NORTH CAROLINA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
IC FILE NO. X57890; FRANCIS ATIAPO, Plaintiff v. GOREE LOGISTICS, INC.,
NON-INSURED, and/or OWENS THOMAS, INC., Defendants.
PH-2819 NC INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION v. GOREE LOGISTICS, INC. and
MANDIEME DIOUF, Individually.
DEFENDANT OWEN THOMAS, INC.’S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF APPEAL TO
THE FULL COMMISSION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff filed a Form 18 on 29 July 2011, alleging that he injured his right leg in a
trucking accident in Loveland, Colorado on 30 June 2011, and was entitled to
compensation for medical bills and lost wages from his employer, Goree Logistics, Inc.
(“Goree Logistics”). (See Stip. Ex. 2.)
On 19 September 2011, Plaintiff filed a Form 33. On 28 September 2011, Goree
Logistics filed a Form 61 denying Plaintiff’s claim for the reasons that, “[t]he claimant
was an independent contractor and not an employee on the date in question,” and “[a]t the
time of the incident, Goree Logistics had only two individuals driving trucks for Goree.”
(Id.)
On 7 November 2011, Goree Logistics filed a Form 33R, again denying
compensability on the grounds set forth in its previously filed Form 61. (Id.) Deputy
Commissioner Adrian A. Phillips presided over the 9 August 2012 hearing. Appearances
were made by Kenneth C. Martin, counsel for Plaintiff, Lawrence P. Margolis, counsel
for Goree Logistics, and Assistant Attorney General Marc X. Sneed appearing for the
State in the penalty portion of the hearing against Goree Logistics due to its non-insured
status.
At the 9 August 2012 hearing, Assistant Attorney General Sneed made a motion
to add Owen Thomas, Inc. (“Owen Thomas”) as a Party-Defendant. Deputy
Commissioner Phillips allowed the motion and filed an order on 28 August 2012 adding
Owen Thomas to the claim portion of the proceeding.1 A second hearing was scheduled
for 16 November 2012.
Undersigned counsel filed notice of appearance for Owen Thomas on 24 October
2012, and on 25 October 2012 moved for a continuance of the 16 November 2012
hearing for additional time to conduct discovery. Deputy Commissioner Phillips allowed
the motion. A hearing was held on 1 March 2013, with appearances by Mr. Martin, Mr.
Margolis, undersigned counsel, and Assistant Attorney General Sneed. Testimony was
received from Plaintiff Francis Atiapo, Defendant Mandieme Diouf for Goree Logistics,
and John Thomas Grimes for Owen Thomas.
On 26 July 2013, Deputy Commissioner Phillips filed her Opinion and Award,
which held that Plaintiff’s injuries were compensable and that Owen Thomas was a
statutory employer within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. §97-19, and thus liable to
Plaintiff for any and all medical expenses related to the compensable injuries, as well as
temporary total disability compensation. The Opinion and Award also imposed penalties
against Goree Logistics as a non-insured employer and Madieme Diouf, individually.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
I.
Plaintiff’s 30 June 2011 Accident
Plaintiff and Goree Logistics stipulated in their pre-trial agreement that Plaintiff
sustained an injury to his right leg as a result of a trucking accident in Colorado. Plaintiff
and Goree Logistics further stipulated that they were bound by the provisions of the
1
Owen Thomas, Inc. is misidentified as “Owens” Thomas, Inc. in the original caption of this matter.
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North Carolina Workers’ Compensation Act (the “Act”), and that Goree Logistics was
not carrying workers’ compensation insurance at the time of the accident. The main
contested matter between Plaintiff and Goree Logistics was whether Plaintiff was an
independent contractor at the time of the accident, which Goree Logistics contended
would exclude Plaintiff from entitlement to benefits. (T. vol. 1 pp. 1:20-3:4.) Plaintiff
claimed that he was an employee of Goree Logistics at the time of the accident. (T. vol. 1
p. 5:17-5:22.) Plaintiff further testified that the truck he was driving was owned by
Goree Logistic’s president, “Omar” Madieme Diouf. (T. vol. 1 p. 13:19-13:21.) Also, the
truck was registered with the Department of Transportation in Mr. Diouf’s name. (T. vol.
1 p. 8:8-8:14.) Plaintiff testified that Mr. Diouf hired him and was his immediate
supervisor. (T. vol. 1 p. 6:10-6:16.)
