Post-Conflict Economic and
Social Recovery
January 9th, 2016
Edina High School
Edina, Minnesota
Background Guide
Edina Model United Nations Conference 2016
Economic and Social Council
Post-Conflict Economic and Social Recovery
Description of Committee
The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), is the primary organ of the United Nations used to debate,
reflect, and induce innovative thinking in regards to economic, social, and environmental issues.
Established in 1946 as one of the six main organs of the United Nations, ECOSOC manages
internationally agreed upon development goals as well as both long and short term policy goals. The
Economic and Social Council oversees specialized agencies and missions pertaining to economic, social,
and environmental matters by handling the coordination, dialogue, recommendations, and policy review.
Post-Conflict Economic and Social Recovery
Introduction
Armed conflict has plagued nations since the beginning of the twentieth century, causing endless
casualties, decreased stability, crippled economies, and distraught citizens. Conflicts can last for any
period of time, but the damage they inflict on economies and societies remains long after the conflict has
ended. According to the Geneva Declaration, an estimated 508,000 people suffer violent deaths in conflict
settings each year (N21) and “tens of millions of children [are] growing up in situations affected by
conflict” according to the United Nations Office of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed
Conflict (N22).
Since the publication of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, protecting human rights has
been at the forefront of United Nations (UN) led missions. These post-conflict missions and
peacebuilding operations “include the human rights-related mandates aimed at contributing to the
protection and promotion of human rights through both immediate and long-term action; empowering the
population to assert and claim their human rights; and enabling State and other national institutions to
implement their human rights obligations and uphold the rule of law.” (N23)
Because conflicts have differing historical backgrounds, different pre-conflict infrastructure, and disparate
societies and cultures, nations’ needs after conflict are often very diverse. They can range from basic
shelter and medical care, to rebuilding economic and political stability. Following conflicts such as the
Rwandan Genocide, the Somalian Civil War, and the Korean War, nations often lack effective legal,
social, political, and economic infrastructure, leaving them incredibly vulnerable and at risk of relapsing
into conflict. (N10)
The United Nations focuses on assisting countries emerging from conflict through peacebuilding, which
the UN defines as “efforts to reduce a country's risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening
national capacities for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and
development.” (N17) It has been observed that between one- third and one-half of conflict regions relapse
back into conflict within five years (N23) and with twenty-eight Security Council recognized nations in
conflict (N24), the United Nations has an increasingly large focus on peacebuilding across the globe.
Background
Main Economic Issues
The key challenge that countries recovering from severe conflict face is how they can successfully
integrate themselves back into the global economy. These conflict countries are often seen as being
disconnected from the global economy because they are cut off from flows of trade, finance and
technology (M1). In addition, conflict leads to weakened state capacity, destroyed physical, human and
social capital, distorted economic incentives, destructions of infrastructure (e.g., transport,
communication), widespread poverty and unemployment. Due to the state’s reduced ability to regulate,
illicit activities often expand in conflict-areas, including increased drug production and trade, smuggling
and theft (M3). Thus, the ultimate goal that regional and global peacemaking bodies aim to achieve is to
establish conditions for self-sustaining economic growth and human development while addressing the
major risk factors for conflict recurrence (M1).
Economic recovery is critical for reversing problems and addressing challenges that face conflict
countries. Steps taken towards economic recovery will curtail the risk of conflict recurrence and will
restore confidence in social, political and economic institutions. Also, the state’s ability to provide
security for households and communities as well as economic security will be enhanced. Finally, recovery
will create employment, encourage productive investment, mitigate business risks, and reduce group
inequalities (M3). The first question that should be asked when taking the initial steps in post conflict
recovery and reconstruction is asking how existing systems can be strengthened. Understanding
indigenous drivers of the economy, while at the same time, not undervaluing the effect of external
assistance is a key first step in rebuilding the economy. As stated in the 2008 United Nations
Development Program (UNDP) Crisis Prevention and Recovery Report, “Recovery is more likely to be
sustainable if it is grounded in the full understanding of social dynamics and institutional processes, and if
it fosters local capacities and initiatives” (M3). The second question that should be asked is how
macroeconomic policies can be developed and encouraged. Economic problems that conflict countries
face include massive unemployment, high inflation, low domestic revenue, and high domestic debt. “Post
conflict recovery is about creating a new political economy dispensation. It is about building differently
and better” (M3). The final question that should be asked is how to rebuild political institutions by
restoring government control over the financial sector and recreating public administration.
