Table of contents
1. Introduction…………………………………………………………………………1
2. Methodology…………………………………………………………………………3
3. Theoretical framework …………………………………………………...………...6
3.1. Global Governance Theory…………………………………...……...6
3.2. Conflict Theory………………………………………………………9
3.3. Important Background Information…………………………………11
3.3.1. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam……………11
3.3.2. Treaty from 1929: The Nile Treaty 1929 and
from 1959: Nile Waters Agreement……………………….12
3.3.3. Nile Basin Initiative………………………………...13
3.3.4. Water Governance in the Nile Basin……………….14
4. Case study…………………………………………………………………………..14
4.1. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Project……………………15
4.2. International Law aspect……………………………………………15
4.2.1. Theories and doctrines of International
Water Law………………………………………………...15
4.2.2. Principles of International Water Law……………..17
5. Analysis……………………………………………………………………………..18
5.1. The GERD project from Ethiopia’s perspective……………………19
5.2. The GERD project from Egypt’s perspective………………………23
5.3. The GERD project from an International Law perspective………....28
5.4. The GERD project from regional actors’ perspective………………31
5.5. The GERD project from international actors’ perspective …………34
6. Discussion…………………………………………………………………………...36
7. Conclusion………………………………………………………………………..…44
References
1. INTRODUCTION
Over the years, the scarcity of water in the world has created many sources of conflicts,
including in the Nile Basin. The Basin has posed a lot of tension between the nations
dependant on its water. The most recent issue is between Ethiopia and Egypt and the
Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) Project. The tensions between the countries
are rapidly escalating and a future conflict would affect the region tremendously. By
using Global Governance Theory and Conflict Theory, we aim to analyse how different
actors position themselves in this dispute. Hence, our research question is “How Global
Governance Theory and Conflict Theory contribute to understand the dispute
over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Project, with a special emphasis on
Ethiopia and Egypt”.
The Nile has been supplying countries with water for many centuries. Countries
dependent on the Nile’s water are: Egypt, Sudan, South Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia,
Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi and Rwanda. This
makes it the world’s longest river, flowing for 6850 kilometres (Sinnona 2011). The
Nile’s main water sources come from both Lake Tana in Ethiopia and from Lake
Victoria in Uganda (ibid). Lake Tana culminates into the Blue Nile and Lake Victoria
culminates into the White Nile, which later on merges and become the Nile (ibid). Even
though the Nile gets all of its water from these two lakes, only 20 percent of the Nile
actually flows through Ethiopia and Uganda (ibid). The rest of it flows through nations
with high evaporation rates and minimum rainfall (ibid). Due to this complexity, the
hydropolitics in the Nile Basin is very tense, which has caused tremendous effect on the
development throughout the region.
Currently, Ethiopia is building one of the largest dams in the world, the Grand
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. The construction started in 2011 and has spurred a lot of
controversy, mainly with Egypt. The treaty ‘Nile Waters Agreement’ from 1959 with
Sudan gave Egypt the right to approximately 90 percent of its water (Tekle 2013). The
water from the river is dispersed to the Egyptian farmers, because the agricultural
industry would otherwise not survive, as Egypt has a shortage in rainfalls (Abulezz
2013). According to the Egyptian Government, the dam would decrease the flow to
their country, causing agricultural industry and their farmers to suffer (ibid). The
1
politicians of Egypt view this issue as a national security threat, and in return, threats
have been made to Ethiopia that consequences might occur (Nabil 2014). Egypt claims
that this dam project is violating international law, and thus Egyptian politicians are
trying to find a solution to cooperate with Ethiopia or to stop the project (Al-Jazeera
2014). Ethiopia, on the other hand, believes that not only will the dam not hinder the
flow of the Nile, it will also foster development of both Ethiopia and their neighbouring
countries (Maasho 2014). Since the treaty of 1959, Sudan and Egypt have exercised
close relations, however the current water issue has jeopardised those relations, as
Sudan is supporting Ethiopia in this situation (Hammond 2013).
The two theories used in this project are Conflict Theory and Global Governance
Theory. We decided on these two theories, as we believe that we will receive a more
concrete answer at the end of the paper, than if we would have used mainstream
theories, such as Realism and Liberalism. Conflict Theory and Realism have some
similarities in power relations and their understanding of human nature; both are
pessimistic. However, we believe that Realism is too broad, too state-centric and does
not believe in international organisations; hence, it would not agree with the dam issue.
We could have chosen Institutional Liberalism instead of Global Governance Theory,
but as it only concentrates on institutions and organisations it would narrow our topic
down too much. We therefore agreed on Global Governance Theory, as it also deals
with treaties and international law. Furthermore, it entails a more optimistic worldview.
The theory also goes well together with the issue as it is not only a regional, but also a
global one as several organisations and institutions have offered their opinion on the
issue.
The paper is built by first introducing and explaining methodology, and then followed
by a theoretical framework and a case study, thereafter an analysis and discussion
section and lastly, the conclusion. Under the theoretical framework we will explain the
two theories, Global Governance Theory and Conflict Theory, and we will also
introduce and provide background information on important key concepts. The case
study will entail information on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Project, and we
will also look at the dam project from an international law aspect. During the main
section, the analysis, we will analyse Ethiopia’s and Egypt’s opinions on the GERD, as
well as the international law aspect, regional and international actors, from a Global
Governance and Conflict Theory point of view. In the discussion section we will
2
examine the issue from the actors’ positions, as well as discuss which theory holds more
explanatory value.
2. METHODOLOGY
This chapter will contain the methodology of the project and also the considerations
behind the choice of theories. We will briefly describe the choice of case study,
empirical material and choice of data collection.
The aim of this paper is to examine the actors’ positions on the GERD issue through the
two theories, and in the end acknowledge which theory explains the issue the best. We
will specifically focus on Ethiopia and Egypt, as they are the main actors in this issue.
However, references to other regional and international actors will be made. The
relevance of this topic is that it is very up to date, not only in hydropolitics but also in
the international sphere. As the global warming issue intensifies, the lack of water and
the issues surrounding it will increase. Hence, nations and politicians need to be able to
solve these problems without resorting to hard power.
We realise that water governance is a transnational issue, but currently the debates
surrounding the dam are mainly between Ethiopia and Egypt. However, the outcome of
this dispute will tremendously affect the entire region. By providing basic information
on the GERD, as well as relevant doctrines and international laws in the case study, we
get an initial overview on the situation. By then drawing in more detailed quotes,
statements and facts, into the analysis, on Ethiopia’s and Egypt’s positions, we are able
to build a coherent overview of the issue as well as analyse it from each of the two
chosen theories.
In the discussion section we expect to find that global governance will have a more
sustainable solution and it will benefit all riparian countries around the Nile, as opposed
to a conflict scenario. However, as Egypt feels that Ethiopia is threatening their national
security, a conflict might occur. Yet, it is important to also keep in mind that Egypt’s
response to the issue will be affected by their political turmoil at the moment. We
recognise that the conflictual situation between Ethiopia and Egypt is transnational, but
since it is also a regional problem, we decided to use the concept transboundary instead
of transnational, as many articles refer to this concept.
3
Choice of country and topic
The country and topic was chosen after some discussion within the group on which
region of the world and countries we wanted to focus on; we chose Africa as a region
because of its lack of water. We discussed whether or not to do a comparison study or a
single case study. We, then, narrowed the topic down even further and found a recent
dilemma with the dispute between Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan regarding the Ethiopian
dam. We found this to be an interesting topic due to its relevance at the present time.
The dam has opened up a lot of discussions and critiques, which would be exciting to
explore further.
Case study
We have chosen to work with a single case study, where we go into depth with the
GERD including opinions and reactions from various actors. The study will be
explained from different observations, and thereby it is possible to study a case that is
included in a larger and broader context (Bryman 2012). The project is a theoretical
interpretative case study and its starting point is in the empirical material.
The case study is an object of interest in its own right, and we try to provide an in-depth
interpretation of it (ibid). The arguments which we will present for the interpretive
theoretical approach is also the arguments for the deductive approach in the project,
because the starting point will be the theories, and these are then used to study the
empirical material (ibid).
Choice of empirical material
Due to time constraints and the issue being current there is limited amount of primary
data, which is why we will mostly use secondary data, such as academic articles, books
and trusted Internet websites. We are also relying on reports from international
organisations (IO), such as the United Nations (UN), the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), as these three are some of the major and most
trusted organisations involved with water governance; thus, we are ensured that the
information provided is credible. As we will approach the issue with an international
law angle, we will also concentrate on treaties and relevant international doctrines and
laws. Since the dam project is very recent, there are limited amount of academic articles
on the subject, which is why we will have to refer to newspapers, such as BBC, AlJazeera and Reuters etc., for information regarding the project. However, information
4
on the issue of water governance and disputes over the Nile in general is available
through academic articles. We decided to combine reports and articles, as it will provide
us with a more coherent picture of the situation since reports are very factual and mostly
only focus on numbers, while articles concentrate more on the societal factor and
discuss the topic. We will not collect primary data for this project, as the issue takes
place in the Nile Basin, and it is impossible to collect primary data in such limited
amount of time.
By using secondary data we will be able to have a broader overview of the topic, which
is needed since we are using two very different theoretical approaches. However, this
means that we will not be able to control how the secondary data is collected and
interpreted. Even though we will be using reports containing numbers, we will only use
a limited amount of them. In addition, we have very little raw data; hence, we will not
be using quantitative methods, but qualitative methods.
Qualitative methods are approaches that “are typically used to explore new phenomena
and to capture individuals’ thoughts, feelings, or interpretations of meaning and
process” (Given 2008, n. pag.). Hence, it will help us understand the reasoning and
values behind Ethiopia’s decision to build the dam, and Egypt’s hostility towards it. It is
also the best method because it promotes a deeper understanding of phenomena. We
will be building the project based on one case study. With the qualitative methods we
will try to explore, explain and understand the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam issue
so that we can successfully answer our research question.
Choice of theory
The theories were chosen on the basis of our topic and on the thought that these two
theories could be best applied when trying to interpret the empirical material and
analysing them in relation to the dam project and the dispute between Ethiopia and
Egypt. The two theories will give us an overview from two different perspectives,
which is what we need in order to successfully answer our research question.
We see the scarcity of water as a critical issue today, and believe that in order to find
solutions to that problem, countries need to cooperate and have mutual policies
regarding transnational issues. Since we do live in a world where cooperation among
countries happens daily, we believe that transboundary and global governance would
offer a sustainable solution. Thus, we chose to use Global Governance Theory as our
5
first theoretical basis. As a second theory, we decided to utilise Conflict Theory as this
is a very negative, selfish and hostile theory compared to Global Governance Theory.
By having two opposite theories, it would ensure us that we would get two very
different perspectives.
Choice of analytical strategy
Due to the numerous actors involved in the dispute, we decided that we need to expand
on their position in order to get a more comprehensive overview of the dam project and
the issue. By dividing the analysis in five subsections, all according to the actors, we
will be able to easier reflect on their positions from a Global Governance and Conflict
Theory perspective. Throughout the analysis, we will use the two theories
independently as they are very different; thus, it will help us to get two very diverse but
comprehensive perspectives on the issue which will eventually assist us in successfully
answer our research question.
Critical reflection on the methodological choices
We are aware of some critical reflections in the choice of the methodology within the
project. When we use existing empirical material, we are aware of some bias that might
occur, and also that this empirical material was created for another purpose, therefore it
will be necessary for us to interpret the material objectively to avoid any bias.
