staging and accuracy. They are making progress and are consistent with previous Department of Defense threat assessments that directed
an acceptable risk of interceptors needed for the protection of the United States. Nothing has changed this assessment and calculus to reduce the long range
ballistic threat capability to the United States.
* Reducing the Shot Doctrine 'look-shoot-look': the amount of interceptors that are needed to fire at one
incoming missile to assure success, reliability and confidence of the missile defense system. This number has been as high as four or more GBIs to one
incoming missile to insure 90 percent plus confidence in a not fully mature system (GBI) that has been initially deployed while still being tested for its capabilities
during its deployment. Nothing in the past year with the confidence in the reliability of the GBI system and its testing has shown the need to reduce the shot
doctrine from a high number to a low number. A
reduced shot doctrine of two shots or less to one ballistic missile has been
suggested as a reason to reduce the 44 interceptors to 30 interceptors, thus significantly increasing the risk that assured destruction of
a long range ballistic missile by the GBIs and potential anomalies of that system would be successful * What amount of
risk is the Department of Defense taking against a known enemy and relying on a deterrent value of the long-range ballistic missile system rather than in the
systems war fighting capability? In every war game using missile defenses that the current US military war fighters have participated in, every participating US
military war fighter has requested more defensive missiles. Iran has achieved a successful space launch earlier this year placing a satellite into orbit. North Korea
this year has come close to attaining a space launch but failed in its attempt in the third stage. Once these countries gain maturity on the technology and the
correct design on long-range ballistic missiles, mass production of these production designs becomes eminent. The Department of Defense and the intelligence
* Accidental launch capability against
unauthorized long-range ballistic missile launches needs to be factored in the overall calculus for amount of GBIs
needed. There are more countries that will have more ballistic missiles and these countries may not have the controls
to prevent unauthorized launches. * United States tax dollars have paid approximately $13 billion for the Ground-based Midcourse Defense
community do not know what those numbers could be and cannot control production of these missiles.
(GMD) system. The cost of deploying the remaining 14 missiles in silos on missile field at Fort Greely, Alaska is approximately $116 million. It is just 1 percent of
the total expenditure to complete the system as designed. "This is a matter of determining what risk is acceptable and tolerable to our nation by not fully
completing the deployment of the ground-based interceptors to protect us against future long range ballistic missile threats," said Ellison. "The American
public continues to show overwhelming support at close to 90 percent for the need for missile defense and protection
of their homeland. It would be risky business to put our nation at risk and not listen to the American public."
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NMD Good- Russia supports
Even Russia supports global missile defense – they won’t be a problem, and can’t
link to any impacts.
BBC 2010
(BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union – Political Source: Interfax-AVN military news agency website, Moscow, in Russian 1240 gmt 5 Mar 10
http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T9808546947&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=
1&resultsUrlKey=29_T9808546952&cisb=22_T9808546951&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=10962&docNo=6)
Moscow, 5 March: Europe's missile
defence system should be developed with specific risks and threats in mind, Yuriy Baluyevskiy,
Russian Security Council deputy secretary, said on Friday [5 March]. "As for the European missile defence system that is under development,
it is first necessary to decide against whom it is targeted," Baluyevskiy said. He did not rule out that at some stage, Iran and North Korea
would develop nuclear-armed missiles. However, he said, that will take a long time. "It is necessary together to assess the degree
to which there is a risk that these states will develop nuclear weapons," Baluyevskiy said. At the same time, he said,
there are limits to cooperation on missile defence. "There can be no cooperation where the decision has to be taken to destroy a missile
already in flight," the general, who is Russia's former chief of the General Staff, said. The US, Baluyevskiy said, will never allow its partners to be part of the
algorithm that controls its missile defence. Baluyevskiy said that India, Pakistan and Israel were actually in possession of nuclear
weapons, and North Korea was in his view also close to that goal.
Russia is cooperating with the US on the European missile shield
ITAR-TASS news agency, Moscow, in Russian, lexis, October 1, 2009
http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T9804960077&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=
26&resultsUrlKey=29_T9804960085&cisb=22_T9804960084&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=10962&docNo=43,)
Moscow is ready for a detailed discussion of cooperation with the USA in the sphere of missile defence, the Russian
Foreign Ministry's official spokesman, Andrey Nesterenko, said today.
"The revision by US President Barack Obama of the plans to deploy elements of the missile defence system of the
third positioning area in Eastern Europe is an internal decision," said Nesterenko. "It has definitely been dictated by US national
interests". According to him, "it is a step in the right direction and reflects Russian notions of how to organize a missile
defence system in the world".
"Good conditions are developing for a joint statement on missile defence by the Russian and US presidents, which was reflected in the agreements reached as
part of the summit meeting on 6 July in Moscow," said the Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman. Nesterenko recalled in particular that the
agreements "confirmed the willingness to strengthen strategic relations based on respect, and mutually beneficial
missile defence cooperation".
Meanwhile, Nesterenko noted that "detailed consultations are needed to study all aspects of the presence of missile defence elements in Europe". Moscow "is
ready for a discussion moving towards mutually acceptable agreements". He also stressed the need for joint work in analyzing the
missile threats, which "will allow us to guarantee the security and interests of all sides".
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NMD Good- Russia supports
US, Europe, and Russia cooperation key to missile defense system.
NUNN, IVANOV, ISCHINGER (SAM, IGOR, WOLFGANG. SECTION: EDIT; Pg. 6 The International Herald Tribune. July 22, 2010) l/n
North America, Europe and Russia must make common missile defenses a joint priority. No other initiative has more near-term
potential to ease the NATO-Russian relationship out of its petulant, impacted state, while giving a positive jolt to the revived but tentative and unfocused interest
in an improved and more inclusive European security system, than missile-defense cooperation. Were North America, Europe and Russia to make defense of the
entire Euro-Atlantic region against potential ballistic missile attack a joint priority, they would - apart from addressing a concrete problem - in a single
stroke undermine much of the threat analysis that sets Russia against NATO, and prove that trilateral cooperation on
a key security issue is possible. After decades of failed efforts to find common ground on missile defense, leaders in Washington, Moscow and
Brussels have returned to the task. Both U.S. and Russian presidents have underscored the importance of finding a mutually acceptable approach to missile
defense, and the U.S. side, in the run-up to the June 24 Washington summit, proposed a series of steps to start the process. NATO Secretary General Anders
Fogh Rasmussen last March moved three-way cooperation on missile defense to the very center of his proposed agenda, stressing the importance of creating ''a
missile-defense system that not only defends the Euro-Atlantic community, but one that also brings it together.'' No one thinks it will be easy. Years of
thickening mistrust, differing threat analyses, and a deficit of political will still weigh on the prospects for cooperation -
notwithstanding the recent improvement in U.S.-Russian relations. Nor are the technical obstacles trivial. For both practical and political reasons a fully integrated
system with joint command and control may be a reach too far. Even separate but coordinated systems, the model experts think more likely, pose formidable
challenges. But, significant as these hurdles are, the more fundamental point lies elsewhere. Political will, not technical obstacles, will determine whether missile
defense becomes a pillar of a more inclusive and better-defended Euro-Atlantic community, or persists, even grows, as a source of tension and discord within
what national leaders in their moment of hope at the Cold War's close spoke of as a ''Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals whole and free for the first time in 300
years.'' The necessary political will, however, will almost certainly not emerge where it must - among all three parties, North America, Europe and Russia - unless
the process, the
system and its implementation are of, by and for all three. It will not come if a missile-defense system is
essentially the creation of a single country with invited participation, or the work of two countries, or the project of an
alliance. From the start, Europe, North America and Russia should assess jointly the common threat, and then undertake as equal parties to design from the
ground up a common architecture to deal with the threat. Elements of the Obama administration's new U.S. four-stage territorial defense system
may well provide a critical core for the effort, but the ultimate architecture and the division of labor sustaining it should
be an equally balanced three-legged stool. The reasons for treating missile-defense cooperation as an imminent and serious
objective go much beyond narrow concerns. More than a potential game changer in U.S.-Russian and NATO-Russian relations,
more than a crucial step in search of a sounder European security order, and more than an essential factor in creating an optimally effective defense against
ballistic missile threats, genuine trilateral cooperation in this instance promises to aid progress in bolstering the nuclear
nonproliferation regime. It should add momentum to the already impressive achievements in securing nuclear weapons and materials. It would help
Washington and Moscow address the role of strategic offense and defense as they contemplate new steps to render their nuclear relationship safer
and more stable. And, not least, it will also create a basis by which strategically key states, including China, can explore cooperation on the role and place
of missile defense in a multipolar nuclear world. Progress on all these fronts requires U.S., European and Russian leadership, and their success will either be
enhanced or impaired by what happens in the realm of missile defense. Because the stakes are this high, we, voices from not one or two countries but from all
parts of the Euro-Atlantic region, are concerned that this moment of opportunity not slip by, or be sabotaged by narrow-minded concerns, or take a back seat to
things easier done.
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U.S. Space Militarization Good
U.S. space “weaponization” imperative for 21st century warfare – ensures deserved
freedom in space
David ’05 (Leonard, Senior Space Writer, June 17, “Weapons In Space: Dawn of a New Era,” http://www.space.com/news/050617_space_warfare.html)
For more than a decade, the military utilization of space has become all the more important in warfighting. Since the Gulf
War of 1991, using space assets has enabled air, land, and sea forces and operations to be far more effective. Space
power has changed the face of warfare. So much so, particularly for the United States, skirmishes of the 21st century cannot be
fought and won without space capabilities. That reliance has led to a key action item for U.S. space warriors: How best
to maintain and grow the nation's space superiority and deny adversaries the ability to use space assets. That fact has prompted arguments as
to the "weaponization" of space - from satellites killing satellites, exploding space mines, even using technology to make an enemy's spacecraft go deaf, dumb,
or blind. Leftover Legacy. The White House is now delving into U.S. military space policy and what it sees as the need to reshape current national space policy, a
leftover legacy document from the Clinton Administration. Clinton's unclassified National Space Policy was issued in September 1996. Among its proclamations:
"Consistent with treaty obligations, the United States will develop, operate and maintain space control capabilities to ensure freedom of action in
space and, if directed, deny such freedom of action to adversaries. These capabilities may also be enhanced by
diplomatic, legal or military measures to preclude an adversary's hostile use of space systems and services." In a June
10 press briefing, White House spokesman, Scott McClellan, explained that the national space policy has been "undergoing an interagency review" because it
hasn't been updated in several years. McClellan said that "we've seen a lot of dramatic changes, internationally and domestically, that affect our space policy.
And that's why it needs to be updated." "But we believe in the peaceful exploration of space," McClellan continued. "And there are treaties in place, and we
continue to abide by those treaties. But there are issues that relate to our space program that could affect those space programs that we need to make sure are
addressed." As for the interagency review process of national space policy itself, McClellan added: "It's not looking at weaponizing space, as some reports had
previously suggested. But the peaceful exploration of space also includes the ability of nations to be able to protect their space systems."
Forestalling space weaponization will result in arms race and the forfeit of U.S.
hegemony
David ’05 (Leonard, Senior Space Writer, June 17, “Weapons In Space: Dawn of a New Era,” http://www.space.com/news/050617_space_warfare.html)
Time to weaponize space "The
time to weaponize and administer space for the good of global commerce is now, when the
United States could do so without fear of an arms race there." This is the view of Everett Dolman, Associate Professor
of Comparative Military Studies in the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. No peer competitors
are capable of challenging the United States, Dolman explained, as was the case in the Cold War, and so no "race" is
possible. The longer the United States waits, however, the more opportunities for a peer competitor to show up on
the scene. Dolman argues that, in ten or twenty years, America might be confronting an active space power that could
weaponize space. And they might do so in a manner that prevents the United States from competing in the space
arena. "The short answer is, if you want an arms race in space, do nothing now," Dolman said. Maintain the status quo. For
those that think space weaponization is impossible, Dolman said such belief falls into the same camp that "man will never
fly". The fact that space weaponization is technically feasible is indisputable, he said, and nowhere challenged by a credible authority. "Space
weaponization can work," Dolman said. "It will be very expensive. But the rewards for the state that weaponizes first--and
establishes itself at the top of the Earth's gravity well, garnering all the many advantages that the high ground has
always provided in war--will find the benefits worth the costs."
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Space Militarization Good- Modern War
Space militarization is a necessity to fighting modern war effectively
Warden and Shaw 02 https://research.au.af.mil/papers/ay2002/fairchild/wordenshaw.pdf (Air University Library (“Whither Space Power? Forging a
Strategy for the New Century” SIMON P. WORDEN Brigadier General, USAF JOHN E. SHAW Major, USAF)
Most immediate and visible is the necessity for space power in fighting modern war effectively. The expanding power
of space capabilities in military engagements points to an increasingly visible reality: Space capabilities are an
integral part of a modern war-fighting force. With this reality comes an admonition: We cannot, and must not, take our
space capabilities for granted; nor can we ignore the increasing role space capabilities will take in the war-making
efforts of our adversaries. With our amazing space war-fighting capabilities—all kinds of intelligence collection, force
navigation and weapons delivery precision, worldwide communication and transmission of information—we have
been paving the road of 21st century warfare. Others will soon follow as potential adversaries seek to develop and
leverage these same capabilities. In fact, they are doing it right now. It has been noted before that we have not lost
an American to enemy air attack in 50 years. It has been our ability to maintain air supremacy in every hostile
environment we have entered that has produced this amazing and proud legacy. We have kept air supremacy
because we have a very rigorous and aggressive doctrine: Control of the air! The first thing we do in any military
campaign or combat operation is to gain mastery of the skies and deny the skies to our adversary. We need to do
the same in space. When American lives are put at risk because an adversary uses spaceborne imagery collectors to
identify and target American forces, or leverages the global positioning system (or the Galileo constellation) to attack
American forces with precision, we will need to aggressively counter that threat. Space capabilities will only become
more and more a part of an adversary’s war-making capacity. Thus, it will not lie outside our war-fighting
responsibilities to deprive adversaries of their benefit. In addition to space denial, an equally important facet of space
supremacy is space protection. If adversaries recognize the value of space capabilities in modern warfare, they will
not only seek to use them themselves, but they will also seek to deprive us of ours.
U.S. Weaponization of space leads to international stability, not arms race
David ’05 (Leonard, Senior Space Writer, June 17, “Weapons In Space: Dawn of a New Era,” http://www.space.com/news/050617_space_warfare.html)
What if America weaponizes space? One would think such an action would kick-start a procession of other nations to
follow suit. Dolman said he takes issues with that notion. "This argument comes from the mirror-image analogy that if another
state were to weaponize space, well then, the U.S. would have to react. Of course it would! But this is an entirely
different situation," Dolman responded. "The U.S. is the world's most powerful state. The international system looks to it for
order. If the U.S. were to weaponize space, it would be perceived as an attempt to maintain or extend its position, in
effect, the status quo," Dolman suggested. It is likely that most states--recognizing the vast expense and effort needed to
hone their space skills to where America is today--would opt not to bother competing, he said.
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U.S. Space Militarization Good
U.S. Space Militarization is vital to preserving future hegemony and preventing global
nuclear war
Miller ’02 (John, National Review, July 15, 2002, “Our 'Next Manifest Destiny': America should move to control space -- now, and decisively,”
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/714383/posts)
No writer has clearly become the Mahan of space, though one candidate is Everett C. Dolman,
a professor at the Air Force's School of
Advanced Airpower Studies, in Alabama. Dolman's new book Astropolitik offers a grand strategy that would have the United
States "endeavor at once to seize military control of low-Earth orbit" and impose "a police blockade of all current
spaceports, monitoring and controlling all traffic both in and out." Dolman identifies low-Earth orbit as a chokepoint in the sense of Mahan
-- anybody who wants access to space must pass through it. "The United States should grab this vital territory now, when there's no real
competition for it," Dolman tells me. "Once we're there, we can make sure the entry cost for anybody else wanting to achieve
space control is too high. Whoever takes space will dominate Earth." Dolman would benefit from a political benefactor. Mahan enjoyed
the patronage of Roosevelt, who took a scholar's ideas and turned them into policies. Space has a number of advocates within the military
bureaucracy, mostly among its younger members. It does not have a political champion, with the possible exception of Sen. Bob Smith, a New Hampshire
Republican who has made the subject a personal passion. Smith calls space America's "next Manifest Destiny" and believes the Department of Defense should
establish an independent Space Force to serve alongside the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Smith, however, may not stay in the Senate much longer, facing stiff
With the right mix of intellectual firepower and political muscle, the United States could achieve what
control" of space. The goal would be to make the heavens safe for capitalism and science while
also protecting the national security of the United States. "Only those spacecraft that provide advance notice of their mission and flight plan would
political challenges at home.
Dolman calls "hegemonic
be permitted in space," writes Dolman. Anything else would be shot down. That may sound like 21st-century imperialism, which, in essence, it would be. But is
that so bad? Imagine that the United States currently maintained a battery of space-based lasers. India and Pakistan could inch
toward nuclear war over Kashmir, only to be told that any attempt by either side to launch a missile would result in a boost-phase blast from outer space.
Without taking sides, the United States would immediately defuse a tense situation and keep the skies above Bombay and
Karachi free of mushroom clouds. Moreover, Israel would receive protection from Iran and Iraq, Taiwan from China, and Japan and South Korea from
the mad dictator north of the DMZ. The United States would be covered as well, able not merely to deter aggression, but also to
defend against it. National security always has been an expensive proposition, and there is no getting around the enormous costs posed by a robust
system of space-based weaponry. It would take a supreme act of national will to make it a reality. We've done it before: Winning the Cold War required laying out
trillions of dollars, much of it on machines, missiles, and warheads that never saw live combat. Seizing control of space also would cost trillions, but it would lead
to a world made immeasurably safer for America and what it values.
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Hege Module: Space hege is key to all hege
Leadership in space is vital to all aspects of American leadership and economic wellbeing.
Christopher Petras, Chief of Operations Law for United States Space Command, Fall 20 02 (Journal of Air Law and Commerce, The Use of Force in
Response to Cyber-Attack on Commercial Space Systems—Reexamining“Self-Defense” in Outer Space in Light of the Convergence of U.S. Military and
Commercial Space Activities, Pg.8)
While the phrase "space control capabilities [and] military measures" is arguably a euphemism for "space and terrestrial force," the 1996 policy left the question
of the use of force in response to an attack on U.S. space assets awash in verbiage. By
the end of the decade, however, the expanded
commercial use of space, and the growing dependence of the military on the commercial space sector to provide
essential services, gave rise to renewed concern over the vulnerability of the nation's space systems to attack. 81 So,
in 1999, DoD promulgated its current space policy, which clarified the issue: Space is a medium like the land, sea, and air within which
military activities shall be conducted to achieve U.S. national security objectives. The ability to access and utilize
space is a vital national interest because many of the activities conducted in the [*1231] medium are critical to U.S.
national security and economic well-being. Ensuring the freedom of space and protecting U.S. national security
interests in the medium are priorities for space and space-related activities. U.S. space systems are national property afforded the
right of passage through and operations in space without interference, in accordance with [the National Space Policy (1996)]. Purposeful interference with U.S.
space systems will be viewed as an infringement on our sovereign rights. The U.S. may take all appropriate self-defense measures, including... the use of force,
to respond to such an infringement on U.S. rights. 82Thus, under the new DoD policy, it is now clear that the United States construes the "inherent right of selfdefense" as not only allowing the use of military force in response to attacks on the nation's military space systems, but in response to attacks against U.S.
commercial interests and investments in space as well. 83
U.S. leadership ensures world stability and the prevention of proliferation, regional
conflicts, and global nuclear war - military dominance is key.
Khalilzad '95, U.S. Special envoy to Afghanistan [Zalmay, “Losing the Moment? TheUnited States and The World After the Cold War,” The Washington
Quarterly, pg. 84;Spring 1995]
Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for
the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best longterm guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself,
but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would
be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a
world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by
renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and
the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more
conducive to global stability than
a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.
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Space exploration Module
First, effective space militarization key to developing technology used for space
exploration in the civilian and commercial arena.
Kevin Haggerty teaches at the University of Alberta and Richard Ericson at Oxford University. The summary is taken for their article in Militarizing
the American Criminal Justice System: The Changing Roles of the Armed Forces and the Police, edited by Peter Kraska, Boston: 2001, Northeastern
University Press, pp. 43-64, http://crpr.icaap.org/issues/issue1/haggarty-ericson.html
Since World War II the defining attribute of the U.S. military has been its commitment to using advanced technology
for military purposes. To that end it has funded any number of new technologies, academic institutions and individual scientists.