Main Social Issues
In addition to addressing the economic challenges faced by post-conflict nations, it is necessary for the
committee to consider the wide range of social ramifications conflicts have on human populations.
Conflict can cause the deterioration of human development and human security indicators by decreasing
life expectancy, increasing infant mortality, and limiting access to health and education services.
Additionally, conflict nations often experience significant loss of human capital and massive internal
population displacement, which can lead to a dramatic increase of people needing social assistance,
especially the most vulnerable members of society, including the disabled, the elderly, and children (M9).
Gender equity is another key concern when considering social consequences of conflicts. For example,
Timor Leste has scored fairly well on most principal standards of gender equity, however, upheavals have
left women and children vulnerable to abuse, an issue that requires targeted assistance and must be
accounted for (E1). It is important to address gender equity and recognize the political and socioeconomic
contributions that men and women make, and to allow for equal access to opportunities irrespective of
gender (M3).
There are many key factors that delegates should consider when designing programs to solve this issue
(M4). Firstly, delegates should avoid exacerbating current issues and keep in mind the sensitivity to each
situation, otherwise known as “do no harm.” Secondly, be mindful of the context of each conflict,
including political situations and intensity, and climate of the conflict. Finally, be able to address preconflict issues. According to the UNDP’s 2008 Report, “Recovery is a process of socioeconomic
transformation and not the mere restoration of past structures and dynamics, or a simple return to pre-war
levels and trends” (M3). Recovery does not always mean returning to the status quo, simply put, it means
helping the country transition back to a stable economic standing, often times surpassing what was in
place before, but maintaining previously functioning systems in place (M13).
Defining “Post-Conflict Recovery”
It is no easy task defining “post-conflict recovery.” In essence, “post-conflict reconstruction aims at the
consolidation of peace and security and the attainment of sustainable socio-economic development in a
conflict-stricken country” (M9). The term ‘post-conflict’ does not mean that the root of conflict has been
identified and removed. In many cases, the term denotes “merely an abatement of hostilities, or a
‘window of opportunity’ for peace in a conflict that can again escalate if mismanaged. Post-conflict
reconstruction is generally understood as a complex, holistic and multidimensional process encompassing
efforts to simultaneously improve military, political, economic, and social conditions” (M9). Therefore,
post-conflict recovery must entail rebuilding the conflict zone while also addressing the fundamental
causes of the conflict itself.
One important concept that delegates should note is the context of each individual situation (M3). There
lies an extremely high degree of variation across conflicts and countries in terms of the length, scope, and
intensity of conflict and the terms of peace. Furthermore, the nature in which some countries come out of
conflicts is different. Some countries come out with a large reserve of economic assets, human capital,
functioning institutions and a formal economy, while others face larger hurdles to both sustainable peace
and economic recovery. Because each reconstruction effort is unique, the policies crafted and programs
established to address recovery must be designed and tailored to each case and circumstance as much as
possible.
Peacemaking bodies often establish a list of milestones to gauge how effective their efforts are towards
encouraging peace and stability in conflict countries. According to the UNDP’s 2008 Report (M3), the
following is a list of peacebuilding milestones:







(M13)
ceasing hostilities and violence
signing of peace agreements
demobilization, disarmament, and
reintegration
return of refugees and internally
displaced persons (IDPs)
establishing the foundations for a
functioning state
initiating reconciliation and
societal integration
commencing economic recovery
Challenges to Post-Conflict Recovery
Relapsing into Conflict
One of the most dangerous threats to post-conflict recovery efforts is the resumption of hostilities
between parties of the original conflict or the emergence of new conflict zones due to ineffective security
and authority structures. “Minimizing
the risk of conflict recurrence is a
critical priority in recovery efforts,
and to do this requires understanding
of the factors that may have
contributed to the conflict.” Conflict
never leaves a tabula rasa, or a ‘clean
slate’ (M3). “Of the 103 countries that
experienced some form of civil war
between 1945-2009 (from minor to
major conflict), only 44 avoided a
subsequent return to civil war.” This
is what experts refer to as the
“conflict trap:” once a country
experiences one civil war, it is
significantly more likely to
experience additional episodes of
violence (M8, M15)
Analysis of the trends in conflicts suggests that the problem of war “is not a problem of preventing new
conflicts from arising, but of permanently ending the ones that have already started” (M8). Hence, when
addressing the issue of post-conflict recovery and reconstruction, it is crucial to develop programs and
methods that will minimize the risk of conflict recurrence.
