MSDI Terror DA 1
About MSDI & Missouri State U..
For twenty years, the Missouri State Debate Institute has offered an excellent educational experience in
the middle of the high school topic. MSDI is distinct from other camps in six ways. First, our skills focus
assures that a typical 2-week debater gets nearly 80 speeches, including over 20 debates. Second, we
emphasize the largest cases on topic, with students getting both aff and neg rounds on each. Third, our
senior faculty are comparable with top lab leaders in any camp. Fourth, MSDI students can earn highly
transferable college credit in public speaking for a minimal cost. Fifth, we respect variance in home
debate circuits – our goal is to improve line by line debating in ways that will help students no matter
who judges in their home circuit. Finally, our price is below any comparable camp and far below most
camps. Our 2016 information will be available shortly at: http://debate.missouristate.edu/camp.htm.
Missouri State University is a large comprehensive university (enrollment over 24k), with nearly any
major you might want. The university has excellent academic scholarship support – most debaters
combine academic “entitlement” scholarships (guaranteed based on GPA/test scores) with debate
scholarships. The Spicer Debate Forum competes in two year-long policy debate formats: NDT and NFALD. We’ve national semis or finals in both in the last decade. Our debaters have an average GPA over
3.5, a 97% graduation rate, and 70% complete law/grad school afterward. Our program is a high-impact
academic experience with an exceptional alumni network. Please contact Dr. Eric Morris for more
information (EricMorris@MissouriState.edu).
http://debate.missouristate.edu/
http://www.missouristate.edu/FinancialAid/scholarships/
Contents
Shell ............................................................................................................................................................... 5
1NC ........................................................................................................................................................ 6
Links ............................................................................................................................................................ 11
General Domestic Surveillance ............................................................................................................... 12
Video Surveillance................................................................................................................................... 17
Warrantless Surveillance ........................................................................................................................ 22
Business records ..................................................................................................................................... 24
Signal Intelligence Necessary to Prevent Terrorism ........................................................................... 25
Bulk Data ................................................................................................................................................. 30
PRISM/ Section 702................................................................................................................................. 34
Cyber Provisions...................................................................................................................................... 42
Domestic Anti-Terrorism Key .............................................................................................................. 43
Intelligence Necessary to Prevent Genocide ...................................................................................... 44
A2: Terrorists No Longer Use Email .................................................................................................... 45
MSDI Terror DA 2
Government Transparency ..................................................................................................................... 46
RFID ......................................................................................................................................................... 47
Biometrics ............................................................................................................................................... 50
UQ ............................................................................................................................................................... 52
General.................................................................................................................................................... 53
Surveillance Programs Now ................................................................................................................ 54
Internal Terror Prevention Strong Now .............................................................................................. 58
General Terror Risk ................................................................................................................................. 60
Up now ................................................................................................................................................ 61
Al Qaeda UQ............................................................................................................................................ 62
General................................................................................................................................................ 63
Egypt Warrant ..................................................................................................................................... 64
Arab Spring Warrant ........................................................................................................................... 65
AQAP Warrant..................................................................................................................................... 69
ISIS UQ..................................................................................................................................................... 70
General Strong Now ............................................................................................................................ 71
Attacks Increasing Warrent................................................................................................................. 72
Military Capacity Warrent................................................................................................................... 73
Returning Fighters Warrent ................................................................................................................ 75
Al-Shabaab UQ ........................................................................................................................................ 76
General................................................................................................................................................ 77
I/L ................................................................................................................................................................ 78
Al Qaeda Specific..................................................................................................................................... 79
Surveillance Solves .............................................................................................................................. 80
ISIS Specific.............................................................................................................................................. 82
Surveillance Solves ISIS ....................................................................................................................... 83
ISIS Nuclear Terrorism......................................................................................................................... 84
Impacts........................................................................................................................................................ 88
Nuke Terror ............................................................................................................................................. 89
Dirty Bomb Risk High........................................................................................................................... 90
General High Risk ................................................................................................................................ 92
Al Qaeda Risk High .............................................................................................................................. 94
ISIS Risk High ....................................................................................................................................... 96
MSDI Terror DA 3
Yes Extinction .......................................................................................................................................... 98
Nuke Taboo ......................................................................................................................................... 99
Miscalculation ................................................................................................................................... 100
U.S. Lash out...................................................................................................................................... 102
Econ Collapse .................................................................................................................................... 103
Middle East Escalation ...................................................................................................................... 105
AT: Can’t Get the Bomb Here............................................................................................................ 107
AT: Can’t Build Them......................................................................................................................... 108
AT: Empirically Denied ...................................................................................................................... 109
AT: No Expertise ................................................................................................................................ 110
Bioterror Impacts .................................................................................................................................. 111
General Risk High .............................................................................................................................. 112
Al Qaeda Risk High ............................................................................................................................ 116
ISIS Specific........................................................................................................................................ 118
Yes Extinction ........................................................................................................................................ 121
Lashout .............................................................................................................................................. 122
Pandemic Extinction.......................................................................................................................... 123
AT: Deterrence/Terrorists Won’t use WMD’s................................................................................... 125
AT: No bioweapon access ................................................................................................................. 126
AT: No BW Delivery ........................................................................................................................... 128
AT: Containment Solves BW ............................................................................................................. 129
Other Scenarios......................................................................................................................................... 130
Cyber Scenario ...................................................................................................................................... 131
Core ................................................................................................................................................... 132
Blackouts Module ............................................................................................................................. 135
Oil Shocks Module............................................................................................................................. 140
Nuke Power Scenario ............................................................................................................................ 145
Core ................................................................................................................................................... 146
Fuel Rod Internal ............................................................................................................................... 149
Blackout Scenario.................................................................................................................................. 150
Core ................................................................................................................................................... 151
Other AT / Ext ........................................................................................................................................... 154
A2: Drone Strikes Solve ..................................................................................................................... 155
MSDI Terror DA 4
AT: Domestic Terrorism Decline ....................................................................................................... 158
AT: State Sponsorship of Terrorism Decreasing ............................................................................... 161
A2: Al Qaeda Threat Decreasing ....................................................................................................... 163
A2: Al Qaeda Leaders Killed .............................................................................................................. 166
A2: ISIS Can’t Succeed/No Positive Mission...................................................................................... 168
A2 ISIS No means .............................................................................................................................. 169
MSDI Terror DA 5
Shell
MSDI Terror DA 6
1NC
The Syrian Civil War has Dramatically Increased The Risk of Terror Attacks Of all
kinds in the U.S.
David Francis, February 25, 2015, Foreign Policy, Islamic State Threat Comes to American Shores,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/25/islamic-state-threat-comes-to-american-shores/ DOA: 3-1-15
US. law enforcement authorities nabbed three terrorism suspects Wednesday for conspiring to travel to
Syria to fight for the Islamic State and conduct attacks here at home, including a potential attempt on
President Barack Obama’s life and a hoped-for bomb attack at New York’s Coney Island. The arrests are
likely to raise concerns about the Islamic State’s presence on American shores. No one claiming
allegiance to the group has yet to strike in the United States but the militants running a self-proclaimed
caliphate in parts of Syria and Iraq have inspired attacks in Canada, Denmark, France, and Australia. In
the last year, U.S. law enforcement personnel have arrested more than 20 people for trying to travel to
the Middle East to fight for the Islamic State or other terrorist groups. One suspect, Akhror
Saidakhmetov, was arrested at New York’s Kennedy Airport while trying to board a plane to Istanbul. A
second suspect, Abdurasul Hasanovich Juraboev, traveled to Turkey last month and was picked up in
Brooklyn. Abror Habibov was arrested up in Florida and stands accused of funding Saidakhmetov’s
attempts to travel to the Middle East. Each faces a maximum sentence of 15 years in federal prison.
“The flow of foreign fighters to Syria represents an evolving threat to our country and to our allies,”
United States Attorney Loretta Lynch, who is also Obama’s nominee as attorney general, said in a
statement announcing the arrests. “As alleged in the complaint, two of the defendants in this case
sought to travel to Syria to join [the Islamic State] but were also prepared to wage violent jihad here in
the United States.” Their arrests serve as a reminder of the international reach of the group.
Saidakhmetov lives in Brooklyn but is a citizen of Kazakhstan. Juraboev and Habibov are from
Uzbekistan.
Intensive Domestic Surveillance is Empirically Key to Prevent Nuclear, Chemical
and Bio Terror Attacks
Yohn Yoo, Summer 2014, Emanuel S. Heller Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley Law
School; Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise Institute, Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, THE
LEGALITY OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY'S BULK DATA SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS,
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/is/files/2013/11/Yoo1.pdf, DOA: 1-1-15, p. 929-30
The real problem with FISA, and even the Patriot Act, as they existed before the 2008 Amendments, is
that they remained rooted in a law enforcement approach to electronic surveillance. They tied the
government's counterterrorism efforts to individualized suspicion. Searches and wiretaps had to target a
specific individual already believed to be involved in harmful activity. But detecting al Qaeda members
who have no previous criminal record in the United States, and who are undeterred by the possibility of
criminal sanctions, requires the use of more sweeping methods. To prevent attacks successfully, the
government has to devote surveillance resources where there is a reasonable chance that terrorists will
appear or communicate, even if their specific identities remain unknown. What if the government knew
that there was a fifty percent chance that terrorists would use a certain communications pipeline, such
as e-mail provided by a popular Pakistani ISP, but that most of the communications on that channel
MSDI Terror DA 7
would not be linked to terrorism? An approach based on individualized suspicion would prevent
computers from searching through that channel for the keywords or names that might suggest terrorist
communications because there are no specific al Qaeda suspects and thus no probable cause. Searching
for terrorists depends on playing the probabilities rather than individualized suspicion, just as
roadblocks or airport screenings do. The private owner of any website has detailed access to
information about the individuals who visit the site that he can exploit for his own commercial purposes,
such as selling lists of names to spammers or gathering market data on individuals or groups. Is the
government's effort to find violent terrorists a less legitimate use of such data? Individualized suspicion
dictates the focus of law enforcement, but war demands that our armed forces defend the country with
a broader perspective. Armies do not meet a "probable cause" requirement when they attack a position,
fire on enemy troops, or intercept enemy communications. The purpose of the criminal justice system is
to hold a specific person responsible for a discrete crime that has already happened. But focusing on
individualized suspicion does not make sense when the purpose of intelligence is to take action, such as
killing or capturing members of an enemy group, to prevent future harm to the nation from a foreign
threat. FISA should be regarded as a safe harbor that allows the fruits of an authorized search to be used
for prosecution. Using FISA sacrifices speed and breadth of information in favor of individualized
suspicion, but it provides a path for using evidence in a civilian criminal prosecution. If the President
chooses to rely on his constitutional authority alone to conduct warrantless searches, then he should
generally use the information only for military purposes. The primary objective of the NSA program is to
"detect and prevent" possible al Qaeda attacks on the United States, whether another attack like
September 11; a bomb in apartment buildings, bridges, or transportation hubs such as airports; or a
nuclear, biological, or chemical attack. These are not hypotheticals; they are all al Qaeda plots, some of
which U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies have already stopped. A President will want to
use information gathered by the NSA to deploy military, intelligence, and law enforcement personnel to
stop the next attack. The price to pay for speed, however, is foregoing any future criminal prosecution. If
the President wants to use the NSA to engage in warrantless searches, he cannot use its fruits in an
ordinary criminal prosecution. Al Qaeda has launched a variety of efforts to attack the United States,
and it intends to continue them. The primary way to stop those attacks is to find and stop al Qaeda
operatives, and the best way to find them is to intercept their electronic communications. Properly
understood, the Constitution does not subject the government to unreasonable burdens in carrying out
its highest duty of protecting the nation from attack.
The First impact is a global nuclear exchange
Robert Ayson 10 Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New
Zealand @ The Victoria University of Wellington, July 2010, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging
Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 33 Issue 7)
But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear
exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and
especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange
of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and
tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new
MSDI Terror DA 8
state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war
between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and
early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a
considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear
terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist
nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could
plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most
obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be
involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well.
Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States
react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had
come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear
laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of
science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear
explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable,
identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency
of the explosion, the materials used and, most important . . . some indication of where the nuclear
material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and
American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all)
suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United
Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with
a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan.
But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear
Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in
Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded
between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst?
Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already
involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting
each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present
time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during
a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing
resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator
or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil
might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or
China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear
attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear
arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against
the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of
U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations
to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably
still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as
discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or
disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group.
Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might
MSDI Terror DA 9
interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their
spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario
might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist
action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the
“Chechen insurgents’ . . . long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part
of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced
consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide.
Additionally, Bioterror Leads to Extinction
Nathan Mhyrvold 2013 “Strategic Terrorism: A Call to Action”
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2290382 Lawfare Research Paper No. 2-2013 He
attended Mirman School and began college at age 14. He studied mathematics, geophysics, and space
physics at UCLA. He was awarded a Hertz Foundation Fellowship for graduate study and studied at
Princeton University, where he earned a master's degree in mathematical economics and completed a
PhD in theoretical and mathematical physics. He also attended Santa Monica College. For one year, he
held a postdoctoral fellowship at the University of Cambridge working under Stephen Hawking.
As horrible as this would be, such a pandemic is by no means the worst attack one can imagine, for
several reasons. First, most of the classic bioweapons are based on 1960s and 1970s technology because
the 1972 treaty halted bioweapons development efforts in the United States and most other Western
countries. Second, the Russians, although solidly committed to biological weapons long after the treaty
deadline, were never on the cutting edge of biological research. Third and most important, the science
and technology of molecular biology have made enormous advances, utterly transforming the field in
the last few decades. High school biology students routinely perform molecular-biology manipulations
that would have been impossible even for the best superpower-funded program back in the heyday of
biological-weapons research. The biowarfare methods of the 1960s and 1970s are now as antiquated as
the lumbering mainframe computers of that era. Tomorrow’s terrorists will have vastly more deadly
bugs to choose from. Consider this sobering development: in 2001, Australian researchers working on
mousepox, a nonlethal virus that infects mice (as chickenpox does in humans), accidentally discovered
that a simple genetic modification transformed the virus.10, 11 Instead of producing mild symptoms,
the new virus killed 60% of even those mice already immune to the naturally occurring strains of
mousepox. The new virus, moreover, was unaffected by any existing vaccine or antiviral drug. A team of
researchers at Saint Louis University led by Mark Buller picked up on that work and, by late 2003, found
a way to improve on it: Buller’s variation on mousepox was 100% lethal, although his team of
investigators also devised combination vaccine and antiviral therapies that were partially effective in
protecting animals from the engineered strain.12, 13 Another saving grace is that the genetically altered
virus is no longer contagious. Of course, it is quite possible that future tinkering with the virus will
change that property, too. Strong reasons exist to believe that the genetic modifications Buller made to
mousepox would work for other poxviruses and possibly for other classes of viruses as well. Might the
same techniques allow chickenpox or another poxvirus that infects humans to be turned into a 100%
lethal bioweapon, perhaps one that is resistant to any known antiviral therapy? I’ve asked this question
of experts many times, and no one has yet replied that such a manipulation couldn’t be done. This case
is just one example. Many more are pouring out of scientific journals and conferences every year. Just
last year, the journal Nature published a controversial study done at the University of Wisconsin–
MSDI Terror DA 10
Madison in which virologists enumerated the changes one would need to make to a highly lethal strain
of bird flu to make it easily transmitted from one mammal to another.14 Biotechnology is advancing so
rapidly that it is hard to keep track of all the new potential threats. Nor is it clear that anyone is even
trying. In addition to lethality and drug resistance, many other parameters can be played with, given
that the infectious power of an epidemic depends on many properties, including the length of the
latency period during which a person is contagious but asymptomatic. Delaying the onset of serious
symptoms allows each new case to spread to more people and thus makes the virus harder to stop. This
dynamic is perhaps best illustrated by HIV , which is very difficult to transmit compared with smallpox
and many other viruses. Intimate contact is needed, and even then, the infection rate is low. The
balancing factor is that HIV can take years to progress to AIDS , which can then take many more years to
kill the victim. What makes HIV so dangerous is that infected people have lots of opportunities to infect
others. This property has allowed HIV to claim more than 30 million lives so far, and *approximately 34
million people are now living with this virus and facing a highly uncertain future.15 A virus genetically
engineered to infect its host quickly, to generate symptoms slowly—say, only after weeks or months—
and to spread easily through the air or by casual contact would be vastly more devastating than HIV . It
could silently penetrate the population to unleash its deadly effects suddenly. This type of epidemic
would be almost impossible to combat because most of the infections would occur before the epidemic
became obvious. A technologically sophisticated terrorist group could develop such a virus and kill a
large part of humanity with it. Indeed, terrorists may not have to develop it themselves: some scientist
may do so first and publish the details. Given the rate at which biologists are making discoveries about
viruses and the immune system, at some point in the near future, someone may create artificial
pathogens that could drive the human race to extinction. Indeed, a detailed species-elimination plan of
this nature was openly proposed in a scientific journal. The ostensible purpose of that particular
research was to suggest a way to extirpate the malaria mosquito, but similar techniques could be
directed toward humans.16 When I’ve talked to molecular biologists about this method, they are quick
to point out that it is slow and easily detectable and could be fought with biotech remedies. If you
challenge them to come up with improvements to the suggested attack plan, however, they have plenty
of ideas. Modern biotechnology will soon be capable, if it is not already, of bringing about the demise of
the human race— or at least of killing a sufficient number of people to end high-tech civilization and set
humanity back 1,000 years or more. That terrorist groups could achieve this level of technological
sophistication may seem far-fetched, but keep in mind that it takes only a handful of individuals to
accomplish these tasks. Never has lethal power of this potency been accessible to so few, so easily. Even
more dramatically than nuclear proliferation, modern biological science has frighteningly undermined
the correlation between the lethality of a weapon and its cost, a fundamentally stabilizing mechanism
throughout history. Access to extremely lethal agents—lethal enough to exterminate Homo sapiens—
will be available to anybody with a solid background in biology, terrorists included.
MSDI Terror DA 11
Links
MSDI Terror DA 12
General Domestic Surveillance
Surveillance is a critical tool needed to defeat terrorism
Alan Dershowitz, Harvard Law School, May 5, 2014, The Atlantic, “No one opposes all surveillance:;
false equivalence on the NSA, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/05/false-equivalenceon-surveillance-from-alan-dershowitz/361694/ DOA: 2-22-15
Our enemies, especially those who target civilians, have one major advantage over us. They are not
constrained by morality or legality. We have an advantage over them. In addition to operating under the
rule of law, we have developed through hard work and extensive research technological tools that allow
us to monitor and prevent their unlawful and letha l actions. Such technological tools helped us break
the German and the Japanese code during the Second World War. They helped us defeat fascism. They
helped us in the Cold War. And they are helping us now in the hot war against terrorists who would
bomb this theater if they had the capacity to do so. You're going to hear again that there are only
excuses that are being offered, that terrorism is really not a serious problem, or that American policy is
as terroristic as the policy of al-Qaeda. I don't think you're going to accept that argument. We must not
surrender our technological advantage.
Surveillance critical to the war on terror
Jessica Zuckerman et al, 2013, 60 Terrorist Plots Since 9-11: Continued Lessons in Domestic
Counterterrorism, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/07/60-terrorist-plots-since-911continued-lessons-in-domestic-counterterrorism DOA: 5-24-15 Zuckerman is a Policy Analyst @
Heritage, Steven Bucci Phd, Drector, Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign and National Security
Policy, James Carafano, Vice President for the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National
Security and Foreign Policy, and the E. W. Richardson Fellow
Three months after the attack at the Boston Marathon, the pendulum of awareness of the terrorist
threat has already begun to swing back, just as it did after 9/11. Due to the resilience of the nation and
its people, for most, life has returned to business as usual. The threat of terrorism against the United
States, however, remains. Expecting to stop each and every threat that reaches a country’s borders is
unreasonable, particularly in a free society committed to individual liberty. Nevertheless, there are
important steps that America’s leaders can take to strengthen the U.S. domestic counterterrorism
enterprise and continue to make the U.S. a harder target. Congress and the Administration should:
Ensure a proactive approach to preventing terrorist attacks. Despite the persistent threat of terrorism,
the Obama Administration continues to focus on reactive policies and prosecuting terrorists rather than
on proactive efforts to enhance intelligence tools and thwart terrorist attempts. This strategy fails to
recognize the pervasive nature of the threat posed by terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and homegrown
extremism. The Administration, and the nation as a whole, should continue to keep in place a robust,
enduring, and proactive counterterrorism framework in order to identify and thwart terrorist threats
long before the public is in danger. Maintain essential counterterrorism tools. Support for important
investigative tools such as the PATRIOT Act is essential to maintaining the security of the U.S. and
MSDI Terror DA 13
combating terrorist threats. Key provisions within the act, such as the roving surveillance authority and
business records provision, have proved essential for thwarting terror plots, yet they require frequent
reauthorization. In order to ensure that law enforcement and intelligence authorities have the essential
counterterrorism tools they need, Congress should seek permanent authorization of the three sun
setting provisions within the PATRIOT Act.[208] Furthermore, legitimate government surveillance
programs are also a vital component of U.S. national security, and should be allowed to continue.
Indeed, in testimony before the house, General Keith Alexander, the director of the National Security
Agency (NSA), revealed that more than 50 incidents of potential terrorism at home and abroad were
stopped by the set of NSA surveillance programs that have recently come under scrutiny. That said, the
need for effective counterterrorism operations does not relieve the government of its obligation to
follow the law and respect individual privacy and liberty. In the American system, the government must
do both equally well. Break down the silos of information. Washington should emphasize continued
cooperation and information sharing among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to
prevent terrorists from slipping through the cracks between the various jurisdictions. In particular, the
FBI should make a more concerted effort to share information more broadly with state and local law
enforcement. State and local law enforcement agencies are the front lines of the U.S. national security
strategy. As a result, local authorities are able to recognize potential danger and identify patterns that
the federal authorities may miss. They also take the lead in community outreach, which is crucial to
identifying and stopping “lone wolf” actors and other homegrown extremists. Federal law enforcement,
on the other hand, is not designed to fight against this kind of threat; it is built to battle cells, groups,
and organizations, not individuals.
Surveillance needed to defeat terrorism
Glenn Sulmassy, 2013, CNN, “Feds start building case against NSA leaker,”
http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/10/opinion/sulmasy-nsa-snowden/ DOA: 4-1-15
The current threat by al Qaeda and jihadists is one that requires aggressive intelligence collection and
efforts. One has to look no further than the disruption of the New York City subway bombers (the one
being touted by DNI Clapper) or the Boston Marathon bombers to know that the war on al Qaeda is
coming home to us, to our citizens, to our students, to our streets and our subways. This 21st century
war is different and requires new ways and methods of gathering information. As technology has
increased, so has our ability to gather valuable, often actionable, intelligence. However, the move
toward "home-grown" terror will necessarily require, by accident or purposefully, collections of U.S.
citizens' conversations with potential overseas persons of interest. An open society, such as the United
States, ironically needs to use this technology to protect itself. This truth is naturally uncomfortable for a
country with a Constitution that prevents the federal government from conducting "unreasonable
searches and seizures." American historical resistance towards such activities is a bedrock of our laws,
policies and police procedures. But what might have been reasonable 10 years ago is not the same any
longer. The constant armed struggle against the jihadists has adjusted our beliefs on what we think our
government can, and must, do in order to protect its citizens. However, when we hear of programs such
PRISM, or the Department of Justice getting phone records of scores of citizens without any signs of
suspicious activities nor indications of probable cause that they might be involved in terrorist related
MSDI Terror DA 14
activities, the American demand for privacy naturally emerges to challenge such "trolling" measures or
data-mining. The executive branch, although particularly powerful in this arena, must ensure the
Congress is kept abreast of activities such as these surveillance programs. The need for enhanced
intelligence activities is a necessary part of the war on al Qaeda, but abuse can occur without ensuring
the legislative branch has awareness of aggressive tactics such as these. Our Founding Fathers, aware of
the need to have an energetic, vibrant executive branch in foreign affairs, still anticipated checks upon
the presidency by the legislature. Working together, the two branches can ensure that both legally, and
by policy, this is what the citizens desire of their government -- and that leaks such as Snowden's won't
have the impact and damage that his leaks are likely to cause.
Surveillance Key
Britain Eakin, June 19, 2013, Al Arabia, “NSA: Secret Surveillance Helped Prevent 50-plus terror
attacks,” http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/world/2013/06/19/NSA-Secret-U-S-surveillance-helpedprevent-50-plus-terror-attacks.html DOA: 4-25-15
Secret surveillance programs helped prevent more than 50 potential terror attacks worldwide, including
plots to target the New York Stock Exchange and the city’s subway, the director of the National Security
Agency testified on Tuesday. Ten of the 50 potential threats were domestic, said Army General Keith B.
Alexander. A hearing before the House Intelligence Committee sought to calm fears among the
American public that the U.S. government spies on them unconstitutionally, and repeated assurances
that none of the NSA surveillance programs can target U.S. citizens at home or abroad without a court
order. “These programs are limited, focused and subject to rigorous oversight,” Alexander said. Because
of that, the civil liberties and privacy of Americans are not at stake, he added. However, Bruce Fein, a
specialist in constitutional law, said the NSA surveillance programs are unconstitutional because there is
no demonstration of individualized suspicion, as required by the Fourth Amendment. “The government
has a burden to show some reasonable suspicion that someone being spied on is engaged in some
wrongdoing before privacy can be invaded,” said Fein. Nonetheless, the witnesses defended the NSA
programs as legal and necessary because of the nature of the threat of terrorism. “If you’re looking for a
needle in a haystack, you have to get the haystack first,” testified Deputy Attorney General James Cole.
Alexander and other senior U.S. intelligence officials testified in response to details leaked by former
NSA contractor Edward Snowden about how the agency gathers data. The hearing reviewed NSA
surveillance programs 215 and 702. Testimony said program 215 gathers data in bulk from various
providers, such as Verizon, but does not look at content or names, while program 702 applies only to
foreign citizens. The leak has sparked a debate among the American public over what information the
government should be able to collect to safeguard national security, and how it should be allowed to
gather it. A recent Pew poll shows that a slight majority of Americans think the NSA surveillance
programs are acceptable. Meanwhile, U.S. President Barack Obama’s approval ratings have dropped
over the past month. Alexander linked the relative safety Americans have enjoyed since the 9/11 attacks
directly to the NSA surveillance programs, but Fein said people’s fears are being exploited.
“Most
people are risk-averse. They’re easily frightened, and told they need to surrender their liberties in order
to be safe, even if it’s not true,” Fein said. The government has not provided any evidence that these
programs are effective, he added. “It’s just their say-so.” When questioned about whether the NSA
MSDI Terror DA 15
surveillance programs previously collected any other information, Alexander said what they have and
have not collected remains classified and cannot be discussed. However, some details about how the
programs have stopped potential terror attacks would be presented as early as Wednesday to U.S.
lawmakers, he said. The largely docile Congress expressed overall support for the NSA programs, with
Rep. Michele Bachmann framing Snowden as a traitor. “It seems to me that the problem here is that of
an individual who worked within the system, who broke laws and who chose to declassify highly
sensitive classified information,” Bachmann said. Alexander said they are investigating where security
broke down, and how to provide better oversight for nearly 1,000 system administrators that can access
classified information. The leaks were viewed across the board as a threat to national security. “These
are egregious leaks… and now here we are talking about this in front of the world, so I think those leaks
affect us,” said Sean Joyce, deputy director of the FBI. Only one member of the House Committee, Rep.
Jim Himes, said he was troubled by what he called the historically unprecedented revelations revealed in
the leaks. “We know that when a capability exists, there’s a potential for abuse… From time to time, it’ll
be abused.”
Surveillance has prevented more than 50 terror plots
Kimberly Dozier, 6-18-2013, "NSA: 50 Terrorist Plots Were Foiled Thanks To Surveillance Program,"
Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/18/nsa-surveillance_n_3460106.html
The director of the National SECURITY Agency insisted on Tuesday that the government's sweeping
surveillance programs have foiled some 50 terrorist plots worldwide in a forceful defense echoed by the
leaders of the House Intelligence Committee. Army Gen. Keith Alexander said the two recently disclosed
PROGRAMS – one that gathers U.S. phone records and another that is designed to track the use of U.S.based Internet servers by foreigners with possible links to terrorism – are critical in the terrorism fight.
Intelligence officials have disclosed some details on two thwarted attacks, and Alexander promised
additional information to the panel on thwarted attacks that the PROGRAMS helped stop. He provided
few additional details. The PROGRAMS "assist the intelligence community to connect the dots,"
Alexander told the committee in a rare, open Capitol Hill hearing. Alexander got no disagreement from
the leaders of the panel, who have been outspoken in backing the PROGRAMS since Edward Snowden, a
29-year-old former contractor with Booz Allen Hamilton, disclosed information to The Washington Post
and the Guardian newspapers. Rep. Mike Rogers, R-Mich., chairman of the committee, and Rep. C.A.
Dutch Ruppersberger of Maryland, the panel's top Democrat, said the programs were vital to the
intelligence community and assailed Snowden's actions as criminal. "It is at times like these where our
enemies within become almost as damaging as our enemies on the outside," Rogers said. Ruppersberger
said the "brazen disclosures" put the United States and its allies at risk. The general counsel for the
intelligence community said the NSA cannot TARGETphone conversations between callers inside the U.S.
– even if one of those callers was someone they were targeting for surveillance when outside the
country. The director of national intelligence's legal chief, Robert S. Litt, said that if the NSA finds it has
accidentally gathered a phone call by a target who had traveled into the U.S. without their knowledge,
they have to "purge" that from their system. The same goes for an accidental collection of any
conversation because of an ERROR. Litt said those incidents are then reported to the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court, which "pushes back" and asks how it happened, and what the NSA is
doing to fix the problem so it doesn't happen again. Rogers previewed the latest public airing of the NSA
MSDI Terror DA 16
controversy the morning after President Barack Obama, who is attending the G-8 summit in Ireland,
vigorously defended the surveillance programs in a lengthy interview Monday, calling them transparent
– even though they are authorized in secret. "It is transparent," Obama told PBS' Charlie Rose in an
interview. "That's why we set up the FISA court," the president added, referring to the secret court set
up by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act that authorizes two recently disclosed programs: one that
gathers U.S. phone records and another that is designed to track the use of U.S.-based Internet servers
by foreigners with possible links to terrorism. Obama said he has named representatives to a privacy
and civil liberties oversight board to help in the debate over just how far government data gathering
should be allowed to go – a discussion that is complicated by the secrecy surrounding the FISA court,
with hearings held at undisclosed locations and with only government lawyers present. The ORDERS that
result are all highly classified. "We're going to have to find ways where the public has an assurance that
there are checks and BALANCES in place ... that their phone calls aren't being listened into; their text
messages aren't being monitored, their emails are not being read by some big brother somewhere," the
president said. A senior administration official said Obama had asked Director of National Intelligence
James Clapper to determine what more information about the two PROGRAMS could be made public, to
help better explain them. The official spoke on condition of anonymity because the official was not
authorized to speak publicly. Snowden accused members of Congress and administration officials
Monday of exaggerating their claims about the success of the data gathering PROGRAMS, including
pointing to the arrest of the would-be New York subway bomber, Najibullah Zazi, in 2009. In an online
interview with The Guardian in which he posted answers to questions Monday, Snowden said that Zazi
could have been caught with narrower, targeted surveillance PROGRAMS – a point Obama conceded in
his interview without mentioning Snowden. "We might have caught him some other way," Obama said.
"We might have disrupted it because a New York cop saw he was suspicious. Maybe he turned out to be
incompetent and the bomb didn't go off. But, at the margins, we are increasing our chances of
preventing a catastrophe like that through these PROGRAMS," he said. Obama repeated earlier
assertions that the NSA programs were a legitimate counterterror tool and that they were completely
noninvasive to people with no terror ties – something he hoped to discuss with the privacy and civil
liberties board he'd formed. The senior administration official said the president would be meeting with
the new privacy board in the coming days.
MSDI Terror DA 17
Video Surveillance
Video surveillance essential to defeat terrorism
St. Louis Dispatch, August 13, 2013, “The Role of Surveillance Cameras in the War on Terror,”
http://www.gopusa.com/news/2013/04/22/the-role-of-surveillance-cameras-in-crime-or-terror/ DOA:
5-1-15
Mere hours after the public release of grainy surveillance camera images in the Boston Marathon
bombings, law enforcement officials had pinpointed suspects in one of the nation's most horrific
terrorist acts. It was a stunning and swift break in the case, one that illustrates the potency surveillance
photos have for the public and police in solving crime. For Howard Richards, the images captured in
Boston are validation of a three-year project in St. Louis to link 150 surveillance cameras into a single
security system throughout the city's central corridor, from the riverfront to Forest Park. "Without those
images, they would not have been able to solve this thing as quickly, there are no two ways about it,"
Richards said of the Boston case. "You can't overestimate the value of this technology." Richards is head
of security at Harris-Stowe State University and chairs monthly meetings of the Central Corridor Security
Group, formed about three years ago to address security issues. The group eventually brought on United
for a Better St. Louis, a nonprofit organization formed in 2011 to enhance public safety efforts, to lead a
fundraising campaign. The St. Louis project would form a common network out of cameras owned and
operated by a host of entities, such as the city's port authority and street department, the Partnership
for Downtown St. Louis, the Locust Business District and the Central West End. The security system,
which organizers hope to have in place in about three months, would equip police with tablet
computers and software allowing officers to look through any of the cameras on the network. With
newer cameras, police would be able to zoom, pan and tilt to get a better view. "It's going to make us
cutting-edge and on board with other big cities in the country," said Michael Gerdine, a chiropractor and
chairman of United for a Better St. Louis. Cities such as Baltimore, Chicago, Atlanta and Dallas use the
technology, and their systems have been reviewed for the St. Louis project. New York operates a "Ring
of Steel" that trains an estimated 3,000 cameras in Lower Manhattan. Boston has a network of cameras
throughout its city and transit system. London -- known for its ubiquitous security cameras -- has also
seen how surveillance images can lead to a swift resolution to terrorism investigations. In 2005,
terrorism suspects were quickly identified with such images. Weeks later, a failed group of bombers was
also caught, thanks to the cameras. In Baltimore, the cameras have been a valuable tool in prosecuting
crimes, and have been successful in reducing crime in trouble spots, said Baltimore police spokesman
Anthony Guglielmi. "We love them. It's a really great system," Guglielmi said. Still, he said, "they are in
no way designed to replace those on patrol." Research further backs up the value that surveillance
cameras have in solving crime. In St. Louis, the project grew out of meetings between members of the
Locust Business District and the Downtown Partnership over security concerns. Expanding and linking
camera systems was proposed as a way to not only help solve crime, but prevent it. From those early
discussions, the Central Corridor Security Group was formed. The group's board includes representatives
of the Downtown Partnership, Grand Center Inc., St. Louis University and Barnes-Jewish Hospital. Two
St. Louis police captains are on the board. Representatives of Metro, Sigma-Aldrich and Wells Fargo also
attend meetings. Maggie Campbell, president of the Partnership for Downtown St. Louis, said live
MSDI Terror DA 18
monitoring of cameras has been happening downtown for about five years. "But if we can grow it and
leverage it with our neighboring business districts, then we can make it work better for everyone," she
said. "It's all about multiplying the eyes that are watching." No public funds are being sought in the
startup of the program, and the cameras would be limited to public areas. "We all decided it would be a
good idea to basically look out for each other," Richards said. But increasing cameras and the number of
people allowed to monitor them concerns privacy advocates.
Surveillance cameras critical to defeat terrorism
Farhad Manjo, April 18, 2013, Slate, We Need More Cameras and We Need them Now,”
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/technology/2013/04/boston_bomber_photos_the_maratho
n_bombing_shows_that_we_need_more_security.html DOA: 4-5-15
Though DesLauriers did not indicate the source of the images, the Boston Globe reported earlier that
authorities were focusing on video “from surveillance cameras on the same side of Boylston Street as
the explosions.” If it turns out that the people in the FBI’s photos are the guys who did it, they shouldn’t
be surprised that surveillance cameras turned out to be their undoing. Neither should you. We should
see this potential break in the case as a sign of the virtues of video surveillance. More than that, we
should think about how cameras could help prevent crimes, not just solve them once they’ve already
happened. Cities under the threat of terrorist attack should install networks of cameras to monitor
everything that happens at vulnerable urban installations. Yes, you don’t like to be watched. Neither do
I. But of all the measures we might consider to improve security in an age of terrorism, installing
surveillance cameras everywhere may be the best choice. They’re cheap, less intrusive than many
physical security systems, and—as will hopefully be the case with the Boston bombing—they can be
extremely effective at solving crimes. Surveillance cameras aren’t just the bane of hardcore civil
libertarians. The idea of submitting to constant monitoring feels wrong, nearly un-American, to most of
us. Cameras in the sky are the ultimate manifestation of Big Brother—a way for the government to
watch you all the time, everywhere. In addition to normalizing surveillance—turning every public place
into a venue for criminal investigation—there’s also the potential for abuse. Once a city is routinely
surveilled, the government can turn every indiscretion into a criminal matter. You used to be able to
speed down the street when you were in a hurry. Now, in many places around the world, a speed
camera will record your behavior and send you a ticket in the mail. Combine cameras with facialrecognition technology and you’ve got a recipe for governmental intrusion. Did you just roll a joint or
jaywalk or spray-paint a bus stop? Do you owe taxes or child support? Well, prepare to be
investigated—if not hassled, fined, or arrested. These aren’t trivial fears. The costs of ubiquitous
surveillance are real. But these are not intractable problems. Such abuses and slippery-slope fears could
be contained by regulations that circumscribe how the government can use footage obtained from
security cameras. In general, we need to be thinking about ways to make cameras work for us, not
reasons to abolish them. When you weigh cameras against other security measures, they emerge as the
least costly and most effective choice. In the aftermath of 9/11, we’ve turned most public spaces into
fortresses—now, it’s impossible for you to get into tall buildings, airports, many museums, concerts, and
even public celebrations without being subjected to pat-downs and metal detectors. When combined
with competent law enforcement, surveillance cameras are more effective, less intrusive, less
MSDI Terror DA 19
psychologically draining, and much more pleasant than these alternatives. As several studies have
found, a network of well-monitored cameras can help investigators solve crimes quickly, and there’s
even evidence that cameras can help deter and predict criminal acts, too.
Surveillance cameras necessary to counter terrorism
Charlie Savage, August 12, 2007, “US doles out millions for street cameras, local efforts raise privacy
concerns,” Boston Globe,
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2007/08/12/us_doles_out_millions_for_street_cameras/
?page=full DOA: 5-1-15
The Department of Homeland Security is funneling millions of dollars to local governments nationwide
for purchasing high-tech video camera networks, accelerating the rise of a "surveillance society" in which
the sense of freedom that stems from being anonymous in public will be lost, privacy rights advocates
warn. Since 2003, the department has handed out some $23 billion in federal grants to local
governments for equipment and training to help combat terrorism. Most of the money paid for
emergency drills and upgrades to basic items, from radios to fences. But the department also has doled
out millions on surveillance cameras, transforming city streets and parks into places under constant
observation. The department will not say how much of its taxpayer-funded grants have gone to
cameras. But a Globe search of local newspapers and congressional press releases shows that a large
number of new surveillance systems, costing at least tens and probably hundreds of millions of dollars,
are being simultaneously installed around the country as part of homeland security grants. In the last
month, cities that have moved forward on plans for surveillance networks financed by the Homeland
Security Department include St. Paul, which got a $1.2 million grant for 60 cameras for downtown;
Madison, Wis., which is buying a 32-camera network with a $388,000 grant; and Pittsburgh, which is
adding 83 cameras to its downtown with a $2.58 million grant. Small towns are also getting their share
of the federal money for surveillance to thwart crime and terrorism. Recent examples include Liberty,
Kan. (population 95), which accepted a federal grant to install a $5,000 G2 Sentinel camera in its park,
and Scottsbluff, Neb. (population 14,000), where police used a $180,000 Homeland Security Department
grant to purchase four closed-circuit digital cameras and two monitors, a system originally designed for
Times Square in New York City. "We certainly wouldn't have been able to purchase this system without
those funds," police Captain Brian Wasson told the Scottsbluff Star-Herald. Other large cities and small
towns have also joined in since 2003. Federal money is helping New York, Baltimore, and Chicago build
massive surveillance systems that may also link thousands of privately owned security cameras. Boston
has installed about 500 cameras in the MBTA system, funded in part with homeland security funds.
Marc Rotenberg, director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, said Homeland Security
Department is the primary driver in spreading surveillance cameras, making their adoption more
attractive by offering federal money to city and state leaders. Homeland Security Department
spokesman Russ Knocke said that it is difficult to say how much money has been spent on surveillance
cameras because many grants awarded to states or cities contained money for cameras and other
equipment. Knocke defended the funding of video networks as a valuable tool for protecting the nation.
"We will encourage their use in the future," he added. But privacy rights advocates say that the
technology is putting at risk something that is hard to define but is core to personal autonomy. The
MSDI Terror DA 20
proliferation of cameras could mean that Americans will feel less free because legal public behavior -attending a political rally, entering a doctor's office, or even joking with friends in a park -- will leave a
permanent record, retrievable by authorities at any time. Businesses and government buildings have
used closed-circuit cameras for decades, so it is nothing new to be videotaped at an ATM machine. But
technology specialists say the growing surveillance networks are potentially more powerful than
anything the public has experienced. Until recently, most surveillance cameras produced only grainy
analog feeds and had to be stored on bulky videotape cassettes. But the new, cutting-edge cameras
produce clearer, more detailed images. Moreover, because these videos are digital, they can be easily
transmitted, copied, and stored indefinitely on ever-cheaper hard-drive space. In addition, police
officers cannot be everywhere at once, and in the past someone had to watch a monitor, limiting how
large or powerful a surveillance network could be. But technicians are developing ways to use computers
to process real-time and stored digital video, including license-plate readers, face-recognition scanners,
and software that detects "anomalous behavior." Although still primitive, these technologies are
improving, some with help from research grants by the Homeland Security Department's Science and
Technology Directorate. "Being able to collect this much data on people is going to be very powerful,
and it opens people up for abuses of power," said Jennifer King, a professor at the University of
California at Berkeley who studies privacy and technology. "The problem with explaining this scenario is
that today it's a little futuristic. [A major loss of privacy] is a low risk today, but five years from now it
will present a higher risk." As this technological capacity evolves, it will be far easier for individuals to
attract police suspicion simply for acting differently and far easier for police to track that person's
movement closely, including retracing their steps backwards in time. It will also create a greater risk that
the officials who control the cameras could use them for personal or political gain, specialists said. The
expanded use of surveillance in the name of fighting terrorism has proved controversial in other arenas,
as with the recent debate over President Bush's programs for eavesdropping on Americans'
international phone calls and e-mails without a warrant. But public support for installing more
surveillance cameras in public places, both as a means of fighting terrorism and other crime, appears to be
strong. Last month, an ABC News/Washington Post poll foun that 71 percent of Americans favored
increased use of surveillance cameras, while 25 percent opposed it.