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This chapter will define the two theories, which we will use in the project. We will not
present the whole theory here, but only the essence of the theories which we will be
using in our analysis. The chapter is divided into three parts: Global Governance
Theory, Conflict Theory and Important Background Information.
3.1. Global Governance Theory
The concept of ‘Global Governance’ emerged among the scholars of world politics
during the 1990s, around the same time the Berlin Wall fell and the Cold War ended
(Hewson and Sinclair 1999; Stripple and Stephan 2013). In the meantime, the question
6
of global change became rapidly a dominant topic in international relations theorising
(ibid), and the debate around it, as well as around global governance itself, has stayed
vivid until today. Global Governance can be seen as sort of a tool to better understand
the global change and its multiple challenges. It encompasses a multitude of formal and
informal structures of multilevel political coordination in public and private agencies,
which are designed to implement collectively agreed transnational or global rules and
regulations, both institutional and normative in nature (McGrew in Baylis et al. 2011).
Due to the complexity of global governance, it has often been seen as both a recent
empirical phenomenon and a theoretical concept for studying it (Stripple and Stephan
2013). The following chapter examines and discusses the origin, functions and
theoretical framework of Global Governance Theory. It gives us a means to understand
and investigate the conflicting water governance issue in the Nile Basin, and thus helps
us to analyse the diverse challenges related to the formation of transboundary water
governance in the region.
The term ‘Governance’ helps us to comprehend the origin and the ideology behind
Global Governance. The concept was introduced around World War II and it was
adopted in many areas, such as economics and business organisation since the 1960s
(Pierre 2000 in Stripple and Stephan 2013). At the same time as Governance emerged,
society changed into a more complex and differentiated matter than before; private and
self-governing units emerged in the sphere of public governing (Stripple and Stephan
2013). Hence, Governance became to be understood as a system of rules that regulated
all functioning in the private and public spheres (ibid). In the 1960s and 1970s, the
concept of Governance was shaped through the development of neo-institutional
economics, systems theory and particularly through the debates on the crises of the
welfare state and the deficient centralised policy-making (ibid). These contested issues
formed a basis for the normative discourse of good governance, which seems to frame
many contemporary debates considering global environmental governance (ibid).
The academic approach of Global Governance evolved notably during the 1970s, as the
literature on transnational actors emerged among the field of international relations
(ibid). Due to the globalising structures and thus the change in power relations, nonstate actors and network-like forms of governance became more influential in state
politics and behaviour. This new world order provided the basis for creating a
theoretical model of ‘complex interdependence’, which depicts a world where
transnational activity impacts on states’ competence to act (Keohane and Nye 1977 in
7
Stripple and Stephan 2013). Moreover, armed force became less important as new
interdependencies, such as environment, transformed as characterising elements of
world politics, and the differentiation between high and low politics appeared obsolete
(Stripple and Stephan 2013). The mutual interdependence of states and other actors can
be interpreted as an indication of the decrease of the state-centric perception of world
politics. This, again, refers to the changing nature of authority and governance on the
scene of international politics.
Global Governance Theory consists of the idea that “it is possible to conceive of
governance without government”, and effective and regulatory governing can be
reached even without formal authority of the state (Rosenau 1992, p. 5 in Stripple and
Stephan 2013). In this regard, Global Governance comprises three elements that are
important for global change; the relocation of authority in various directions and levels,
the development of a global civil society, and the reorganising of the global political
economy (Hewson and Sinclair 1999). Furthermore, Global Governance Theory aims to
build a global public domain, which embeds new systems of governance in wider global
structures of social capacity and agency that exist beyond the nation-state (Ruggie 2004
in Stripple and Stephan 2013). Its strength seems to be on its capability to explain the
diversity of global life, as well as the expanding presence of non-state actors in
governing of transnational collective affairs. In other words, it gives a comprehensive
approach to analyse global change.
It is, however, important to note that there is not a uniform understanding of the
ontology of Global Governance, but the concept is rather relatively debated. On the one
hand, it refers to a broad theoretical approach that aims to understand the patterns of
various regimes and the political implications of global change from a more integral
perspective (Hewson and Sinclair 1999). On the other hand, it is to be seen as a
normative element for the better management of common resources in the global stage,
which includes diverse issues, such as human rights, ecology and social development
(ibid). Multiple non-hierarchical, hybrid and network-like modes of governing are to be
addressed as relevant means for the identification and management of related global
affairs (Hewson and Sinclair 1999; Stripple and Stephan 2013). In addition, Global
Governance offers an alternative narrative to the field of international relations under
conditions of globalisation; it should no longer be understood as a simple system of
anarchy within the theory of Realism, but rather as a complex that encompasses
territorial states and other actors engaged in governing within a global society. From a
8
practical viewpoint, governance itself requires leadership, legitimacy, efficiency, and
more importantly coherence (Lamy 2012) – these features are also recognised as
significant but challenging elements in building global level governance. Despite of its
complex nature both in theory and practice, it provides a tool to confront and localise
major global problems (Hurrell 2011; Lamy 2012). It thus draws out the best in the
international community and rescues it from its worst inclinations (Barnett and Duval
2005).
In order to comprehend the complex issue of global water governance, and especially
the situation in the Nile Basin, more attention needs to be put in the governing of the
Nile water. In general, transboundary river basins have been governed by means of
power politics that has left minor space for mutually agreed rules and regulations. The
aim of the analysis on transboundary water governance in the region is to generate an
overview that helps us to understand the powers between the two main actors, Ethiopia
and Egypt, and examine the regional but yet global challenges of forming water
governance in the Nile Basin.
3.2. Conflict Theory
Conflict Theory is seen as a negative theory, as it believes that hostility and resentment
are constant factors of society (Lepird et al. n.d.). Hence, the theory focuses on the,
“negative, conflicting and ever-changing nature of our society” (Crossman a n.d., n.
pag). Conflict Theory, which is considered to be a macro-sociological theoretical
perspective (Lepird et al. n.d.), originated in the mid-1800s based on work from Karl
Marx (Chegg n.d.), but it was not until the 1970s the theory reached its peak (Wells
1979). In a society there are limited amount of resources, which can help citizens
improve their position, such as education, power and wealth (Anon n.d.). According to
Marx, there are two different groups in society; the bourgeoisie and the proletariat
(Lepird et al.). Both groups compete for the same limited amount of resources, even
though the groups have uneven power (Chegg n.d.); due to the unevenness in power
Marx believed that “those who have power want to hang on to it by suppressing the
poor and powerless” (Chegg n.d., n. pag). The competition between the two groups
leads to conflict and a change in society (Anon n.d.). The societal change occurs
because of the competition between the different interests and agendas of the
9
bourgeoisie and the proletariat (Crossman a. n.d.). Therefore, the theory does not
believe that change occurs through consensus or adaption (Investopedia a. n.d.).
Through the competition social order is determined, and as the bourgeoisie acquire
more power, Conflict Theory believe that “rich and powerful people force social order
on the poor and weak” (Crossman a. n.d., n. pag). Which is why the theory believes in
challenging the status quo, as social change will have a positive impact on society
(ibid). Several conflict theorists have a positive view on social change, as they believe
that it will be the solution to the conflict (Anon n.d.).
As Conflict Theory has a very negative outlook on the world, it states that a zero-sum
game exists; if A obtains the resources, B obtains nothing. Zero-sum game is one part of
Game Theory (Crossman c. n.d.). As the name suggests, Game Theory looks at human
interaction as a game (ibid). Some game theorists even state that they know how people
are going to react to certain situations by applying strategies, profits, and costs etc.
which have been extensively studied (ibid). Originally, Game Theory was an economic
and mathematical theory, but over the years it has expanded into the field of social
science, for example to explain sociological, political and psychological behaviours
(ibid). The amount of participants involved in a zero-sum game can be everything
between two players and millions (Investopedia b. n.d.). “Zero-sum describes a situation
in which a participant’s gain or loss is exactly balanced by the losses or gains of the
other participant(s)”; hence, many often refer to zero-sum game as strictly competitive
(Princeton n.d., n. pag). But if cooperation does happen, it is only for the purpose of
acquiring resources; meaning power is the core of all relationships (Lepird et al.). In the
case of the dam, a zero-sum game would not be able to be applied, as Egypt would still
be able to profit from the Nile water, and according to Ethiopia, it will also be able to
profit from the energy the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam will project. However, if
Ethiopia and Egypt do join into an agreement it would solely be to acquire resources
from Egypt’s perspective, and from Ethiopia’s perspective it would be the increasing
business from Egypt, which will boost Ethiopia’s national economy.
Many societal problems, such as various discriminations, occur as a consequence of
conflict (Anon n.d.). Yet, social change does not always follow conflict, however
Conflict Theory has proven to be able to extensively explain social change, which is
why Conflict Theory is often used when explaining criminal behaviour (ibid).
10
Over the years, Conflict Theory has broadened its views and understanding of conflict,
including social conflict and power (ibid). Yet, a common point of criticism is that
Conflict Theory is only able to define and defend one part of social life (Goodman and
Ritzer 2003), and is “ideologically radical, underdeveloped and unable to deal with
order and stability” (Goodman and Ritzer 2003, ch. 7).
We chose Conflict Theory, because as mentioned in the introduction, we believe that at
the end of this paper we will have a more concrete answer with Conflict Theory than if
we would have chosen a mainstream theory, such as Realism. It is also a well-suited
theory to our project, as it deals with power relations between two groups, in this
situation, the power relations between Ethiopia and Egypt, and the competition for the
Nile water. The theory closest to Conflict Theory is Functionalism. Functionalism
focuses on social order and how a society remains stable (Crossman b. n.d.).
Functionalism states that in a society there are different interdependent parts, mostly
institutions, and if they work well together, a stable society will emerge (ibid).
However, if one part collapses, it will lead to social change (ibid). We could have
chosen this theory instead of Conflict Theory, but Functionalism does not acknowledge
the imbalance of power between rich and poor, Functionalism only recognizes that
people have uneven amount of wealth (Berrached 2010). Also, Conflict Theory
encourages the challenge of the status quo; which is what the riparian states have been
trying to do by contesting the existing treaty from 1959.
3.3. Important Background Information
In this section there will be a brief description of key concepts we will touch upon
throughout the project, such as; the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, the two
treaties from 1929 and 1959 concerning the issue of the Nile water, the Nile Basin
Initiative and the Water Governance in the Nile Basin.
3.3.1. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
In 2011, the Ethiopian Government announced that they had plans to construct a
hydroelectric dam on the Blue Nile, which would be situated 45 kilometres east of their
11
border with Sudan (Hammond 2013). The project has been named the Grand Ethiopian
Renaissance Dam (ibid). The Ethiopian Government sees the dam as a major factor for
national development, but downstream countries of the Nile, such as Egypt, are
concerned about the possible negative effects (ibid). Ethiopia is rich on water resources
and they have a significant hydropower potential (ibid). The Ethiopian Government has
argued that as well as supplying Ethiopians with electricity, the dam would also
generate surplus energy for export to neighbouring countries; thus, benefitting the wider
region (ibid). The World Bank and several other international donors have refused to
invest in the project due to numerous implications, such as a lack of multipurpose
infrastructure (ibid). Therefore, the Ethiopian Government decided to finance the
project by selling national bonds to the population and to the Ethiopian Diaspora (ibid).
Ethiopia’s use of the Nile water for hydropower generation is expected to have little
effect on Sudan and Egypt if the filling of the reservoirs is planned and executed over a
reasonable period of time (ibid).