(M8)
International Action
UN Action
According to the United Nations, “Building lasting peace in war-torn societies is among the most
daunting of challenges for global peace and security.” (M2) The process of building and maintaining
peace in conflict zones necessitates significant and consistent support from the international community
across a wide and diverse spectrum of economic, social, and political arenas. The United Nations and
other international bodies must focus on “monitoring ceasefires; demobilizing and reintegrating
combatants; assisting the return of refugees and displaced persons; helping organize and monitor elections
of a new government; supporting justice and security sector reform; enhancing human rights protections
and fostering reconciliation after past atrocities” (M2). The United Nations is perhaps the largest and most
notable peacemaking body in the world that aims to achieve all that has been listed previously. UN
intervention primarily takes the form of peacekeeping. There are two chapters of the UN Charter that deal
with the settlement of disputes (M10). Firstly, in Chapter VI entitled “Pacific Settlement of Disputes”
(M11), the Security Council is given the right to investigate and suggest courses of action at any stage of
a dispute. These rights are further elaborated in Chapter VII (“Action with respect to threats to the peace,
breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression”), in which the Security Council is given the right to impose
economic sanctions and may “take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain
or restore international peace and security” (M11).
In the 2005 World Summit Outcome, the United Nations General Assembly created the Peacebuilding
Commission and outlined an extensive list of actions that encourage peacekeeping (M6). The concept of
the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was conceived in 2001 and formally accepted by the UN in this
Outcome. R2P asserts that “if a state is manifestly failing to protect its citizens from mass atrocities and
peaceful measures are not working, the international community has the responsibility to intervene: first
diplomatically, then more coercively, and as a last resort with military force” (M10).
The Peacebuilding Commission was
established as an intergovernmental
advisory body in order to develop
integrated strategies for post-conflict
peacebuilding and recovery as well as
lay the foundation for sustainable
development. The Peacebuilding
Commission reaffirms “the vital role
of the UN in preventing conflicts,
assisting parties to conflicts to end
hostilities and emerge towards
recovery, reconstruction and
development and in mobilizing
sustained international attention and
assistance” (M5). Furthermore, this
commission recognizes the primary responsibility of indigenous authorities of conflict countries in
identifying priorities and strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding, “with a view to ensuring national
ownership” (M5). “The UN presents peacekeeping as a mechanism not only for ending violence in a
country or countries engaged in war, but also as a path to institution building, democratization, and
promoting human rights” (M10, M18).
Other International Action
Other international organizations often help individual countries through funding or humanitarian aid.
The World Bank has been supporting post-conflict recovery since the mid-1980s. (J4) In creating a
network to coordinate support, they attempt to go past basic financial and technical assistance to aid with
recovery. Microfinance organizations also often help in providing funds for economic recovery. (J6)
Often times they go beyond providing just a medium for financial support but also one for cooperation
and social reconciliation such as in Afghanistan, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Nepal, and many others.
(J5) Humanitarian aid organizations often help with refugees or internally displaced persons as well as
any widespread trauma situations. (J2) Regional organizations such as the African Union have put
significant effort into facilitating peaceful resolution. The AU set up Post Conflict Reconstruction and
Development policy to help serve as a guide for countries to develop policies and strategies unique to
their own situations. (J7) Other countries have also helped aid in post conflict economic and social
recovery yet they must always be aware of issues of sovereignty and understand when to draw the lines.
