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Normativity, Reason and the act of Promising
This essay will question the extent to which our ability to reason objectively (to recognise
reasons for action that are distinct from our personal/subjective desires and goals) is
necessary to enact promises. This essay will note the tight relation between normative
evaluation and reasoning, before assessing accounts of the historical context under which
individual’s made normative choices distinct from mere instinctive willing1 and humankind
first made promises. It will be argued that there have (and still can) be cases in which
promises have been made without recognition of any objective (public) reasons to act and
that individuals can make and keep promises purely for personal/subjective reasons. Whilst
the act of promising will be scrutinised, the arguments made could stretch to other possible
moral action that Kantian theorists traditionally argue requires individuals to have an
awareness of objective/public reasons.
In chapter nine of Self-Constitution, Korsgaard argues that the act of promising requires
individuals to “deliberate together, to arrive at a shared decision”2. In turn, our ability to
deliberate together requires a specific conception of reasons; public reasons. Korsgaard
argues that public reasons are those “…whose normative force can extend across the
boundaries between people”3. In this sense Korsgaard is likening public reasons to a more
traditional understanding of objective reasons, by arguing that public reasons are those
which can extend beyond the mere personal interests and desires of the subjective
individual4. Private, or subjective reasons to act, are agent relative and concerned with the
1
The context in which individual’s made normative choices concerning the principles from which action can be
derived rather than simply choosing means to satisfy instinctive ends
2
Christine Korsgaard, Self-Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) p.190
3
Ibid. p.191
4
I take my distinction between Objective and Subjective rationality (forms of reasoning) from the work of Max
Horkheimer. “It [subjective reason] is essentially concerned with means and ends, with the adequacy of
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fulfilment of personal goals and desires held by an individual. Likewise, public or objective
reasons are agent neutral in that they motivate all individuals to act in spite of their
personal desires or goals;
“…a universalizability requirement commits me to the view that if I have a reason to do
action-A in circumstances-C, I must be able to will that you should do action-A in
circumstances-C, because your reasons are normative for me”5
Korsgaard argues that only through a public conception of reasons can we be motivated to
make and enact promises to one another i.e. only through our ability to recognise reasons
distinct from our personal desires and goals can we be motivated to keep promises made
with one another. In short, Korsgaard suggests that only in light of a public conception of
reasons will we arrive in any “moral territory”6 – only in light of a public conception of
reasons will we be capable of recognising moral laws (such as the Categorical imperative) as
motivating reasons for action.
Is this conception of promising, - as a manifestation of our ability to recognise public reasons
- necessarily true when we focus upon the historical origins of the act of promising itself?
Was it necessary for the first rudimentary promises to be made, that individuals were
capable of objective reasoning? To fully understand and answer this question, we must first
note a necessary pre-requisite for promises to be made, namely the ability of individuals to
make normative choices concerning potential action. For one to be capable of reasoning on
procedures for purposes more or less taken for granted… that they serve the subject’s interest in relation to
self-preservation – be that of the single individual, or of the community on whose maintenance that of the
individual depends. The idea that an aim can be reasonable for its own sake – on the basis that virtue and
insight reveals it to have in itself – without some kind of subjective gain or advantage, is utterly alien to
subjective reason…” Max Horkheimer, Eclipse of Reason (London: Continuum Publishing Company, 1974) p.3
5
Korsgaard, Self Constitution p.191
6
Ibid p.192
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motivations for and against keeping a promise, one must be capable of normatively
evaluating one’s choices. The historical context in which the first promises were made will
be closely linked with the emergence of normative deliberation. If our ability to make
normative choices emerged through objective reasoning i.e. our ability to recognise certain
reasons to act as transcending personal goals and desires, then arguably our ability to make
promises (and furthermore our ability to recognise moral laws as motivation for action) was
also a consequence of objectively reasoning. This is the view Korsgaard attempts to defend
throughout Self-Constitution (primarily from chapter six onwards); she initially begins by
presenting a genealogy of sorts, outlining the origins of normativity.
