Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. 1. Is the activity speech? For symbolic or expressive conduct the test is “whether an intent to convey a particularized message was present and whether the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.” Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989). 2. Is the policy vague or overbroad? It is vague “when men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning . . ..” See Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 866-67 (E.D. Mich. 1989). It is overbroad “if it sweeps within its ambit a substantial amount of protected speech along with that which it can legitimately regulate . . ..” Id. at 864. 3. Is the regulation content-based? If yes, it is presumed unconstitutional unless it falls within one of the recognized exceptions. 4. Does the speech fit within one of the exceptions to the general prohibition against content-based restrictions? Obscenity Child Pornography Fighting Words Incitement to Imminent Lawless Conduct Defamation Invasion of Privacy Harassment True Threats Copyright Infringement Another Recognized Tort or Crime 5. If the regulation is content-based and the speech does not fit into one of the exceptions, can the regulation meet the strict scrutiny test? A content-based regulation “must be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government interest, and if a less restrictive alternative would serve the Government’s purpose, the legislature must use that alternative.” U.S. v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 804 (2000). Should it be unconstitutional for schools to restrict student speech that could not be restricted outside the school? Facts: Students decided to wear black armbands to protest the Vietnam War. After learning of the plan, the district adopted a policy that prohibited the wearing of armbands. Students who wore armbands were asked to remove them. Five students refused and were suspended. Issue: Did the school’s policy violate the students’ constitutional right to freedom of expression? 1. Is the wearing of an armband speech? 2. Is the policy vague or overbroad? 3. Is the policy content-based? 4. Is there an exception that would permit content-based restriction (obscenity, defamation, etc.)? 5. Can the regulation survive strict scrutiny? Narrowly tailored Compelling government interest No less restrictive alternative 6. Does the speech involve K-12 students in a public school setting? Rule: School can limit speech only if school can reasonably forecast material and substantial disruption with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school. Speech that “materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.” The school’s undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not sufficient. Reasoning: Although students do not “shed their constitutional rights of freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,” students’ rights must be considered in light of special circumstance of the school environment. Balancing Test: Student’s interests v. school’s interest. Holding: Passive political speech of students in this case did not materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school. Facts: Fraser delivered a nomination speech for a classmate at a mandatory school assembly. His speech involved an “elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor.” Fraser was suspended for three days for violating the school policy prohibiting obscene language. He was also removed from the list of candidates for graduation speaker. Would the Tinker standard (material and substantial disruption) permit the school to discipline Fraser? Rule: School can restrict speech that is vulgar, lewd, obscene, or plainly offensive. Reasoning: Role of Public Education: “[T]he inculcation of fundamental values necessary for the maintenance of a democratic political system,” including the habits and manners of civility” Teaching the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior Factual considerations: Students are captive audience. Schools serve in loco parentis. Speech caused actual disruption (class time response). Schools should protect students from inappropriate and embarrassing material. The Court finds that regulation of the offensive speech was unrelated to political viewpoint (distinguished from Tinker). The Court reasons, “Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the states from insisting that certain modes of expression are inappropriate and subject to sanctions.” Facts: Students complained that school officials violated their First Amendment rights when they barred the publication of two articles in the school newspaper. The articles described students’ experiences with pregnancy and the impact of divorce. Does the policy meet one of the school standards? Tinker – School can regulate speech that causes a material and substantial disruption or invades the rights of others Bethel – School can restrict speech that is vulgar, lewd, obscene, or plainly offensive. The Court distinguishes Tinker and Fraser as cases that ask whether the First Amendment requires schools to tolerate particular student speech. In contrast, Hazelwood raises the question of whether the First Amendment requires a school to affirmatively promote particular student speech. Hazelwood creates a new category often referred to as school-sponsored speech. Holding: Educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. School has the right to disassociate itself from speech that students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school if the speech is ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately researched, biased or prejudiced, vulgar or profane, or unsuitable for immature audiences. Rule: A school can regulate school-sponsored student speech as long as the regulation is reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. Facts: Students were permitted to watch the Olympic Torch Relay as it passed along the street by the school. Teachers monitored students’ actions. A senior who was late to school joined classmates on the sidewalk and unfurled a banner that said “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.” When he refused the principal’s order to take it down, he was suspended. Two Issues: 1. Is this a school speech case? 2. If it is, can a principal restrict student speech at a school event when that speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use? Majority – Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito Concurring – Thomas Concurring – Alito and Kennedy Concurring in judgment in part, dissenting in part – Breyer Dissent – Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg 1. Is this a school-speech case? Facts suggesting it is not: Frederick was standing on a public sidewalk. He was not yet in attendance that day. He was 18 and not required to be in school. Facts suggesting that it is: The event took place during school hours and was sanctioned by the principal. Teachers were supervising. Band and cheerleaders performed. Frederick stood among other students. Court decides that this is a school speech case. Court finds that Frederick cannot “stand in the midst of his fellow students, during school hours, at a school-sanctioned activity and claim that he is not at school.” 2. Can a principal restrict student speech at a school event when that speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use? Is it reasonable for principal to interpret the banner as promoting illegal drug use? Court says message could mean either of two things: “[Take] bong hits” or “Bong hits [are a good thing]” Holding: “The ‘special characteristics of the school environment’. . . and the government interest in stopping student drug use . . . allow schools to restrict student expression that they reasonably regard as promoting illegal drug use.” School can limit speech that materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invades the rights of others. School can restrict speech that is vulgar, lewd, obscene, or plainly offensive. School can regulate school-sponsored student speech as long as the regulation is reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. School can restrict student expression that it reasonably regards as promoting illegal drug use. A public school district may require students to wear a school uniform or restrict student dress to a particular style in accordance with the law. The school district may determine the style and color of the school uniform. No employee of or volunteer in or school board member of or school district administrator of a public school or charter school shall direct a student to remove an emblem, insignia, or garment, including a religious emblem, insignia, or garment, as long as such emblem, insignia, or garment is worn in a manner that does not promote disruptive behavior. Facts: After a number of racially charged incidents, the school banned the wearing of clothing depicting the confederate flag symbol. Several students were sent home for refusing to remove items of clothing that violated the school policy. Those students sued the school claiming it had violated their First Amendment rights. The Eighth Circuit applied the Tinker standard and found that the school policy met that standard. “The record in this case contains evidence of likely racially-motivated violence, racial tension, and other altercations directly related to adverse race relations in the community and the school. Tinker is satisfied. Because the school could reasonably forecast a substantial disruption, the administration did not violate the First Amendment by banning the flag.” “Racially offensive speech cannot be restricted for that reason alone; but, when that speech occurs in an educational and social context that enables school officials to reasonably suspect material and substantial discipline disruption, some limitation of normal free expression is constitutionally permissible. Based on the substantial race-related events occurring both at the school and in the community, some of which involved the Confederate flag, we hold that the District’s ban was constitutionally permissible. Farmington school officials, considering the instant facts and circumstances, could reasonably “forecast” a “substantial disruption” resulting from any display of the Confederate flag.” Facts: Twin brothers created a website (NorthPress) and blog intended to discuss, satirize, and vent about events at Lee’s Summit North. The posts included offensive and racist comments and also sexually explicit and degrading comments about named female classmates. The brothers told only 5 or 6 classmates, but the student body soon learned about blog. Procedure The brothers were suspended for 10 days. Following a hearing, an appeal, and a second hearing, they were suspended for 180 days. They were permitted to enroll in Summit Ridge Academy during their suspensions. The brothers filed suit for a preliminary injunction to lift the suspension. Test for Preliminary Injunction: “(1) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant; (2) the state of balance between this harm and the injury that granting the injunction will inflict on other parties litigant; *(3) the probability that movant will succeed on the merits; and (4) the public interest.” Issue: Are the Wilsons likely to prevail on their claim that the school violated their constitutional right to free speech? Sub-issues: 1. Can off-campus speech be the subject of school discipline? Yes, if it is reasonably foreseeable that the speech will reach the school community and cause a substantial disruption. 2. If off-campus speech can be the subject of discipline, which First Amendment standard applies? The Eighth Circuit decides thatTinker applies. That view is supported by Second, Third, and Fourth Circuit decisions. Under Tinker, why would the Wilsons be unlikely to succeed on the merits? Eighth Circuit also notes the distress that the Wilsons’ return could have caused the targeted female student. “We hold that the Wilsons are unlikely to succeed on the merits under the relevant caselaw. We also conclude the District Court's findings do not establish sufficient irreparable harm to the Wilsons to justify a preliminary injunction.”