(J9) Countries may send diplomats to aid in transition and help with funding or other actions. (J8)
Overall, international help is often available for countries in need of help.
Case Studies
Timor Leste
Timor Leste received independence in 2002 after a long and tumultuous battle. Portugal controlled the
region in the 16th century, but invested little in the region and withdrew its rule in 1975. Within days,
Indonesia took over, showing just how fragile a newly independent region can be. The takeover attracted
little international attention, even amidst volatile military control. It finally took a 250 person massacre
for attention to be drawn, prompting international peacekeeping forces to step in. Since this 1991 incident,
Timor Leste proved significant success in its social and economic reconstruction. (E7).
Economically, the non-petroleum economy relied too strongly on low-productivity agriculture to prove
stable. The country maintained fairly low inflation levels due to non-petroleum generated GDP, however
public sector expenditure was too low to support post conflict recovery on its own. Timor Leste is now a
petroleum producing country after making an agreement with Australia to share offshore oil reserves, and
the rising oil and gas wealth has become a strong contributor in the recovery process of which Timor
Leste is beginning to take hold. However, low agricultural productivity continues to be the cause of
serious problems in certain areas today, in which expansion of cash-cropping and diversification are
essential (E1).
While the switch to petroleum-based revenue, infrastructure systems in Timor Leste are among the
world’s weakest, and the region is drought-prone, which doesn’t help the already faltering
economy. Increased revenue is helping to jump-start economic activity by upgrading infrastructure,
equipment, and workforce development, yielding important improvements in productivity that will help
raise incomes and living standards. While petroleum-based revenue has certainly helped boost Timor
Leste, the country certainly isn’t in an ideal state with 37.4% of citizens living below the international
poverty line (E8). Politically, priorities of the country include poverty reduction through enhanced
governance, including state administrative structures, and judiciary and security services which would
help boost democracy as well as balancing the nation's budget more representationally than the current
centralized government.
For many countries navigating the process of rebuilding after conflict, the idea of reaching out for
external help is threatening. While the concept of engaging foreign countries for help with, for example,
telecommunications and electricity is mixed, it is a small portion of legitimacy to lose and would allow
other private sectors to grow (E1). Breakouts of gang violence have led to the creation of a new
peacekeeping force known as the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor Leste (UNMIT). This
organization is targeted mainly at improving the states of poverty and unemployment said to be the roots
of these problems. UNMIT proves to be an example of an external force that has stepped in to help Timor
Leste without overpowering the nation, a balance seen rarely enough that the idea of accepting such
support steers many countries away (E7).
The Former Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia was formed after World War I in 1918 and was comprised of parts of the former Ottoman
Empire and Austria-Hungary. Following an invasion by the Axis powers in 1944, it became the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and was divided into six Socialist republics, an autonomous province,
and an autonomous district that still functioned under one national government. This nation-state was
comprised of present day Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, and
Macedonia (N25). However, after economic and political crisis in the 1980s, Yugoslavia broke up along
the borders of the socialist republics and entered into the Yugoslav Wars. In 1991, Slovenia and Croatia
declared independence and effectively dissolved Yugoslavia’s existence.
The Yugoslav Wars were fueled by declining economic performance, an abrupt regime change, undefined
identity, a surge of nationalism, (N29) and severe ethnic tensions amongst and within the former republics
(N28). Throughout the 1990s, the former Yugoslavia was a battleground “for the most serious conflict
and abuses in Europe since World War II. The abuses included widespread attacks against civilians,
population expulsions, systematic rape, and the use of concentration camps.” (N27) According to the
International Center for Transitional Justice during the Yugoslav wars, more than 140,000 people were
killed, and almost four million others were displaced. (N27)
The international
community took different
approaches in terms of
intervening in the wars.
In the summer of 1990,
the United States and
some of its Western allies
attempted to marshal
some coordinated
assistance, however as
the conflict grew bloody,
many of the nations
decreased their
engagement and instead
offered assistance
following the conflicts.