Goree Logistics contended at the first hearing that Plaintiff was an independent
contractor. Mr. Diouf testified that Plaintiff received a 1099. (T. vol. 1 pp. 53:11-54:5.)
Mr. Diouf also testified that Goree Logistics and Plaintiff had signed an agreement
indicating that Plaintiff was an independent contractor. (T. vol. 1 pp. 58:22-59:4.)
At the time of the accident, Plaintiff was making a delivery in Cheyenne,
Wyoming. The customer in Cheyenne refused the load, and Plaintiff was directed by
Goree Logistics to bring the truck to Georgia. (T. vol. 1 p. 11:1-11:6; See Stip. Ex. 5,
Pl.’s Resp. to Def’s Interrog. 14 and 15; T. vol. 2 p. 30:12-30:23.) On the way to
Georgia, Plaintiff was told by Goree Logistics to change course and go to Denver,
Colorado. (Id.) It was in route to Denver that Plaintiff came upon a “long backup” of
cars at the peak of a hill. When he pressed the brakes, the brakes failed and he collided
with the car in front of him. (T. vol. 1 pp. 11:21-12:1.)
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II.
Freight Broker Owen Thomas, Inc.
Owen Thomas is a federally-licensed freight broker with its office in Zephyrhills,
Florida. (T. vol. 2 pp. 4:15-5:5.) Owen Thomas has customers in the produce industry,
like Sunny Ridge Farms2 in the instant case, who sell their produce to various grocery
stores, as well as superstores such as Wal-Mart or Costco. (T. vol. 2 pp. 18:18-19:8.) As
a freight broker, Owen Thomas’ job is to find motor carriers, like Goree Logistics, to haul
those loads of produce for the customer. (Id.)
Owen Thomas and Goree Logistics entered into a “Broker-Carrier Agreement” on
or about 22 June 2011 (the “Agreement”). (See Stip. Ex. 3.) The Agreement set forth the
parameters of Owen Thomas’ relationship with Goree Logistics — specifically, that
Owen Thomas is a licensed transportation broker acting on behalf of its customers, and
Goree Logistics is a licensed motor carrier (U.S. Dept. of Transportation # 1946972).
Section 1 of the Agreement states, “[b]roker is an agent authorized by its customers to
negotiate and arrange for transportation of their shipments in interstate commerce.”
(emphasis added) In this case, Owen Thomas’ “customer” was Sunny Ridge Farms, and
the “shipment” was a load of blueberries being hauled by Plaintiff at the time of the
accident.
The Agreement further states in section 1.1 that, “[Goree Logistics] has exclusive
control and direction of the work [Goree Logistics] performs pursuant to this Agreement
and each Transportation Schedule. [Goree Logistics] agrees to assume full responsibility
for the payment of all local, state, federal and intra-provincial payroll taxes, and
contributions or taxes for unemployment insurance, workers’ compensation…or related
protection with respect to the persons engaged by Carrier for Carrier’s performance of the
2
Sunny Ridge Farms is misspelled Sunny “Rich” Farms in the transcript.
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transportation…” In section 4(c) of the Agreement, Goree Logistics warrants that it
“shall maintain workers’ compensation insurance as required by state law.” In Section
4.1 Goree Logistics also guarantees that it will carry workers’ compensation insurance in
an amount “no less than the statutory limits for the state(s) or province(s) in which
transportation services are to be performed…” It is important to note that no federal law
or regulation requires a freight broker like Owen Thomas to obtain proof of a motor
carrier’s workers’ compensation insurance. (See Stip. Ex. 3; T. vol. 2 p. 38:15-38:18.)
In the case at bar, Sunny Ridge Farms engaged Owen Thomas to find a carrier to
deliver a shipment of blueberries to Wal-Mart. Owen Thomas, on behalf of Sunny
Ridge, secured the services of Goree Logistics to haul the load of blueberries. As part of
that process, Owen Thomas provided Goree Logistics with a “rate confirmation” sheet
with certain requirements for Goree Logistics which were necessary to preserve the
freshness of the load of blueberries and ensure its safe delivery. (See Stip. Ex. 4.)
ARGUMENT
I.
Deputy Commissioner Phillips Erred in Making Finding of Fact Number
Eleven (11) Because It is Not Supported By the Competent and Credible
Evidence.