Video surveillance necessary to defeat terrorism
Steven Simon, 2015 , adjunct senior fellow in Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign
Relations and the co-author of “The Age of Sacred Terror” and “The Next Attack.”, Times Square,
Bombs, and Big Crowds, New York Times, http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/03/timessquare-bombs-and-big-crowds/?_r=0#steven DOA: 5-5-15
Video surveillance would not have stopped the Times Square attack. Does this mean that it would be
useless? Not necessarily. Swift and accurate analysis of video surveillance information might prevent the
next attack, even if it is powerless to stop the last one. Imagery can be used to assist in the identification
and location of individuals at the scene of the crime. It can also be used to track the progress of the
bomb-laden vehicle from the its point of origin, or the point at which the truck was weaponized, to the
place the terrorists have targeted. In combination with physical evidence acquired from the vehicle —
fingerprints, hair, cloth fibers, soil, trash, forgotten personal items or a host of other bits of evidence —
MSDI Terror DA 21
video surveillance can lead to the arrest of the bombers and to the unraveling of cells or networks and, if
the attackers are foreign, the ratlines they exploited to enter the country. At this point, the U.S. does not
have the kind of pervasive surveillance systems in place that, say, the British have deployed. In the U.K.,
there is about one surveillance camera for every thousand residents. It took British authorities years to
reach this level of intensive surveillance. The U.S., as anyone who follows the debate over privacy loss in
this country knows, is studded with cameras, but most of these are in stores to track consumption
habits to facilitate marketing or deter shoplifters. They’re not where they’re needed, which is on the
street. The two smallest jurisdictions in the U.K., very rural areas indeed, together deploy more
surveillance cameras than the San Francisco police department. The U.S., of course, does not have to
match Britain camera for camera. Surveillance can be enhanced in areas that are assessed to be likely
targets, a category that can be inferred, at least in a general sense, from targeting patterns and what the
terrorists actually have said about the desirability of attacking this or that; and they do discuss this in
their literature and on their Web sites. More problematic, is the need to organize our law enforcement
capabilities in ways that enable this visual information to be exploited effectively, while protecting the
rapidly fading privacy available to ordinary citizens. Therein lies the real challenge.
MSDI Terror DA 22
Warrantless Surveillance
Warrant requirement for national security decisions undermines executive
power needed for effective surveillance
Yohn Yoo, Summer 2014, Emanuel S. Heller Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley Law
School; Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise Institute, Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, THE
LEGALITY OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY'S BULK DATA SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS,
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/is/files/2013/11/Yoo1.pdf, DOA: 1-1-15, p. 904
This approach applies to national security activity that occurs within the United States as well as
outside it. In 1972, the Supreme Court refused to subject surveillance for national security purposes to
the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. But it has extended this protection to purely domestic
terrorist groups, out of concern that the government might use its powers to suppress political liberties.
Lower courts, however, have found that when the government conducts a search of a foreign power or
its agents, it need not meet the requirements that apply to criminal law enforcement. In a leading 1980
case, the Fourth Circuit held that "the needs of the executive are so compelling in the area of foreign
intelligence, unlike the area of domestic security, that a uniform warrant requirement would . . . unduly
frustrate the President in carrying out his foreign affairs responsibilities." A warrant requirement for
national security searches would reduce the flexibility of the executive branch, which possesses
"unparalleled expertise to make the decision whether to conduct foreign intelligence surveillance" and
is "constitutionally designated as the pre-eminent authority in foreign affairs." A warrant requirement
would place national security decisions in the hands of the judiciary, which "is largely inexperienced in
making the delicate and complex decisions that lie behind foreign intelligence surveillance." Under this
framework, Presidents conducted national security surveillance using their executive authority for
decades. President Nixon's abuses, however, led Congress to enact the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act (FISA) in 1978. FISA replaced presidentially-ordered monitoring of national security threats with a
system similar to that used by law enforcement to conduct electronic surveillance of criminal suspects,
but with important differences to protect classified information. FISA requires the government to show
"probable cause" that a target is "an agent of a foreign power," which includes terrorist groups. A
special court of federal district judges, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), examines
classified information in a closed, ex parte hearing before issuing the warrant.
Warrantless surveillance necessary to combat Al Qaeda
Yohn Yoo, Summer 2014, Emanuel S. Heller Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley Law
School; Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise Institute, Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, THE
LEGALITY OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY'S BULK DATA SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS,
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/is/files/2013/11/Yoo1.pdf, DOA: 1-1-15, p. 903-4
It is al Qaeda's nature as a decentralized network that stresses the normal division between military and
intelligence surveillance and the warrant-based approach of the criminal justice system. The
Constitution vests the President with the executive power and designates him Commander-in-Chief. The
MSDI Terror DA 23
Framers understood these powers to invest the executive with the duty to protect the nation from
foreign attack and the right to control the conduct of military hostilities. To exercise those powers
effectively, the President must have the ability to engage in electronic surveillance that gathers
intelligence on the enemy. Regular military intelligence need not follow standards of probable cause for
a warrant or reasonableness for a search, just as the use of force against the enemy does not have to
comply with the Fourth Amendment. During war, military signals intelligence might throw out a broad
net to capture all communications within a certain area or by an enemy nation. Unlike the criminal
justice system, which seeks to detain criminals, protection of national security need not rest on
particularized suspicion of a specific individual.
MSDI Terror DA 24
Business records
MSDI Terror DA 25
Signal Intelligence Necessary to Prevent Terrorism
Signal intelligence necessary because human intelligence on the decline
Stuart Taylor, April 29, 2014, The Big Snoop: Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Terrorists,
http://www.brookings.edu/research/essays/2014/the-big-snoop-print (is an author, a freelance
journalist, and a Brookings nonresident senior fellow. Taylor has covered the Supreme Court for a
variety of national publications, including The New York Times, Newsweek, and National Journal, where
he is also a contributing editor. His published books include Mismatch: How Affirmative Action Hurts
Students It's Intended to Help, and Why Universities Won't Admit It. In addition to his work as a
journalist and scholar, he is a graduate of Harvard Law School and practiced law in a D.C. firm.)
Over the five years that she has been chairman of the Intelligence Committee, Feinstein has seen more
inside information on NSA activities than most of her fellow lawmakers. She is convinced that, since the
FISA reforms of the seventies put safeguards and multiple layers of oversight in place, there has been no
evidence of the NSA’s seriously violating those strictures. She is also convinced that signals intelligence
is, if anything, more indispensable than ever at a time when human intelligence—that is, information
from undercover U.S. operatives operating abroad or inside hostile organizations like al Qaeda—is so
hard to come by. That leads her to worry that curbs on the phone records program might increase the
exposure of Americans to danger from terrorists and other enemies, perhaps including mass-casualty
cyber, biological, or even nuclear attacks.
Signals intelligence necessary to combat terrorism and weapons proliferation
Report and Recommendations of the President’s Review Group on Intelligence,
December 2013, Liberty and Security in a Changing World, December 12,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-12-12_rg_final_report.pdf
Protecting The Nation Against Threats to Our National Security. The ability of the United States to
combat threats from state rivals, terrorists, and weapons proliferators depends on the acquisition of
foreign intelligence information from a broad range of sources and through a variety of methods. In an
era increasingly dominated by technological advances in communications technologies, the United
States must continue to collect signals intelligence globally in order to assure the safety of our citizens at
home and abroad and to help protect the safety of our friends, our allies, and the many nations with
whom we have cooperative relationships.
Section 702 and Section 215 programs have prevented terror attacks
Sean M. Joyce, Deputy Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), July 31, 2013, Hearing of the
Senate Judiciary Committee Subject: "Strengthening Privacy Rights and National Security: Oversight of
FISA (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act) Surveillance Programs"
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=741931 (First joined the Department of Justice in 1979. He served for
MSDI Terror DA 26
13 years in the Criminal Division, later becoming the deputy chief of the division's public integrity
section, went in private practice, sworn in as deputy attorney general on January 3rd, 2011)
SEN. FEINSTEIN: Good. Now, the NSA has produced and declassified a chart, which I'd like to make
available to all members. It has the 54 total events. It includes a Section 702 authority and Section 215
authority, which essentially work together. And it shows the events disrupted based on a combination of
these two programs, 13 in the homeland, 25 in Europe, five in Africa and 11 in Asia. Now, I remember I
was on the Intelligence Committee before 9/11, and I remember how little information we have and the
great criticism of the government because of those stovepipes, the inability to share intelligence, the
inability to collect intelligence. We had no program that could've possibly caught two people in San
Diego before the event took place. I support this program. I think, based on what I know, they will come
after us. And I think we need to prevent an attack wherever we can from happening. That doesn't mean
that we can't make some changes.
Signals intelligence from business records needed to stop WMD attacks
Stuart Taylor, April 29, 2014, The Big Snoop: Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Terrorists,
http://www.brookings.edu/research/essays/2014/the-big-snoop-print (is an author, a freelance
journalist, and a Brookings nonresident senior fellow. Taylor has covered the Supreme Court for a
variety of national publications, including The New York Times, Newsweek, and National Journal, where
he is also a contributing editor. His published books include Mismatch: How Affirmative Action Hurts
Students It's Intended to Help, and Why Universities Won't Admit It. In addition to his work as a
journalist and scholar, he is a graduate of Harvard Law School and practiced law in a D.C. firm.) DOA: 225-15
Over the five years that she has been chairman of the Intelligence Committee, Feinstein has seen more
inside information on NSA activities than most of her fellow lawmakers. She is convinced that, since the
FISA reforms of the seventies put safeguards and multiple layers of oversight in place, there has been no
evidence of the NSA’s seriously violating those strictures. She is also convinced that signals intelligence
is, if anything, more indispensable than ever at a time when human intelligence—that is, information
from undercover U.S. operatives operating abroad or inside hostile organizations like al Qaeda—is so
hard to come by. That leads her to worry that curbs on the phone records program might increase the
exposure of Americans to danger from terrorists and other enemies, perhaps including mass-casualty
cyber, biological, or even nuclear attacks.
Business record 215 program has been used to stop a terror attack
Sean M. Joyce, Deputy Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), July 31, 2013, Hearing of the
Senate Judiciary Committee Subject: "Strengthening Privacy Rights and National Security: Oversight of
FISA (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act) Surveillance Programs"
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=741931 (First joined the Department of Justice in 1979. He served for
13 years in the Criminal Division, later becoming the deputy chief of the division's public integrity
section, went in private practice, sworn in as deputy attorney general on January 3rd, 2011)
MSDI Terror DA 27
As you mentioned another instance when we used the business record 215 program, as Chairman Leahy
mentioned, Basaaly Moalin. So initially the FBI opened a case in 2003 based on a tip. We investigated
that tip. We found no nexus to terrorism and closed the case. In 2007 the NSA advised us, through the
business record 215 program, that a number in San Diego was in contact with an al-Shabab and east -al-Qaida east -- al-Qaida East Africa member in Somalia. We served legal process to identify that
unidentified phone number. We identified Basaaly Moalin. Through further investigation, we identified
additional co-conspirators, and Moalin and three other individuals have been convicted -- and some
pled guilty -- to material support to terrorism.
Business records closes holes in intelligence in order to defeat terrorism
Sean M. Joyce, Deputy Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), July 31, 2013, Hearing of the
Senate Judiciary Committee Subject: "Strengthening Privacy Rights and National Security: Oversight of
FISA (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act) Surveillance Programs"
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=741931 (First joined the Department of Justice in 1979. He served for
13 years in the Criminal Division, later becoming the deputy chief of the division's public integrity
section, went in private practice, sworn in as deputy attorney general on January 3rd, 2011)
SEN. GRASSLEY: OK. Mr. Joyce, one part of the balance that we have to strike, protecting privacy of
Americans -- the other part, national security. Thankfully, until the Boston bombing, we had prevented
large-scale terrorist attacks on American soil. I have a few questions about how valuable the role of
Section 215 and 702 programs have played in predicting (sic) our national security. Two questions, and
then I'll have to stop and go to our colleagues. Can you describe any specific situations where Section
215 and Section 702 authorities helped disrupt a terrorist attack or identify individuals planning to
attack, the number of times? And then secondly, if you didn't have the authority to collect phone
records in bulk the way that they are now under Section 215, how would you have affected those
investigations? MR. JOYCE: So to your first question, Senator, as far as a specific example of when we
have utilized both of these programs is the one I had first mentioned, the first al-Qaida-directed plot
since 9/11, in September of 2009, when Najibullah Zazi and others conspired plot to bomb the New York
subway system. We initially found out about Zazi through an NSA 702 coverage, and he was actually
talking to an al-Qaida courier who was -- he was asking for his help to perfect an explosives recipe. So
but for that, we would not have known about the plot. We followed that up with legal process and then
had FISA coverage on him and others as we fully investigated the plot. Business records 215 was also
involved, as I had previously mentioned, where we also through legal process were submitting legal
process for telephone numbers and other email addresses, other selectors. But NSA also provided
another number we are unaware of of a co-conspirator, Adis Medunjanin. So that is an instance where a
very serious plot to attack America on U.S. soil that we used both these programs. But I say, as Chairman
Leahy mentioned, there is a difference in the utility of the programs. But what I say to you is that each
and every program and tool is valuable. There were gaps prior to 9/11. And what we have collectively
tried to do, the members of the committee, other members of the other oversight committees, the
executive branch and the intelligence community, is we have tried to close those gaps and close those
seams. And the business record 215 is one of those programs that we have closed those seams. So I
MSDI Terror DA 28
respectfully say to the chairman that the utility of that specific program initially is not as valuable. I say
you are right. But what I say is it plays a crucial role in closing the gaps and seams that we fought hard to
gain after the 9/11 attacks.
Section 702 and Section 215 programs have prevented terror attacks
Sean M. Joyce, Deputy Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), July 31, 2013, Hearing of the
Senate Judiciary Committee Subject: "Strengthening Privacy Rights and National Security: Oversight of
FISA (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act) Surveillance Programs"
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=741931 (First joined the Department of Justice in 1979. He served for
13 years in the Criminal Division, later becoming the deputy chief of the division's public integrity
section, went in private practice, sworn in as deputy attorney general on January 3rd, 2011)
SEN. FEINSTEIN: Good. Now, the NSA has produced and declassified a chart, which I'd like to make
available to all members. It has the 54 total events. It includes a Section 702 authority and Section 215
authority, which essentially work together. And it shows the events disrupted based on a combination of
these two programs, 13 in the homeland, 25 in Europe, five in Africa and 11 in Asia. Now, I remember I
was on the Intelligence Committee before 9/11, and I remember how little information we have and the
great criticism of the government because of those stovepipes, the inability to share intelligence, the
inability to collect intelligence. We had no program that could've possibly caught two people in San
Diego before the event took place. I support this program. I think, based on what I know, they will come
after us. And I think we need to prevent an attack wherever we can from happening. That doesn't mean
that we can't make some changes.
Business records program has stopped many attacks
Rep. Mike Rogers, Miami Times (Florida), June 18, 2013, (Rep. Mike Rogers, R-Mich., is chairman of
the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/06/18/nsa-mike-rogers-house-intelligence-committeeeditorials-debates/2436541/ , DOA: 2-24-15
The gross distortion of two vital National Security Agency [NSA] programs is dangerous and unfortunate.
Neither program authorizes NSA to read e-mails or listen to phone calls of American citizens. Both are
constitutional with numerous checks and balances by all three branches of government. They have
been authorized and overseen by Congress and presidents of both parties. And they have produced vital
intelligence, preventing dozens of terrorist attacks around the world, including plots against New York
City subways and the New York Stock Exchange. The first program allows NSA to preserve a limited
category of business records. It preserves only phone numbers and the date, time and duration of calls.
It doesn't include any names or the content of calls. These records can only be accessed when NSA is
investigating a foreign terrorist. If a foreign terrorist is found linked to an American, the tip is passed to
the FBI and requires a court order before additional action can be taken. This is a critical tool for
connecting the dots between foreign terrorists plotting attacks in the U.S. The second program allows
the NSA to target foreigners overseas to collect certain foreign intelligence with court approval. It
MSDI Terror DA 29
doesn't create a "back door" to any company's server, and doesn't authorize monitoring of U.S. citizens.
No U.S. person anywhere in the world can be intentionally monitored without a specific order. Any
comparison to government abuses in decades past is highly misleading. Today's programs are
authorized in law, with a thorough system of oversight and checks and balances in place, and a court
review not present in the past. Now each of the agencies has an inspector general and general counsels
who ensure that these authorities are exercised in accordance with the law. The House and Senate each
have Intelligence Committees charged with overseeing these authorities. Additionally, electronic
surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes occurs with approval of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court. None of these structures and protections was in place in the 1950s, '60s or '70s.
These narrowly targeted programs are legal, do not invade Americans' privacy, and are essential to
detecting and disrupting future terrorist attacks.
Section 215 necessary to defeat terrorism
James Carafano, May 21, 2015, Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act and Metadata Collection:
Responsible Options for the Way Forward, Dr. Carafono is
Vice President for the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy,
and the E. W. Richardson Fellow, Charles Stimson is Manager, National Security Law Program and Senior
Legal Fellow, Dr. Steven Bucci is Director, Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign and National
Security Policy, John Malcolm is Director, Edwin Meese III Center for Legal and Judicial Studies, and the
Ed Gilbertson and Sherry Lindberg Gilbertson Senior Legal Fellow,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/05/section-215-of-the-patriot-act-and-metadatacollection-responsible-options-for-the-way-forward DOA: 5-24-15
The United States is in a state of armed conflict against al-Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, ISIS, and
associated forces. It must therefore rely on all lawful tools of national security, including but not limited
to robust signals intelligence. As the 9/11 Commission Report made crystal clear, one of the key failures
of the United States before the 9/11 attacks was the government’s inability to “connect the dots”
between known or suspected terrorists. The artificial “wall” between domestic law enforcement and
U.S. intelligence agencies, enacted during the 1990s, proved to be America’s Achilles’ heel. Some
analysts believe that had America had a Section 215–type program in place before 9/11, U.S.
intelligence, along with domestic law enforcement, would have been able to connect the dots and
prevent at least some of the hijackers from launching their devastating attack. In fact, according to a
report by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, using the authorities under Section
215 and 702 of the PATRIOT Act has contributed to thwarting 54 total international terrorist plots in 20
countries. Thirteen of those plots were directed inside the United States.
MSDI Terror DA 30
Bulk Data
Mass records collection is needed to catch terrorists because they are not all in
one place
Joshua Kapstein, May 16, 2014, “The NSA Can ‘Collect it All,’”, but what would it do with the data?,
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/05/16/the-nsa-can-collect-it-all-but-what-will-it-do-withour-data-next.html DOA: 2-23-15
The NSA and its allies are staunch defenders of these “haystacks,” even though multiple studies
concluded the database containing millions of Americans’ phone records played little or no role in
preventing terrorist attacks. They’ve countered that it’s foolish to assume all terrorists hang out in one
isolated section of the Internet, therefore mass-collection becomes a necessary obsession to find that
ever-elusive needle.
Database needs to be broad to find terrorist cells
Yohn Yoo, Summer 2014, Emanuel S. Heller Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley Law
School; Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise Institute, Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, THE
LEGALITY OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY'S BULK DATA SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS,
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/is/files/2013/11/Yoo1.pdf, DOA: 1-1-15, p. 911-12
A critic, however, might argue that billions of innocent calling records are not "relevant" to a
terrorism investigation. Even if terrorist communications take place over the phone, that cannot justify
the collection of all phone call records in the United States, the vast majority of which have nothing to
do with the grounds for the search. The FISC rejected this argument because, to be useful, a database
has to be broad enough to find terrorist calls. "Because known and unknown international terrorist
operatives are using telephone communications, and because it is necessary to obtain the bulk
collection of a telephone company's metadata to determine those connections between known and
unknown international terrorist operatives as part of authorized investigations," the Court observed,
"the production of the information sought meets the standard for relevance under Section 215."
Aggregating calling records into a database, the court found, was necessary to find the terrorist
communications and the links between terrorists. It may not even be possible to detect the links unless
such a database is created. If a database is not comprehensive, in other words, then the government will
only be able to glimpse incomplete patterns of terrorist activity, if it can glimpse any at all.
Broad-based records approaches are often used in national security cases
Yohn Yoo, Summer 2014, Emanuel S. Heller Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley Law
School; Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise Institute, Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, THE
LEGALITY OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY'S BULK DATA SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS,
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/is/files/2013/11/Yoo1.pdf, DOA: 1-1-15, P 911-12
Relevance is a slippery concept, but it cannot require that every piece of information obtained by
subpoena must contain information related to guilt. Even when grand juries subpoena the business
MSDI Terror DA 31
records or communications of a criminal suspect, it is likely that the large majority of the items will not
have any relationship to the crime. Nonetheless, a grand jury may subpoena all of a suspect's financial
records to find those that pertain to a criminal conspiracy. A different way to view the NSA's telephone
calling record program is that the "relevant" tangible "thing" is the database itself, rather than any
individual calling record. Of course, the NSA program differs from a subpoena to a financial institution
for the records of a known criminal suspect. The amount of data collected by the NSA program is many
orders of magnitude greater, and hence the percentage of directly involved communications much
smaller. Also, unlike a regular subpoena, it is important to have as large a searchable database as
possible because the breadth will bring into the sharpest contrast the possible patterns of terrorist
activity. On the other hand, the magnitude of harm that the government seeks to prevent exceeds by
several orders that of regular crime. The magnitude of the harm should be taken into account in judging
relevance as well as the unprecedented difficulties of locating al Qaeda operatives disguised within the
United States.
Data mining critical to defeat terrorism
Dr. James Carafano, June 6, 2005, The Future of Antiterrorism Technologies,
http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/the-future-of-anti-terrorism-technologies DOA: 5-1-15
Data Mining and Link Analysis Technologies. We live in a world that is becoming increasingly awash in
commercial and government information. The trail of the terrorist, however, is often indistinguishable
from a mass of bills, license applications, visa forms, census records, and telephone lists. Traditional law
enforcement investigation techniques often begin with the identification of a suspected individual,
followed by the laborious process of seeking out information related to that individual. As more and
more information becomes available, this task becomes more and more problematic. Technology,
however, now has the potential to turn this challenge into an advantage. Rather than trying to narrow
the scope of information that has to be looked at, data mining and link analysis technologies work best
by exploiting larger and larger amounts of information. Data mining is a "technology for analyzing historical and current online data to support informed decision making."[5] It involves identifying patterns and
anomalies from the observation of vast datasets. The primary goals of data mining are prediction and
description. Prediction involves using some variables or fields in the database to predict unknown or
future values of other variables of interest, and description focuses on finding human-interpretable
patterns describing the data. Description concerns increasing knowledge about a variable or dataset by
finding related information.[ This second characteristic of data mining- description-is often referred to
as link analysis. Whereas data mining attempts to identify anomalies in vast amounts of information, link
analysis technologies sift through databases to find commonalties. Link analysis is a slightly different
twist on data mining. In preventing a terrorist attack, it is critical that one understands the relationships
among individuals, organizations, and other entities which could be security threats. Link analysis is the
process of analyzing the data surrounding the suspect relationships to determine how they are connected-what links them together. While the technology to conduct data mining is rapidly maturing, it is
currently limited by its capacity to handle non-structured formats; i.e., those that are a mix of text,
image, video, and sensor information. In addition, future algorithms will also need to incorporate the
knowledge of human experts into their derivation of patterns. "Breakthrough" Technologies My final
two candidate technologies definitely fit into the last category of an aggressive technology acquisition
program. They offer two potential breakthroughs which could significantly reshape the nature of
competition between terrorism and counterterrorism. Nanotechnology. As a counterterrorism tool,
MSDI Terror DA 32
nanotechnologies are in their infancies. Nanotechnology involves developing or working with materials
and complete systems at the atomic, molecular, or macromolecular levels where at least one dimension
falls with the range of 1-100 nanometers.[7] Working at such a small scale offers unique capabilities,
such as being able to control how nanodevices interact with other systems at the atomic or molecular
level. Current research areas include materials, sensors, biomedical nanostructures, electronics, optics,
and fabrication. Materials which have been modified at the nanoscale can have specific properties
incorporated into them. For instance, materials can have coatings that make them water-repellant or
stain-resistant. According to a study by Daniel Ratner and Mark A. Ratner: Nanoscale sensors are
generally designed to form a weak chemical bond to the substance of whatever is to be sensed, and
then to change their properties in response (that might be a color change or a change in conductivity,
fluorescence, or weight).[8] Biomedical nanostructures, by design, interact with people at the molecular
level, allowing for targeted drug delivery, adhesive materials for skin grafts or bandages, etc. Nanoscale
electronics can help to shrink computer circuits even further and to make them more efficient.
Nanoscale optics allow once again for materials that fluoresce to be tuned at the nanoscale to change
specific properties under certain conditions. Fabrication at the nanoscale offers the potential of creating
devices from the atom up, as opposed to having to shrink materials down to the needed size. According
to a RAND report, there are numerous future applications for nanotechnology, though most face at least
some technical hurdles. They include nanofabricated computational devices like nanoscale
semiconductor chips, biomolecular devices, and molecular electronics. If one includes integrated
microsystems and micro-electrical-mechanical systems (MEMS) in the discussion, and one probably
should, there are additional uses for nanotechnology, including smart systems-on-a-chip and micro- and
nanoscale instrumentation and measurement technologies. While there are counterterrorism
applications for all of the research areas, sensors are the most promising. Nanodevices offer the
opportunity for fast, cheap, and accurate sensors and detectors, and markers that can be used for a
wide range of forensic activities.
Metadata collection needed to cast a wide net
Yohn Yoo, Summer 2014, Emanuel S. Heller Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley Law
School; Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise Institute, Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, THE
LEGALITY OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY'S BULK DATA SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS,
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/is/files/2013/11/Yoo1.pdf, DOA: 1-1-15, p. 907-8
A. Phone Call Metadata Collection Like business records, phone call metadata falls within Section
215's definition of tangible items. Collection of such metadata relates to an authorized investigation to
protect against international terrorism. Several investigations into al Qaeda plots remain open, as shown
by the repeated indictments against bomb plotters in the last five years. The examination of records also
helps protect the nation against terrorist attacks. According to the NSA, only the information contained
in the billing records is collected; the content of calls is not. There can be no First Amendment violation
if the content of the calls remains untouched. A critic might argue that the terms of the search are too
broad because ninety-nine percent of the calls are unconnected to terrorism. But an intelligence search,
as Judge Richard Posner has described it, "is a search for the needle in a haystack." Rather than focus on
foreign agents who are already known, counterterrorism agencies must search for clues among millions
of potentially innocent connections, communications, and links. "The intelligence services," Posner
MSDI Terror DA 33
writes, "must cast a wide net with a fine mesh to catch the clues that may enable the next attack to be
prevented." For this reason, the FISC approved the NSA program in 2006 and has continued to renew it
since.
The wider the surveillance net, the more effective the surveillance
Report and Recommendations of the President’s Review Group on Intelligence,
December 2013, Liberty and Security in a Changing World, December 12,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-12-12_rg_final_report.pdf DOA: 1-1-14
When public officials acquire information, they seek to reduce risks, above all risks to national security.
If the government is able to obtain access to a great deal of information, it should be in a better position
to mitigate serious threats of violence. And if the goal is to reduce such threats, a wide net seems far
better than a narrow one, even if the government ends up acquiring a great deal of information that it
does not need or want. As technologies evolve, it is becoming increasingly feasible to cast that wide net.
In the future, the feasibility of pervasive surveillance will increase dramatically. From the standpoint of
risk reduction, that prospect has real advantages.
MSDI Terror DA 34
PRISM/ Section 702
Authority for PRISM is in section 702
James Carafano, 8-6, 13 Heritage Foundation, The Examiner (Washington, DC)m August 6, 2013,
PRISM is essential to U.S. security in war against terrorism (Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy
Studies at The Heritage Foundation, PRISM is Essential to US Security in the War on Terrorism,
http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2013/8/prism-is-essential-to-us-security-in-waragainst-terrorism DOA: 2-1-13
"Our intelligence professionals must be able to find out who the terrorists are talking to, what they are
saying, and what they're planning," said the president. "The lives of countless Americans depend on our
ability to monitor these communications." He added that he would cancel his planned trip to Africa
unless assured Congress would support the counterterrorism surveillance program. The president was
not , Barack Obama. It was George W. Bush, in 2008, pressing Congress to extend and update reforms to
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). He was speaking directly to the American public, in an
address broadcast live from the Oval Office. How times have changed. Back then, the President of the
United States willingly led the fight for the programs he thought necessary to keep the nation safe. Now,
our president sends underlings to make the case. In distancing himself from the debate over PRISM (the
foreign intelligence surveillance program made famous by the world- travelling leaker , Edward
Snowden), , President Obama followed the precedent he established in May at the National Defense
University. There, he spoke disdainfully of drone strikes, the authorization to use military force against
terrorists, and the detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay. All three are essential components of his
counterterrorism strategy. In distancing himself from his own strategy, , Obama hoped to leave the
impression that he is somehow above it all. He has dealt with the Snowden case the same way. When
asked while traveling in Africa if he would take a role in going after the leaker, the president replied "I
shouldn't have to." The White House's above-it-all attitude sends seriously mixed messages to the
American people, who are trying to figure if the government's surveillance programs are legal and
appropriate. Congress has not been much better. The authority for PRISM is in FISA Section 702.
Congress debated these authorities in 2007 and again when the program was reauthorized in 2008.
Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, D-Nev., surely remembers the controversy. He wrote President Bush:
"There is no crisis that should lead you to cancel your trip to Africa. But whether or not you cancel your
trip, Democrats stand ready to negotiate a final bill, and we remain willing to extend existing law for as
short a time or as long a time as is needed to complete work on such a bill." Evidently, Reid must have
felt the authorities granted under Section 702 received a full and sufficient hearing. Most current
members of Congress were seated under the dome during the 2008 debates. They had every
opportunity not just to read the law, but to be briefed on the program by intelligence officials before
voting on the bill. For them to act shocked at the scope of the program today rings about as hollow as ,
Obama's expressed disdain for the operations he oversees. The reality is that Congress and the
administration share responsibility for these programs. If they want to change or modify them, who's
stopping them? If changes are made, however, they should to be made for the right reason. Leaders
must never compromise our security for political expediency. At least 60 Islamist-inspired terrorist plots
have been aimed at the U.S. since the 9/11 attacks. The overwhelming majority have been thwarted
MSDI Terror DA 35
thanks to timely, operational intelligence about the threats. Congress should not go back to a pre-/11
set of rules just to appeal to populist sentiment. Congress and the White House have an obligation to
protect our liberties and to safeguard our security -- in equal measure. Meeting that mission is more
important than winning popularity polls.
PRISM necessary to get to emails to counter threats
Michael Hayden, former director of the NSA and the CIA, May 5, 2014,
“Michael Hayden’s Unwitting
Case Against Secret Surveillance,” ihttp://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/05/michaelhaydens-unwitting-case-against-secret-surveillance/361689/ DOA: 2-19-15
Actually, you need to go back and look at the whole movie. You need to see what went on before.
Because if you know what went on before you may have a different interpretation of what you think the
butler is guilty of. There are three or four things that happen that NSA and all these organizations have
tried to solve. Enormous volume. How do you conduct signals intelligence to keep you safe in a tsunami
of global communications? Well, the answer to that is bulk collection of metadata. Another issue that's
out there prominently is NSA is mucking about in those global telecommunication grids that have your
emails. No one complained when NSA was doing Soviet strategic microwave rocket signals. Well, the
equivalent of those Soviet microwave signals are proliferator, terrorist, narco-trafficker, moneylaunderer emails, coexisting with yours and mine, out there in Gmail. And if you want NSA to continue
to do what it was doing, or CSEC to continue to do what it's doing, what it had been doing to keep you
safe, it's got to be in the stream where your data is. There's a couple other things too. After 9/11, the
enemy was inside my country. That's the 215 program, metadata. Who might be affiliated with terrorists
inside the United States? And finally, when the enemy wasn't in my country his communications were.
It's an accident of history, but it's a fact, most emails reside on servers in the United States. They should
not deserve constitutional protection if the email's from a bad man in Pakistan communicating to a bad
man in Yemen. And the Prism program is what allowed us to get those emails to keep everyone safe.
There's a lot more to talk about but you're going to start clapping in about nine seconds. So I'm going to
go back to the podium.
PRISM has contributed to actionable intelligence in the fight against terrorism
Stuart Taylor, April 29, 2014, The Big Snoop: Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Terrorists,
http://www.brookings.edu/research/essays/2014/the-big-snoop-print (is an author, a freelance
journalist, and a Brookings nonresident senior fellow. Taylor has covered the Supreme Court for a
variety of national publications, including The New York Times, Newsweek, and National Journal, where
he is also a contributing editor. His published books include Mismatch: How Affirmative Action Hurts
Students It's Intended to Help, and Why Universities Won't Admit It. In addition to his work as a
journalist and scholar, he is a graduate of Harvard Law School and practiced law in a D.C. firm.)
The PRISM program poses an even trickier version of the cost/benefit question: it is easier to justify its
efficacy, but because it goes after the contents of messages, not just their origin and destination, it is
more intrusive on the liberties of the people whose communications it scoops up. Moreover, while
PRISM is more restrictive in its formal mandate (i.e., it is targeted only at foreign bad actors), in practice
MSDI Terror DA 36
it does pry “incidentally” into the Internet traffic of many law-abiding U.S. citizens. Yet there’s no
denying that PRISM’s mining of emails and other Internet messages has produced a mother lode of
useful information. An internal NSA document leaked by Snowden described the program as “the most
prolific contributor to the President’s Daily Brief” and the NSA’s “leading source of raw material,
accounting for nearly one in seven [of all the intelligence community’s secret] reports.” More to the
point, PRISM has often contributed to the collection of actionable intelligence used in the fight against
terrorism. Even Wyden, the NSA’s strongest congressional critic, acknowledges as much. He and his ally
on the surveillance issue, Senator Mark Udall (D-Colo.), said in a joint statement last summer that
“multiple terrorist plots have been disrupted at least in part because of information obtained under
Section 702.”
Section 702 programs necessary to defeat terrorism
Sean M. Joyce, Deputy Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), July 31, 2013, Hearing of the
Senate Judiciary Committee Subject: "Strengthening Privacy Rights and National Security: Oversight of
FISA (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act) Surveillance Programs"
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=741931 (First joined the Department of Justice in 1979. He served for
13 years in the Criminal Division, later becoming the deputy chief of the division's public integrity
section, went in private practice, sworn in as deputy attorney general on January 3rd, 2011)
SEN. GRASSLEY: OK. Mr. Joyce, one part of the balance that we have to strike, protecting privacy of
Americans -- the other part, national security. Thankfully, until the Boston bombing, we had prevented
large-scale terrorist attacks on American soil. I have a few questions about how valuable the role of
Section 215 and 702 programs have played in predicting (sic) our national security. Two questions, and
then I'll have to stop and go to our colleagues. Can you describe any specific situations where Section
215 and Section 702 authorities helped disrupt a terrorist attack or identify individuals planning to
attack, the number of times? And then secondly, if you didn't have the authority to collect phone
records in bulk the way that they are now under Section 215, how would you have affected those
investigations? MR. JOYCE: So to your first question, Senator, as far as a specific example of when we
have utilized both of these programs is the one I had first mentioned, the first al-Qaida-directed plot
since 9/11, in September of 2009, when Najibullah Zazi and others conspired plot to bomb the New York
subway system. We initially found out about Zazi through an NSA 702 coverage, and he was actually
talking to an al-Qaida courier who was -- he was asking for his help to perfect an explosives recipe. So
but for that, we would not have known about the plot. We followed that up with legal process and then
had FISA coverage on him and others as we fully investigated the plot. Business records 215 was also
involved, as I had previously mentioned, where we also through legal process were submitting legal
process for telephone numbers and other email addresses, other selectors. But NSA also provided
another number we are unaware of of a co-conspirator, Adis Medunjanin. So that is an instance where a
very serious plot to attack America on U.S. soil that we used both these programs. But I say, as Chairman
Leahy mentioned, there is a difference in the utility of the programs. But what I say to you is that each
and every program and tool is valuable. There were gaps prior to 9/11. And what we have collectively
tried to do, the members of the committee, other members of the other oversight committees, the
executive branch and the intelligence community, is we have tried to close those gaps and close those
MSDI Terror DA 37
seams. And the business record 215 is one of those programs that we have closed those seams. So I
respectfully say to the chairman that the utility of that specific program initially is not as valuable. I say
you are right. But what I say is it plays a crucial role in closing the gaps and seams that we fought hard to
gain after the 9/11 attacks.
Section 702 critical to fight terrorism
Washington Post, June 20, 2013, Reprinted in South China Morning Post, US Defends Surveillance
Tactics in War on Terrorism, http://www.scmp.com/news/world/article/1264602/us-defendssurveillance-tactics-war-terrorism DOA: 4-1-15
In November 2008, Abid Naseer, a Pakistani student living in Manchester, England, began to e-mail a
Yahoo account ultimately traced to his home country. The young man's e-mails appeared to be about
four women - Nadia, Huma, Gulnaz and Fozia - and which one would make a "faithful and loving wife".
British investigators later determined that the four names were code for types of explosives. And they
ascertained that a final April 2009 e-mail announcing a "marriage to Nadia" between the 15th and the
20th was a signal that a terrorist attack was imminent, according to British court documents. It is unclear
exactly how British intelligence linked the Pakistani e-mail address to a senior al-Qaeda operative who
communicated in a kind of code to his distant allies. But the intelligence helped stop the plot in England,
and the address made its way to the US National Security Agency (NSA). A few months later, the NSA
was monitoring the Yahoo user in Pakistan when a peculiar message arrived from a man named
Najibullah Zazi, an Afghan American living in Colorado. He asked about "mixing of [flavour and ghee oil]
and I do not know the amount, plz right away." Soon after, on September 9, 2009, a second message
arrived that echoed the code used in the British plot: "The marriage is ready," Zazi wrote. The e-mails
led the NSA to alert the FBI, which obtained a court order to place Zazi under more extensive
surveillance. Officials learned that he had visited Pakistan in 2008, the same time as one of the British
plotters. In the end, the e-mails and additional surveillance foiled a plot by Zazi and two others to
conduct suicide bombings in the New York subway system just days after he sent the "marriage is ready"
e-mail. In recent days, US intelligence and law enforcement officials, as well as congressional officials,
have pointed to the authority that allowed them to target the Yahoo account - Section 702 of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) - as a critical tool in identifying and disrupting terrorist plots
in the US and abroad. But some critics of NSA surveillance suggested that the collection of data under a
programme called Prism was not essential to Zazi's capture because the British first obtained the critical
e-mail address. Still, the case study provides a rare glimpse of how the broad surveillance practices of
the United States, often in concert with allies, are deployed. "The 702 programme has been enormously
useful in a large number of terrorist cases," said a US official who has access to classified records on NSA
programmes. "It's beyond dispute that it is highly effective. It operates exactly as anyone paying
attention would have expected it to operate based on floor debate and plain reading of law." Passage of
Section 702 as an amendment to FISA in 2008 gave the government the authority to request
information from US telecommunications companies on foreign targets located overseas without a
court order for each individual case. The broad authority is reviewed and renewed annually by the FISA
court, although the law does not preclude making a specific request for surveillance. "It appears the NSA
did not need any of the expanded authorities conferred by Section 702 to monitor the communications
MSDI Terror DA 38
at issue," said Elizabeth Goitein, co-director of the Brennan Centre for Justice's Liberty and National
Security Programme. "The government easily could have met this standard if it certified that the targets
were al-Qaeda terrorists in Pakistan." But US officials argue that, given the flood of leads in today's
interconnected world, the system would get bogged down and they could miss plots if they had to go
before the court every time they got information about potential foreign suspects. The officials said they
used material from multiple sources - allies, agents, informants and other investigations - to provide
rolling targeting information for the Prism program. They also said if the Yahoo address had not been
included, Zazi might not have been identified just days before the attacks were set to occur. In
testimony before Congress on Tuesday, senior intelligence and law enforcement officials said that
recently revealed surveillance programmes have disrupted more than 50 "potential terrorist events",
including at least 10 plots with a connection in the US. The Zazi case was one of four that officials used in
recent days to defend the effectiveness of the surveillance programmes. One of the others was a
planned attack on a Danish newspaper that involved a Pakistani American, David Headley. Sean Joyce,
the deputy director of the FBI, described the other two potential attacks on Tuesday in testimony before
the House Intelligence Committee. In one, Joyce said, the NSA was monitoring "a known extremist in
Yemen" when it learned that the individual was in contact with a man in Kansas City, Missouri. Joyce
said Khalid Ouazzani and two co-conspirators were plotting to bomb the New York Stock Exchange.
Ouazzani pleaded guilty in 2010 to supporting a terrorist organisation, bank fraud and overseas money
laundering. His co-conspirators also pleaded guilty to terrorism charges. In the other incident, phone
records helped identify a San Diego man who was financing a terrorist group overseas, apparently alShabab in Somalia. "Investigating terrorism is not an exact science. It's like a mosaic," Joyce said. "We try
to take these disparate pieces and bring them together to form a picture. There are many different
pieces of intelligence. "We have assets. We have physical surveillance. We have electronic surveillance
through a legal process, phone records through additional legal process, financial records. "Also, these
programmes that we're talking about here today, they're all valuable pieces to bring that mosaic
together." General Keith Alexander, head of the National Security Agency, said details of the two
programmes disclosed by Snowden were not closely held within the secretive agency. Alexander said
after the hearing that most of the documents accessed by Snowden, a former systems analyst on
contract to the NSA, were on a web forum available to NSA employees. Others were on a site that
required a special credential to access. Alexander said investigators were studying how Snowden did
that. He told lawmakers Snowden's leaks had caused "irreversible and significant damage to this
nation". He also said the internet programme had helped stop 90 per cent of the 50-plus plots he cited.
He said more than 10 of the plots thwarted had a link inside the US. Still, little was offered to
substantiate claims that the programmes had been successful in stopping acts of terrorism that would
not have been caught with narrower surveillance. In the New York subway bombing case, Barack Obama
conceded the would-be bomber might have been caught with less sweeping surveillance. Committee
chairman Congressman Mike Rogers said the programmes were vital to the intelligence community and
blasted Snowden's actions as criminal. "It is at times like these where our enemies within become
almost as damaging as our enemies on the outside," Rogers said. Officials acknowledged that
intelligence collected from US phone records under a programme authorised by the USA Patriot Act is
less compelling and the case for that extensive surveillance is harder to make. The NSA's ability to
intercept "the contents of e-mail communications of bad guys overseas provides a more lucrative set of
information" about terrorist activity than its access to phone records of millions of Americans, one US
official said.
MSDI Terror DA 39
Section 702 critical to defeat terrorism
Benjamin Wittes, Brookings, 2014, Senior Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution. I
co-founded and am Editor in Chief of Lawfare, a website devoted to sober and serious discussion of
“Hard National Security Choices.” I am the author or editor of several books on subjects related to law
and national security: Detention and Denial: The Case for Candor After Guantánamo (2011), Law and the
Long War: The Future of Justice in the Age of Terror (2008), and Legislating the War on Terror: An
Agenda for Reform (2009). I have written extensively both on the AUMF and on NSA collection under
various provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).3 The views I am expressing here
are my own, April 8, Prepared Statement, Is Al Qaeda Winning the Administration’s Counterterrorism
Policy,” http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA18/20140408/102109/HHRG-113-FA18-Wstate-WittesB20140408.pdf DOA: 5-1-15
President Obama has announced that he wants to end the AUMF conflict, raising profound questions
both about the plausibility and timeframe of that objective and about what legal instrument—if any—
will replace the AUMF. Meanwhile, serial leaks have generated enormous political anxiety about NSA
programs and persistent calls for reform in the press, in the general public, among allies, and in this
body. Section 702 will sunset in 2017 absent action by Congress to renew this important collection
authority.4 So major pillars of the legal architecture of America’s conflict with Al Qaeda have been
placed—in different ways and for very different reasons—on the table. This body thus cannot avoid the
question of how much, if at all, it wants to alter the most fundamental architecture of the conflict. In my
view, as I will lay out, the critical task facing the Congress is different with respect to these two laws.