(N28) When Macedonia
declared independence in
1991, a U.S.
peacekeeping and
monitoring force was
dispatched to the border
with Serbia to monitor
violence and the province
was placed under a U.N.
administrative mandate. (N28)
The United Nations became actively involved in the situation in Yugoslavia on September, 25 1991
when the Security Council adopted its resolution 713 expressing deep concern at the fighting in that
country and calling on all States to implement immediately a "general and complete embargo on all
deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia". (N30) Their involvement continued with
the establishment of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in hopes of halting warfare and
th
bringing peace to the disputed areas. (N29) UNPROFOR was deployed into certain areas that were
selected as United Nations Protected Areas (UNPA), which were conflict hotspots. UNPROFOR was
“authorized to control access to the UNPAs, to ensure that the UNPAs remain demilitarized, and to
monitor the functioning of the local police there to help ensure non-discrimination and the protection of
human rights.” (N30)
UNPROFOR faced resistance and even suffered attacks while deployed in the region. After a year of
work, the United Nations reviewed the success of UNPROFOR’s work and found it insufficient (N30).
The United Nations refused to play any direct role to solve the conflict despite evidence of genocide in
the region, instead providing ‘humanitarian aid,’ a ‘no fly’ zone, sponsoring “safe areas” and promoting
discussions. Due to undersupplied and weak peacekeeping forces, as well as the ‘no fly zone’ and arms
embargo favoring the Serbs, little was done to stop the war or the genocide. (N29)
Throughout the Yugoslav War, there were attempts at brokering peace through peace talks and in 1995
the Dayton Agreement was signed to end the Bosnian War. However, this did not stop violence in the
region. Guerilla war and militant attacks ensued, resulting in the death of countless individuals and
intervention from NATO in the form of air strikes (N26). The international community also tried to act
through economic sanctions (N30), but did little to help combat the atrocities being committed, such as
the event of seven thousand males being killed while UN Peacekeepers stood by, unable to act (N29).
In 1993, the UN Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY), an ad hoc tribunal mandated to prosecute war crimes committed in the region since
1991. The tribunal has indicted 161 persons and has finished proceedings against over 100 defendants
(N27). The ICTY’s precedent-setting decisions on genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity
have assisted in restoring peace to the region and the has shown that an individual’s senior position can no
longer protect them from prosecution. (N25)
The inconsistent and inadequate actions from the international community offered little support to the
new nations while they suffered through loss, destruction, and instability. As of August 2013,
approximately 11,800 families were still waiting for answers regarding the fate of their loved ones, (N27)
which illustrates the long-lasting effects of the conflict. Even decades after the wars ended, the legacy of
the former Yugoslavia’s armed conflicts in the 1990s continues to affect the regional human rights
climate, the rule of law, and reconciliation efforts. (N27)
(N31)
Rwanda
While domination by an elite group of the Tutsi ethnic community characterized the pre-colonial and
early colonial era in Rwanda, the later Belgian colonial powers supported the authority of the ethnic Hutu
majority. In 1959, a social revolution led by Hutus forced most Tutsi out of their positions of power. The
resulting post-independence government implemented many exclusionary policies and strong patronclientele relationships. The Tutsi in exile formed the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) which engaged with
government forces from 1990-1994 as militia forces started carrying out violent anti-Tutsi attacks. With
this violence as a backdrop, the infamous Rwandan genocide of 1994 was instigated by civil authorities
pressuring Hutu civilians to comply through propaganda, bribery, intimidation tactics, and fines for
criticizing the policies. Over 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu were murdered as the international
community failed to act. The ex-FAR and Interahamwe, the Rwandan armed forces and militia, then fled
the country. (J1) The resulting two million internally displaced persons and two million other refugees
left to seek refuge in other countries (J2). After the conflict, large influxes of people returned to their
homes led to controversy surrounding issues of ownership of farmland, buildings, and agricultural and
forest products. (J1) Another wave of returning citizens came in 1996 and 1997, presenting even more
economic and social challenges to the nation. (J1) Thousands of people suffered from physical or mental