Few technologies are now developed without being scrutinized for potential military applications. The range of technologies developed for
military purposes and to military specifications is extensive and, very importantly, is not confined to lethal
technologies. Hence, assorted sensors, visualization devices, electronics, communication systems, as well as
nuclear energy, computers and space exploration can all be conceived of as military technologies by virtue of their
genesis in military programs. These technologies, however, do not remain confined to their military context. Most
eventually move into wider society through a ‘trickle down’ process of dispersion, where corporate interests work to
develop potential civilian applications of technologies with a military origin. The computer provides a paradigmatic example of such a
process, as prior to World War II there was little research on computing machines. The war effort galvanized efforts to develop computers, the first of which
were used for assorted military purposes. In the ensuing years refinements in computational abilities have ushered in a new military ideology that emphasizes
the use of information. Computers, however, have transcended their military origins, and are now a generalized technology capable of any number of different
non-martial applications.
And, there are multiple other scenarios for extinction if we do not get off the rock:
Sylvia Hui, AP, June 13, 2006, The Associated Press, information from Stephen Hawking, a world renowned scientist,
http://apnews.myway.com/article/20060613/D8I7ADB81.html
The survival of the human race depends on its ability to find new homes elsewhere in the universe because there's
an increasing risk that a disaster will destroy the Earth, world-renowned scientist Stephen Hawking said Tuesday. The
British astrophysicist told a news conference in Hong Kong that humans could have a permanent base on the moon
in 20 years and a colony on Mars in the next 40 years. "We won't find anywhere as nice as Earth unless we go to
another star system," added Hawking, who arrived to a rock star's welcome Monday. Tickets for his lecture planned for Wednesday were sold out. He
added that if humans can avoid killing themselves in the next 100 years, they should have space settlements that can continue without support from Earth. "It
is important for the human race to spread out into space for the survival of the species," Hawking said. "Life on Earth
is at the ever-increasing risk of being wiped out by a disaster, such as sudden global warming, nuclear war, a
genetically engineered virus or other dangers we have not yet thought of." The 64-year-old scientist - author of the global best seller
"A Brief History of Time" - is wheelchair-bound and communicates with the help of a computer because he suffers from a neurological disorder called
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, or ALS. Hawking said he's teaming up with his daughter to write a children's book about the universe, aimed at the same age
range as the Harry Potter books. "It is a story for children, which explains the wonders of the universe," his daughter, Lucy, added. They didn't provide other
details.
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Space weapon ban can’t solve
Many things can be considered space weapons making enforcement impossible
Everett, Terry. ("Arguing for a Comprehensive Space Protection Strategy." Strategic Studies Quarterly. Vol. 1, No. 1 (Fall 2007): 20-35.
“Ambiguity over Definition of a Space Weapon makes Arms Control Impractical” www.spacedebate.org/about/backfileOct.doc)
Some believe a space weapon is purely a weapons system based in space that collides with another space object or
intercepts a missile traveling through space. However, I would argue, the damage caused by a ground-based high energy
laser is just as severe for a target satellite as the damage caused by a physical on-orbit collision. The key difference is the
latter may create an unacceptable debris field, posing further risks to other orbiting satellites.
It is the ambiguity in definition that makes arms-control measures which ban space weapons difficult to
implement and nearly impossible to enforce. This is compounded by the fact that satellites have tremendous dual-use
value, making it very difficult to distinguish a nonweapon space system from a weapon space system. Any satellite could be
maneuvered in such a way as to collide with a target satellite. Any ballistic missile, with sufficient orbital ephemeris data and software changes, could be used to
target a satellite.
Defining space weapons limits other non military space functions
DeSutter, Paula A. (Is An Outer Space Arms Control Treaty Verifiable?. Washington, D.C.: U.S. State Department, March 4, 2008. [ 6 quotes ]
Lack of Concise Definition of "Space Weapons" makes Arms Control Unworkable” www.spacedebate.org/about/backfileOct.doc)
When is an object to be considered to be a covered – and prohibited – outer space weapon?
One possible definition would include only space-based devices that were produced or converted specifically to damage or destroy other space-based objects.
Such a definition, however, immediately raises the question of intent. How could one determine that an object was specially produced or
converted? Also, how could one verify, in the event of damage or destruction to a space object, that the cause of the
damage or destruction was the result of genuine error or malfunction, and not deliberate?
Another approach could be to define “outer space weapon” to mean any object in, or transiting through, space that
could destroy or damage another object in space. The problem with this approach is that it would need to include all
objects in or transiting space, since any such object could, at least theoretically, have the inherent capability to strike
another object and cause damage to it or destroy it. Moreover, would it be permissible to attack a ground tracking station, which performs a
critical role in providing access to space and in the use of space, but which is not itself located in space?
Such an approach obviously would be unworkable. It would constrain – if not force the end of – legitimate uses, such
as defense, civil, commercial, intelligence, and non-weapon military satellite functions that are critical not only to the
United States, but also to global security, commerce, science, and research. In this regard, it easily could capture and prohibit the
deployment of ground-launched, non-weapon systems such as, for example, an unmanned replacement for the U.S. Space Shuttle, which is the workhorse of the
International Space Station. Furthermore, it would capture important systems designed for other, non-counterspace missions,
due to their inherent anti-satellite capabilities. These would include missile defense systems whose purpose is to destroy ballistic missiles
launched from the ground at other objects on the ground, and terrestrial-based ballistic missiles.
Many peaceful space technologies could be considered space weapons
Mineiro, Michael C. ("The United States and the Legality of Outer Space Weaponization: A Proposal for Greater Transparency and a Dispute Resolution
Mechanism." Annals of Air and Space Law. (2008): 441-466. [ 5 quotes ] [ page 447 ]” Even Civillian Space Applications could be Used as Space Weapons”)
One of the major difficulties in defining "space weapon" is that many space systems designed for peaceful purposes
have the capacity to destroy or interfere with another object or being in space or in the Earth environment.26 For
example, NASA recently launched their first autonomous robotic spacecraft, a repair robot called DART.27 DART is laying the groundwork for future projects like
robotic delivery of cargo to space shuttles and automated docking and repair between spacecraft in orbit. DART is capable of maneuvering to satellites and
physically interacting with satellites. DART's ability to maneuver and interact with other satellites gives it the potential to be used as an anti-satellite weapon
(ASAT). A DART-like space system could target a satellite and force it out of its orbit, either destroying it or effectively
negating its usefulness. Is a space robot like DART a "space weapon?" Is it a dual-use system? Or is it strictly a
peaceful non-weaponized system? Lawyers and policy makers debating the issue of weaponization must consider the overlapping capabilities
inherent in space systems. Most space systems, due to their very nature, will exhibit some weapon-like capabilities.
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Space Mil inevitable
Space weaponization inevitable
Spacy, William L. (Does the United States Need Space-Based Weapons?. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University, September 1999. [ page 4 ] “Every
environment accessible to humanity eventually becomes weaponized” www.spacedebate.org/about/backfileOct.doc)
Another line of argument in
favor of space-based weapons, or at least an argument for why they are inevitable, devolves
from the fact that every environment accessible to man has eventually become an arena for combat. This line of reasoning
was noticeable in then-Secretary of the Air Force Sheila E. Widnall's address to the National Security Forum in May 1997: "You have, first off, a
fundamental question of whether we will place weapons in space. We have a lot of history that tells us that warfare
migrates where it can -- that nations engaged in a conflict do what they can, wherever they must. At a very tender
age, aviation went from a peaceful sport, to a supporting function, very analogous to what we do today in space -- to
a combat arm. Our space forces may well follow that same path." This argument holds that the evolution of warfare will
inevitably require placing weapons in space in order to fulfill a multitude of military roles. These roles include defending against
ballistic missile attack, defending space-based assets (the space control mission), and attacking terrestrial targets (the force application mission).
We can’t stop proliferation of weapons, space weapons will happen
Smith, M. V. (Ten Propositions Regarding Spacepower. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University, October 2002. [ page 81 ] “Humanity has Failed at Past
Attempts to Restrict Development of Weaponry” www.spacedebate.org/about/backfileOct.doc)
Humanity has attempted to prevent or delay the proliferation of weapons for centuries, but history suggests that
mankind is driven to develop new weapons. At the Second Lateran Council in 1139, the Church banned the crossbow for being too lethal. Within
a millennium, however, humans had built nuclear weapons and used them in war. Competition is part of the human condition, and war is a
natural expression of this condition. If this were not so, states would likely have forgone their military establishments
and preparations for war a long time ago. We are not at the end of history -- states still vie for power in an anarchic
international system and will compete in every medium of human endeavor. Former Secretary of the Air Force Sheila E. Widnall
said, "We have a lot of history that tells us that warfare migrates where it can -- that nations engaged in a conflict do
what they can, wherever they must."
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Space Mil inevitable
US moving to weaponize space
Cowan-Sharp, Jessy, Robert Lawson et al. (Space Security Index 2004. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, June 2005. [ page 38 ] “US Air
Force Counterspace Operations Doctrine Indicates U.S. Moving towards Weaponizing Outer Space” www.spacedebate.org/about/backfileOct.doc)
In August 2004, the
USAF released a Counterspace Operations doctrine document, the first to clarify the concepts of
'space situation awareness,' 'defensive counterspace,' and 'offensive counterspace.' As well, it was the first to make
explicit mention of military operations conceived "to deceive, disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy adversary space
capabilities." Although the Counterspace Operations document represents the views of the USAF and not necessarily that of the US Government, it did
provide an important indicator of where US policy may be heading. For example, in December 2004, the US issued a
Presidential directive calling on the US Department of Defense to develop its ability to deny an adversary the use of
satellite-based positioning, navigation, and timing systems during a conflict.
The current policy is aimed at space expansion and defense
Collard-Wexler, Simon, Thomas Graham et al. (Space Security 2006. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, July 2006. [ page 61 ]“New U.S. military
space policy directive is imminent” www.spacedebate.org/about/backfileOct.doc)
The US is expected to release a new military space directive to replace the existing policy that was formulated in 1996, although the release has been delayed
several times for revisions. Media reports have indicated that the new space directive would provide freer access in space
for the USAF and would call for the deployment of capabilities to ensure that space systems or services cannot be
used for purposes hostile to US national interests. The new policy directive is widely speculated to build on certain recommendations of the
2001 Rumsfeld Commission report that "explicit national security guidance and defense policy is needed to direct development
of doctrine, concepts of operations and capabilities for space, including weapons systems that operate in space." The
US reiterated the importance of military uses of space-based assets, conducting its third space war games in
February 2005 to test the use of space-based assets in future operations related to the war on terrorism. The "Schriever
III" games focused on how the US could maintain space superiority by integrating manned and unmanned space systems to assist terrestrial operations in the
event of war. Officials from Canada, Australia, and the UK also participated.
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Space Mil Inevit
Military policy creates inertia for governments to obtain space weapons
Deblois, Bruce M. ("The Advent of Space Weapons." Astropolitics. (Summer 2003). Military Doctrine and Institutional Inertia will Push the Development of
Space Weapons, www.spacedebate.org/about/backfileOct.doc)
Seizing the high ground is a military doctrinal precept as old as warfare itself. As
technology opens the new high ground of space and
offers the means to exploit it, sound doctrinal development would be grossly remiss to overlook it. Simply put, the
coupling of advanced technologies with well-intended and effective military doctrine development will inevitably lead
to the acquisition of space weapons. In addition to the power of top-down policy leadership, forces outside the control of high-level
policy makers will also drive the acquisition of space weapons. In some circumstances, the institutions involved in the
planning processes -- including scientific laboratories, administrative divisions and military consumers -- apply
significant pressure outside their formal areas of expertise or responsibility. In explaining one motivation for countries to acquire
nuclear weapons, Scott Sagan explains: 'bureaucratic actors are not passive recipients of top-down political decisions; instead,
they create the conditions that favor weapons acquisition'. Today we find ourselves in a situation with an absence of clear top-down policy
guidance on space weapons, and in such a case, military doctrine can build an inertia of its own, and impact -- or even become -- the default policy.
Economic and military pressures increase the possibility of space wars
Hyten, John E. (A Sea of Peace or a Theater of War: Dealing with the Inevitable Conflict in Space. Urbana-Champaign, IL: Program in Arms Control,
Disarmament and International Security, April 2000. “Space War Inevitable Due to Economic Motives” www.spacedebate.org/about/backfileOct.doc)
The pressures on the space frontier are enormous -- from both an economic and a military perspective. Looked at in
isolation, each of these pressures is severe enough to create conflict. In combination, they create the risk that future space
conflicts could result in war -- either on earth, in space, or both. On the economic front, conflict has already occurred
because of crowding in GEO orbits and through saturation of the available radio spectrum. On the military front, conflict has
been avoided because the United States, in recent years, has retained an effective monopoly on the use of space during conflict. Conflicts involving the
commercial use of space will continue to increase as crowding increases. There are limited unoccupied slots at GEO and a limited
spectrum remaining to be allocated. On the military side, one cannot imagine the United States allowing an enemy to either threaten
U.S. space capabilities or use space systems to their advantage, putting the U.S. at risk. Conflict involving space
systems could be a significant part of the next major theater war involving the United States.
Many countries are moving to have a space presence
Cowan-Sharp, Jessy, Robert Lawson et al. (Space Security Index 2004. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, June 2005. [ page X ]
Number of States Emphasizing Military Space in their Military Doctrine is Increasing, www.spacedebate.org/about/backfileOct.doc)
Fueled by the revolution in military affairs, the military doctrine of a growing number of states, led by China, Russia,
the US, and key EU members, is increasingly emphasizing the use of military space systems to support terrestrial
military operations. Dependence on space systems has led several of these states to view space assets as national
security critical infrastructure. US military space doctrine has also begun to focus on the need to ensure US freedom
of action in space, while preventing adversaries from accessing and using space when necessary. Several states continued
to place a greater emphasis on military space applications in 2004. The EU, France, Japan, and Russia articulated new policies
designed to increase the uses of space for national security purposes. The US Air Force (USAF) released a doctrine document that
outlined in greater detail the practice of 'counterspace operations.' To the extent that the USAF vision of counterspace doctrine is accepted by
the US Government, this represents a significant departure from the broadly accepted international legal norm that
space should be preserved as an environment that is open to all and belonging to none.
Eating cocaine off of American gravestones.
40
SCFI 2010
NMD File
Sloths! Sloths!
___ of ___
Space= us causes china space war
US space presence causing China to increase space weaponization
Koskinas, Ioannis. "Space Warfare Foolosophy: Should the United States be the First Country to Weaponize Space?." Air & Space Power Journal.
(January 2005). “China Recognizes U.S. Dependence on Space Assets and is Bolstering its Counterspace Capabilities”
www.spacedebate.org/about/backfileOct.doc)
According to the latest DOD report on Chinese military capabilities, the
People's Republic of China (PRC) views the need for
counterspace capabilities as inevitable. The PRC, according to Theresa Hitchens, is the only other country in the world that is
engaged in a political-military debate on the value of space weaponization. Part of what makes China the most likely
near term competitor for the United States is the extreme uncertainty that surrounds the Chinese space program.
According to the DOD's 2004 report on Chinese military capabilities, the PRC realizes that the US is so dependent on
space and, thus, it remains interested in counterspace capabilities that can deny or degrade America's ability to react
to a PRC-Taiwan conflict. Paradoxically, the mystique of Chinese intentions makes space derived intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) one of the few ways that the US can assess the progress of PRC space
weapons. China recognizes this paradox and has taken steps to bolster its counterspace capabilities. A July 2000 article
by Yang Hucheng, a Chinese defense analyst, supports this assertion. Hucheng suggests "for countries that can never win a war with
the United States by using the method of tanks and planes, attacking the U.S. space system may be an irresistible
and most tempting choice. Part of the reason is that the Pentagon is greatly dependent on space for its military
action."
US space capabilities causes China to weaponize space
Hitchens, Theresa. ("Monsters and Shadows: Left Unchecked, American Fears Regarding Threats to Space Assets Will Drive Weaponization."
Disarmament Forum. (2003): 15-33. [ page 25 ] “China Pursuing Space Weapons to Counter American Space Dominance”
www.spacedebate.org/about/backfileOct.doc)
At the same time, however, some influential
thinkers in China have argued that the revolution in military affairs requires China
to now consider its options in space. Some maintain that space warfare with a superpower should be a Chinese
concern, and that China needs anti-ASAT technology, smaller satellites to reduce vulnerability and first strike capabilities in space. According to the Pentagon,
China already has jamming technology and may be developing ASAT capabilities, including a ground-based high-energy laser and other lasers to blind optical
satellites. However, as indicated, much of China's interest in space seems to stem directly from concerns about American
military activities in space. According to the Nuclear Threat Initiative, China's worries about protecting its space-based assets are
due to concern about American development of missile defences and future American global dominance as a result
of American space power. Indeed, at the 7 February 2002 meeting of the CD, Hu specifically mentioned American actions as a key
reason that negotiations on the weaponization of space should commence quickly. 'Now that the ABM [Anti-Ballistic
Missile] Treaty has been scrapped and efforts are being stepped up to develop missile defence and outer space
weapon systems, there is an increasing risk of outer space being weaponized', he said.
Eating cocaine off of American gravestones.
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Sloths! Sloths!
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Space mil inevit-China
China wants to put weapons into space to stop US supremacy.
Thompson, David J. (China in Space: Civillian and Military Developments. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University, August 2001. [ page 10 ] China Views
Space Power as Key to Counter U.S. Strength www.spacedebate.org/about/backfileOct.doc)
For example, in 2000 the
PRC Defense Minister said that space-power is viewed as the key to China's planning to supplant
the United States. PLA doctrine would deny the advantages of space to the US, seeking to leverage space for
China's own advantage. This is in direct confrontation with the recently released Rumsfeld Commission report characterizing space as a "vital national
interest" for the United States. As the Hong Kong newspaper Sing Tao Daily reported in January 2001, "to ensure winning in a future hightech war, China's military has been quietly working hard to develop asymmetrical combat capability [sic] so that it will
become capable of completely paralyzing the enemy's fighting system when necessary by 'attacking selected vital
points' in the enemy's key areas." This correlates to CIA Director George J. Tenet's February 2001 testimony before the Senate Intelligence
Committee that weaker foreign militaries view US space systems as a key vulnerability during potential conflicts.
Eating cocaine off of American gravestones.
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Sloths! Sloths!
___ of ___
Space mil inevit-China
China wants space weapons to counter US non-space forces
France, Martin E.B. and Richard J. Adams. (The Chinese Threat to US Superiority." High Frontier Journal. (Winter 2005): 17-22. [ page 18 ] “China is
Developing Spacepower Capabilities to Counter U.S. Conventional Strength, not as a Response to U.S. Spacepower”
www.spacedebate.org/about/backfileOct.doc)
Contrary to the views of space sanctuary and space arms control advocates, fear of an emerging US capability to
destroy Chinese satellites is not the primary catalyst behind Beijing's counterspace moves. Chinese interests in
space weapons do not hinge on winning a potential US-Chinese ASAT battle or participating in a space arms race.
Two other motivations play a much greater role in cultivating China's desire for counterspace weapons: to counter
the space-enabled advantage of US conventional forces; and to guarantee the viability of Chinese nuclear forces in
the face of emerging American missile defenses.
China views US missile defense as a threat
Deters, Angela, Jing-dong Yuan
et al. (China's Space Capabilities and the Strategic Logic of Anti-Satellite Weapons. Monterey, CA: Center for
Nonproliferation Studies, July 22, 2002. “Chinese Interest in Space Warfare Driven by U.S. Taiwan Policy and Missile Defense”
www.spacedebate.org/about/backfileOct.doc)
Plans Chinese attention to future space warfare has also been driven by such considerations as potential conflict over Taiwan and
U.S. plans to deploy missile defense. These developments have not only strained Sino-U.S. relations, but also led
China to view itself as the target of U.S. defense strategies. People's Liberation Army (PLA) analysts are aware of U.S.
preparations for possible future space warfare against China. A 2001 war game held by U.S. Space Command pitted U.S. forces against
an opponent threatening a small neighbor (i.e., China threatening Taiwan) and focused on the use of space assets by the two main countries. The war game's
significance was not lost on Chinese commentators. As the United States intensifies efforts to deploy missile defenses, China's
military planners are increasingly concerned about how missile defenses might affect their ability to deter unwanted
U.S. actions, especially with regards to Taiwan. Many Chinese analysts also see missile defenses as part of a U.S. effort to
negate China's nuclear deterrent and ensure complete U.S. dominance in the international arena. Given that U.S. missile
defense systems will rely heavily on satellite assistance, a Chinese ASAT capability could be a useful asymmetrical means of disabling U.S. satellites and
thereby degrading U.S. missile defenses.
