Executive Order No. 9066
The President
Executive Order
Authorizing the Secretary of War to Prescribe Military Areas
Whereas the successful prosecution of the war requires every possible protection against
espionage and against sabotage to national-defense material, national-defense premises, and
national-defense utilities as defined in Section 4, Act of April 20, 1918, 40 Stat. 533, as amended
by the Act of November 30, 1940, 54 Stat. 1220, and the Act of August 21, 1941, 55 Stat. 655
(U.S.C., Title 50, Sec. 104);
Now, therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, and
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, I hereby authorize and direct the Secretary of War,
and the Military Commanders whom he may from time to time designate, whenever he or any
designated Commander deems such action necessary or desirable, to prescribe military areas in
such places and of such extent as he or the appropriate Military Commander may determine,
from which any or all persons may be excluded, and with respect to which, the right of any
person to enter, remain in, or leave shall be subject to whatever restrictions the Secretary of War
or the appropriate Military Commander may impose in his discretion. The Secretary of War is
hereby authorized to provide for residents of any such area who are excluded therefrom, such
transportation, food, shelter, and other accommodations as may be necessary, in the judgment of
the Secretary of War or the said Military Commander, and until other arrangements are made, to
accomplish the purpose of this order. The designation of military areas in any region or locality
shall supersede designations of prohibited and restricted areas by the Attorney General under the
Proclamations of December 7 and 8, 1941, and shall supersede the responsibility and authority of
the Attorney General under the said Proclamations in respect of such prohibited and restricted
areas.
I hereby further authorize and direct the Secretary of War and the said Military Commanders to
take such other steps as he or the appropriate Military Commander may deem advisable to
enforce compliance with the restrictions applicable to each Military area hereinabove authorized
to be designated, including the use of Federal troops and other Federal Agencies, with authority
to accept assistance of state and local agencies.
I hereby further authorize and direct all Executive Departments, independent establishments and
other Federal Agencies, to assist the Secretary of War or the said Military Commanders in
carrying out this Executive Order, including the furnishing of medical aid, hospitalization, food,
clothing, transportation, use of land, shelter, and other supplies, equipment, utilities, facilities,
and services.
This order shall not be construed as modifying or limiting in any way the authority heretofore
granted under Executive Order No. 8972, dated December 12, 1941, nor shall it be construed as
limiting or modifying the duty and responsibility of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with
respect to the investigation of alleged acts of sabotage or the duty and responsibility of the
Attorney General and the Department of Justice under the Proclamations of December 7 and 8,
1941, prescribing regulations for the conduct and control of alien enemies, except as such duty
and responsibility is superseded by the designation of military areas hereunder.
Franklin D. Roosevelt
The White House,
February 19, 1942.
[F.R. Doc. 42–1563; Filed, February 21, 1942; 12:51 p.m.]
Source: Executive Order No. 9066, February 19, 1942.
Executive Order 9066: The President Authorizes Japanese
Relocation
In an atmosphere of World War II hysteria, President Roosevelt, encouraged by officials at all
levels of the federal government, authorized the internment of tens of thousands of American
citizens of Japanese ancestry and resident aliens from Japan. Roosevelt’s Executive Order 9066,
dated February 19, 1942, gave the military broad powers to ban any citizen from a fifty- to sixtymile-wide coastal area stretching from Washington state to California and extending inland into
southern Arizona. The order also authorized transporting these citizens to assembly centers
hastily set up and governed by the military in California, Arizona, Washington state, and Oregon.
Although it is not well known, the same executive order (and other war-time orders and
restrictions) were also applied to smaller numbers of residents of the United States who were of
Italian or German descent. For example, 3,200 resident aliens of Italian background were
arrested and more than 300 of them were interned. About 11,000 German residents—including
some naturalized citizens—were arrested and more than 5000 were interned. Yet while these
individuals (and others from those groups) suffered grievous violations of their civil liberties, the
war-time measures applied to Japanese Americans were worse and more sweeping, uprooting
entire communities and targeting citizens as well as resident aliens.
HIRABAYASHI v. UNITED STATES
Case Basics
Docket No.
870
Petitioner
Hirabayashi
Respondent
United States
Decided By
Stone Court (1943-1945)
Opinion
320 U.S. 81 (1943)
Argued
Monday, May 10, 1943
Decided
Monday, June 21, 1943
Term:

1940-1949
o 1942
Facts of the Case
In the wake of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt acted to prevent
incidents of subversion and espionage from individuals of Japanese descent living in the United
States. He issued two executive orders which were quickly enacted into law. One gave the
Secretary of War the power to designate certain parts of the country "military areas" and exclude
certain persons from them. The second established the War Relocation Authority which had the
power to remove, maintain, and supervise persons who were excluded from the military areas.
Gordon Kiyoshi Hirabayashi, a student at the University of Washington, was convicted of
violating a curfew and relocation order.
Question
Did the President's executive orders and the power delegated to the military authorities
discriminate against Americans and resident aliens of Japanese descent in violation of the Fifth
Amendment?
Conclusion
The Court found the President's orders and the implementation of the curfew to be constitutional.
Chief Justice Stone, writing for the unanimous Court, took into account the great importance of
military installations and weapons production that occurred on the West Coast and the
"solidarity" that individuals of Japanese descent felt with their motherland. He reasoned that
restrictions on Japanese actions served an important national interest. The Court ducked the
thorny relocation issue and focused solely on the curfew, which the Court viewed as a necessary
"protective measure." Stone argued that racial discrimination was justified since "in time of war
residents having ethnic affiliations with an invading enemy may be a greater source of danger
than those of a different ancestry."