With respect to the AUMF, the Congress should legislate to clearly authorize, and establish proper
oversight of, the conflict the United States is likely to continue fighting after its withdrawal from
Afghanistan. With respect to Section 702, the task is simpler: to maintain the intelligence community’s
capacity to support both the broad national security objectives of the United States and the conflict’s
prosecution under whatever legal authorities may succeed the AUMF. CONTINUES As I said at the outset
of this statement, the question of intelligence collection under Section 702 of the FAA may seem
connected to the AUMF’s future in only the most distant fashion. In fact, the connection between
intelligence collection authorities and the underlying regime authorizing the conflict itself is a critical
one. Good intelligence is key to any armed conflict and good technical intelligence is a huge U.S.
strength in the fight against Al Qaeda. Yet ironically, the more one attempts to narrow the conflict, the
more important technical intelligence becomes. The fewer boots on the ground we have in Afghanistan,
for example, the greater our reliance will become on technical collection. The more we rely on drone
strikes, rather than large troop movements, in areas where we lack large human networks, the more we
rely on technical intelligence. Particularly if one imagines staying on offense against a metastasizing Al
Qaeda in the context of a withdrawal from Afghanistan and a narrowing—or a formal end—of the AUMF
conflict, the burden on technical intelligence collection to keep us in the game will be huge even
ignoring the many other foreign intelligence and national security interests Section 702 surveillance
supports. Section 702 is a complicated statute, and it is only one part of a far more complicated, larger
statutory arrangement. But broadly speaking, it permits the NSA to acquire without an individualized
warrant the communications of non-US persons reasonably believed to be overseas when those
communications are transiting the United States or stored in the United States. Under these
circumstances, the NSA can order production of such communications from telecommunications carriers
and internet companies under broad programmatic orders issued by the Foreign Intelligence
MSDI Terror DA 40
Surveillance Court (FISC), which reviews both targeting and minimization procedures under which the
collection then takes place. Oversight is thick, both within the executive branch, and in reporting
requirements to the congressional intelligence committees. Make no mistake: Section 702 is a very big
deal in America’s counterterrorism arsenal. It is far more important than the much debated bulk
metadata program, which involves a few hundred queries a year. Section 702 collection, by contrast, is
vast, a hugely significant component not only of contemporary counterterrorism but of foreign
intelligence collection more generally. In 2012, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence wrote that
“[T]he authorities provided [under section 702] have greatly increased the government’s ability to
collect information and act quickly against important foreign intelligence targets. . . . [The] failure to
reauthorize [section 702] would ‘result in a loss of significant intelligence and impede the ability of the
Intelligence Community to respond quickly to new threats and intelligence opportunities.’”8 The
President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies, after quoting this
language, wrote that “Our own review is not inconsistent with this assessment. . . . [W]e are persuaded
that section 702 does in fact play an important role in the nation’s effort to prevent terrorist attacks
across the globe.”9 The Washington Post has reported that 702 was in 2012 the single most prolific
contributor to the President’s Daily Brief.10 Yet we have seen enormous anxiety about Section 702
collection, along with its close cousin, collection overseas against non-US person targets under Executive
Order 12333. Sometimes, these anxieties have been rooted in the supposed effects of this collection on
U.S. persons.11 Sometimes, however, the complaints have stemmed from broader concerns about
infringement of privacy worldwide. Europeans have expressed shock, for example, that a U.S. spy
agency would presume to collect against an allied foreign leader like German Chancellor Angela
Merkel12—surveillance that now seems forward-thinking and reasonable given later reports that
Merkel has been on the phone frequently during the Crimea crisis with Vladimir Putin.13 Major news
organizations have considered it front-page news that NSA has pursued intelligence targets on online
gaming platforms and smartphone apps,14 that NSA has collected contact lists in large numbers around
the world,15 even that foreign countries spy on one another, collect attorney-client communications
involving U.S. lawyers along the way, and may share that material with NSA subject to U.S. law and
minimization requirements.16 Whether one considers these stories important journalism or reckless
blowing of valuable surveillance activities, they both reflect and further stoke a deep concern about the
scope of U.S. surveillance practices. And that concern is creating inexorable pressures for reforms we
may regret in the counterterrorism space. The legal regime here is one that this body knowingly and
deliberatively created in an iterative set of interactions with the intelligence community and the courts.
It requires no apology. Rather, it requires an active defense. And while there are certainly areas in which
the regime could benefit from reform, the big risk here is that overreaction and panic in the face of
exposure will lead to a burdening of the core signals intelligence capacity of the United States with legal
processes designed to protect civil liberties domestically. This could happen either because reform
efforts go too far or because Congress fails to reauthorize 702 and thus applies the terms of core FISA—
which require an individualized warrant based on probable cause— to a wide swath of overseas
collection. Broadly then, the legislative task with respect to Section 702 is something of the opposite of
the task with respect to the AUMF. To the extent that members of this committee continue to believe,
as I do, in the essential integrity and value of the existing legal authorities for intelligence collection and
oversight, the task in the current political environment is to defend that architecture—publicly and
energetically—rather than to race to correct imagined deficiencies, or even real structural deficiencies
that, however real they may be, bear little relation to the outcomes that disquiet us.
MSDI Terror DA 41
MSDI Terror DA 42
Cyber Provisions
Encryption cracking necessary to prevent terrorism
Network World, September 19, 2013, NSA wants even closer partnership with tech industry; NSA's
Debora Plunkett says NSA's now is real-time automated information sharing on a large scale,
http://www.networkworld.com/news/2013/091913-nsa-tech-industry-274011.html DOA: 2-1-15
The National Security Agency's director of information assurance today said the "way to achieve
confidence in cyberspace" is to increase collaboration between the government and the high-tech
industry -- remarks that rang ironic given former NSA contractor Edward Snowden's revelations about
how NSA works with industry. NSA documents leaked by Snowden showed that the NSA's goal is to build
backdoors into commercial products and weaken encryption to make it easier for surveillance,
allegations that the U.S. government has not even tried to refute. When asked about that today, NSA
director of information assurance Debora Plunkett, who gave the keynote address at the New York
Institute of Technology Cyber Security Conference here, flatly refused to discuss the topic. But her
keynote address was intended to get hardware and software vendors to work in ever-closer partnership
with the NSA. Cyberattacks that could take electricity grids offline and disrupt transportation systems
are possible, Plunkett said in her keynote, pointing out the destructive attack that hit Saudi Aramco last
year and impacted data systems there. [RELATED: Reported NSA actions raise serious questions about
tech industry partnerships MORE: Black Hat: Top 20 hack-attack tools] It's a simple matter to hire
hacking services to carry out attacks such as denial-of-service, she said, and the fear now is of "integrity
attacks" that would destroy or alter critical data. These are all "cyber security challenges," she noted,
and the government today is largely dependent on commercial hardware and software for which the
NSA itself cannot "provide indemnification." NSA's needs industry's help, she said. Plunkett said "we
have to have a community come together" to collaborate on security in mobility and the cloud
especially. The NSA expects that the future of network security lies in "more automated cyber defense"
based on "large-scale automation" that would reduce the need for manpower where there would be
more real-time sharing of findings. She said there's a need for collaboration with ISPs and hardware
companies to achieve all of this. "We have to build a close partnership," she said, adding, there can be
"confidence in cyberspace" if "we stay the course." Plunkett is a 29-year veteran of the NSA who worked
her way up through the ranks to have a hand in guiding strategic direction for the agency, which carries
out surveillance to help defend the country against cyberthreats. But NSA documents recently leaked by
Snowden show that the NSA views its partnership with industry in part as a way to subvert security in
commercial products and services to make cyber-spying easier. This revelation casts NSA's call for
industry partnership and its insistence that there can be "confidence in cyberspace" in a questionable
light.
MSDI Terror DA 43
Domestic Anti-Terrorism Key
Domestic terror solvency spills over to international solvency
Michael Massing, Journalist, 2001 [The American Prospect, " Home-Court Advantage: What the War
on Drugs Teaches Us about the War on Terrorism, 12/3, 12: 21, http://prospect.org/article/home-courtadvantage]
Might not the same be true with terrorism? There is no treatment analogy, of course. But if our main
goal is to prevent future terrorist attacks, wouldn't it be more effective to concentrate our enforcement
efforts here, in the United States, instead of operating on the hostile terrain of the Middle East? In all
the talk about unleashing the CIA, it's often overlooked that the perpetrators of September 11 had been
living in this country for years. In detecting and rooting out terrorists, shouldn't we tend primarily to our
own backyard? The Home Team Emphasizing prevention at home would offer a number of advantages.
First, it's much easier to carry out undercover work here than abroad. Agents face fewer hazards in San
Diego, Trenton, and Boca Raton than they do in Beirut, Cairo, or Peshawar. And we have many more
resources here. In addition to the FBI and other federal agencies, thousands of local police officers are
working on terrorism in cities across the country. In the drug war, the local police have led the way in
dismantling drug gangs, and they could make a similar contribution toward uprooting terrorist networks.
Furthermore, when it comes to obtaining "HUMINT"--the critical "human intelligence" collected by
investigative agencies--the millions of loyal American Muslims living in this country would seem a far
more fruitful source than Islamic fundamentalists in the Middle East. Finally, concentrating on domestic
law enforcement would avoid the types of covert actions that have proved so costly and embarrassing in
the past.
MSDI Terror DA 44
Intelligence Necessary to Prevent Genocide
Intelligence necessary to prevent human trafficking and mass atrocities
Report and Recommendations of the President’s Review Group on Intelligence,
December 2013, Liberty and Security in a Changing World, December 12,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-12-12_rg_final_report.pdf
Intelligence is designed not only to protect against threats but also to safeguard a wide range of national
security and foreign policy interests, including counterintelligence, counteracting the international
elements of organized crime, and preventing drug trafficking, human trafficking, and mass atrocities.
MSDI Terror DA 45
A2: Terrorists No Longer Use Email
Terrorists still communicate via email
Alastair Stevenson , Computer Reseller News UK, June 24, 2014, NSA and GCHQ mass surveillance a
waste of time, says Edward Snowden
"The top spy in the US - the director of National Intelligence James Clapper - stated in a private meeting
that was later reported in the press, that regardless of their fears, terrorists and criminals have to
communicate. And when they do, they will always make mistakes and give us ways to find them," he
said. "For example, we've all known about telephone wire taps for years now, but criminals still use
them. We know about internet surveillance, but we still use email because it's critical to our lives. We
have ways to monitor them."
MSDI Terror DA 46
Government Transparency
Increasing transparency increases terrorism risks because terrorists can take
advantage of the information
SENATOR CHARLES GRASSLEY (R-IA), July 31, 2013, Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee
Subject: "Strengthening Privacy Rights and National Security: Oversight of FISA (Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act) Surveillance Programs" https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=741931
Finally, increased transparency is a worthy goal in general. And as I suggested before, whenever we can
talk about these programs, I think there's less questions out there in the minds of people, and we
probably created some public relations problems for us and for this program and for our national
security community because maybe we haven't made enough information available. I say that
understanding that we can't tell our enemies what we -- what tools we use. But if we consider any
reform that may bring more transparency to the FISA process, we should keep in mind, then, that every
piece of information we make available to the public will be read by a determined adversary, and that
adversary has already demonstrated the capacity to kill thousands of Americans, even on our own soil.
MSDI Terror DA 47
RFID
RFID technology defeats terrorism
Gene Kaprowski, August 13, 2014, UPI, “Wireless World: RFID to Thwart Terrorism,”
http://www.upi.com/Science_News/2004/08/13/Wireless-World-RFID-to-thwartterrorism/88291092413872/ DOA: 5-1-15
An associate of Osama bin Laden crawls into a container -- along with some new luxury cars -- in a
shipyard in Hamburg, Germany. The goal -- shipping himself to the United States and evading the
Department of Homeland Security, with its high-tech officers on the ground at major airports, armed
with databases of suspects' photos. He is foiled, however, when a silent alarm is triggered, and an alert
is sent to security over the airwaves, as he lifts the lid of the container in the warehouse. A wireless radio
frequency identification or RFID security tag on the container sent the signal, silently, without alerting the
intruder. This scenario is one the government, major shippers and transportation companies are
envisioning as possible for the near future. "The security of American ports continues to be a critical
issue for homeland security," Robert Jackson, an attorney with Reed Smith LLP, located in the firm's
Washington, D.C., office, told United Press International. RFID technology, long touted as in-store antitheft devices for retailers, is evolving and now is "the answer for homeland defense at our ports," Ben
Quinones, a partner in the technology law practice of Pillsbury Winthrop in California's Silicon Valley,
told UPI. The technology, developed by private sector research and development labs -- at companies
like Avery Dennison, among others -- goes by several names, but one well-known product is called the
"security strap," a spokesman for the company told UPI. Once goods are sealed inside a box, a
longshoreman or another worker affixes the security strap. That enables shippers to track the cargo
containers through their entire overseas trip. Tampering with the seal brings a security check.
Companies like SAMSys are moving forward with second-generation RFID security technologies that may
be even more effective. Sun Microsystems Inc. recently opened a test center in Dallas, giving customers
a location to test an array of RFID scenarios, a spokesman told UPI. Even food and drug companies are
eyeing the technology, fearful that rogues may tamper with or, worse yet, counterfeit the nation's
pharmaceutical supplies. The technology also is garnering funds at government research laboratories, as
scientists are anxious to improve the state of the art for RFID. Last month, the U.S. Department of
Energy's Oak Ridge National Laboratory reached a development deal with Spectrum Signal Processing
Inc. for a RFID platform, endorsed by the Pentagon, for an array of applications, a spokesman told UPI.
RFID security technology currently comes in many forms, experts said. "Tags on containers, for rail cars,
are fairly large and are active," John Parkinson, chief technologist, North American Region, with the
consulting firm Capgemini in suburban Chicago, told UPI. "They contain a power source and can
broadcast a signal that can be tracked by a satellite. Load the tag with a manifest of what's in the
container, and you can track it as it moves along the global supply chain." Other kinds of tags operate
passively but still are good for catching stowaways, Parkinson said. “Pass the tag through a broadcast RF
(radio frequency) from a reader and the tag gets enough energy to squawk out a short code so it can be
used to look up what's on the pallet or in the carton," he said. "If the passive tag IDs point to data that
specifies size and weight, a quick calculation and weighbridge datum tells you if the container is full and
over or under weight. Stowaways or added materials would show up." Some technology companies,
like RAE Systems Inc. and a wireless semiconductor maker called Ember Corp., don't think RFID tags
provide enough information or security. They believe wireless sensor technology will be more effective
MSDI Terror DA 48
at monitoring shipping containers. Around Christmas last year, the companies demonstrated a
prototype wireless security monitoring system, designed to help carriers of cargo comply with federal
regulations seeking to prevent terrorists from smuggling nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass
destruction into the United States. The Department of Homeland Security last Nov. 18 declared it
wanted cargo companies that ship to American ports to equip their containers to prevent terrorist
threats. The prototype technology developed by RAE Systems and Ember uses embedded RF chips and
networking software to wrap cargo in a virtual Web network, which can detect weapons grade
materials, as well as detail when containers have been opened. "It's easier to detect potential terrorists
in American ports when we know what's happening inside the container at all times," RAE Systems Chief
Executive Officer Robert Chen said in a statement. More than 7 million shipping containers pass through
U.S. ports each year, experts said. "The sheer volume of cargo entering our country every day makes it
too easy for terrorists to smuggle dangerous cargo," Ember CEO Jeff Grammer said in a statement. The
movement for wireless technology to track potential terrorist threats also is creating some consumer
spin-offs, experts said. The Airport IT Trends Survey, sponsored by the airline information technology
industry, reported 8 percent of responding airports already offer RFID tracking for passenger baggage.
This is expected to increase to 25 percent of airports during the next two years. That could, one day, mean
no more irretrievable luggage, lost forever in some cargo bin. Long-term, RFID also could speed up the
process for importers to bring legitimate goods into the United States. The Department of Homeland
Security has started using RFID tags to identify freight-carrying trucks as they cross the border with
Canada and, by the end of the year, the technology is expected to be deployed to other land entry
points into the United States. Another use is RFID cards for those people who frequently cross the
border into the U.S. Congress is eyeing these technology developments, especially now that the
Pentagon and Homeland Security are pushing RFID projects, and views them as replacing less-effective
video surveillance methods. "RFID chips are more powerful than today's video surveillance technology,"
said Sen. Patrick Leahy, D-Vt., during a conference this spring at the Georgetown University Law Center.
"RFIDs are more reliable, they are 100 percent automatic, and they are likely to become pervasive,
because they are significantly less expensive."
RFID technology provides security against terrorism
Laura Wiegler, 2014, June 20, RFID Insider, “Securing Entry: RFID is Making us Safer,”
DOA: 5-2-15
In 2001, the database the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) uses to check visa and passport
applicants held about 7 million visa records and over 2 million passport records, according to the DHS.
Further, they said that, “If a visa applicant turned out to be a possible match for a terrorism-related
CLASS record, the consular officer requested a Security Advisory Opinion (SAO) from the Visa Office in
Washington. Such requests were sent via cables, as were the Department’s responses. This multi-step
cable process to communicate with posts and to coordinate with other government agencies resulted in
long wait times for both the consular officers and the applicants.” A simpler, more efficient way By
2005, though, those long wait times were going to change – at least in theory – as RFID was introduced to
the average American passenger traveling internationally. Today, the State Department issues both
passport cards and passport books that are “smart” enough to read our information, the former at a
distance and the latter at close range. The U.S. employs biometrics, which can be obtained through facial
recognition, fingerprints, or the scanning of irises, but apparently requirements can vary. Michael Holly,
Senior Advisor for International Affairs, Passport Services in the U.S. Department of State Bureau of
MSDI Terror DA 49
Consular Affairs told RFIDinsider that “We use both fingerprints and facial recognition [for
visas]. We’ve also studied the use of iris images.” He did not elaborate further, but it’s widely
speculated that scanning iris images is not as reliable, and thus less popular, than scanning fingerprints
and recognizing faces. For passports, moreover, a digitized and readable photo is used, forgoing
fingerprints on its contactless chip. Insofar as the Government’s rationale behind RFID’s use, Holly claims
the history far precedes 9-11, a common barometer for measuring the nation’s security practices.
Indeed, according to the U.S. Government, RFID has been used along the nation’s land borders with
Canada and Mexico since 1995. While Holly didn’t spell this out, the new passports have been designed to
better protect the public from terrorism, even though it’s arguable whether or not they are also easing
hassles at airports. Toward that end, there are bells and whistles attached to modern-day passports, and
depending on whether one has the “card” or the “book”, the technology differs. “What we provide to a
U.S. traveling citizen bearing a passport card is a protective sleeve with that document,” Holly says. “But
with a passport we do a number of things – these are two different technologies: proximity and vicinity.”
He says with a passport card “vicinity technology” is employed; and a number of things are done to
protect it “from the possibility of skimming data from the chip, and eavesdropping. We use antiattenuation tape, a skimming sleeve that blocks the possibility of someone trying to skim data from the
chip if the book is closed,” he says. The borders agent can thus obtain information discreetly, and in real
time, according to Holly. “They’re [the passport issuers] using PKI (public key infrastructure) and in
association with the RFID chip we can …confirm data that appears on the passport’s data page and
[which one] can authenticate using the digital signatures,” he says. Obviously, in an era when a plane
can go missing for weeks or months, and two passengers can board with stolen passports, security at
least worldwide is hardly foolproof. Nevertheless, Holly believes that over about the past decade, the
American traveler’s experience is far more secure than it was in the halcyon days of early air travel. “We
use a security protocol known as the “basic access control” that requires, in order for the chip to
communicate with a reader, that [the passport owner’s] book must be open, that the machine- readable
zone be read.” He says this “zone” is two lines of OCR code at bottom of the passport page, and from
which “a number of pins are derived, and then once that happens, the chip will communicate with the
reader, releasing the data on the chip.” In the case of passport books, the readers are at the customs
booths for use upon entry to the foreign country. But in the case of cards, which he explains are
commonly used when U.S. citizens travel by car from the northernmost and southernpost parts of the
country, the data is read from a greater distance. (See article on toll booth RFID use.) Both [the card
type and book type] are passports but the book uses RFID proximity technology, he explains. “The chip
in the passport book is a microprocessor. It stores data on it. …The passport card does not store any
data. It simply points [via a recognized serial number] to a record stored in a secure database.” The
Netherlands-based Gemalto, a global digital security firm, has been working with the U.S. Government
for several years on rolling out RFID for use on or with passports. Gemalto says on its website that in
August of 2012, the Government Printing Office (GPO) awarded the company with a second consecutive
five-year contract. “Gemalto first partnered with [the] GPO in 2006 following stringent evaluations to
meet agency requirements,” the company says on its site
MSDI Terror DA 50
Biometrics
Biometrics essential to counter terrorism
Patrick Tucker, February 27, 2015, Defense One, Jihadi John
and the Future of the Biometrics Terror
Hunt, http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2015/02/jihadi-john-and-future-biometrics-terrorhunt/106263/ DOA: 5-7-15
On Thursday, the Washington Post and BBC publicly identified Mohammed Emwazi, a British-educated,
Kuwaiti-born man in his mid 20s, as “Jihadi John,” the Islamic State frontman who executed several
hostages on camera, to the world’s horror. “We will not comment on ongoing investigations and
therefore are not in a position to confirm or deny the identity of this individual,” the FBI said Thursday.
Denials aside, FBI director James Comey said months ago that they knew John’s identity. If the FBI has in
fact identified Jihadi John, the victory was, in part, a product of the FBIs growing collaboration with the
Department of Defense — a relationship that will grow much more cozy in the coming years, in the black
cherry tree dotted hills of Clarksburg, West Virginia. About four hours away from Washington D.C. sits
the headquarters of the FBI’s Criminal Justice Information Services Division, or CJIS, which houses the
bureau’s Biometric Center of Excellence. The center is not a place so much as a program begun in 2007
that plays a key role in making use of all the biometric data that comes into the FBI’s possession. That’s
every fingerprint, every image, and every phone message that anyone sends to the FBI. “Bottom line for
us … if any of our divisions, whether it be our counterterrorism division, our criminal division, if at any
time during their investigations they develop biometrics … they submit it through our system,” Stephen
L. Morris, assistant director of the CJIS, told Defense One at a recent conference in Washington. In terms
of identifying John, he said, “I’m not going to tell you how we did it,” but added, “You have to have
something to search … you can have images with faces but if you’re not capturing it in the right way, if
there’s not data in that image to make a comparison, it’s just not useful.” This, in part, is why the
biometric center plays a role in bringing parties, and their biometric databases, together. The FBI’s
system is called the Next Generation Identification, or NGI. It includes photos, aliases, physical
characteristics and, of course, fingerprints. Today, it’s completely interoperable with the military’s
Automated Biometric Identification System, or ABIS, and the Department of Homeland Security’s
Automated Biometric Identification System, or IDENT. The center also works with the State Department
and allied law enforcement agencies around the world. The FBI and Britain’s MI5 have been working
together to identify John. Obtaining a biometric record on a suspect to match against a terrorist video of
a masked jihadi is not something done easily or robotically. It requires old school investigation, either
sifting through lots of hours of collected video footage and comparing that to crime videos (such as
beheadings), or going out into the field to find voice samples on suspects to match against crime videos,
or both. This is where the Defense Department’s extensive library of biometric signatures, gathered on
the field in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, can play a role in future investigations. The department’s
biometrically enabled watch list, or BEWL, houses more than 200,000 records. “I can’t speak enough
about our relationship with the Department of Defense. After 9/11, our mission in life changed. It was
all about national security, our partnership with DHS and DOD — to say it expanded is an
understatement,” Morris said at a recent biometrics conference in Washington, D.C.“Their ABIS system
was connected with our system, so they have a small group of folks who are out there [in West Virginia]
MSDI Terror DA 51
in charge of their system. Having them co-locate with us has been very important.” That important
relationship is about to get a lot more intimate. Later this year, the FBI is going to open a $328 million,
360,000-square foot Biometric Technology Center next to the current CJIS campus. The Defense
Department will get about 40,000 square feet in the building, which will also consolidate the FBI’s
biometric workers and operations. “Anything and everything we do will be run out of that building,” said
Morris. In September of last year, the FBI announced that the $1.2 billion dollar NGI system was fully
operational (it was rolled out in increments over a period of years). If it works according to plan, it will
provide law enforcement with a very fast and reliable sense of exactly who they are talking to, what
threat that individual may pose, and what records they’ve left — fingerprints, voiceprints, etc. — in
what places. But fingerprints don’t help you catch everyone. Voice recognition played a key role in the
identification of Jihadi John, according to published reports. The FBI’s biometric center site lists voice
recognition as one of its key modalities, or areas of study, along with DNA and others, but fingerprints
and more traditional biometric signatures make up a bulk of the records it manages.
Biometrics needed to prevent terrorism
John Woodward, RAND, 2002, Biometrics: Facing Up Terrorism,
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/www/external/congress/terrorism/phase1/biometrics.pdf
DOA: 5-3-15
As the nation recovers from the attacks of September 11, 2001, we must rededicate our efforts to
preventing any such terrorist acts in the future. While there is no easy, foolproof technical fix to counter
terrorism, the use of biometric technologies might help make America a safer place. Biometrics refers to
the use of a person’s physical characteristics or personal traits to identify, or verify the claimed identity,
of that individual. Fingerprints, faces, voices, and handwritten signatures are all examples of
characteristics that have been used to identify us in this way. Biometric based systems provide
automatic, nearly instantaneous identification of a person by converting the biometric, for example a
fingerprint, into digital form and then comparing it against a computerized database. This RAND Issue
Paper discusses how biometric technologies could be used to impede terrorism in three critical areas: 1.
Controlling access to sensitive facilities at airports, 2. Preventing identity theft and fraud in the use of
travel documents, and, 3. Identifying known or suspected terrorists with a proposed counterterrorist
application known as FaceCheck.
MSDI Terror DA 52
UQ
MSDI Terror DA 53
General
MSDI Terror DA 54
Surveillance Programs Now
Surveillance is first step to prevent terror
General Keith Alexander, retired after 8 years as director of the NSA, May 15, 2014,
New Yorker, http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2014/05/were-atgreater-risk-q-a-with-general-keith-alexander.html DOA: 2-20-15
In January, President Obama claimed that the N.S.A. bulk-metadata program has disrupted fifty-four
terrorist plots. Senator Patrick Leahy said the real number is zero. There’s a big difference between fiftyfour and zero. Those [fifty-four events] were plots, funding, and giving money—like the Basaaly Moalin
case, where the guy is giving money to someone to go and do an attack. [Note: Moalin’s case is awaiting
appeal.] It’s fifty-four different events like that, where two programs—the metadata program and the
702 program—had some play. I was trying to think of the best way to illustrate what the intelligence
people are trying to do. You know “Wheel of Fortune”? Here’s the deal: I’m going to give you a set of
big, long words to put on there. Then I’m going to give you some tools to guess the words. You get to
pick a vowel or a consonant—one letter. There’s a hundred letters up there. You’ll say, I don’t have a
clue. O.K., so you’ve used your first tool in analysis. What the intelligence analysts are doing is using
those tools to build the letters, to help understand what the plot is. This is one of those tools. It’s not the
only tool. And, at times, it may not be the best tool. It evolved from 9/11, when we didn’t have a tool
that helped us connect the dots between foreign and domestic. Around 9/11, we intercepted some of
[the hijackers’] calls, but we couldn’t see where they came from. So guys like [Khalid al-]Mihdhar, [one
of the 9/11 hijackers who was living] in California—we knew he was calling people connected to Al
Qaeda in Yemen. But we thought he was in the Middle East. We had no way to connect the dots. If you
rewound 9/11, what you would have done is tipped the F.B.I. that a guy who is planning a terrorist
attack is in San Diego. You may have found the other three groups that were with him.
We must keep all intelligence tools to fight terror
John McLaughlin teaches at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He was
deputy director and acting director of the CIA from 2000 to 2004, January 2, 2014, Washington Post,
“NSA Intelligence-Gathering Programs Keep us Safe,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/nsaintelligence-gathering-programs-keep-us-safe/2014/01/02/0fd51b22-7173-11e3-8b3fb1666705ca3b_story.html
As our debate continues, the terrorist threat is not receding but transforming. The core leadership of al-Qaeda has
been degraded and remains under pressure, but robust al-Qaeda affiliates have multiplied. With the decline of
central government authority in the Middle East and North Africa in the wake of the Arab Spring and the war in
Syria, terrorists have the largest havens and areas for operational planning in a decade. If anything, the
atomization of the movement has made the job of intelligence more labor-intensive, more detail-oriented and
more demanding. Now is not the time to give up any tool in the counterterrorism arsenal.
MSDI Terror DA 55
Intelligence gathering critical to defeat terrorism
Paul Rosenzweig, Heritage Senior Legal Research Fellow, 2004 ["The Patriot Act Reader," w/ Alane
Kochems & James Jay Carafano, 9/20,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cf
m&PageID=69895]
As should be clear from the outline of the scope of the problem, the suppression of terrorism will not be
accomplished by military means alone. Rather, effective law enforcement and/or intelligence gathering
activity are the key to avoiding new terrorist acts. Recent history supports this conclusion. In fact, police
have arrested more terrorists than military operations have captured or killed. Police in more than 100
countries have arrested more than 3,000 al-Qaeda–linked suspects, while the military captured some
650 enemy combatants. Equally important, it is policing of a different form—preventative rather than
reactive, since there is less value in punishing terrorists after the fact when, in some instances, they are
willing to perish in the attack. The foregoing understanding of the nature of the threat from terrorism
helps to explain why the traditional law enforcement paradigm needs to be modified (or, in some
instances, discarded) in the context of terrorism investigations. The traditional law enforcement model
is highly protective of civil liberty in preference to physical security. All lawyers have heard one or
another form of the maxim that “it is better that 10 guilty go free than that one innocent be mistakenly
punished.” This embodies a fundamentally moral judgment that when it comes to enforcing criminal
law, American society, in effect, prefers to have many more Type II errors (false negatives) than it does
Type I errors (false positives). That preference arises from two interrelated grounds. One is the historical
distrust of government that, as already noted, animates many critics of the Patriot Act. But the other is,
at least implicitly, a comparative valuation of the social costs attending the two types of error. We value
liberty sufficiently highly that we see a great cost in any Type I error. And though we realize that Type II
errors free the guilty to return to the general population, thereby imposing additional social costs on
society, we have a common-sense understanding that those costs, while significant, are not so
substantial that they threaten large numbers of citizens or core structural aspects of the American
polity. The post–September 11th world changes this calculus in two ways. First, and most obviously, it
changes the cost of the Type II errors. Whatever the cost of freeing mob boss John Gotti or sniper John
Muhammad might be, they are substantially less than the potentially horrific costs of failing to stop the
next al-Qaeda assault. Thus, the theoretical rights-protective construct under which our law
enforcement system operates must, of necessity, be modified to meet the new reality. We simply
cannot afford a rule that “better 10 terrorists go free than that one innocent be mistakenly punished.”
Second, and less obviously, it changes the nature of the Type I errors that must be considered. In the
traditional law enforcement paradigm, the liberty interest at stake is personal liberty—that is, freedom
from the unjustified application of governmental force. We have as a model the concept of an arrest,
the seizure of physical evidence, or the search of a tangible place. As we move into the Information Age,
and deploy new technology to assist in tracking terrorists, that model is no longer wholly valid.
MSDI Terror DA 56
NSA surveillance has disrupted more than 50 terror plots
USA Today, JUN 07, 2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/06/18/nsasurveillance-secret-programs-terror-plots/2434193/ NSA: Surveillance foiled 50 terror plots By: Kevin
Johnson, DOA: 1-1-14 Director says NYSE was among targets Section: News, Pg. 05a
National Security Agency Director Keith Alexander told a House committee Tuesday that more than 50
terror threats throughout the world have been disrupted with the assistance of two secret surveillance
programs that were recently disclosed by former defense contractor Edward Snowden. More than 10 of
the plots targeted the U.S. homeland, Alexander told the House Intelligence Committee, including a plan
to attack the New York Stock Exchange. "I would much rather be here today debating this," Alexander
said, "than explaining why we were unable to prevent another 9/11" attack. At the rare open committee
hearing, Alexander and Deputy Attorney General Jim Cole told lawmakers that both surveillance
operations -- a domestic telephone tracking system that collects records of millions of Americans and an
Internet monitoring program targeting non-citizens outside the U.S. -- have been subject to rigorous
oversight to guard against privacy abuses. "This isn't some rogue operation that some guys at the NSA
are operating," Alexander said. Deputy FBI Director Sean Joyce told the committee about a threat that
was neutralized by the programs: Investigators used the phone-tracking system to identify an operative
in San Diego who was providing support to terrorists in Somalia. Joyce also referred to two disrupted
plots that were disclosed last week as having been thwarted by the surveillance operations, including a
2009 plan to bomb the New York subway system. In that case, authorities used NSA's Internet
monitoring program to identify overseas communications involving Najibullah Zazi in Colorado, who was
later convicted in connection with the subway attack plan. "This is not a program that is off the books,"
Cole said, outlining the executive, legislative and judicial controls. In the plot against the stock exchange,
Joyce said investigators identified a former New York accountant working with contacts in Yemen who
were in the early stages of planning an assault. Joyce did not name the man. In court documents,
however, he is identified as Sabirhan Hasanoff, 37, who pleaded guilty last year to providing support to
al-Qaeda. Hasanoff was not charged in a plot against the stock exchange, but prosecutors, while arguing
for a harsh prison sentence, alleged in court documents that he "cased the New York Stock Exchange" at
the direction of a terror leader in Yemen. Hasanoff's attorney was not immediately available for
comment. Lawmakers raised few questions about the intelligence officials' authority to conduct the
operations, despite the heated national privacy debate that was prompted by Snowden's disclosures.
Rep. Mike Rogers, R-Mich., the panel's chairman, said the programs were "designed" to protect
Americans. Maryland Rep. Dutch Ruppersberger, the committee's ranking Democrat, said Snowden's
unauthorized disclosures "put our country and allies in danger."
Surveillance critical to disrupt clandestine terrorist operations
Report and Recommendations of the President’s Review Group on Intelligence,
December 2013, Liberty and Security in a Changing World, December 12,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-12-12_rg_final_report.pdf DOA: 1-1-14
In the American tradition, the word “security” has had multiple meanings. In contemporary parlance, it
often refers to national security or homeland security. Thus understood, it signals the immense
MSDI Terror DA 57
importance of counteracting threats that come from those who seek to do the nation and its citizens
harm. One of the government’s most fundamental responsibilities is to protect this form of security,
broadly understood. Appropriately conducted and properly disciplined, surveillance can help to
eliminate important national security risks. It has helped to save lives in the past. It will help to do so in
the future. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, it should not be necessary to
belabor this point. By their very nature, terrorist attacks tend to involve covert, decentralized actors
who participate in plots that may not be easy to identify or disrupt. Surveillance can protect, and has
protected, against such plots.
Any Restrictions on intel gathering increase terror risk
Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, National Commission on Terrorism Chair, 2000 ["New Terrorist Threats
and How to Counter Them," 7/31, http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/hl678.cfm]
It is obvious that there is no substitute for good intelligence if you are going to have an effective
counterterrorist policy. I have worked in and around government for 35 years now, and I have never
seen a field in which intelligence is more central to good policy and intelligence is more difficult to get
than in the field of terrorism. If you don't have good intelligence on terrorists, you simply don't have an
effective counterterrorist policy and, most of all, you cannot prevent attacks. After all, the basic
objective of counterterrorism is to stop the attacks before they happen.
Intel Key to solve terror
Fernando Reinares, Department of Politics and Sociology, Universidad Nacional de Education a
Distancia, Madrid, War on Terrorism, ed. Alan O’Day, 2004, p. 226-7
Given the clandestine and unpredictable nature of terrorism, however, all these resources may not be
effective unless they are accompanied by mechanisms for detecting and preventing future threats.
Reliable intelligence is an essential tool. Experience shows that, as long as the other components
function as they should, success in the state’s counter-terrorism campaign is directly proportional to the
emphasis placed on the gathering and analyzing of reliable information. On the contrary, when
intelligence is insufficient or inadequate, the terrorist group may sense the window of opportunity they
are being offered and will not hesitate to exploit this advantage by escalating its campaign of insurgent
violence. In 1976, for reasons that have never been sufficiently clarified, the Italian Government decided
to dismantle the special anti-terrorist units it had created only a few years earlier and ordered farreaching reorganization of its secret services. Terrorist attacks, which until then had been diminishing in
frequency, immediately began to pick up and did not ease again until the early 1980s. Not
coincidentally, by that time, revamped intelligence services put under greater supervisory control of the
legislative and executive branches, had begun to produce results.
MSDI Terror DA 58
Internal Terror Prevention Strong Now
Intelligence necessary to protect against WMD proliferation and terrorism
Report and Recommendations of the President’s Review Group on Intelligence,
December 2013, Liberty and Security in a Changing World, December 12,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-12-12_rg_final_report.pdf
The national security threats facing the United States and our allies are numerous and significant, and
they will remain so well into the future. These threats include international terrorism, the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, and cyber espionage and warfare. A robust foreign intelligence
collection capability is essential if we are to protect ourselves against such threats. Because our
adversaries operate through the use of complex communications technologies, the National Security
Agency, with its impressive capabilities and talented officers, is indispensable to keeping our country
and our allies safe and secure.
Efforts to track-down and arrest terrorists are effective
Heritage Foundation, August 2011, Homeland Security 2010,
http://www.heritage.org/Events/2011/08/TerrorTrends?query=Terrorism+by+the+Numbers:+Understanding+U.S+and+Global+Trends
A decade after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and after the demise of Osama bin Laden, looking back is
as important as looking forward, in order to learn from the past and to examine the current and
future threats facing the United States. Domestically, since the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, at least 40 terror plots against the U.S. have been foiled thanks to domestic and
international cooperation, as well as efforts to track down terror leads in local communities.
Likewise, on a global scale, from 1969 to 2009, there were a staggering 38,345 terrorist incidents
around the world, with nearly 3,000 targeted at the United States alone. These numbers serve as
a reminder that terrorists have not relented in their desire to harm the United States and its
people – America needs to remain vigilant. Join us as our panelists discuss the nature of the
terrorist threat to the United States and U.S. counterterrorism policy since 9/11.
Existing US counterterrorism efforts effective
Bergen, et al, September 2013, Jihadist Terrorism: A Threat Assessment,
http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Jihadist%20Terrorism-A%20Threat%20Assesment_0.pdf
Peter Bergen is the author of four books about al-Qaeda, three of which were New York Times best
sellers. The books have been translated into 20 languages. He is the director of the National Security
Program at the New America Foundation in Washington, D.C.; a fellow at Fordham University’s Center
on National Security; and CNN’s national security analyst.
As detailed above, al-Qaeda has weakened considerably over the past few years, while U.S. defenses
have been strengthened. Just consider the following changes since the 9/11 attacks: On 9/11, there
MSDI Terror DA 59
were 16 people on the “no fly” list. Now there are more than 20,000. In 2001, there were 32 Joint
Terrorism Task Force “fusion centers” where multiple law enforcement agencies work together to chase
down leads to build terrorism cases. Now there are 103. A decade ago, the Department of Homeland
Security, National Counterterrorism Center, Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Northern
Command, and U.S. Cyber Command didn’t exist. All of these new institutions currently make it much
harder for terrorists to operate in the United States. Before 9/11, Special Operations Forces were
rarely deployed against al-Qaeda and allied groups. Now they perform nearly a dozen operations every
day in Afghanistan, as well as missions in other countries such as Yemen and Somalia. At the
beginning of the 21st century, the American public didn’t comprehend the threat posed by jihadist
terrorists, but that changed dramatically after 9/11. In December 2001, it was passengers who disabled
Richard Reid, “the shoe bomber.” Similarly, it was fellow passengers who tackled Umar Farouk
Abdulmutallab, the “underwear bomber,” eight years later. And the following year, it was a street
vendor who spotted the bomb-laden SUV Faisal Shahzad had parked in Times Square. Before 9/11,
the CIA and the FBI barely communicated about their respective investigations of terrorist groups. Now
they work together quite closely. The U.S. intelligence budget grew dramatically after 9/11, giving the
government large resources with which to improve its counterterrorism capabilities. In 2010, the United
States spent more than $80 billion on intelligence collection and other covert activities, a total more
than three times what it spent in 1998.
MSDI Terror DA 60
General Terror Risk
MSDI Terror DA 61
Up now
Number of terror attacks increasing
General Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, February 26, 2015, Full Committee Hearing on
“Worldwide Threats”, http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/15-02-26-worldwide-threats
Moving onto terrorism, in 2013, just over 11,500 terrorist attacks worldwide killed approximately 22,000
people. Preliminary data for the first nine months of 2014 reflects nearly 13,000 attacks, which killed
31,000 people. When the final counting is done, 2014 will have been the most lethal year for global
terrorism in the 45 years such data has been compiled.
Terror threat increasing
General Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, February 26, 2015, Full Committee Hearing on
“Worldwide Threats”, http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/15-02-26-worldwide-threats
I'm drawing this data -- ISIL conducting more attacks than any other terrorist group in the first nine
months of 2014. And credit where credit's due, I'm drawing this data from the National Consortium of
the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, or START, at the University of Maryland. The recent
terrorist attacks in Europe emphasized the threat posed by small numbers of extremists radicalized by
the conflicts in Syria and Iraq. The global media attention and widespread support in extremist circles
for these attacks probably will inspire additional extremists to conduct similar attacks. In ISIL, Al Qaida
and Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula and most recently, Al Shabaab are calling on their supporters to
conduct loan- wolf attacks against the United States and other Western countries. Of the 13 attacks in
the West since last May, 12 were conducted by individual extremists. Since the conflict began, more
than 20,000 Sunni foreign fighters have travelled to Syria from more than 90 countries to fight the Assad
regime. Of that number, at least 13,600 have extremist ties. More than 3,400 Western fighters have go
to Syria and Iraq. Hundreds have returned home to Europe. About 180 Americans or so have been
involved in various stages of travel to Syria. I should point out, this is those who've attempted to go,
didn't get there, those who got there and were killed, those who got there who fought and went to
another country and -- and some number have come back. A relatively small number have returned, and
we've not identified any of them engaged in attack plotting Nevertheless, the home-grown violent
extremists continue to pose the most likely threat to the homeland. Loan actors or (inaudible) groups
who act autonomously will -- will likely gravitate to simpler plots that don't require advanced skills,
outside training or communication with others. A small but persistent number of Sunni terrorist remain
intent on striking the U.S. and the West, some of whom still see commercial aviation as -- as an
appealing target.