China’s anger about missile defense could result in an arms race
Hagt, Eric. (“Mutually Assured Vulnerabilities." China Security. (2006): 84-106. [ page 85 ], “China Feels it is the Target of U.S. Missile Defense Efforts”
www.spacedebate.org/about/backfileOct.doc)
Although the U.S. government claims ‘rogue states’ such as North Korea and Iran as putative targets for such
programs, China increasingly perceives itself as an intended loser -- as a robust U.S. missile defense network and an
arsenal of space-based weapons could effectively negate China’s nuclear deterrent and thus trigger a destabilizing
arms race. The rationale for China’s angst comes from a number of places. In terms of background, in 1998 the Pentagon reinstated China as a strategic
nuclear target in the U.S. nuclear war plan, and Bush’s 2001 Nuclear Posture Review identifies China for the first time in two decades as an “immediate or
potential nuclear contingency.” Coupled with a U.S. national defense strategy that asserts a preference for preemptive strikes,
even a modest missile defense capability would dramatically raise the risk for Beijing that the United States would be
capable of disabling China’s strategic nuclear force. Considering that China has always maintained a policy of minimal deterrence with its
immobile, liquid-fuel strategic nuclear force, circumscribed by a declared No-First-Use policy, Beijing feels particularly vulnerable.
Eating cocaine off of American gravestones.
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Sloths! Sloths!
___ of ___
NMD Bad- Russian Relations
US National Missile Defense threatens Russia
SLATER (ALICE, NY Director of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, a founder of Abolition 2000. Bastille Day Edition. July 14, 2009)
http://www.counterpunch.org/slater07142009.html
Although Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev pledged to work for a nuclear weapons free world this
spring, they failed to take meaningful steps at their July summit to put the world on the proper path to nuclear
abolition. Disappointingly, they only agreed to minor cuts in their respective weapons arsenals due to US unwillingness to
cancel its plans to put missile and radar bases in Poland and the Czech Republic which Russia views as a threat to
its security. Essentially we have come full circle to the 1986 Reagan-Gorbachev summit at Reykjavik, when negotiations for the total abolition of nuclear
weapons tragically collapsed because Reagan wouldn't give up U.S. plans for a Strategic Defense Initiative to dominate space. Clinton similarly rejected
opportunities to take up Putin's proposal to cut our nuclear arsenals to 1,000 warheads. After Russia's ratification of START II and the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty in 2000, Putin called for new talks to reduce long-range missiles from 3,500 to 1,500 or even 1,000, upping the ante from planned levels of 2,500
warheads. This forward-looking proposal was accompanied by Putin's stern caveat that all Russian offers would be off the table if the United
States proceeded to build a National Missile Defense (NMD) in violation of the ABM Treaty. Astoundingly, U.S. diplomatic "talking points"
leaked by Russia to the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists revealed that Clinton was urging Russia it had nothing to fear from NMD as long as Russia kept 2,500
weapons at launch-on-warning, hair-trigger alert. Rejecting Putin's offer to cut to 1,000 warheads, the United States assured Russia that with 2,500 warheads it
could overcome a NMD shield and deliver an "annihilating counterattack"! If the Clinton administration had instead embraced Putin's plan, the United States and
Russia would have been able to call all nuclear weapons states to the table — even those with arsenals in the hundreds or fewer — to negotiate a treaty to ban
the bomb. Bush unilaterally withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, pursuing U.S. plans "to dominate and control the military use of space, to protect U.S.
interests and investments," as set forth in the U.S. Space Command's Vision 2020 mission statement and the Rumsfeld Commission Report of 2000. Had
Obama been willing to forego the illusory US missile shield (which is incapable of offering any protection against incoming missiles, since those missiles could
easily be accompanied by a barrage of indistinguishable decoys rendering the missile defenses useless) Russia might well have agreed to larger reductions in
their mutual arsenals which together now total about 25,000 warheads with only about 1,000 more in the possession of all seven other nuclear powers—UK,
France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea. If the US and Russia agree to reduce their stockpiles of nuclear bombs to 1,000 or less, they would then
have the moral authority required to bring all the nuclear weapons states to the negotiating table to eliminate nuclear weapons. The numerous responses from
US experts and commentators that have been highly critical and dismissive of Obama's goal for nuclear abolition make it apparent that Obama must overcome
the resistance of rusty cold warriors in the Pentagon and weapons labs to achieve a nuclear-free world. But he must also address the drivers for space weapons
and missile shields--the millions of dollars spent unconscionably by Pentagon contractors now staffed by former Congress members and Capitol Hill aides. This
corrupt revolving door system lobbies Congress and finances the re-election campaigns of members who can then be relied upon to keep the military-industrialacademic-congressional complex in the money to the detriment of nuclear disarmament and world peace.
Eating cocaine off of American gravestones.
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SCFI 2010
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Sloths! Sloths!
___ of ___
NMD Bad- Russian Relations
Missile Defense System hurts Russian Relations
Sunset (Bali http://middle-eastconflict.blogspot.com/ By ASSOCIATED PRESS WASHINGTON. Thursday, 26 March 2009)
Democratic Rep. Ellen Tauscher is under consideration to be undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, a position that has involved
shaping policy on US missile defense plans in Poland and the Czech Republic. As chair of a congressional military appropriations panel, she has been a critic of
US long-range missile defense systems. Her comments came as the Obama administration was reviewing the European
missile defense plans, and
has signaled to Russia that it is willing to reconsider them, should the threat from Iran recede. Russia has adamantly
opposed the European plans, which it believes would undermine its nuclear deterrent and encroach on its interests.
On another defense matter involving Russia, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Sen. Carl Levin, told the same conference on missile
defense the subject will be at the center of a new set of security talks between Washington and Moscow and could become "a positive political tool" rather than
an impediment to better US-Russian relations. Advocates
of the US defense plans for Europe argue that missile defense systems
should be deployed urgently to counter Iran, which the United States has estimated could have missiles capable of reaching Europe or America
within a decade. Congresswoman Tauscher said the threat has been exaggerated. She told a conference on missile defense that the United States and allies
should first develop and field short-range missile defense systems that could protect forces deployed in combat operations. She said advocates of the European
plans "have been running around with their hair on fire." "The argument that the US would be naked against an Iranian threat unless we deploy the GMD system
in Europe is simply not right," she said, referring to the long-range system. Levin suggested that the United States and Russia should set aside their differences
on missile defense and begin cooperating against Iran to make a decisive difference toward weakening Iran as a missile threat and start US-Russian cooperation
on defenses against Iranian missiles. Russia strongly opposes the plan crafted by the Bush administration and under review by the Obama administration to
place US missile interceptors in Poland and an associated radar in the Czech Republic. European defense from a long-range Iranian missile attack is the stated
purpose. Levin did not suggest that the Obama administration bargain away the Bush-era plan, although there has been speculation that US President Barack
Obama would offer to scrap that plan in return for Russian help in persuading Iran to end its alleged nuclear program. "Even if we were simply to begin serious
discussions on the subject [it] would send a powerful signal to Iran," Levin said. "Iran would face in a dramatic way a growing unity against her pursuit of
dangerous nuclear technology." Later he added, "The bottom line is simple: We have a new opportunity to seek a cooperative approach with Russia on missile
defense, and we should seize it. The upside potential of such an effort is huge, a geopolitical game changer. The downside is minimal." Levin cited two matters
the United States and Russia could take up immediately: a previous Russian offer to share data from an early warning radar in Azerbaijan, on Iran's northern
border, and a never-executed US-Russian agreement to open a facility in Moscow for sharing missile-related data. Speaking at the same conference, Gen.
James E. Cartwright, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said those who develop US missile defenses must take into account that adversaries are
increasingly likely to use means other than traditional ballistic missiles in any attack on US interests. "Ballistic missiles are about as passe as e-mail," Cartwright
said. "Nobody does it anymore." Instead the
emerging threat is missiles that can be maneuvered in flight and missiles that
remain inside Earth's atmosphere, he said. Thus missile defenses must be flexible and adaptable enough to be
useful against a range of threats, he added.
Eating cocaine off of American gravestones.
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SCFI 2010
NMD File
Sloths! Sloths!
___ of ___
NMD Bad: Russia
NMD is the reason the world hasn’t moved forward on disarmament, and it won’t
unless NMD is stopped.
Slater 2009
(“How US Missile Defense Plans Sabotaged Nuclear Disarmament Talks With Russia” Alice Slater, July 14, 2009 Alice Slater is NY Director of
the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and a founder of Abolition 2000. http://www.counterpunch.org/slater07142009.html)
Although Barack Obama
and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev pledged to work for a nuclear weapons free world this spring, they failed to take
meaningful steps at their July summit to put the world on the proper path to nuclear abolition. Disappointingly, they only agreed
to minor cuts in their respective weapons arsenals due to US unwillingness to cancel its plans to put missile and radar bases in Poland
and the Czech Republic which Russia views as a threat to its security. Essentially we have come full circle to the 1986 Reagan-Gorbachev
summit at Reykjavik, when negotiations for the total abolition of nuclear weapons tragically collapsed because Reagan wouldn't give up U.S. plans for a Strategic
Defense Initiative to dominate space. Clinton similarly rejected opportunities to take up Putin's proposal to cut our nuclear arsenals to 1,000 warheads. After
Russia's ratification of START II and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 2000, Putin called for new talks to
reduce long-range missiles from 3,500 to 1,500 or even 1,000, upping the ante from planned levels of 2,500 warheads. This forward-looking
proposal was accompanied by Putin's stern caveat that all Russian offers would be off the table if the United States
proceeded to build a National Missile Defense (NMD) in violation of the ABM Treaty. Astoundingly, U.S. diplomatic
"talking points" leaked by Russia to the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists revealed that Clinton was urging Russia it had
nothing to fear from NMD as long as Russia kept 2,500 weapons at launch-on-warning, hair-trigger alert. Rejecting Putin's
offer to cut to 1,000 warheads, the United States assured Russia that with 2,500 warheads it could overcome a NMD shield
and deliver an "annihilating counterattack"! If the Clinton administration had instead embraced Putin's plan, the
United States and Russia would have been able to call all nuclear weapons states to the table — even those with
arsenals in the hundreds or fewer — to negotiate a treaty to ban the bomb. Bush unilaterally withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty, pursuing U.S. plans "to dominate and control the military use of space, to protect U.S. interests and investments," as set forth in the U.S. Space
Had Obama been willing to forego the illusory US
missile shield (which is incapable of offering any protection against incoming missiles, since those missiles could easily be accompanied by a barrage of
indistinguishable decoys rendering the missile defenses useless) Russia might well have agreed to larger reductions in their mutual
arsenals which together now total about 25,000 warheads with only about 1,000 more in the possession of all seven other nuclear powers—UK, France,
Command's Vision 2020 mission statement and the Rumsfeld Commission Report of 2000.
China, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea. If the US and Russia agree to reduce their stockpiles of nuclear bombs to 1,000 or less, they would then have the
moral authority required to bring all the nuclear weapons states to the negotiating table to eliminate nuclear weapons. The numerous responses from US experts
and commentators that have been highly critical and dismissive of Obama's goal for nuclear abolition make it apparent that Obama must overcome the
resistance of rusty cold warriors in the Pentagon and weapons labs to achieve a nuclear-free world. But he must also address
the drivers for space
weapons and missile shields--the millions of dollars spent unconscionably by Pentagon contractors now staffed by former Congress members and
Capitol Hill aides. This corrupt revolving door system lobbies Congress and finances the re-election campaigns of members who can then be relied upon to keep
the military-industrial-academic-congressional complex in the money to the detriment of nuclear disarmament and world peace.
Eating cocaine off of American gravestones.
46
SCFI 2010
NMD File
Sloths! Sloths!
___ of ___
NMD Bad: Russia
US Russia relations on the brink – NMD is the breaking factor, and implications of a
damaged US-Russia relationship span across the Atlantic – source is president of
Russia
Medvedev 2009 (The Washington Post March 31, 2009 Tuesday Regional Edition EDITORIAL COPY; Pg. A17 l/n
It is hard to dispute the pessimistic assessments of the Russian-American relationship that prevailed at the end of last year.
Unfortunately, relations soured because of the previous U.S. administration's plans -- specifically, deployment of the U.S. global
missile defense system in Eastern Europe, efforts to push NATO's borders eastward and refusal to ratify the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in
Europe. All of these positions undermined Russia's interests and, if implemented, would inevitably require a response on
our part. I believe that removing such obstacles to good relations would be beneficial to our countries -- essentially removing "toxic assets" to make good a
negative balance sheet -- and beneficial to the world. This will require joint efforts. The exchange of letters between myself and President Obama this year
showed mutual readiness to build mature bilateral relations in a pragmatic and businesslike manner. For that we have a "road map" -- the Strategic Framework
Declaration our countries signed in Sochi in 2008. It is essential that the positive ideas in that declaration be brought to life. We are ready for that. Possible areas
of cooperation abound. For instance, I agree with President Obama that resuming
the disarmament process should become our
immediate priority. The wish to ensure absolute security in a unilateral way is a dangerous illusion. I am encouraged that our new partners in Washington
realize this. It also appears that we all understand the need to search for collective solutions to the problems facing Afghanistan, with the involvement of all
influential players. In this spirit, Moscow hosted a broad-based conference on Afghanistan under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. We
welcome the U.S. initiative to convene a United Nations conference in the Netherlands. It is critical that Russia and the United States view these conferences as
mutually reinforcing rather than competitive. Neither Russia nor the United States can tolerate drift and indifference in our relations. I spoke in Washington last
November about the need to put an end to the crisis of confidence. To begin with, we should agree that overcoming our common negative legacy is possible only
by ensuring equality and mutual benefit and by taking into account our mutual interests. I am ready for such work with President Obama on the basis of these
principles, and I hope to begin as early as tomorrow at our first meeting in London before the Group of 20 summit. The state of the global economy is a great
concern to all. We can ensure the sustainability of the global financial system only by making its architecture mutually complementary and reliant on a diversified
system of regional reserve currencies and financial centers. During the summit, Russia and the United States can help lead the effort to establish universal rules
and disciplines that would apply to all parties without exception. We should also think together of whether it might be expedient to introduce a world supranational
reserve currency, potentially under the aegis of the International Monetary Fund. In bilateral relations, we need to see more successful investment projects, joint
research and development by companies, and increased trade in high-tech products. The end of the Cold War and subsequent globalization fundamentally
altered the geopolitical context of our relations and vastly increased the importance of leadership. Today, effective leadership must be collective, based on the
desire and ability to find common denominators for the interests of the international community and major groups of states. The G-20 summits are a major step
toward this. I am convinced that Russia and the United States can offer much to the world while maintaining our special responsibility in world affairs. These
opportunities are most visible on the issues of strategic stability and nuclear security. The
nature of the Russian-U.S. relationship to a large
extent determines transatlantic politics, which could use trilateral cooperation among the European Union, Russia
and the United States as its pillar. The need to restart our cooperation is prompted in part by the history of our relations, which includes a number of
highly emotional moments -- diplomatic support provided by Russia to the United States at critical points of America's development, our joint fight against fascism
and the era of détente. In his inaugural address, President Obama explicitly expressed his understanding that the United States needed to change together
with the rest of the world. His speech deeply impressed me with its unbiased assessment of America's problems. I agree that greatness is never a given. It must
be earned. Long ago, Alexis de Tocqueville predicted a great future for our two nations. So far, each country has tried to prove the truth of those words to itself
and the world by acting on its own. I firmly believe that at this turn of history, we should work together. The world expects Russia and the United
States to take energetic steps to establish a climate of trust and goodwill in global politics, not to languish in inaction
and disengagement. We cannot fail to meet those expectations.
Eating cocaine off of American gravestones.
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Sloths! Sloths!
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NMD Bad- Space war
NMD and subsequent space weaponization, if not stopped, will lead to a space war
and subsequent land war – the impacts are not only loss of life, but also global
economic devastation.
Martel and Yoshihara 2003 (The Washington Quarterly 26.4 (2003) 19-35 Averting a Sino-U.S. Space Race William C. Martel and Toshi
Yoshihara http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/washington_quarterly/v026/26.4martel.html)
At the same time that the United States views space dominance as a fundamental tenet of its national security, China evidently views
U.S. space
dominance as a major threat to its geostrategic interests. These views inevitably breed a zero-sum competition, in
which one side perceives any loss as a gain for the other, and could ultimately prove destabilizing for Sino-U.S. relations. First, Beijing
perceives the proposed U.S. missile defense system, which will be supported by an array of space systems and sensors, as a strategic
menace to China and to international security. 15 Many China watchers contend that this perception stems from
anxieties that any conceivable system of missile defenses being developed by the Bush administration will
undermine China's small nuclear deterrent. 16 Beijing remains wary of the joint research program on missile defense by the U.S.-Japanese
alliance, which the PRC sees as a potential partnership for blocking Chinese regional aspirations or, in broader terms, for containing China. Of particular
concern for Beijing is the possibility that Tokyo's decision formally to join U.S. plans for deploying missile defense in
Northeast Asia will significantly increase Japan's military capabilities by providing an opportunity for Japanese forces
to enjoy unprecedented military integration with U.S. forces in the areas of space-based intelligence and
communications. [End Page 23] Second, the military use of space has profound implications for the uneasy stalemate in
the Taiwan Strait, which has always presented the possibility of a major confrontation between Washington and
Beijing. One argument is that U.S. capabilities allow the United States to project power near Taiwan, while the space-based sensors and weapons for missile
defense could blunt China's arsenal of ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan. Moreover, the prospect of transfers of missile defense systems to Taiwan, which could
usher in a period of unprecedented military cooperation between Taipei and Washington, no doubt deeply troubles Beijing. China, for its part, will increasingly
need military space capabilities if it is to improve its ability to coerce Taiwan ina conflict and counter U.S. intervention to defend the island in a crisis or conflict. A
final argument is that, even though recent Chinese efforts to curtail the transfer of technologies related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have progressed
(albeit haltingly), proliferation remains a key point of contention in Sino-U.S. relations. Indeed, China played a key role in the status of
Pakistan's nuclear capabilities as well as in North Korea's development of long-range Taepo-dong missiles. Recent revelations about Islamabad's nuclear
assistance to Pyongyang in exchange for missile technology suggest that many roads lead to Beijing when it comes to WMD proliferation in the region. In May
2003, the Bush administration imposed sanctions on a major, state-owned Chinese firm for allegedly assisting Iran's ballistic missile program. 17 The
technologies behind Beijing's proliferation of ballistic missile technologies are highly relevant to the development of China's space power. These differing
bilateral perspectives on space and security are contributing to the growing perception in both capitals that the other
poses a significant military and strategic threat in space. The prevailing assessments in Beijing and Washington are notable for their
unmistakable apprehension of each other. For example, annual Pentagon reviews of China's military, which began in 1998, have produced an ominous picture of
PRC space capabilities. 18 Even while conceding that China's technologies lag far behind those of the West, these reports argue that the exploitation of
space is beginning to dominate Chinese military strategy. They also assert that the PRC has established key military
programs for the specific purpose of denying the United States its use of space. For example, China is reportedly developing a
high-energy laser that could temporarily dazzle or permanently blind the sensors on imaging satellites. Department of Defense assessments have also [End
Page 24] concluded that, by 2010, China will have indigenously developed advanced space technologies as well as imaging and communications satellites. Of
particular concern and the subject of intense scrutiny by the Pentagon is China's interest in developing antisatellite
capabilities that would prevent the United States from using military and commercial satellites. 19 A congressionally
mandated bipartisan commission, which annually reviews security ties between the United States and China, concurs with the Pentagon's conclusions. 20 The
U.S.-China Security Review Commission noted that China will need space-based reconnaissance to precisely target its new generation of ballistic missiles, landattack cruise missiles, and antiship cruise missiles. The latter would be of decisive importance in military operations against U.S. aircraft carriers in the Taiwan
Strait. Arguing that China was devising strategies to counter U.S. space-based warfare, the Rumsfeld Commission also identified a conflict in the Taiwan Strait
as a threat to U.S. space systems. China
could, for example, preemptively attack U.S. assets in space prior to the outbreak of
conflict in the Taiwan Strait in an effort to prevent the United States from coordinating military intervention. China
could also disrupt commercial satellites upon which everyday American life depends in the hopes of dampening U.S.
political will to intervene. 21 Chinese officials and commentators have drawn similar conclusions about the United States. In a rather blunt article
published in a Hong Kong-based newspaper, which reportedly enjoys close ties with the Chinese military establishment, Chinese analyst Gao Yan,
argued that, because space power determines a nation's destiny, it is imperative for China to pursue military capabilities in space aggressively. He warned
that, because of fundamental differences in ideology, national interests, geopolitics, and military strategies, the PRC must be prepared for the
imminent strategic rivalry with the United States. 22 In remarks apparently made in response to a U.S. military space exercise conducted in
early 2001 in Colorado Springs, in which China was the presumptive enemy, Teng Jianqun, the chief editor of China's World Military Review and a member of
China's Military Science Academy, echoed similar sentiments. He stated that, "[w]hen any country [in this case, the United States] is preparing a military
confrontation with China in outer space, we have to pay close attention and prepare for what would happen." 23 Furthermore, the director of the China
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NMD Bad- Space war
Aerospace Corporation's Science and Technology [End Page 25] Committee, Zhuang Fengan, has argued that a major aim of China's space program is to
develop advanced weapons for space warfare. 24 Zhuang indicated that key areas for further development include reliability, precision strike ability, and stealth.