3.3.2. Treaty from 1929: The Nile Treaty 1929 and from 1959: Nile Waters Agreement
There are two important treaties relevant to this issue (Hammond 2013). The first was
established in 1929 (Nile Treaty 1929), where Egypt and the United Kingdom, on
behalf of Sudan, agreed to allocate minimum flows to the two countries (ibid). The
treaty stated that Egypt’s and Sudan’s share of the Nile water falls under natural and
historic rights (ibid). It also declared that the other riparian states cannot introduce
construction projects without the consent of Egypt and Sudan (Salman 2012). The treaty
states the following,
“Except with the prior consent of the Egyptian Government, no irrigation
works shall be undertaken nor electric generators installed along the Nile and
its branches nor on the lakes from which they flow if these lakes are situated
in Sudan or in countries under British administration which could jeopardize
the interests of Egypt either by reducing the quantity of water flowing into
Egypt or appreciably changing the date of its flow or causing its level to
drop.” (Salman 2012, p. 18)
This treaty is still valid and binding, even though it has met critique from other
countries, saying that they are not bound to this agreement because they were not parties
in the establishment of the agreement (Salman 2012).
12
The second treaty came about in 1959 and it was called the ‘The Nile Waters
Agreement’, which was an outcome of a dispute between Egypt and Sudan on the one
hand, and the rest of the Nile riparians on the other hand (ibid). The agreement
established the total annual flow of the Nile, as 84 billion cubic meters, and allocated
55.5 cubic kilometres to Egypt and 18.5 cubic kilometres to Sudan (ibid). The
remaining ten cubic kilometres represent the evaporation and outflow at the large
reservoir created by the Aswan High Dam in the southern Egypt and northern Sudan
(ibid). Hence, the two countries more or less assigned the entire flow of the Nile to
themselves and established rights to the waters of the Nile. This agreement is rejected
by the other riparian states (ibid). They argue that they are not parties to it and that they
have never complied with it (ibid). According to the riparian states, it is also a violation
of international law, since the “entire flow of the Nile originates within their territories”
(Salman 2012, p. 391).
3.3.4. Nile Basin Initiative
The Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) was created in 1999 as a “regional intergovernmental
partnership that seeks to develop the River Nile in a cooperative manner, share
substantial socio-economic benefits and promote regional peace and security” (Nile
Basin Initiative 2014, n. pag). The NBI will use the water resources of the Nile River to
reach its goal of a sustainable socioeconomic development (ibid). In 2010, the
Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) was only signed by the upstream countries
with strong opposition from Egypt and Sudan, who wish to retain veto power over
upstream developments (ibid). This agreement outlines the general principles that each
Nile Basin state has the right to use, within its territory, the waters of the Nile River
Basin (ibid). It also outlines the obligation to reasonable utilisation of the waters, and
that there is done no damage to it (ibid). The agreement introduces the notion of water
security, and it states, “the right of all Nile Basin States to reliable access to and use of
the Nile River system for health, agriculture, livelihoods, production and the
environment” (Salman 2012, p. 21). Egypt and Sudan were not satisfied with these
principles, and they wanted a special clause that would secure their right and use of the
waters (Salman 2012). They claimed their rights through the 1959 Treaty (ibid).
13
3.3.3. Water Governance in the Nile Basin
The UN defines water governance as follows,
“by the political, social, economic and administrative systems that are in place,
and which directly or indirectly affect the use, development and management of
water resources and the delivery of water service delivery at different levels of
society. Importantly, the water sector is a part of broader social, political and
economic developments and is thus also affected by decisions outside of the
water sector” (UNDP Water Governance Facility at SIWI 2014, n. pag).
The Nile Basin Initiative is an attempt to integrate water resource management or
governance and begin transboundary cooperation between the Nile states (ibid). There
have been several attempts to promote this cooperation; in 1993 the Technical
Cooperation Commission for the Promotion and Development of the Nile
(TECCONILE) was formed with the intention to promote development (World Bank),
and in 1993, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) funded 10 Nile
2002 Conferences, which aimed at promoting dialogue and cooperation within the Nile
Basin (Mapedza et al. 2009). It was during these conferences that the riparian states
finally agreed on the shared vision of the Nile Basin Initiative, and how to govern and
utilise the Nile water without causing any damage to its surroundings (ibid). This is
called benefit sharing in transboundary water governance (ibid). This agreement
included the riparian states and gave them permission to focus on producing basin-wide
benefits, and thereafter focus on sharing these benefits in a way that seems fair (ibid).
During conflicts of this kind, treaties play a big role (ibid).
4. CASE STUDY
In the following section brief information on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
will be given. We will also explain how international law affects the dispute over the
dam. This is done in order to better understand the position of Ethiopia and Egypt, and
to investigate the legal foundations of their dispute.
14
4.1. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Project
As mentioned above, in April 2011, Ethiopia declared their plans to construct one of the
world’s largest dams, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (Hammond 2013). The
government of Ethiopia considers this dam a substantial base for their development; the
aim of the dam project is the enlargement of the hydroelectric power efficiency (ibid).
The downstream riparian countries, in turn, are worried about the eventual unfavourable
consequences; accordingly, the transboundary cooperation is obstructed by the
oppositions of Egypt and Sudan as they believe Ethiopia violates international law
(ibid).
4.1.1. International Law aspect
The “transboundary water resources management” develops its principles of
international water law from a diversity of theories and doctrines (Rahaman 2009, p.
209).
4.1.1.1. Theories and Doctrines of International Water Law
There are many doctrines developed to regulate principles, theories, conventions and
rules of governing the utilisation of transboundary rivers; the “Absolute Territorial
Sovereignty Theory” doctrine was the first ever applied (Alebachew 2011). This
doctrine states that “[e]very nation can utilise the waters of an international river
flowing on its territory, as it likes, regardless of the consequences in other countries and
without the duty to consult” (Rahaman 2009, p. 209). This means that the upstream
countries of the Nile would be allowed to deflect the water from a common watercourse
without taking into consideration the need of the other states (ibid).
The second doctrine, labelled the “Absolute Territorial Integrity Theory”, argues that “a
state is entitled to expect that the same volume of water, uninterrupted in quantity and
unimpaired in quality, flows into its territory” (Alebachew 2011, p. 8). Thus, it is
prohibited to disrupt, reduce or amplify the flow generated by the use of the waters
(ibid). On the one hand, the upper states are permitted to utilise the rivers as long as this
exploitation does not traverse the rights of the downstream riparian (ibid). On the other
15
hand, the lower states have the right to complain about the utilisation of the water that is
presumably to perturb the natural flow of the river (Rahaman 2009).
The first theory seems to be in contradiction with the second one; while the first
doctrine favours the upper stream countries, the second theory favours the downstream
societies. Countries applying the first theory have absolute independence, regardless of
the other riparian states. The second theory, in contrast, aims to constrain any act of the
upper states that would disturb the normal course of the water. However, these theories
proved to be inefficient, as they do not give equal rights for the upstream and
downstream countries. In the interest of both parties, it was necessary to evolve a third
theory.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses from 1997 declares the general obligation of the states to
cooperate. Article 8 states:
“Watercourse States shall cooperate on the basis of sovereign equality,
territorial integrity, mutual benefit and good faith in order to attain optimal
utilization and adequate protection of an international watercourse.”
This means that the watercourse states have sovereignty over their own country, but
they have to take into consideration the rights of the other riparian states when acting.
The best way to maintain the proper utilisation of the river and to defend the quality of
the water is to be attentive to the mutual benefit.
The new doctrine, the “Limited Territorial Sovereignty” theory, “is based on the
assertion that every state is free to use shared rivers flowing on its territory as long as
such utilisation does not prejudice the rights and interests of the co-riparian” (Rahaman
2009, p. 210). Therefore, the absolute right of a state to utilise the waters is limited in
cases where the exploitation of international watercourses alters the interest of other
riparian states (Alebachew 2011). The third theory is the middle course between the
previous two theories: it recognises equal rights for all the watercourse countries, and
stipulates that each state has the obligation to respect the other co-riparian’s sovereignty
and rights.
16
4.1.1.2. Principles of International Water Law
Article 38 (1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) from 1964 states:
“The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law
such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: a.) international conventions,
whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the
contesting states; b.) international custom, as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law; c.) the general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations; (...)”.
The principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation is one of the most important
principles of the international water law. This principle, which is a subgroup of the
theory of limited territorial sovereignty, is incorporated in The Helsinki Rules [Article
V] and the United Nations Watercourses Convention [Article 5] (The Helsinki Rules on
the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers 1967; Convention on the Law of the Nonnavigational Uses of International Watercourses 1997; Rahaman 2009). The second
important principle, also a part of the limited territorial sovereignty theory, is the
obligation not to cause significant harm (ibid). This principle is universally recognised
by international water and environmental law, as well as a principle of The Helsinki
Rules [Articles V,X,XI,XXIX (2)] and the United Nations Watercourses Convention
[Articles 7, 10, 12, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21(2), 22, 26(2), 27, 28(1,3)] (ibid). A third
relevant principle also emerges when talking about international water law. The
obligation of notification, consultation and negotiation is included in The Helsinki Rules
(Articles XXIX [2], XXIX [3], XXIX [4], XXX, and XXXI) and in the UN
Watercourses Convention in Articles 11 to 18 (1967; 1997).
Ethiopia is devoted to the no harm principle and places its arguments on three central
policies and technical reasons (Alebachew 2011). Firstly, Ethiopia’s utilisation of the
Nile water for agricultural purposes is very low, around six billion cubic litres, unlike
Egypt’s, which, according to a water engineer, Alebachew, wastes doubly this amount
of water through unsuitable governance of the evaporation (2011). Secondly, the
requirement of Ethiopia for water is for the development of hydroelectric power (ibid).
After the water has been used, it will pursue its flow to downstream riparian states
without diversion (ibid). Ethiopia argues that Egypt’s enormous loss of water due to
evaporation could only be ameliorated by such projects as the GERD (ibid). Lastly,
17
Ethiopia considers that the innovations on the Nile River will have a beneficial effect on
the environment and that ultimately Egypt will profit from these advantages (ibid).
The most repeated rules are The Helsinki Rules of International Water Courses from
1967 and the 1997 United Nations Convention on Non-Navigational Watercourses
(Alebachew 2011). Egypt relies on these conventions for all its policy bases against
Ethiopia’s use of the water of the Nile (ibid). It uses the Absolute Territorial Integrity
Theory and argues that upper countries should not affect the natural flow of the river,
because this causes negative consequences to the downstream riparian states (ibid). This
diversion occurs, for instance, if the upper states cause an insufficiency of water
sustenance as dissimilar from the amount formerly used, or if the change of the river
course is a source of environmental damage (ibid). Article V (II, 11) of The Helsinki
Rules states that the share of the water should be done ‘without causing substantial
injury’ to the other riparian states. This is a clear utilisation of the principle ‘not to cause
significant harm’. However, authors’ opinions about the extent of the word ‘significant’
are not in concordance with each other. Egypt, in opposition to Ethiopia, is against the
qualification ‘significant’, it would prefer the term to remain imprecise (Alebachew
2011). This can suggest that, without the word ‘significant’, Egypt could easier
complain to Ethiopia about any changes in regard to the flow of the Nile as this would
be allowed by law. This restriction is not favourable for Egypt because its possibilities
for accusation are reduced. Ethiopia, in turn, can feel reassured as long as it is not
responsible for causing harm to the riparian states.