MSDI Terror DA 62
Al Qaeda UQ
MSDI Terror DA 63
General
Al-Qaeda’s strength and geographic reach increasing
Dr. Hegghammer, 7-18, 13, Dr. Thomas Hegghammer is the Zukerman Fellow at Stanford University
Center for International Security and Cooperation and a senior research fellow at the Norwegian
Defense Research Establishment in Oslo, Hearing of the Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade
Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee Subject: "Global al-Qaida: Affiliates, Objectives
and Future Challenges" https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=740859
I would first point out that I think the growth of al-Qaida's affiliate in Syria and other recent
developments make this hearing particularly timely and important. In reviewing al-Qaida's evolution
since 1988, I'm going to make three arguments in my opening remarks. First, contrary to some
interpretations of the weakness of al- Qaida today, I would respond that it is actually quite resilient. As I
look at both al-Qaida as it stood, reflected in part in your map, Mr. Chairman, there has been a net
expansion in the number and the geographic scope of al-Qaida affiliates and allies over the past decade,
indicating that al-Qaida, at least in my view, is -- and the movement are far from defeated. I'll explain in
a moment what I mean by al-Qaida. This growth, in my view, is caused by at least two factors. One is
the Arab uprisings, which have weakened regimes across North Africa and the Middle East and created
an opportunity for al-Qaida to -- and its allies to establish or attempt to establish a foothold or a safe
haven. I would submit that the developments in Egypt are of particular concern. It is where the head of
-- current head of al- Qaida is from, and it is another potential avenue for a foothold, depending on how
that situation develops over the next several weeks and months. In addition, the growing sectarian
struggle across the Middle East between Sunni and Shia, which has been funded by, on the Sunni side,
both states and nonstate actors, has increased the resources available to militant groups, including to alQaida and its affiliates. So the first point is that I think there's been a slight net expansion in al-Qaida's
geographic scope and its number. Second, however, this expansion has, along with the weakness of
central al-Qaida in Pakistan -- recently, anyway -- has created a more diffuse and decentralized
movement. And I do think this is important, because I think what we see as we look at Syria, Jabhat alNusra, Iraq, al-Qaida in Iraq, Somalia, Al-Shabaab, Yemen, the al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, and alQaida in the Islamic Maghreb in North Africa, the main affiliates, they largely, as I interpret it, run their
operations somewhat autonomously, though they still communicate with the core and still may take
some strategic advice. And I would note that, what's interesting in the Syrian front is the attempt from
the core in Pakistan to adjudicate a dispute between al-Qaida in Iraq and Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria, and
then to have the affiliate in Syria essentially break away from Iraq, the al-Qaida in Iraq segment, and
swear allegiance directly to the core element in Pakistan, which to me symbolizes that there is still some
importance to that leadership Now, the way I would -- if pressed, would define al-Qaida today, it would
include the core in Pakistan, and I would say, even if Zawahiri were killed, there are at least three
potential replacements that sit in Iran today, all of whom are quite well-esteemed and are members of
what was called the management council, and one that potentially sits in -- or that sits in Yemen. So
even with the death of Zawahiri, I still think you would get a movement that would continue.
MSDI Terror DA 64
Egypt Warrant
Egyptian coup strengthened Al Qaeda
Gartenstein-Ross 14 (Daveed, Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, adjunct
assistant professor in Georgetown University’s security studies program, “The Arab Spring and AlQaeda’s Resurgence,” Congressional Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, 2/4/14,
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20140204/101698/HHRG-113-AS00-Wstate-GartensteinRossD-20140204.pdf)
But al-Qaeda’s biggest gain last year was perhaps the July military coup that deposed Egyptian president
Mohamed Morsi, and the often-brutal crackdown on protesters that followed. After the coup, jihadist
groups in the Sinai went on an immediate offensive, with targets including security officers and
Christians. That offensive has both extended beyond the Sinai region and continued into this year, with
a series of four January 24 bombings in Greater Cairo, including an explosion at the security directorate.
Egypt’s coup also bolstered al-Qaeda’s narrative. Many Western observers had hoped the Arab uprisings
would weaken al-Qaeda by providing a democratic alternative to the region’s dictators. These hopes
rested on an inexorable march toward democracy that would prompt increasing numbers of citizens to
participate in the new political systems. But the coup showed that democracy is reversible—perhaps
particularly so if political Islamist groups are in power. Al-Qaeda emir Ayman al-Zawahiri had been
saying exactly this since the revolutions began—claiming in March 2011 that Egypt’s new regime, even if
nominally democratic, would “preserve and maintain the old policies that fight Islam and marginalize
the sharia.” Though it’s too early to say whether more people are gravitating toward al-Qaeda’s
argument as a result, Zawahiri and other leading jihadist thinkers have already claimed vindication after
the coup, and we can expect more full-throated rhetoric on this point in the coming year. Al-Qaeda also
continues to be a force in its traditional strongholds. For example, it has spearheaded an assassination
campaign in Yemen that has, for more than two years, targeted the country’s military officers. Bearing in
mind the manner in which prisoner releases gave new life to jihadism in North Africa, a final concern is a
series of jailbreaks in July. The most significant was a July 21 jailbreak at Iraq’s notorious Abu Ghraib
prison that freed about 500 prisoners from a facility boasting a high concentration of skilled jihadists. On
July 28, prison riots coupled with an external attack freed 1,117 inmates from Benghazi’s Kuafiya prison.
And a sophisticated July 30 prison break in Pakistan, where almost 250 prisoners escaped, was claimed
by the militant group Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan.45 Some of the least surprising news of the year was that
U.S. officials came to suspect that these incidents, all occurring around the same time, might “be part of
an al Qaeda- coordinated ‘Great Escape’-like plot.”46
MSDI Terror DA 65
Arab Spring Warrant
The Arab Spring strengthened Al Qaeda – three reasons
Gartenstein-Ross 14 (Daveed, Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, adjunct
assistant professor in Georgetown University’s security studies program, “The Arab Spring and AlQaeda’s Resurgence,” Congressional Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, 2/4/14,
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20140204/101698/HHRG-113-AS00-Wstate-GartensteinRossD-20140204.pdf)
Factors Strengthening al-Qaeda and Jihadism Three primary factors have strengthened al-Qaeda and
jihadism in the Arab Spring environment, two of which fundamentally relate to the jihadist strategy
previously outlined: prisoner releases, dawa opportunities, and the resurgence of jihadist-aligned charity
networks. Prisoner releases. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence report on the notorious
September 2012 attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi notes that a number of individuals affiliated
with terrorist groups were involved, including those affiliated with the Muhammad Jamal Network.
Jamal himself is notable as one of many jihadist figures to have been released from Egyptian prison. This
makes Jamal part of the aforementioned trend that began with the Arab Spring uprisings, in which
prisons in affected countries have been emptied. In many cases, it is a good thing that prisoners have
gone free: the Arab dictatorships were notorious for unjustly incarcerating and abusing their political
prisoners. But jihadists were part of this wave of releases. Prisoners went free for a variety of reasons. In
Libya, Qaddafi’s government initially used releases as an offensive tactic early after the uprisings, setting
prisoners free in rebellious areas in order to create strife.28 As the rebellion continued, some prison
governors decided to empty prisons they were charged with guarding, including as a means of
defection.29 Chaos also allowed prison escapes, and gunmen attacked prisons in order to free inmates.
Regimes that experienced less chaotic transitions, including Tunisia and Egypt, were hesitant to continue
imprisoning virtually anybody jailed by the old regime, including violent Islamists with blood on their
hands. Moving beyond Muhammad Jamal, other prominent figures from Egypt’s jihadist movement
were also freed from prison. The most notorious is Muhammad al-Zawahiri, the brother of al-Qaeda’s
emir and a former member of Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Zawahiri played a prominent role in encouraging
jihadists to join the September 2012 attack on the U.S. embassy in Cairo, and American officials told The
Wall Street Journal that he has also helped Muhammad Jamal connect with his brother, the al-Qaeda
chief. Other released Egyptian inmates returned to operational and media roles, including Murjan Salim,
who has been directing jihadists to training camps in Libya. Figures like Jalal al-Din Abu al-Fatuh and
Ahmad ‘Ashush, among others, helped loosely reorganize networks through media outlets al-Bayyan
and al-Faruq. Prisoner releases helped regenerate jihadist networks in the Sinai that have been able to
cause a great deal of bloodshed since the country’s July coup. Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia’s striking growth
was also attributable to prisoner releases. AST leader Abu Iyadh al-Tunisi had been imprisoned since
2003 for involvement in terrorism abroad, but was released in the general amnesty of March 2011. In
fact, prominent AST members have claimed that the organization was born during periods of
imprisonment, when “communal prayer time served as a forum for discussion and refining ideas that
would be put into practice on release.” In Libya, many former prisoners, including some leaders of the
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, said they would forsake armed struggle and join the political process. But
other released prisoners returned to jihadist violence. Mohammed al-Zahawi and Shaykh Nasir alTarshani of Katibat Ansar al-Sharia in Benghazi both spent years in Qaddafi’s notorious Abu Salim
MSDI Terror DA 66
prison.31 Abu Sufyan bin Qumu, another Ansar al-Sharia leader based in Derna, was formerly
imprisoned in both Guantánamo Bay and Abu Salim. Dawa opportunities. Newfound opportunities to
undertake dawa allowed the spread of salafi jihadist ideology in places like Egypt and Tunisia. In Egypt,
members of the salafi jihadist current such as Muhammad al-Zawahiri and Ahmad ‘Ashush were able to
personally advocate for the movement on television for the first time. In Tunisia, AST developed a
sophisticated dawa strategy. It continues to undertake dawa even after the Tunisian government
banned it, but AST youth leader Youssef Mazouz said the group now carries out “less than half the work
it used to before August when it could plan events openly and post details on Facebook.”32 Some of
AST’s dawa efforts have been rather traditional: holding dawa events at markets or universities, holding
public protests, and dominating physical spaces, such as cafés, near places of worship. But AST also used
innovative approaches to dawa, including provision of social services (something other militant Islamic
groups like Hizballah and Hamas have also done) and its use of social media. As noted, AST’s ban now
impedes its ability to leverage social media. AST’s social services activity has included distribution of
food, clothing, and basic supplies, as well as sponsorship of convoys that provide both medical care and
medicine. These efforts concentrated on areas of Tunisia that are typically neglected by the
government, such as rural and impoverished areas, and AST also provided emergency humanitarian
assistance in the wake of such natural disasters as flooding. AST’s social services are typically
accompanied by distribution of literature designed to propagate its ideology. But even at its height,
AST’s distribution of social services didn’t reach the same areas consistently: it isn’t clear any
communities saw AST as a services provider week after week. This is where AST’s savvy use of social
media was particularly relevant. Almost immediately after it undertook humanitarian efforts, AST would
post information about its latest venture, including photographs, to its Facebook page and other
websites. Social media served as a force multiplier: while AST didn’t provide consistent services to a
single area, its social media activity illustrated a rapid pace of humanitarian assistance, and thus helped
the group achieve its goal of visibility. The context in which this dawa work was undertaken is important,
as the country’s economy suffered and much of its revolutionary hopes had faded. AST positioned itself
as a critic of the status quo and a champion of those whom the system neglected. This helped AST
develop into a growing movement by the last time I did field research there, in April 2013. Whether the
new Tunisian constitution will rekindle revolutionary hopes remains to be seen. Resurgence of jihadistaligned charity networks. Prior to the 9/11 attacks, al- Qaeda received significant funding from a wellfinanced network of Islamist charity organizations. As a monograph produced for the 9/11 Commission
noted, prior to those attacks “al-Qaeda was funded, to the tune of approximately $30 million per year,
by diversions of money from Islamic charities and the use of well-placed financial facilitators who
gathered money from both witting and unwitting donors.”33 Despite the efforts made to shut down
such groups, Islamist-leaning international charities and other NGOs have been reemerging as sponsors
of jihadist activity. In Tunisia, the pictures, videos, and information that AST posted on its Facebook page
suggest that AST received support from jihadist charity networks. In at least one case, it received
medical supplies from the Kuwaiti charity RIHS (the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society). The fact that
RIHS supported a jihadist-oriented group in Tunisia will come as no surprise to seasoned watchers of
terrorist financing. The U.S. Treasury Department designated RIHS in 2008 “for providing financial and
material support to al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda affiliates, including Lashkar e-Tayyiba, Jemaah Islamiyah, and
Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya.”34 The Treasury designation also charges that RIHS provided financial support
specifically for terrorist acts. And that’s not AST’s only connection to sympathetic foreign organizations.
The literature it passes out at dawa events can be traced to at least three book publishing houses in
MSDI Terror DA 67
Saudi Arabia: Dar al-Qassem, based in Riyadh; Dar al-Tarafen, based in Taif; and the Cooperative Office
for the Call and Guidance and Education Communities, based in Dammam. It’s likely that AST, which has
distributed a significant amount of these publishers’ literature, either has a direct relationship with the
publishers or else a designated intermediary. The most significant theater for jihadist charities’ rebound,
though, will likely be Syria. A recent comprehensive report published by the Brookings Institution notes
the role of “individual donors in the Gulf,” who “encouraged the founding of armed groups, helped to
shape the ideological and at times extremist agendas of rebel brigades, and contributed to the
fracturing of the military opposition.”35 The report singles out Kuwaiti donors and charities in
particular—including the aforementioned RIHS—in part because Kuwait has had fewer controls than
other Gulf countries. Further, the Syrian Islamic Front (SIF)—an umbrella group of six organizations that
is considered one of the key jihadist elements within the Syrian opposition—has clearly expressed ties to
Turkish and Qatari government-linked NGOs. The video proclaiming the creation of this new group in
December 2012 showed SIF members providing aid to Syrian civilians with boxes and flags bearing the
logos of the Turkish Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH). In January 2013, SIF posted a video to
YouTube depicting its members picking up aid from IHH in Yayladagi, Turkey, that was to be distributed
in Syria. Other boxes and flags in SIF’s December 2012 video belonged to Qatar Charity, which used to
go by the name Qatar Charitable Society. Evidence submitted by the U.S. government in a criminal trial
noted that in 1993 Osama bin Laden named the society as one of several charities that were used to
fund al-Qaeda’s overseas operations. Other charities that in the past supported al-Qaeda and jihadist
causes may also be on the rebound. For example, when the U.S. Treasury Department designated the Al
Haramain Islamic Foundation (AHIF), a Saudi charity that provided significant support to al-Qaeda
internationally, it noted that AHIF’s leadership “has attempted to reconstitute the operations of the
organization, and parts of the organization have continued to operate.”36 Further, the U.N.’s Office of
the Ombudsperson overseeing sanctions of al-Qaeda-linked individuals has produced a delisting in 38
different cases as of the time of this testimony.37 The delisting of al-Qaeda supporters at the United
Nations could further re-energize al-Qaeda charity networks.
Arab Spring led to AQ expansion
Gartenstein-Ross 14 (Daveed, Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, adjunct
assistant professor in Georgetown University’s security studies program, “The Arab Spring and Al-Qaeda’s
Resurgence,” Congressional Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, 2/4/14,
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20140204/101698/HHRG-113-AS00-Wstate-GartensteinRossD-20140204.pdf)
Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, distinguished members of the committee, it is an honor to
appear before you to discuss the state of al-Qaeda, its affiliates, and associated groups. My testimony
will focus on how the Arab Spring environment presented new opportunities for al-Qaeda, altered its
focus in discernible ways, and allowed it to experience significant geographic expansion. Not only is the
expansion of al-Qaeda’s recognized affiliates clear, but also a large number of new organizations have
cropped up in the Middle East and North Africa that profess an allegiance to al-Qaeda’s ideology, salafi
jihadism, yet claim they are organizationally independent from its network. These claims cannot
necessarily be taken at face value. Indeed, two central questions that analysts of jihadist militancy
MSDI Terror DA 68
debate today are: 1) to what extent are these new jihadist groups connected to the al- Qaeda network,
and 2) to what extent is al-Qaeda’s senior leadership (AQSL) able to set priorities and strategy for its
affiliates, and thus either control or influence their activities? Uncertainties surrounding both questions
somewhat complicate the U.S.’s policy response. This testimony begins by examining the question of
what al-Qaeda is, and what its goals are. Thereafter, it turns to the perceptions that al-Qaeda and other
salafi jihadists had of the Arab Spring, and their ideas about how the movement could benefit. The
testimony then calls into question the notion that al-Qaeda’s senior leadership has been decimated—
which, if true, means that intentions aside, the group would be unable to execute strategy in the new
environment. I then turn to factors that did in fact strengthen al-Qaeda and jihadism during the Arab
Spring, before giving an overview of al-Qaeda’s current position. I conclude by discussing what kinds of
policy responses are appropriate for the United States to adopt to address this challenge.
MSDI Terror DA 69
AQAP Warrant
AQAP is likely to attempt transnational attacks.
Clapper 12 (James, Director of National Intelligence, “Unclassified Statement for the Record on the
Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence,” http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2012_hr/013112clapper.pdf)
Aulaqi, we judge AQAP remains the node most likely to attempt transnational attacks. His death
probably reduces, at least temporarily, AQAP‟s ability to plan transnational attacks, but many of those
responsible for implementing plots, including bombmakers, financiers, and facilitators, remain and could
-led government in
Baghdad in favor of a Sunni-led Islamic caliphate. It probably will attempt attacks primarily on local Iraqi
targets, including government institutions, Iraqi Security Forces personnel, Shia civilians, and recalcitrant
Sunnis, such as members of the Sons of Iraq, and will seek to re-build support among the Sunni
population. In its public statements, the group also supports the goals of the global jihad, and we are
watchful for indications that AQI aspires to conduct attacks in the West.
MSDI Terror DA 70
ISIS UQ
MSDI Terror DA 71
General Strong Now
ISIS strength increasing
The Malone Telegram, February 28, 2015 Saturday, Obama's reasoned request, P. 4
ISIL is a serious and growing threat, with reports that it is looking to gain footholds in even more nations
in its quest to establish a caliphate. If the Middle East seems chaotic now, imagine it with ISIL ruling an
oil-rich nation from which to export its violent doctrine. It must be stopped.
ISIS a threat to regional and international security
Charles Lister, Brookings Doha Center, December 2014, Profiling the Islamic State,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2014/11/profiling-islamic-statelister/en_web_lister.pdf?la=en DOA: 3-1-15
This impressively managed, almost obsessively bureaucratic organization has become a serious threat to
regional and international security. In fundamentally challenging al-Qaeda’s place as the recognized
leader of transnational jihadism, it continues to attract recruits from across the globe. The scale of this
threat has been demonstrated by the initiation of airstrikes by a broad international coalition in Iraq and
Syria in recent months. While IS has shifted underground, it continues operations in Syria and Iraq.
Moreover, its beheading of foreign hostages has presented a concerning element of leverage over the
international community’s ability to counter its influence.
MSDI Terror DA 72
Attacks Increasing Warrent
ISIS conducts mass casualty urban attacks
Charles Lister, Brookings Doha Center, December 2014, Profiling the Islamic State,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2014/11/profiling-islamic-statelister/en_web_lister.pdf?la=en DOA: 3-1-15
IS military operations can generally be divided into two categories. The first is mass casualty urban
attacks, normally targeting Shia, Alawi Muslims, and other minority groups, often in civilian areas. These
attacks, which have been more common in Iraq, see IS operate as a typical terrorist organization,
managing small, covert, largely urban cells linked to a larger militant infrastructure capable of providing
funding and equipment. These operations can continue amid favorable or unfavorable operating
environments and are the key to sustaining offensive momentum against adversaries.
MSDI Terror DA 73
Military Capacity Warrent
ISIL’s influence and threat in the Middle East is increasing
General Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, February 26, 2015, Full Committee Hearing on
“Worldwide Threats”, http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/15-02-26-worldwide-threats
DOA: 3-1-15
Moving into the Mid East, ISIL is increasing its influence outside of Iraq and Syria, seeking to expand its
self-declared caliphate into the Arabian Peninsula, North Africa and South Asia and planning terrorist
attacks against Western and Shia interests. ISIL's rise represents the greatest shift in the Sunni violent
extremist landscape since Al Qaida affiliates first began forming, and it is the first to assume at least
some characteristics of a nation state. Spillover from the Syrian conflict is raising the prospect of
instability in Lebanon, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. In Iraq, sectarian conflict in mixed Shia-Sunni areas is
growing and if not blunted, will undermine progress against ISIL. Although Prime Abadi has begun to
alter the etho-sectarian tone in Iraq, resistance from his Shia political allies and persistent distrust
among Iraqi leaders will limit progress toward a stable, inclusive political environment. ISIL's ability to
conduct large-scale offensive operations in Iraq has been degraded by coalition airstrikes, the provision
of weapons and munitions by the U.S. and other allies, and stiffened defenses by the Iraqi security
forces, Kurdish Peshmerga, Shia militants and tribal allies, not to mention the Iranians. However, ISIL
remains, as we've seen, a formidable and brutal threat.
ISIS has a professional military organization
Charles Lister, Brookings Doha Center, December 2014, Profiling the Islamic State,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2014/11/profiling-islamic-statelister/en_web_lister.pdf?la=en DOA: 3-1-15
At the top, Baghdadi brings a crucial image of Islamic legitimacy, justified by his apparent Ph.D. in Islamic
Studies from the Islamic University of Baghdad and his history as an imam and preacher in Samarra.
Though not a graduate of al-Azhar or Dar al-Ifta’ al-Masriyyah, this clerical background puts Baghdadi on
a qualitatively higher religious level than Osama bin Laden or Ayman al-Zawahiri. More significant,
however, is the military and intelligence experience held by many of Baghdadi’s deputies, which has
brought a level of professionalism to IS’s ability to operate as an efficient and capable organization. For
example, both of Baghdadi’s deputies were former ranking officers in the Iraqi military. Abu Ali alAnbari, the chief of Syria operations, was a major general in the Iraqi Army and Fadl Ahmad Abdullah alHiyali (Abu Muslim al-Turkmani), the chief of operations in Iraq, was a lieutenant colonel in Iraqi Military
Intelligence and a former officer in the Iraqi Special Forces.50 Moreover, according to data seized from
the safe-house of former IS General Military Council leader Adnan Ismail Najem Bilawi (Abu Abd alRahman al-Bilawi) in early June 2014, the group maintained roughly 1,000 “medium and top level field
commanders, who all have technical, military, and security experience.”
ISIS creates power vacuums that it enters and takes over
Charles Lister, Brookings Doha Center, December 2014, Profiling the Islamic State,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2014/11/profiling-islamic-statelister/en_web_lister.pdf?la=en DOA: 3-1-15
MSDI Terror DA 74
Independent of specific local dynamics, IS has proven capable of designing and implementing a multistage strategy aimed at engendering a chaotic power vacuum into which it can enter. Combining a
typical insurgent strategy of attrition with extreme brutality (such as the execution of approximately 200
men captured at Tabaqa Airbase in late August), IS is able to acquire the leverage necessary to become
locally dominant. At that point, IS units assume a central role in all local affairs, as Abu Usama, a British
fighter based in Homs explained in May 2014: “Our average day here is now normally much of the
same—manning checkpoints, going on patrol in the area, settling disputes between locals and between
tribes, and a lot of meetings with village elders and their chiefs, so we can discuss their concerns and
complaints.”4
MSDI Terror DA 75
Returning Fighters Warrent
ISIS fighters are security threats when they return home
Charles Lister, Brookings Doha Center, December 2014, Profiling the Islamic State,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2014/11/profiling-islamic-statelister/en_web_lister.pdf?la=en DOA: 3-1-15
Realistically, however, the chance that a foreign fighter might choose to return home to carry out an
attack is quite unpredictable and should be treated as plausible. Judging by data from 1990-2010,
approximately 11 percent of foreign fighters have become active security threats after returning
home—not a small number.109 For Western Europe, from which there are approximately 3,000 fighters
in Syria, that would amount to 330 potential terrorists. Notably, the last three prominent terrorist
attacks in the Western world involved individuals with travel experience in foreign conflict zones—Syria,
Dagestan, Kenya, and Somalia. Moreover, there is already a precedent for fighters with experience in
Syria returning to their home countries or for individuals influenced by IS commanders plotting or
successfully carrying out attacks. The cases of Mehdi Nemmouche in Brussels and Ibrahim Boudina in
France suggest such fears are already being realized.
ISIS is well resourced and plans on attacking the US
James Kittfield, 8-20, The National Journal, August 20, 2014 Why Washington Should Declare War on ISIS
Most importantly, ISIS today represents a direct and growing threat to the United States. It has attracted
an estimated 12,000 foreign fighters to its black banner flying over Syrian and Iraqi territory, including
hundreds of Europeans and Americans who can travel freely with Western passports. It has a bigger
sanctuary, far more money, and is more indiscriminately murderous than al-Qaida was on Sept. 10,
2001. ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has assured anyone who will listen that he eventually intends to
direct his jihad at the United States, telling the U.S. soldiers who released him from prison in 2009, "I'll
see you in New York."
MSDI Terror DA 76
Al-Shabaab UQ
MSDI Terror DA 77
General
Al-Shabaab is also recovering
Gartenstein-Ross 14 (Daveed, Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies,
adjunct assistant professor in Georgetown University’s security studies program, “The Arab Spring and
Al-Qaeda’s Resurgence,” Congressional Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, 2/4/14,
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20140204/101698/HHRG-113-AS00-Wstate-GartensteinRossD-20140204.pdf)
Another al-Qaeda franchise that is seemingly recovering its capabilities, based on the attacks it was able
to execute, is the Somali militant group al-Shabaab. Shabaab once controlled more territory in southern
Somalia than did the country’s U.N.-recognized government, but it lost its last major urban stronghold of
Kismayo to advancing African Union forces in October 2012. However, Shabaab’s capabilities have
recovered since then. The group captured worldwide attention on September 21, 2013, when terrorists
associated with the group launched a spectacular assault on Nairobi’s Westgate Mall. The attack
dragged on for four days, killing 67 and injuring at least 175. But even before that, there were signs that
a complex operation like Westgate was possible, as Shabaab carried out increasingly sophisticated
attacks throughout the year. These included an April 2013 attack on a Mogadishu courthouse that killed
29, and a June 2013 twin suicide bombing at Mogadishu’s U.N. compound that claimed 22 lives. Over
the course of 2013, Shabaab was able to kill between 515 and 664 people, according to a database that I
maintain.
MSDI Terror DA 78
I/L
MSDI Terror DA 79
Al Qaeda Specific
MSDI Terror DA 80
Surveillance Solves
Al Qaeda activity can be detected with email and phone record surveillance
Yohn Yoo, Summer 2014, Emanuel S. Heller Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley Law
School; Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise Institute, Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, THE
LEGALITY OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY'S BULK DATA SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS,
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/is/files/2013/11/Yoo1.pdf, DOA: 1-1-15, p. 908-9
Members of the al Qaeda network can be detected, with good intelligence work or luck, by
examining phone and e-mail communications, as well as evidence of joint travel, shared assets, common
histories or families, meetings, and so on. As the time for an attack nears, "chatter" on this network will
increase as operatives communicate to coordinate plans, move and position assets, and conduct
reconnaissance of targets. When our intelligence agents successfully locate or capture an al Qaeda
member, they must be able to move quickly to follow new information to other operatives before news
of the capture causes them to disappear. The NSA database is particularly important because it will
point the way to al Qaeda agents within the United States, where they are closest to their targets and
able to inflict the most harm on civilians. The September 11 hijackers themselves provide an example of
the way that the NSA could use business record information to locate an al Qaeda cell. Links suggested
by commercially available data might have turned up ties between every single one of the al Qaeda
plotters and Khalid al Mihdhar and Nawar al Hazmi, the two hijackers known to the CIA to have been in
the country in the summer of 2001. Mihdhar and Hazmi had rented apartments in their own names and
were listed in the San Diego phone book. Both Mohammad Atta, the leader of the September 11 al
Qaeda cell, and Marwan al-Shehi, who piloted one of the planes into the World Trade Center, had lived
there with them. Hijacker Majed Moqed used the same frequent flier number as Mihdhar; five hijackers
used the same phone number as Atta when booking their flights; the remaining hijackers shared
addresses or phone numbers with one of those hijackers, Ahmed Alghamdi, who was in the United
States in violation of his visa at the time. Our intelligence agents, in fact, had strong leads that could
conceivably have led them to all of the hijackers before 9/11. CIA agents had identified Mihdhar as a
likely al Qaeda operative because he was spotted at a meeting in Kuala Lumpur and mentioned in
Middle East intercepts as part of an al Qaeda "cadre." Hazmi too was known as likely to be al Qaeda. But
in neither case was there enough evidence for a criminal arrest because they had not violated any
American laws. If our intelligence services had been able to track immediately their cell phone calls and
e-mail, it is possible that enough of the hijacking team could have been rounded up to avert 9/11. Our
task is much more difficult today, because we might not have even this slender information in hand
when the next al Qaeda plot moves toward execution.
Intelligence collection key to defeating Al Qaeda
Benjamin Wittes, Brookings, 2014, Senior Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution. I
co-founded and am Editor in Chief of Lawfare, a website devoted to sober and serious discussion of
“Hard National Security Choices.” I am the author or editor of several books on subjects related to law
and national security: Detention and Denial: The Case for Candor After Guantánamo (2011), Law and the
Long War: The Future of Justice in the Age of Terror (2008), and Legislating the War on Terror: An
Agenda for Reform (2009). I have written extensively both on the AUMF and on NSA collection under
MSDI Terror DA 81
various provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).3 The views I am expressing here
are my own, April 8, Prepared Statement, Is Al Qaeda Winning the Administration’s Counterterrorism
Policy,” http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA18/20140408/102109/HHRG-113-FA18-Wstate-WittesB20140408.pdf DOA: 5-1-15
Yet in considering the question of the state of the U.S. confrontation with Al Qaeda, there is something
to be said for considering these questions in conjunction with one another. These are, after all, two of
the most important legal instruments in the struggle this committee is endeavoring to assess. One is the
key legal authority for virtually every military action the United States undertakes in its military battle
against Al Qaeda, its offshoots, and its affiliates. The other is the single most important legal authority
the intelligence community has for collecting intelligence against the Al Qaeda target—not to mention
other foreign targets of great national security significance. This intelligence is key to arrests and the
thwarting of terrorist plots against the United States and its allies. It is also key to accurate and precise
targeting judgments in lethal force operations.
MSDI Terror DA 82
ISIS Specific
MSDI Terror DA 83
Surveillance Solves ISIS
Surveillance necessary to prevent ISIS attacks
Guardian, June 22, 2014 , Isis threat justifies greater surveillance powers in UK, says Liam Fox
Former defence secretary says first duty of state is to protect citizens and public will accept greater
monitoring powers Britain's security services may need to be given greater powers of surveillance to
monitor extremists from Isis when they return home to Britain from Iraq and Syria, the former defence
secretary Liam Fox has said. A majority of people will accept that an "ideological battle" means that the
authorities will need greater powers to intercept the communications of extremists, Fox said. The
former defence secretary, who was speaking on the Andrew Marr Show on BBC1, said that Britain
should offer to put its airbases at the disposal of the US to avoid "horrendous" situation in Iraq as Isis
forces pose a threat to Baghdad. Fox said: "There are those who say if we don't get involved, if we
hunker down then we will be fine. There will be no backlash. That is utterly, utterly wrong because the
jihadists don't hate us because of what we do. They hate us because of who we are. We can't change
that. It is our values and our history that they detest more than anything else." Fox said that the
authorities could deprive British citizens returning from Syria and Iraq of their passports. But he said that
the greatest effort should go towards increasing the power of the state to monitor the communications
of extremists. He said: "We have the security services to ensure that they [extremists] are watched and
that they don't pose a greater threat." Asked whether the powers of the security services were
insufficient, the former defence secretary said: "That is a real question that we are going to have to ask whether the security services have adequate resources for an increased threat. "That is a question
politicians will have to take into account in judgments on spending allocations but also do the powers
they have reflect the increasing [threat]? You've got people in the light of Snowden saying that the state
has too many powers and we have to restrict the powers of the state." Asked which powers the state
should be given, Fox said: "The whole areas of intercept that need to be looked at. We have got a real
debate, and it is a genuine debate in a democracy, between the libertarians who say the state must not
get too powerful and pretty much the rest of us who say the state must protect itself." Asked whether
this meant more surveillance and increasing the manpower of the security services, he said: "If required
is the first duty of the state to protect its citizens ... it is a real worry and it is a problem that is going to
be with us for a very long time. At heart it is an ideological battle and we have to realise that we have to
win the ideological battle as well." The remarks by Fox suggests that some figures, particularly on the
right, will use the success of extremists in Iraq to challenge the claim by Edward Snowden that the state
has amassed too many powers of surveillance. Snowden leaked a series of NSA files to the former
Guardian journalist Glenn Greenwald last year.
MSDI Terror DA 84
ISIS Nuclear Terrorism
ISIS created the world’s largest terrorist safe haven – it’s the largest risk of
nuclear terrorism
Bunn, 7/11/14 - Matthew Bunn, a professor of practice at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center
for Science and International Affairs, is a former adviser on nonproliferation in the White House Office
of Science and Technology Policy, where he focused on control of nuclear weapons and materials
(Matthew, “ISIS Seizes Nuclear Material—but That’s Not the Reason to Worry” 7/11,
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/isis-seizes-nuclear-material%E2%80%94-that%E2%80%99s-not-thereason-worry-10849)
But while this particular uranium is not much of a worry, the larger picture is starting to make me bite
my nails a bit. The Islamic State now controls a big chunk of territory, hundreds of millions of dollars,
and thousands of armed troops – and it has made clear that its ambitions are global. Its statement
declaring itself the caliphate promised by Allah was an explicit invitation to violent Islamic extremists
from all over the world to join them. Like the Taliban’s Afghanistan before 9/11, the Islamic State may
become a safe haven for people from other groups and countries to train and plot complex attacks.
Having such a haven where the government is not going to interfere makes a huge difference in
terrorists’ ability to put together a really complicated plot – from something like 9/11 to a plot to make a
nuclear bomb. Let’s not forget that al Qaeda has repeatedly sought to get the kind of nuclear material
that really could be put together into a nuclear bomb, and the expertise to do that job. The Islamic State
or others taking advantage of its territory may well renew that effort. That’s all the more reason to
accelerate the effort to ensure that all the world’s potential nuclear bomb material is effectively secured
– and to be grateful that past efforts eliminated such material from Iraq long before the Islamic State
came on the scene.
ISIS Is the Biggest Nuclear Threat
Brent Budowsky 8/22/14, LL.M. degree in international financial law from the London School of
Economics, former aide to former Sen. Lloyd Bentsen and Bill Alexander, then chief deputy majority
whip of the House, “ISIS poses nuclear 9/11 threat”, 2014, http://www.opednews.com/articles/ISISposes-nuclear-9-11-th-by-Brent-Budowsky-ISI_Military_Nuclear_insanity_Threat-To-World-Peace140822-911.html
After the latest grotesque atrocity by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the beheading of an
American journalist, American and European policymakers must clearly understand the near certainty
that unless it is defeated and destroyed, ISIS will launch a major terror attack on American or European
soil. Analysts estimate that ISIS has amassed a cash hoard of between $400 million and $2 billion. It is
highly probable that ISIS will attempt to use some of this money to obtain nuclear, chemical, biological
or other weapons of mass death on the international black market or from corrupt officials in nations
such as Russia, China, Pakistan or North Korea to use in attacks against New York, Washington, London,
Paris, Berlin, Rome, Brussels or other nations it considers infidel enemies. This danger is magnified by
the fact that ISIS has recruited nationals of the United States and Europe, who possess American and
European passports and are physically indistinguishable from local populations in America and Europe. It
is extraordinary that the mass murdering butchery of ISIS is so demented than even al Qaeda is
MSDI Terror DA 85
offended. It is alarming that the CIA, which launched intelligence operations even against the United
States Senate, and the NSA, which launched massive and unprecedented eavesdropping operations, and
intelligence services of leading European nations were blind to the magnitude of the ISIS threat until the
most barbaric terrorists in modern history had taken over almost a third of Iraq and are on the brink of
creating a terrorist super-state that dwarfs al Qaeda's efforts prior to 9/11. I vehemently opposed the
misguided Iraq War from the moment it was proposed by former President George W. Bush and have
never been a neoconservative, warmonger or super-hawk. But aggressive action against ISIS is urgently
needed. ISIS has stated its intention to attack the United States and Europe to advance its evil, messianic
and genocidal ideology and ambitions. ISIS has the money to purchase the most deadly weapons in the
world, and has recruited American and European traitors with above-average capability to execute an
attack. The odds that ISIS can obtain nuclear, chemical, biological or other forms of mass destruction
weapons are impossible to ascertain but in a world of vast illegal arms trafficking, with so many corrupt
officials in nations possessing arsenals of destruction, the danger is real. The fact that WMD scares prior
to the Iraq War ranged from mistaken to deceitful does not mean that the WMD danger does not exist
today. It does. I applaud the recent actions taken by President Obama. Obama's airstrikes saved tens of
thousands of Yazidis from genocide, took back the Mosul Dam from ISIS and saved countless Iraqis,
Kurds and Syrians from slaughter. The airstrikes inflicted material damage to ISIS. The diplomacy of
Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry contributed mightily to the replacement of a disastrous Iraqi
government by a government can unite Iraqi Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds. The Obama-Kerry initiatives will
lead to the creation of a stable Afghan government and avoid the collapse that was possible after the
recent controversial Afghan elections. These are real successes. In the current political climate, Obama
seems to get credit for nothing, but he deserves great credit for some important successes in recent
weeks. And yet the danger of ISIS pulling off a nuclear, chemical, biological or other mass death 9/11style attack in a major American or European city is real. Even with dirty or primitive WMD weapons, the
casualty totals could be catastrophic. ISIS must be defeated and destroyed. This will not be achieved
with "boots on the ground" proxies from Iraqi or Kurd forces alone, though Kurdish forces should
immediately receive strong military assistance. America should not initiate another massive Iraq ground
war. What is needed is a multinational special ops strike force made up of 10,000 troops from NATO
nations and possibly Arab League nations.
ANY WMD attack on U.S. Soil Would Escalate – Miscalculation and Command
Confusion
Hellman 8 (Martin E. Hellman, emeritus prof of engineering @ Stanford, “Risk Analysis of Nuclear
Deterrence” SPRING 2008 THE BENT OF TAU BETA PI, http://www.nuclearrisk.org/paper.pdf)
The threat of nuclear terrorism looms much larger in the public’s mind than the threat of a full-scale
nuclear war, yet this article focuses primarily on the latter. An explanation is therefore in order before
proceeding. A terrorist attack involving a nuclear weapon would be a catastrophe of immense
proportions: “A 10-kiloton bomb detonated at Grand Central Station on a typical work day would likely
kill some half a million people, and inflict over a trillion dollars in direct economic damage. America and
its way of life would be changed forever.” [Bunn 2003, pages viii-ix]. The likelihood of such an attack is
also significant. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry has estimated the chance of a nuclear
MSDI Terror DA 86
terrorist incident within the next decade to be roughly 50 percent [Bunn 2007, page 15]. David Albright,
a former weapons inspector in Iraq, estimates those odds at less than one percent, but notes, “We
would never accept a situation where the chance of a major nuclear accident like Chernobyl would be
anywhere near 1% .... A nuclear terrorism attack is a low-probability event, but we can’t live in a world
where it’s anything but extremely low-probability.” [Hegland 2005]. In a survey of 85 national security
experts, Senator Richard Lugar found a median estimate of 20 percent for the “probability of an attack
involving a nuclear explosion occurring somewhere in the world in the next 10 years,” with 79 percent of
the respondents believing “it more likely to be carried out by terrorists” than by a government [Lugar
2005, pp. 14-15]. I support increased efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism, but that is not
inconsistent with the approach of this article. Because terrorism is one of the potential trigger
mechanisms for a full-scale nuclear war, the risk analyses proposed herein will include estimating the
risk of nuclear terrorism as one component of the overall risk. If that risk, the overall risk, or both are
found to be unacceptable, then the proposed remedies would be directed to reduce which- ever risk(s)
warrant attention. Similar remarks apply to a number of other threats (e.g., nuclear war between the
U.S. and China over Taiwan). his article would be incomplete if it only dealt with the threat of nuclear
terrorism and neglected the threat of full- scale nuclear war. If both risks are unacceptable, an effort to
reduce only the terrorist component would leave humanity in great peril. In fact, society’s almost total
neglect of the threat of full-scale nuclear war makes studying that risk all the more important. The cosT
of World War iii The danger associated with nuclear deterrence depends on both the cost of a failure
and the failure rate.3 This section explores the cost of a failure of nuclear deterrence, and the next
section is concerned with the failure rate. While other definitions are possible, this article defines a
failure of deterrence to mean a full-scale exchange of all nuclear weapons available to the U.S. and
Russia, an event that will be termed World War III. Approximately 20 million people died as a result of
the first World War. World War II’s fatalities were double or triple that number—chaos prevented a
more precise deter- mination. In both cases humanity recovered, and the world today bears few scars
that attest to the horror of those two wars. Many people therefore implicitly believe that a third World
War would be horrible but survivable, an extrapola- tion of the effects of the first two global wars. In
that view, World War III, while horrible, is something that humanity may just have to face and from
which it will then have to recover. In contrast, some of those most qualified to assess the situation hold
a very different view. In a 1961 speech to a joint session of the Philippine Con- gress, General Douglas
MacArthur, stated, “Global war has become a Frankenstein to destroy both sides. … If you lose, you are
annihilated. If you win, you stand only to lose. No longer does it possess even the chance of the winner
of a duel. It contains now only the germs of double suicide.” Former Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara ex- pressed a similar view: “If deterrence fails and conflict develops, the present U.S. and
NATO strategy carries with it a high risk that Western civilization will be destroyed” [McNamara 1986,
page 6]. More recently, George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn4 echoed those
concerns when they quoted President Reagan’s belief that nuclear weapons were “totally irrational,
totally inhu- mane, good for nothing but killing, possibly destructive of life on earth and civilization.”
[Shultz 2007] Official studies, while couched in less emotional terms, still convey the horrendous toll
that World War III would exact: “The resulting deaths would be far beyond any precedent. Executive
branch calculations show a range of U.S. deaths from 35 to 77 percent (i.e., 79-160 million dead) … a
change in targeting could kill somewhere between 20 million and 30 million additional people on each
side .... These calculations reflect only deaths during the first 30 days. Additional millions would be
injured, and many would eventually die from lack of adequate medical care … millions of people might
MSDI Terror DA 87
starve or freeze during the follow- ing winter, but it is not possible to estimate how many. … further
millions … might eventually die of latent radiation effects.” [OTA 1979, page 8] This OTA report also
noted the possibility of serious ecological damage [OTA 1979, page 9], a concern that as- sumed a new
potentiality when the TTAPS report [TTAPS 1983] proposed that the ash and dust from so many nearly
simultaneous nuclear explosions and their resultant fire- storms could usher in a nuclear winter that
might erase homo sapiens from the face of the earth, much as many scientists now believe the K-T
Extinction that wiped out the dinosaurs resulted from an impact winter caused by ash and dust from a
large asteroid or comet striking Earth. The TTAPS report produced a heated debate, and there is still no
scientific consensus on whether a nuclear winter would follow a full-scale nuclear war. Recent work
[Robock 2007, Toon 2007] suggests that even a limited nuclear exchange or one between newer
nuclear-weapon states, such as India and Pakistan, could have devastating long-lasting climatic
consequences due to the large volumes of smoke that would be generated by fires in modern
megacities. While it is uncertain how destructive World War III would be, prudence dictates that we
apply the same engi- neering conservatism that saved the Golden Gate Bridge from collapsing on its
50th anniversary and assume that preventing World War III is a necessity—not an option.
MSDI Terror DA 88
Impacts
MSDI Terror DA 89
Nuke Terror
MSDI Terror DA 90
Dirty Bomb Risk High
Dirty bomb risks increasing, insecure nuclear material world-wide
Bunn & Tobey, 5-20-15, The Hill, “Don’t weaken our defenses against nuclear smuggling,”
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/homeland-security/242566-dont-weaken-our-defenses-againstnuclear-smuggling DOA: 5-25-15 Bunn is a professor at Harvard Kennedy School and co-principal
investigator for the Kennedy School’s Project on Managing the Atom. Tobey is a senior fellow at Harvard
Kennedy School’s Belfer Center and former deputy administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation
at the National Nuclear Security Administration. Roth is research associate with the Belfer Center’s
Project on Managing the Atom.