To begin, Korsgaard notes that the distinction between human action and the actions of
animals concerns the “…interaction of two factors, an incentive and a principle. The
incentive is a motivationally loaded representation of an object… The principle determines,
or we may say describes, what the animal does, or tries to do, in the face of an incentive”7.
The incentives of a tiger may present certain animals (objects) as things to be eaten; the
governing principles of the tiger determine what will be done in light of the incentive,
namely ‘catch and eat the object’. In the case of non-human animals, the principles that
govern action in light of incentives are comprised solely by instinct. Such instincts can be
understood as self-governing laws, in so much as they arise from an animal’s physical design
and abilities; the instincts of a hummingbird will greatly differ from that of a tiger therefore.
Nevertheless, both the hummingbird and tiger’s actions will be governed by instinct in the
light of certain incentives; at the sound of a gunshot the actions of the hummingbird and
tiger may greatly differ but the actions of both will have been purely instinctive. In this
7
Korsgaard, Self-Constitution, p.109
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sense the animals “…instincts are the laws of [their] own causality, they are in effect the
animal’s will”8
For an animal to have a well formed instinctive response is for said animal to conceptualise
the world in light of its own subjective identity i.e. needs and desires. The most primitive
creature will have normative instinctive responses, that is a set of requirements that are
good or bad in light of the actions required for the animals maintained survival, but ”…the
animal knows nothing of the normative; she doesn’t need to, because it is built right into
the way she perceives the world”9. In other words, though an animal may have certain
primitive reasons to act in light of certain incentives, which she can succeed or fail to fulfil,
such reasons only exist in light of the animal’s subjective organisation of her perceived
world.
In light of Korsgaard’s aim of presenting the origins of normative evaluation requisite for
actions such as promising and moral choice, she argues that in instances where an animal’s
will is composed of her instincts, there exists no evaluative ‘space’ (no evaluative capability)
between the incentive for action and the principle governed response. Korsgaard notes that
such a claim could fall in line with a classic distinction made between instinctive and
intelligent action; an intelligent response is one governed by an evaluation of possible
choices, whereas an instinctive response is a natural automated reaction. In response to this
claim however, Korsgaard also argues that this distinction is far too over simplified and
crude in light of the fact that many animals exhibit action that requires some degree of
intelligence.
8
9
Korsgaard, Self-Constitution, p.110
Ibid. p.113
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Intelligent animals are capable of learning from experience and forming causal connections
between certain objects or primitive concepts (an intelligent animal may have a primitive
understanding of gravity by making the causal connection between an object and its falling
from a certain height to the ground). “So intelligence is a capacity to forge new connections,
to increase your stock of automatically appropriate responses. Intelligence so understood is
not something contrary to instinct, but rather something that increases its range…”10 In this
sense, an intelligent animal is capable of making choices concerning the satisfaction of
certain instinctive needs. If, from experience, a tiger understands the he has caught more
prey at the river than on the plateau, he can greater enhance his chances of satisfying his
need for food by hunting down by the river. Intelligence allows for an increase in the
options of instinctive responses available to the tiger concerning his incentives and
instinctive will.
Intelligence can further stretch to instrumental thinking, where an understanding of an
object’s properties through experience can lead to said objects use as a rudimentary tool. In
this sense, “…the world of tools and obstacles presented by instinct is elaborated and
changed in ways that contribute to the animal’s flexibility in dealing with changes in her
environment…”11 Even in instances of extreme intelligence resulting in instrumental thinking
however, the actions of an animal (intelligently deliberated or not) extend only to the
satisfaction of the instinctive will of the creature i.e. the principle from which all action is
motivated remains the animal’s instincts. In terms of means and ends discussion, we could
suggest that the actions of an animal are solely concerned with the fulfilment of certain
means (avoiding other predators, catching prey) for the satisfaction of instinctive ends
10
11
Korsgaard, Self-Constitution, p.113
Ibid. p.114
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(survival, feeding). The distinguishing feature of animals and rational human agents
therefore will lie in our ability to make choices that are not motivated from (or in some
instances contrary to), our natural instincts. As human agents, we can deliberate on the
principles that govern our actions in response to certain incentives, thereby freeing our will
from purely instinctive drives.