5. ANALYSIS
In the following chapter, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam project will be
examined through Global Governance and Conflict Theory perspectives, giving
attention to the historical and geopolitical background behind the governing of the Nile
water. In order to better comprehend the recently contested water management issue in
the Nile, and particularly between Ethiopia and Egypt, multiple aspects regarding
international law will be taken into consideration. In addition, relevant regional and
international actors’ standpoints will be examined. The chapter contains five
subsections, in which Ethiopia’s, Egypt’s, international law, regional actors’ and
international actors’ perspectives are taken into account.
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5.1. The GERD project from Ethiopia’s perspective
Ethiopia’s population of 90 million makes it the world’s most populous landlocked
country, according to the UN’s Human Development Index (Carlson 2013). The
country’s population is today growing at a higher speed than Egypt’s, making it a
pressing issue for Ethiopia to enhance their food production and expand their current
allowed water use of the Nile, which today is 0.65 percent (Ibrahim 2011), for
agricultural purposes (Paisley and Henshaw 2013). Due to Ethiopia’s poverty and lack
of infrastructure, it will not be able to meet its Millennium Development Goals if their
energy supplies are constrained. This means that Ethiopia cannot sustain the economic
growth necessary for poverty reduction (Consulate General of Ethiopia, Los Angeles
n.d.). Today, 83 percent of the Ethiopians have to rely on biomass fuel for cooking and
heating because there is a shortage of electricity in the country (Hammond 2013). The
consequences of biomass are environmental and health problems (ibid).
Ethiopia has often been named the “water- tower” of Africa (Hammond 2013), since 85
percent of the Nile River water originates in the country (Dixon 2010); thus, Ethiopia
has potential to create hydropower. Ethiopia announced to Egypt on July 19th 2010 of its
intention to build a dam (Whittington et al. 2014). Tegenu, the Minister of Water and
Energy of Ethiopia, states “our first priority is to supply power to our economy, our
industries, our investments, our domestic users. In this regard, the Renaissance Dam
will play a very big role in our development” (Council on Foreign Relations 2012, p. 5).
This statement is a clear indication that global governance is not Ethiopia’s main
concern, since their first priority is to develop their own nation instead of the region’s
needs. Since the Nile water can barely be used by the Ethiopian population, Egypt has
over the years been able to thrive on the Nile water. It can be argued from a Conflict
Theory point of view that the enhancement of Ethiopia’s development will change the
relations between Ethiopia and Egypt, as they are now competing for the same
resources. Egypt will feel threatened by the building of the dam because it might
jeopardise their influential position in both the Basin and internationally, and thus the
friendly relationship towards Ethiopia will change.
19
History has shown that dams have helped many countries overcome poverty, which is
what Ethiopia hopes the GERD will do for them (Carlson 2013); “its sheer size and cost
is daunting but it is a fitting symbol of the country’s ambitious five year Growth and
Transformation Plan which will provide Ethiopia with the momentum to move the
country forward into the ranks of middle-income states” (Desalegn 2011, n. pag), says
Ethiopia’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. The dam will generate enough
energy to power up New York City (ibid). However, the dam is only one step in
Ethiopia’s plan to develop its hydroelectric power capacity (Hammond 2013). The dam
is expected to cost US$ five billion dollars (Consulate General of Ethiopia, Los Angeles
n.d.) and is set to be ready in July 2017 (Carlson 2013). Yet, as of 2014 the dam is only
1/4 complete (Maasho 2014).
Ethiopia already has an understanding with Kenya, Djibouti, and Sudan to sell the
dam’s surplus energy to them (Ventures Africa); thus, according to the Ethiopian
Minister of Foreign Affairs, the dam “also offers major advantages to the Nile Basin”
(Adhanom n.d., p. 5). Studies demonstrated that economic growth can increase
proportional to the increase in energy sustenance (Ventures Africa 2014). It is estimated
that when the dam starts its function, the domestic economy will raise by a
supplementary four percent (ibid). However, by selling the surplus energy to other
countries, not only would it boost Ethiopia’s economy, it would also develop a more
balanced trade relations with the outside world and, in return, it would spread Ethiopia’s
diplomatic influence, both regionally and internationally (Verhoeven 2013). At an
initial glance it can be argued that global governance is important to Ethiopia, as they
are planning to help their neighbour countries develop by selling them cheap surplus
energy. However, in the long-term this will strengthen Ethiopia’s economy, and thus its
status; therefore, it can be seen that building the dam is more a selfish act of Ethiopia
than trying to help the other countries. Hence, from a Conflict Theory point of view, it
can be argued that in the case of the dam, cooperation between Ethiopia and its
neighbour countries is solely happening because Ethiopia wants to increase its own
influence in the region.
During the launch of the GERD, the late Prime Minister of Ethiopia stated:
“the necessary climate for engagement, based on equitable and constructive
self-interest, does not exist at the moment. Indeed, the current disposition is to
make attempts to undercut Ethiopia’s efforts to secure funding to cover the cost
20
of the project. We have, in fact, been forced to rely on our own savings alone to
cover the expense” (Zenawi 2011, n. pag).
The Ethiopian Government has even made it possible for the civilians and Diaspora to
invest in the dam by selling them bonds (Consulate General of Ethiopia, Los Angeles
n.d.). Hence, the major problem of the dam at the moment is financing (Hammond
2013). Even though the World Bank has realised that “increased investment in
multipurpose water infrastructure would make Ethiopia more water-resilient, and
promote long-term economic growth” (Hammond 2013, p. 2), the World Bank and
other international donors have denied providing funding for the dam project
(Hammond 2013). The World Bank’s reason to refuse to support the project is because
they believe that Ethiopia will postpone other important infrastructure development
projects, since the GERD project will absorb ten percent of Ethiopia’s GDP (Carlson
2013).
During the speech of the launch, the late Prime Minister conveyed another important
message to the audience:
“The second message we want to send is that the intention to exercise our
rights to use our own rivers is in order to fight poverty in our own country. It
shows no malice to any of our neighbors. Among the concerns we factored in
when we made the decision to build the Nile Dam with our own resources,
was to avoid any negative consequences for our neighbors and indeed to offer
positive benefits for all of them. I would dare to say that nothing can provide a
better testimony of our deepest commitment to forge a lasting partnership
between all the Nile Basin riparian countries than the building of the
Millennium Dam” (Zenawi 2011, n. pag).
By saying that Ethiopia wants to be able to use their own Nile water, it can be argued
from a Conflict Theory point of view, that Ethiopia is sending a strong statement to
Egypt that they are challenging their status quo. The late Prime Minister also stated that
the main purpose of the dam is to eradicate poverty (ibid); by building the dam Ethiopia
has calculated that just the irrigation scheme would be able to help 15-20 million
Ethiopians (BBC News 2005). The Prime Minister continued with saying that “on this
occasion, therefore, we, the peoples of Ethiopia, call upon all the peoples of the Nile
Basin to turn over to a new page of cooperation and solidarity” (Zenawi 2011, n. pag). It
is a very good speech and it shows potential for increased regional governance, as
Ethiopia shows concerns and hopes for further cooperation with its neighbour countries.
21
Yet, it can be argued from a Conflict Theory point of view that the beginning of the
quote challenges the Basin’s status quo by not obeying the 1929 and 1959 agreement.
However, at the end of the quote there are positive signs that global governance can be
an option for creating sustainable water management in the region, as the decision to
build a dam was not to spite anyone, according to Ethiopia’s late Prime Minister, but to
offer positive benefits to all. As Ethiopia is a landlocked country, it recognises that it is
hard to develop independently, which is why it is imperative to engage the other
riparian states in this issue. Ethiopia’s hope for cooperation and peace in the region was
shown when the government in 2011 invited Egypt and Sudan to create an International
Panel of Experts (IPoE) (International Panel of Experts 2013). The GERD will
eventually be one of Africa’s largest hydroelectric plants, which can provide Africa
with huge beneficial development, but concerns have been raised of the possible
impacts of the dam, such as a decrease in the Nile water flow (Freitas 2013); therefore,
the IPoE’s task is to analyse the possible impacts of the dam (International Panel of
Experts 2013). The Minister of Water Affairs of the respective countries decided that
the IPoE would include two experts from each of the countries, and four experts with
expertise in firstly, dam engineering, secondly, water resources planning and
hydrological modelling, thirdly socioeconomics and lastly, environment (ibid). The
IPoE’s mandate is
“to review the design documents of the GERD and provide transparent
information sharing and to solicit understanding of the benefits and costs
accrued to the three countries and impact if any of the GERD on the two
downstream countries so as to build trust and confidence among all parties. The
role of the IPoE is mainly facilitative focused on promoting dialogue and
understanding around GERD-related issues of interest to the three countries and
thus contribute to regional confidence and trust building” (International Panel of
Experts 2013, p. 6).
Even though the report is 48 pages long, it was only a first effort to assess the
downstream impacts of the GERD (International Panel of Experts 2013). The IPoE
raised some concerns regarding the project, such as the structure of the dam, safety, and
engineering (Aman 2014); however, it was not feasible to assess all aspects, as Ethiopia
failed to provide the panel with some of the required documents (International Panel of
Experts 2013).
22
Initial findings from the panel are that the water supply in Egypt will not be affected by
the GERD fillings (ibid). The Aswan Dam in Egypt has a 70 billion cubic metres
strategic reserve to control annual floods and provide water irrigation (Abulezz 2013).
The strategic reserve will decrease by 15 billion cubic metres annually, ergo, after five
years, Egypt states that “there will be an electricity shortage and the strategic reserve
will be used up” (Abulezz 2013, n. pag). Which is why, Egypt has called for further
assessment of the impact from the dam (Abulezz 2013). Egypt’s decision to further
assess the dam is in agreement with the IPoE, as they stated that “the analysis presented
is very basic, and not yet at a level of detail, sophistication and reliability that would
befit a development of this magnitude, importance and with such regional impact”
(International Rivers 2014, n. pag).
It could be argued that this panel was created so Ethiopia could avoid any conflict,
especially with Egypt, but also with the neighbouring countries. It has also been debated
that when Egypt and Sudan built some of their dams they did not inform Ethiopia or
other countries of these constructions; hence, Ethiopia should not be required to disclose
any information about this project either. It should not be in Ethiopia’s interest to
engage in a conflict with Egypt, as it can rapidly evolve into a war; a war which could
be devastating for Ethiopia’s economy. The same goes for Egypt, with their domestic
instability, Egypt cannot afford both economically and socially, to be in a war.
However, Egypt should not even be thinking of going into war with Ethiopia, as the
IPoE’s preliminary findings show that no harm will be done to Egypt, thus the alleged
misplaced opposition should call for new thinking in Egypt. By Egypt not contesting the
dam, transboundary water governance could easier be achieved. This shows that global
governance has a hard time overcoming unforeseen obstacles. Nevertheless, it is
important to take Ethiopia’s decision into account, because global governance cannot be
achieved unless Ethiopia will use the dam to promote regional integration instead of
enhancing its own status regionally and internationally.