The possibility of a terrorist detonating a “dirty bomb” or even a crude nuclear bomb is one of the
gravest threats facing the United States today. Yet the House Armed Services Committee is pushing a bill
that would prohibit funding for fixed radiation detectors to catch nuclear smugglers – both for installing
new ones and even for maintaining the ones U.S. taxpayers have already paid billions to
install. Radiation detection is a highly imperfect line of defense. Once nuclear material has left the
facility where it is supposed to be, it could be anywhere, and recovering it poses an enormous challenge.
The immense length of national borders, the huge scale of legitimate traffic, the myriad pathways across
these borders, and the small size and sometimes weak radiation signal of the nuclear and radiological
materials terrorists might be seeking combine to make nuclear smuggling extraordinarily difficult to
stop. But that hardly justifies giving up. From airports to bridges across major waterways to the loading
stations at container ports, there are many locations where fixed radiation detectors make sense. A
balanced program to defeat nuclear smugglers must include strong security to keep material from being
stolen in the first place, effective law enforcement and intelligence work, and interdiction efforts and
border controls backed by both fixed and mobile radiation detectors. These elements work together,
reinforcing each other’s effectiveness. In addition to detecting stolen radioactive and nuclear material,
fixed radiation detectors deter smugglers from using official borders, limiting their options and making
them easier to catch. As a military leader in Azerbaijian—which shares borders with Russia—recently
argued, “to leave an unequipped border crossing is like leaving the window open.” For nearly twenty
years, both Republicans and Democrats in Congress and the White House have invested billions in
putting in place a network of thousands of fixed radiation detectors in more than fifty countries. Cutting
off funding now would mean abandoning partners across the world, after years of painstaking
diplomacy – and would undermine the investment already made, reducing the chance that existing
detectors would continue to be used effectively. As much of the nuclear and radiological material
smuggled to date has come from Russia—a country with hundreds of tons of nuclear weapons material
spread across dozens of facilities—detecting smuggling from Russia is vital. It became even more
important last year, when Russia halted nearly all work with the United States on improving the security
of its nuclear stockpiles, increasing the risk of nuclear theft and smuggling. The good news is that before
the recent crisis in U.S.-Russian relations, Russia and the United States worked together to install a ring
of detectors at all of Russia’s official border crossings. The bad news is that the conflict in Ukraine has
effectively erased some of those borders, and Russia’s customs union with Belarus and Kazakhstan
means goods flow across those borders unchecked. Hence, there is a clear need to install more fixed
MSDI Terror DA 91
radiation detectors to patch the holes in the system already put in place. Beyond Russia, there is
radiological material located at thousands of inadequately protected sites in more than a hundred
countries. These vulnerabilities, combined with the rise of groups like the Islamic State who are bent on
mass violence and terror, make deliberately weakening defenses against nuclear smugglers recklessly
negligent.
MSDI Terror DA 92
General High Risk
Risk of nuclear terror is high and likely
Ogilvie-White 2014
Dr Tanya Ogilvie-White, former senior analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute; Stanton nuclear
security fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, senior lecturer in international
relations at the University of Canterbury, Preventing Nuclear Terrorism, Australia’s Leadership Role,
https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/preventing-nuclear-terrorism-australias-leadershiprole/SR63_prevent_nuclear_terrorism.pdf
The main worry about the theft and trafficking of nuclear and radiological materials is that they will end
up in the hands of terrorist groups, who will use them in INDs or RDDs. Even in the case of an RDD,
which is a more likely scenario but would be much less lethal than an IND, radioactive contamination in
a densely populated area could have serious economic and social consequences. Although a successful
RDD attack has never been perpetrated, there’s evidence that terrorists have invested in such devices:
Chechen separatists were involved in two incidents involving radioactive materials in November 1995
and December 1998, and more recently intelligence agencies in mainland Europe, Thailand, the UK and
the US have managed to foil RDD plots before they reached fruition. In 2012, the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) Incident and Trafficking Database reported 160 incidents involving the illegal trade
and movement of nuclear or other radioactive material across national borders. Of those, 17 involved
possession and related criminal activities, 24 involved theft or loss and 119 involved other unauthorised
activities. Two incidents involved highly enriched uranium (HEU) in unauthorised activities. There were
also three incidents involving dangerous Category 1–3 radioactive sources, two of which were thefts.
Information reported to the database demonstrates that: • the availability of unsecured nuclear and
other radioactive material persists • although effective border control measures help to detect illicit
trafficking, effective controls aren’t uniformly implemented at all international border points •
individuals and groups are prepared to engage in trafficking this material. The possibility of RDD or,
worse, IND detonation is real and, while the risks need to be kept in perspective, they need to be taken
seriously. One of the most worrying recent cases of illicit trafficking involving HEU occurred in June 2011
in Moldova, where officials arrested six people with a quantity of weapon-grade material. The group
claimed to have access to plutonium and up to 9 kilograms of HEU, which they were willing to sell for
$31 million. A serious buyer, reportedly of North African origin, appears to have been involved and
remains at large. Research reactors are considered vulnerable to thefts of nuclear and radiological
materials because they’re often located on university campuses or in larger scientific research centres,
which are relatively open to the public or have many users and visitors. Moreover, other than the
amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which has yet to enter into force,
there’s no internationally binding requirement for securing these facilities. Since 2003, however, the US
and the IAEA have been working with various countries to reduce the risks associated with research
reactors. Many countries with HEU-fuelled research reactors, including some in Australia’s near
neighbourhood, have taken part in securing HEU and converting the reactors to use low-enriched
uranium (LEU). In particular, HEU has been removed and secured from Indonesia, the Philippines,
Thailand and, most recently, Vietnam. Of course, LEU-fuelled research reactors remain a target for
terrorists who wish to spread ionising radiation or damage a symbolic facility representing technological
MSDI Terror DA 93
progress, and most research reactors have substantial quantities of sealed sources that are potentially
vulnerable to theft.
MSDI Terror DA 94
Al Qaeda Risk High
Al Qaeda likely to use WMDs – extreme ideology, no fear of counterattack,
ambitious goals and they are likely to attack the US homeland
Nathan Myhrvold, 13, July 2013, Myhrvold is chief executive and founder of Intellectual Ventures and
a former chief technology officer at Microsoft. “Strategic Terrorism: A Call to Action,”
http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Strategic-Terrorism-Myhrvold-7-3-2013.pdf
The risk that al Qaeda or some future group will use equally terrible weapons seems higher on every
level. its geopolitical goals are, if anything, more ambitious than the soviets’ were. al Qaeda’s ideology is
more extreme. The group’s vulnerability to counterattack or reprisal is far lower than anything the
soviets faced—it has already survived the worst our nation can throw at it. The terrorists have
demonstrated a shocking degree of ruthlessness. Under any theory of risk, these foes must be
considered more likely to act than the soviets ever were. Another reason terrorists would attack is the
oldest jus- tification in the world—because we’re trying to get them. it’s no secret that the United states
aims to exterminate al Qaeda and similar terrorist groups—and rightly so. With revenge and selfpreservation on their minds, our primary adversaries are not likely to show us unnecessary mercy. A
more mundane reason to worry is that the informa- tion cascade that empowers stateless groups will
ultimately demand more numerous and spectacular demonstrations of power to feed popular interest.
terrorism survives by making a big impact, and when the world gets desensitized to beheadings, the
temptation to one-up the last attack increases. Similarly, the arc of terrorism in iraq—which spiked
dramatically from 2004 through 2007 and then leveled off, only to resurge somewhat recently—may
foreshadow an increasing risk to the United states. terrorists quite ratio- nally sought to destabilize iraq
and afghanistan as a way to humble the United states and influence its policy by forcing a pullout. That
strategy focused terrorists’ atten- tion more on these countries and possibly distracted some groups
from directly attacking U.s. territory. as U.s. forces withdraw from the region, these targets become less
interesting. What next? al Qaeda and other stateless groups will seek to build on their previous successes. They have successfully carved out a safe haven for them- selves in the lawless frontiers of Pakistan.
dramatic attacks on the american homeland would be a natural next step. The decentralized nature of
stateless organizations raises another set of concerns. once mass death becomes accessible to small
groups, it is unclear who would be in control. This lack of direction has already been seen in vari- ous al
Qaeda attacks in saudi arabia and europe, some of which clearly hurt the cause of islamic terrorists.
They took place because no single chain of command exists in the overall movement—it is, at best, a
loose confederacy. an additional issue might be called the “craziness fac- tor.” small groups can have
crazy goals. The smaller the group, the crazier they may be. The apocalyptic death cult aum shinrikyo is a
case in point. Kaczynski is another example. The belief that terror groups will not use terrible weapons if
they get them seems foolish in the extreme. to borrow a phrase from A Streetcar Named Desire, to hold
this belief is, in effect, to rely “on the kindness of ” terror- ists. any rational analysis must assign a
substantial amount of the terror risk to large-scale, high-magnitude events. yet that is not how our
defenses are organized and not how we are spending our resources. instead, we focus most of our
MSDI Terror DA 95
counterterrorism efforts on thwarting small-scale attacks— by, for example, confiscating grandma’s
four-ounce bottle of hand lotion at the airport.
Terrorists attempting to gain access to WMDs
Bergen, et al, September 2013, Jihadist Terrorism: A Threat Assessment,
http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Jihadist%20Terrorism-A%20Threat%20Assesment_0.pdf
Peter Bergen is the author of four books about al-Qaeda, three of which were New York Times best
sellers. The books have been translated into 20 languages. He is the director of the National Security
Program at the New America Foundation in Washington, D.C.; a fellow at Fordham University’s Center
on National Security; and CNN’s national security analyst.
However, the fact that jihadist extremists in the United States have shown no interest in CBRN weapons
does
not eliminate the need for securing potential sources of chemical, biological, and radiological
agents. According to a count by the New America Foundation, since 2001, 13 extremists motivated by
right-wing ideologies, one left-wing militant, and two individuals with idiosyncratic motives have
deployed, acquired, or tried to acquire chemical, biological, or radiological weapons. For example,
William Krar and Judith Bruey, two anti-government extremists, possessed precursor chemicals for
hydrogen cyanide gas, which they discussed deploying through a building’s ventilation system.10 They
were arrested in 2003. Zawahiri’s new goal is acquisition of a nuclear bomb – risk of al Qaeda nuclear
attack is high Kanani, Editor of World Affairs Commentary, 6-29-’11 (Rahim, “New al-Qaeda Chief
Zawahiri Has Strong Nuclear Intent” Forbes,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/rahimkanani/2011/06/29/new-al-qaeda-chief-zawahiri-has-strongnuclear-intent/) We should be especially worried about the threat of nuclear terrorism under Zawahiri’s
leadership. In a recent report titled “Islam and the Bomb: Religious Justification For and Against Nuclear
Weapons”, which I researched for and contributed to, lead author Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, former director
of intelligence and counterintelligence at the U.S. Department of Energy, argues that al-Qaeda’s WMD
ambitions are stronger than ever. And that “this intent no longer feels theoretical, but operational. “I
believe al-Qaeda is laying the groundwork for a large scale attack on the United States, possibly in the
next year or two,” continues Mowatt-Larssen in the opening of the report issued earlier this year by the
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard Kennedy School. “The attack may or may
not involve the use of WMD, but there are signs that al-Qaeda is working on an event on a larger scale
than the 9/11 attack. Most will readily dismiss such claims as implausible and unlikely, and we hope they
are right, but after spending months with Mowatt-Larssen, who also served as the former head of the
Central Intelligence Agency’s WMD and terrorism efforts, scrutinizing and cross-referencing Zawahiri’s
268-page treatise published in 2008 titled “Exoneration”, the analytics steered us towards something far
more remarkable than expected.
MSDI Terror DA 96
ISIS Risk High
ISIS Can Buy, Build or Steal Nuclear Weapons – Just a Matter of Time
Russ Wellen, 10-21-2014, "Is the Islamic State Capable of Nuclear Terrorism?," Foreign Policy In Focus,
http://fpif.org/islamic-state-capable-nuclear-terrorism/
After 9/11, many feared that Al Qaeda would get its hands on nuclear weapons. Such fears were stoked
by the far right, especially the books of journalist Paul Williams with their provocative titles: Osama’s
Revenge: The Next 9/11 and The Al Qaeda Connection: International Terrorism, Organized Crime, And
the Coming Apocalypse. (Yes, I read them at the time; ate them up even.) In fact, Al Qaeda had made
attempts to obtain nuclear materials. In 2007 at the New Yorker, Steve Coll asked: Can the United States
be made safe from nuclear terrorism? Even the Belfer Center of the Harvard Kennedy School issued a
report in 2010. Key excerpt: Al Qaeda’s patient, decade-long effort to steal or construct an improvised
nuclear device (IND) flows from their perception of the benefits of producing the image of a mushroom
cloud rising over a US city, just as the 9/11 attacks have altered the course of history. This lofty aim
helps explains why al Qaeda has consistently sought a bomb capable of producing a nuclear yield, as
opposed to settling for the more expedient and realistic course of devising a “dirty bomb,” or a
radiological dispersal device. Now such fears are beginning to be transferred to the Islamic State.
Ploughshares Fund President Joseph Cirincione: [The Islamic State, or ISIS’s] seizure of banks and oil
fields gave it more than $2 billion in assets. If ISIS could make the right connection to corrupt officials in
Russia or Pakistan, the group might be able to buy enough highly enriched uranium (about 50 pounds)
and the technical help to build a crude nuclear device. Militants recruited from Europe or America could
help smuggle it into their home nations. Or ISIS could try to build a “dirty bomb,” conventional
explosives like dynamite laced with highly radioactive materials. The blast would not kill many directly,
but it would force the evacuation of tens of square blocks contaminated with radioactive particles. The
terror and economic consequences of a bomb detonated in the financial districts of London or New York
would be enormous. [Also] ISIS could also try to get chemical weapons, such as deadly nerve gases or
mustard gas. Fortunately, the most likely source of these terror weapons was just eliminated. How
would it pull that off? The Times of India reported on one fanciful idea the Islamic State had, as
explained in a “manifesto believed to have been written by Abdullah Ahmed al-Meshedani, a member of
the group’s highly secretive six-man war cabinet.” The document, typed on perforated sheets, was
seized by Iraqi special forces during a raid in March on the home of one of the commanders of ISIS, The
Sunday Times reported today. And from whom does the Islamic State propose to obtain nuclear knowhow, material, or actual weapons? In the document, which has been examined by western security
officials — who believe it to be authentic — Meshedani wrote that ISIS aims to get hold of nuclear
weapons with the help of Russia, to whom it would offer access to gas fields it controls in Iraq’s Anbar
province. And as long as you’re sharing nuclear weapons with us, Russia, one more little thing: Also, the
documents said, Kremlin will have to give up “Iran and its nuclear programme and hands over its
secrets.” Russia would also have to abandon support for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and back the
Gulf States against Iran. It may not be much of a problem now, but it could be some day. On October 1
the New York Daily News reported on a statement by British Home Secretary Theresa May (emphasis
added): “If (ISIS) succeeds in firmly consolidating their grip on the land they occupy in Syria and Iraq, we
will see the world’s first truly terrorist state established within a few hours flying time of our country,” …
Britain and the West cannot cede ISIS “the space to plot attacks against us, train their men and women,
MSDI Terror DA 97
and devise new methods to kill indiscriminately,” she said. “We will see the risk, often prophesied, but
thank God not yet fulfilled, that with the capability of a state behind them, the terrorists will acquire
chemical, biological or even nuclear weapons to attack us.”
ISIS Thumps General Nuke Terror Defense – It has Massive Resources and
International Connections
Budowsky, Budowsky was an aide to former Sen. Lloyd Bentsen and Bill Alexander, then chief deputy
majority whip of the House. He holds an LL.M. degree in international financial law from the London
School of Economics., 8-20-2014, "Budowsky: ISIS poses nuclear 9/11 threat," TheHill,
http://thehill.com/opinion/brent-budowsky/215603-brent-budowsky-isis-poses-9-11-scope-threat
Analysts estimate that ISIS has amassed a cash hoard of between $400 million and $2 billion. It is highly
probable that ISIS will attempt to use some of this money to obtain nuclear, chemical, biological or other
weapons of mass death on the international black market or from corrupt officials in nations such as
Russia, China, Pakistan or North Korea to use in attacks against New York, Washington, London, Paris,
Berlin, Rome, Brussels or other nations it considers infidel enemies. This danger is magnified by the fact
that ISIS has recruited nationals of the United States and Europe, who possess American and European
passports and are physically indistinguishable from local populations in America and Europe. It is
extraordinary that the mass murdering butchery of ISIS is so demented than even al Qaeda is offended.
It is alarming that the CIA, which launched intelligence operations even against the United States
Senate, and the NSA, which launched massive and unprecedented eavesdropping operations, and
intelligence services of leading European nations were blind to the magnitude of the ISIS threat until the
most barbaric terrorists in modern history had taken over almost a third of Iraq and are on the brink of
creating a terrorist super-state that dwarfs al Qaeda’s efforts prior to 9/11. I vehemently opposed the
misguided Iraq War from the moment it was proposed by former President George W. Bush and have
never been a neoconservative, warmonger or super-hawk. But aggressive action against ISIS is urgently
needed. ISIS has stated its intention to attack the United States and Europe to advance its evil, messianic
and genocidal ideology and ambitions. ISIS has the money to purchase the most deadly weapons in the
world, and has recruited American and European traitors with above-average capability to execute an
attack. The odds that ISIS can obtain nuclear, chemical, biological or other forms of mass destruction
weapons are impossible to ascertain but in a world of vast illegal arms trafficking, with so many corrupt
officials in nations possessing arsenals of destruction, the danger is real. The fact that WMD scares prior
to the Iraq War ranged from mistaken to deceitful does not mean that the WMD danger does not exist
today. It does.
MSDI Terror DA 98
Yes Extinction
MSDI Terror DA 99
Nuke Taboo
An attack breaks the nuclear taboo – leads to nuclear war.
Li Bin 2009 "An Investigation of China – U.S. Strategic Stability" Prof. Li Bin is a leading Chinese expert
on arms control and is currently the director of Arms Control Program at the Institute of International
Studies, Tsinghua University. He received his Bachelor and Master Degrees in Physics from Peking
University before joining China Academy of Engineering Physics (CAEP) to pursue a doctorate in the
technical aspects of arms control. He served as a part-time assistant on arms control for the Committee
of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND).Upon graduation Dr. Li entered the
Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics (IAPCM) as a research fellow and joined
the COSTIND technical group supporting Chinese negotiation team on Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT). He attended the final round of CTBT negotiations as a technical advisor to the Chinese
negotiating team. Nie Hongyi is an officer in the People’s Liberation Army with an MA from China’s
National Defense University and a Ph.D. in International Studies from Tsinghua University, which he
completed in 2009 under Prof. Li Bin.
The nuclear taboo is a kind of international norm and this type of norm is supported by the promotion
of the norm through international social exchange. But at present the increased threat of nuclear
terrorism has lowered people’s confidence that nuclear weapons will not be used. China and the
United States have a broad common interest in combating nuclear terrorism. Using technical and
institutional measures to break the foundation of nuclear terrorism and lessen the possibility of a
nuclear terrorist attack can not only weaken the danger of nuclear terrorism itself but also strengthen
people’s confidence in the nuclear taboo, and in this way preserve an international environment
beneficial to both China and the United States. In this way even if there is crisis in China-U.S. relations
caused by conflict, the nuclear taboo can also help both countries reduce suspicions about the nuclear
weapons problem, avoid miscalculation and thereby reduce the danger of a nuclear war.
MSDI Terror DA 100
Miscalculation
Causes accidental US-Russia nuclear war.
Barrett et al. 13 – (6/28, Anthony, PhD, Engineering and Public Policy from Carnegie Mellon
University, Director of Research, Global Catastrophic Risk Institute, Fellow in the RAND Stanton Nuclear
Security Fellows Program, Seth Baum, PhD, Geography, Pennsylvania State University, Executive
Director, GCRI, Research Scientist at the Blue Marble Space Institute of Science, former Visiting Scholar
position at the Center for Research on Environmental Decisions at Columbia University, and Kelly
Hostetler, Research Assistant, GCRI, “Analyzing and Reducing the Risks of Inadvertent Nuclear War
Between the United States and Russia,” Science and Global Security 21(2): 106-133, pre-print, available
online)
War involving significant fractions of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, which are by far the largest
of any nations, could have globally catastrophic effects such as severely reducing food production for
years,1 potentially leading to collapse of modern civilization worldwide and even the extinction of
humanity.2 Nuclear war between the United States and Russia could occur by various routes, including
accidental or unauthorized launch; deliberate first attack by one nation; and inadvertent attack. In an
accidental or unauthorized launch or detonation, system safeguards or procedures to maintain control
over nuclear weapons fail in such a way that a nuclear weapon or missile launches or explodes without
direction from leaders. In a deliberate first attack, the attacking nation decides to attack based on
accurate information about the state of affairs. In an inadvertent attack, the attacking nation mistakenly
concludes that it is under attack and launches nuclear weapons in what it believes is a counterattack.3
(Brinkmanship strategies incorporate elements of all of the above, in that they involve intentional
manipulation of risks from otherwise accidental or inadvertent launches.4 ) Over the years, nuclear
strategy was aimed primarily at minimizing risks of intentional attack through development of
deterrence capabilities, though numerous measures were also taken to reduce probabilities of
accidents, unauthorized attack, and inadvertent war. For purposes of deterrence, both U.S. and
Soviet/Russian forces have maintained significant capabilities to have some forces survive a first attack
by the other side and to launch a subsequent counterattack. However, concerns about the extreme
disruptions that a first attack would cause in the other side’s forces and command-and-control
capabilities led to both sides’ development of capabilities to detect a first attack and launch a counterattack before suffering damage from the first attack.5 Many people believe that with the end of the
Cold War and with improved relations between the United States and Russia, the risk of East-West
nuclear war was significantly reduced.6 However, it has also been argued that inadvertent nuclear war
between the United States and Russia has continued to present a substantial risk.7 While the United
States and Russia are not actively threatening each other with war, they have remained ready to launch
nuclear missiles in response to indications of attack.8 False indicators of nuclear attack could be caused
in several ways. First, a wide range of events have already been mistakenly interpreted as indicators of
attack, including weather phenomena, a faulty computer chip, wild animal activity, and control-room
training tapes loaded at the wrong time.9 Second, terrorist groups or other actors might cause attacks
on either the United States or Russia that resemble some kind of nuclear attack by the other nation by
actions such as exploding a stolen or improvised nuclear bomb,10 especially if such an event occurs
during a crisis between the United States and Russia.11 A variety of nuclear terrorism scenarios are
MSDI Terror DA 101
possible.12 Al Qaeda has sought to obtain or construct nuclear weapons and to use them against the
United States.13 Other methods could involve attempts to circumvent nuclear weapon launch control
safeguards or exploit holes in their security.14 It has long been argued that the probability of
inadvertent nuclear war is significantly higher during U.S.-Russian crisis conditions,15 with the Cuban
Missile Crisis being a prime historical example. It is possible that U.S.-Russian relations will significantly
deteriorate in the future, increasing nuclear tensions. There are a variety of ways for a third party to
raise tensions between the United States and Russia, making one or both nations more likely to
misinterpret events as attacks.
MSDI Terror DA 102
U.S. Lash out
A new WMD terrorist attack will Cause the U.S. to Lash out
Greg Easterbrook, senior editor with THE NEW REPUBLIC, November 2001, p.
www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0111/01/gal.00.html. (UNDRG/C324)
Terrorists may not be held by this, especially suicidal terrorists, of the kind that al Qaeda is attempting
to cultivate. But I think, if I could leave you with one message, it would be this: that the search for
terrorist atomic weapons would be of great benefit to the Muslim peoples of the world in addition to
members, to people of the United States and Western Europe, because if an atomic warhead goes off in
Washington, say, in the current environment or anything like it, in the 24 hours that followed, a hundred
million Muslims would die as U.S. nuclear bombs rained down on every conceivable military target in a
dozen Muslim countries.
That Domino’s into Global Nuclear War
Mohamed Sid-Ahmed, Al-Ahram Weekly political analyst, 2004 [Al-Ahram Weekly, "Extinction!" 8/26,
no. 705, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm]
What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further
exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living.
Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of
human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would
proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of
world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack
succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a
conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners
and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.
MSDI Terror DA 103
Econ Collapse
A nuclear terror attack in the U.S. will collapse the global financial markets
William J. Perry is the Michael and Barbara Berberian Professor at Stanford University. He is a senior
fellow at Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and serves as codirector of the Preventive
Defense Project, ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, September
2006, p. 86
Of course, terrorists setting off a nuclear bomb on U.S. soil would not be equivalent to the nuclear
holocaust threatened during the cold war. But it would be the single worst catastrophe this country has
ever suffered. Just one bomb could result in more than one hundred thousand deaths, and there could
be more than one attack. The direct economic losses from the blast would be hundreds of billions of
dollars, but the indirect economic impact would be even greater, as worldwide financial markets would
collapse in a way that would make the market setback after 9/11 seem mild. And the social and political
effects are incalculable, especially if the weapon were detonated in Washington or Moscow or London,
crippling the government of that nation.
Global economic crisis causes war---strong statistical support
Royal 10 – Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of
Defense, 2010, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” in
Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p.
213-214
Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict.
Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic
decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been
considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the
systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson’s (1996) work on leadership cycle
theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of pre-eminent
power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous
shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin, 10981)
that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fearon, 1995).
Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment
for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner, 1999). Seperately,
Polllins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact
the likelihood of conflict among major, medium, and small powers, although he suggests that the causes
and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second,
on a dyadic level, Copeland’s (1996,2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that ‘future expectation
of trade’ is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behavior of states.
He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have
an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectation of future trade decline,
particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases ,
as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the
MSDI Terror DA 104
trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by
interdependent states. Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external
armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal
conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write, The linkages
between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic
conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a
recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each
other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002, p.89). Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the
likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across
borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting
government. ‘Diversionary theory’ suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic
decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to create a ‘rally round the flag’ effect. Wang
(1996), DeRouen (1995), and Blomberg, Hess and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that
economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997) Miller (1999) and
Kisanganie and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for
democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more
susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided
evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak
presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force.
MSDI Terror DA 105
Middle East Escalation
Instability in The Middle East ensures that Nuclear Terror Would cause a Surge
in Extremism against a pre-occupied U.S. and it’s allies – Iran, Pakistan, Israel
and Independent Nuclear Terror Attacks are all likely to cause War
Freilich 10 – (2010, Chuck, PhD, Senior Fellow at the International Security Program, Harvard
Kennedy School, Adjunct Professor at New York University, former Deputy National Security Adviser in
Israel, “The Armageddon Scenario: Israel and the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism,” THE BEGIN-SADAT
CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES BAR-ILAN UNIVERSITY, Mideast Security and Policy Studies No. 84,
http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/MSPS84.pdf)
The Middle East is a demographic, socio-economic, political, and military time bomb waiting to explode.
Even before the recent global economic crisis, unemployment in Arab countries was the highest in the
world, including among young people. Economic growth in the Middle East is likely to remain stagnant,
with the region falling further behind the rest of the world. When combined with the highly combustible
winds of religious fundamentalism, the danger of nuclear terrorism is particularly acute in this region.23
There is little reason to believe that regional governments will permit political reform and greater selfexpression, and political grievances will likely continue to be expressed in extremist and fundamentalist
terms which render them inviolate and non-negotiable. For example, there is no assurance that Egyptian
President Hosni Mubarak will be succeeded by a moderate and peaceful leader, or that Egypt will not
become a radical Islamic state. The long anticipated regime change in Iran may give rise to a more
moderate government, but may also result in an even more radical one. Saudi Arabia’s future is also
questionable. Even the future of Turkey, heretofore held out as a beacon of democracy and secularism
within the Muslim world, is unclear. Hatred of Israel, the US, and the West is likely to continue and
possibly intensify. Progress towards peace with Israel and improvements in Arab-Western relations are
unlikely to be sufficient to reduce the evolving socio-economic, political, and demographic pressures.
The Middle East faces another explosion today – of potential nuclear capabilities. Not only Israel, but
also the Sunni Arab regimes, are deeply afraid of Iran's nuclear capabilities. In response, over a dozen
Arab countries have announced civil military programs. Arab “civil” nuclear programs, as seen from past
experience, have a nasty tendency to morph into military ones. The danger of nuclear terrorism, further
abetted by the spread of nuclear technology and materials in the region, will be greatly exacerbated by
the rise of a multi-polar nuclear Middle East. Nuclear terrorism could give rise to a broader war in the
Middle East and even lead to nuclear war. Nuclear war could give rise to more nuclear terrorism.24
Escalates and Leads to extinctions
Russell 09 (James A. Russell, senior lecturer in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval
Postgraduate School, “Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prosepects for Nuclear War and Escalation in the
Middle East,” in collaboration with the Atomic Energy Commission,
http://www.nps.edu/academics/sigs/ccc/people/biolinks/russell/PP26_Russell_2009.pdf)
MSDI Terror DA 106
Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors: (1) asymmetric interests in the
bargaining framework that can introduce unpredictable behavior from actors; (2) the presence of nonstate actors that introduce unpredictability into relationships between the antagonists; (3) incompatible
assumptions about the structure of the deterrent relationship that makes the bargaining framework
strategically unstable; (4) perceptions by Israel and the United States that its window of opportunity for
military action is closing, which could prompt a preventive attack; (5) the prospect that Iran’s response
to pre-emptive attacks could involve unconventional weapons, which could prompt escalation by Israel
and/or the United States; (6) the lack of a communications framework to build trust and cooperation
among framework participants. These systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework all
suggest that escalation by any the parties could happen either on purpose or as a result of
miscalculation or the pressures of wartime circumstance. Given these factors, it is disturbingly easy to
imagine scenarios under which a conflict could quickly escalate in which the regional antagonists would
consider the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. It would be a mistake to believe the
nuclear taboo can somehow magically keep nuclear weapons from being used in the context of an
unstable strategic framework. Systemic asymmetries between actors in fact suggest a certain increase in
the probability of war – a war in which escalation could happen quickly and from a variety of
participants. Once such a war starts, events would likely develop a momentum all their own and
decision-making would consequently be shaped in unpredictable ways. The international community
must take this possibility seriously, and muster every tool at its disposal to prevent such an outcome,
which would be an unprecedented disaster for the peoples of the region, with substantial risk for the
entire world.
MSDI Terror DA 107
AT: Can’t Get the Bomb Here
Their Evidence is just complacency – U.S. Security measures are not Resilient
Enough Absent Strong Domestic Surveillance
Bunn 13 – (2013, Matthew, PhD, Professor of Practice; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing
the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard, “Beyond Crises: The Unending
Challenge of Controlling Nuclear Weapons and Materials,” in Nuclear Weapons Security Crises: What
Does History Teach? Ed. Henry D. Sokolski. Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 253-278)
In short, the threats are out there. In a world that includes terrorists with global reach, effective nuclear
security and accounting measures are needed wherever nuclear weapons, plutonium, or HEU exist. All
countries with such stockpiles on their soil should ensure that they are at least protected against a
modest group of well-armed, well-trained outsiders; a wellplaced insider; and both outsiders and an
insider working together, using a broad range of tactics. Countries that face more substantial adversary
threats—Pakistan being an obvious example—need to provide even higher levels of protection.9
Unfortunately, in many countries around the world, the security measures in place today are
demonstrably not sufficient to protect against the kinds of threats terrorists and thieves have already
shown they can pose. For example, a U.S. team visiting a foreign site with a Category I quantity of HEU
from 2005 to 2010 found that there were no fences around the perimeter, no sensors to detect
intrusions, no video surveillance systems to help guards assess the cause of alarms generated by
sensors, and no vehicle barriers.10 (It is a reasonable bet that this facility also did not have an on-site
armed response team to protect it from armed attackers.) The U.S. team recommended that all of these
basic security measures be put in place, which the country agreed to do. But when a team of
congressional auditors visited in 2010-11, some of the improvements were still under way. The fact that
such glaring weaknesses still existed at a site with Category I materials years after the September 11,
2001 (9/11), attacks speaks volumes about the urgent work still ahead to plug nuclear security weak
points around the world. Indeed, I would argue that every country with nuclear weapons or weaponsusable nuclear materials—including the United States—has more to do to ensure that these items are
effectively protected. PUNCTUATING COMPLACENT EQUILIBRIUM: THE U.S. CASE If political turmoil is
not the most important driver of nuclear security problems, what is? In a word, complacency—the belief
that nuclear terrorism is not a serious threat, and that whatever security measures are in place today
are already sufficient. The history of nuclear security is a story of punctuated equilibrium, with long
stretches of complacency and little change punctuated by moments when something—typically, a major
incident of some kind—made it possible to move the system to a higher-security state, from which it
would then begin to drift slowly into complacency again. The results of incidents and other events are
mediated by the different political cultures and institutions in different countries, so that one country
might react to an incident by establishing substantial new security rules, while another might react by
having participants in the system offer explanations why it could never happen again.
MSDI Terror DA 108
AT: Can’t Build Them
Russian Materials Make Construction Relatively Easy
Zimmerman 09 – (2009, Peter, PhD, experimental nuclear and elementary particle physics, Emeritus
Professor of Science and Security at King's College London, former Chief Scientist of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, “Do We Really Need to Worry? Some Reflections on the Threat of Nuclear
Terrorism,” Defence Against Terrorism Review Vol. 2, No. 2, Fall 2009, 1-14)
Abstract: This paper considers the case for and against there being a substantial risk that a sub-state
adversary might be able to carry the construction of a nuclear device to completion and delivery. It
discusses works both for and against the proposition that the detonation of an improvised nuclear
device (IND) or a stolen nuclear weapon is sufficiently probable that strong measures to prevent the act
must be considered. Contrarian articles and books have appeared suggesting that the possibility of
nuclear terrorism has been greatly exaggerated. They argue that building an IND is too difficult for even
well-financed terrorists, that obtaining sufficient fissile materials is nearly impossible, and that no intact
weapons will be stolen. But an examination of these works finds some to be simplistic and ridden with
basic mistakes in risk analysis or misconceptions, while others are better informed but still flawed. The
principal barrier to entry for either a new nuclear weapons possessor state or a sub-state group, namely
acquiring fissile material, plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU), became less imposing with the
collapse of the Soviet Union. There is a gap in our knowledge of Russian fissile inventories, which have
not always been well guarded, and in this circumstance one cannot reassure the world that there has
been no theft of fissile material, or that any attempt will be detected quickly enough to prevent its being
made into a nuclear device. The probability of a nuclear terrorist attack in any given year remains
significant. Significant investment to deter, prevent, detect, and destroy a nuclear terror plot is required.
MSDI Terror DA 109
AT: Empirically Denied
High risk of nuclear terrorism, empirically denied arguments are bunk, and
terrorists can steal materials
Simon Sturdee, 7-1, 13, “UN Atomic Energy Agency Sounds Warning on ‘Nuclear Terrorism,’
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/07/01/un-atomic-agency-sounds-warning-on-nuclear-terrorism/
The head of the UN atomic agency warned Monday against complacency in preventing "nuclear
terrorism", saying progress in recent years should not lull the world into a false sense of security.¶
"Much has been achieved in the past decade," Yukiya Amano of the International Atomic Energy Agency
told a gathering in Vienna of some 1,200 delegates from around 110 states including 35 ministers to
review progress on the issue.¶ "Many countries have taken effective measures to prevent theft,
sabotage, unauthorised access, illegal transfer, or other malicious acts involving nuclear or other
radioactive material. Security has been improved at many facilities containing such material."¶ Partly as
a result, he said, "there has not been a terrorist attack involving nuclear or other radioactive material."¶
"But this must not lull us into a false sense of security. If a 'dirty bomb' is detonated in a major city, or
sabotage occurs at a nuclear facility, the consequences could be devastating.¶ "Nuclear terrorism"
comprises three main risks: an atomic bomb, a "dirty bomb" -- conventional explosion spreading
radioactive material -- and an attack on a nuclear plant.¶ The first, using weapons-grade uranium or
plutonium, is generally seen as "low probability, high consequence" -- very difficult to pull off but for a
determined group of extremists, not impossible.¶ There are hundreds of tonnes of weapons-usable
plutonium and uranium -- a grapefruit-sized amount is enough for a crude nuclear weapon that would fit
in a van -- around the world.¶ A "dirty bomb" -- a "radiological dispersal device" or RDD -- is much easier
but would be hugely less lethal. But it might still cause mass panic.¶ "If the Boston marathon bombing
(in April this year) had been an RDD, the trauma would be lasting a whole lot longer," Sharon Squassoni
from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) told AFP.¶ Last year alone, the IAEA
recorded 17 cases of illegal possession and attempts to sell nuclear materials and 24 incidents of theft or
loss. And it says this is the "tip of the iceberg".¶ Many cases have involved former parts of the Soviet
Union, for example Chechnya, Georgia and Moldova -- where in 2011 several people were arrested
trying to sell weapons-grade uranium -- but not only.¶ Nuclear materials that could be used in a "dirty
bomb" are also used in hospitals, factories and university campuses and are therefore seen as easy to
steal.¶ Major international efforts have been made since the end of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the
September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States to prevent nuclear material falling into the wrong
hands.¶ US President Barack Obama hosted a summit in 2010 on the subject which was followed by
another one in Seoul last year. A third is planned in The Hague in March.¶ A report issued in Vienna on
Monday to coincide with the start of the meeting by the Arms Control Association and the Partnership
for Global Security said decent progress had been made but that "significant" work remained.¶ Ten
countries have eliminated their entire stockpiles of weapons-grade uranium, many reactors producing
nuclear medicines were using less risky materials and smuggling nuclear materials across borders, for
example from Pakistan, is harder, it said.¶ But some countries still do not have armed guards at nuclear
power plants, security surrounding nuclear materials in civilian settings is often inadequate and there is
a woeful lack of international cooperation and binding global rules.¶ "We are still a long way from
having a unified regime, a unified understanding of the threat and a way to address it," Michelle Cann,
co-author of the report, told AFP.
MSDI Terror DA 110
AT: No Expertise
Terrorists Could Build a Dirty bomb without Expertiese
Michael Clark, 2013, Michael Clarke (m.clarke@griffith.edu.au) is an Australian Research Council (ARC)
Research Fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute, June 2013, Comparative Strategy, “Pakistan and Nuclear
Terrorism: How Real is the Threat?,” pp. 98-114
The threat of terrorist use of an RDD or “dirty bomb” has increased since September 11, 2001, and is
perceived as the most likely act of nuclear terrorism. An RDD is not a nuclear weapon but a bomb that
uses conventional explosives to spread radiological material over a wide area. The damage caused by
the detonation of an RDD would not necessarily stem from the effects of the radiological material itself
but instead from the amount of conventional explosives used. 35 Nonetheless, the detonation of a dirty
bomb would have a major psychological impact due to the widespread fear of radiation in the public
imagination. 36 The effectiveness of an RDD would also depend on a number of variables including the
radiological material used, the amount of conventional explosive, and the weather conditions. While
there are hundreds of radioactive isotopes, only a small number are considered to be effective in an
RDD, notably cesium-137 and cobalt-60, both of which are produced in nuclear reactors and are widely
used for medical/industrial purposes. As these materials are found in hospitals, universities, and
research facilities, they are perceived by some analysts as a “soft target” for potential terrorists seeking
materials for an RDD. 37 Spent fuel from nuclear power reactors has also been identified as a potential
source of radioactive materials for an RDD.
MSDI Terror DA 111
Bioterror Impacts
MSDI Terror DA 112
General Risk High
Bio and Nuclear Weapon Acquisition Risk is High – Lone Wolves Can Deliver
Gary A. Ackerman 14 & Lauren E. Pinson, Gary is Director of the Center for Terrorism and Intelligence
Studies, Lauren is Senior Researcher and Project Manager for the National Consortium for the Study of
Terrorism and Responses of Terrorism, An Army of One: Assessing CBRN Pursuit and Use by Lone Wolves
and Autonomous Cells, Terrorism and Political Violence, Volume 26, Issue 1
The first question to answer is whence the concerns about the nexus between CBRN weapons and
isolated actors come and whether these are overblown. The general threat of mass violence posed by
lone wolves and small autonomous cells has been detailed in accompanying issue contributions, but the
potential use of CBRN weapons by such perpetrators presents some singular features that either amplify
or supplement the attributes of the more general case and so are deserving of particular attention. Chief
among these is the impact of rapid technological development. Recent and emerging advances in a
variety of areas, from synthetic biology 3 to nanoscale engineering, 4 have opened doors not only to
new medicines and materials, but also to new possibilities for malefactors to inflict harm on others.