In the Opinion and Award, finding of fact eleven (11) states: “At the time of
Plaintiff’s injury, Owen Thomas was engaged in the business of moving freight through
contracts with freight hauling companies as a regular part of its business.” This finding
of fact was based on the following testimony from John Grimes:
Q: Does Owen Thomas broker the movement of freight
through contracts with freight hauling companies as a
regular part of its business?
A: Yes, sir.
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(T. vol. 2 p. 4:25-5:3.) (emphasis added)
The testimony of John Grimes was that Owen Thomas brokered the movement of
freight through contracts with freight hauling companies as a regular part of its business.
Deputy Commissioner Phillips omitted the term “broker” in Finding of Fact eleven (11).
Without the term “broker,” this finding of fact implies that Owen Thomas itself has the
ability to “move freight.” Owen Thomas does not have the ability to move freight
because it has no trucks of its own and is only a broker. (See Stip. Ex. 5, Def.’s Resp. to
Pl.’s Interrog. 5.) While this might seem like a subtle distinction, it has great bearing on
the legal analysis of whether Owen Thomas was a “statutory employer” in the case at bar.
II.
Deputy Commissioner Phillips Erred in Making Finding of Fact Fifteen
(15) For the Reason That It is Not Supported By the Competent and
Credible Evidence.
In her Opinion and Award, Deputy Commissioner Phillips’ Finding of Fact fifteen
(15) states:
Although the Broker-Carrier Agreement provides that
Goree Logistics understands and agrees that they are an
independent contractor, Owen Thomas maintained control
over the performance of Goree Logistics’ work including
requiring Goree Logistics to call Owen Thomas at 8 a.m.
and 2 p.m. daily. The agreement also required Goree
Logistics to pulp product, call with pulp temperatures and
write pulp temperatures on the confirmation and bills. The
agreement also required Goree Logistics to cooperate with
redeliveries and deviations from the original terms of the
contract for reasonable compensation.
The competent and credible evidence shows that Owen Thomas did not “maintain
control” over the performance of Goree Logistics’ work. The fact that Owen Thomas
required Goree Logistics to call at certain times, preserve the produce it was hauling, and
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cooperate when a delivery failed does not mean that Owen Thomas “controlled…the
performance of Goree Logistics’ work.” The reason this finding of fact is in error is
because Deputy Commissioner Phillips did not make a distinction between the kind of
“work” performed by Owen Thomas and the kind of “work” performed by Goree
Logistics.
The competent and credible evidence shows that Owen Thomas was engaged in
the business of being a freight broker at the time of Plaintiff’s injury. In the case at bar,
Sunny Ridge Farms hired Owen Thomas as a broker-agent to find a motor carrier to haul
Sunny Ridge’s shipment of blueberries. (T. vol. 2 pp. 5:20-5:24; 6:13-6:20; 7:8-7:13;
18:18-19:8.) Owen Thomas did not designate when the produce was going to be picked
up and delivered. (T. vol. 2 p. 6:4-6:7.) Owen Thomas did not purchase the produce, sell
the produce to the retailers, or schedule the delivery appointment. (T. vol. 2 p. 6:116:20.) With respect to the actual delivery, all Owen Thomas did was communicate
delivery information to Goree Logistics for its customer Sunny Ridge. (T. vol. 2 p. 6:206:22.)
Plaintiff’s testimony corroborates the limited role played by Owen Thomas.
Plaintiff testified that he never had any contact or communication with Owen Thomas;
that all of his communication was with Goree Logistics; and simply put, that he “got [his]
orders from Goree Logistics.” (T. vol. 2 p. 33:2-34:1.)
Furthermore, Owen Thomas does not employ drivers. (See Stip. Ex. 5, Def.’s
Resp. to Pl.’s Interrog. 5.) Making deliveries like the one during which Plaintiff was
injured are not “part of the regular business” of Owen Thomas.
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Thus, Owen Thomas’ “work” was to find a motor carrier like Goree Logistics to
ship produce for a customer like Sunny Ridge Farms. A natural extension of this role
was to communicate information so that the blueberries made it to the retailer in a fresh
condition. The requirements in the “rate confirmation sheet” were present so that Owen
Thomas could, in turn, fulfill its brokerage obligations to Sunny Ridge. As John Grimes
testified with respect to the requirement of periodic updates: “[W]e are required by Sunny
Ridge and most of our customers to provide periodic updates on the status of their freight
that’s being shipped. And so it’s simply a way that we have for the carrier to contact us
so that we can further communicate that to the customer.” (T. vol. 2 13:19-14:5.)