During the next decade or so, the PRC will not likely be able to compete in every area of space technology with the United States at any level that even remotely
resembles the intensity of the superpower rivalry during the Cold War. In addition, with the Bush administration's defense transformation plans, U.S. investments
in the next generation of leap-ahead technologies are likely to leave China even further behind. Over the next 5-10 years, however, Beijing may
be able to pursue selective technological capabilities that can challenge U.S. interests in space. The fact that 95
percent of space technologies are dual-use in nature could both accelerate and conceal progress in China's space
program. 25 For example, advances in China's commercial launchers are likely to improve the range, accuracy, and payload of intercontinental ballistic
missiles. As economic reforms accelerate, indigenous sources of innovation in civilian technologies could migrate into China's military and space programs.
Similarly, international ventures involving the transfer of technology and skills to China will likely find their way into military programs. Furthermore, the
blurry—if existent—divisions between civil and military institutions in the Chinese space program make it easy to
transfer technologies from the civilian sector to military programs. In any event, China does not need to reach parity with the United
States to harm U.S. interests in space. Some China scholars have argued that China could use a range of old and new technologies, including advanced space
capabilities, to weaken the political will of superior adversaries who increasingly depend on space to fight wars. 26 Whether this approach will be successful is
debatable, but U.S. vulnerabilities to disruptions in space might embolden China to attack U.S. space systems in the event of a military confrontation over
Taiwan. Strategists in the United States and in China are clearly monitoring the other's developments in space. How the United States judges Chinese intentions
and capabilities will determine Washington's response; of course, the reverse is equally true. As each side eyes the other, the potential for mutual misperceptions
can have serious and destabilizing consequences in the long term. In particular, both countries' exaggerated views of each other could lead unnecessarily to
competitive action-reaction cycles. [End Page 26] What exactly does such an action-reaction cycle mean? What would a bilateral space race look like?
Hypothetically, in the next 10 years, some critical sectors of China's economy and military could become increasingly vulnerable to disruptions in space. During
this same period, Sino-U.S. relations may not improve appreciably, and the Taiwan question could remain unresolved. If Washington and Beijing could
increasingly hold each other's space infrastructure hostage by threatening to use military options in times of crisis, then potentially risky paths to preemption
could emerge in the policy planning processes in both capitals. In preparing for a major contingency in the Taiwan Strait, both the United States and China might
be compelled to plan for a disabling, blinding attack on the other's space systems before the onset of hostilities. The most troubling dimension to this scenario is
that some elements of preemption (already evident in U.S. global doctrine) could become a permanent feature of U.S. and Chinese strategies in space. Indeed,
Chinese strategic writings today suggest that the leadership in Beijing believes that preemption is the rational way to prevent future U.S. military intervention.
If
leaders in Beijing and Washington were to position themselves to preempt each other, then the two sides would enter
an era of mutual hostility, one that might include destabilizing, hair-trigger defense postures in space where both
sides stand ready to launch a first strike on a moment's notice. One scenario involves the use of weapons, such as
lasers or jammers, which seek to blind sensors on imaging satellites or disable satellites that provide warning of
missile launches. Imagine, for example, Washington's reaction if China disabled U.S. missile warning satellites or
vice versa.In that case, Sino-U.S. relations would be highly vulnerable to the misinterpretations and miscalculations
that could lead to a conflict in space. Although attacks against space assets would likely be a precursor or a
complement to a broader crisis or conflict, and although conflicts in the space theater may not generate many casualties or massive physical
destruction, the economic costs of conflict in space alone for both sides, and for the international community, would be
extraordinary given that many states depend on satellites for their economic well-being.
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NMD bad: Russia
Deploying NMD system would decrease national security and risk accidental Russian
attack, resulting in the deaths of millions of people
Andrew M. Sessler ET AL ((Chair of the Study Group), John M. Cornwall, is a professor of physics at UCLA and a professor of science and policy analysis
at the RAND Corporation’s graduate school. Bob Dietz, Steve Fetter, is a professor in the School of Public Affairs at the University of Maryland Sherman
Frankel, is a professor of physics at the University of Pennsylvania. Richard L. Garwin, was a member of the Rumsfeld Commission to Assess the Ballistic
Missile Threat to the United States, Kurt Gottfried, is an emeritus professor of physics at Cornell University. Lisbeth Gronlund, and a research fellow in MIT’s
Security Studies Program. George N. Lewis, an associate director of MIT’s Security Studies Program, Theodore A. Postol, David C. Wright, research fellow in
the Security Studies Program at MIT.April 2000 Union of Concerned Scientists MIT Security Studies Program “countermeasures”
http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nwgs/cm_all.pdf)
By deploying an ineffective NMD system, the United States would stimulate responses that would produce a net
decrease in its national security. Deployment would make it far more difficult to reduce the greatest threat to the security
of the United States: an accidental, unauthorized, or erroneous attack from Russia. Current US and Russian nuclear
weapons deployment and operational policies, which remain largely unchanged since the end of the cold war, carry a risk of
accidental, unauthorized, or erroneous attack on the United States. Today, such an attack poses the gravest threat to
the United States: it would likely result in the deaths of millions of Americans. Even a deliberate nuclear attack by an
emerging missile state would result in far fewer deaths and injuries. If the United States deploys its planned NMD
system, Russia is likely to increase its reliance on a launch-on-warning strategy, thereby heightening the risk of
accidental, unauthorized, or erroneous attack. As Russia has made clear, a US NMD deployment would also limit deep
reductions in Russian nuclear weapons, thereby insuring that this threat to US security continues into the future.
Deployment would also limit US Russian cooperation on reducing the dangers posed by Russian nuclear weapons
and the risk of theft of Russian nuclear materials.
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NMD bad: Russia Relations
Even with the reconfigured missile shield, russia is still angry about the US missile
defenses in Europe
“
The next salvo; Missile defence in Europe”, The
Economist, February 20, 2010, lexis
America's reconfigured anti-missile shield still irks Russia
READ the small print. That would have been good advice for foes and allies alike when America announced in September
last year that it would abandon its plans for anti-missile defences in Poland and the Czech Republic, in favour of a
new system initially based on ships.
Some saw that as a sell-out. Russia was being appeased as part of President Barack Obama's
"reset" of relations with the Kremlin, and the ex-communist countries were being punished for supporting the Bush
administration. Five months later, that reading of events looks mistaken.
The new system, the Obama administration officials said at the time, will be more flexible and will have a land component from 2015. Poland will eventually host
one base. And earlier this month Romania—after the briefest of talks—announced that it would be the site for interceptors. American officials are trying to find a
consolation prize for Bulgaria, the runner-up, which says it would like a base too.
This has annoyed Russia. Its foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, said the Kremlin had complained to America about the Romanian "surprise" followed by a
Bulgarian one. In fact, America itself seems to have been caught unprepared by the enthusiasm of its allies. It had expected protracted
negotiations, of the kind it had pursued with Poland. This would have provided a chance to soothe Russian feelings
at a time when America is seeking its help to impose sanctions against Iran.
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NMD BAD Russia, China NATO
NMD missile systems jeopardize our relations with Russia, China and NATO
Andrew M. Sessler ET AL ((Chair of the Study Group), John M. Cornwall, is a professor of physics at UCLA and a professor of science and policy analysis
at the RAND Corporation’s graduate school. Bob Dietz, Steve Fetter, is a professor in the School of Public Affairs at the University of Maryland Sherman
Frankel, is a professor of physics at the University of Pennsylvania. Richard L. Garwin, was a member of the Rumsfeld Commission to Assess the Ballistic
Missile Threat to the United States, Kurt Gottfried, is an emeritus professor of physics at Cornell University. Lisbeth Gronlund, and a research fellow in MIT’s
Security Studies Program. George N. Lewis, an associate director of MIT’s Security Studies Program, Theodore A. Postol, David C. Wright, research fellow in
the Security Studies Program at MIT.April 2000 Union of Concerned Scientists MIT Security Studies Program “countermeasures”
http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nwgs/cm_all.pdf)
The deployment of the NMD system could seriously impair efforts to control the proliferation of long-range ballistic
missiles and weapons of mass destruction, and thus ultimately increase the threat to the United States from these
weapons. Controlling proliferation of these weapons requires the cooperation of Russia and China, which, as the 1999
National Intelligence Estimate stated, will be influenced by their perceptions of US ballistic missile defenses. Moreover, as long as the United
States and Russia rely on nuclear deterrence, NMD deployment would place a floor on US-Russian nuclear arms
reductions, and thereby put at risk the survival of the broader arms control and nonproliferation regimes. Statements
by key US allies reflect their concerns that NMD deployment would decrease international security as well as
complicate relations within NATO.
Only cooperation with Russia will be able to prevent the kind of accidental launch of
nuclear warheads that the NMD is for. US NMD deployment reduces cooperation
Andrew M. Sessler ET AL ((Chair of the Study Group), John M. Cornwall, is a professor of physics at UCLA and a professor of science and policy analysis
at the RAND Corporation’s graduate school. Bob Dietz, Steve Fetter, is a professor in the School of Public Affairs at the University of Maryland Sherman
Frankel, is a professor of physics at the University of Pennsylvania. Richard L. Garwin, was a member of the Rumsfeld Commission to Assess the Ballistic
Missile Threat to the United States, Kurt Gottfried, is an emeritus professor of physics at Cornell University. Lisbeth Gronlund, and a research fellow in MIT’s
Security Studies Program. George N. Lewis, an associate director of MIT’s Security Studies Program, Theodore A. Postol, David C. Wright, research fellow in
the Security Studies Program at MIT.April 2000 Union of Concerned Scientists MIT Security Studies Program “countermeasures”
http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nwgs/cm_all.pdf)
Only cooperation can reduce the risk of accidental, erroneous, or unauthorized launch of Russian missiles. Accidental
launch cannot be deterred. US security is inextricably linked to the proper management of Russia’s nuclear forces. USRussian cooperative programs are needed to prevent unintended launches, and to reduce the risk that Russian
nuclear weapons, weapon materials or weapon know-how might be stolen or sold. However, US NMD deployment is
likely to make such cooperation much more difficult. The risk of accidental, erroneous, or unauthorized launch of Russian missiles could be
reduced through a variety of cooperative measures to reduce the size and launch-readiness of missile forces. The current situation, in which both
countries stand ready to launch thousands of nuclear warheads in a few minutes, is exceedingly dangerous. Deterrence
requires the ability to retaliate, not the ability to retaliate instantaneously. To reduce the risk of accidental, unauthorized and erroneous attack, both countries
could take their vulnerable forces (silo-based missiles, garrisoned mobile missiles, and pier-side sub-launched missiles), or all their nuclear missile forces, off
rapid-launch alert status.
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NMD Bad: China prolif
China feels threatened by the missile defense system and warns of regional
instability and proliferation
(Cui Xiaohuo contributed to the story “ANTI-NUKE EFFORTS FACE BARRIER”, The China Daily, January 21, 2009, lexis,
http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T9804960077&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=
1&resultsUrlKey=29_T9804960085&cisb=22_T9804960084&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=227171&docNo=4)
The deployment of a global missile defense system is a threat to nuclear disarmament, Chinese military officials and
researchers have said, following the release of China's latest white paper on its defense policy.
The country has expressed great concern over the threat of such a missile defense system to international and
regional security, according to the latest paper, which is considered to be the first time the Chinese government has responded to the United Statesinitiated missile system.
The white paper carried the comment in its section detailing China's strong stance on nuclear disarmament, analysts said.
The US deployment of the missile defense system offers no benefit to the global nuclear disarmament movement
that the country has also promoted, said Teng Jianqun, deputy general-secretary of the China Arms Control and
Disarmament Association (CACDA).
"China opposes the global missile defense system, which is not good for regional stability," China's Defense Ministry
spokesman Hu Changming told China Daily yesterday.
China started developing nuclear weapons in the 1960s to avoid possible nuclear attacks from other countries amid
the Cold War, analysts said.
When China obtained its first nuclear weapon in 1964, the government announced the principle of "no first use of nuclear weapons" and a commitment to the
thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. These policies continue, as the latest white paper on national defense showed.
"China holds that all nuclear-weapon states should make an unequivocal commitment to the thorough destruction of
nuclear weapons, undertake to stop research into and development of new types of nuclear weapons, and reduce
the role of nuclear weapons in their national security policy," the paper said.
However, "the imbalance in world security will force some actors in the international community to seek nuclear
weapons to protect themselves", Teng said.
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The planned United States missile shield would not be effective against long range
nuclear capable missiles
The Washinton Post, Joby Warrick and R. Jeffrey Smith; May 19, 2009 (Washington Post Staff Writers, U.S.-Russian Team Deems Missile Shield in
Europe Ineffective,
http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T9806688356&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=
1&resultsUrlKey=29_T9806687229&cisb=22_T9806688359&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=8075&docNo=5)
A planned U.S. missile shield to protect Europe from a possible Iranian attack would be ineffective against the kinds
of missiles Iran is likely to deploy, according to a joint analysis by top U.S. and Russian scientists.
The U.S.-Russian team also judged that it would be more than five years before Iran is capable of building both a
nuclear warhead and a missile capable of carrying it over long distances. And if Iran attempted such an attack, the
experts say, it would ensure its own destruction.
"The missile threat from Iran to Europe is thus not imminent," the 12-member technical panel concludes in a report produced by the
EastWest Institute, an independent think tank based in Moscow, New York and Belgium.
The report, scheduled for release today, could further dampen the Obama administration's enthusiasm for a Bush administration plan to deploy radars and
interceptor missiles in Poland and the Czech Republic. The missile shield has been promoted as a safeguard against future attacks
from rogue states, particularly Iran. But the plan has severely strained relations with Moscow, which says it would
undermine strategic stability and lead to a new arms race.
The year-long study brought together six senior technical experts from both the United States and Russia to assess the military threat to Europe from Iran's
nuclear and missile programs. The report's conclusions were reviewed by former defense secretary William J. Perry, among others, before being presented to
national security adviser James L. Jones and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov.
The report acknowledges dramatic technological gains by Iran, and it predicts that the country could probably build a simple nuclear device in one to three years,
if it kicked out U.N. inspectors and retooled its uranium-processing plants to make weapons-grade enriched uranium. Another five years would be needed to build
a warhead that would fit on one of Iran's missiles, the panel says. U.S. intelligence agencies have made similar predictions; Israel maintains that Iran could build
a bomb in as little as eight months.
The U.S.-Russian experts say Iran faces limits in developing ballistic missiles that could someday carry nuclear warheads . Its
current arsenal is derived from relatively unsophisticated North Korean missiles, which in turn are modified versions
of a Russian submarine-launched missile that dates from the 1950s. "We believe that these components were likely transferred to
North Korea illegally in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when Russia was experiencing major political and economic chaos," the report states.
As a result, the missiles have inherent weaknesses stemming from such aged technology, despite some improvements in their
range, the report states. Moreover, the country lacks "the
infrastructure of research institutions, industrial plants, or the scientists
and engineers that are needed to make substantial improvements."
They conclude that it would take Iran at least another six to eight years to produce a missile with enough range to reach Southern Europe and that only illicit
foreign assistance or a concerted and highly visible, decade-long effort might produce the breakthroughs needed for a nuclear-tipped missile to threaten the
United States.
Moreover, if Iran were to build a nuclear-capable missile that could strike Europe, the defense shield proposed by the
United States "could not engage that missile," the report says. The missile interceptors could also be easily fooled by
decoys and other simple countermeasures, the report concludes.
"The much more urgent problem is to seek a resolution" of the Iranian nuclear crisis, the report says. "That is a project on which the United States and Russia
need to cooperate more closely."
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NMD will lead to space arms race
Us space defenses will ignite an arms race of offensive space weapons
Thomas Graham "International Law and the Military Uses of Space." Disarmament Diplomacy. No. 63 (March-April 2002). [ 1 reference ] “Defensive
Weapons will be Countered by Offensive Weapons, Sparking an Arms Race”
The realisation of the increasing vulnerability of the United States to attacks against space assets has caused some
to encourage Washington to begin to deploy defensive weapon systems to protect those assets from new weapons.
While this could appear to make sense on a visceral or superficial level, a thoughtful analysis of the history of military development
reveals basic flaws with this notion. Most importantly, history categorically demonstrates that effective defensive weapon
systems will inevitably be countered by effective offensive systems, sparking an ever-spiralling arms race that
ultimately leaves all sides less secure. For evidence supporting this contention, one need look no further than the second half of
the 20th century and the nuclear arms race that dominated it. Until the United States and the Soviet Union signed the
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 1972, effectively preventing each side from deploying defensive systems, the world was engaged in a
nuclear confrontation constantly threatening to escalate out of control. For this reason, I believe that - as with the Antarctic Treaty and
the strategic nuclear arms control accords of the last three decades - the international community of space-faring nations will ultimately
recognise the need for restraint and seek to develop some legal regime to preserve outer space as a non-militarised or at least non-weaponised - realm. It is crucial that this happen as soon as possible.
Weaponization of space under guise of defense will result in space proliferation
Oberg, James. (Space Power Theory. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University, 2001. Space Warfare Inevitable for Strategic Reasons Space Weapons will
Inevitably be Deployed for Defense, www.spacedebate.org/about/backfileOct.doc)
It is almost certain that sometime early in the 21st Century, the fielding of space-based weapons will occur under the
auspices of defense, in much the same manner as the nuclear weapon buildup that occurred within the latter half of
the 20th. And, like nuclear weapons, once fielded, there will be no reversing course. This too is an historical lesson of
warfare. As the world now grapples with the proliferation of nuclear weapons that were once the province of
superpowers, so too will it see the initial weaponization of space be followed by increasingly sophisticated
armaments as proliferation occurs there as well. A sobering thought is the prospect that as launch costs go down per unit of
mass, the opportunity for other actors to put weapons into orbit about the Earth will go up.