What is most relevant in the context of lone actors and small autonomous cells is not so much the pace
of new invention, but rather the commercialization and consumerization of CBRN weapons-relevant
technologies. This process often entails an increase in the availability and safety of the technology, with
a concurrent diminution in the cost, volume, and technical knowledge required to operate it. Thus, for
example, whereas fifty years ago producing large quantities of certain chemical weapons might have
been a dangerous and inefficient affair requiring a large plant, expensive equipment, and several
chemical engineers, with the advent of chemical microreactors, 5 the same processes might be
accomplished far more cheaply and safely on a desktop assemblage, purchased commercially and
monitored by a single chemistry graduate student.¶ The rapid global spread and increased userfriendliness of many technologies thus represents a potentially radical shift from the relatively small
scale of harm a single individual or small autonomous group could historically cause. 6 From the limited
reach and killing power of the sword, spear, and bow, to the introduction of dynamite and eventually
the use of our own infrastructures against us (as on September 11), the number of people that an
individual who was unsupported by a broader political entity could kill with a single action has increased
from single digits to thousands. Indeed, it has even been asserted that “over time … as the leverage
provided by technology increases, this threshold will finally reach its culmination—with the ability of
one man to declare war on the world and win.” 7 Nowhere is this trend more perceptible in the current
age than in the area of unconventional weapons.¶ These new technologies do not simply empower
users on a purely technical level. Globalization and the expansion of information networks provide new
opportunities for disaffected individuals in the farthest corners of the globe to become familiar with
core weapon concepts and to purchase equipment—online technical courses and eBay are undoubtedly
a boon to would-be purveyors of violence. Furthermore, even the most solipsistic misanthropes, people
who would never be able to function socially as part of an operational terrorist group, can find
radicalizing influences or legitimation for their beliefs in the maelstrom of virtual identities on the
Internet.¶ All of this can spawn, it is feared, a more deleterious breed of lone actors, what have been
referred to in some quarters as “super-empowered individuals.” 8 Conceptually, super-empowered
individuals are atomistic game-changers, i.e., they constitute a single (and often singular) individual who
can shock the entire system (whether national, regional, or global) by relying only on their own
MSDI Terror DA 113
resources. Their core characteristics are that they have superior intelligence, the capacity to use
complex communications or technology systems, and act as an individual or a “lone-wolf.” 9 The end
result, according to the pessimists, is that if one of these individuals chooses to attack the system, “the
unprecedented nature of his attack ensures that no counter-measures are in place to prevent it. And
when he strikes, his attack will not only kill massive amounts of people, but also profoundly change the
financial, political, and social systems that govern modern life.” 10 It almost goes without saying that the
same concerns attach to small autonomous cells, whose members' capabilities and resources can be
combined without appreciably increasing the operational footprint presented to intelligence and law
enforcement agencies seeking to detect such behavior.¶ With the exception of the largest truck or
aircraft bombs, the most likely means by which to accomplish this level of system perturbation is
through the use of CBRN agents as WMD. On the motivational side, therefore, lone actors and small
autonomous cells may ironically be more likely to select CBRN weapons than more established terrorist
groups—who are usually more conservative in their tactical orientation—because the extreme
asymmetry of these weapons may provide the only subjectively feasible option for such actors to
achieve their grandiose aims of deeply affecting the system. The inherent technical challenges
presented by CBRN weapons may also make them attractive to self-assured individuals who may have a
very different risk tolerance than larger, traditional terrorist organizations that might have to be
concerned with a variety of constituencies, from state patrons to prospective recruits. 11 Many other
factors beyond a “perceived potential to achieve mass casualties” might play into the decision to pursue
CBRN weapons in lieu of conventional explosives, 12 including a fetishistic fascination with these
weapons or the perception of direct referents in the would-be perpetrator's belief system.¶ Others are
far more sanguine about the capabilities of lone actors (or indeed non-state actors in general) with
respect to their potential for using CBRN agents to cause mass fatalities, arguing that the barriers to a
successful large-scale CBRN attack remain high, even in today's networked, tech-savvy environment. 13
Dolnik, for example, argues that even though homegrown cells are “less constrained” in motivations,
more challenging plots generally have an inverse relationship with capability, 14 while Michael Kenney
cautions against making presumptions about the ease with which individuals can learn to produce viable
weapons using only the Internet. 15 However, even most of these pundits concede that low-level CBR
attacks emanating from this quarter will probably lead to political, social, and economic disruption that
extends well beyond the areas immediately affected by the attack. This raises an essential point with
respect to CBRN terrorism: irrespective of the harm potential of CBRN weapons or an actor's capability
(or lack thereof) to successfully employ them on a catastrophic scale, these weapons invariably exert a
stronger psychological impact on audiences—the essence of terrorism—than the traditional gun and
bomb. This is surely not lost on those lone actors or autonomous cells who are as interested in getting
noticed as in causing casualties.¶ Proven Capability and Intent¶ While legitimate debate can be had as
to the level of potential threat posed by lone actors or small autonomous cells wielding CBRN weapons,
possibly the best argument for engaging in a substantive examination of the issue is the most concrete
one of all—that these actors have already demonstrated the motivation and capability to pursue and
use CBRN weapons, in some cases even close to the point of constituting a genuine WMD threat. In the
context of bioterrorism, perhaps the most cogent illustration of this is the case of Dr. Bruce Ivins, the
perpetrator behind one of the most serious episodes of bioterrorism in living memory, the 2001
“anthrax letters,” which employed a highly virulent and sophisticated form of the agent and not only
killed five and seriously sickened 17 people, but led to widespread disruption of the U.S. postal services
and key government facilities. 16¶ Other historical cases of CBRN pursuit and use by lone actors and
MSDI Terror DA 114
small autonomous cells highlight the need for further exploration. Among the many extant examples:
17¶ Thomas Lavy was caught at the Alaska-Canada border in 1993 with 130 grams of 7% pure ricin. It is
unclear how Lavy obtained the ricin, what he planned to do with it, and what motivated him.¶ In 1996,
Diane Thompson deliberately infected twelve coworkers with shigella dysenteriae type 2. Her motives
were unclear.¶ In 1998, Larry Wayne Harris, a white supremacist, was charged with producing and
stockpiling a biological agent—bacillus anthracis, the causative agent of anthrax.¶ In 1999, the Justice
Department (an autonomous cell sympathetic to the Animal Liberation Front) mailed over 100 razor
blades dipped in rat poison to individuals involved in the fur industry.¶ In 2000, Tsiugio Uchinshi was
arrested for mailing samples of the mineral monazite with trace amounts of radioactive thorium to
several Japanese government agencies to persuade authorities to look into potential uranium being
smuggled to North Korea.¶ In 2002, Chen Zhengping put rat poison in a rival snack shop's products and
killed 42 people.¶ In 2005, 10 letters containing a radioactive substance were mailed to major
organizations in Belgium including the Royal Palace, NATO headquarters, and the U.S. embassy in
Brussels. No injuries were reported.¶ In 2011, federal agents arrested four elderly men in Georgia who
were plotting to use ricin and explosives to target federal buildings, Justice Department officials, federal
judges, and Internal Revenue Service agents.¶ Two recent events may signal an even greater interest in
CBRN by lone malefactors. First, based on one assessment of Norway's Anders Breivik's treatise, his
references to CBRN weapons a) suggest that CBRN weapons could be used on a tactical level and b)
reveal (to perhaps previously uninformed audiences) that even low-level CBRN weapons could achieve
far-reaching impacts driven by fear. 18 Whether or not Breivik would actually have sought or been able
to pursue CBRN, he has garnered a following in several (often far-right) extremist circles and his treatise
might inspire other lone actors. Second, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) released two issues
of Inspire magazine in 2012. Articles, on the one hand, call for lone wolf jihad attacks to target noncombatant populations and, on the other, permit the use of chemical and biological weapons. The
combination of such directives may very well influence the weapon selection of lone actor jihadists in
Western nations. 19
Bioterror is Easier than Most Experts Let on
Allison, IR Director @ Harvard, 12 (Graham, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International
Affairs; Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, Harvard Kennedy School, "Living in the Era of
Megaterror", Sept 7,
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/22302/living_in_the_era_of_megaterror.html)
Forty years ago this week at the Munich Olympics of 1972, Palestinian terrorists conducted one of the
most dramatic terrorist attacks of the 20th century. The kidnapping and massacre of 11 Israeli athletes
attracted days of around-the-clock global news coverage of Black September’s anti-Israel message.
Three decades later, on 9/11, Al Qaeda killed nearly 3,000 individuals at the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon, announcing a new era of megaterror. In an act that killed more people than Japan’s attack on
Pearl Harbor, a band of terrorists headquartered in ungoverned Afghanistan demonstrated that
individuals and small groups can kill on a scale previously the exclusive preserve of states. Today, how
many people can a small group of terrorists kill in a single blow? Had Bruce Ivins, the U.S. government
microbiologist responsible for the 2001 anthrax attacks, distributed his deadly agent with sprayers he
could have purchased off the shelf, tens of thousands of Americans would have died. Had the 2001
“Dragonfire” report that Al Qaeda had a small nuclear weapon (from the former Soviet arsenal) in New
MSDI Terror DA 115
York City proved correct, and not a false alarm, detonation of that bomb in Times Square could have
incinerated a half million Americans. In this electoral season, President Obama is claiming credit, rightly,
for actions he and U.S. Special Forces took in killing Osama bin Laden. Similarly, at last week’s
Republican convention in Tampa, Jeb Bush praised his brother for making the United States safer after
9/11. There can be no doubt that the thousands of actions taken at federal, state and local levels have
made people safer from terrorist attacks. Many are therefore attracted to the chorus of officials and
experts claiming that the “strategic defeat” of Al Qaeda means the end of this chapter of history. But we
should remember a deeper and more profound truth. While applauding actions that have made us safer
from future terrorist attacks, we must recognize that they have not reversed an inescapable reality: The
relentless advance of science and technology is making it possible for smaller and smaller groups to kill
larger and larger numbers of people. If a Qaeda affiliate, or some terrorist group in Pakistan whose
name readers have never heard, acquires highly enriched uranium or plutonium made by a state, they
can construct an elementary nuclear bomb capable of killing hundreds of thousands of people. At
biotech labs across the United States and around the world, research scientists making medicines that
advance human well-being are also capable of making pathogens, like anthrax, that can produce
massive casualties. What to do? Sherlock Holmes examined crime scenes using a method he called
M.M.O.: motive, means and opportunity. In a society where citizens gather in unprotected movie
theaters, churches, shopping centers and stadiums, opportunities for attack abound. Free societies are
inherently “target rich.” Motive to commit such atrocities poses a more difficult challenge. In all
societies, a percentage of the population will be homicidal. No one can examine the mounting number
of cases of mass murder in schools, movie theaters and elsewhere without worrying about a society’s
mental health. Additionally, actions we take abroad unquestionably impact others’ motivation to attack
us. As Faisal Shahzad, the 2010 would-be “Times Square bomber,” testified at his trial: “Until the hour
the U.S. ... stops the occupation of Muslim lands, and stops killing the Muslims ... we will be attacking
U.S., and I plead guilty to that.” Fortunately, it is more difficult for a terrorist to acquire the “means” to
cause mass casualties. Producing highly enriched uranium or plutonium requires expensive industrialscale investments that only states will make. If all fissile material can be secured to a gold standard
beyond the reach of thieves or terrorists, aspirations to become the world’s first nuclear terrorist can be
thwarted. Capabilities for producing bioterrorist agents are not so easily secured or policed. While more
has been done, and much more could be done to further raise the technological barrier, as knowledge
advances and technological capabilities to make pathogens become more accessible, the means for
bioterrorism will come within the reach of terrorists. One of the hardest truths about modern life is that
the same advances in science and technology that enrich our lives also empower potential killers to
achieve their deadliest ambitions. To imagine that we can escape this reality and return to a world in
which we are invulnerable to future 9/11s or worse is an illusion. For as far as the eye can see, we will
live in an era of megaterror.
MSDI Terror DA 116
Al Qaeda Risk High
Best Evidence – Al Qaeda Specifically Wants To Use bio weapons
Hellmich and Redig 07 – (2007, Christina, PhD, Reader in International Relations and Middle East
Studies, and Amanda, MD, PhD, Clinical Fellow in Medicine, Harvard Catalyst Clinical and Translational
Science Center, “The Question is When: The Ideology of Al Qaeda and the Reality of Bioterrorism,”
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism Volume 30, Issue 5, 2007)
The fictional scenario presented at the beginning of this article is not meant to be a scientifically valid
primer in the production or distribution of a biological agent. Rather, it is intended to illustrate the ease
with which biological agents can be adapted to more conventional and well-documented historical
examples of terrorism. In this setting, the question du jour is not if it can be done, but rather, is there
someone willing to do it. It is thus the aim of the remainder of this commentary to provide a missing
piece of analysis in what has become a topic of international concern with a budget of billions of dollars.
Current evaluations of bioterrorism do not adequately consider either the unique and often
unrecognized ideological position of Al Qaeda or the relevance of the organization's historical and
contextual setting. Furthermore, in what is a dangerous oversight, the scientific and technical aspects of
creating and using biological weapons have only been assessed from a now invalid historical paradigm
that does not accurately reflect the decision-making structure and operations of the present-day
organization most likely to use such weapons. As counterterrorism measures are only as accurate as the
analysis on which they are based, it is a matter of grave importance that the threat of bioterror be
philosophically and scientifically reevaluated through the only lens that matters: Al Qaeda's.
Loose Soviet Anthrax Presents Biggest Risk
Hellmich and Redig 07 – (2007, Christina, PhD, Reader in International Relations and Middle East
Studies, and Amanda, MD, PhD, Clinical Fellow in Medicine, Harvard Catalyst Clinical and Translational
Science Center, “The Question is When: The Ideology of Al Qaeda and the Reality of Bioterrorism,”
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism Volume 30, Issue 5, 2007)
Although the ability to effectively weaponize a microbe such as anthrax, smallpox, or Yersinia pestis is
admittedly a challenge, it has already been accomplished by at least one state entity, namely the former
Soviet Union. 64 This raises concerns at two levels: in the dissolution of an entire society, what
happened to the reagent stocks of bioweapons and what happened to the scientists who created them?
Ironically, the world was probably more secure from the threat of biowarfare during the years in which
some of the world's most talented molecular biologists were actively creating superstrains of bacteria
and determining how to effectively deliver them than it is today. For even as research accelerated the
development of extremely sophisticated bioweapons, the political checks and constraints of a bipolar
world made the likelihood of their eventual use very low. In addition, the not inconsiderable resources
of a superpower with an established Gulag and NKVD were fully deployed to prevent the unauthorized
use, transport, or discussion of such weapons. However, the politics that prevented a nuclear holocaust
triggered by the opposition of two superpowers during the Cold War simply do not apply to the political
or strategic decision-making process of an organization like Al Qaeda. And although Al Qaeda itself may
not have the resources to create a weapons-grade strain of anthrax or smallpox, Biopreparat did. In the
collapse of any social safety net, and in the wake of rampant inflation, unemployment, and poverty
following the end of the Soviet Union, it is not hard to imagine that some of the estimated 50,000
MSDI Terror DA 117
scientists employed by Biopreparat may have been tempted to trade what resources were left–
information or materials—to stave off starvation, secure medical care for an ill child, or provide the
means to relocate to a more stable society. In short, Al Qaeda is poised to benefit from resources it
could never hope to match while organizing an operation a state actor could never conceivably order.
Bioterror attacks are unlikely as long as the means and the will to orchestrate them remain separated.
Quite simply, the Western world can no longer assume that is the case.
MSDI Terror DA 118
ISIS Specific
ISIS Is Developing Bioweapons – Recovered Raid Data Proves
Harald Doornbosjenan Moussa, 8-28-2014, Harald Doornbos is a reporter based in Pakistan covering
the greater Middle East. "Found: The Islamic State’s Terror Laptop of Doom," Foreign Policy,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/08/28/found-the-islamic-states-terror-laptop-of-doom/
AKYA, Turkey — Abu Ali, a commander of a moderate Syrian rebel group in northern Syria, proudly
shows a black laptop partly covered in dust. “We took it this year from an ISIS hideout,” he says. Abu Ali
says the fighters from the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), which have since rebranded
themselves as the Islamic State, all fled before he and his men attacked the building. The attack
occurred in January in a village in the Syrian province of Idlib, close to the border with Turkey, as part of
a larger anti-ISIS offensive occurring at the time. “We found the laptop and the power cord in a room,”
he continued, “I took it with me. But I have no clue if it still works or if it contains anything interesting.”
The Complex:Is the ISIS laptop of doom an operational threat? Meet Lady al Qaeda: Why does every
jihadi group want the U.S. to free Aafia Siddiqui? Inside the Bureaucracy of Evil: From electricity to
sewage, U.S. intel warns the Islamic State has gotten pretty good at running a country. As we switched
on the Dell laptop, it indeed still worked. Nor was it password-protected. But then came a huge
disappointment: After we clicked on “My Computer,” all the drives appeared empty. Appearances,
however, can be deceiving. Upon closer inspection, the ISIS laptop wasn’t empty at all: Buried in the
“hidden files” section of the computer were 146 gigabytes of material, containing a total of 35,347 files
in 2,367 folders. Abu Ali allowed us to copy all these files — which included documents in French,
English, and Arabic — onto an external hard drive. A screenshot of material found on the computer. The
files appear to be videos of speeches by jihadist clerics. (Click to enlarge.) The laptop’s contents turn out
to be a treasure trove of documents that provide ideological justifications for jihadi organizations — and
practical training on how to carry out the Islamic State’s deadly campaigns. They include videos of
Osama bin Laden, manuals on how to make bombs, instructions for stealing cars, and lessons on how to
use disguises in order to avoid getting arrested while traveling from one jihadi hot spot to another. But
after hours upon hours of scrolling through the documents, it became clear that the ISIS laptop contains
more than the typical propaganda and instruction manuals used by jihadists. The documents also
suggest that the laptop’s owner was teaching himself about the use of biological weaponry, in
preparation for a potential attack that would have shocked the world. The information on the laptop
makes clear that its owner is a Tunisian national named Muhammed S. who joined ISIS in Syria and who
studied chemistry and physics at two universities in Tunisia’s northeast. Even more disturbing is how he
planned to use that education: The ISIS laptop contains a 19-page document in Arabic on how to
develop biological weapons and how to weaponize the bubonic plague from infected animals. The ISIS
laptop contains a 19-page document in Arabic on how to develop biological weapons and how to
weaponize the bubonic plague from infected animals. “The advantage of biological weapons is that they
do not cost a lot of money, while the human casualties can be huge,” the document states. The
document includes instructions for how to test the weaponized disease safely, before it is used in a
terrorist attack. “When the microbe is injected in small mice, the symptoms of the disease should start
to appear within 24 hours,” the document says. The laptop also includes a 26-page fatwa, or Islamic
ruling, on the usage of weapons of mass destruction. “If Muslims cannot defeat the kafir [unbelievers] in
a different way, it is permissible to use weapons of mass destruction,” states the fatwa by Saudi jihadi
MSDI Terror DA 119
cleric Nasir al-Fahd, who is currently imprisoned in Saudi Arabia. “Even if it kills all of them and wipes
them and their descendants off the face of the Earth.” When contacted by phone, a staff member at a
Tunisian university listed on Muhammed’s exam papers confirmed that he indeed studied chemistry and
physics there. She said the university lost track of him after 2011, however. Out of the blue, she asked:
“Did you find his papers inside Syria?” Asked why she would think that Muhammed’s belongings would
have ended up in Syria, she answered, “For further questions about him, you better ask state security.”
An astonishing number of Tunisians have flocked to the Syrian battlefield since the revolt began. In June,
Tunisia’s interior minister A photo of Muhammed S. found on his laptop. This image has been digitally
altered. Out of the blue, she asked: “Did you find his papers inside Syria?” Asked why she would think
that Muhammed’s belongings would have ended up in Syria, she answered, “For further questions
about him, you better ask state security.” An astonishing number of Tunisians have flocked to the Syrian
battlefield since the revolt began. In June, Tunisia’s interior minister estimated that at least 2,400
Tunisians were fighting in the country, mostly as members of the Islamic State. This isn’t the first time
that jihadists have attempted to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Even before the 9/11 attacks, al
Qaeda had experimented with a chemical weapons program in Afghanistan. In 2002, CNN obtained a
tape showing al Qaeda members testing poison gas on three dogs, all of which died. Nothing on the ISIS
laptop, of course, suggests that the jihadists already possess these dangerous weapons. And any jihadi
organization contemplating a bioterrorist attack will face many difficulties: Al Qaeda tried unsuccessfully
for years to get its hands on such weapons, and the United States has devoted massive resources to
preventing terrorists from making just this sort of breakthrough. The material on this laptop, however, is
a reminder that jihadists are also hard at work at acquiring the weapons that could allow them to kill
thousands of people with one blow. “The real difficulty in all of these weapons … [is] to actually have a
workable distribution system that will kill a lot of people,” said Magnus Ranstorp, research director of
the Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies at the Swedish National Defence College. “But to produce
quite scary weapons is certainly within [the Islamic State’s] capabilities.” The Islamic State’s sweeping
gains in recent months may have provided it with the capacity to develop such new and dangerous
weapons. Members of the jihadi group are not solely fighting on the front lines these days — they also
control substantial parts of Syria and Iraq. The fear now is that men like Muhammed could be quietly
working behind the front lines — for instance, in the Islamic State-controlled University of Mosul or in
some laboratory in the Syrian city of Raqqa, the group’s de facto capital — to develop chemical or
biological weapons. In short, the longer the caliphate exists, the more likely it is that members with a
science background will come up with something horrible. The documents found on the laptop of the
Tunisian jihadist, meanwhile, leave no room for doubt about the group’s deadly ambitions. “Use small
grenades with the virus, and throw them in closed areas like metros, soccer stadiums, or entertainment
centers,” the 19-page document on biological weapons advises. “Best to do it next to the airconditioning. It also can be used during suicide operations.”
The WHO Concludes that ISIS Has the Capability to Develop a Bio Weapon
Ryan Wallace, 6-25-2015, ScienceTimes.com Writer "Biological Warfare on the Horizon? ISIS Soldiers
May Be Infected With Ebola," Science Times,
http://www.sciencetimes.com/articles/2395/20150105/biological-warfare-on-the-horizon-isis-soldiersmay-be-infected-with-ebola.htm
MSDI Terror DA 120
It's what national security organizations have feared since day one-the World Health Organization
(WHO) announced last week that they are evaluating jihadist militants associated with ISIS, who may
have contracted the virus responsible for Ebola. While the WHO has yet to confirm whether or not the
fighters are exhibiting symptoms, the current evaluations of a Mosul hospital 250 miles north of
Baghdad are prompting concerns that the fringe extremist group ISIS may in fact be able to obtain a
biological weapon unlike anything the world has seen before. Though Mosul has been under ISIS control
since late last June, the Iraqi health ministry has issued a press release denying reports from Iraqi news
outlets that claim the soldier are definitively infected and seeking treatment in Mosul. "The Ebola virus
could be in any area in the world, including Mosul, where they don't have the measures or techniques to
diagnose the virus" spokesperson for the health ministry Ahmed Rudaini says. "They are incapable to
detect it." Over the past several months, the world has watched as threats from extremist group ISIS
have come true, from the beheadings of captured prisoners of war to the mass murder of children's
schools. And with the possibility of a global pandemic looming over our heads, many are demanding
action be taken to isolate the potential vectors as a worst case scenario. Yet, as conflicting reports
abound, international health organizations and the WHO are unable to assess the health concern on
site, and treat the patients as their own. WHO director Christy Feig told reporters early this weekend
that " We [the WHO] have no official notification from the Iraqi government that it is Ebola." While that
may be true, the possibility that the militants may have contracted the virus causes a problematic
situation for the WHO, in that ISIS does not believe in modern medicine and an outbreak in an ISIScontrolled area like Mosul could be a breeding ground for the ever-mutating virus. But worst of all, aside
from the possibility of possible infection of Iraq, should ISIS isolate the virus for themselves, the entire
western world may find soon enough that the Ebola virus could be the worst weapon known to man.
"U.N. workers have thus far been prohibited from entering ISIS-controlled territory in both Iraq and
Syria," intelligence analyst for Levantine Group, Benjamin T. Decker says. "In this context, the lack of
medical infrastructure, supplies and practitioners in the city suggests that the outbreak could quickly
lead to further infection of both ISIS fighters and residents of Mosul."
MSDI Terror DA 121
Yes Extinction
MSDI Terror DA 122
Lashout
Lack of security measures ensures US pre-emption and lashout.
Koblentz, 4, Gregory Koblentz is a doctoral candidate in Political Science at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, “Pathogens as Weapons: The International Seucrity Implications of Biological
Warfare”, International Security, Vol. 28 No. 3 Winter 2003/04, pp. 84-122,
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/koblentz.pdf
prevention and preemption. States may adopt preventive or preemptive strategies to neutralize
perceived threats posed by the prospect of anonymous biological attacks or the acquisition of biological
weapons by nondeterrable ac- tors.118 After the September 11 terrorist attacks, preventive and
preemptive strategies became central to U.S. national security planning.119 These strategies, however,
arst emerged during President Bill Clinton’s administration in re- sponse to the threat of mass casualty
terrorism. In 1995, the White House is- sued a presidential decision directive stating that the acquisition
of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons by terrorists was “unacceptable.” According to the directive,
“There is no higher priority than preventing the acquisition of this capability or removing this capability
from terrorist groups potentially op- posed to the U.S.”120 This policy was arst implemented on August
20, 1998, when the United States launched cruise missiles at the al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Sudan,
which ofacials believed was linked to the development of chemical weapons for al-Qaeda.121 Despite
concerns within the administration about the legal and intelligence justiacations for the attack, “the
perception of imminent danger was powerful enough to overcome these concerns. At the Principals
meeting, [National Security Adviser] Sandy Berger asked, ‘What if we do not hit it [al-Shifa] and then,
after an attack, nerve gas is released in the New York City subway? What will we say then?’”122
Although this incident in- volved terrorist acquisition of chemical (not biological) weapons, it indicates
how states may respond to the specter of terrorist acquisition of even more le- thal weapons.
Preventive and preemptive attacks against suspected biological weapons facilities present signiacant
intelligence, military, and diplomatic challenges. The potential consequences of a biological attack and
the limita- tions of defensive and deterrent strategies, however, may inouence a decision- maker’s
calculation that the risks of inaction outweigh the costs of action.
MSDI Terror DA 123
Pandemic Extinction
Bioweapons independently cause extinction
Richard Ochs: 7-9-02, has published articles in the Baltimore Sun, Baltimore Chronicle, Science
magazine, past president of the Aberdeen Proving Ground Superfund Citizens Coalition, member of the
Depleted Uranium Task force of the Military Toxics Project and a member of the Chemical Weapons
Working Group, “Biological Weapons must be abolished immediately,”
http://www.freefromterror.net/other_articles/abolish.html
Of all the weapons of mass destruction, the genetically engineered biological weapons, many without a known
cure or vaccine, are an extreme danger to the continued survival of life on earth. Any perceived military
value or deterrence pales in comparison to the great risk these weapons pose just sitting in vials in
laboratories. While a "nuclear winter," resulting from a massive exchange of nuclear weapons, could also kill off most of life on earth
and severely compromise the health of future generations, they are easier to control. Biological weapons, on the other
hand, can get out of control very easily, as the recent anthrax attacks has demonstrated. There is no way to guarantee the
security of these doomsday weapons because very tiny amounts can be stolen or accidentally released and then grow or be grown to
horrendous proportions. The
Black Death of the Middle Ages would be small in comparison to the potential
damage bioweapons could cause. Abolition of chemical weapons is less of a priority because, while they can also kill millions of
people outright, their persistence in the environment would be less than nuclear or biological agents or more localized. Hence, chemical
weapons would have a lesser effect on future generations of innocent people and the natural environment. Like the Holocaust, once a localized
chemical extermination is over, it is over. With nuclear and biological
weapons, the killing will probably never end.
Radioactive elements last tens of thousands of years and will keep causing cancers virtually forever. Potentially worse than that,
bio-engineered agents by the hundreds with no known cure could wreck even greater calamity on the
human race than could persistent radiation. AIDS and ebola viruses are just a small example of recently emerging plagues with
no known cure or vaccine. Can we imagine hundreds of such plagues? HUMAN EXTINCTION IS NOW POSSIBLE.
Engineered diseases cause extinction.
Sandberg et al 8, Anders Sandberg is a James Martin Research Fellow at the Future of Humanity
Institute at Oxford University. He received a PhD in computational neuroscience from Stockholm
University and is a postdoctoral research assistant for the EU Enhance project. Jason G. Matheny is a
PhD candidate in Health Policy and Management at Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health.
He is also a special consultant to the Center for Biosecurity at the University of Pittsburgh Medical
Center. Milan M. Ćirkovićis senior research associate at the Astronomical Observatory of Belgrade. He is
also an assistant professor of physics at the University of Novi Sad in Serbia and Montenegro. “How Can
We Reduce The Risk of Human Extinction?” http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/how-canwe-reduce-the-risk-of-human-extinction
The risks from anthropogenic hazards appear at present larger than those from natural ones. Although
great progress has been made in reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world, humanity is
still threatened by the possibility of a global thermonuclear war and a resulting nuclear winter. We
may face even greater risks from emerging technologies. Advances in synthetic biology might make it
possible to engineer pathogens capable of extinction-level pandemics. The knowledge, equipment, and
materials needed to engineer pathogens are more accessible than those needed to build nuclear
weapons. And unlike other weapons, pathogens are self-replicating, allowing a small arsenal to
become exponentially destructive. Pathogens have been implicated in the extinctions of many wild
species. Although most pandemics "fade out" by reducing the density of susceptible populations,
MSDI Terror DA 124
pathogens with wide host ranges in multiple species can reach even isolated individuals. The
intentional or unintentional release of engineered pathogens with high transmissibility, latency, and
lethality might be capable of causing human extinction. While such an event seems unlikely today, the
likelihood may increase as biotechnologies continue to improve at a rate rivaling Moore's Law.
MSDI Terror DA 125
AT: Deterrence/Terrorists Won’t use WMD’s
Terrorists will use WMDs when they get them.
Bucci, 8-25, Steve Bucci, previous Deputy Assistant Secretary for Homeland Security at the Department
of Defense, “Weapons of Mass Destruction – A Dangerous and Uncertain Future”,
http://securitydebrief.com/2011/08/25/weapons-of-mass-destruction-a-dangerous-and-uncertainfuture/
Clearly our enemies, extremists in the main, but also rouge states, continue to seek the full gamut of
Chem, Bio, Rad, Nuke, and HYE devices. They have few if any scruples that would deter them from
deploying such devices against any vulnerable target – Gov’t, Military, or civilian, including complete
innocents. One imagines that using such a terror-producing device against the most innocent of targets
would actually be a more desirable outcome for many of these groups.
MSDI Terror DA 126
AT: No bioweapon access
Bioweapons availability is increasing- cheap option for mass destruction
CSIS, 6 (“STRATEGIC STUDY ON BIOTERRORISM,
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/061016_bioterrorism.pdf)
Bio-agents are readily available in the modern world and are relatively inexpensive to produce, store
and transport from one country to another. At the same time, they can be toxic, transmissible and
lethal. Some have a long period of incubation, and many items involved in biotechnology are dual use,
thus difficult to ban. The physical security of biological agents is very poor in a number of facilities, with
dangerous pathogens stored in unlocked kitchen refrigerators and simple fences without alarm systems
surrounding the facilities. Lax border controls make illicit trafficking of drugs, arms and materials of
weapons of mass destruction a possibility in regions such as Central Asia and the Caucusus, which is an
area also traveled by terrorist groups. This report focuses on bio agents that may be available to
terrorists rather than terrorism in general. How can we secure, collect or destroy strains that may pose a
serious threat and prevent them from falling into the hands of terrorists? How can we channel the
knowledge and experience of unemployed former Soviet bioscientists into benefits for the international
community? It is almost impossible to detect and deter the movement and/or transfer of a small
quantity of dangerous infectious agents. It is very difficult to forecast consequences of a bioterrorist
attack. For example, in the case of a sudden appearance of an epidemic type of avian flu H5N1, the
epidemic will travel the globe quickly, while the development, testing and production of the necessary
quantities of a vaccine against the avian flu will take at least 4 to 5 months; this will provide protection
for 50% of the world population. Therefore, the protection of the population from epidemics and
pandemics of dangerous diseases caused by natural outbreaks, man-made accidents or bioterrorist
attacks is an issue of national and international concern. Given their proximity, Russia and other
European countries are well placed to cooperate on improving communications and surveillance
systems to reach hospitals and doctors, including in isolated areas. There is no common definition of
bioterrorism. A modified FBI definition refers to it as the “unlawful use of viruses, bacteria, fungi, toxins
or other pathogenic material against a government, the civilian population, livestock, crops or any
segment thereof, in furtherance of political, social and/or economic objectives.”13 An unofficial Russian
definition states, “Bioterrorism is the use of dangerous biological agents for inflicting damage to the life
and health of people in order to reach goals of a political and materialistic nature.” The possibilities for
bioterrorism exist in water, land, food, air, and the human being itself. Much has been written about
possible scenarios of pathogens in the major water reserves, the food supply, animal husbandry, the
subway, sport arenas, railway stations, and places where large numbers of people congregate. The
sources of water supplies are generally considered protected in the cities, though they are not failsafe.
Certain safeguards are in place for food protection, though a number of experts have expressed concern
in particular about possible contamination of milk.14 The experts in this Study agreed that the highest
risk was that of air contamination, and they recognized that it is close to impossible to protect the
population from being contaminated. The method of dissemination of bio agents depends on the kinds
of diseases. Non-contagious diseases require complex dissemination equipment such as a spray system
or an explosive device to create a large-scale effect. The anthrax letters delivered in the United States
Senate Office Building showed that widespread psychological effects could be inflicted via a simple
means of delivery and a small number of actual victims. Various organizations have compiled lists of
MSDI Terror DA 127
agents that are based on parameters such as lethality, toxicity, morbidity, and mortality. The United
States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has defined three categories of bioterrorism
agents/diseases. Category A comprises high priority agents that “include organisms that pose a risk to
national security because they can be easily disseminated or transmitted from person to person; result
in high mortality rates and have the potential for major public health impact; might cause public panic
and social disruption; and require special action for public health preparedness.” The CDC lists the
following under Category A: Anthrax (bacillus anthracis), Botulism (Clostridium botulinum toxin), plague
(Yersinia pestis), Smallpox (variola major), Tularemia (Francisella tularensis) and Viral hemorrhagic
fevers (filoviruses [e.g. Ebola, Marburg] and arenaviruses [e.g. Lassa, Machupo]). Category B
diseases/agents are defined as those that “are moderately easy to disseminate; result in moderate
morbidity rates and low mortality rates; and require specific enhancements of CDC’s diagnostic capacity
and enhanced disease surveillance.” Category B includes: Brucellosis (Brucella species); Epsilon toxin of
Clostridium perfringens; Food safety threats (e.g. Salmonella species, Escherichia coli 0157:H7, Shigella);
Glanders (Burkholderia mallei); Melioidosis (Burkholderia pseudomallei); Psittacosis (Chlamydia psittaci);
Q fever (Coxiella burnetii); Ricin toxin from Ricinus communis (castor beans); Staphylococcal enterotoxin
B; Typhus fever (Rickettsia prowazekii); Viral encephalitis (alphaviruses [e.g. Venezuelan equine
encephalitis, eastern equine encephalitis, western equine encephalitis]); Water safety threats (e.g.
Vibrio cholerae, Cryptosporidium parvum). The third highest priority agents, Category C, are defined as
“emerging pathogens that could be engineered for mass dissemination in the future because of
availability; ease of production and dissemination; and potential for high morbidity and mortality rates
and major health impact.” The CDC list mentions emerging infectious diseases such as Nipah virus and
hanta virus.15 Similar lists of pathogens exist for plants and animals. Recent examples of diseases that
have caused economic as well as psychological distress include foot and mouth disease in the United
Kingdom in 2001, which cost an estimated $12 billion, SARS, which cost Canadian tourism almost $1
billion in lost revenue,16 and avian flu. Even the process of finding a disease capable of causing
bioterrorism costs a great deal in research and development, money that could be spent on other
activities such as treating tuberculosis, dengue fever or other severe diseases. During the Soviet era the
country had very strong scientific and engineering capabilities, with a high level of university training.
President Yeltsin acknowledged in 1992 that the Soviet Union had violated the Biological Weapons
Convention, which entered into force in 1975. The legacy of suspicion and mistrust between the former
Soviet Union and the United States that persisted during the cold war has continued to this day. The
economic decline that set in after the Soviet era resulted in poor physical security systems in facilities
housing large collections of dangerous pathogens and a drop in salaries for an estimated 10,000 former
Soviet biological scientists possessing relevant bioweapons expertise. 17 Many either changed careers
or sought work in other countries, causing concern over the possibility of terrorists acquiring knowledge
from them. Many Russian officials now talk about the “lost generation” of scientists: at the Russian
Academy of Medical Sciences, for example, more than half the researchers are older than 45, and only
15 percent are between the age of 30 and 45.
MSDI Terror DA 128
AT: No BW Delivery
Delivery is possibly- ingenuity and motivation for use ensures capabilities
Carafano 3, Phd, Deputy Director, Institute for International Studies and Director, Center for Foreign
Policy Studies, (James, “ Improving Federal Response to Catastrophic Bioterrorist Attacks: The Next
Steps,” Heritage Foundation, November 13,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2003/11/Improving-Federal-Response-to-CatastrophicBioterrorist-Attacks-The-Next-Steps#pgfId-1083840)
Equally troubling, the difficulties in effectively delivering biotoxins can be overcome with some
forethought and ingenuity. For example, cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, or aircraft could
perform sprayer attacks, but only if specialized spraying equipment was employed that ensured proper
dispersal and prevented particle clumping. Clumping of agents can degrade the effectiveness of an
attack. Large particles quickly drop to the ground or, if inhaled, do not easily pass into lung tissue,
significantly lessening the potential for infection. Mechanical stresses in the spraying system might also
kill or inactivate a large percentage of particles--by some estimates up to 99 percent.9 However, if an
enemy had a large supply (e.g., 50 kilograms of a virulent bioweapon) or was not terribly concerned
about achieving maximum effects, crude dispensers might be adequate. In creating bioweapons,
terrorists might be limited only by their imagination. For example, a low-tech version of a bio-cruise
missile attack could be attempted with a system like the Autonomous Helicopter, a 14-foot-long,
pilotless, remote-controlled helicopter built by Yamaha for crop dusting in Japan. The $100,000 aircraft
uses a GPS system and video camera to allow its flight route to be preprogrammed and monitored.
Intentional contamination of food and water is another possible form of biological attack. Product
tampering or contaminating food supplies is an ever-present danger.10 For instance, in 1984, the
Rajneeshee cult contaminated local salad bars in an Oregon town with salmonella, demonstrating the
ease of conducting small-scale, indiscriminate terrorist attacks.11 Another means of bioattack is to
spread infectious diseases through humans, animals, or insects. Infectious diseases are already the third
leading cause of death in the United States, and battling them is an ongoing health issue. Foreign animal
diseases also present a serious risk. Many diseases can infect multiple hosts. Three-quarters of emerging
human pathogens are zoonotic--in other words, readily transmitted back and forth among humans,
domesticated animals, and wildlife.
MSDI Terror DA 129
AT: Containment Solves BW
Diversity of pathogens means response is key, drugs don’t check.
Koblentz, 4, Gregory Koblentz is a doctoral candidate in Political Science at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, “Pathogens as Weapons: The International Seucrity Implications of Biological
Warfare”, International Security, Vol. 28 No. 3 Winter 2003/04, pp. 84-122,
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/koblentz.pdf
Biological warfare agents are characterized by a relatively high degree of diversity, which provides
terrorists and military planners with significant flexibility. The open literature discusses some thirty
pathogens as having the physical and biological characteristics needed for a mass casualty–producing
biological weapon. Most national biological warfare programs have focused on ten to fifteen agents.26
Even this short list of biological warfare agents, how- ever, offers a range of possibilities from the lethal
B. anthracis to incapacitating agents such as Coxiella burnetii (which causes Q fever) and Venezuelan
equine encephalitis. Pathogens that cause contagious diseases that have been devel- oped as biological
weapons include variola major (the causative agent of small- pox) and Yersinia pestis (the cause of
plague). This list of agents, however, reflects only known threats. Unexpected or novel pathogens may
also emerge as threats. U.S. experts were surprised to learn of some of the agents that Iraq and the
former Soviet Union had chosen to produce and weaponize.27 Because biological terrorism is generally
less sophisticated and less demanding than the military use of biological weapons, the range of possible
agents for terrorists is even larger and more varied.28 The application of molecular biology to the
development of advanced biological weapons could significantly increase the diversity of biological
warfare agents, but efforts along these lines are believed not to have advanced beyond the re- search
stage.29 As a result, because of the difficulty in assessing threat agents in a timely manner, defensive
programs tend to lag behind offensive programs.30
MSDI Terror DA 130
Other Scenarios
MSDI Terror DA 131
Cyber Scenario
MSDI Terror DA 132
Core
Domestic Cyber Terror Risk is High now
General Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, February 26, 2015, Full Committee Hearing on
“Worldwide Threats”, http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/15-02-26-worldwide-threats
Again this year, I'll start with some cyber threats. Attacks against us are increasing in frequency, scale,
sophistication, and severity of impact. Although we must be prepared for a catastrophic large scale
strike, a so called -- cyber Armageddon, the reality is that we've been living with a constant and
expanding barrage of cyber attacks for some time. This insidious trends, I believe, will continue. Cyber
poses a very complex set of threats, because profit-motivated criminals, ideologically-motivated hackers
or extremists, and variously capable nation states like Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran are all
potential adversaries who, if they choose, can do great harm.CLAPPER: Additionally, the methods of
attacks, the systems targeted and the victims are also expanding in diversity and intensity on a daily
basis. 2014 saw, for the first time, destructive cyber attacks carried out on U.S. soil by nation-state
entities, marked first by the Iranian attack against the Las Vegas Sands Casino Corporation a year ago
this month and the North Korean attack against Sony in November. While both of these nations have
lesser technical capabilities in comparison to Russia and China, these destructive attacks demonstrate
that Iran and North Korea are motivated and unpredictable cyber actors. Russia and China continue to
develop very sophisticated cyber programs. While I can't go into detail, the Russian cyber threat is more
severe than we have previously assessed, and Chinese economic espionage against U.S. companies
remains a major threat, despite detailed private-sector reports, scathing public indictments and stern
U.S. (inaudible). With respect to non-nation-state entities, some ideologically motivated cyber actors
expressing support for ISIL have demonstrated their capabilities by hacking several social-media
accounts. The so- called cyber caliphate successfully hacked CENTCOM's Twitter account and YouTube
page in January and two weeks ago hacked Newsweek Magazine's Twitter handle. The most pervasive
cyber threat to the U.S. financial sector is from cyber criminals. Criminals were responsible for cyber
intrusions in 2014 in the JPMorgan, Home Depot, Target, Neiman Marcus, Anthem and other U.S.
companies. And in the future, we'll probably see cyber operations that change or manipulate electronic
information to compromise its integrity instead of simply deleting or disrupting access to it
Domestic Surveillance Key to Prevent Cyber Terror
Jack Goldsmith, contributing editor, teaches at Harvard Law School and is a member of the Hoover
Institution Task Force on National Security and Law., 10-10-2013, "We Need an Invasive NSA," New
Republic, http://www.newrepublic.com/article/115002/invasive-nsa-will-protect-us-cyber-attacks
Ever since stories about the National Security Agency’s (NSA) electronic intelligence-gathering
capabilities began tumbling out last June, The New York Times has published more than a dozen
editorials excoriating the “national surveillance state.” It wants the NSA to end the “mass warehousing
of everyone’s data” and the use of “back doors” to break encrypted communications. A major element
of the Times’ critique is that the NSA’s domestic sweeps are not justified by the terrorist threat they aim
to prevent. At the end of August, in the midst of the Times’ assault on the NSA, the newspaper suffered
what it described as a “malicious external attack” on its domain name registrar at the hands of the
Syrian Electronic Army, a group of hackers who support Syrian President Bashar Al Assad. The paper’s
MSDI Terror DA 133
website was down for several hours and, for some people, much longer. “In terms of the sophistication
of the attack, this is a big deal,” said Marc Frons, the Times’ chief information officer. Ten months
earlier, hackers stole the corporate passwords for every employee at the Times, accessed the computers
of 53 employees, and breached the e-mail accounts of two reporters who cover China. “We brought in
the FBI, and the FBI said this had all the hallmarks of hacking by the Chinese military,” Frons said at the
time. He also acknowledged that the hackers were in the Times system on election night in 2012 and
could have “wreaked havoc” on its coverage if they wanted. Illustration by Harry Campbell Such cyberintrusions threaten corporate America and the U.S. government every day. “Relentless assaults on
America’s computer networks by China and other foreign governments, hackers and criminals have
created an urgent need for safeguards to protect these vital systems,” the Times editorial page noted
last year while supporting legislation encouraging the private sector to share cybersecurity information
with the government. It cited General Keith Alexander, the director of the NSA, who had noted a 17-fold
increase in cyber-intrusions on critical infrastructure from 2009 to 2011 and who described the losses in
the United States from cyber-theft as “the greatest transfer of wealth in history.” If a “catastrophic
cyber-attack occurs,” the Timesconcluded, “Americans will be justified in asking why their lawmakers ...
failed to protect them.” When catastrophe strikes, the public will adjust its tolerance for intrusive
government measures. The Times editorial board is quite right about the seriousness of the cyberthreat and the federal government’s responsibility to redress it. What it does not appear to realize is the
connection between the domestic NSA surveillance it detests and the governmental assistance with
cybersecurity it cherishes. To keep our computer and telecommunication networks secure, the
government will eventually need to monitor and collect intelligence on those networks using techniques
similar to ones the Timesand many others find reprehensible when done for counterterrorism ends. The
fate of domestic surveillance is today being fought around the topic of whether it is needed to stop Al
Qaeda from blowing things up. But the fight tomorrow, and the more important fight, will be about
whether it is necessary to protect our ways of life embedded in computer networks. Anyone anywhere
with a connection to the Internet can engage in cyber-operations within the United States. Most truly
harmful cyber-operations, however, require group effort and significant skill. The attacking group or
nation must have clever hackers, significant computing power, and the sophisticated software—known
as “malware”—that enables the monitoring, exfiltration, or destruction of information inside a
computer. The supply of all of these resources has been growing fast for many years—in governmental
labs devoted to developing these tools and on sprawling black markets on the Internet.