trauma as a result of the genocide and the number of women raped and infected with HIV/AIDS left
thousands of widowers and orphans. Children were not shielded from the effects of the genocide as 80%
of surviving children witnessed the carnage. (J2)
With all these challenges to face on the road to recovery, the Rwandan government chose to focus on
ensuring internal and external security, governing responsibly, guaranteeing the ability for everyone to
participate in the political process, promoting human rights and fighting impunity, mobilizing all
resources, strengthening socio-economic power and policies in regards to women, and utilizing
humanitarian aid. (J2) Internally, the Rwandan government eliminated the last of the Ex-FAR and
Interahamwe, ensuring internal security by 2002. Externally, Rwanda decided to occupy east Congo in
order to keep the attacks of the Hutu guerrillas outside its borders. Ensuring safety both within and
outside Rwandan borders helped facilitate recovery in other areas. (J2) A focus on rebuilding institutions
has led to significant improvement in economic outcomes and social indicators. (J3)
Politically, elections in 2003 led to the adoption of a constitution and universal suffrage for presidential
and legislative elections. (J2) To help handle the overwhelming 120,000 detainees awaiting judgement,
the International Penal Tribunal for Rwanda was created by the UN Security Council and the classic legal
system was rebuilt. Gacaca, or community courts, were created to help speed up the dispute resolution as
well. The importance of remembering the genocide was greatly emphasized by efforts to ensure postconflict justice and the creation of education programs to promote human rights and responsible
citizenship. (J2)
Unable to find an outside source to finance reconstruction, Rwanda relied on its own resources and opted
for opportunistic partnership policies. From there, it was able to convince investors of its stability and
attract the investment of private funds. Its growth economically can clearly be seen the figure. (J2) IDA
funds enabled financial
reconstruction as well as funding
for education, health, water,
energy, transport, and
communications. Technical
assistance in agriculture, funding
through the Education for All Fast
Track Initiative, financing for the
Rwanda-HIV/AIDS program,
repairing damaged water supply
systems, and other problem
specific solutions ensure that
funding is used efficiently. (J3)
Rwanda also benefitted from case
by case grants from the IBRD
though they were the only country
in Africa to benefit from such a
grant. (J4)
Faced with the unique problem of
housing two opposing sides in a
civil war, the government made a
great effort to integrate the two. A decentralization program led to local and strict elections in 1999 and
2001 as a transition period which ended in 2003 and implemented presidential and parliamentary
elections though research by NGOs revealed a lack of trust between local communities and lack of full
two-way communication between various levels of government. (J1) Humanitarian organizations helped
take care of refugees, displaced and traumatized persons, prisoners, HIV/AIDS victims, widows, orphans
and demobilized combatants and eased their reintegration into society. (J2) The role of women was
greatly emphasized, especially the inclusion of women in government. It is now the country with the
greatest female political participation in the world, with 49% of deputies being women. (J2)
Rwanda’s recovery is overall seen as successful. It was able to ensure safety within its own borders
starting from the beginning which helped provide a foundation for reconstruction and recovery politically,
economically, and socially. Though some efforts may not have gone as planned, overall, Rwanda’s efforts
have enabled change and recovery in the country.
(J3)
Somalia
Somalia has been plagued by conflict during most of its fifty-five years of independence (N32).
Following decades of regime changes and political vicissitudes, in 1991 a coup d’état plunged the country
into a civil war that remains problematic today (N33). The Somali Civil War has caused an estimated
350,000 to one million Somali deaths (N34).
The first two years of the civil war were some of the most devastating and deadly (N32). Warlords were
scrambling to gain control of the country and the power struggle between competing clans led to the death
of thousands of civilians due to both violence and famine (N33). An American military intervention
began in 1992 (N32) and the United Nations sent peacekeeping troops in shortly after in hopes of
restoring order in Somalia. However, after skirmishes occurred and several American troops were killed
by Somali militant groups, the United States formally ended their mission only two years after it began
(N33). The United Nations shortly followed suit and ended their peacekeeping mission. The failure of
both missions informally signaled an end to the possibility of international intervention rebuilding
Somalia any time soon.