Goree Logistics’ “work,” on the other hand, was that of a motor carrier. A motor
carrier is defined by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (“FMCSA”) as “a
person engaged in the transportation of goods or passengers for compensation,” and who
is “responsible for hiring, supervising, training, assigning, or dispatching of drivers…”3
The uncontroverted evidence shows that Goree Logistics trained Plaintiff on “all aspects
of delivering, i.e. inspections, refrigeration, picking up and delivering loads on time,
keeping log books.” (See Stip. Ex. 5; Def. Goree’s resp. to Owen Thomas’ interrog. 13.)
The evidence further shows that Goree Logistics provided the truck and assigned the
driver (Plaintiff) to haul the load for Sunny Ridge. And according to Goree Logistics,
Plaintiff chose the route for delivering the produce. (See Stip. Ex. 5; Def. Goree’s resp.
to Owen Thomas’ interrog. 11.)
It is to be expected that Owen Thomas would follow-up with Goree Logistics to
make sure the customer’s produce was being properly preserved and delivered in good
Definitions of “For-Hire Motor Carrier” and “Motor Carrier,” http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/rulesregulations/administration/fmcsr/fmcsrruletext.aspx?reg=390.5 (last visited 22 September 2013).
3
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condition, but Owen Thomas did not provide the truck, choose the driver, or choose the
route for delivery. Goree Logistics and its driver performed those tasks because that was
Goree Logistics’ “work” as a motor carrier and not the work of Owen Thomas, the
broker. Therefore, the finding of fact that Owen Thomas “maintained control over the
performance of Goree Logistics’ work” is not supported by the competent and credible
evidence.
III.
Deputy Commissioner Phillips Erred in Concluding as a Matter of Law
That All Parties Were Properly Before the Industrial Commission,
Subject to and Bound by the Provisions of the Act, and the Industrial
Commission Had Jurisdiction Over the Parties and the Subject Matter of
the Case at Bar.
The issue of a plaintiff’s employment status in relation to a defendant is a
jurisdictional issue, and the Commission has no jurisdiction to apply the Act to a party
not subject to its provisions. See Williams v. ARL, Inc., 133 N.C. App. 625, 628, 516
S.E. 2d 433 (1999) (citing Youngblood v. North State Ford Truck Sales, 321 N.C. 380,
364 S.E.2d 433 (1988)). Deputy Commissioner Phillips held that Owen Thomas had an
employer-employee relationship with Plaintiff because it was acting as a statutory
employer under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-19 and/or N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-19.1. For the
reasons set forth in section IV below, Owen Thomas was not a statutory employer.
Therefore, no employer-employee relationship existed between Owen Thomas and
Plaintiff, and the Commission lacked jurisdiction as to Owen Thomas.
IV.
Deputy Commissioner Phillips Erred in Concluding as a Matter of Law
that Owen Thomas was a Statutory Employer Under N.C. Gen. Stat. §
97-19 and/or N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-19.1 for the Reason that Said
Conclusion is Not Supported by Findings of Fact Based on the Competent
and Credible Evidence.
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Deputy Commissioner Phillips’ conclusion of law five (5) holds that Owen
Thomas was Plaintiff’s statutory employer because it was a “general contractor” that
sublet work to its subcontractor Goree Logistics within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. §
97-19. Deputy Commissioner Phillips’ conclusion of law six (6) holds that Owen
Thomas is Plaintiff’s statutory employer pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-19.1, which
extends the statutory employer provision of § 97-19 to the motor carrier industry.