The concern of this essay lies with Korsgaard’s understanding of how rational human agents
are made aware of what she calls ‘the potential grounds for action’, and the following claim
that this awareness “…of the workings of the grounds of our beliefs and actions gives us
control over the influence of those grounds themselves”12 Korsgaard’s claim, is that an
awareness of the principle that governs our action in the face of incentive opens up “… a
space of what I call reflective distance”13. This reflective space results in the liberation from
instinct, as it provides an evaluative realm where one’s incentives can be judged as potential
reasons to act. Whilst instinct still exists as a principle providing possible responsive actions,
it is not our sole principle from which possible actions can be realised. The imposition of
rational principles can provide further choices of responsive actions, thereby allowing an
agent to make a choice between ends. Rather than only being tasked with choosing the
mere means of satisfying a principle, an agent is now capable of choosing whether to abide
to the principle itself. Whilst instinct may cause the potential action of fleeing from the
battlefield, rational principles concerning moral virtue may provide us with reasons to fight
and possibly commit an act of self-sacrifice.
Korsgaard notes that the reflective space that emerges through an awareness of the
potential grounds for action is the development of a particular form of self-consciousness
12
13
Korsgaard, Self-Constitution, p.116
Ibid. p.116
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and that such self-consciousness is specific to rational human agents and no other animals.
But in terms of genealogical history how can such a form of self-consciousness emerge? This
is arguably a key concern (perhaps criticism) of Korsgaard’s thesis. Korsgaard fails to
adequately explain how any intelligent animal, endowed with instrumental thinking of the
highest order, naturally progresses to a self-conscious awareness of the constitutive
principle that governs its action, without any external influence on its behaviour? In other
words, how could such an awareness of the potential grounds for action emerge in primitive
homo-sapiens and not in other animal species such as chimps (or even tigers)? Furthermore,
why does a mere awareness of one’s governing constitutive principle give one a reason to
act against it? Arguably, Korsgaard is not implying that an awareness of one’s governing
principle provides any substantial reason or motivation to act against it. What creature,
whose instinctive will had maintained its survival since birth, would choose to act against
such instinct freely, simply by becoming aware that such instinct governed its actions? But
how then can Korsgaard explain humankind’s ability to act on principles distinct from mere
instinctive willing in modernity? What key steps are missing from her thesis that take
humanity from a mere awareness of constitutive principles for action to acting against our
natural, instinctive principles altogether? Whilst we can accept that Korsgaard provides
thorough accounts of what distinguishes human agents from animals and further what
distinguishes reason from mere intelligence, she fails to account for how such distinctions
emerge in any genealogical sense.
Korsgaard’s failure to adequately present the context in which an awareness of the
potential grounds for action (the emergence of normative choice) emerged is extremely
significant to her conclusive argument in chapter nine that actions such as promises, stem
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solely from an objective form of reasoning. As normative evaluation is a pre-requisite of
promise making, and Korsgaard argues all promise making is instantiated by objective
reasoning, we need a clear explanation of how the emergence of normative choice was
facilitated through objective reasoning. In other words, failure to demonstrate that
objective rationality resulted in the emergence of normative choice, which in turn is a prerequisite for promise making, could suggest, that certain normative choices can be made on
purely subjective grounds. This would imply that there could be cases in which promises
were made and kept for wholly subjective (private) reasons. If it can be demonstrated that
the earliest normative choices and subsequent promises were made for purely subjective
reasons, then Korsgaard’s concrete claim in chapter nine, that all promises require
deliberation of individual’s concerning their public reasons, would appear false.
An understanding of what initially caused both an awareness of the potential grounds for
action, as well as the motivation to act on reasons contrary to instinct may be found in
Nietzsche’s Genealogy on Mordality14 (primarily the second essay ‘”Guilt”, “Bad Conscience”
and Related Matters’) One of Nietzsche’s fundamental goals is to establish a social/historical
context in which the most primitive customs of moral law emerged. Furthermore, Nietzsche
attempts to establish under what circumstances, primitive human beings developed the
rational principles of reflection that suppressed their instinctive wills. Nietzsche’s discussion
is highly significant to this essay as it provides greater insight into the context under which
normativity emerged in humankind, as well as discussing the consequential emergence of,
the self-conscious individual, moral language (good/bad, good/evil) and actions necessary
for social organisation and function such as promising.