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NMD leads to space weapons
Ballistic missile defense encourages offensive space weaponry
Mitchell, Gordon R. ("Japan-U.S. Missile Defense Collaboration: Rhetorically Delicious, Deceptively Dangerous." Fletcher Forum of World Affairs. (Winter
2001) “Missile Defense Systems Directly Related to Space Weapons” www.spacedebate.org/about/backfileOct.doc)
This full-throated call for a robust blend of offensive and defensive space weaponry reflects a strategic principle
elucidated by Frank Barnaby: when it comes to arming the heavens, "anti-ballistic missiles and anti-satellite warfare
technologies go hand-in-hand." The interlocking nature of offense and defense in military space technology stems
from the inherent "dual capability" of spaceborne weapon components. To the extent that ballistic missile interceptors
based in space can knock out enemy missiles in mid-flight, such interceptors can also be used as orbiting "Death
Stars," capable of sending munitions hurtling through the earth's atmosphere at dizzying velocities. As Marc Vidricaire,
a member of the Canadian Delegation to the U.N. Conference on Disarmament, explains: "If you want to intercept something in space, you
could use the same capability to target something on land." Furthermore, spaceborne BMD components can be used
for offensive attacks in outer space itself, where orbiting space assets belonging to adversaries could be targeted for
destruction. According to defense analyst James E. Oberg, " . . . the benign, defensive nature of a ballistic missile killer is not
the only facet of such a system -- it also has inherent offensive capability against satellites." This dual capability of
BMD systems provides one rationale for why space weapons advocates such as Senator Smith propose to make
offensive attack weapons part of missile defense. In a world where deployment of purely offensive space weaponry
might be difficult to justify as a stand-alone military initiative, Oberg speculates, "the means by which the placement
of space-based weapons will likely occur is under a second US space policy directive? that of ballistic missile
defense."
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NMD Bad:North Korea
The NMD alienates North Korea and triggers global nuclear war
Sinmun, Nodong 2008 (Commentary by reporter Ri Hyo'n-to: "Nuclear War Insanity That Brings New Cold War;" Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting
Station in Korean carries the following at 0952 gmt on 3 November as a Rodong Sinmun article
http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T9790111930&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=
1&resultsUrlKey=29_T9790111933&cisb=22_T9790111932&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=10962&docNo=1)
The danger of nuclear calamities likely to fall over the head of mankind is budding anew in the United States. The
unusual words and deeds of the US nuclear warmongers show that. The US bellicose forces are of late contemplating setting up a new
operations command for a nuclear war. The US nuclear war command, which reportedly will be established within the next year, will unify and
specialize in commanding nuclear activities which are currently scattered throughout five different commands and its staff is expected to be appointed soon.
Meanwhile, US Congress adopted a decision on defraying $5US million as expenses for an independent research on
a
possibility of missile defence base in space with a view to reviving the "Star Wars" plan. It is said that for the study of the
possibility of reviving the ambitious "Star Wars," a creation of former US President Reagan, test and research alone will take three to four years and cost $3US-5
billion. This is a dangerous action that will touch off a new Cold War as it is an adventurous attempt to unleash a nuclear war. There is no need to repeat that
the United
States does not need to set up an operations command for a nuclear war or a missile defence system unless it
pursues a nuclear war. Regarding the establishment of an operations command for a nuclear war, the United States presents poor excuses, saying that
it is due to the major mistakes that have repeatedly taken place in the management and maintenance of nuclear weapons over the recent few years, which are
the results of "neglected nuclear operations," or that a large number of Air Force troops participating in the nuclear-related activities in the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan has diminished the role of the Air Force as the "nuclear manager." The bellicose forces in the United States describe the establishment of an
The US imperialists are
about to set up an operations command for a nuclear war in order to realize with ease their ambitions for world domination. The United
operations command for a nuclear war as a requirement for nuclear weapons management. This is absurd beyond measure.
States established the Strategic Air Command during the World War II in order to put its overall nuclear forces under its control and frantically pushed ahead with
the moves for a nuclear war through it during the Cold War. The US measure to set up a new operations command for a nuclear war is an extension
of its moves for a nuclear war that are becoming more undisguised with the passage of time. The United States has stuck to its
moves for a nuclear war more frantically from the outset of the new century. It is the US imperialists' unchanging policy and strategic goal to threaten, blackmail,
and gain supremacy over other countries with a nuclear stick and realize its wild ambition for world domination. Viewing their preemptive nuclear attack strategy
as the main content of their military strategy in the 21st century, the US bellicose forces are developing new nuclear weapons even more earnestly. It is the
design of the US nuclear warmongers to make the use of nuclear weapons in wars of aggression as if they are conventional weapons. They are trying to make
nuclear weapons with high explosive power but small in size so that the US mobile forces can use them with ease any time they choose. Not long ago, the
United States defined "future wars as nuclear wars." The United States, which declared its preemptive nuclear attack to the world and has enthused over the
production of new nuclear weapons to realize the strategy after defining "future wars as nuclear wars," is about to go the length of setting up an operations
command for a nuclear war. Can this be viewed as a coincidence? Unless the United States regards the nuclear weapons as an all-purpose means and unless
it does not pin great hope on the use of nuclear weapons in realizing its strategy for world domination, it cannot cleave to its moves for nuclear war as openly as it
does now. The US moves to set up an operations command for a nuclear war is not for the management of nuclear weapons as they claim, but for the purpose of
making the management of nuclear weapons more practical in line with the nuclear war strategy of the new century. No matter what sophistry they may resort
to, the nuclear warmongers in the United States cannot hide their wicked true colours as those who are determined to realize their wild ambition for world
domination even by bringing nuclear catastrophe over the head of mankind. The US imperialists are the arch criminal posing a nuclear threat to the world and
bringing the danger of a nuclear arms race and a nuclear war. The reality, in which mankind faces the danger of a nuclear war and the world peace is seriously
threatened on account of the US imperialists' reckless moves, urgently demands that the peace-loving peoples of the world actively struggle to frustrate and hold
in check the US imperialists' moves for a nuclear war. The US imperialists' frantic nuclear war moves act as the catalyst to ignite a global
nuclear arms race and create the danger of a thermal nuclear war. It is as clear as daylight that countries designated as the targets of
US nuclear preemptive attack will take measures to counter the US bellicose forces' plan to set up a new operations command for a nuclear war and unleash a
nuclear war. The US moves to set up an operations command for a nuclear war is driving the situation on the Korean Peninsula,
where the danger of a nuclear war is most conspicuous in the world, even further to an acute phase. US Secretary of Defence Gates
has recently let loose outbursts that it is important for the United States to stockpile nuclear weapons as those countries likely to be threats to the United States
have nuclear weapons in their possession or seek to possess them and that it would "keep providing" South Korea and Japan and others "with nuclear
umbrellas" to cope with the "nuclear threat from North Korea." This proves that the US bellicose forces seek to ignite the fuse of a nuclear war on the Korean
Peninsula at any cost. Under the situation where the US bellicose forces pay lip service to the "settlement of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula while
carrying out their moves for a nuclear war from behind it,
it is natural for our Republic to bolster the war deterrent to cope with their
moves. Our war deterrent is a means to prevent a nuclear war from breaking out and a treasured sword to defend
our sovereignty and peace. Under the circumstances where the US imperialists are running amok to realize their wild ambition for an
invasion of the DPRK through a preemptive nuclear attack, our Republic will reinforce its war deterrent even more
firmly.
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NMD Bad: North Korea
NMD serves as main reason for North Korean nuclear proliferation and possibility of
an arms race as well as a nuclear war
KCNA, 2009 ( North Korean Paper KCNA website, Pyongyang, in English 0918 gmt 16 Jun 09
http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T9790252496&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=
1&resultsUrlKey=29_T9790254003&cisb=22_T9790254002&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=10962&docNo=10)
Pyongyang, June 16 (KCNA) - The
US war-hawks have asserted that the establishment of missile defence system should be
intensified to cope with increased "missile threat" to the US from "rogue states". Such brigandish and preposterous
sophism can work on nobody. Minju Joson Tuesday [ 16 June] observes this in a signed commentary. It says: The US is putting spurs to the
establishment of MD while spreading the rumour about "missile threat" like a thief crying "Stop the thief". This is aimed to have an absolutely military strategic
edge with the capacity for preemptive missile attack and thus make military deterrent of other countries ineffective in a bid to realize its world strategy for
supremacy. The US would assert that its establishment of MD is for "defence," but it is, in essence, designed to cover the world with missile
defence network and mount preemptive missile attack on any regions and countries anytime. Citing facts to prove that it is
the invariable intention and strategy of the US to keep its hegemonic position and hold sway over the world by
strength, the commentary goes on: The danger of new arms race and nuclear showdown is now prevailing in the world and global peace and security are
being exposed to serious threat by such military reinforcement as the US frantic MD establishment being intensified under the pretext of coping with "missile
threat" from someone. The facts clearly show that though it is talking about "peace" and "disarmament", the US is not "defender of peace" but
wrecker of peace and the very one responsible for the nuclear threat and proliferation and arms race.
The US can never
cover up its true colours as an aggressor though it is craftily working to conceal the aggressive nature of the MD establishment and justify it. The
US
better stop at once the criminal buildup of missile armed forces aimed at harassing the world
strategic stability and sparking off a new arms race and a nuclear war.
imperialist war-hawks had
NMD provides North Korea with an excuse to continue building nuclear weapons
North Korean news agency KCNA 2008 (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific – Political Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring October 27, 2008
Monday)
Pyongyang, October 27 (KCNA) - The US warlike
forces are making much ado about the "missile threat" from the DPRK while
letting loose a spate of conjecture as they please. This is preposterous and robber-like logic. Nodong Sinmun Monday observes this in a
signed commentary. It goes on: The United States, an assailant posing missile threat, is pulling up the DPRK which has fallen victim to it. This reminds one of a
thief crying "Stop the thief!" The US is reeling off a string of unreasonable and unilateral vituperation not understandable by the DPRK. It is getting evermore
frantic in its moves to increase military expenditure and step up arms buildup including the modernization of nuclear weapons and the space militarization with an
aim to put the world under its domination. However, it is finding fault with other countries in their efforts to increase their national defence capacity to cope with
those moves. The US warmongers force the DPRK to stop the missile development, claiming that it poses "threat" to the US. This is really a robber-like logic
By raising a hue and cry over the "missile threat" from the DPRK the US
seeks a sinister intention. It seeks to overwhelm other powers by holding a military edge through the establishment of
the missile defence system (MD). The US moves to build a missile shield is touching off great concern and denunciation of the international
little short of urging the DPRK to remain bare-handed.
community as it is a revelation of its criminal intention to destroy the strategic stability of the world and spark off a new arms race and a nuclear war. It is precisely
for this reason that the warlike forces of the US are hell-bent on publicizing the fictitious story about the "missile threat" from the DPRK in a bid to justify their
moves to establish the MD and push forward with it in real earnest. Now that the US is clinging to the military strong-arm policy towards
the DPRK while running amuck in its moves to establish the MD under the pretext of the non-existent "missile threat"
from someone, the DPRK will build stronger war deterrent for self-defence, not caring what others say.
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NMD Bad: = No Disarm
Disarmament can’t proceed if NMD continues to exist
Hoge 2006 ( WARREN HOGE The New York Times June 2, 2006 Friday Late Edition – Final, Section A; Column 1; Foreign Desk; Pg. 12)
Hans Blix, the former chief United Nations weapons inspector, said Thursday that American
arms agreements was undermining efforts to curb nuclear weapons.
unwillingness to cooperate in international
Mr. Blix said it was essential that Washington act to end what he
called the stagnation of arms limitation. ''If it takes the lead, the world is likely to follow,'' he said. ''If it does not take the lead, there could be more nuclear tests
and new nuclear arms races.'' Mr. Blix, who left his arms inspection post in 2003 shortly after the invasion of Iraq, made his comments in the introduction to a
225-page report by an international
commission financed by Sweden. The report was delivered Thursday to Secretary General Kofi Annan. The panel,
that treatybased disarmament was being set back by ''an increased U.S. skepticism regarding the effectiveness of international
institutions and instruments, coupled with a drive for freedom of action to maintain an absolute global superiority in
weaponry and means of their delivery.'' Mr. Blix, 77, a Swedish constitutional lawyer and the director general of the International Atomic Energy
with Mr. Blix as chairman and members from more than a dozen countries, listed 60 recommendations for nuclear disarmament. It concluded
Agency from 1981 to 1997, was disparaged by the Bush administration for failing to turn up unconventional weapons during the three years he was chief of the
United Nations inspection team in Iraq. The report drew a direct link between the rise of individual action and the decline of cooperation. ''Over the past decade,
there has been a serious and dangerous loss of momentum and direction in disarmament and nonproliferation efforts,'' it said. ''Treaty-making and
implementation have stalled, and, as a new wave of proliferation has threatened, unilateral enforcement action has been increasingly advocated.'' The
commission urged all countries to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and called on nuclear states to reduce their arsenals and stop producing
plutonium and highly enriched uranium for more nuclear weapons. The United States has not ratified the test ban treaty, and in 2002 it withdrew from the 1972
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. ''While the reaction of most states to the treaty violations was to strengthen and develop the existing treaties and institutions,'' Mr.
Blix said, ''the U.S., the sole superpower, has looked more to its own military power for remedies.'' One result, he said, was that ''the nuclear weapons states no
longer seem to take their commitment to nuclear disarmament seriously.'' The commission said there were 27,000 nuclear weapons in the world, with 12,000 of
them deployed. Mr. Blix said he feared that the number would rise because of efforts to develop more sophisticated new weapons and place them in space. He
said he also feared that a
China.
missile shield proposed by the United States would lead to countermeasures by Russia and
The commission said nuclear weapons should be banned the way biological and chemical weapons have been. ''Weapons of mass destruction cannot
be uninvented,'' the report said. ''But they can be outlawed, as biological and chemical weapons already have been, and their use made unthinkable.'' It
identified as ''two loud wake-up calls'' the breakdown of the United Nations conference a year ago on the future of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the
failure of a United Nations summit meeting of heads of state last fall to include mention of unconventional weapons, a lapse Mr. Annan described as a ''disgrace.''
It said weapons ought to be taken off high-alert status because of the risk of launching by error and called on countries to pledge no first use. It also called for
declaring regions that should be free of unconventional weapons -- ''particularly and most urgently in the Middle East.''
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NMD Bad: Accidental War
The NMD (aka BMD) is highly prone to malfunction and could easily trigger global
nuclear war.
Mitchell, Gordon, 2001 (“Missile Defence: Trans-Atlantic Diplomacy at a Crossroads” Gordon R Mitchell, Kevin J. Ayotte, and David Cram Helwich
http://www.pitt.edu/~gordonm/JPubs/Mitchelletal2001b.pdf)
Skeptics question this ‘scarecrow’ rationale for hung/-up BMD deployment, pointing out that a reckless
development timetable would require
conditions for dangerous system malfunctions that could lead to tragic
accidents. For example, in simulated tests assessed by the Pentagon’s own Director of Operational Testing and
Evaluation, an immature BMD system mistakenly identified a radar signal as an incoming missile, then launched
interceptors at these ‘phantom tracks’ after manual override attempts failed. This malfunction was ‘particularly frustrating’ and made
operators ‘anxious’ because ‘there was no tool that could definitively warn operators when a phantom track appeared. According to US Representative John
Tierney (D-OH), ‘one immediate danger in these types of situations is that adversaries may interpret these launches as a strike and
respond accordingly’. This danger is exacerbated in the case of BPI, since as defence analyst Rodney Jones notes, ‘Close-in boost-phase
concepts depend on virtually instantaneous and therefore automatic reaction. The tyranny of reaction time is so short
that the "man in the loop” disappears, and the potential for serious accidents rises correspondingly’. The US
inadvertently sow the seeds of nuclear destruction by recklessly pursuing a poorly tested missile defense system prone to
malfunction. Potential adversaries such as China and Russia often express concerns about missile defence’s offensive
capabilities. Such concerns could turn into a recipe for devastating nuclear exchanges in a world where accidental
launches of US missile defense interceptors are perceived as acts of aggression.
premature abrogation of the ABM Treaty and also create
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Space Mil= War
NMD would be perceived as militarization of space. This increases the likelihood of
accidental nuclear war.
ANDREI KISLYAKOV : June 5, 2008 (Andrei Kislyakov is a political commentator for RIA Novosti. This article is reprinted by permission of RIA
Novosti. The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.) By UPI Outside View Commentator
Outside View: Space race warnings
http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2008/06/05/Outside-View-Space-race-warnings/UPI-99011212714302/print/
MOSCOW, June 5 (UPI) -- The Americans seem determined to flood outer space with weapons. In early April U.S. Missile Defense Agency Director Lt. Gen.
Henry Obering again called for the early deployment of space-based missile defense systems, a universal means of
hitting either ground or space targets.
His Russian counterpart and longtime opponent on this issue,
Space Forces Commander Col. Gen. Vladimir Popovkin, responded in late
for the umpteenth time: "We are against any deployment or placement of weapons in outer space, as it
is one of the few realms where frontiers do not exist. Militarization of outer space will disrupt the current balance in
the world."
May, warning
The Russian general is seriously worried that space-based attack weapons could increase the risk of igniting
hostilities on the ground.
Putting the long-distance dispute between the two generals aside, let us recall that the defensive doctrines of most industrialized countries are space-oriented.
Satellite systems are involved in every aspect of an industrialized country's activity, warfare included. The majority of modern weapon systems, both nuclear and
conventional, include space-based components.
Russia is behind the United States in development and deployment of space-based systems. The figures are far from encouraging. A total of around 500
American and 100 Russian satellites currently are orbiting the Earth. The U.S. military satellite fleet is more than four times the size of Russia's, and some of the
orbiting Russian satellites are inoperable.
The Americans also have the Navstar Global Positioning System, which has been working successfully already several years. Russia's equivalent, the widely
publicized GLONASS, is undergoing its initial deployment, with only 12 operable satellites presently in orbit, compared with 31 American ones.
Obviously the Pentagon can afford to speak of space-based weapons deployment, possessing such impressive assets.
Now back to Col. Gen. Popovkin's idea that space-based weapons could spark a war. He says that present space
systems and complexes are very sophisticated and susceptible to failures, and "in such cases, I cannot guarantee
that a failure was not caused by hostile action."
Is this statement logical? Surely it is. Strategic
nuclear stability -- that is to say, a high-degree guarantee against a surprise
nuclear missile strike -- depends on the trouble-free operation of early warning and intelligence satellites. If a satellite
fails with another country's attack weapons deployed in orbit, there will be an increase of mistrust, which could lead
to a military disaster.
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Space weaponization= War
Warfare in space is more deadly and creates more debris than warfare on earth, and
could escalate to nukes faster than on land
KREPON ET AL, MAY 2007, STIMSON CENTER REPORT NO. 66, “Preserving Freedom of Action in Space: Realizing the Potential and Limits of
U.S. Spacepower” Michael Krepon is the co-founder of the Henry L. Stimson Center, where he served as President and CEO from 1989-2000. Mr. Krepon
previously served under President Jimmy Carter at the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Theresa Hitchens is the Director of the Center for Defense
Information, Michael Katz-Hyman served as Research Associate on the Space Security and South Asia Projects
The misapplication of hard power here on Earth could also adversely affect relations between major powers, friends,
and allies. The interconnectedness of hard and soft spacepower means that poor decisions by one space-faring
nation are more likely to negatively affect all other spacefaring nations, a situation that does not arise in non-nuclear,
terrestrial conflict. The length of recovery from poor decisions in space is also far longer than from non-nuclear,
terrestrial conflict. For example, when conventional battles take place on the ground, sea and air, debris is a temporary and
geographically limited phenomenon. Minefields can be marked or cleared and chemical warfare can be contained or cleaned up – although this
may take large amounts of both time and money. Battlefield debris in space, however, can last for decades, centuries, or even
millennia, thereby constituting an indiscriminate lethal hazard to space operations. Debris generated in space also
tends to spread to other orbits over time, and environmental clean-up technologies in space do not appear promising
at present. In gravity-based warfare, the victor’s spoils are gained through unhindered access. But unhindered access is likely to be lost in the event that
weapons are used in or from space, even for the “victor.” Battlefields in space are therefore fundamentally different from those on
land, at sea, or in the air. The potentially disabling problem of space debris is now well recognized even by advocates
of hard spacepower. “Hit to kill” kinetic energy anti-satellite weapons (ASATs) that were tested in the 1970s and 1980s have therefore fallen out of favor –
at least in the United States, but apparently not in the China, whose January 2007 test was the worst debris generating event in the history of the space age.3
The earliest ASAT weapons – nuclear warheads atop ballistic missiles – would produce indiscriminate and lethal effects, as the
United States learned after conducting a series of atmospheric nuclear tests in 1962. Nonetheless, this method of space warfare could still be employed.
Currently, the preferred U.S. methods of using force to maintain “space control” entail nondestructive techniques (although U.S. officials and military leaders have
not ruled out destructive methods). But bounding the unintended, negative consequences of warfare in space depends on truly heroic assumptions, beginning
with the dictation of rules of warfare against weaker foes. In unfair fights, however, weaker foes typically play by different rules. And if debris-causing space
warfare hurts the United States severely, it is reasonable to expect that U.S. fastidiousness in engaging in warfare in space may not be reciprocated – as the
Chinese kinetic kill ASAT test seemed to indicate.