5.2. The GERD project from Egypt’s perspective
From ancient times the Nile and Egypt have been generally associated with one another;
the Nile has a huge impact on the rise of the ancient Egyptian civilisation (Debessai
23
2013). Still today, Egypt is highly dependent on the Nile water, and around 98 percent
of it originates from outside of their territory, which has led the country to claim to their
historical right to the management of the Nile Basin (ibid). Egypt, therefore, sees the
equitable utilisation of the river by all riparian countries as a threat to their water
security, since Egypt aims to remain a powerful nation in the region (ibid). From a
Conflict Theory point of view, Egypt will no longer stay in power if their resources are
decreasing. Due to the Egyptian power, one can call Egypt a hydro-hegemony. Hydrohegemony is a state that can determine the status quo in a basin by having more relative
power than other neighbouring countries (Allan and Mirumachi 2007). This power can
be shown in many different aspects, militarily, economically, size of the country or
value of territory (ibid). Egypt’s advantage to power lies in the fact that they received
international financial help for many years, which gave the country the possibility to
develop a strong economy and military (Parkes 2013). The fact that Egypt’s
neighbouring countries are in poverty has also been advantageous for Egypt, as it has
hindered the neighbouring countries from challenging Egypt’s status quo (Abawari
2011). Due to this power, Egypt has naturally evolved to the region’s leader (Parkes
2013). From a Conflict Theory point of view it can be argued that it is natural that
Egypt is considered the leader of the region, as they are in possession of most of the
resources, and hence providing them with power and status.
By stressing the fact that the Nile water is a “national security” issue and Egypt’s “prior
use” claim, Egypt has managed to contest any “equitable sharing” demands, and thus
been able to hang on to their hegemonic position, both in the Basin and with
international actors (Parkes 2013, p. 454). Conflict Theory would suggest that Egypt is
hanging on to the power they have acquired over the years by any means necessary.
Hence, the argument considering Egypt’s water security, and more precisely water
scarcity, can rather be seen as a political construct than just as an actual physical fact
(Tesfaye 2012 in Debessai 2013). This perception developed already during the British
colonial rule, and it is to be interpreted as a way to disperse the opportunity of setting up
impartial rights-based arrangement in the region (Debessai 2013). A hegemonic state is
counterproductive to Global Governance, since Global Governance believes in a
balance between nations, whereas a hegemonic state represents power.
According to Mohamed Morsi, the former Egyptian President, Egypt would normally
not have any issues with projects in the Nile Basin as long as “those projects do not
affect or damage Egypt’s legal and historical rights” (BBC News 2013, n. pag).
24
Nevertheless, since Ethiopia’s capital, Addis Ababa, admitted that the river will divert
slightly from its normal course, Egypt’s response towards the GERD was very negative
(ibid). Egypt’s biggest concern and belief is that the dam will decrease the flow of the
Nile by 20-30 percent (BBC News 2005), causing severe water shortage in the country
(McGrath 2014). Water shortage can, in turn, result in food reduction to the people,
which means that demonstrations might erupt in the Egyptian cities (Hussein 2014).
Egypt’s vulnerability to a decrease of the flow of the Nile has made that any change of
the Nile flow will be resisted by Egypt (Parkes 2013). The Egyptian Government has
even used their international influence in the past to block donors from supporting
upstream projects (ibid). It even reached the point where Egypt is willing to use their
military force to stop events where the Nile flow can be jeopardised (Haftendorn 2000).
In the current dispute of the dam, WikiLeaks released emails last year where it clearly
states that Egypt is planning to engage in a military attack with the help of Sudan
(Maasho 2014). Once again, Conflict Theory would describe this as Egypt suppressing
its neighbouring countries, because they are desperate to remain the most powerful actor
in the region. Sudan has always been Egypt’s ally on issues relating to the Nile water,
but in 2012 they decided to support the GERD project, which initially they did not do
(McGrath 2014). In this scenario Karl Marx would argue that Egypt is the bourgeoisie
and the other riparian states are the proletariats. By blocking the riparian states’ dam
projects, the countries’ national developments have been jeopardised, and thus it can be
argued from a Conflict Theory point of view that Egypt suppresses the downstream
countries to hang on to their own regional power and status.
Even though (now former) President Morsi made a statement saying “if our share of
Nile water decreases, our blood will be the alternative” (El-Behairy b. 2013, n. pag),
Egypt is trying to tackle this issue with diplomatic measures (Ahram Online 2014). The
fact that Egypt is issuing a statement that can be interpreted as an act of war, but yet
they maintain that they are trying to solve the problem with diplomatic measures, is
very counterproductive. However, one must keep in mind the political turmoil Egypt is
facing at the moment, and that the statement from Egypt was maybe solely made to
calm a nervous and unpredictable population from acting out on their government; the
transboundary water issue has possibly become political opportunism for the Egyptian
Government. But as mentioned, it is counterproductive because Ethiopia does not know
if Egypt’s statement is simply a strategy or not, which means that Ethiopia will increase
their security and possibly military. In turn, Egypt will see this as an act of war, which
25
will cause a downward spiral into the security dilemma. As Security Dilemma it is a
theory of its own, and neither Conflict Theory nor Global Governance can directly be
applied; however, Conflict Theory and Security Dilemma have similar attributes, as
both are attracted to power.
According to Egypt’s Prime Minister, the dispute needs to be handled with a “balance
of interests” (Ahram Online 2014, n. pag). Even though “there is no zero-sum game in a
vital issue like the Nile River water” according to Egypt (Kuwait News Agency 2014, n.
pag), they have a tendency to behave, as there was a zero-sum game in place. As Egypt
has occupied most of the Nile water and refused to decrease their share, it is a clear
indication that Egypt believes that there is not enough water for all riparian states.
Hence, a zero-sum game exists in the Basin, at least from Egypt’s point of view.
Despite hoping for a diplomatic solution, Egypt has not ruled out hard power yet
(United Press International 2014). Since Egypt’s main focus at the moment lies with the
domestic political turmoil and how to restore stability and avoid a growing Islamist
insurgency in Egypt, they will continue to try negotiating (ibid). Unfortunately, Ethiopia
has not shown any interest to engage in any serious negotiations concerning the GERD
dispute (Kuwait News Agency 2014). From a Global Governance Theory point of view,
it seems that Ethiopia is not willing to engage in dialogue with Egypt, and thus there
might be limited options of reaching mutual water governance in the Nile Basin. Due to
Egypt’s weakening position, they can no longer “stage a ground attack of the dam”
(Hussein 2014, n. pag), but an airstrike would still be possible, yet filled with various
risks (Hussein 2014). However, at the moment both Ethiopia and Egypt are very
vulnerable; Egypt is facing both domestic and regional turmoil and Ethiopia is taking a
huge economic risk with the GERD project. This means that neither country can go to
war, especially since the outcome of the war is highly uncertain (ibid).
To this day, Egypt’s population only lives on five percent of the country because the
rest is only desert, causing it to be very populous in the cities (BBC News 2005). The
Egyptian Government states that 40 percent of the Egyptians are farmers and if the
Nile’s flow will decrease, they will lose their jobs and future opportunities making
people move into the cities or urban centres instead; “we want to relieve these major
cities and urban centres from this heavy population density” (BBC News 2005, n. pag).
Due to the country’s high dependence on the Nile water and Egypt’s fear of their share
decreasing, Egypt has offered to help with the financing of the GERD, but Ethiopia
states that “the price is worth paying to guarantee Egypt has no veto over the dam”
26
(Maasho 2014, n. pag). This can be contradicted by a statement made by the late
Ethiopian Prime Minister, saying that he urges both Sudan and Egypt to pay
respectively 30 and 20 percent of the project’s costs (Zenawi 2011). The contradiction
can be depicted as Ethiopia wanting to gain the international community’s attention and
pity. Since IO’s are not financing the project, this might have been a way for Ethiopia to
receive more support in financial assistance in form of the purchase of national bonds;
thus, one step closer to increase their status in the region. However, the statement made
by Ethiopia not wanting Egypt to have veto over the dam, shows that transboundary
water governance is not in the forefront of Ethiopia’s mind. By not letting Egypt
contribute to the cost of the dam, Ethiopia is excluding Egypt of any decision-making,
hence having Egypt’s fate in their hands.
Even though Egypt has faced challenges over the years, they maintain a strong position
in the region (Sinnona 2011). Due to Ethiopia’s geographical location, it is the best
country to challenge Egypt, since the water gives them “bargaining power to
counterbalance its weakness” (Sinnona 2011, p. 6). With the upcoming dam, Ethiopia
would “physically control the Blue Nile Gorge” (Carlson 2013, p. 3), which is the most
influential source of the Nile water (Parkes 2013). According to Conflict Theory, this
shows that status quo in the Nile Basin is challenged. Targeting the Nile water is the
best way of decreasing Egypt’s status due to their dependence on the river. The
potential benefit Ethiopia will gain from the dam will increase their status, which in the
long-term can threaten Egypt’s long lasting status as the region’s leader. The GERD
issue will decrease Egypt’s bargaining power in the region and help gain ground for
further potential cooperation among other actors in the Nile. In the long run, it will be
most beneficial for Egypt if they establish a partnership with the upstream countries
(Hefny and El-Din Amer 2005). This change in power relations can be seen as an
opportunity to build a framework for a new regime of transboundary water governance.
Nevertheless, due to the ideological clashes related to the dam project, there would be a
need to develop rather internationally accurate regulations that could help establish
legal-based and mutually binding solutions to the governing of water resources between
Ethiopia and Egypt, and other riparian countries in the Nile Basin. Due to the Basin’s
current economic and political instability, it has changed the riparian nations’ awareness
of Egypt and their power (Parkes 2013). The instability has given the other nations
optimistic views that the status quo can be changed (ibid). The shifting in balance of
power will have repercussions for the continued usage of the Nile water and have an
27
impact on Egypt’s dominance (ibid). According to Conflict Theory, the change in this
social order is due to competition between the two groups, the bourgeoisie – Egypt, and
the proletariat – the other riparian states.
5.3. The GERD project from an International Law perspective
Over the years, the Nile Basin had to endure many water related conflicts, yet no proper
law has been enforced (Brunnée 2008). The failure of creating a water law in the Nile
Basin has mainly been due to a “misplaced faith in formal rules and hard entitlements”
(Brunnée 2008, p. 361). One of the steps towards a partnership in the region has been
the NBI, which aims to fight poverty and strengthen economic development in the Nile
by promoting benefit-shares on common water resources (UN Water for Life Decade
n.d.). Regardless the seemingly promising perspective of this governance dialogue, its
real significance has stayed unclear (Dixon 2010). However, the NBI and other
commonly agreed initiatives reflect two important elements considering cooperation on
international water resources; firstly, they highlight the institutional need to evolve a
process of engagement, and secondly they form a basis for well-funded third-party
support trusted by all factions (ibid).
In 2010, a new deal was drafted called the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA).
This agreement was built solidly with the Limited Territorial Sovereignty Theory,
mentioned in the case study section, and contains the principles of the international
water law. Article 1 introduces the scope of the framework as reads:
“The present Framework applies to the use, development, protection,
conservation and management of the Nile River Basin and its resources and
establishes an institutional mechanism for cooperation among the Nile Basin
States.”
By agreeing to the CFA, countries in the Nile Basin would be allowed to work on
projects on the Nile without the consent of Egypt; it would thus replace the NBI. Article
2 explains the use of terms in the agreement; Article 2 (f) states:
28
“Water security” means the right of all Nile Basin States to reliable access to and
use of the Nile River system for health, agriculture, livelihoods, production and
environment.”
The utilisation of the term ‘all’ is a clear symbol of the independence of the river course
countries; each state can use the water for the satisfaction of their needs.
However, at the moment only six countries, Ethiopia, Uganda, Rwanda, Tanzania,
Kenya and Burundi (State Information Service n.d.), have ratified the document; hence,
it is not valid. Opposition comes mainly from Egypt and Sudan (Freitas 2013), as they
believe that the CFA overlooks their water supply needs (Abulezz 2013). Furthermore,
here we encounter again the resistance of Egypt in regards to the qualification
‘significant’. The object of the disagreement was the Article 14 (b) of the CFA, which
stated: “not to significantly affect the water security of any other Nile Basin State”.