HIRABAYASHI v. UNITED STATES. The Oyez Project at IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law.
16 March 2014. <http://www.oyez.org/cases/1940-1949/1942/1942_870/>.
Korematsu v. United States
Citation. 323 U.S. 214, 65 S. Ct. 193, 89 L. Ed. 194, 1944 U.S. 1341
Brief Fact Summary. During World War II, a military commander ordered all persons of
Japanese descent to evacuate the West Coast. The Petitioner, Korematsu (Petitioner), a United
States citizen of Japanese descent, was convicted for failing to comply with the order.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Legal restrictions that curtail the civil rights of a single racial group
are subject to the most rigid scrutiny. But, pressing public necessity may sometimes justify such
restrictions.
Facts. President of the United States Franklin Roosevelt (President Roosevelt) issued an
executive order authorizing military commanders to prescribe military areas from which any or
all persons may be excluded. Thereupon, a military commander ordered all persons of
Japanese descent, whether or not they were United States citizens, to leave their homes on the
West Coast and to report to “Assembly Centers.” The Petitioner, a United States citizen of
unchallenged loyalty, but of Japanese descent, was convicted under a federal law making it an
offense to fail to comply with such military orders.
Issue. Was it within the power of Congress and the Executive to exclude persons of Japanese
ancestry from the West Coast at the time that they were excluded?
Held. Yes. At the time the exclusion was ordered, it was justified.
Justice Hugo Black stated that although the exclusion order imposed hardships upon a large
number of American citizens, hardships are part of war. When, under conditions of warfare, our
shores are threatened by hostile forces, the power to protect them must be commensurate with
the threatened danger.
Dissent.
Justice Frank Murphy (J. Murphy) argued that the exclusion at issue here goes over the brink of
constitutional power and falls into the abyss of racism. Although we must extend great
deference to the judgments of the military, it is essential that there be definite limits to military
discretion. Moreover, the military order is not reasonably related to the dangers it seeks to
prevent.
Justice Robert Jackson (J. Jackson) stated he would not distort the United States Constitution
(Constitution) to approve everything the military may deem expedient.
Discussion. Ironically, this case establishes the “strict scrutiny” standard of review, thereby
leading to the invalidation of much race-based discrimination in the future.
Ex parte Endo
In the unanimous U.S. Supreme Court decision on Ex parte Mitsuye Endo in December 1944, the court
ruled that "citizens who are concededly loyal" could not be held in War Relocation Authority concentration
camps. The ruling led to Japanese Americans being allowed to return to the West Coast and to the closing
of the camps.
At the outbreak of World War II, Mitsuye Endo was a 22-year-old clerical worker for the California
Department of Motor Vehicles based in Sacramento, one the few Nisei who had been able to secure a
state job at a time when occupational discrimination against Japanese Americans was severe. In the
hysteria following the attack on Pearl Harbor, Endo was among those Nisei state workers first
harassed, then eventually fired from their jobs because of their racial ancestry. During this process,
Saburo Kido, a lawyer and president of the Japanese American Citizens League vowed to assist them. He asked
his friend, James Purcell, a San Francisco-based attorney, to help, and he agreed to do so without fee.
The mass exclusion and detention of Japanese Americans on the West Coast beginning in the spring of
1942 added to the difficulty of the task. Seeking a test case for whom he could file a habeas corpus
petition, he settled on Endo without actually meeting her based on her profile as a Nisei who was
Christian, had a brother in the U.S. Army, had never been to Japan, and could neither speak nor read
Japanese. Endo agreed to serve as the test case.
While Endo was incarcerated at Tule Lake, Purcell filed the habeas corpus petition seeking her release
on July 13, 1942, arguing that her detention had deprived her of the right to report to work as a state
employee, and that Public Law 503 did not allow military officials to order Japanese Americans detained.
He further claimed that her detention was "undeclared martial law" since she had been detained
without trial despite the fact that the courts had been functioning. Her petition was heard by Judge
Michael Roche in July 1942, but he did not rule on the case for over a year. When he did rule in July
1943, he dismissed her petition without explanation. The case was appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals, where in April 1944, Judge William Denman invoked certification to the Supreme Court
rather than ruling on the case. Throughout this time, Endo remained incarcerated (she moved from
Tule Lake to Topaz after segregation), even rejecting an offer by the War Relocation Authority to release
her as long as she agreed not to return to the West Coast, allowing her case to proceed.
Oral arguments before the Supreme Court took place in October 1944. In a unanimous ruling issued
on December 18, 1944, the court decided in Endo's favor. The opinion, authored by Justice William O.
Douglas, began:
We are of the view that Mitsuye Endo should be given her liberty. In reaching that conclusion we do
not come to the underlying constitutional issues which have been argued. For we conclude that,
whatever power the War Relocation Authority may have to detail other classes of citizens, it has no
authority to subject citizens who are concededly loyal to its leave procedure.
Though freeing Endo and other Japanese Americans, the court avoided addressing the constitutionality
of excluding and incarcerating Japanese Americans. Having been tipped off earlier, the Roosevelt
administration had issued Public Proclamation 21 the day before the Endo ruling, rescinding the
exclusion orders. Japanese Americans would be allowed to return to the West Coast in January 1945
and the concentration camps (with the exception of the "segregation center" at Tule Lake) shut down over
the course of that year.
Authored by Brian Niiya, Densho