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Exploration module- Space mil bad
Space militarization leads to war and space debris that prevents space activities like
exploration and colonization.
KREPON ET AL, MAY 2007, STIMSON CENTER REPORT NO. 66, “Preserving Freedom of Action in Space: Realizing the Potential and Limits of
U.S. Spacepower” Michael Krepon is the co-founder of the Henry L. Stimson Center, where he served as President and CEO from 1989-2000. Mr. Krepon
previously served under President Jimmy Carter at the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Theresa Hitchens is the Director of the Center for Defense
Information, Michael Katz-Hyman served as Research Associate on the Space Security and South Asia Projects
The misapplication of hard power here on Earth could also adversely affect relations between major powers, friends,
and allies. The interconnectedness of hard and soft spacepower means that poor decisions by one space-faring
nation are more likely to negatively affect all other spacefaring nations, a situation that does not arise in non-nuclear,
terrestrial conflict. The length of recovery from poor decisions in space is also far longer than from non-nuclear,
terrestrial conflict. For example, when conventional battles take place on the ground, sea and air, debris is a temporary and
geographically limited phenomenon. Minefields can be marked or cleared and chemical warfare can be contained or cleaned up – although this
may take large amounts of both time and money. Battlefield debris in space, however, can last for decades, centuries, or even
millennia, thereby constituting an indiscriminate lethal hazard to space operations. Debris generated in space also
tends to spread to other orbits over time, and environmental clean-up technologies in space do not appear promising
at present. In gravity-based warfare, the victor’s spoils are gained through unhindered access. But unhindered access is likely to be lost in the event that
weapons are used in or from space, even for the “victor.” Battlefields in space are therefore fundamentally different from those on
land, at sea, or in the air. The potentially disabling problem of space debris is now well recognized even by advocates
of hard spacepower. “Hit to kill” kinetic energy anti-satellite weapons (ASATs) that were tested in the 1970s and 1980s have therefore fallen out of favor –
at least in the United States, but apparently not in the China, whose January 2007 test was the worst debris generating event in the history of the space age.3
The earliest ASAT weapons – nuclear warheads atop ballistic missiles – would produce indiscriminate and lethal effects, as the
United States learned after conducting a series of atmospheric nuclear tests in 1962. Nonetheless, this method of space warfare could still be employed.
Currently, the preferred U.S. methods of using force to maintain “space control” entail nondestructive techniques (although U.S. officials and military leaders have
not ruled out destructive methods). But bounding the unintended, negative consequences of warfare in space depends on truly heroic assumptions, beginning
with the dictation of rules of warfare against weaker foes. In unfair fights, however, weaker foes typically play by different rules. And if debris-causing space
warfare hurts the United States severely, it is reasonable to expect that U.S. fastidiousness in engaging in warfare in space may not be reciprocated – as the
Chinese kinetic kill ASAT test seemed to indicate.
And, there are multiple other scenarios for extinction if we do not get off the rock:
Sylvia Hui, AP, June 13, 2006, The Associated Press, information from Stephen Hawking, a world renowned scientist,
http://apnews.myway.com/article/20060613/D8I7ADB81.html
The survival of the human race depends on its ability to find new homes elsewhere in the universe because there's
an increasing risk that a disaster will destroy the Earth, world-renowned scientist Stephen Hawking said Tuesday. The
British astrophysicist told a news conference in Hong Kong that humans could have a permanent base on the moon
in 20 years and a colony on Mars in the next 40 years. "We won't find anywhere as nice as Earth unless we go to
another star system," added Hawking, who arrived to a rock star's welcome Monday. Tickets for his lecture planned for Wednesday were sold out. He
added that if humans can avoid killing themselves in the next 100 years, they should have space settlements that can continue without support from Earth. "It
is important for the human race to spread out into space for the survival of the species," Hawking said. "Life on Earth
is at the ever-increasing risk of being wiped out by a disaster, such as sudden global warming, nuclear war, a
genetically engineered virus or other dangers we have not yet thought of." The 64-year-old scientist - author of the global best seller
"A Brief History of Time" - is wheelchair-bound and communicates with the help of a computer because he suffers from a neurological disorder called
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, or ALS. Hawking said he's teaming up with his daughter to write a children's book about the universe, aimed at the same age
range as the Harry Potter books. "It is a story for children, which explains the wonders of the universe," his daughter, Lucy, added. They didn't provide other
details.
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Uniqueness- START doesn’t preclude NMD
START will not include a restriction on missile defense.
BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union January 27, 2010 Russian foreign minister sums up outcomes of 2009 l/n
[Question] Question on the resumption of START. What can Washington forgo, and what is it ready to forgo, for the sake of an early resumption of the treaty?
What concessions is Moscow ready to make without prejudice to Russia's national interests?
[Lavrov] You have already answered my, or rather, your own question. Here the most important criterion is national interests and security. We are guided by this
criterion, and I am convinced that the same criteria are used by the United States. What we do need to forgo is the logic of the old treaty. The old treaty was
concluded in a completely different era. It reflected a different relationship of strategic potentials and was made, incidentally, in a situation where the ABM Treaty
was in force, from which the United States later withdrew.
The new treaty is being concluded at a time when trust has dramatically improved between our countries, when we can conduct business with each other solely
on the basis of equality and the consideration of the interests of each other, on the basis of strict parity in all respects.
Of course, we must consider
that we are negotiating in an environment where no treaty restrictions on missile defence exist. These are actually basic
parameters, an understanding of which has enabled us to move forward with our US colleagues on most of the questions discussed. I hope that the remaining
questions will be swiftly resolved when negotiations resume, and they will resume at the very start of February. Meanwhile, just in these days in Moscow we are
holding consultations at the level of chiefs of general staffs that will help determine refined guidance to both delegations to make it easier for them to fix
compromise solutions.
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Link: Turkey
Turkey doesn’t have missile defense but could obtain it soon from the United States.
Defense Daily, December 24, 2009 Taiwan Spends $1.1 Billion For New Production Patriot Air, Missile Defense Systems l/n
There are also discussions ongoing between the United States and Turkey, part of that nation's interest in obtaining
an air and missile defense system, Smith said.
"Turkey has asked for bidders for an air and missile defense system. The three bidders were the U.S., China, and Russia." Smith said.
Proposals are due to the Turkish government by mid January and Smith anticipated Turkey making a down select in the summer 2010 time frame.
"India has put out documents saying they are interested in air and missile defense," he added. "So anywhere there is an air and missile defense need, we look at
this kind of system, Patriot, to bid.
US proposing that Turkey become the radar center for the missile defense shield.
BBC Monitoring Europe December 21, 2009 Turkey asking "11 critical questions" about NATO missile shield radars l/n
When Ellen Tauscher, Under Secretary of Arms Control and International Security Affairs at the US Defence
Department, came to Ankara on 19 November, she proposed that Turkey become the "radar centre" of the [missile]
defence shield the United States plans to build along the Mediterranean-Middle East-Europe axis.
Tauscher delivered the proposal on behalf of NATO and the United States. The proposal said: "The radars may be deployed in your
country and the missiles in neighbouring countries. The threat would be detected from your facilities, but the missiles would be fired from
elsewhere." Turkey's proximity to all critical points and its geostrategic location played a key role in the formulation of the proposal. However, the proposal has
generated concerns on the Turkish side. Eleven questions raised by a doubtful Ankara have blocked the process. Tauscher noted that Turkey can assume a
greater initiative in the system that was originally proposed during the tenure of George Bush but that has been modified by Barack Obama. She added that
Turkey can use this system free of charge if it buys US-made Patriot missiles.
Turkey is a potential future BMD site.
China Post September 10, 2009 YET ANOTHER FOREIGN-POLICY FUMBLE
l/n
Yes, the Obama administration is reportedly looking at alternatives to the Eastern European sites X including seabased missile defense on Aegis-class ships and ground-based sites in Turkey and the Balkans. Problem is, those
configurations would be for fending off Iranian short-range missiles against some European targets, but couldn't tackle the long-range ICBM threat, which could
be bore-sighted on Western Europe X or the United States.
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Link: Kuwait
Missile defense has been extended in Kuwait.
The Washington Post July 6, 2010
In replying to West, Iran stresses its naval abilities in Persian Gulf l/n
In February, U.S. officials also said that the United States had expanded its missile defense systems in Kuwait, Qatar,
the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain to counter what it sees as Iran's growing missile threat.
Kuwait has recently acquired missile defense from the US.
The New York Times, February 16, 2010 Tuesday U.S. Fears That Iran Is Headed Toward a Military Dictatorship BYLINE: By MARK LANDLER
l/n
''We will always defend our friends and allies, and we will certainly defend countries who are in the Gulf who face the
greatest immediate nearby threat from Iran,'' Mrs. Clinton said in Doha.
Qatar is one of four Persian Gulf states -- along with Kuwait, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates -- that have
recently acquired additional anti-missile defense systems from the United States, military officials said.
Pressed by an audience of students, most of them Muslim, at the Doha campus of Carnegie Mellon University, Mrs. Clinton said the United States had no plans
to carry out a military strike against Iran.
Kuwait is home to part of our new missile defense.
Press TV, 2010-1-31, US beefs up military presence off Iranian shores http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=117487&sectionid=351020104
In addition to imposing new sanctions on the Tehran government, the US has reportedly begun beefing up its military
presence and war paraphernalia off the Iranian coast.
US military officials told AP on condition of anonymity that Washington has taken silent steps to increase the
capability of land-based Patriot missiles on the territory of some of its Arab allies in the Persian Gulf region.
Patriot missile systems were originally deployed to the Persian Gulf region to target aircrafts and shoot down missiles before they reach their target.
According to the officials, who were expounding on the classified information in a Sunday interview, the US Navy is also upgrading the presence of ships capable
of intercepting missiles.
The officials claimed that details are kept secret, because a number of Arab states fear Iran's military capabilities, but
at the same time, are cautious about acknowledging their cooperation with the US.
Arab states have a long history of housing US military bases and combat equipments. Kuwait plays host to US Patriots, while the United Arab
Emirates and Bahrain are home to the US Navy's 5th Fleet headquarters.
Qatar is also known to have a modernized US air operations center that has played a central role in the US wars on
Iraq and Afghanistan.
Central Command Chief David Petraeus, who is responsible for US military operations across the Middle East, in early January warned of a series of
'contingency plans' in dealing with Iran's refusal to accept Western demands over its nuclear program.
"It would be almost literally irresponsible if CENTCOM were not to have been thinking about the various 'what ifs' and to make plans for a whole variety of
different contingencies," said Petraeus in a break from the Obama administration's oft-stated claims of diplomacy with Tehran.
Petraeus has repeatedly asserted in his recent public speeches that the refurbishment of Patriot missiles is directly
linked to US plans about Iran.
"Other countries have certainly increased their Patriots, a whole host of different systems; Aegis ballistic missile cruisers are in the Gulf at all times now,"
Petraeus added.
Equipped with advanced radar systems, the Aegis ships features a missile known as the SM-3, which came to the fore in February 2008 when it was used to
shoot down a defective US satellite in space.
Meanwhile, Defense Secretary Robert Gates has spoken fervently of a new approach to missile systems, both in Europe and the Persian Gulf.
"I
don't want to get into it in too much detail," Gates had said earlier in September, "but the reality is we are working
both on a bilateral and a multilateral basis in the Gulf to establish the same kind of regional missile defense that
would protect our facilities out there as well as our friends and allies."
The buildup comes at a critical time in Tehran-Washington affairs. On Thursday, the US Senate passed a bill advocating tough sanctions on any entity,
individual, company or even country, which deals in refined petroleum with Iran.
Washington accuses Iran of developing nuclear weapons and has for years applied sanctions as a prime strategy to force the Tehran government into halting its
nuclear activities.
This is while Iran is a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and unlike some of its regional neighbors has opened its enrichment plants to UN
inspection.
Under the Bush administration, Washington had strived to portray Iran's uranium enrichment program and missile development as threats to regional stability in
what analysts believe to be an attempt to justify the increased US military presence in the Middle East.
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Link: South Korea
South Korea is protected by US missile defense.
BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific October 22, 2009
US promises S Korea conventional, missile defence against North l/n
Seoul, 22 October: The
United States declared Thursday it will provide conventional forces and missile defence on top of
its nuclear umbrella to provide South Korea an effective deterrent against the threat of North Korea's ongoing nuclear
and missile programmes.
The affirmation came after South Korean Defence Minister Kim Tae-young [Kim Tae-yo'ng] met with his US counterpart, Robert Gates, in Seoul for the annual
Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) between the allies.
The joint communique reached between the sides marks the first time that the US has expanded on the concept of "extended deterrence" since North Korea
conducted its second nuclear test in May.
"Secretary Gates reaffirmed the US commitment to provide extended deterrence for the ROK, using the full range of
military capabilities, to include the US nuclear umbrella, conventional strike, and missile capabilities," the statement said.
The ROK is the abbreviation of the Republic of Korea, South Korea's official name. The US has 28,500 troops stationed here as a legacy of the 1950-53 Korean
War, which ended in a truce rather than a peace treaty.
"North Korea continues to pose a threat to the Republic of Korea, to the region and to others. And as such, I want to reaffirm the unwavering commitment of the
US to the alliance and to the defence of the Republic of Korea," Gates said during an expanded meeting of South Korean and US defence officials.
"Key to that deterrence capability is our commitment to an enduring US force presence on the Korean peninsula as part of the combined defence posture," he
said.
South Korea is protected by US missile defense.
Korea Times, June 29, 2009 Monday USFK Chief Pledges Shield Against NK Missiles BYLINE: By Jung Sung-ki Staff Reporter l/n
The United States will use its missile defense network to defend South Korea against incoming missiles from North
Korea under an extended deterrence pledge in case of an emergency, the chief of the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK)
said.
South Korea is protected by US missile shield and asked to join the global missile
shield project that Japan is already on board.
Korea Times February 25, 2009 USFK Chief Urges Seoul to Join US BMD BYLINE: By Jung Sung-ki Staff Reporter l/n
"The ROK does not have a robust missile defense capability in place and this would likely be one of the bridging
capabilities the U.S. would provide until the ROK improves this," Sharp said in an exclusive interview with The Korea Times this week.
ROK is the acronym of South Korea's official name, the Republic of Korea.
In this regard, both the ROK and U.S. would benefit greatly from interoperability and the exchange of data between
missile defense systems, said the general, who concurrently serves as chief of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC) and the United
Nations Command (UNC). "We encourage the ROK to develop a layered and robust defense that provides protection at all levels."
The United States has asked South Korea to participate in the U.S.-led global missile defense network, which Japan
has already joined. Since 2004, Washington and Tokyo have been working jointly to develop a regional ballistic
missile defense shield against possible attacks from Pyongyang, which fired a missile over Japan in 1998 and conducted a nuclear
device test in 2006.
The U.S.-Japan defense system consists of up-to-date sea-to-air SM-3 missiles and PAC-3 interceptors.
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Sloths! Sloths!
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Link: South Korea
Continued US military presence in South Korea will lead to establishment of a global
NMD network. Withdrawal, however, will lead to South Korea not participating in US
missile defense.
Korea Herald 2010
(THE KOREA HERALD February 9, 2010 Tuesday, “Changes to alliance”,
http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/returnTo.do?returnToKey=20_T9804925394)
At a time when close cooperation is most needed in the efforts to denuclearize North Korea through the six-party talks, South
Korea and the United
States are entering a sensitive phase of important changes to their six-decade-old military alliance. First of all, the U.S. emphasis on
"strategic flexibility" applied to Korea prompts an uncomfortable look into an unpredictable future, with the WMD-armed North Korea falling into an economic
catastrophe. The U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review released last week indicated that the Obama administration would develop a more adaptive and flexible
U.S. and combined forces posture on the Korean Peninsula to strengthen the alliance's deterrent and defense capabilities. "Doing so includes continuing to
advance the Republic of Korea's lead role in the combined defense of its territory together with the transition of
wartime operational control to the ROK military in 2012," the QDR said. The quadrennial report made clear the concept of deploying part of
the U.S. Forces in Korea to overseas locations "helping to expand the pool of available forces for global contingencies." The U.S. troop redeployment from Korea
is suggested as the USFK is changing its status from the present "forward-deployed" to "forward-stationed" forces with a standard three-year family-accompanied
tour of duty in Korea. By the time the shift of status has been made - within three to four years as the Korean Defense Ministry estimates or sometime in the
latter part of the 2010s as U.S. officials say - the fixed size of the USFK will have little meaning. And by that time, the wartime operational control of the allied
Korean and U.S. forces will have been transferred to the Korean military - on the already set date of April 17, 2012 - and the present Combined Forces
Command will have been dismantled. On another issue of defense cooperation, the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense Review, released together with
the QDR, classified
South Korea as a nation "interested" in joining in the establishment of the ballistic missile defense
system. Seoul's Defense Ministry instantly denied any Korean role in the current BMD program. The conflicting claims revealed the complexity
of the issue. South Korea needs to develop its own capabilities to cope with the North's short- and medium-range missiles
aimed at Seoul and industrial centers. The Korean military is working on building the basic Air and Missile Defense
Cell radars and a command system but the Seoul government is reluctant to participate in the U.S.-led ballistic missile
defense system, being wary of negative reactions from China and Russia. Seoul's conservative government has conveyed to
Washington its request for a review of the timeline for the takeover of the wartime operational control, which was fixed during the previous liberal rule. This issue
has been on the table at some high-level consultations but the United States has not given a commitment to any possible delay. Pundits here are speculating that
Washington may be seeking to link a review of the OPCON transfer schedule to Korea's joining the BMD. After 60 years, a
change to a military
alliance that had begun with a major war may be in order to meet the changes in global defense requirements. Yet, on
the Korean Peninsula, seismic changes are taking place in the alliance at a time when the adversary is bolstering its WMD capabilities and causing great
unpredictability with its catastrophic economic failure, which undoubtedly leads to internal instability. Flexibility is much emphasized in the Quadrennial Defense
Review and strategists
at the Pentagon need to exercise flexibility in their own thoughts, correctly seeing the reality on
the Korean Peninsula.
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Sloths! Sloths!
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Link: South Korea
No uniqueness: South Korea already has NMD due to the fact that they’re not idiots
and realize North Korea is a threat
Korea Herald 2010
(Korea Times September 16, 2008 Tuesday By Jung Sung-ki “Seoul Begins Deploying Patriot Missile Interceptors”
http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T9804973327&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=
1&resultsUrlKey=29_T9804973330&cisb=22_T9804973329&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=174045&docNo=18)
Advanced Patriot missile defense systems from Germany have been deployed on South Korean Air Force bases and
unidentified locations nationwide, in an apparent move to counter the increasing threat of North Korean missiles, a
military source said Tuesday. The deployment of upgraded Patriot Advanced Capability-2 (PAC-2) systems is a core part of Seoul's plan to build
an independent theater missile defense shield, dubbed the Korean air and missile defense (KAMD) network system.
The KAMD, also involving Aegis destroyer ship-to-air missile defense systems, is designed to intercept low-flying, short- and
medium-range missiles from North Korea. The North is believed to have deployed more than 600 Scud missiles with a range of 320 to 500 kilometers, and 200
Rodong missiles that can hit Japan, near the border. The low-tier missile shield is expected
to reach initial operational capability by 2010,
while full operational capability is expected by 2012 when a ballistic missile early warning radar is to be introduced.
That's also when three 7,600-ton KDX-III Aegis-equipped destroyers will begin service. "The German PAC-2 systems have recently been
delivered to South Korea's Air Force and are being deployed at Air Force bases and other sites," the source told The Korea
Times on condition of anonymity. German missile technicians and soldiers who operated the systems are staying in South Korea to help install the Patriots at
designated sites, he added. Another source said some have been deployed in Yeongjongdo Island, Incheon, an Air Force base in Suwon, Gyeonggi Province
and Mount Hwangbyeong in Gangwon Province, while other systems are at a testing and evaluation site of the Agency for Defense Development in Seosan,
South Chungcheong Province. Lt. Col. Moon Chae-wook at the Air Force's public affairs office in Seoul declined to confirm this, citing the sensitivity of the issue.