Only Egypt and Sudan rejected the original text and proposed the following version:
“not to adversely affect the water security and current uses and rights of any other Nile
Basin State.” This can again suggest that Egypt would like to keep their options of
criticising Ethiopia as open as possible; a significant harm is more difficult to cause
than an adversely act; hence, Conflict Theory is best applied here. However, the most
important factor is the inclusion of the phrase ‘current uses and rights’. This can mean
that Egypt wishes that all riparian states recognise their current hegemonic position.
According to Ibrahim (2011), Doctor of Science of Law candidate, the CFA will not
serve its purpose as long as Egypt claims their historic rights.
Article 7 of the UN Convention on Non-Navigational Watercourses states:
”Watercourse States shall, in utilizing an international watercourse in their
territories, take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant
harm to other watercourse States.”
At the moment, the only legal framework for transboundary water conflicts is this UN
Convention (Kasimbazi n.d.); although it has only been ratified by 16 countries (Hall
and Rogers 2003), Egypt states that the construction of the GERD violates this article
(Maasho 2014). Egypt is referring to the general rules in international law that oversees
international water; the rules state that “a riparian provides other riparians with advance
notice of uses or changes in existing uses with risk of significant harm” (Paisley and
Henshaw 2013, p. 8). The rule also states that before future changes can happen, the
states need to consult with each other, as well as various technical information needs to
29
be provided. These are laws both Ethiopia and Egypt agreed to follow (Paisley and
Henshaw 2013). The fact that Ethiopia and Egypt have found common ground before is
a positive indication that transboundary water governance could be formed in the future.
In terms of preventing significant harm to other states, both Ethiopia and Egypt make
strong arguments. Hence, the best way to solve this dispute diplomatically is to take the
issue to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), or as Egypt suggested, to the UN
Security Council (Hussein 2014). From a Global Governance Theory point a view, a
multilateral cooperation would be beneficial when addressing the dam issue. In this case
both the ICJ and the UN can function not only as a global authority, but also as an
arbitrary between the two countries. Another advantage is that the ruling of the ICJ
resides under international law forcing the two countries to adhere to it. However, a
ruling from the UN Security Council would only be beneficial from a Global
Governance perspective, as the Conflict Theory does not believe in multilateral
institutions.
The treaties from 1929 and 1959 ban the other riparian nations to decrease Egypt’s
annual water amount without their consent (Gathanju 2006). Article ‘Fifth’ (2) first
paragraph of the 1959 treaty between Egypt and Sudan states:
“As the riparian states, other than the two Republics, claim a share in the Nile
waters, the two Republics have agreed that they shall jointly consider and reach
one unified view regarding the said claims.”
This means that if any of the other riparian countries would like to use the Nile water,
they would have to ask permission from Egypt and Sudan. This disposition reflects the
Absolute Territorial Integrity Theory, mentioned in the case study section, with the
distinction that upstream nations do not seem to have any rights over the share of the
water. This authority makes any of Egypt’s opposition understandable; it does not want
to lose such power. From a Conflict Theory point of view, by building the dam,
Ethiopia’s status regionally and internationally will most likely increase, threatening
Egypt’s current dominant position. This competition for the same resources will have a
social change in the Nile Basin. In fact, Egypt would consider the competition for the
same resource, the Nile water, as “an act of war” (Gathanju 2006, p. 30). However, as
these treaties were signed during the colonial area (Gathanju 2006), they are being
contested, as they should be viewed as no longer valid (Kasimbazi n.d.). Nevertheless,
the Vienna Convention states that “countries that won independence through succession
inherit treaties and agreements entered into by their colonial masters” (Gathanju 2006,
30
p. 31); therefore, the treaties should technically still be valid to this day. Yet, the
dominant view in the Nile Basin is that transboundary waters should be evenly shared
between all the riparian states (Negash et al. 2014).
From the international law point of view, this kind of water security discourse has no
legal grounds (ibid), and it should not be used as means to hinder more equitable,
cooperative and benefit-sharing approaches from emerging. However, Conflict Theory
would argue that the geopolitical and power-centric approach seems also to be one of
the dominant reasons for Egypt’s highly adverse position towards the construction of
the GERD.
As mentioned previously, Egypt believes that Ethiopia is not adhering to the treaties or
the international laws, which is why Cairo has set up a “high-level ministerial
committee” that includes three international law experts (Al-Awsat 2014, n. pag). The
experts’ task is to establish Egypt’s legal rights to the Nile water and the possibility of
obtaining international arbitration (ibid). However, it can be considered ironic that
Egypt expects Ethiopia to adhere to international law since Egypt did not respect it
when building the Aswan High Dam in the 1960s (Al Jazeera 2014).
5.4. The GERD project from regional actors’ perspective
The Nile has always been a regional issue; the GERD is no exception. Agreements and
treaties from colonial times have shaped the hydropolitics in the Basin for decades, but
the regional situation is about to change. It is therefore vital to examine the standpoints
of the most influential player in Africa, the African Union (AU), and the third most
influential player in the GERD dispute, Sudan, in order to get a clear overview of the
current situation, by adding the perspectives of these regional actors to the analysis of
the current situation.
The intergovernmental organisation, the African Union, has been very quiet when it
comes to behaviours of military rulers of Egypt, but also on the Nile River system, due
to conflicts. However, they have now begun to recognise the issues and disputes
concerning the Nile River systems. The AU has placed Ethiopia’s and the other
upstream riparian countries’ possible rights to rightfully share the waters of the Nile on
the African agenda.
31
The Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union, Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini
Zuma, has noted with some concern the tension between Ethiopia and Egypt on the Nile
water issue. Zuma evokes the principles protected in the Constitutive Act of the African
Union (CAAU), which states “peaceful resolution of conflicts among Member States of
the African Union through such appropriate means” (Constitutive Act of the African
Union 2000, p. 5), and “prohibition of the use of force or threat to use force among
Member States of the Union” (Constitutive Act of the African Union 2000, p. 7).
Egypt’s plan or threat to use its military force to stop any changes regarding the flow of
the Nile is against these two principles, and Ethiopia will have the right to ask the AU to
intervene to restore peace. Another principle worth taking a look at is that “Member
States are committed to uphold the spirit of cooperation, dialogue and good
neighbourliness and to settle disputes exclusively through peaceful means”
(Constitutive Act of the African Union 2000, p. 7). Zuma has faith in the three countries
to cooperate and to resolve the issue and agree on a transboundary water management
agreement. In line with this, she expressed the willingness of the AU Commission to
provide proper assistance to foster mutual understanding and cooperation (El-Behairy a.
2013). Global Governance would argue that this sort of creation of global networks
would increase mutual interdependence between countries, and hence would help build
a proper management strategy. Since the AU relies on the CAAU, the AU does not
seem to be interested in involving itself more in the disputes or in the potential conflict.
They are willing to offer any support Ethiopia and Egypt might need, but it does not
seem that the AU will actively take any part in the disputes or include themselves more
than they have to, at least not at this point. From a Global Governance point of view, the
fact that AU is not getting involved is contradictory, as their role is to build bridges
between the countries in Africa, but they have yet not shown sufficient interest towards
the GERD issue and the potential conflict that may arise.
The Conflict Theory points out that the AU is not trying to challenge the status quo, but
believe that it should be up to the countries to find a solution in a peaceful manner.
However, since it seems that Egypt is prepared to launch an attack, the AU cannot sit
back and let a potential conflict occur. Since the theory focuses on the conflicting,
negative and ever-changing nature of society, and it believes that hostility and
resentment are constant factors of society, the AU should be interested in changing the
outcome of this project into something positive, since they are concerned with achieving
“greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the peoples of Africa”
32
(Constitutive Act of the African Union 2000, p. 5) and “peaceful co-existence of
Member States and their right to live in peace and security” (Constitutive Act of the
African Union 2000, p. 7).
Even though Global Governance Theory recognises that disputes can be resolved
without government interference, they also acknowledge that the dispute between
Ethiopia and Egypt will be hard to resolve without some sort of governing or
institutional interference. Transboundary river basins have generally been governed by
power politics, but this does not seem to work in this specific situation due to Egypt’s
strong resentment towards the dam. The AU could be more present, because it is a nonstate actor, but as an intergovernmental organisation it should govern, to some part, the
transnational collective affairs. They should be more influential in state politics and
behaviour. So it could be argued that the AU should be much more involved in this
dispute and also in the project to make sure that mutual regulations and agreements are
being respected, and finally to avoid any outbreak of conflict.
The other regional actor we will take a closer look at in this section is Sudan. In the
beginning Sudan strongly protested against the construction of the Grand Ethiopian
Renaissance Dam and the reasons were that it could cause grave damage as well as cut
down the quantities of the water from the Nile (Negash et al. 2014). Sudan allocated a
great part of the Nile water and its rights to themselves with the treaty of 1959. With the
construction of the dam Sudan is afraid that the water flow to Sudan and Egypt will be
reduced, at least for a few years until the dam’s reservoirs are filled up. This means that
the country will suffer when it comes to their water resources, which will eventually
have an impact on the people and their livelihood. The wild life along the Nile will also
be affected, due to the loss of fertile silt carried by water and the feared erosion of the
Nile River.
Despite the previous protest, Sudan does now support the construction of the dam; they
acknowledged that the dam serves in their interests, according to Harry Verhoeven
(2013), who teaches African politics at the University of Oxford. Sudan realises that it
will be able to import the cheap energy it desperately needs, which is vital for their
development (Schwartzstein 2013). When Sudan was against the dam construction they
were not necessarily trying to challenge the status quo, just maintain it. They relied on
the treaty from 1959, saying that they control a certain amount of the Nile River.
However, they were trying to stop Ethiopia from doing any major changes to the region
33
and the Nile. Egypt was the main power behind the power struggle, but Sudan played a
part in the competition to acquire more power, or at least keep the power they had
achieved. But since they changed to Ethiopia’s ‘side’, it could be argued that they are no
longer a part of this power relation competition. They realise that they might have some
water shortage in the short-term, but the dam will benefit them in the long-term. They
will have to look beyond here and now, and look further down the road and realise what
will be best for the country. In the long-term, a sustainable water management will be
most beneficial for Sudan, which will be most easily achieved through creating
transboundary water governance within the region. Global Governance Theory would
suggest that by applying a multilevel cooperation it can further help Sudan’s
socioeconomic development, but Conflict Theory, in turn, would argue that it would
help Sudan maintain their current strong position in the Nile Basin, without the help of
Egypt; hence, on their own terms.
5.5. The GERD project from international actors’ perspective
Water governance in the Nile and debates surrounding this controversial issue are not
only national or regional in nature, but also entail an international aspect. International
treaties and conventions impact the outcome of the issue, and also various international
actors, such as the World Bank, IMF and UN have an important background role
considering the ongoing discourse on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Project.
Thus, these actors and their position related to the dam need to be taken into
consideration in order to better comprehend the diverse elements that are involved in the
project.