These conclusions of law are based on findings of fact eleven (11) and fifteen
(15), which as previously argued are not supported by the competent and credible
evidence. Finding of fact eleven (11) implies that Owen Thomas was not acting in its
capacity as a broker, and finding of fact fifteen (15) holds that Owen Thomas maintained
control over Goree Logistics’ performance of the delivery. The competent and credible
evidence, as set forth above, shows that Owen Thomas was acting as a broker-agent in
this case, not a general contractor, principal contractor, intermediate contractor, or
subcontractor. Deputy Commissioner Phillips erred in concluding as a matter of law that
Owen Thomas was a statutory employer because it is well-established law in North
Carolina that agents cannot be held liable as statutory employers.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “broker” as “[a]n agent who acts as an
intermediary or negotiator, esp. between prospective buyers and sellers; a person
employed to make bargains and contracts between other persons in matters of trade,
commerce, or navigation. BROKER, Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009). As
discussed above, the evidence in the record shows that Owen Thomas did two things: (1)
it found a motor carrier — Goree Logistics — to transport Sunny Ridge’s load of
blueberries, and (2) it communicated to Goree Logistics the instructions from Sunny
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Ridge on the “when and where’s” of the delivery. In other words, it was an
“intermediary” in a matter of “trade, commerce, or navigation.”
It is stated in Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law § 70.03 that, “[a]lthough
different states use different designations for the person being subjected to statutory
employer liability, it is quite common to find such liability confined to “principal” or
“general” contractors. Under a strict construction of these designations, courts have
sometimes refused to apply the “contractor-under” clause to ‘owner,’ entrepreneurs,
agents, and governments…” (emphasis added).
With respect to the rule that various states do not hold “agents” liable as statutory
employers, Larson’s cites the NC Court of Appeals decision in Cook v. NorvellMackorell Real Estate Co., 99 N.C. App. 307, 392 S.E.2d 758 (1990). In that case,
Norvell-Mackorell Real Estate Co. (“Norvell”) was the property manager for an
apartment complex. Norvell engaged the injured worker’s employer to repair the
apartment building’s roof. Norvell did not obtain proof that the injured worker’s
employer was in compliance with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-93. Nevertheless, the
Commission dismissed the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that
Norvell was not a statutory employer because it was an agent for the apartment complex,
not a “principal contractor, intermediate contractor, or subcontractor” as required by the
“statutory employer” provision. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission’s
decision.
In reaching its conclusion that Norvell was an “agent,” and thus not a “statutory
employer,” the Court of Appeals found especially important the fact that Norvell had no
contractual obligation to do the repairs itself, only to procure repair services from a
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contractor. This distinction was significant to the Court because according to the Court,
the North Carolina statutory employer statute was enacted “to prevent principal
contractors, intermediate contractors, and sub-contractors from relieving themselves of
liability under the Act by doing through sub-contractors what they would otherwise do
through the agency of direct employees.” Id. at 759 (quoting Withers v. Black, 230 N.C.
428, 53 S.E.2d 668 (1949)) (emphasis added).
The purpose of the statutory employer statute — that contractors should not be
allowed to hide behind sub-contractors where they could do the job through their own
employees — is reiterated in Larson’s, which states that “[p]ractically all of the cases of
general interest interpreting this type of statute are addressed to one question: When is the
subcontracted work part of the regular business of the statutory employer?” Larson’s §
70.06. With respect to statutory employer “transportation” cases, Larson’s states,
“[d]elivery and transportation cases turn largely on common-sense considerations of
whether the delivery activity was routine or extraordinary for this type of business.” Id.
Owen Thomas does not employ drivers. (See Stip. Ex. 5, Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s
Interrog. 5.) Owen Thomas does not perform deliveries. Therefore, deliveries such as
the one during which Plaintiff was injured are not “part of the regular business” of Owen
Thomas. North Carolina’s statutory employer statute, as interpreted by our appellate
courts, does not apply here because Owen Thomas was not “doing through subcontractors what [it] would otherwise do through the agency of direct employees.” Owen
Thomas is in the same position as Norvell. Like Norvell, Owen Thomas acted as an
agent for Sunny Ridge Farms in order to find and hire a motor carrier to deliver produce
for Sunny Ridge Farms. All of the competent and credible evidence supports this
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finding. No competent and credible evidence supports a finding that Owen Thomas acted
in any other role.
V.
Deputy Commissioner Phillips Erred by Concluding as a Matter of Law
That the Industrial Commission Had Jurisdiction Over Owen Thomas
Where Exercising Jurisdiction Over Owen Thomas Violates 49 U.S.C. §
14501(c).