14
Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘On the Genealogy of Morality: A Polemic (2 nd Essay)’ in The Nietzsche Reader (ed.) K.A.
Pearson & D. Large (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2006) pp.408-424
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Nietzsche begins his second essay by addressing the pre requisite features, necessary for
human beings to be capable of making promises15. The act of promising is arguably of grave
necessity for the functioning and success of any social structure, and key to the act itself are
the concepts of contractual obligation and duty. Within the act of promising lies (among
other things), the rational faculties of causality and its relation to time, the ability to
anticipate, calculate as well as remember. But prior to the development of these faculties,
Nietzsche suggests “…the more immediate task of first making man to a certain degree
undeviating, uniform, a peer amongst peers, orderly and consequently predictable.”16 In
the pre-historical period Nietzsche coins ‘the Morality of Custom’ the intense “labour of
man on himself”17 in which the uniformity of human beings occurs stretches, “the longest
epoch of the human race.”18
Predictability or regulation in this sense is concerned with the curbing and controlling of
human beings instinctive will, inclinations and desires. For the most basic and fundamental
social organisations to exist, a degree of regulation must be demonstrated by its
inhabitants. In a historical context, primitive human beings were once endowed with a
purely instinctive will like all other intelligent animals. For Nietzsche, the ‘Morality of
Custom’ is the expanse of time in which (in Korsgaard’s terminology) an awareness of the
potential grounds for action would emerge. It is in this time that human beings rational
principles would have emerged to make contractual agreements and the regulation of
instinctive action possible. For Nietzsche, this regulation and ability to curb instinctive
16
Nietzsche, ‘On the Genealogy of Morality…’ p.409
Ibid. p.409
18
Ibid. p.409
17
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drives is justification for the barbaric and violent methods demonstrated throughout the
age.
Nietzsche argues that the ability to remember (necessary for contractual social agreements
such as promising) or to“…give a memory to the animal, man…”19 lies in the “oldest (and
unfortunately longest- lived) psychology on Earth”20. To be endowed with the ability to
remember is to learn from experience that forgetfulness will lead to pain, suffering and
torment. The brutality of punishment witnessed in the morality of custom held a purpose;
to inspire fear and dread into those who failed to keep their word and fulfil their contractual
promises. Arguably the barbaric nature of punishment was imposed on all instances where
individuals acted against the norms and customs of the society in the interests of their
instinctive will. Through the imposition of cruel social punitive measures, individuals were
taught or governed to supress their instinctive will and reflect upon their instinctive
incentives. “With the aid of this sort of memory, people finally came to ‘reason’! – Ah,
reason, solemnity, mastering of emotions, this really dismal thing called reflection, all these
privileges and splendours man has: what a price had to be paid for them!21
On this reading, the potential grounds for action emerge in a violent and brutal age, where
the instinctive will of individuals was suppressed and regulated for the development of
primitive social structures and organisations. More importantly however, it presents a full
account of the facts resulting in primitive human beings acting against their instinctive will,
something Korsgaard fails to provide in Self-Constitution. Korsgaard argues that a specific
form of self-consciousness is required for an awareness of the potential grounds for action
19
Nietzsche, ‘On the Genealogy of Morality…’ p.410
Ibid. p.410
21
Ibid. p.411
20
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and similarly, Nietzsche argues that specific form of ‘bad conscience’ will emerge through
the suppression of instinctive willing. This “serious illness”22 results from the dramatic shift
in governing principles of action human beings abide to. Where instinct once provided all
necessary responses to incentives and possible choices of action, the “…change whereby he
finally found himself imprisoned within the confines of society and peace…”23 resulted in
one’s own natural responses being evaluated, scrutinised and ultimately suppressed. Whilst
instinct remained to provide possible responses, inclinations and motivations for action,
individuals were forcibly made to act against them. Under these circumstances, the
individual is truly made aware of the potential grounds for action i.e. made aware that they
could potentially act on their instinctive drives. For Nietzsche, the emotion of guilt and the
concept of the soul emerge in this “internalization of man”24 , the ‘momentous’ act in which
an individual must act against its very own nature. The result of this internalisation of
instinctive willing leads to a change in the “…whole character of the world” 25 whereby
human beings ceased to exist as merely intelligent animals in the natural world endowed
with instinctive wills and instead became regulated and internally conflicted rational agents.