When looking at above-mentioned international organisations, it can be noted that they
have not shown much interest in supporting the construction of the GERD. The
apparent absence of their contribution to the project can be interpreted in many ways,
but one of the most plausible motives for it seems to be the potential conflict that may
arise in the region – and more precisely, the unwillingness of international actors to get
involved in this highly political internal procedure. Another reason for the international
organisations’ hesitation might be because a study made by the World Bank unravelled
that the price of hydrological instability is over a third of Ethiopia’s annual GDP
34
(Hammond 2013). Nevertheless, it is believed that a raised investment in a water
framework, which could be used for various purposes, such as hydropower production
facilities, storage capacities, irrigation system, would eventually bring a stable
economic growth (ibid). However, since the dam would principally be utilised for
electrical power generation, the World Bank has argued that this might be a
disadvantageous option (ibid). Although the World Bank has previously financed
hydroelectric ventures (Schwartzstein 2013), it and other international donors have now
consequently denied the sponsorship of the project (Hammond 2013), as these projects
seem to have political inclinations (Alemu 2013).
From a Global Governance point of view, this kind of passive behaviour of the
international actors does not necessarily progress the forming of transnational
governance in the region, as multilevel interdependency and activity are needed in order
to create a more sustainable form of water management. The role of international actors
in the global system, particularly the World Bank, can hence be criticised of not being
sufficiently involved in the governing process of the Nile water. Conflict Theory, in
turn, seems to be able to better depict the actual situation in the Nile, as the high risk of
conflict between the two nations, Ethiopia and Egypt, tends to affect potential funding
partners’ behaviour and decrease their financial support tremendously. In addition,
lacking international support and surveillance will probably create more tensions
between the two countries, as no higher authority is addressed.
The IMF has shown a quite similar position in the dam project as the World Bank, by
being relatively prudent in their opinions. In 2012 (Davison), an article stated that the
IMF, although this statement was contested by the organisation, pressured Ethiopia to
decelerate the construction of the dam in order to prevent the consumption of all their
resources. However, Ethiopia’s government stated that they have full confidence in the
project, as it has been well-planned (Davison 2012). Shortly after the appearance of the
article where the county director was misunderstood, another one emerged in which he
once again stated: “I did not urge the Ethiopian government to slow down
implementation of any particular project - this is entirely a decision to be made by
Ethiopian authorities” (Ethiopia Investor 2012, n. pag). In addition, he declared that the
IMF does not have the necessary competence to decide the fate of specific projects,
including the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (ibid). The IMF simply stated the
importance of economic growth and infrastructure investment being in accordance with
macroeconomic stability (ibid).
35
The standpoint of the IMF in the GERD issue can be seen as a clear indication of many
international donors prudent position in the discourse on water management in the Nile.
As the IMF is mainly funded by western countries, it can hence be depicted that it is not
in their interest to interfere with the dam dispute, since it is to be seen primarily as a
complex domestic policy issue. From a Global Governance perspective, this kind of
passive behaviour is however contradictory and even harmful, since further engagement
of significant international actors would probably lead to major multilevel cooperation
and could gradually help create commonly agreed regulations for transboundary water
governance in the region. International organisations’ presence and activity could give
also an external pressure that could speed up the solving of the contested dam building
process. Thus, it can be argued that more international actors, both public and private,
should be actively involved in the issue, as this could eventually strengthen the
interdependence between diverse parties and form a consultative and legitimate basis
for sustainable problem-solving procedures.
The UN has an important role in regards to conventions and treaties concerning
international watercourses, but they have not generally taken an arbitrary position in
water disputes in the Nile. However, in June 2013, UN secretary-General Ban-Ki Moon
personally demanded Ethiopian Prime Minister Desalegn and (now former) Egyptian
President Morsi to begin negotiations to resolve differences on the contested dam
project (Ahram Online 2013). This could be seen as a subtle indication of the UN’s
willingness to address its concern on the disputed situation in the Nile. From a Global
Governance point of view the UN, and particularly the UN Security Council, could
function as a transnational arbitrary in the issue due to their legitimate position in the
world system. Ban-Ki Moon’s gesture hence indicates that the UN might see it
necessary to interfere in the dam dispute at certain point, if no solutions are to be found
mutually between Ethiopia and Egypt.
6. DISCUSSION
There are usually two sides to a story, but in the case of the GERD dispute there are
several ways to approach this issue. It is hard to understand the dispute without an indepth understanding of the position of the involved actors. It might sound egocentric
36
that Egypt is disputing this dam, but the Nile is more or less the sole water provider for
Egypt, and hence from this perspective it makes sense that the Egyptian Government is
worried about the outcome of the dam. Yet, from Ethiopia’s point of view it is equally
as logical that they would like to build this dam, as it would greatly benefit the country;
they will no longer be dependent on importing energy and their national economy will
improve.
It is understandable that the dam project has spiralled into a complicated international
law issue due to the many and contradicting international theories and laws. When it
comes to a complex issue, such as transboundary water, there needs to be clear water
laws. Today, there are too many doctrines and theories which make it easy to find
loopholes, which give countries like Egypt an opportunity to accuse countries like
Ethiopia for breaching the international law.
As mentioned in the Case Study chapter, the first theory ever applied was the Absolute
Territorial Sovereignty Theory. Specific to this doctrine is that it does not take into
account the interests of the riparian states, but only the significance to the first user of
the water resources, regardless of its position. Taking the essence of this theory into
account, it can be argued that the application of this theory could be the most obvious
for Egypt. However, the present legal views and moral concepts, including Ethiopia’s
and Egypt’s, support the mutual benefit as the main regulation, which is opposed to the
Theory of Absolute Territorial Sovereignty (Alebachew 2011). As the mutual benefit
constitutes the foundation of cooperation between the actors, there should be the
possibility to avoid major conflicts. The second theory, called the Absolute Territorial
Integrity, gives the right to the countries to expect that the same volume of water flows
uninterruptedly to their territory, which provides the actors more possibilities to
disagree. It can be depicted that while Ethiopia is trying to boost their economy by
introducing the GERD project, it gives Egypt a chance, de jure, to accuse Ethiopia for
interrupting the natural course of the flow. In this case, none of the actors will benefit;
Ethiopia could not exercise their rights without having a disagreement with Egypt, and
Egypt would be in constant standby to claim their rights. The application of this theory
would not be appropriate to Ethiopia, since it is the main contributor of the Nile from
among the upstream states (ibid); this theory would traverse their possibilities to build
the dam. The third theory, labelled Limited Territorial Sovereignty, which admits the
rights of both upper and lower countries, is the only theory that has been widely
accepted and paved the ground for the modern international water law (Rahaman 2009).
37
The application of this theory gives the right to Ethiopia to build the dam without
causing significant harm to Egypt, and in return, gives Egypt the right to complain if
their rights are significantly violated. The fact that this theory laid the foundation for the
modern international water law shows that law is improving and no longer is concerned
with historical rights.
A possible solution for achieving a more balanced legal situation could be to change the
laws. The treaties could be repealed and new agreements could be signed. By aspiring to
achieve water equality, instead of focusing on power, maybe problems related to water
inequality could be reduced. But, as long as power is a main element in conflict
situations, the equality will be hard to achieve. Changing and adapting the laws would
also be important in the interest of maintaining the order in the Basin; riparian states
could also, in virtue of the Ethiopia’s actions, violate the international laws and
agreements. Another reason for updating the laws in the Basin is that currently there is
no agreement whether the treaties should adhere to the Vienna Convention or not, hence
Egypt will always claim that they have historic and natural rights to the Nile, and
therefore the status quo will most likely never change. Transboundary conflicts will
only become more common due to the global warming; therefore, the law needs to
follow this phenomenon. It is not necessary that all countries in the world follow the
same transboundary water laws; nevertheless, it is important that countries that are
dependent on the same water, agree to follow the same laws. Otherwise, accusations
about breaching international law will keep on appearing.
It can be argued that the dam issue is not only based on the fact that Egypt is dependent
on the river for their survival, but also Egypt’s hegemonic powers are dependent on the
Nile water. By having the majority share of the Nile water, Egypt has had the chance to
thrive due to it. If the Nile’s flow will decrease Egypt will suffer, and thus their image
and status in the region will be impacted. Ergo, Egypt’s firm stand on the dam project
might not only be based on survival, but also a political unwillingness to lose their
image and status.
The GERD has the possibility to affect Egypt’s power, but even though Egypt is at the
moment experiencing domestic political turmoil, they are still maintaining a strong
position. Assessing the dam problem from the Egyptian nation’s point of view, it can be
argued that the political turmoil in Egypt is today intertwined with the Nile water,
although it initially was not. Egypt finds itself in a delicate situation, because the
38
citizens are currently very sensitive to controversial issues. Uncertainty is a powerful
emotion, and thus can be harmful. When citizens do not know what will happen, they
could get worried, which could transfer into anger and demonstrations. As a result, two
hypotheses can be imagined; firstly, the Egyptian Government remains passive and does
not respond to the dam issue, secondly, Egypt reacts too strong. In the first assumption,
the passivity of Egypt could easily create indignation among the population. They could
argue that their government reacts insufficiently in order to protect their livelihood, and
this could lead to revolution once again. The second presumption is, again,
unfavourable to the nation, as it would generate war. In both cases, the population’s
confidence in the Egyptian Government would deflect, which is disadvantageous to the
political system. Hence, Egypt is now backed into a corner where if the Egyptian
Government does not respond to the dam issue accordingly, negative consequences
might follow. A conflict, either domestically or with Ethiopia respectively Egypt, would
be devastating to both countries because of the national instability.
The GERD could be risky towards Ethiopia’s economy. If the dam were to fail it would
have grave consequences for their national economy, but as mentioned in the analysis,
the Ethiopian Government has confidence in this project. However, a statement made by
International Rivers confirms the riskiness of this project,
“our experience studying mega-dams in Africa reveals these projects have
consistently failed to reduce poverty, and have been a costly and ineffective
solution for increasing access for the millions of people on the continent
without reliable access to electricity” (Pottinger 2014, n. pag).
From a Conflict Theory point of view, it would be beneficial for Egypt if the dam failed
because Ethiopia is currently the sole challenger to Egypt and their hegemonic power,
besides Sudan, and this would no longer be the case if Ethiopia’s GERD project would
fail.
Ethiopia is today the world’s most populous landlocked country, and thus somewhat
dependent on its neighbouring countries. A landlocked country without exit to the open
sea is vulnerable from an economical point of view due to the lack of infrastructure. In a
military conflict, a border closed and airspace blocked country left without supplies
would rapidly be defeated. In a case of a country with a warlike past like Ethiopia, a
military conflict could damage their slowly growing economy. Therefore, Ethiopia
should concentrate on promoting global governance, instead of putting energy towards
39
this conflict. However, it is understandable that Ethiopia wants to defend their decision
of building the dam, but global governance would serve Ethiopia’s interest the best. If
the neighbouring countries were to engage with transboundary water governance, it
would promote peace in the region, as well as help Ethiopia contest the Egyptian
accusations, which, in turn, would help the development of the riparian states. For every
one percent Ethiopia’s national economy improves, the neighbouring countries
economy will improve by 0.4 percent (Collier 2007). As studies predict, Ethiopia’s
economy will increase by four percent if the dam succeeds, and the neighbour countries’
economy will each improve by 1.6 percent (ibid). Therefore, they should help Ethiopia
against the statements from Egypt, since economic growth obviously has a spillover
effect (ibid).
It can be argued that Ethiopia does not need the dam to be able to challenge Egypt’s
hegemonic power. Over the years, Ethiopia’s economy has slowly improved, and their
goal is to be a middle-income country by 2025. Today, Egypt is considered to be a
lower middle-income country by the World Bank (World Bank 2012). If Egypt’s status
does not change as a result of the political instability they are currently facing, Ethiopia
would have the necessary tools to challenge Egypt’s status quo. The dam will only help
Ethiopia reach their goal quicker, unless the dam fails, which would then set Ethiopia’s
economy back.