Telecommunication networks are the channels through which malware typically travels, often
anonymized or encrypted, and buried in the billions of communications that traverse the globe each
day. The targets are the communications networks themselves as well as the computers they connect—
things like the Times’ servers, the computer systems that monitor nuclear plants, classified documents
on computers in the Pentagon, the nasdaq exchange, your local bank, and your social-network
providers. To keep these computers and networks secure, the government needs powerful intelligence
capabilities abroad so that it can learn about planned cyber-intrusions. It also needs to raise defenses at
home. An important first step is to correct the market failures that plague cybersecurity. Through law or
regulation, the government must improve incentives for individuals to use security software, for private
firms to harden their defenses and share information with one another, and for Internet service
providers to crack down on the botnets—networks of compromised zombie computers—that underlie
many cyber-attacks. More, too, must be done to prevent insider threats like Edward Snowden’s, and to
MSDI Terror DA 134
control the stealth introduction of vulnerabilities during the manufacture of computer components—
vulnerabilities that can later be used as windows for cyber-attacks.
MSDI Terror DA 135
Blackouts Module
Two Impacts, First is Blackouts
Cetron 09, Dr. Marvin J. Cetron, President of Forecasting International, “55 Trends for Cyberwar”,
Presented at Future of Information Warfare and Information Operations Sponsored by JIOPO (Joint
Information Operations Program Office), CIA, DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency) & NSA (National
Security Agency), 3-18-09, http://davidleffler.com/55-Trends-for-Cyberwar.html#_Toc224031549
“Cyber Security is the soft underbelly of this country,” outgoing National Intelligence Director Mike
McConnell declared in a valedictory address to reporters in mid-January 2009. He rated this problem
equal in significance to the potential development of atomic weapons by Iran. With this concern in
mind, Forecasting International (FI) undertook a study of factors likely to influence the future
development of information warfare. This work was based on a list of 55 trends FI believes will shape
the world in the years ahead. In the first stage of research, FI’s staff analyzed the probable effects of
trends in fields such as economics, demographics, and technology on the course of cyberwar. In the
second, we presented this work to 31 leading forecasters, intelligence professionals, and military
thinkers and requested their views. This report presents the results. Director McConnell does not
worry so much that hackers or spies will steal classified information from computers owned by
government or the military, or by contractors working for them on secret projects. He is afraid they
will erase it and thereby deprive the United States of critical data. “It could have a debilitating effect
on the country,” he said. Real-world attacks over the Internet also are possible. In March 2007, the
Department of Energy’s Idaho Lab conducted an experiment to determine whether a power plant
could be compromised by hacking alone. The result was a diesel generator smoking and on fire as a
result of some malicious data that could easily have been sent to it over the Internet from anywhere in
the world. In January 2008, a CIA analyst told American utilities that hackers had infiltrated electric
companies in several locations outside the U.S. In at least one case, they had managed to shut off
power to multiple cities. Information attacks have been used in practical conflicts as well. In April and
May 2008, Russian hackers believed not to be directly employed by the Moscow government
subjected Estonia to a nationwide denial-of-service (DoS) attack that effectively shut down the
country’s access to the Internet, with substantial economic impact. They began the same sort of attack
on Georgia in the run-up to the August 2008 clash between Moscow and T’blisi. Similarly, the military
dictatorships of Myanmar and Mauritania both reportedly have hired operators of botnets—networks
of illegally commandeered PCs—to smother several opposition websites with DoS attacks. We
conclude that information warfare will be a significant component in most future conflicts. This
position is in line with both U.S. military doctrine and white papers published by the Chinese People’s
Army. One study affirms that as many as 120 governments already are pursuing information warfare
programs. Repeated reports that Chinese computer specialists have hacked into government networks
in Germany, the United States, and other countries show that the threat is not limited to relatively
unsophisticated lands.
A 2007 estimate suggested that hackers sponsored by the Chinese government had downloaded more
than 3.5 terabytes of information from NIPRNet, a U.S. government network that handles mostly
unclassified material. More disturbingly, The Joint Operating Environment 2008: Challenges and
Implications for the Future Joint Force (“the JOE”) comments that “our adversaries have often taken
advantage of computer networks and the power of information technology not only to directly
influence the perceptions and will of the United States, its decision-makers, and population, but also to
plan and execute savage acts of terrorism.” In a 2008 magazine article, attached as Appendix C,
MSDI Terror DA 136
Forecasting International examined possible targets of future terrorist attack. At that time, we were
considering vulnerabilities to relatively conventional weapons, such as bombs and toxins. However,
many of the targets we identified lend themselves to cyber assaults as well. Consider these examples:
Detonate EMP Bombs in the Internet-Critical Region of Northern Virginia Probability: Medium Impact:
High EMP means “electromagnetic pulse,” a blast of radio energy so strong it fries electronic
equipment. (Set off an atomic bomb at an altitude of 30,000 feet, and there won’t be a computer
working for miles around.) The terrorists who strike Northern Virginia on 9/11 in 2010 do not need a
nuclear weapon to shut down the region’s computers. Instead, they use homemade EMP generatorbombs that any good engineering student can build with $400 and information found on the Internet.
They detonate nine of the bombs within a triangle stretching from McLean west to Dulles International
Airport and south to Chantilly. The EMP blasts take down communications and navigation equipment
at Dulles, some of the less critical computers at CIA headquarters in Langley, and data centers that
carry some 40 percent of the world’s Internet traffic. With police unable to use radios, computers, and
cellphones, the terrorists escape. It is eight months before they are identified. Only one of the sixmember team will be captured in the next two years. A similar bomb, detonated near Wall Street, acts
as a “weapon of mass disruption,” sowing chaos and fear. Casualties: None directly. In Northern
Virginia-area hospitals, 17 patients die in part because their computerized monitors no longer operate
properly. Another 14 may have died when their pacemakers delivered massive shocks to the heart and
then ceased working. Consequences: Dulles-bound aircraft are diverted for three days until
replacement gear can be brought in. Some 40 percent of the world’s Internet traffic flowed through
this part of Northern Virginia. Losing that capacity slows the Internet to a crawl, which further
complicates emergency response. Most of the 175,000 people employed in this IT-intensive region will
be out of work for at least a year. Repairing the electronic infrastructure will cost an estimated $40
billion. Businesses across the United States lose an additional $2 billion per month owing to the loss of
efficient Internet service. The Dow plummets 1,000 points and trading is suspended for three days.
This attack is, of course, a cyber assault even as originally imagined. The same weapon could be used
to destroy computer systems in Manhattan’s financial district, at financial wire-system centers, or in
the government offices of Washington, D.C. According to the best estimates we have been able to find,
a good engineer could produce an EMP bomb from widely available parts for $5,000. Attack on U.S.
Oil Refineries Probability: High Impact: High Four terrorists driving minivans approach the gates of four
oil refineries: the Royal Dutch Shell installation at Port Arthur, Texas; the Valero Energy refinery at
Corpus Christi, Texas; the Chalmette refinery east of New Orleans; and the Chevron refinery at
Pascagoula, Miss. They crash through the gates and aim for the key catalytic units used to refine
petroleum. The crashes set off more than 500 pounds of dynamite in the back of each van. Eleven
workers die in the initial attacks and six more perish in the infernos that send plumes of dark smoke
miles into the sky. Even before the flames can be extinguished, the price of oil skyrockets to more than
$200 a barrel. The president declares a state of emergency and dispatches National Guard units to
protect key infrastructure. Casualties: Seventeen dead, 34 wounded (several critically burned).
Consequences: In a single day, America loses 15 percent of its crude-oil processing capability for more
than a year. The Federal Reserve slashes the prime rate by a full point in a desperate attempt to avert
a recession, as gas jumps to $4 a gallon. Critics bemoan the fact that, for decades, the United States
neglected development of its “dirty” oil-processing infrastructure—and now it’s too late. Total
economic cost: $1.2 trillion. Like many other facilities, oil refineries are almost completely automated.
Manipulating their computers to push operating temperatures and pressures out of tolerance could
disrupt nation’s petroleum supplies as effectively as bombs, with little risk to the attackers. With
sufficient preparation, many more than four refineries could be brought down at once. Similar attacks
might release toxins from chemical plants or destroy manufacturing facilities. Bring Down Four High-
MSDI Terror DA 137
Tension Wires Across the West Probability: High Impact: High The North American power grid has a
dark secret: Of the 10,000 power substations, a loss of only 4 percent will disconnect almost two-thirds
of the entire grid. But with proper planning and timing, only 2 percent need be disrupted—downing just
a few power lines can have widespread consequences. Some attacks are as easy as starting forest or
grass fires under transmission lines, to ionize the air and cause the lines to fail. Others require suicide
car bombs. In 12 hours, by downing just four lines, more than 60 percent of North America is without
power. Power is lost from Knoxville, Tenn., to Nevada, and north to the Canadian border. Casualties:
Other than the suicide bombers, there are no direct casualties. But patients in hospitals, nursing
homes, and even on respirators and other life-saving devices in private homes begin to expire. The
indirect death toll starts to climb rapidly. Based on prior blackouts, 100 to 300 deaths are likely. Stop
lights don’t work, gas stations can’t pump fuel, and civil disturbances occur as crowds waiting in lines
to receive ice grow restless. The president considers requesting help from the National Guard to
maintain order. Consequences: Nearly 200 million people are affected, and infrastructure damage
could take several months to repair. Even the most optimistic projections show the economic impact
could easily top $100 billion. Again, the power grid is governed by computers that could be manipulated
to bring down the system. Oil and gas pipelines, subway systems, and rail lines appear to be equally
vulnerable to cyber attack.
That Leads to Nuclear Meltdowns.
Public Citizen, 3, “The Big Blackout and Amnesia in Congress: Lawmakers Turn a Blind Eye to the
Danger of Nuclear Power and the Failure of Electricity Deregulation”,
http://www.citizen.org/documents/bigblackout.pdf
Unfortunately, many policymakers and politicians have misidentified the cause of the blackout,
ignored one of its most serious effects, and offered as a solution massive legislation that would only
make the situation worse. Although there are problems with many facets of the nation’s energy
system, many of the deficiencies that have been highlighted since the blackout are either non-existent
(such as the alleged shortage of electricity capacity) or have been mischaracterized. In this report,
Public Citizen analyzes one of the most serious and immediately dangerous effects of the blackout: the
unreliability and heightened vulnerability of nuclear power reactors. Furthermore, we trace the cause
of the blackout to the chaotic effects of electricity deregulation. Finally, we consider the folly of the
pending omnibus energy legislation in Congress, which completely fails to provide the most
appropriate legislative prescription for the problem: the strengthening of electricity regulations and
consumer protections, coupled with investment in safe, renewable and reliable electricity generation
and distribution systems. THE BLACKOUT DEMONSTRATES THE UNRELIABILITY, VULNERABILITY, AND
DANGER OF NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS Unfortunately, some nuclear industry cheerleaders are
opportunistically exploiting the blackout to promote further reliance on the inherently unsafe,
unreliable and polluting technology of nuclear power. As usual, they espouse nuclear “solutions” to
nearly every problem, while turning a blind eye to the myriad problems caused by the nuclear industry
itself. Sen. Pete Domenici (R-N.M.), chairman of the Energy and Commerce committee, and a staunch
supporter of nuclear power, issued a statement after the blackout in which he claimed: This outage
clearly demonstrates how close the nation is to its energy production and distribution limit. [...]
Ensuring the proper level of power to the country demands that we make trade-offs,
including...greater use of such sources as nuclear energy... [Emphasis added] In the aftermath of the
recent blackout, it is important to consider the enormous risks and reliability deficiencies of nuclear
MSDI Terror DA 138
power. The unique dangers of nuclear power were exacerbated by the huge power outage: 21 nuclear
reactors—which are, ironically, dependent upon off-site power—were forced to shut down in the U.S.
and Canada. Power loss from the grid forces nuclear power stations to resort to emergency generators
for basic safety operations while in shutdown mode—a contingency operation that presents a whole
host of new risks for the plant. Power outages, especially on a grand scale, put already-vulnerable
nuclear facilities at an even greater risk of serious accident.
Extinction
Wasserman 2, Harvey Wasserman, Greenpeace USA, Nuclear Information & Resource Service,
“America’s Terrorist Nuclear Threat To Itself”, http://www.greens.org/s-r/27/27-13.html
A jet crash like the one on 9/11 or other forms of terrorist assault at Indian Point could yield three
infernal fireballs of radioactive lava burning through the earth and into the aquifer and the river.
Striking water they would blast gigantic billows of radioactive steam into the atmosphere. Prevailing
winds from the north and west might initially drive these clouds of mass death downriver into New
York City and east into Westchester and Long Island. But at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, winds
ultimately shifted around the compass to irradiate all surrounding areas. At Indian Point, thousands of
square miles would have been saturated with the most lethal clouds ever created, depositing genetic
poisons that would kill forever. In nearby communities like Buchanan, Nyack, Monsey and scores
more, infants and small children would quickly die en masse. Virtually all pregnant women would
spontaneously abort, or ultimately give birth to deformed offspring. Sores, rashes, ulcerations and
burns would afflict the skin of millions. Emphysema, heart attacks, stroke, multiple organ failure, hair
loss, nausea, inability to eat or drink or swallow, diarrhea and incontinence, sterility and impotence,
asthma, blindness, and more would kill thousands on the spot, and doom hundreds of thousands if not
millions. A metallic taste would afflict virtually everyone downwind in New York, New Jersey and New
England, a ghoulish curse similar to that endured by the fliers who dropped the atomic bombs on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, by those living downwind from nuclear bomb tests in the south seas and
Nevada, and by victims caught in the downdrafts from Three Mile Island and Chernobyl. Then comes
the wave of cancers, leukemias, lymphomas and tumors. Evacuation would be impossible, but
thousands would die trying. Bridges and highways would become killing fields for those attempting to
escape to destinations that would soon enough become equally deadly as the winds shifted. The
assault would not require a large jet. Attempts to quench the fires would be futile. At Chernobyl, pilots
flying helicopters that dropped boron on the fiery core died in droves. At Indian Point, such missions
would be a sure ticket to death. Their utility would be doubtful as the molten cores rage uncontrolled
for days, weeks and years, spewing ever more devastation into the eco-sphere. More than 800,000
Soviet draftees were forced through Chernobyl’s seething remains in a futile attempt to clean it up.
They are dying in droves. Who would now volunteer for such an American task force? The radioactive
cloud from Chernobyl blanketed the vast Ukraine and Belarus landscape, then carried over Europe and
into the jetstream, surging through the west coast of the United States within 10 days, carrying across
our northern tier, circling the globe, then coming back again. The radioactive clouds from Indian Point
would enshroud New York, New Jersey, New England, and carry deep into the Atlantic and up into
Canada and across to Europe and around the globe again and again. The immediate damage would
render thousands of the world’s most populous and expensive square miles permanently uninhabitable.
All five boroughs of New York City would be an apocalyptic wasteland. The World Trade Center site
would be rendered as unusable and even more lethal by a jet crash at Indian Point than it was by the
direct hits of 9/11. All real estate and economic value would be poisonously radioactive throughout
the entire region. Irreplaceable trillions in human capital would be forever lost. As at Three Mile
MSDI Terror DA 139
Island, where thousands of farm and wild animals died in heaps, and as at Chernobyl, where soil, water
and plant life have been hopelessly irradiated, natural eco-systems on which human and all other life
depends would be permanently and irrevocably destroyed. Spiritually, psychologically, financially,
ecologically, our nation would never recover. This is what we missed by a mere 40 miles near New
York City on September 11. Now that we are at war, this is what could be happening as you read this.
There are 103 of these potential Bombs of the Apocalypse now operating in the United States. They
generate just 18% of America’s electricity, just 8% of our total energy. As with reactors elsewhere, the
two at Indian Point have both been off-line for long periods of time with no appreciable impact on life
in New York. Already an extremely expensive source of electricity, the cost of attempting to defend
these reactors will put nuclear energy even further off the competitive scale. Since its deregulation
crisis, California—already the nation’s second-most efficient state—cut further into its electric
consumption by some 15%. Within a year the US could cheaply replace with increased efficiency all the
reactors now so much more expensive to operate and protect. Yet, as the bombs fall and the terror
escalates, Congress is fast-tracking a form of legal immunity to protect the operators of reactors like
Indian Point from liability in case of a meltdown or terrorist attack. Why is our nation handing its
proclaimed enemies the weapons of our own mass destruction, and then shielding from liability the
companies that insist on continuing to operate them? Do we take this war seriously? Are we
committed to the survival of our nation? If so, the ticking reactor bombs that could obliterate the very
core of our life and of all future generations must be shut down.
MSDI Terror DA 140
Oil Shocks Module
Second is Oil Shocks – Cyber Terror Would Target Commodities Exchanges and
Spike Oil Prices
Cetron 09, Dr. Marvin J. Cetron, President of Forecasting International, “55 Trends for Cyberwar”,
Presented at Future of Information Warfare and Information Operations Sponsored by JIOPO (Joint
Information Operations Program Office), CIA, DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency) & NSA (National
Security Agency), 3-18-09, http://davidleffler.com/55-Trends-for-Cyberwar.html#_Toc224031549
“Cyber Security is the soft underbelly of this country,” outgoing National Intelligence Director Mike
McConnell declared in a valedictory address to reporters in mid-January 2009. He rated this problem
equal in significance to the potential development of atomic weapons by Iran. With this concern in
mind, Forecasting International (FI) undertook a study of factors likely to influence the future
development of information warfare. This work was based on a list of 55 trends FI believes will shape
the world in the years ahead. In the first stage of research, FI’s staff analyzed the probable effects of
trends in fields such as economics, demographics, and technology on the course of cyberwar. In the
second, we presented this work to 31 leading forecasters, intelligence professionals, and military
thinkers and requested their views. This report presents the results. Director McConnell does not
worry so much that hackers or spies will steal classified information from computers owned by
government or the military, or by contractors working for them on secret projects. He is afraid they
will erase it and thereby deprive the United States of critical data. “It could have a debilitating effect
on the country,” he said. Real-world attacks over the Internet also are possible. In March 2007, the
Department of Energy’s Idaho Lab conducted an experiment to determine whether a power plant
could be compromised by hacking alone. The result was a diesel generator smoking and on fire as a
result of some malicious data that could easily have been sent to it over the Internet from anywhere in
the world. In January 2008, a CIA analyst told American utilities that hackers had infiltrated electric
companies in several locations outside the U.S. In at least one case, they had managed to shut off
power to multiple cities. Information attacks have been used in practical conflicts as well. In April and
May 2008, Russian hackers believed not to be directly employed by the Moscow government
subjected Estonia to a nationwide denial-of-service (DoS) attack that effectively shut down the
country’s access to the Internet, with substantial economic impact. They began the same sort of attack
on Georgia in the run-up to the August 2008 clash between Moscow and T’blisi. Similarly, the military
dictatorships of Myanmar and Mauritania both reportedly have hired operators of botnets—networks
of illegally commandeered PCs—to smother several opposition websites with DoS attacks. We
conclude that information warfare will be a significant component in most future conflicts. This
position is in line with both U.S. military doctrine and white papers published by the Chinese People’s
Army. One study affirms that as many as 120 governments already are pursuing information warfare
programs. Repeated reports that Chinese computer specialists have hacked into government networks
in Germany, the United States, and other countries show that the threat is not limited to relatively
unsophisticated lands. A 2007 estimate suggested that hackers sponsored by the Chinese government
had downloaded more than 3.5 terabytes of information from NIPRNet, a U.S. government network
that handles mostly unclassified material. More disturbingly, The Joint Operating Environment 2008:
Challenges and Implications for the Future Joint Force (“the JOE”) comments that “our adversaries
have often taken advantage of computer networks and the power of information technology not only
to directly influence the perceptions and will of the United States, its decision-makers, and population,
but also to plan and execute savage acts of terrorism.” In a 2008 magazine article, attached as
MSDI Terror DA 141
Appendix C, Forecasting International examined possible targets of future terrorist attack. At that time,
we were considering vulnerabilities to relatively conventional weapons, such as bombs and toxins.
However, many of the targets we identified lend themselves to cyber assaults as well. Consider these
examples: Detonate EMP Bombs in the Internet-Critical Region of Northern Virginia Probability:
Medium Impact: High EMP means “electromagnetic pulse,” a blast of radio energy so strong it fries
electronic equipment. (Set off an atomic bomb at an altitude of 30,000 feet, and there won’t be a
computer working for miles around.) The terrorists who strike Northern Virginia on 9/11 in 2010 do
not need a nuclear weapon to shut down the region’s computers. Instead, they use homemade EMP
generator-bombs that any good engineering student can build with $400 and information found on the
Internet. They detonate nine of the bombs within a triangle stretching from McLean west to Dulles
International Airport and south to Chantilly. The EMP blasts take down communications and
navigation equipment at Dulles, some of the less critical computers at CIA headquarters in Langley,
and data centers that carry some 40 percent of the world’s Internet traffic. With police unable to use
radios, computers, and cellphones, the terrorists escape. It is eight months before they are identified.
Only one of the six-member team will be captured in the next two years. A similar bomb, detonated
near Wall Street, acts as a “weapon of mass disruption,” sowing chaos and fear. Casualties: None
directly. In Northern Virginia-area hospitals, 17 patients die in part because their computerized
monitors no longer operate properly. Another 14 may have died when their pacemakers delivered
massive shocks to the heart and then ceased working. Consequences: Dulles-bound aircraft are
diverted for three days until replacement gear can be brought in. Some 40 percent of the world’s
Internet traffic flowed through this part of Northern Virginia. Losing that capacity slows the Internet to
a crawl, which further complicates emergency response. Most of the 175,000 people employed in this
IT-intensive region will be out of work for at least a year. Repairing the electronic infrastructure will
cost an estimated $40 billion. Businesses across the United States lose an additional $2 billion per
month owing to the loss of efficient Internet service. The Dow plummets 1,000 points and trading is
suspended for three days. This attack is, of course, a cyber assault even as originally imagined. The
same weapon could be used to destroy computer systems in Manhattan’s financial district, at financial
wire-system centers, or in the government offices of Washington, D.C. According to the best estimates
we have been able to find, a good engineer could produce an EMP bomb from widely available parts
for $5,000. Attack on U.S. Oil Refineries Probability: High Impact: High Four terrorists driving minivans
approach the gates of four oil refineries: the Royal Dutch Shell installation at Port Arthur, Texas; the
Valero Energy refinery at Corpus Christi, Texas; the Chalmette refinery east of New Orleans; and the
Chevron refinery at Pascagoula, Miss. They crash through the gates and aim for the key catalytic units
used to refine petroleum. The crashes set off more than 500 pounds of dynamite in the back of each
van. Eleven workers die in the initial attacks and six more perish in the infernos that send plumes of
dark smoke miles into the sky. Even before the flames can be extinguished, the price of oil skyrockets to
more than $200 a barrel. The president declares a state of emergency and dispatches National Guard
units to protect key infrastructure. Casualties: Seventeen dead, 34 wounded (several critically burned).
Consequences: In a single day, America loses 15 percent of its crude-oil processing capability for more
than a year. The Federal Reserve slashes the prime rate by a full point in a desperate attempt to avert a
recession, as gas jumps to $4 a gallon. Critics bemoan the fact that, for decades, the United States
neglected development of its “dirty” oil-processing infrastructure—and now it’s too late. Total
economic cost: $1.2 trillion. Like many other facilities, oil refineries are almost completely automated.
Manipulating their computers to push operating temperatures and pressures out of tolerance could
disrupt nation’s petroleum supplies as effectively as bombs, with little risk to the attackers. With
sufficient preparation, many more than four refineries could be brought down at once. Similar attacks
might release toxins from chemical plants or destroy manufacturing facilities.
MSDI Terror DA 142
Instability in oil prices causes worldwide recession and resource wars.
Roberts 2004 (Paul, The end of Oil: on the edge of a perilous new world, p13)
The last three times oil production dropped off a cliff- the Arab oil embargo of 1974, the Iranian
revolution in 1979, and the 1991 Persian Gulf War- the resulting price spikes pushed the world into
recession. And these disruptions were temporary. Presumably, the effects of a long-term permanent
disruption would be far more gruesome. As prices rose, consumers would quickly shift to other fuels,
such as natural gas or coal, but soon enough, those supplies would also tighten and their prices would
rise. An inflationary ripple effect would set in. As energy became more expensive, so would such
energy-dependent activities as manufacturing and transportation. Commercial activity would slow,
and segments of the global economy especially dependent on rapid growth- which is to say, pretty
much everything these days- would tip into recession. The cost of goods and services would rise,
ultimately depressing economic demand and throwing the entire economy into an enduring depression
that would make 1929 look like a dress rehearsal and could touch of a desperate and probably violent
contest for whatever oil supplies remained.
Conflicts over natural resources are the most probable scenario for global war –
Escalates and Makes all other Impacts More likely
Klare 2006 (Michael- professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College, March 7,
http://www.energybulletin.net/13605. html)
It's official: the era of resource wars is upon us. In a major London address, British Defense Secretary
John Reid warned that global climate change and dwindling natural resources are combining to increase
the likelihood of violent conflict over land, water and energy. Climate change, he indicated, “will make
scarce resources, clean water, viable agricultural land even scarcer”—and this will “make the
emergence of violent conflict more rather than less likely.” Lthough not unprecedented, Reid’s
prediction of an upsurge in resource conflict is significant both because of his senior rank and the
vehemence of his remarks. “The blunt truth is that the lack of water and agricultural land is a
significant contributory factor to the tragic conflict we see unfolding in Darfur,” he declared. “We
should see this as a warning sign.” Resource conflicts of this type are most likely to arise in the
developing world, Reid indicated, but the more advanced and affluent countries are not likely to be
spared the damaging and destabilizing effects of global climate change. With sea levels rising, water
and energy becoming increasingly scarce and prime agricultural lands turning into deserts, internecine
warfare over access to vital resources will become a global phenomenon. Reid’s speech, delivered at
the prestigious Chatham House in London (Britain’s equivalent of the Council on Foreign Relations), is
but the most recent expression of a growing trend in strategic circles to view environmental and
resource effects—rather than political orientation and ideology—as the most potent source of armed
conflict in the decades to come. With the world population rising, global consumption rates soaring,
energy supplies rapidly disappearing and climate change eradicating valuable farmland, the stage is
being set for persistent and worldwide struggles over vital resources. Religious and political strife will
not disappear in this scenario, but rather will be channeled into contests over valuable sources of
MSDI Terror DA 143
water, food and energy. Prior to Reid’s address, the most significant expression of this outlook was a
report prepared for the U.S. Department of Defense by a California-based consulting firm in October
2003. Entitled “An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its Implications for United States National
Security,” the report warned that global climate change is more likely to result in sudden, cataclysmic
environmental events than a gradual (and therefore manageable) rise in average temperatures. Such
events could include a substantial increase in global sea levels, intense storms and hurricanes and
continent-wide “dust bowl” effects. This would trigger pitched battles between the survivors of these
effects for access to food, water, habitable land and energy supplies. “Violence and disruption
stemming from the stresses created by abrupt changes in the climate pose a different type of threat to
national security than we are accustomed to today,” the 2003 report noted. “Military confrontation
may be triggered by a desperate need for natural resources such as energy, food and water rather than
by conflicts over ideology, religion or national honor.” Until now, this mode of analysis has failed to
command the attention of top American and British policymakers. For the most part, they insist that
ideological and religious differences— notably, the clash between values of tolerance and democracy
on one hand and extremist forms of Islam on the other—remain the main drivers of international
conflict. But Reid’s speech at Chatham House suggests that a major shift in strategic thinking may be
under way. Environmental perils may soon dominate the world security agenda. This shift is due in
part to the growing weight of evidence pointing to a significant human role in altering the planet’s
basic climate systems. Recent studies showing the rapid shrinkage of the polar ice caps, the
accelerated melting of North American glaciers, the increased frequency of severe hurricanes and a
number of other such effects all suggest that dramatic and potentially harmful changes to the global
climate have begun to occur. More importantly, they conclude that human behavior—most
importantly, the burning of fossil fuels in factories, power plants, and motor vehicles—is the most
likely cause of these changes. This assessment may not have yet penetrated the White House and
other bastions of head-in-the-sand thinking, but it is clearly gaining ground among scientists and
thoughtful analysts around the world. For the most part, public discussion of global climate change has
tended to describe its effects as an environmental problem—as a threat to safe water, arable soil,
temperate forests, certain species and so on. And, of course, climate change is a potent threat to the
environment; in fact, the greatest threat imaginable. But viewing climate change as an environmental
problem fails to do justice to the magnitude of the peril it poses. As Reid’s speech and the 2003
Pentagon study make clear, the greatest danger posed by global climate change is not the degradation
of ecosystems per se, but rather the disintegration of entire human societies, producing wholesale
starvation, mass migrations and recurring conflict over resources. “As famine, disease, and weatherrelated disasters strike due to abrupt climate change,” the Pentagon report notes, “many countries’
needs will exceed their carrying capacity”—that is, their ability to provide the minimum requirements
for human survival. This “will create a sense of desperation, which is likely to lead to offensive
aggression” against countries with a greater stock of vital resources. “Imagine eastern European
countries, struggling to feed their populations with a falling supply of food, water, and energy, eyeing
Russia, whose population is already in decline, for access to its grain, minerals, and energy supply.”
Similar scenarios will be replicated all across the planet, as those without the means to survival invade
or migrate to those with greater abundance—producing endless struggles between resource “haves” and
“have-nots.” It is this prospect, more than anything, that worries John Reid. In particular, he expressed
concern over the inadequate capacity of poor and unstable countries to cope with the effects of
climate change, and the resulting risk of state collapse, civil war and mass migration. “More than 300
million people in Africa currently lack access to safe water,” he observed, and “climate change will
worsen this dire situation”— provoking more wars like Darfur. And even if these social disasters will
occur primarily in the developing world, the wealthier countries will also be caught up in them,
MSDI Terror DA 144
whether by participating in peacekeeping and humanitarian aid operations, by fending off unwanted
migrants or by fighting for access to overseas supplies of food, oil, and minerals. When reading of
these nightmarish scenarios, it is easy to conjure up images of desperate, starving people killing one
another with knives, staves and clubs—as was certainly often the case in the past, and could easily
prove to be so again. But these scenarios also envision the use of more deadly weapons. “In this world
of warring states,” the 2003 Pentagon report predicted, “nuclear arms proliferation is inevitable.” As
oil and natural gas disappears, more and more countries will rely on nuclear power to meet their
energy needs—and this “will accelerate nuclear proliferation as countries develop enrichment and
reprocessing capabilities to ensure their national security.”
MSDI Terror DA 145
Nuke Power Scenario
MSDI Terror DA 146
Core
US nuclear power sites not protected, risk of terror attack
Laura Muth, 9-2, 13 graduated in 2012 from Johns Hopkins University with a degree in political
science, Policy Mic, The Unexpected Threat to America’s Nuclear Power Sites,
http://www.policymic.com/articles/61611/the-unexpected-threat-to-america-s-nuclear-sites
Decades after the end of the Cold War, the U.S. is dealing with a different nuclear threA2: the security of
its own nuclear sites. But the problem is more complicated than you might think.¶ The University of
Texas, Austin Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Project (NPPP) recently released a report stating that
none of the 104 commercial nuclear reactors or three research reactors in the U.S. is adequately
protected against terrorist threats. The report cites two “credible threats: the theft of bomb-grade
material to make a nuclear weapon, and sabotage attacks intended to cause a reactor meltdown.Ӧ
Domestic Intelligence is Key to Check Insiders that could attack plants
Laura Kirkman, Allan Kuperman, 8-15, 13, Nonproliferation Prevention Project, “Protecting US
Nuclear Facilities from Terrorist Attack: Reassessing the Current ‘Design Basis Threat’ Approach,”
http://blogs.utexas.edu/nppp/files/2013/08/NPPP-working-paper-1-2013-Aug-15.pdf
Implicit in the four threats described above is the possibility of an active or passive insider using
knowledge of facilities to assist terrorists in their actions. Passive insiders could provide information
about weaknesses in the plant or operations, allowing terrorists to magnify their impact. 49 An active
insider could deactivate alarm and emergency safety systems or deliver explosives to sensitive areas of
the nuclear facility.50¶ A recent incident highlights the immediacy of the insider threat problem. An
American citizen, suspected of al Qaeda membership, worked for five different US nuclear power plants
from 2002 to 2008 after passing federal background checks.51 This incident is particularly disturbing
because nuclear power plants depend heavily on their employee screening processes to combat the
insider threat.52 Another incident that allegedly involved insider information was the break-in at the
Pelindaba nuclear reactor and research center in South Africa. In November 2007, four gunmen spent 45
minutes inside the heavily guarded facility, eventually breaking into the emergency control center at the
middle of the facility. They fled when an alarm was triggered. At the same time, another four men tried
but failed to break-in from the other side of the facility, suggesting a coordinated attack. The ease with
which the attackers disabled multiple layers of security strongly suggests the use of insider
information.53
Attack on a reactor means a massive release of radioactivity
Michael Clark, 2013, Michael Clarke (m.clarke@griffith.edu.au) is an Australian Research Council
(ARC) Research Fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute, June 2013, Comparative Strategy, “Pakistan and
Nuclear Terrorism: How Real is the Threat?,” pp. 98-114
Commercial power reactors are arguably more attractive for a terrorist attack aimed at dispersing
radioactive material than research reactors due to the fact that they are more numerous (approximately
440 commercial power reactors in 31 countries), are larger, contain more radioactive spent fuel in
MSDI Terror DA 147
cooling ponds, and contain much higher levels of radioactivity in their core. 33 Ferguson and Potter
conclude that while a terrorist attack targeting a reactor or spent fuel pond “could not ignite an
explosive chain reaction—that is a nuclear bomb-type explosion,” the “worst plausible scenario is that
terrorists would be able to cause a massive off-site release of radioactivity and substantial damage to
the nuclear facility.”
Extinction
Wasserman 2, Harvey Wasserman, Greenpeace USA, Nuclear Information & Resource Service,
“America’s Terrorist Nuclear Threat To Itself”, http://www.greens.org/s-r/27/27-13.html
A jet crash like the one on 9/11 or other forms of terrorist assault at Indian Point could yield three
infernal fireballs of radioactive lava burning through the earth and into the aquifer and the river. Striking
water they would blast gigantic billows of radioactive steam into the atmosphere. Prevailing winds from
the north and west might initially drive these clouds of mass death downriver into New York City and
east into Westchester and Long Island. But at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, winds ultimately shifted
around the compass to irradiate all surrounding areas. At Indian Point, thousands of square miles would
have been saturated with the most lethal clouds ever created, depositing genetic poisons that would kill
forever. In nearby communities like Buchanan, Nyack, Monsey and scores more, infants and small
children would quickly die en masse. Virtually all pregnant women would spontaneously abort, or
ultimately give birth to deformed offspring. Sores, rashes, ulcerations and burns would afflict the skin of
millions. Emphysema, heart attacks, stroke, multiple organ failure, hair loss, nausea, inability to eat or
drink or swallow, diarrhea and incontinence, sterility and impotence, asthma, blindness, and more
would kill thousands on the spot, and doom hundreds of thousands if not millions. A metallic taste
would afflict virtually everyone downwind in New York, New Jersey and New England, a ghoulish curse
similar to that endured by the fliers who dropped the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, by
those living downwind from nuclear bomb tests in the south seas and Nevada, and by victims caught in
the downdrafts from Three Mile Island and Chernobyl. Then comes the wave of cancers, leukemias,
lymphomas and tumors. Evacuation would be impossible, but thousands would die trying. Bridges and
highways would become killing fields for those attempting to escape to destinations that would soon
enough become equally deadly as the winds shifted. The assault would not require a large jet.
Attempts to quench the fires would be futile. At Chernobyl, pilots flying helicopters that dropped boron
on the fiery core died in droves. At Indian Point, such missions would be a sure ticket to death. Their
utility would be doubtful as the molten cores rage uncontrolled for days, weeks and years, spewing ever
more devastation into the eco-sphere. More than 800,000 Soviet draftees were forced through
Chernobyl’s seething remains in a futile attempt to clean it up. They are dying in droves. Who would
now volunteer for such an American task force? The radioactive cloud from Chernobyl blanketed the
vast Ukraine and Belarus landscape, then carried over Europe and into the jetstream, surging through
the west coast of the United States within 10 days, carrying across our northern tier, circling the globe,
then coming back again. The radioactive clouds from Indian Point would enshroud New York, New
Jersey, New England, and carry deep into the Atlantic and up into Canada and across to Europe and
around the globe again and again. The immediate damage would render thousands of the world’s most
populous and expensive square miles permanently uninhabitable. All five boroughs of New York City
would be an apocalyptic wasteland. The World Trade Center site would be rendered as unusable and
MSDI Terror DA 148
even more lethal by a jet crash at Indian Point than it was by the direct hits of 9/11. All real estate and
economic value would be poisonously radioactive throughout the entire region. Irreplaceable trillions in
human capital would be forever lost. As at Three Mile Island, where thousands of farm and wild animals
died in heaps, and as at Chernobyl, where soil, water and plant life have been hopelessly irradiated,
natural eco-systems on which human and all other life depends would be permanently and irrevocably
destroyed. Spiritually, psychologically, financially, ecologically, our nation would never recover. This is
what we missed by a mere 40 miles near New York City on September 11. Now that we are at war, this is
what could be happening as you read this. There are 103 of these potential Bombs of the Apocalypse
now operating in the United States. They generate just 18% of America’s electricity, just 8% of our total
energy. As with reactors elsewhere, the two at Indian Point have both been off-line for long periods of
time with no appreciable impact on life in New York. Already an extremely expensive source of
electricity, the cost of attempting to defend these reactors will put nuclear energy even further off the
competitive scale. Since its deregulation crisis, California—already the nation’s second-most efficient
state—cut further into its electric consumption by some 15%. Within a year the US could cheaply
replace with increased efficiency all the reactors now so much more expensive to operate and protect.
Yet, as the bombs fall and the terror escalates, Congress is fast-tracking a form of legal immunity to
protect the operators of reactors like Indian Point from liability in case of a meltdown or terrorist attack.
Why is our nation handing its proclaimed enemies the weapons of our own mass destruction, and then
shielding from liability the companies that insist on continuing to operate them? Do we take this war
seriously? Are we committed to the survival of our nation? If so, the ticking reactor bombs that could
obliterate the very core of our life and of all future generations must be shut down.
MSDI Terror DA 149
Fuel Rod Internal
Terrorists can attack spent fuel rods
Laura Kirkman, Allan Kuperman, 8-15, 13, Nonproliferation Prevention Project, “Protecting US
Nuclear Facilities from Terrorist Attack: Reassessing the Current ‘Design Basis Threat’ Approach,”
http://blogs.utexas.edu/nppp/files/2013/08/NPPP-working-paper-1-2013-Aug-15.pdf
Sabotage of spent fuel pools is related to sabotage of nuclear power plants, which typically store their
spent fuel in facilities located on their grounds. Unlike fresh fuel, spent nuclear fuel is highly radioactive
but unable to sustain as efficient a nuclear chain reaction. This spent fuel is removed from the reactor
and stored in pools of cooling water, and sometimes is subsequently transferred to more permanent
dry-cask storage on- site. The pools often lack the shielding and structural protections that the
containment provides to the reactor itself, leaving the spent fuel also more vulnerable to sabotage by
terrorists.43 A 2006 report by the National Academy of Sciences concluded that a successful terrorist
attack on spent fuel pools would be difficult, but possible.44 In the absence of a centralized national
storage facility for spent fuel, nuclear power plants often maintain their spent fuel pool inventories at
amounts beyond the original design limits of the pool.45 A terrorist with enough technical knowledge
and means could drain a spent fuel pool, triggering a cladding fire that could result in the release of
large amounts of radioactive material.46 This is similar to what occurred in 2011 in Fukushima, Japan,
when an earthquake’s effects drained the spent fuel pools. According to Beyea, Lyman, and von Hippel,
a terrorist attack on a spent fuel pool could cause thousands of deaths from cancer, and economic
damages in the hundreds of billions of dollars.47 In the wake of the NAS report, U.S. utilities reportedly
have taken some measures that may somewhat mitigate this risk, but not eliminate it.48 An attack on
dry cask storage would also result in the release of radioactive material, although in smaller amounts
due to design differences.
MSDI Terror DA 150
Blackout Scenario
MSDI Terror DA 151
Core
ISIS will shut down the U.S. national grid – it’ll independently kill 9 out of 10
Americans
Bedard 9/3/14 – Paul, columnist at the Washington Examiner, “New ISIS threat: America's electric grid;
blackout could kill 9 of 10” http://washingtonexaminer.com/new-isis-threat-americas-electric-gridblackout-could-kill-9-of-10/article/2552766
Former top government officials who have been warning Washington about the vulnerability of the
nation’s largely unprotected electric grid are raising new fears that troops from the jihadist Islamic State
are poised to attack the system, leading to a power crisis that could kill millions. “Inadequate grid
security, a porous U.S.-Mexico border, and fragile transmission systems make the electric grid a target
for ISIS,” said Peter Pry, one of the nation’s leading experts on the grid. Others joining Pry at a press
conference later Wednesday to draw attention to the potential threat said that if just a handful of the
nation’s high voltage transformers were knocked out, blackouts would occur across the country. “By one
estimate, should the power go out and stay out for over a year, nine out of 10 Americans would likely
perish,” said Frank Gaffney, founder and president of the Center for Security Policy in Washington. At
the afternoon press conference, Gaffney dubbed the potential crisis the "grid jihad." A lack of electricity
would shut off water systems, impact city transportation services and shutdown hospitals and other big
facilities. Fresh and frozen foods also would be impacted as would banks, financial institutions and
utilities. Pry provided details of recent attacks on electricity systems and said that ISIS could easily team
with Mexican drug cartels to ravage America. He told Secrets, for example, that the Knights Templar
drug gang blacked out the electric grid of the Mexican state of Michoacan in 2013 to provide cover for
killing those fighting the drug trade. “The Knights Templars and other criminal gangs in Mexico will do
anything for money, and ISIS, the richest terrorist organization in history, has hundreds of millions of
dollars at its disposal,” said Pry. “ISIS could hire one of the Mexican cartels, or one of their criminal
gangs already in the U.S., or activate jihadist terror cells already in the U.S., and inflict a multi-state
blackout immediately, within days or weeks. Perhaps even a nationwide blackout,” Pry explained to
Secrets. “I am not saying it is likely they will do so. But given the capabilities and objectives of ISIS and
our obvious vulnerabilities, it would be foolish to ignore the threat to the grid, to regard the threat as
unlikely. Our planning should be based on imminent asymmetrical threats, and not assume that another
9/11 large-scale attack is years away,” he added.