Efforts by neighboring countries and clan leaders to re-establish Somalia proved ineffective as years of
persistent lawlessness and hostile clan rivalries continued. Although Somalia is made up of nearly 9.5
million people who share a common language, ethnicity, and devotion to Islam, they are severely divided
into clan fiefdoms. The struggle for power and representation is only worsened due to fighting for scarce
resources. (N32) In 2006, Islamist extremist groups, including the Al-Shabab and al-Qaeda challenged the
already unstable and precarious authority of the interim government by taking the capital, Mogadishu, and
southern parts of the country. At this time, after twelve years of silence from the international community,
foreign military involvement from Ethiopia and the United States as well as peacekeeping troops from the
African Union reentered Somalia. (N35)
Al-Shabab still maintains a stronghold in southern Somalia, which has made it increasingly difficult and
dangerous for humanitarian agencies to offer support to the Somali people. The lack of humanitarian aid
and assistance during the Somali Civil War has been a trend in its entirety because of the volatile and
erratic conditions present in the region. Al-Shabab also placed a ban on foreign aid agencies in the south,
which isolated southern Somalia and its capital from humanitarian aid for nearly five years. From 2010 to
2012, Somalia suffered through a famine that, according to the UN, killed almost 260,000 people. The
UN World Food Programme attempted to offer aid; however workers received threats from Al-Shabab,
which forced the Programme to withdraw from Somalia. (N33)
Recently, the developing state has been focusing on strengthening their military sector and improving
federalism within the government. Somalia’s Defense Minister hopes that “If the army sector is
strengthened, then it will be an easy mission to eradicate the terrorists and take control of our country’s
peace and stability.” (N6) This, however, will be difficult for the former failed state (N32) due to limited
equipment and an underdeveloped and inexperienced national defense sector (N4). To address the
newfangled and fragile government, an international coalition has been working since 2014 to implement
the “New Deal” Somalia Compact, which “sets out agreed goals for peace building and state building”
(N36) and has proven successful thus far. (N37) Somalia, however, still has a long road of reconciliation
and rebuilding ahead.
Libya
Former Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi came to power in 1969 after a coup against King Idris. The
republican system was removed and the Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (mass state)
was established where he exercised absolute political authority, eliminating all opposition. In February
2011, the Libyan people rose up against Qaddafi and his tyranny of 42 years. Civil war broke out and
eight months later the regime fell and Qaddafi himself was killed. There had been minimal development
in basically every sector during Qaddafi's reign which left Libya in an already grim state and the sudden
collapse of the state led to an intensely chaotic power vacuum. (J9)
Libya’s path to recovery has been a rocky one; on more than one occasion, Libya has teetered on the
brink of civil war and political, economic, and social progress has fallen behind. One of the main issues is
the lack of security due to the lack of effort to disarm and demobilize rebel militia since the original
uprising of 2011. Additionally, political and social leaders are under the constant threat of attack,
threatening progress in all national sectors. (J8)
Politically, one of the first steps the Libyan government took towards reconciliation and recovery was that
of transitional justice. Such a step is essential for a healthy transition from conflict to recovery as it allows
victims to reconcile with their past and also lets perpetrators acknowledge their wrongdoings. The Libyan
public demanded justice be carried out and thus the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was created.
The TRC investigates human rights violations such as killing, torture, rape, imprisonment, and
disappearances in addition to corruption, bribery, and money laundering. These offenses are documented
and used to estimate compensation for victims. The lack of a legal framework prevents the TRC from
functioning as it should and greatly diminishes its effectiveness as a transitional justice institution. (J9)
Politically, efforts to create a constitution were extremely off schedule as the constitutional drafting
committee had not even begun meeting until three years after Qaddafi’s death. (J8)
Economically, Libya was able to fund the reconstruction once oil production restarted—an option most
post-conflict societies do not have—yet stalled political progress and insecurity within the country limited
progress in other economic sectors. Recent armed takeovers of oil facilities further draw into question the
stability and sustainability of such an economy. Such a system will work temporarily but must be changed
if it is to support future growth. A few steps towards a more sustainable, broad-based economy have been
taken in Libya but increased government salaries and subsidies reverse any progress. (J8)
Socially, Libya remains starkly divided between the thuwar and azlam, revolutionaries and supporters
respectively. The “culture of the victor” that is prevalent in Libya means that the former are treated with
great honor whilst the latter are publically shamed. Often times, the labels are unfairly given to towns that
had a small minority of supporters. This type of culture splits Libya apart and prevents the social progress
and cooperation that is necessary for recovery. (J9) The high number of internally displaced persons
further hinder post-conflict recovery. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees estimates the number of
IDPs to be almost 60,000. Often the division between the thuwar and the azlam contributes to this
displacement though land disputes, historical grievances, tribal rivalries and other factors also contribute.