Deputy Commissioner Phillips’ Opinion and Award recognizes in Finding of Fact
ten (10) that Owen Thomas is a “federally licensed Brokerage Firm for the transportation
of freight.” 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c) provides an exception to federal preemption of the
regulation of interstate transportation by allowing states to regulate insurance
requirements for motor carriers. The section provides,
Motor Carriers of Property.—
(1) General rule.— Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3), a State,
political subdivision of a State, or political authority of 2 or more States
may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the
force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of any motor
carrier…or any private motor carrier, broker, or freight forwarder with
respect to the transportation of property.
(2) Matters not covered.— Paragraph (1)—
(A) shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect
to motor vehicles, the authority of a State to impose highway route
controls or limitations based on the size or weight of the motor vehicle or
the hazardous nature of the cargo, or the authority of a State to regulate
motor carriers with regard to minimum amounts of financial
responsibility relating to insurance requirements and self-insurance
authorization;
(emphasis added).
The plain language of the above statutory provision indicates that the federal
“insurance exception” applies solely to “motor carriers,” and excludes “brokers.”
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Both “broker” and “motor carrier” are contained in 49 U.S.C. 14501(c)’s general
rule restricting state regulation of interstate transportation. However, only the term
“motor carrier” is referenced in the exception allowing state regulation of insurance
requirements. As the United States Supreme Court has pointed out, it is axiomatic that “a
negative inference may be drawn from the exclusion of language from one statutory
provision that is included in other provisions of the same statute.” Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
548 U.S. 557, 578, 126 S.Ct. 2749, 2765, 165 L. Ed.2d 723 (2006). “Where Congress
includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of
the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in
the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” Id. (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16,
23, 104 S.Ct. 296, 78 L.Ed.2d 17 (1983)). Although present in the general rule of 49
U.S.C. § 14501(c), the term “broker” has been intentionally excluded from the provision
allowing state regulation of insurance requirements for “motor carriers.”
A 2 July 2007 advisory opinion by the North Carolina Attorney General, attached
hereto, addressed the question: “Does N.C.G.S. § 97-19.1 violate 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)?”
The advisory opinion concluded that § 97-19.1 is not in violation because of the abovementioned exception for regulating insurance requirements for motor carriers.
The advisory opinion also shed light on the legislative intent behind § 97-19.1:
Section 97-19.1 allows the independent driver to purchase insurance or for
the motor carriers up the chain of command to have secured coverage for
the truckers below them in the chain.
(emphasis added).
The General Assembly’s intent according to the Attorney General’s advisory
opinion is that § 97-19.1 applies to “motor carriers.” The statute protects truckers
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beneath “motor carriers up the chain of command.” Owen Thomas is not a part of this
figurative chain of command. It is a broker-agent outside the chain, performing the
service of finding motor carriers, like Goree, to transport loads for produce suppliers.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Owen Thomas respectfully requests that the Full
Commission REVERSE Deputy Commissioner Phillips’ Opinion and Award as it
pertains to Defendant Owen Thomas.
Respectfully submitted, this the _____ day of September 2013.
FERGUSON, SCARBROUGH,
HAYES, HAWKINS & DEMAY, P.A.:
____________________________________
JOHN F. SCARBROUGH (Bar No. 41569)
65 McCachern Blvd., S.E.
P.O. Box 444
Concord, North Carolina 28026-0444
Telephone: 704-788-3211
Fax: 704-784-3211
johnscarbrough@fspa.net
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, John Scarbrough, hereby certify that I have served the foregoing upon all
parties of record by mailing a copy thereof by first-class mail, postage pre-paid, to the
addresses listed below:
Kenneth C. Martin
Grandy & Martin
115 East Park Ave.
Charlotte, NC 28203
Counsel for Plaintiff
Assistant Attorney General Marc X. Sneed
North Carolina Department of Justice
4333 Mail Service Center
Raleigh, NC 27699-4333
Counsel for the State
Lawrence P. Margolis
P.O. Box 473323
Charlotte, NC 28247
Counsel for Defendant Goree Logistics, Inc.
This, the ____ day of September 2013.
FERGUSON, SCARBROUGH, HAYES, HAWKINS &
DEMAY, P.A.:
___________________________________________
JOHN F. SCARBROUGH (Bar No. 41569)
65 McCachern Blvd., S.E.
P.O. Box 444
Concord, North Carolina 28026-0444
Telephone: 704-788-3211
Fax: 704-784-3211
johnscarbrough@fspa.net
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