Surveillance necessary to prevent ISIS attacks
Guardian, June 22, 2014 , Isis threat justifies greater surveillance powers in UK, says Liam Fox
Former defence secretary says first duty of state is to protect citizens and public will accept greater
monitoring powers Britain's security services may need to be given greater powers of surveillance to
monitor extremists from Isis when they return home to Britain from Iraq and Syria, the former defence
secretary Liam Fox has said. A majority of people will accept that an "ideological battle" means that the
authorities will need greater powers to intercept the communications of extremists, Fox said. The
former defence secretary, who was speaking on the Andrew Marr Show on BBC1, said that Britain
should offer to put its airbases at the disposal of the US to avoid "horrendous" situation in Iraq as Isis
MSDI Terror DA 152
forces pose a threat to Baghdad. Fox said: "There are those who say if we don't get involved, if we
hunker down then we will be fine. There will be no backlash. That is utterly, utterly wrong because the
jihadists don't hate us because of what we do. They hate us because of who we are. We can't change
that. It is our values and our history that they detest more than anything else." Fox said that the
authorities could deprive British citizens returning from Syria and Iraq of their passports. But he said that
the greatest effort should go towards increasing the power of the state to monitor the communications
of extremists. He said: "We have the security services to ensure that they [extremists] are watched and
that they don't pose a greater threat." Asked whether the powers of the security services were
insufficient, the former defence secretary said: "That is a real question that we are going to have to ask whether the security services have adequate resources for an increased threat. "That is a question
politicians will have to take into account in judgments on spending allocations but also do the powers
they have reflect the increasing [threat]? You've got people in the light of Snowden saying that the state
has too many powers and we have to restrict the powers of the state." Asked which powers the state
should be given, Fox said: "The whole areas of intercept that need to be looked at. We have got a real
debate, and it is a genuine debate in a democracy, between the libertarians who say the state must not
get too powerful and pretty much the rest of us who say the state must protect itself." Asked whether
this meant more surveillance and increasing the manpower of the security services, he said: "If required
is the first duty of the state to protect its citizens ... it is a real worry and it is a problem that is going to
be with us for a very long time. At heart it is an ideological battle and we have to realise that we have to
win the ideological battle as well." The remarks by Fox suggests that some figures, particularly on the
right, will use the success of extremists in Iraq to challenge the claim by Edward Snowden that the state
has amassed too many powers of surveillance. Snowden leaked a series of NSA files to the former
Guardian journalist Glenn Greenwald last year.
Attack on the grid risks nuclear war.
Andres and Breetz 11 (Richard Andres, Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War
College and a Senior Fellow and Energy and Environmental Security and Policy Chair in the Center for
Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University, and
Hanna Breetz, doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at The Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, Small Nuclear Reactorsfor Military Installations:Capabilities, Costs, andTechnological
Implications, www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/StrForum/SF-262.pdf)
Grid Vulnerability. DOD is unable to provide its bases with electricity when the civilian electrical grid is
offline for an extended period of time. Currently, domestic military installations receive 99 percent of
their electricity from the civilian power grid. As explained in a recent study from the Defense Science
Board: DOD’s key problem with electricity is that critical missions, such as national strategic awareness
and national command authorities, are almost entirely dependent on the national transmission grid . . .
[which] is fragile, vulnerable, near its capacity limit, and outside of DOD control. In most cases, neither
the grid nor on-base backup power provides www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 262 3 sufficient reliability to
ensure continuity of critical national priority functions and oversight of strategic missions in the face of a
long term (several months) outage. 7 The grid’s fragility was demonstrated during the 2003 Northeast
blackout in which 50 million people in the United States and Canada lost power, some for up to a week,
MSDI Terror DA 153
when one Ohio utility failed to properly trim trees. The blackout created cascading disruptions in sewage
systems, gas station pumping, cellular communications, border check systems, and so forth, and
demonstrated the interdependence of modern infrastructural systems. 8 More recently, awareness has
been growing that the grid is also vulnerable to purposive attacks. A report sponsored by the
Department of Homeland Security suggests that a coordinated cyberattack on the grid could result in a
third of the country losing power for a period of weeks or months. 9 Cyberattacks on critical
infrastructure are not well understood. It is not clear, for instance, whether existing terrorist groups
might be able to develop the capability to conduct this type of attack. It is likely, however, that some
nation-states either have or are working on developing the ability to take down the U.S. grid. In the
event of a war with one of these states, it is possible, if not likely, that parts of the civilian grid would
cease to function, taking with them military bases located in affected regions. Government and private
organizations are currently working to secure the grid against attacks; however, it is not clear that they
will be successful. Most military bases currently have backup power that allows them to function for a
period of hours or, at most, a few days on their own. If power were not restored after this amount of
time, the results could be disastrous. First, military assets taken offline by the crisis would not be
available to help with disaster relief. Second, during an extended blackout, global military operations
could be seriously compromised; this disruption would be particularly serious if the blackout was
induced during major combat operations. During the Cold War, this type of event was far less likely
because the making bases more resilient to civilian power outages would reduce the incentive for an
opponent to attack the grid United States and Soviet Union shared the common understanding that
blinding an opponent with a grid blackout could escalate to nuclear war. America’s current opponents,
however, may not share this fear or be deterred by this possibility.
MSDI Terror DA 154
Other AT / Ext
MSDI Terror DA 155
A2: Drone Strikes Solve
Al Qaeda dead in Pakistan but operating elsewhere
Bergen, et al, September 2013, Jihadist Terrorism: A Threat Assessment,
http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Jihadist%20Terrorism-A%20Threat%20Assesment_0.pdf
Peter Bergen is the author of four books about al-Qaeda, three of which were New York Times best
sellers. The books have been translated into 20 languages. He is the director of the National Security
Program at the New America Foundation in Washington, D.C.; a fellow at Fordham University’s Center
on National Security; and CNN’s national security analyst. He has held teaching positions at the Kennedy
School of Government at Harvard University and at the School of Advanced International Studies at
Johns Hopkins University.¶ Bruce Hoffman is a professor at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh
School of Foreign Service, where he is also the director of both the Center for Security Studies and the
Security Studies Program. He previously held the corporate chair in counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency at the RAND Corporation and was the scholar-in-residence for counterterrorism at
the CIA between 2004 and 2006.¶ Michael Hurley is the president of Team 3i LLC, an international
strategy company, and advises the Bipartisan Policy Center’s Homeland Security Project. He led the 9/11
Commission’s counterterrorism policy investigation, as well as CIA personnel in Afghanistan immediately
after the 9/11 attacks. He retired from the CIA following a 25-year career and has served as director on
the National Security Council staff.¶ Erroll Southers is the associate director of research transition at the
Department of Homeland Security’s National Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events
(CREATE) at the University of Southern California, where he is an adjunct professor in the Sol Price
School
of Public Policy. He is a former FBI special agent and was President Barack Obama’s nominee for
the Transportation Security Administration, as well as Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger’s deputy
director for the California Office of Homeland Security and the chief of homeland security and
intelligence for the LAX Police Department. He is the author of Homegrown Violent Extremism.) Core alQaeda has been decimated by drone strikes and arrests in Pakistan, but continues to find some
sanctuary in the country’s ungoverned tribal regions, and is potentially ready to move back into
Afghanistan, should that country experience significant instability after NATO combat troops withdraw
at the end of 2014.¶ CIA drone strikes have killed 33 al-Qaeda leaders or senior operatives in Pakistan
since 2008.3 As a result, there are only around four al-Qaeda leaders in Pakistan today. The group’s
overall leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, has proved to be more capable than some analysts initially thought,
officially bringing Somalia’s al-Shabaab group and Syria’s Jabhat al-Nusra organization into al-Qaeda’s
fold. Zawahiri also had no problem transferring already existing al-Qaeda affiliates’ allegiances from
Osama bin Laden to himself. In the three months following bin Laden’s death in May 2011, the leaders
of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and al-Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM) all pledged their allegiance to Zawahiri as their new overall commander.4,5,
Drone strikes won’t solve US-citizen terrorists
Brian Ross, 9-11, 13, ABC News, http://gma.yahoo.com/officials-dozens-u-under-surveillancepotential-terror-threats-234106742--abc-news-topstories.html
MSDI Terror DA 156
Twelve years after al Qaeda slaughtered nearly 3,000 Americans on U.S. soil, the FBI has under watch as
many as 100 people inside the homeland suspected of being linked to or inspired by the terror group,
intelligence and law enforcement officials told ABC News.¶ Additionally, intelligence and law
enforcement officials had anticipated -- even before April's Boston Marathon bombings -- that this
approximate number of terror cases wouldn't change in the years ahead, even with arrests made,
because of new cases expected to surface.¶ Despite years of losses from drone strikes overseas and
counter-terrorism operations inside the American homeland, the al Qaeda network still survives thanks
in part to its American recruits.¶ "I think that is the most disturbing thing, to see Americans switching
sides and going over to the enemy," Rep. Michael McCaul, R-Texas, Chairman of the House Committee
on Homeland Security, told ABC News.¶ Some of the Americans that have gone over to al Qaeda have
risen far enough in the ranks that in the years after the Twin Towers fell, often the public voice of the
perpetrators of that horrible attack speak with an American accent.¶ "America is absolutely awash with
easily obtainable firearms," said Adam Yahiye Gadahn, a California Muslim convert, in a 2011 Al Qaeda
video urging individual violent jihad. "So what are you waiting for?"¶ Gadahn, who once tore up his U.S.
passport on camera, is now in Al Qaeda's leadership in Pakistan, regularly producing videos in English
and Arabic. He is the first American since the 1950's to be charged with treason, indicted in 2006.¶
Gadahn is one of five Americans the U.S. has offered a total of $21 million in rewards to help capture
because they served under Osama Bin Laden or his henchmen. The five, however, are only a fraction of
the number of Americans believed to be fighting for al Qaeda or one of its affiliates.¶ Americans
taunting their own countrymen -- or luring them into the fight -- is a new and troubling reality about the
resilience of al Qaeda even after the killings of Osama bin Laden and Yemeni-American al Qaeda cleric
and leader Anwar al-Awlaki two years ago.¶ The accused American terrorists come from small towns
and big cities, law enforcement officials told ABC News. They include a man who grew up on Monte
Vista Road in Phoenix, 30-year-old U.S. Army veteran Eric Harroun.¶ This year he became one of about a
dozen Americans who authorities say are fighting in Syria with a group that has sworn allegiance to al
Qaeda, called Jabhat al-Nusra.¶ Harroun, who was lured out of the region by the FBI and charged with
terrorism in a Virginia federal court, allegedly posted videos on Facebook of his adventures in Syria with
fellow fighters, including one where he addressed Syria's president Bashar al-Assad, saying, "Where you
go we will find out and kill you. Do you understand?"¶ Eric Harroun's father says his son just fell in with
the wrong people.¶ "He's not any terrorist, not any more than I am," Darryl Harroun said in an interview
today with ABC News from Phoenix.¶ The younger Harroun is expected to go to trial in two months on
terror charges.¶ American recruits to al Qaeda are also showing up in other hot spots across the Middle
East and Africa, intelligence sources said.¶ "As an American citizen, I'm shocked. I'm amazed that
something like that occurs," Shawn Henry, who retired last year as a senior FBI official, told ABC News.¶
Henry, now an executive at the cyber security firm CrowdStrike, said Americans or "U.S. Persons" -- noncitizens who have lived here and have certain legal rights -- radicalized to violent Islamist extremism are
"a minority," but the FBI's highest counterterrorism priority.¶ "Once they get that into their blood, it's a
threat," Henry said.¶ At least 50 young American men have been tracked to the al Qaeda group fighting
in Somalia, al-Shabaab, where a young man from the small town of Daphne, Alabama, Omar Hammami,
became a top commander.¶ "Our main objective, one of the things we seek for in this life of ours, is to
die as martyrs," Hammami explained in one video, among numerous he made to help al-Shabaab draw
Westerners into the fight.¶ More than 15 U.S. citizens have been killed fighting with al-Shabaab, and at
least 20 remain unaccounted for in Somalia.¶ A new American voice in the Somali terror organization,
the as yet unidentified "Abu Ahmed al-Amriki," appeared in a February video, said his countrymen
MSDI Terror DA 157
should fight Western governments in Afghanistan, Somalia and Mali.¶ "America is going down and the
Caliphate is rising," he said, brandishing an AK-47.¶ Hammami -- who remains committed to violent
jihad despite a falling out with al-Shabaab leaders -- is now one of the five Americans with U.S. rewards
ranging from $1 to $5 million on their head because of their alleged Al Qaeda leadership positions.
Others are men from Waukesha, Wisconsin, Brooklyn, New York and Buffalo, New York.¶ For security
reasons, the details of those 100 or so individuals under surveillance inside the U.S. are closely guarded,
and both U.S. and European officials say they're focused on Westerners joining al Qaeda in places such
as Syria, which is relatively easy to enter.¶ Asked via Twitter last March about those like him, who turn
against America by joining al Qaeda affiliates such as al-Shabaab in Somalia, Hammami did not deny the
threat they pose.¶ Somalia has "many muhajirs from U.S. And dangerous. True," tweeted
@abumamerican, an account believed by U.S. officials to be Hammami's.
MSDI Terror DA 158
AT: Domestic Terrorism Decline
Bergen is wrong – domestic terrorism threat is not decreasing
Gartenstein-Ross 13 (Daveed, Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies,
adjunct assistant professor in Georgetown University’s security studies program, and the author of Bin
Laden’s Legacy, “Is The Terrorist Threat Declining? The Use And Abuse Of Statistics,” 12/16/13,
http://warontherocks.com/2013/12/is-the-terrorist-threat-declining-the-use-and-abuse-of-statistics/)
Earlier this month, terrorism analyst Peter Bergen wrote at CNN that the declining number of jihadists
indicted in the United States demonstrates that the domestic terrorist threat has “markedly declined
over the past couple of years.” His view is a counterpoint to the proclamations of Senate and House
intelligence committee heads Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D.-Calif.) and Rep. Mike Rogers (R.-Mich.), who
have claimed that the U.S. is no safer than it was in 2011. Who is right? Bergen, the head of the National
Security Program at the New America Foundation (NAF), contends that though Feinstein and Rogers
might be on firm ground in arguing that al-Qaeda is resurgent in the Middle East, a NAF study of jihadist
militants shows a substantial decline in the number of indicted extremists since 2010. Bergen contends
that this establishes a declining domestic threat: “The total number of such indicted extremists has
declined substantially from 33 in 2010 to nine in 2013. And the number of individuals indicted for
plotting attacks within the United States, as opposed to being indicted for traveling to join a terrorist
group overseas or for sending money to a foreign terrorist group, also declined from 12 in 2011 to only
three in 2013. Of course, a declining number of indictments doesn’t mean that the militant threat has
disappeared. One of the militants indicted in 2013 was Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, who is one of the brothers
alleged to be responsible for the Boston Marathon bombings in April. But a sharply declining number of
indictments does suggest that fewer and fewer militants are targeting the United States…. In short, the
data on al-Qaeda-linked or -influenced militants indicted in the United States suggests that the threat of
terrorism has actually markedly declined over the past couple of years.” Here’s the interesting thing, to
me, about Bergen’s analysis: it depends almost entirely on how one reads a sudden spike in homegrown
terrorist cases that occurred in 2009-10. Exactly four years ago, in December 2009, Bergen’s view of the
homegrown terrorist threat, based on the sudden rise in cases we were then experiencing, was that
“there is no denying it is increasing.” He explained that a trend toward more homegrown jihadism “is
just a fact,” since the phenomenon had “sort of grown exponentially in the last two years.” In other
words, Bergen assessed at the time that the rising cases weren’t aberrant, but rather part of a trend of
increased homegrown jihadist violence that would continue. At the time, I disagreed in print with
Bergen’s confidence that we were seeing a definite trend toward a persistently higher number of
homegrown terrorism cases. Now that the 2009-10 spike in cases has receded, Bergen argues just as
confidently that we are safer. I disagree with this conclusion, too. Much of our disagreement boils down
to differences between my methodology of interpreting statistics and Bergen’s. In turn, this discussion
has implications for broader efforts to assess U.S. counterterrorism policies: are we drawing the right
lessons from the statistics and evidence that we gather, or are we being fooled by our own numbers?
The 2009-10 Spike in Homegrown Terrorist Cases 2009 saw almost twice as many people in the U.S.
indicted for illegally supporting the jihadist cause as any previous year. According to NAF’s database of
homegrown terrorism cases, there were 43 such cases in 2009, when the highest number in any other
year since the 9/11 attacks had been 23, in 2003. The following year, in 2010, the number of
MSDI Terror DA 159
homegrown jihadist terrorism cases declined to 34, but that still represented more such cases than any
year but 2009. As previously noted, Bergen viewed this sudden spike in homegrown terrorist cases at
the time as an undeniable increase in the threat. I wasn’t so sure. In an article I published in the summer
of 2010, I concluded that it wasn’t “clear that homegrown terrorism is increasing,” for two reasons. The
first was that the perceived spike could be based on changes in policing strategies and tactics. If
authorities started making arrests at a different point relative to a suspect undertaking illegal activities,
that could artificially trigger perceptions of a major increase in homegrown terrorists; and so too could
an increase in the number of sting operations. Second, I raised the possibility that this could be a
statistical aberration: “Another possibility is that the current rash of homegrown terror cases is an
aberration. In a statistical sequence measured over the course of years (such as weather patterns or a
baseball player’s career), aberrant sequences will frequently arise. A spike or precipitous decline in
numbers does not mean the numerical trajectory will extend indefinitely. For example, an unusually cold
May does not mean that July will also be unusually cold. While in the middle of an unusual statistical
sequence, it can be hard to have perspective; and in five years, 2009-2010 may seem exceptional in
terms of the level of homegrown terrorist activity, rather than the beginning of a new trend.” Now that
five years have passed since the onset of that spike in cases, it appears to have been just that, an
aberrational sequence. And we can pinpoint the precise development that drove the 2009-10 rise in
cases: the Somalia war. In December 2008, the U.S. media first reported authorities’ discovery that more
than a dozen young Somali men from Minnesota’s Twin Cities area (which has the U.S.’s largest Somali
community) had disappeared, going abroad to join jihadist groups in Somalia. They decided to fight
there after Ethiopia’s U.S.-backed invasion of Somalia in 2006, which was designed to shore up the
country’s U.N.-recognized transitional federal government and push back its main adversary, the Islamic
Courts Union. In addition to the young men being driven by nationalist sentiments, jihadist recruiters
focused their efforts on the Twin Cities area—a somewhat unique dynamic for domestic terrorist cases,
the vast majority of which do not feature recruiters from any established militant organization.
Thereafter, domestic law enforcement made apprehension of the young men who went to fight abroad,
and the networks encouraging and supporting them, a top priority. Terrorism-related indictments
increased as a result: the NAF dataset suggests that 14 indictments in 2009 and 16 in 2010 were related
to the Somalia conflict. If you subtract these figures from the number of total indictments for both
years, the numerical spike becomes less extreme, with only 29 indictments in 2009 and 18 in 2010 that
were unrelated to the Somalia war. Though 2009 still would have a higher number of indictments than
any year preceding it even with the adjusted figures, 2010 would be more in line with the numbers from
previous years, featuring fewer terrorism indictments than either 2003 or 2006. As recruiting for the
Somalia conflict has declined, the number of indictments has also gone down. So the question remains:
how do we interpret the lower numbers we are seeing now? Has the threat of homegrown terrorism
“markedly declined,” as Bergen insists, or is there a better way to understand the number of
homegrown jihadist cases that we have seen in 2012-13? The Longer View Fortunately, there has always
been a relatively small number of homegrown jihadist terrorism cases in the United States. The fact that
these numbers are small should make us hesitant to infer too much from numerical fluctuations. Take a
look at the number of homegrown jihadists who have been indicted or killed by year, per the NAF
database: 2002: 16 2003: 23 2004: 8 2005: 12 2006: 19 2007: 16 2008: 6 2009: 43 2010: 34 2011: 22
2012: 7 2013: 10 Bergen asserted that there had been nine indictments this year, but his article came
out before Terry Loewen’s arrest, which pushes the number to ten. Looking at the full data by year, it’s
not clear that there is a declining threat. Ten indictments in 2013 is three more than there were last
MSDI Terror DA 160
year; it’s also a higher number than we saw in either 2004 or 2008. Indeed, there were only six such
cases in 2008—the year before we saw the sudden jump to forty-three indictments. In fact, rather than
basing our assessment on indictments, there’s an entirely different statistic for measuring whether we
face a declining threat: the number of people killed or injured by homegrown terrorists in the U.S. in any
given year. That number was zero in 2011, while in 2013 three people were killed and 264 injured (in the
Boston bombings). The bottom line is that it’s perilous to infer too much from the data when the
numbers in question are rather small, because small numbers makes it extraordinarily difficult to
measure trends reliably. All it takes is one unusual development—such as the outbreak of war in
Somalia, and its resulting impact on Minneapolis-St. Paul—to make it appear that everything has
changed from a numerical perspective. There is thus little proof that “the threat of terrorism has
actually markedly declined over the past couple of years.” The core problem with Bergen’s use of
statistics is evident when you compare his analysis in 2009 with his assessment today: his methodology
is prone to perceiving a significant change in the level of threat based upon the direction that the
numerical trend line is pointing at any given time. If the number of indictments doubled to twenty next
year, by Bergen’s established methodology the threat would seem to be increasing again—even though
the absolute numbers would still be lower than 2003, 2009, 2010, or 2011. In attempting to determine
whether we are grappling with an increasing or declining threat, it’s important to view the most recent
data in as broad a context as possible. We should be wary of any method of statistical interpretation
wherein temporary fluctuations in one direction or another can be mistaken for massive shifts in the
threat we confront.
MSDI Terror DA 161
AT: State Sponsorship of Terrorism Decreasing
Terrorists don’t need state sponsors
Stephen D. Collins, 2014 is an associate professor of political science and international affairs at
Kennesaw State University. His research focuses on terrorism, economic statecraft, democracy and
human rights, conflict resolution, and nuclear proliferation. He is the author of, inter alia, “Dissuading
State Support of Terrorism: Strikes or Sanctions? An Analysis of Dissuasion Measures Employed Against
Libya,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 27 (1): 2014. Stephen D. Politics & Policy. Feb2014, Vol. 42 Issue
1, p131-159
State sponsorship of terrorism is today in an attenuated position—weaker than at any point in modern
history. Furthermore, the terrorist organizations that currently represent the greatest threat to civilian
populations are far less reliant on state support than terrorist groups in the earlier phases. Indeed, al
Qaeda and its affiliated jihadist groups operate essentially independent from any state support. A
variety of factors explain why terrorist groups have been able to remain operationally effective without
the aid of state patrons. First, the communications revolution of the late twentieth century has
permitted terrorist networks to reduce their previous reliance on the geographic proximity of members.
Just as the Internet, e-mail, and inexpensive telephony have enabled myriad businesses to situate their
employees in globally disparate locations, these technological agents of globalization have also enabled
terrorist leaders to operate sophisticated terrorist organizations with agents dispersed across thousands
of miles. Thus there is a diminished need today for a physical base of operations for training, planning,
and collaboration. Second, terrorists groups such as al Qaeda have developed their own streams of
revenue by engaging in smuggling and other forms of illicit commerce—including the trade in drugs and
conflict resources—and have also generated large sums through fraudulent charity schemes. Third, the
relaxation of border controls has facilitated the flow of terrorist operatives among their home countries,
the headquarters of terrorist organizations, and target countries.
State sponsorship has played a significant role in supporting terrorism
Stephen D. Collins, 2014 is an associate professor of political science and international affairs at
Kennesaw State University. His research focuses on terrorism, economic statecraft, democracy and
human rights, conflict resolution, and nuclear proliferation. He is the author of, inter alia, “Dissuading
State Support of Terrorism: Strikes or Sanctions? An Analysis of Dissuasion Measures Employed Against
Libya,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 27 (1): 2004. Stephen D. Politics & Policy. Feb2014, Vol. 42 Issue
1, p131-159
While generally not the ultimate cause of terrorism, state sponsorship of terrorist organizations has
played a significant role in facilitating the terrorist violence witnessed in the international system over
the past half century (Council on Foreign Relations 2013). State sponsorship encompasses a variety of
assistance measures including, inter alia, arms, safe haven, financing, training, intelligence, and
diplomatic cover. The succor provided by state sponsors facilitates terrorist groups’ planning, training,
communications, transit, and logistics in support of specific attacks. These benefits allow for increased
MSDI Terror DA 162
sophistication in terror plots, which lead to more lethal attacks. State sponsorship, therefore, can
represent a significant facilitating variable with respect to international terrorism, and it can amplify the
frequency and lethality of attacks.
MSDI Terror DA 163
A2: Al Qaeda Threat Decreasing
Affiliates as strong as ever
Noah Rotham, Mediaite, May 19, 2014
FBI Director: More, Stronger Al Qaeda Affiliates 'Than I Appreciated' http://rt.com/usa/160004-fbicomey-al-qaeda/ DOA: 3-5-15
Al Qaeda's affiliates are both stronger and more prolific than previously anticipated, FBI director James
Comey told the New York Times[1] on Monday. While the Times noted that some expected Comey to be
the first post-9/11 FBI director to redirect his focus away from terrorism, he clarified that Islamic
radicalism is as potent a force as ever. 'I didn't have anywhere near the appreciation I got after I came
into this job just how virulent those affiliates had become,' Comey told the Times when asked if he
thought the threat of al Qaeda-related terrorism had diminished. Referring to the terror group's
affiliates in Africa and the Middle East, Comey said that the threat of terrorism against American interest
sis as present as ever. 'There are both many more than I appreciated, and they are stronger than I
appreciated,' he confessed.
Al Qaeda has adapted and decentralized
MATTHEW OLSEN, Director, National Counterterrorism Center, March 6, 2014, Hearing of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee Subject: "Syria Spillover: The Growing Threat of Terrorism and
Sectarianism in the Middle East" Thank you very much, Chairman, and members of the committee. I
think it was about a year ago I was here to talk about threats in North Africa. So I appreciate the
opportunity to be here again to represent NCTC and to talk a little bit about the threats we face in the
Levant. And I'm particularly pleased to be here with two of our key partners, Deputy Secretary of State
Burns and Assistant Secretary of Defense Chollet. So as you are aware, we continue to face terrorist
threats to the United States and to our interests overseas, particularly in parts of South Asia and the
Middle East and Africa. But it's the current conflict in Syria and the regional instability in the Levant that
stand out for me as areas of particular concern. I do think it's important to consider Syria in the context
of the global terrorist movement. In the face of what's been sustained counterterrorism pressure, core
al-Qaida has adapted. They've adapted by becoming more decentralized and shifting away from the
large-scale plotting that was exemplified in the attacks of September 11th. al-Qaida has modified its
tactics and looked to conduct simpler attacks that don't require the same degree of resources and
training and command and control. So today, we're facing a wider -- a wider array of threats in a greater
variety of locations across the Middle East and around the world. In comparison to the al-Qaida plots
that emanated from the tribal areas of Pakistan a few years ago, these smaller and these less
sophisticated plots are often more difficult for us to detect and disrupt and that's put even greater
pressure on us to work closely with our partners here at the table, across the federal government and
around the world. So turning to Syria, Syria has become the preeminent location for al-Qaida-aligned
groups to recruit and to train and to equip what is now a growing number of extremists, some of whom
seek to conduct external attacks. In addition, Iran and Hezbollah, as you pointed out, are committed to
defending the Assad regime including sending billions of dollars in military and economic aid, training
pro-regime and Iraqi Shia militants and deploying their own personnel into the country. Now, from a
MSDI Terror DA 164
terrorism perspective, the most concerning development is that al-Qaida has declared Syria its most
critical front and has called for extremists to fight against the regime in Syria. So what we've seen is that
thousands of fighters from around the world, including hundreds from the West have traveled to Syria
and many of them have joined with established terrorist groups in Syria. This raises our concern that
radicalized individuals with extremist contacts and battlefield experience could return to their home
countries to commit violence at their own initiative or participate in al-Qaida-directed plots aimed at
Western targets outside of Syria. What we've seen is a coalescence in Syria of al-Qaida veterans from
Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as extremists from other hotspots such as Libya and Iraq. These
extremists bring a wide range of contacts and skills as well as battlefield experience and they're able to
exploit what has become a permissive environment from which to plot and train. Shifting briefly to
Lebanon, one of the continuing effects of the Syrian conflict will be the instability in Lebanon in the
upcoming year. I recently traveled to Lebanon and Jordan and the impacts of the continuing conflict in
Syria continue to be of great concern to officials in the region. Hezbollah publicly admitted last spring
that it is fighting for the Syrian regime and has framed the war as an act of self-defense against Westernbacked Sunni extremists. The group is sending capable fighters for pro-regime operations and support
for a pro-regime militia. In addition, Iran and Hezbollah are using allied Iraqi Shia groups to participate in
counter-opposition operations. And this active support to the Assad regime is of course driving
increased Sunni extremist attacks and sectarian violence. In short, the various factors contributing to
instability in Lebanon are only exacerbated by the protracted conflict in Syria.
Groups associated with Al Qaeda have increased activity
Central Asia General Newswire, April 9, 2014 Radical Islam followers from Europe, Central Asia
fight for Syrian militants - Bortnikov
Federal Security Service Director Alexander Bortnikov has reaffirmed the global nature of terrorism
threats. "The terrorism threat became global a rather long time ago. Although the core of Al Qaeda has
reduced its activity, associated militant groups demonstrate the capacity for autonomous and aggressive
actions," Bortnikov said on Wednesday in Krasnaya Polyana, Sochi, at the 13th conference of chiefs of
foreign security services and law enforcement agencies - partners of the Federal Security Service. The
armed conflict in Syria has galvanized into action destructive forces throughout the Middle East, the
Russian counterintelligence chief stated. "Local rings are being joined by radical Islam followers from
Europe, Central Asia, the South Caucasus and Russia. They are trained in special camps and engage in
the hostilities. The return of persons experienced in sabotage and the creation of covert organizations to
their countries of origin leads to the spread and actualization of the terrorism threat," Bortnikov said. A
complex situation is taking shape in the Afghan-Pakistani zone where terrorist groups, primarily the
Taliban, the Turkestan Islamic Party and the Pakistani Taliban, have lately bolstered their combat
potential, he noted. The forthcoming partial pullout of coalition forces from Afghanistan builds up the
threat of destabilization in neighboring countries, Bortnikov said
Al Qaeda spillover from Syria
SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ (D-NJ), March 6, 2014, Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Subject: "Syria Spillover: The Growing Threat of Terrorism and Sectarianism in the Middle
East"
MSDI Terror DA 165
As we enter the year three of the Syria crisis, headlines coming out of the region are no longer limited to
the violence within Syria, but to the increasing spread of violence across Syria's borders, especially into
Lebanon and Iraq. Of great concern is the proliferation of al-Qaida affiliates and splinter groups and the
increasing sectarian rhetoric fueling the increase of violence that offers new opportunities for al-Qaida
to gain footholds in local communities. It opens the door for an Iranian-sponsored terrorist network to
justify their presence as the protector of the region's Shias while bolstering the Assad regime and
antagonizing Arab states. The spillover from Syria is dangerous and troubling. In Lebanon, there's been
an alarming uptick in high-profile bombings, many claimed by the al-Qaida-affiliated Abdullah Azzam
Brigades. And at the same time, Hezbollah, purportedly protecting the Lebanese Shia community, has
now extended into Syria, protecting the Assad regime.
Threat from affiliates still strong
China Today, April 15, 2014, Cooperate to counter terrorism challenges
The recent terrorist attacks in Afghanistan, Pakistan, China and elsewhere have demonstrated that the
global fight against terrorism is far from over, and it still faces many challenges. After the death of
Osama bin Laden, the threat posed by al-Qaida as a global terrorist organization has declined. However,
the threat posed by its affiliates still persists. The al-Qaida threat continues to diversify, with numerous
loosely linked affiliates and associated radical individuals and cells innovating with regard to their
targets, tactics and technology. Terrorism is still around. For example, the risk of attacks by al-Qaida
affiliates across the Sahel persists. Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula continues to be a strong factor
affecting the security situation in Yemen. Al-Shabaab remains a serious threat to the security of the
region. In Syria, an affiliate of al-Qaida in Iraq has gained influence and recruits from it are fighting in the
civil war. With the deadline for the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan in 2014 approaching, it is
hard to tell whether the situation in Afghanistan will be better or worse. Al-Qaida and the Taliban, taking
refugee in the mountainous areas along the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, may take
advantage of the United States' withdrawal to launch attacks. Afghan troops and law enforcement
forces still lack the capability to keep the situation under full control. The shutdown of US embassies last
year in many parts of the world is a demonstration of the severe threat of terrorism. The Boston
Bombing incident also showed that individuals can pose a serious threat to peace and security. Recent
terrorist attacks in China alerted people once again to the threat of terrorism. All these have shown that
terrorism is still one of the most serious threats to peace and security. Terrorist attacks are spreading,
becoming more isolated and hi-tech. The international community should work together to prevent and
combat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. Any acts of terrorism are criminal acts and
unjustifiable regardless of their motivations, whenever and by whomsoever committed.
MSDI Terror DA 166
A2: Al Qaeda Leaders Killed
Al Qaeda has lots of talent and leaders easily replaceable
Thomas Joscelyn, May 20, 2014, Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan: An Enduring Threat,
Testimony, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/05/al_qaeda_in_afghanis.php# (Thomas
Joscelyn is the Senior Editor of The Long War Journal. Thomas is a senior fellow at the Foundation for
Defense of Democracies (FDD). He is also the executive director of the Center for Law and
Counterterrorism at FDD. He is a terrorism analyst, economist, and writer living in New York. Most of
Thomas's research and writing has focused on how al Qaeda and its affiliates operate around the world.
He is a regular contributor to the Weekly Standard and its online publications, the Daily Standard and
Worldwide Standard. His work has also been published by National Review Online, the New York Post,
and other media outlets. Thomas is the author of Iran's Proxy War Against America, a short book
published by the Claremont Institute that details Iran's decades-long sponsorship of America's terrorist
enemies. He makes regular appearances on radio programs around the country and has appeared on
MSNBC and FOX News. In 2006 he was named one of the Claremont Institute's Lincoln Fellows. Thomas
served as the senior terrorism adviser for Mayor Rudolph Giuliani's 2008 presidential campaign. He
holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in Economics from the University of Chicago.) Al Qaeda is, at its heart, a
clandestine organization, but careful analysis reveals that it has a deep bench of talent from which it
draws. Since its founding in 1988, the organization has attempted to conceal its operations. This has
made it difficult to assess some very basic aspects of al Qaeda. The group does not, for instance, publish
an organizational chart or make its total roster known. If you watch al Qaeda carefully enough, however,
you can see that the group has consistently replaced top leaders lost in the 9/11 wars. In some cases
these replacements are not as competent, while in other cases they may even surpass their fallen
comrades. Nasir al Wuhayshi, the aforementioned general manager of al Qaeda, is a seasoned veteran
who replaced others in that role after they were killed or captured. Wuhayshi is, by all appearances, an
all too competent leader. Still, the American-led counterterrorism effort has certainly disrupted al
Qaeda's international network, delivering severe setbacks in some areas. Al Qaeda's problems with ISIS
stem, to a large degree, from the fact that the U.S. and its allies took out its predecessor organization's
top leadership in 2010. The leaders of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) were loyal to al Qaeda's "general
command" but were replaced with leaders who had not been vetted by al Qaeda's senior leaders. One
of the interesting things about the infighting between the ISIS and Al Nusrah is that it has led al Qaeda to
identify several leaders who were previously unknown to the public. The leaders were identified
because they were called as witnesses against ISIS, relying on their established jihadist pedigrees to give
them credibility. Some of these leaders have dossiers that stretch back decades, but no one was talking
about them until they appeared on screen. This same phenomenon happens all the time. Al Qaeda
leaders who were previously unknown are identified in either the "general command" or the regional
branches. This dynamic leads to a significant epistemological problem. U.S. officials, under both the
Bush and Obama administrations, have repeatedly claimed to have decimated al Qaeda after a certain
number of leaders of the organization were either killed or captured. Part of the reason these
assessments have been flawed is that al Qaeda has a "deep bench" to draw from, both from within its
own organization and allied groups. Al Qaeda is constantly in the process of recruiting new talent as
well. In Pakistan and Afghanistan today, al Qaeda likely has a significant cadre of leaders who have not
MSDI Terror DA 167
been publicly identified. The roles played by other, publicly identified operatives are not widely
understood either. For instance, a cursory review of Vanguards of Khorasan, an al Qaeda publication,
reveals numerous leaders who are not regularly discussed.
MSDI Terror DA 168
A2: ISIS Can’t Succeed/No Positive Mission
Support for ISIS in Iraq
Lee Ferran, February 25, 2015, ABC News, “ISIS Trail of Terror,”
http://abcnews.go.com/WN/fullpage/isis-trail-terror-isis-threat-us-25053190 DOA: 3-1-15
ISIS saw a series of successes as it has cut its way from Syria into Iraq and towards Baghdad using a
combination of military expertise and unimaginable brutality. Social media accounts associated with ISIS
have published disturbing videos purportedly showing ISIS fighters taunting, torturing and executing
scores of unarmed prisoners. In addition, former senior U.S. military officials who served in Iraq and
helped train the Iraqi security forces said that ISIS has been able to take advantage of government forces
who lack the motivation to put up a good fight against ISIS in some areas. The Iraqi government and
much of its military officer corps are mostly made up of Shi’a Muslims, whereas much of the areas ISIS
has retained in Iraq are predominantly Sunni, like ISIS –- meaning the Iraqi military forces are often
operating in areas where the local population may be more willing to tolerate, or even support ISIS. ISIS
has also built relations of convenience with disgruntled local Sunni tribes and ex-Baathists who have felt
marginalized and disenfranchised by the government in Baghdad, which has been accused of favoring
Shi’as.
MSDI Terror DA 169
A2 ISIS No means
ISIS is worth $2 billion
Charles Lister, Brookings Doha Center, December 2014, Profiling the Islamic State,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2014/11/profiling-islamic-statelister/en_web_lister.pdf?la=en DOA: 3-1-15
ISIS likely retained assets of at least $875 million prior to seizing Mosul.2 Judging by the scale of
American-made Iraqi military equipment captured in June and that IS was assessed to be earning $2
million per day by smuggling oil from Iraq and Syria by September, IS represents a formidable militant
organization likely worth close to $2 billion.
ISIS financially self-sufficient
Charles Lister, Brookings Doha Center, December 2014, Profiling the Islamic State,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2014/11/profiling-islamic-statelister/en_web_lister.pdf?la=en DOA: 3-1-15
One aspect of IS’s internal structure and policymaking mechanisms that has proven decisive in enabling
expansion is its generation of income. IS has been almost entirely self-financed since at least 2005 and
according to the U.S. Department of Defense database, external funding to AQI, MSM, and ISI between
2005 and 2010 amounted to no more than five percent of its total “income.”54 After assuming ISI
leadership in 2010, Baghdadi established a financial command council and Mosul cemented its role as a
principal source of income.55 By 2014, a complex extortion network there was generating $12 million
per month. Notwithstanding a potential increase in private financial support following IS’s increased
public prominence, the simultaneous expansion in income-earning capacity makes it likely that the
group has continued to be financially self-sufficient.
ISIS generating millions from oil sales
Charles Lister, Brookings Doha Center, December 2014, Profiling the Islamic State,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2014/11/profiling-islamic-statelister/en_web_lister.pdf?la=en DOA: 3-1-15
While more sustainable, income earned through extortion pales in comparison to the underground sale
of Syrian and Iraqi oil. Illicit oil sales are not new for IS—by 2010, the group was thought to have been
“siphoning off a share of Iraq’s oil wealth, opening gas stations in the north, smuggling oil and extorting
money from industry contractors.”56 But by late August 2014, energy analysts estimated that the group
was selling as much as 70,000 barrels of oil daily from Syria and Iraq (at $26-$35 per barrel of heavy oil
and $60 per barrel of light crude) to internal black market customers and external buyers in Iraq,
Lebanon, Turkey, and Kurdistan.57 These calculations result in a daily income of $1-3 million, which over
12 months amounts to $365 million-1.1 billion.58 The targeting of IS-linked oil facilities in Syria since
late-September, however, will have significantly eroded this prospect.
MSDI Terror DA 170
ISIS raises money through kidnappings
Charles Lister, Brookings Doha Center, December 2014, Profiling the Islamic State,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2014/11/profiling-islamic-statelister/en_web_lister.pdf?la=en DOA: 3-1-15
IS’s finances have been heavily reliant on oil and gas, but other resources are also being exploited,
including agriculture, cotton, water, and electricity. The group is also known to operate an efficient
kidnap-for-ransom operation, with four foreign nationals—two young Italian women, a Dane, and a
Japanese national—all confirmed kidnapped by IS in August 2014 alone.59 While such hostage taking
has proven a powerful weapon in recent months through the public execution of American and British
nationals, it may also be in the hope of securing ransoms for other captives. Despite a French denial,
unnamed NATO sources in Brussels, for example, have claimed that IS was paid $18 million in April 2014
in exchange for four French hostages.60
ISIS makes $ selling antiquities
Charles Lister, Brookings Doha Center, December 2014, Profiling the Islamic State,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2014/11/profiling-islamic-statelister/en_web_lister.pdf?la=en DOA: 3-1-15
Even in areas not under its complete control, IS still maintains extortion networks and protection
rackets. IS units have also allegedly stolen antiques and sold them onto the black market. For example,
one Iraqi intelligence official claimed the group had earned $36 million after selling 8,000 year-old items
from al-Nabk, north of Damascus, in early 2014.
ISIS financial resources enable easy expansion
Charles Lister, Brookings Doha Center, December 2014, Profiling the Islamic State,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2014/11/profiling-islamic-statelister/en_web_lister.pdf?la=en DOA: 3-1-15
While IS fighters have long imposed shadow taxation (and extortion) within areas under their control or
influence, more official taxation systems have begun to be introduced since the proclamation of the
caliphate. For example, IS has introduced a customs tax upon the trucking business on the main
highways of western Iraq. This organized taxation system targets trucks transporting food and
electronics from Syria and Jordan via Iraq’s al-Waleed and al-Tanif crossings. As of September 2014,
rates were placed at $300 per truck of foodstuffs and $400 per load of electronic goods, with an
occasional $800 flat rate for trucks in general. The system itself is surprisingly professional, as Mitchell
Prothero explained: “Not only does IS offer protection from bandits, but its tax collectors also provide
traders with paperwork that shows they’ve paid IS taxes as well as counterfeit government tax receipts
that truckers can show to Iraqi Army checkpoints, which allow them to pass without further
payments.”62
In addition to shielding IS from traditional financial counterterrorism measures, such independent
financial capacities have also provided a source of social leverage, whether through incentives to induce
tribal loyalty or by funding food provision and fuel subsidies to encourage popular support. For example,
during its offensive in Deir Ezzor in May-June 2014, IS “spread $2 million in the area to entice tribes and
MSDI Terror DA 171
leaders to permit their presence,” thereby securing several strategic surrenders and pledges of
allegiance.63
IS’s ability to present an image of wealth and success has strengthened its recruitment of new fighters
locally as well as from abroad. As one moderate commander based in Aleppo, speaking on condition of
anonymity, said in June 2014, “Syrians join ISIS for money, simply because they can afford to pay
salaries.”64 An Islamic Front political official, who also requested anonymity, put it similarly bluntly:
“ISIS is definitely expanding—it has a lot of money and right now, Syrians are so poor. Money changes
everything—people will turn to and support extremism out of desperation.”65