History in the Basin has shown that Nile projects that have been planned in the past
have been blocked by Egypt, but it can be argued that this conflict will be a steppingstone for future similar projects. Currently, it looks like Ethiopia will continue with the
dam no matter what Egypt says. The fact that Ethiopia is ignoring Egypt’s statements on
violating international law might give other countries, both in the Basin and globally,
the motivation to do the same. If the other riparian states start planning Nile projects as
well, Egypt’s hydro-hegemony will most likely seize to exist. However, from Ethiopia’s
perspective, future Nile projects might not be in Ethiopia’s favour, as they are hoping to
become a strong nation; thus, they would have to compete with more states.
When analysing regional and international actors, there seems to be a tendency that they
are not sufficiently involved in the solving of the GERD dispute. As noted in the
analysis, the lack of interest particularly among international actors has led Ethiopia and
Egypt into a situation where no real dialogue or arbitrary means can be reached without
tension. In the following, the similarities and differences between the regional actors,
40
the AU and Sudan, and international actors, the World Bank, IMF and UN, will be
examined and discussed. Furthermore, with the exception of Sudan, it will be discussed
that all the other external actors could be potential legitimate authorities and help solve
the controversial dam dispute, as they are intergovernmental organisations. Thus,
despite the fact that Conflict Theory tends to be more explanatory with the current
situation, we will argue that Global Governance Theory could be a long-term solution
for solving the GERD issue in the Nile. Due to the complexity and conflictual nature of
the project, wider transboundary water governance should be established in the region
in order to avoid potential warlike water conflicts.
As mentioned, the AU is an intergovernmental organisation and the main player within
the African continent. Every African country has the opportunity to become a member,
and hence has, to some degree, influence in the region. Since the AU is the regional
authority, it would be the most reasonable that it was them that would interfere in the
dispute between Ethiopia and Egypt. However, so far they have only expressed
willingness to offer assistance to help foster mutual understanding and cooperation, and
in the end establish common ground to enable the parties to achieve an agreement.
Nevertheless, the AU might have better ground of interference in regional issues than
the other mentioned international actors, due to the fact that they have a better
understanding of the region and its countries. Since the NBI is also a regional
intergovernmental partnership that promotes cooperation and regional peace and
security, the AU could become a vital actor in further developing the regions’
socioeconomic benefits.
It could be argued that the UN is also an intergovernmental organisation, but they are
more powerful on the global stage than the AU, as they interfere in controversial issues
and conflicts all over the world. They are much more influential than any regional
organisations. However, both organisations are interested in maintaining peace and
security both regionally and globally. Despite of the UN’s role as a main global actor,
they have not shown much initiative in creating dialogue between Ethiopia and Egypt,
and thus they can be criticised for not having paid enough attention to the current issue
in the Nile. The passive role of the UN could be explained through to the fact that the
dispute is highly political in nature and no major human rights violations are present at
this stage. But, since the UN would be seen as a higher authority that has an important
role concerning treaties and conventions, they would be able to help foster long-term
governance in the region and to maintain the peace between the countries. Their role
41
could be to assist the AU with resources, knowledge and expertise, and even function as
a consultant between the parties. Nevertheless, due to geopolitical circumstances, the
AU might be in a better position to become the dominant mediating actor in the
conflictual GERD dispute.
As depicted, the main international financial organisations, the World Bank and IMF,
have also remained relatively passive on the debate in the Nile Basin. The significant
role of Western countries in funding both organisations has led to their minor interest in
the GERD project. It can be argued that they are not willing to interfere or involve
themselves in a debate that entails political inclinations. As the World Bank is an
institution that provides technical and financial assistance to developing countries, it
might consider Ethiopia’s economic situation to be too unstable and unpredictable in
order to support the construction of the dam in terms of sustainable development. The
IMF has more or less the same standpoint to the dam issue as the World Bank, and they
have not yet taken an active role in positioning themselves in regards to the dispute.
However, both institutions can be seen as potential contributors in the dam project, and
hence they could be capable of helping the development of Ethiopia and the
surrounding countries.
Compared to other above-mentioned actors Sudan is different, because they have
actually taken part in the dispute, and protested against the dam project. As they
changed sides they have been more silent about the situation. However, it can be
discussed that they might be interested in involving themselves in creating
transboundary water governance in the region. In terms of development, Sudan should
consider the long-term benefits, as this could change their position in the Nile region.
This would have a positive impact on Sudan’s independence, as they would be able to
maintain their strong position in the Basin, but without being Egypt’s ally. Hence, the
decisions made would solely be on their own terms.
Instead of causing an open conflict, the actual need for water sharing in the Nile area
can lead to unexpected cooperation, and thus can be handled in a diplomatic way. From
a Global Governance perspective, these cooperative means seem to be a more potential
way to go than a conflict. This argument can be reinforced by the UN’s perception (UN
Water for Life Decade n.d.), which depicts that only 37 acute and violent conflicts have
occurred in the last 50 years in comparison to the 150 treaties that have been signed
(ibid). International water treaties date back to ancient history (ibid); this is an
42
indication that nations seem to value these agreements, as they make international
relations over water issue not only more stable but also predictable. Hence, history
proves that cooperation is a more likely solution than a conflict.
The analysis indicates that Conflict Theory can be more descriptive when it comes to
explaining the GERD issue, since it recognises the current conflictual nature of the
situation between Ethiopia and Egypt. It can be argued that it is only natural that the
current events can be better explained with Conflict Theory, as we are dealing with a
dispute, which might turn into a conflict. Nevertheless, Conflict Theory does not
provide any long-term solutions or try to solve the issue, whereas Global Governance
Theory would provide a more sustainable approach to future development in relation to
the construction of the dam. In spite of the benefits of global water governance, certain
circumstances need to be taken into consideration before it can be successfully created
in the region. Thus, it is important to have more transparent, responsive and accessible
interaction between diverse actors, such as media, NGOs, local authorities and
international institutions (Gupta 2013). This kind of more cooperative behaviour would
have
“triple dividends because it creates partnerships, provides legitimacy to social
instruments in water management, and improves capacity and ownership. The
global community needs to exploit the new communicative tools and social
networks for public discussion and debate.” (Gupta 2013, p. 4).
As the quote suggests, there needs to be stronger cooperation as well as more public
awareness and interfacing in order to form a solid foundation for water management in
the Nile region, and also in other locations with similar warlike water issues. It is clear
that in the case of the GERD, no easy solutions to water governance are to be found, as
the countries’ backgrounds and geopolitical positions vary tremendously. Since the
international actors have not shown interest in the dam issue, there seems to be a gap
within methods of governance. However, the AU and the other international actors
would have the competence for filling this gap, and thus successfully help establish
transboundary water governance between Ethiopia and Egypt, and other riparian nations
alike.
As discussed above, it seems that Ethiopia and Egypt still have a long way to go in
solving the GERD dispute. In the methodology section, we expected that Global
43
Governance could provide long-term solutions as opposed to Conflict Theory. For this
to be a successful scenario, international actors and all riparian countries in the Nile,
particularly Ethiopia and Egypt, need to engage in further cooperation in order to create
this transboundary water governance.
7. CONCLUSION
Currently, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam is a very controversial issue in the
Nile, and it has major impacts on the surrounding nations. As the Nile is the sole source
of water in the region, the competition for its reserves has been prone to conflictual
situations among the riparian countries. Ethiopia and Egypt are the main actors involved
in the Nile dispute, and their actions in relation to the water management are to affect
the whole region. Egypt is trying to oppose the dam construction, not least because
according to the ‘Nile Waters Agreement’ from 1959 it has historical rights to utilise
roughly 90 percent of the river, but also because it believes that the dam will reduce the
flow into the country. Ethiopia, in turn, argues that the dam will have a positive impact
on its own socioeconomic development, as well as on the other riparian states’
economic growth. In this paper we aimed to look at how the Global Governance Theory
and Conflict Theory can contribute to comprehend the dispute over the GERD project.
Our focus was on the main countries involved in the Nile debate, Ethiopia and Egypt, as
well as on the regional and international actors, and their standpoints on the GERD
construction in correlation to the two theories.
We chose to use Conflict Theory, as it is capable of explaining the current power
relations between Ethiopia and Egypt, and the warlike situation considering the Nile
Basin. Being a pessimistic theory, it gives us a very different approach in comparison to
Global Governance Theory, which looks at the issue from a more optimistic point of
view. Global Governance concentrates on multilevel cooperation, and we believe that
this will provide the region with a long-term and more sustainable solution to the
conflict. Due to our selection of theories, we were able to discuss different approaches
and answer our research question. Conflict Theory helps us understand the competition
for the resources of the Nile, and thus the tensions between the riparian countries. Egypt
being the hydro-hegemonic state in the region, and Ethiopia challenging their status
44
quo, it is clear why Egypt is protesting the GERD project, as this will reduce their
regional power. As a result of this change in power relations, it seems likely that a
conflict might occur. In addition, Egypt argues that the dam project violates
international law, since by building the GERD the natural flow of the river would be
altered, and thus decrease their legal share. In contrast to Conflict Theory, Global
Governance helps us understand the complexity of the water governance in the Nile
Basin. This theory focuses on international organisations’ role in contributing to
cooperation between Ethiopia and Egypt, and the other riparian nations alike. The
interference of both regional actors and international organisations’ is important in order
to establish a form of global governance, as Ethiopia and Egypt do not have the
sufficient means to solve this transboundary water issue themselves.
When it comes to international law, there are no clear indications how to solve the dam
dispute, as many international theories and laws are contradictory. Even though there
are some agreements, such as the Cooperative Framework Agreement or the Nile Basin
Initiative, and these attempts to create a legal framework, they have not been sufficient
enough. The current absence of proper legal water law has led to a situation where the
countries cannot rely on legitimate regulations and rules.
Until now, regional and international actors, such as the African Union, International
Monetary Fund, World Bank, and the United Nations, have been relatively passive in
the debate about the construction of the GERD. The absence of their contribution seems
to be due to the political inclination and the conflictual nature of the project. This kind
of passive behaviour of the external actors tends to hinder the process of forming longterm transboundary water governance in the region. In addition, their lack of interest as
well as the lack of a higher authority might eventually create more tension between
Ethiopia and Egypt.
Throughout the analysis, Conflict Theory has been the most prominent theoretical
approach due to the fact that it entails more explanatory power in this warlike situation
in the Nile Basin. However, Global Governance might provide a long-term solution to
this conflict. This could be achieved by the intervention of the African Union and the
other international organisations, as they possess the competence to objectively address
the problem and could function as mediating actors. Furthermore, Global Governance
would be a more appropriate way to go, since entering into a conflict would have
tremendous consequences on the region’s development. It is obvious that there is no
45
easy path to achieve transboundary water governance between the riparian countries.
However, the reconciliation of laws and treaties could be a significant step towards this
mutually beneficial form of governance. Therefore, we believe that Global Governance
would be the only way to overcome the water scarcity issue in a globalising world.
We consider that the African Union should take the leading role in the GERD dispute,
as it is the major regional organisation, and thus has appropriate expertise to intervene
in issues regarding African states. Moreover, further pressure from the international
community is needed in order to raise awareness and transparency on this issue. But, as
the GERD project is still ongoing and is supposed to be completed in 2017, it is difficult
to predict the future prospects of the dispute between Ethiopia and Egypt.
46
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