Overcoming displacement is essential to achieving national reconciliation and it continues to be a
problem to this day. (J9)
Overall, Libya has much left to overcome. Through oil, Libya was able to secure itself financially though
its stability is questionable. Efforts to change politically, as with the constitution and Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, have been less effective than hoped. Socially, displacement of people
combined with the culture of the victor divide the country, making change and cooperation even harder
yet. No one of these issues can be tackled independently; the success of recovery is dependent on all.
While some issues are specific to Libya itself, much can be used to help understand other countries with
similar problems or similar conflicts.
South Sudan
South Sudan gained independence from Sudan in July of 2011. The country became independent with
unprecedented international support in the form of billions of dollars in development assistance and no
outstanding debt due to abundant oil resources. Only a year after independence, the nation was hit by its
first economic crisis when oil production was shut down after a dispute with Sudan who controlled the
only available pipeline. Oil production resumed promptly, but the impact of the shutdown had shattered
the economy and crisis broke out once again.
Almost all consumer goods in Sudan are imported, as the economy is centered heavily on revenue and
virtually nothing else. The nation’s GDP is projected to continue to benefit from oil prices, however oil
production has fallen by 20% since 2013. The Central Bank, in an effort to compensate for lost income,
began printing money and causing staggering inflation rates. In effect, citizens, especially those in urban
or non-subsistence farming areas can’t afford food or other necessities (E5).
An economy already distorted by conflict is only rendered weaker when current systems are fueled by
corruption. Allocation of foreign exchange reserves are often distributed inefficiently, connections often
held between big business owners and corrupt government officials taking priority over the rest of the
struggling young country. Tax revenue is often taken into the hands of corrupt government officials, who
use their power to dictate how it is spent, including when it comes to their own salaries. Those that import
luxury goods are viewed as above the law and given special treatment as well, as they often work handin-hand with the government officials (E4).
In December of 2014, Fula Water Company, one of the few manufacturing businesses in South Sudan
was forced to shut down as they could not keep up payments for their imports. Instances such as these go
to show the impact a global decline in oil prices can have on an oil-dependent government. Corruption
matched with such little available work contributes to an increase in black market activity (E5).
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005 allowed for South Sudan to finally begin to be
representative and built up of the Sudanese people, an awakening from the weak democracy that barely
allowed the nation to function let alone flourish. The country is strongly controlled by the ruling political
party, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), as well as its military wing, the Sudan People’s
Liberation Army (SPLA). The failure to institute power relations within the party has resulted in
autocracy and insiders who reap the benefits of being close to a power figure, unlike the majority of the
countries citizens who can barely afford to eat. The party is in dire need of reform, past that of the CPA,
in order to begin to function again as normal. The country needs to work to improve their own legitimacy
from the inside as well, as recent peaceful movements and outspoken journalists have been targeted.
Without solving these problems, it would be surprising to see South Sudan becoming a successful nation,
let alone the full-fledged democracy it fought independence for (E6).
Guiding Questions
1. What recent experience does your country have with post-conflict recovery either through its own
conflict or through involvement in supporting recovery in another region? How successful has the
recovery process been?
2. Is your country currently involved with one of these conflicts through military action, economic
support or sanctions, or humanitarian aid?
3. Which of the conflicts in this guide does your country believe to be the most pressing for the
international community at this time? Why?
4. What first steps would your country support to initiate recovery in the conflict zones included in
this guide?
5. Which of the economic or social issues in post-conflict zones does your country believe to be the
most significant in the conflicts outlined in this guide?
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