He said the Air Force doesn't have a plan to make the new systems public because it could unnecessarily provoke North Korea. Last year, the Defense
Acquisition Program Administration approved the $1 billion SAM-X project to purchase 48 second-hand PAC-2 launch modules, radars and missiles, including
the Patriot Anti-Tactical Missile and Guidance Enhanced Missile Plus (GEM+) from Germany. The agency also signed a contract to buy ground-control
equipment from Raytheon of the United States to support two Patriot system battalions. A battalion is usually made up of three units, each of which has eight
missile launchers and a command center. A top official of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said the terminal KAMD system aims to take down North Korean missiles
approximately 40 kilometers north of Seoul. In 2006, Pyongyang test-fired a series of missiles off the eastern coast toward Japan, including a Taepodong-2
ballistic missile with a range of 6,700 kilometers, enough to hit the United States with a light payload. North Korea's short-range missiles pose a grave threat to
South Korea
originally planned to deploy more advanced PAC-3 systems to replace its aging ground-to-air Nike Hercules missiles
in 2000, but budgetary issues and anti-U.S. sentiment modified the plan. Progressive civic groups argued that the
purchase of PAC-3 systems was a move to join the U.S.-led global ballistic missile defense network. The PAC-3
missile is a smaller interceptor designed to ram incoming targets, while the PAC-2 uses an explo
South Korea and U.S. troops in the South, missile experts say, because they could reach South Korean territory within a few minutes.
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Sloths! Sloths!
___ of ___
Link: South Korea
Link- South Korea and Japan already have operation NMD systems that are part of
the greater US defense picture. Furthermore, Obama is actually making cuts on NMD
in the status quo.
Hackett 2009
(“Obama lowers our shield; As North Korea launches missiles into orbit” By James T. Hackett, SPECIAL TO THE WASHINGTON TIMES
April 7, 2009 Tuesday COMMENTARY; A17
http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T9806703011&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=
1&resultsUrlKey=29_T9806703014&cisb=22_T9806703013&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=8176&docNo=4)
It is surprising that North Korea's testing of President Obama by firing a long-range missile should coincide with word from the administration that it plans to slow
the major program defending this country against such threats. When North Korea launched its missile, dozens of radars and other
sensors followed it, confirming that its payload fell into the sea. Either its payload was not a satellite or it was one that failed to reach orbit.
Apparently the missile was an improved Taepodong-2 that went farther than ever before. But there is good news. This time a virtual armada of interceptors on
land and sea was ready to shoot it down. A signal achievement of the George W. Bush administration was its withdrawal from
the highly restrictive Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the subsequent deployment of missile defenses that previously
were banned, such as the land- and sea-based interceptors that stood guard last week. The backbone of our national missile
defense, the 26 Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) interceptors in Alaska and California, were on alert, ready to shoot down the missile if ordered to do
so. So were a number of Navy ships. The United States, Japan and South Korea cooperated as never before. A massive
surveillance system of space-based, land-based and sea-based radars and airborne sensors covered the Sea of
Japan like a blanket. The SPY-1 radars on Aegis destroyers were an important part of this sensor system, providing tracking data to the interceptors on
land and sea. The United States reportedly had seven Aegis ships in the Sea of Japan or the North Pacific to track the launch. Japan had three Aegis
destroyers on station, and South Korea's only Aegis destroyer was in the Sea of Japan to help with the tracking.
Seven of the U.S. and Japanese destroyers carried SM-3 missile interceptors, designed to shoot down missiles of
the kind North Korea has been testing, and some of Japan's Patriot PAC-3 land-based interceptors were moved to
locations closer to the expected trajectory. Because North Korea said it was a satellite launch, the United States did not plan to shoot it down,
although Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said that could happen - for example, if it took an aberrant course and headed for Hawaii. Japan was ready
to shoot down anything that might land on Japanese soil. Because the missile went over northern Honshu Island, dropping its first stage in
the Sea of Japan and the second and third in the Pacific, it was possible they might have come down on Japan. The experience was positive for the United
States and its Asian allies. Despite
historical animosity between South Korea and Japan, the threat from North Korea
brought them together in cooperative missile defense. Hopefully, this Northeast Asian alliance will continue, not only to contain the North
Korean regime, but also to confront Chinese territorial expansionism. It is ironic that the Obama team appears to be planning substantial
cuts from the missile defense budget, targeting some of the very weapons that faced this threat. The GMD defense, mainly in
Alaska, where it is scheduled to grow to 40 interceptors, is there because that is the best location from which to intercept a missile from North Korea or China
heading to Alaska or the U.S. mainland. This existing defense greatly reduces the value of North Korea's missiles and makes it more difficult for China to rattle its
long-range nuclear missiles in pressing this country to abandon Taiwan. Yet the administration may be deferring to those who oppose any
national missile defense, supporting the Russian argument that it would upset "strategic stability." With the global spread of
both ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons, that Cold War argument no longer makes sense. What counts now is to defend the United States from threats from
any quarter. The ship-based defenses are a wonderful addition, and they should be increased. Their main role, however, is to defend allies and U.S. bases
overseas. The defense of the mainland is based on the interceptors in Alaska. They protect the West Coast, but what about the Eastern half of the country? The
base planned for Poland would be an initial step in protecting the Eastern United States and our allies in Europe against a missile from Iran or any group in the
Middle East that may get one. That effort should go forward. The GMD defense in Alaska is important, but new technology must be added as it becomes
available to keep ahead of the evolving threat. This national asset must not be sidetracked as a "Bush program." It protects all Americans and gives Mr. Obama
the important ability to say, if a missile is heading for U.S. soil, "Shoot it down."
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Sloths! Sloths!
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Link: South Korea
South Korea has elements of US BMD now, depending on the U.S. military ties it may
expand to a multi-layer system
Greg Torode June 6, 2010 Chief Asia correspondent in Singapore South China Morning Post, Seoul may deploy Patriot missiles;
South Korean move risks angering Beijing l/n
South Korea is considering deploying Patriot anti-missile batteries in the wake of North Korea's sinking of one of its
warships - a move that risks angering Beijing by deepening Seoul's involvement in US-led regional missile defence.
Senior South Korean officials say Beijing has already warned against such a move but that the plan could proceed once military policy and budget reviews are
completed later this year.
South Korea is likely to keep Patriot PAC-3 batteries on land for low-level protection against incoming missiles but will stop short of putting interceptor missiles on
warships. The seaborne weapons operate high in the atmosphere and form a key element in a theatre missile defence
network operated by the United States and Japan.
The issue surfaced in US-South Korean military talks this year and is likely to be discussed further soon.
"There has a been a big shift in thinking since the Cheonan sinking," said one official close to talks. "It is still an exceptionally sensitive issue but it is now a lot
more likely ... We are talking about protecting South Korea ... it not about a wider envelope, even though that is how it will be perceived."
Forty-six sailors died when the Cheonan was torpedoed in March.
If the defence plan is approved, it will be a dramatic shift for South Korea. The previous two administrations had been wary of provoking North Korea or angering
China by such a move. The
administration of President Lee Myung-bak is proving more assertive. He is also forging even
closer military ties with the US and Japan.
China's testing of missiles to shoot down satellites has further emboldened South Korean thinking, officials said. "Frankly, there is no mood to entertain China
over this issue," one said.
While Patriot missiles (pictured) would nominally be deployed to counter the North Korean threat, Beijing would be concerned by any moves by the US and allies
that it perceives as intended to contain China.
Ballistic missile defences are controversial. They are hugely expensive and detractors liken them to trying to hit a bullet with another bullet. Their use inflames
neighbouring countries which lack them.
Japan and the US have been co-operating on ballistic missile defences based around a network of land- and seabased missiles, satellites and the Aegis command and control system. South Korea has Aegis-equipped warships but
has not deployed interceptor missiles at sea or on land and remains on the fringes of the network.
In a speech to an informal security conference in Singapore yesterday, US Defence Secretary Dr Robert Gates said the US was committed to increasing regional
deterrents, but did not go into specifics.
"We are taking serious steps to enhance our missile defences ... to develop capabilities in Asia that are flexible and
deployable - tailored to the unique needs of our allies and partners and able to counter the clear and growing ballistic
missile threats in the region," he said.
Dr Jonathan Pollack, an Asian studies scholar at the US Naval War College, said any deployment of anti-ballistic-missile batteries in South Korea could force
China to ponder the costs of its habitually cautious approach to North Korea.
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Link: Japan
Missile defense is a current question in Japan.
BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific March 18, 2010 Thursday Japan, USA begin debate on security issues 17 March l/n
Washington, March 17 Kyodo - The
United States and Japan have started formal discussions on a wide range of security
issues, including the US nuclear umbrella and missile defence, a senior US official told a congressional panel on Wednesday.
Michael Schiffer, deputy assistant secretary of defence for Asia and Pacific security affairs, revealed the development at a hearing of the House of
Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs.
Touching on a letter from Japanese Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada calling for bilateral dialogue on nuclear policy and nuclear deterrence, Schiffer said the
two countries began the consultation this year and that several issues were likely to be addressed in the context of
nuclear deterrence, including information security, countermeasures against cyber terrorism, use of space and missile defence.
Japan and the United States started working-level talks to further deepen their alliance in early February. The first bilateral meeting on nuclear deterrence was
held in Washington in mid-February, according to sources close to the matter.
In a written testimony to the House panel, Schiffer said it is desirable to maintain the current "neither confirm nor deny" policy on the possession and
transportation of nuclear weapons by the US military. He added that keeping nuclear weapons will not contradict the US policy of pursuing a nuclear-free world
advocated by President Barack Obama.
On the relocation of a US Marine base in Okinawa Prefecture, Schiffer reiterated the US position that Tokyo should abide by a 2006 bilateral accord to transfer
the heliport functions of the US Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station from Ginowan to a coastal area in the city of Nago, also in Okinawa, by 2014.
The US government awaits a decision by the Japanese government, Schiffer said. He also pointed out that news media have been too sensitive about the base
relocation issue, saying the Japan-US security alliance itself has strong public support in both countries.
Japan and the United States have been at odds over the base issue, which could also affect the planned transfer of
some 8,000 Marines to Guam, as the base relocation and troop transfer are part of a single package.
Japan is struggling to seek an alternative site for the Marine base, while the United States has been pressing Tokyo to stick to the existing plan.
US-Japan military ties are strong, cooperative missile defense may be scaled back.
Satoshi Ogawa, Yomiuri Shimbun Correspondent, Yomiuri May 8, 2009 The Daily Yomiuri(Tokyo) Japan, U.S. out of step on DPRK;
Ties a cornerstone of East Asian security, but cracks seen emerging l/n
The administration of U.S. President Barack Obama has stressed the importance of Japan-U.S. ties on many
occasions.
On Feb. 24, Prime Minister Taro Aso became the first foreign leader to be invited by Obama to the White House. Obama
said the bilateral relationship was the cornerstone of security in East Asia, and expressed a hope to further strengthen ties between Japan and the United States
during his term. He described Japan as a "great partner" of the United States.
Hillary Clinton chose Japan as the first country to visit as U.S. secretary of state, saying the relationship of the two
countries was the foundation for the security of the East Asian region.
Recently, Japan and the United States have been required to cooperate on many occasions such as in tackling the global economic crisis, supporting
reconstruction in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and making efforts to counter global warming. The Japanese government welcomed the remarks made by Obama
and Clinton.
Foreign Minister Hirofumi Nakasone said, "To speak of [the importance of] strong ties between Japan and the United States at a time of great social problems
faced by the world was very meaningful."
However, since then small cracks have been observed on the surface of the cornerstone.
On April 6, Gates spoke of a major review of Pentagon spending priorities regarding the procurement and development of key weaponry.
The review was made in response to a policy introduced by Obama that curbs spending on weapon systems deemed "unnecessary" because they were
designed with the Cold War in mind.
The review includes ceasing production of the F-22 fighter jet--which Japan regards as its most favored candidate to become its next mainstay fighter jet-and a scaling back of its missile defense plan.
In Japan, some experts have pointed to these moves as proof the United States pays scant attention to the situation
confronting Japan, including North Korea's nuclear development and China's military buildup and modernization.
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Link: Japan
Japan’s missile defense relies on US military.
Shozo Nakayama, May 6, 2009 Yomiuri Shimbun Staff Writer The Daily Yomiuri(Tokyo
Drop legal barrier to global role for SDF l/n
Self-defense issue resurfaces
Following North Korea's launch of a ballistic missile on April 5, the issue of Japan's right to collective self-defense--which, according to the government, the
nation has, but is not allowed to exercise under the Constitution--has drawn public attention again.
The Self-Defense Forces recently deployed for the first time a missile defense system with the aim of potentially
intercepting a ballistic missile from North Korea.
However, initial information about the launch was provided by U.S. early warning reconnaissance satellites, indicating
that Japan's missile defense system relies heavily on the U.S. military.
The U.S. government has long requested that Japan use its own missile system to shoot down any missiles targeting
the United States fired by a country neighboring Japan.
South Korea, Japan and United States are working together on missile defense.
James T. Hackett, April 7, 2009 James T. Hackett is a contributing writer to The Washington Times. He is based in Carlsbad, Calif. The Washington
Times Obama As North Korea launches missiles into orbit l/n
It is surprising that North Korea's testing of President Obama by firing a long-range missile should coincide with word from the administration that it plans to slow
the major program defending this country against such threats.
When North Korea launched its missile, dozens of radars and other sensors followed it, confirming that its payload fell into the sea. Either its payload was not a
satellite or it was one that failed to reach orbit.
Apparently the missile was an improved Taepodong-2 that went farther than ever before. But there is good news. This time a virtual armada of interceptors on
land and sea was ready to shoot it down.
A signal achievement of the George W. Bush administration was its withdrawal from the highly restrictive AntiBallistic Missile Treaty and the subsequent deployment of missile defenses that previously were banned, such as the landand sea-based interceptors that stood guard last week.
The backbone of our national missile defense, the 26 Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) interceptors in Alaska and California, were on alert, ready to
shoot down the missile if ordered to do so. So were a number of Navy ships.
The United States, Japan and South Korea cooperated as never before. A massive surveillance system of spacebased, land-based and sea-based radars and airborne sensors covered the Sea of Japan like a blanket. The SPY-1
radars on Aegis destroyers were an important part of this sensor system, providing tracking data to the interceptors
on land and sea.
The United States reportedly had seven Aegis ships in the Sea of Japan or the North Pacific to track the launch. Japan had three Aegis destroyers on station,
and South Korea's only Aegis destroyer was in the Sea of Japan to help with the tracking. Seven of the U.S. and Japanese destroyers carried SM-3 missile
interceptors, designed to shoot down missiles of the kind North Korea has been testing, and some of Japan's Patriot PAC-3 land-based interceptors were moved
to locations closer to the expected trajectory.
Because North Korea said it was a satellite launch, the United States did not plan to shoot it down, although Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said that could
happen - for example, if it took an aberrant course and headed for Hawaii. Japan was ready to shoot down anything that might land on Japanese soil. Because
the missile went over northern Honshu Island, dropping its first stage in the Sea of Japan and the second and third in the Pacific, it was possible they might have
come down on Japan.
The experience was positive for the United States and its Asian allies. Despite historical animosity between South
Korea and Japan, the threat from North Korea brought them together in cooperative missile defense. Hopefully, this
Northeast Asian alliance will continue, not only to contain the North Korean regime, but also to confront Chinese
territorial expansionism.
It is ironic that the Obama team appears to be planning substantial cuts from the missile defense budget, targeting some of the very weapons that faced this
threat. The GMD defense, mainly in Alaska, where it is scheduled to grow to 40 interceptors, is there because that is
the best location from which to intercept a missile from North Korea or China heading to Alaska or the U.S. mainland.
This existing defense greatly reduces the value of North Korea's missiles and makes it more difficult for China to rattle its long-range nuclear missiles in pressing
this country to abandon Taiwan.
Yet the administration may be deferring to those who oppose any national missile defense, supporting the Russian argument that it would upset "strategic
stability." With the global spread of both ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons, that Cold War argument no longer makes sense.
What counts now is to defend the United States from threats from any quarter. The ship-based defenses are a
wonderful addition, and they should be increased. Their main role, however, is to defend allies and U.S. bases
overseas.
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Link: Japan (Russia Internal)
Russia is fine with new cooperative missile defense plans that include them from the
inception but don’t like the current US-Japan missile shield plans.
BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union January 27, 2010 Russian foreign minister sums up outcomes of 2009 l/n
[Lavrov]
When we talk about cooperation with the American side and with our partners in the Russia-NATO Council on
missile defence topics, we talk about the need to start from scratch, to start with a joint analysis of where and what
are the risks and the threats of missile proliferation. We are not prepared to take on trust that someone has already
carried out an analysis and figured out how to combat these threats, as identified by that analysis. They simply invite us
come on, we have our own system, which we will develop, and you please help us with one radar or two or three, and some extra measures.
This is not the approach that we are prepared to support. Our Presidents Medvedev and Obama agreed on a joint analysis of the risks of missile proliferation. At
the meeting of the Russia-NATO Council in December last year a similar agreement was recorded in the Council's work program on joint analysis of missile
proliferation risks. We are ready for this work. What will be the outcome of this joint analysis, I do not know.
We must look not only at those areas that reflect today's political environment, let's say, Iran. We must take a comprehensive look at the whole situation with
missile proliferation risks. After all, we are participants in the control regime for missile technologies, and in this capacity must carry out appropriate assessments.
Therefore, it is about this question only about the joint and equal, moreover equal from the first stage, work. Not about anything else. I
would like to add
that the missile defense issue is topical not only for Europe; it is also relevant for the Far East. We are aware of the
plans which are being implemented particularly by the United States in cooperation with Japan to build missile
defenses there. We watch these plans. We want to understand what implications they will have for strategic stability in this vital part of the globe. So, once
again, if the partners are willing to jointly think about how to overcome those threats, the risks that we will jointly define, we are ready for that. But if someone has
already decided everything themselves, and we are asked only to help them technically or financially, this is not the approach.
[Question] What is your position on the development of relations between Russia and Latin America and Cuba in particular?
And my second question. How do you assess the increasing US military presence in Haiti? One has the impression that the US has prepared for war rather than
humanitarian assistance.
Japan’s missile defense relies on the US.
Blaine Harden; March 27, 2009 Washington Post Foreign Service The Washington Post North Korean Nuclear Test A Growing Possibility l/n
Because another North Korean long-range test missile failed shortly after takeoff in 2006, Japan
has purchased a Patriot missile-defense
system to protect Tokyo and, with the United States, has deployed Aegis antiballistic missiles on destroyers in the
Sea of Japan.
Japanese military officials say the two systems would probably not protect Japan completely if North Korea chose to
launch a large number of Nodongs. But the Aegis systems, together with other U.S.-made anti-missile systems, could
destroy in flight the missile that North Korea is planning to launch in April.
The head of the U.S. Pacific Command, Adm. Timothy J. Keating, told ABC News last month that if it appears North Korea is launching something other than a
satellite, "we'll be ready to respond."
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Link-3-country general
Military Presence in [Japan, Turkey, South Korea] is the centerpiece for building
NMD.