If the above discussion is endorsed, it would appear that a more thorough account of the
awareness of the potential grounds for action can be supplemented by Nietzsche’s concept
of social regulation. We can note, that the first normative choices were not derived from
any reflective awareness of objective reasons distinct from individuals purely instinctive
willing; the first normative choices were made between possible action derived from one’s
own natural instinctive will or the governing force of superior social powers in society.
22
Nietzsche, ‘On the Genealogy of Morality…’ p.419
Ibid. p.419
24
Ibid. p.419
25
Ibid. p.419
23
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Korsgaard wishes to argue, that there emerged at this time a dichotomy with instinctive
willing providing wholly subjective/personal motivations to act on the one hand, and a
reflective awareness of reasons distinct from this willing providing objective/public
motivations to act on the other. This however would not have been the case in light of
Nietzsche’s argument. The first normative choices were made concerning the natural
principles of instinct and the rudimentary laws of society.26 Ultimately, individuals were
imposed with the choice to act on their instinctive wills, thereby incurring grave
punishments, or act in accordance with the rudimentary laws of society, thereby denying
one’s instinctive willing.
The emergence of normative choice was governed by purely subjective interests; arguably
it was a choice concerned with maintenance of one’s own life and survival. This reading
would perhaps harmonise better with the genealogical discussions presented by both
Korsgaard and Nietzsche; the first normative choices were still, in many respects, animalistic
as they were choices concerned with the means to one’s own continued survival.
This subjective understanding of primitive, normative choices helps make clear the manner
in which the earliest social contracts and promises were made in. As Nietzsche suggests,
promises emerge as a social necessity; they ensure organised and stable social functioning.
The motivating factor or reason to maintain a promise on this view was wholly subjective;
not only was it in the interests of the individual to keep their promise to another (for fear of
the punitive measures that could arise from breaking a promise) but it was also in the
interests of the wider society that promises were maintained. No awareness of
metaphysically superior or objective principles motivates or governs the act of making a
26
As has already been mentioned acting in the interests of one’s society is still an instance of subjective
reasoning; one Is still non-directly acting in one’s own interests.
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promise at this time. Whilst much of the moral language still in use today, as well as the
mythology and religious doctrine that cemented moral laws, may have been introduced at
this time, arguably it was all a means of reinforcing the dominance and control of leading
powers in society, whilst also solidifying the necessity to curb instinctive willing and act in
accordance with social laws.
One response to the above claim may be to suggest that these early forms of promising are
not the true representation of how we perceive the act of promising today; the lack of
individual autonomy demonstrates that these promises were by no means a shared
deliberation between individuals. As Korsgaard may suggest, this is not a true
representation of the type of moral action that requires an awareness of public reasons at
all. Simply accepting that the earliest forms of promise were indeed forcibly imposed and
regulated however does not imply, that a lack of force or regulation in modernity requires
concepts of shared deliberation and public reasons to explain the act of promising. Why can
it not be suggested that we make and keep promises for wholly personal/subjective reasons
– would this not also explain why we often break our promises; due to a lack of personal
motivation to keep them? What we can conclude therefore is that the necessary conditions
for promising to occur were in fact motivated from subjective/personal interests, thereby
resulting in the earliest promises being made and kept from solely subjective interests and
reasoning.
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Bibliography
-
Horkheimer, M. Eclipse of Reason (London: Continuum Publishing Company, 1974)
-
Korsgaard, C. Self-Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012)
-
Nietzsche, F. ‘On the Genealogy of Morality: A Polemic (2nd Essay)’ in The Nietzsche
Reader (ed.) K.A. Pearson & D. Large (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2006)
pp.408-424
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