Rozoff
(Rick; Bases, Missiles, Wars: U.S. Consolidates Global Military Network Global Research, January 27, 2010)
Afghanistan is occupying center stage at the moment, but in the wings are complementary maneuvers to expand a
string of new military bases and
missile shield facilities throughout Eurasia and the Middle East. The advanced Patriot theater anti-ballistic missile batteries in place or
soon to be in Egypt, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Israel, Japan, Kuwait, the Netherlands, Poland, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Taiwan,
Turkey and the United Arab Emirates describe an arc stretching from the Baltic Sea through Southeast Europe to the Eastern Mediterranean Sea and the
Caucasus and beyond to East Asia. A semicircle that begins on Russia's northwest and ends on China's northeast. Over the past decade the United States has
steadily (though too much of the world imperceptibly) extended its military reach to most all parts of the world. From subordinating almost all of Europe to the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization through the latter's expansion into Eastern Europe, including the former Soviet Union, to arbitrarily setting up a regional
command that takes in the African continent (and all but one of its 53 nations). From invading and establishing military bases in the Middle East and Central and
South Asia to operating a satellite surveillance base in Australia and taking charge of seven military installations in South America. In the vacuum left in much of
the world by the demise of the Cold War and the former bipolar world, the U.S. rushed in to insert its military in various parts of the world that had been off limits
to it before. And this while Washington cannot even credibly pretend that it is threatened by any other nation on earth. It has employed a series of tactics to
accomplish its objective of unchallenged international armed superiority, using an expanding NATO to build military partnerships not only throughout Europe but
in the Caucasus, the Middle East, North and West Africa, Asia and Oceania as well as employing numerous bilateral and regional arrangements. The pattern that
has emerged is that of the U.S. shifting larger concentrations of troops from post-World War II bases in Europe and Japan to smaller, more dispersed forward
basing locations south and east of Europe and progressively closer to Russia, Iran and China. The ever-growing number of nations throughout the
world being pulled into Washington's military network serve three main purposes. First, they provide air, troop and weapons
transit and bases for wars like those against Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq, for naval operations that are in fact blockades by other
names, and for regional surveillance. Second, they supply troops and military equipment for deployments to war and postconflict zones whenever and wherever required. Last, allies and client states are incorporated into U.S. plans for an
international missile shield that will put NATO nations and select allies under an impenetrable canopy of interceptors
while other nations are susceptible to attack and deprived of the deterrent effect of being able to retaliate. The degree to
which these three components are being integrated is advancing rapidly. The war in Afghanistan is the major mechanism for forging a global
U.S. military nexus and one which in turn provides the Pentagon the opportunity to obtain and operate bases from
Southeast Europe to Central Asia. One example that illustrates this global trend is Colombia. In early August the nation's vice president announced that the first
contingent of Colombian troops were to be deployed to serve under NATO command in Afghanistan. Armed forces from South America will be assigned to the North Atlantic bloc to
fight a war in Asia. The announcement of the Colombian deployment came shortly after another: That the Pentagon would acquire seven new military bases in Colombia. When the
U.S. deploys Patriot missile batteries to that nation - on its borders with Venezuela and Ecuador - the triad will be complete. Afghanistan is occupying center stage at the moment, but in
the wings are complementary maneuvers to expand a string of new military bases and missile shield facilities throughout Eurasia and the Middle East.
On January 28 the British government will host a conference in London on Afghanistan that, in the words of what is identified as the UK Government's Afghanistan website, will be cohosted by Prime Minister Gordon Brown, Afghanistan's President Karzai and United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and co-chaired by British Foreign Minister David Miliband,
his outgoing Afghan counterpart Rangin Spanta, and UN Special Representative to Afghanistan, Kai Eide. The site announces that "The international community are [sic] coming
together to fully align military and civilian resources behind an Afghan-led political strategy." [1] The conference will also be attended by "foreign ministers from International Security
Assistance Force partners, Afghanistan’s immediate neighbours and key regional player [sic]." Public relations requirements dictate that concerns about the well-being of the Afghan
people, "a stable and secure Afghanistan" and "regional cooperation" be mentioned, but the meeting will in effect be a war council, one that will be attended by the foreign ministers of
scores of NATO and NATO partner states. In the two days preceding the conference NATO's Military Committee will meet at the Alliance's headquarters in Brussels, Belgium. "Together
with the Chiefs of Defence of all 28 NATO member states, 35 Chiefs of Defence of Partner countries and Troop Contributing Nations will also be present." [2] That is, top military
commanders from 63 nations - almost a third of the world's 192 countries - will gather at NATO Headquarters to discuss the next phase of the expanding war in South Asia and the
bloc's new Strategic Concept. Among those who will attend the two-day Military Committee meeting are General Stanley McChrystal, in charge of all U.S. and NATO troops in
Afghanistan; Admiral James Stavridis, chief U.S. military commander in Europe and NATO's Supreme Allied Commander; Pakistani Chief of the Army Staff General Ashfaq Parvez
Kayani and Israeli Chief of General Staff Gabi Ashkenazi. Former American secretary of state Madeleine Albright has been invited to speak about the Strategic Concept on behalf of the
twelve-member Group of Experts she heads, whose task it is to promote NATO's 21st century global doctrine. The Brussels meeting and London conference highlight the centrality that
the war in Afghanistan has for the West and for its international military enforcement mechanism, NATO. During the past few months Washington has been assiduously recruiting troops
from assorted NATO partnership program nations for the war in Afghanistan, including from Armenia, Bahrain, Bosnia, Colombia, Jordan, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Ukraine and
other nations that had not previously provided contingents to serve under NATO in the South Asian war theater. Added to forces from all 28 NATO member states and from Partnership
for Peace, Mediterranean Dialogue, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, Adriatic Charter and Contact Country programs, the Pentagon and NATO are assembling a coalition of over fifty
nations for combat operations in Afghanistan. Almost as many NATO partner nations as full member states have committed troops for the Afghanistan-Pakistan war: Afghanistan itself,
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Colombia, Egypt, Finland, Georgia, Ireland, Jordan, Macedonia, Mongolia, Montenegro, New Zealand, Pakistan, Singapore, South
Korea, Sweden, Ukraine and the United Arab Emirates. The Afghan war zone is a colossal training ground for troops from around the world to gain wartime experience, to integrate
armed forces from six continents under a unified command, and to test new weapons and weapons systems in real-life combat conditions. Not only candidates for NATO membership
but all nations in the world the U.S. has diplomatic and economic leverage over are being pressured to support the war in Afghanistan. The American Forces Press Service featured a
story last month about the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force's Regional Command East which revealed: "In addition to...French forces, Polish forces are in charge of
battle space, and the Czech Republic, Turkey and New Zealand manage provincial reconstruction teams. In addition, servicemembers and civilians from Egypt, Jordan and the United
Arab Emirates work with the command, and South Korea runs a hospital in the region." With the acknowledgment that Egyptian forces are assigned to NATO's Afghan war, it is now
known that troops from all six populated continents are subordinated to NATO in one war theater. [3] How commitment to the Alliance's first ground war relates to the Pentagon securing
bases and a military presence spreading out in all directions from Afghanistan and how worldwide interceptor missile plans are synchronized with both developments can be shown
region by region. Central And South Asia After the U.S. Operation Enduring Freedom attacks on and subjugation of Afghanistan began in October of 2001 Washington and its NATO
allies acquired the indefinite use of air and other military bases in Afghanistan, including Soviet-built airfields. The West also moved into bases in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan
and with less fanfare in Pakistan and Turkmenistan. It has also gained transit rights from Kazakhstan and NATO conducted its first military exercise in that nation, Zhetysu 2009, last
September. The U.S. has lobbied the Kazakh government to supply troops for NATO in Afghanistan (as it had earlier in Iraq) under the bloc's Partnership for Peace provisions.
The Black Sea
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The year after Romania was brought into NATO as a full member in 2004 the U.S. signed an agreement to gain control over four bases in Romania, including the Mihail Kogalniceanu
Air Base. The next year a similar pact was signed with Bulgaria for the use of three military installations, two of them air bases. The Pentagon's Joint Task Force-East (which operates
from the above-named base) conducted nearly three-month-long joint military exercises last summer in Bulgaria and Romania in preparation for deployment to Afghanistan. On January
24 eight Romanian and Bulgaria soldiers were wounded in a rocket attack on a NATO base in Southern Afghanistan. Three days earlier Romania announced that it would deploy 600
more troops to that nation, bringing its numbers to over 1,600. Bulgaria has also pledged to increase its troop strength there and is considering consolidating all its forces in the country
in Kandahar, one of the deadliest provinces in the war zone. Late last November Foreign Minister Rumyana Zheleva of Bulgaria was in Washington, D.C. to "hear the ideas of US
President Barack Obama's administration on the strategy of the anti-missile defense in Europe." [4] During the same month Bogdan Aurescu, State Secretary for Strategic Affairs in the
Romanian Foreign Ministry, stated that "The new variant of the US anti-missile shield could cover Romania." [5] A local newspaper at the time commented on Washington's
new "stronger, smarter, and swifter" missile shield plans that "A strong and modern surveillance system located in Romania,
Bulgaria and Turkey could monitor three hot areas at once: the Black Sea, the Caucasus and the Caspian and relevant zones in the Middle East." [6] Also last
November a Russian news source wrote that "Anonymous sources in the Russian intelligence community say that the United States plans to supply weapons,
including a Patriot-3 air defense system and shoulder-launched Stinger missiles, worth a total of $100 million, to Georgia." [7] In October the U.S. led the twoweek Immediate Response 2009 war games to prepare the first of an estimated 1,000 Georgian troops for counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan,
prompting neighboring Abkhazia - which knew who the military training was also aimed against - to stage its own exercises at the same time. American Patriot
Advanced Capability-3 interceptor missiles in Georgia would be deployed against Russia, as they will be 35 miles from its border in Poland. Former head of the
Pentagon's Missile Defense Agency Lt. Gen. Henry Obering stated two years ago that Georgia and even Ukraine were potential locations for American missile
shield deployments.
Middle East
Last October and November the U.S. and Israel held their largest-ever joint military exercise, Operation Juniper Cobra 10, which established another precedent
in addition to the number of troops and warships involved: The simultaneous testing of five missile defense systems. An American military official present at the
war games was one of several sources acknowledging that the exercises were in preparation for the Barack Obama administration's more extensive, NATO-wide
and broader, missile interception system. Juniper Cobra was the initiation of the U.S. X-Band radar station opened in 2008 in Israel's Negev Desert. Over 100
American service members are based there for the foreseeable future, the first U.S. troops formally deployed in that nation. In December the Jerusalem Post
quoted an unnamed Israeli defense official as saying "The expansion of the war in Afghanistan
opens a door for us." The same source wrote "the
NATO-U.S. plan to deploy a cross-continent missile shield in Europe also represents an opportunity for the Jewish state to market its
military platforms...." [8] "Meanwhile, recent months have seen several senior NATO officials travel to Israel for discussions that reportedly focused on, among
other things, how Israel could help NATO troops fight in Afghanistan." [9] Last June Israeli President Shimon Peres led a 60-member delegation that included
Defense Ministry Director-General Pinhas Buchris to Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, on opposite ends of the Caspian Sea. A year ago "Kazakhstan's defense
ministry said...it had asked Israel to help it modernize its military and produce weapons that comply with NATO standards." [10] The United Arab Emirates (UAE)
is the first Arab country to provide troops to NATO for Afghanistan. It has a partnership arrangement with NATO under provisions of the Istanbul Cooperation
Initiative for Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members. Early this month a local newspaper announced that "the UAE became the largest foreign purchaser of
US defence equipment with sales of $7.9bn, ahead of Afghanistan ($5.4bn), Saudi Arabia ($3.3bn) and Taiwan ($3.2bn). "The spending included orders for
munitions for the UAE's F-16 fighter jets as well as a new Patriot defensive missile system and a fleet of corvettes for the navy." [11] Nine days later the same
newspaper reported on a visit by Lt. Gen. Michael Hostage, commander of the U.S. Air Force Central Command, to discuss " the
possibility of setting
up a shared early warning system and enhancing the region's ballistic-missile deterrence." Hostage was quoted as saying "I
am attempting to organize a regional integrated air and missile defense capability with our GCC partners." [12] An Emirati general added, "The GCC needs a
national and multinational ballistic missile defence (BMD) to counter long-range proliferating regional ballistic missile threats." [13] The missile shield is aimed
against Iran. Last September Pentagon chief Robert Gates said, "The reality is we are working both on a bilateral and a multilateral basis in the Gulf to
establish the same kind of regional missile defense [as envisioned for Europe] that would protect our facilities out there as
well as our friends and allies." [14] "In a September 17 briefing, Gates said...the United States has already formed a Gulf missile
defense network that consisted of PAC-3 and the Aegis sea-based systems." The exact system soon to be deployed in the Baltic Sea and Mediterranean
and afterwards the Black Sea. In addition, the "UAE has ordered the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, designed to destroy nuclear
missiles in the exoatmosphere. "Over the last two years, the Pentagon has been meeting GCC military chiefs to discuss regional
and national missile defense programs....At the same time, the U.S. military has been operating PAC-3 in Kuwait and Qatar. The U.S. Army has
also been helping Saudi Arabia upgrade its PAC-2 fleet." [15] Turkey's Hurriyet Daily News reported at the end of last year that "Turkey is set to make
crucial defense decisions in 2010 as the U.S. offer to join a missile shield program and multibillion-dollar contracts are
looming over the country's agenda. "If a joint NATO missile shield is developed, such a move may force Ankara to join the
mechanism despite the possible Iranian reaction....U.S. President Barack Obama's administration has invited Ankara to join a Western missile
shield system...." [16]
An account of the broader strategy adds: "U.S. officials are also urging Turkey to choose the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC3) against Russian and Chinese rivals competing for a Turkish contract for the purchase of high-altitude and long-range antimissile defense systems....[A] new
plan calls for the creation of a regional system in southeastern Europe, the Mediterranean and part of the Middle East. "In phase one of the new Obama plan, the
U.S. will deploy SM-3 interceptor missiles and radar surveillance systems on sea-based Aegis weapons systems by 2011. In phase two and by 2015, a more
capable version of the SM-3 interceptor and more advanced sensors will be used in both sea-and land-based configurations. In later phases three and four,
intercepting and detecting capabilities further will be developed." [17] One of Russia's main news agencies reported on U.S.
plans to incorporate
Turkey into its new missile designs, with Turkey as the only NATO state bordering Iran serving as the bridge between
a continent-wide system in Europe and its extension into the Middle East: "According to the Milliyet daily, U.S. President Barack
Obama last week proposed placing a 'missile shield' on Turkish soil....Both Russia and Iran will perceive that [deployment] as a threat,' a
Turkish military source was quoted as saying." [18] A broader description of the interceptor missile project in progress includes: "Obama's team has...sought to
'NATO-ise' the US plan by involving other allies more closely in its development and deployment. The idea is to create a NATO chain of command similar to that
long used for allied air defences. That would involve a NATO 'backbone' for command-and-control jointly funded by the allies, into which the US sea-based
defences and other national assets, such as short-range Patriot missile interceptors purchased by European nations including
Germany, the Netherlands and Greece, could be 'plugged in' to the NATO system creating a multi-layered defence
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shield." [19] The advanced Patriot theater anti-ballistic missile batteries in place or soon to be in Egypt, Georgia, Germany, Greece,
Israel, Japan, Kuwait, the Netherlands, Poland, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates describe an arc
stretching from the Baltic Sea through Southeast Europe to the Eastern Mediterranean Sea and the Caucasus and
beyond to East Asia. A semicircle that begins on Russia's northwest and ends on China's northeast.
Baltic Sea
Poland's Defense Ministry revealed on January 20 that the U.S. will deploy a Patriot Advanced Capability anti-ballistic missile battery and 100 troops to a Baltic
Sea location 35 miles from Russian territory. The country's foreign minister - former investment adviser to Rupert Murdoch and resident fellow of the American
Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C. -Radek Sikorski, recently pledged to increase Polish troop numbers in Afghanistan from the current 1,955. "We will be at
2,600 by April and 400 additional troops on standby, which we will deploy if there is a need to strengthen security." [20] Fellow Baltic littoral states Estonia, Latvia
and Lithuania combined have almost 500 troops in Afghanistan, a number likely to rise. The Lithuanian Siauliai Air Base was ceded to NATO in 2004 after the
three Baltic states became full members. The Alliance has flown regular air patrols in the region, with U.S. warplanes participating in six-month rotations, ever
since. Within a few minutes flight from Russia. The three nations will be probable docking sites for U.S. Aegis-class warships and their Standard Missile-3
interceptors under new Pentagon-NATO missile shield deployments.
Far East Asia
South Korea pledged 350 troops for NATO's Afghan war last year and in late December Seoul announced that it would send a ranking officer
for the first time "to attend a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) conference to seek ways to strengthen cooperation with other nations in dispatching
troops to Afghanistan and coordinate military operations there," [21] likely a reference to the January 26-27 Military Committee meeting. In the middle of
January the U.S. conducted Beverly Bulldog 10-01 exercises in South Korea which "involved more than 7,200 U.S. airmen
at Osan and Kunsan air bases and other points around the peninsula in an air war exercise" and "about 125 soldiers of the U.S. Army's Patriot
missile unit in South Korea...." [22] On January 14 the new government of Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama ended Japan's naval refuelling mission
carried out in support of the U.S. war in Afghanistan since 2001. However, pressure will be exerted on Tokyo at the January 28
conference in London, particularly by Hillary Clinton, to reengage in some capacity. On last year's anniversary of the Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor, December 7, the U.S. and Japan held joint war games, Yama Sakura (Mountain Cherry Blossom), on the island of Hokkaido in
northernmost Japan, that part of the country nearest Russia on the Sea of Japan. North Korea was the probable alleged belligerent. Over 5,000 troops
participated in drills that included "battling a regional threat that includes missile defenses, air defense and ground-forces operations...."
"Japan's
military has been actively developing its anti-missile defenses in cooperation with the United States. It currently
has deployed Patriot PAC-3 missile defenses at several locations and also has two sea-based Aegis-equipped Kongo-class warships with anti-missile interceptors," [23] the latter
having engaged in joint SM-3 missile interceptions with the U.S. off Hawaii. If support for the war in Afghanistan is linked with deployment of tactical missile shield installations in Israel
and Poland, in the first case aimed at Iran and in the second at Russia, the case of Taiwan is even more overt. Almost immediately after announcements that the U.S. would provide it
with over 200 Patriot Advanced Capability-3 missiles and double the amount of frigates it had earlier supplied, with Taiwan planning to use the warships for Aegis Ballistic Missile
Defense System upgrades, the nation's China Times newspaper wrote that "Following a recent US-Taiwan military deal, the Obama administration has demanded that Taiwan provide
non-military aid for troops in Afghanistan....The US wants Taiwan to provide medical or engineering assistance to US troops in Afghanistan that will be increased...." [24] Dispatching
troops to Afghanistan would be too gratuitous an incitement against China (which shares a narrow border with the South Asian nation), but Taiwan will nevertheless be levied to support
the war effort there.
Wars: Stepping Stones For New Bases, Future Conflicts
The 78-day U.S. and NATO air war against Yugoslavia in 1999, Operation Allied Force, allowed the Pentagon to construct the mammoth Camp Bondsteel in Kosovo and within ten
years to incorporate five Balkans nations into NATO. It also prepared the groundwork for U.S. Navy warships to dock at ports in Albania, Croatia and Montenegro. Two years later the
attack on Afghanistan led to the deployment of U.S. and NATO troops, armor and warplanes to five nations in Central and South Asia. The war in Afghanistan and Pakistan has also
contributed to the Pentagon's penetration of the world's second most populous nation, India, which is being pulled into the American military orbit and integrated into global NATO. The
U.S. and Israel are supplanting Russia as India's main arms supplier and U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently returned from India where his mission included "lifting
bilateral military relations from a policy-alignment plane to a commercial platform that will translate into larger contracts for American companies." [25] With the quickly developing
expansion of the Afghanistan-Pakistan war into an Afghanistan-Pakistan-Yemen-Somalia theater, NATO warships are in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean and the U.S. has
stationed Reaper drones, aircraft and troops in Seychelles. [On the same day as the London conference on Afghanistan a parallel meeting on Yemen will be held in the same city.] After
the 2003 invasion of Iraq the Pentagon gained air and other bases in that nation as well as what it euphemistically calls forward operating sites and base camps in Jordan, Kuwait and
the United Arab Emirates. In less than a decade the Pentagon and NATO have acquired strategic air bases and ones that can be upgraded to that status in Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Iraq,
Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania and Romania.
Global NATO And Militarization Of The Planet
The January 26 Chief of Defense session of NATO's Military Committee with top military leaders of 63 countries attending - while the bloc is waging and escalating the world's largest
and lengthiest war thousands of miles away from the Atlantic Ocean - is indicative of the pass that the post-Cold War world has arrived at. Never in any context other than meetings of
NATO's Military Committee do the military chiefs of so many nations (including at least five of the world's eight nuclear powers), practically a third of the world's, gather together. That
the current meeting is dedicated to NATO operations on three continents and in particular to the world's only military bloc's new Strategic Concept for the 21st century - and for the
planet - would have been deemed impossible twenty or even ten years ago. As would have been the U.S. and its NATO allies invading and occupying a Middle Eastern and a South
Asian nation.
And the elaboration of plans for an international interceptor missile system with land, air, sea and space
components. In fact, though, all have occurred or are underway and all are integrated facets of a concerted drive for
global military superiority.
Notes
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