THE TUCK SCHOOL AT DARTMOUTH Entrepreneurship and Innovation Strategy Final Project Gustavo Ferreira Caroline Hollis Geoff Mattei Ben Tilton 11/11/2011 Executive Summary Groupon was founded November 2008 in Chicago to use “daily deals” to offer bargains to consumers and drive sales with local merchants. Three years after their first sale, they continue to grow at 50% per month, with a revenue run rate of over $2B per year in January 2011. In the process, they have become a darling of the internet companies and are touted as one of the fastest growing companies in the world. In Groupon’s words, their value proposition is to “use collective buying power to offer unbeatable prices and provide a win-win for business and consumers, delivering more than 650 daily deals globally”. 1 In this paper, we examine the dynamics of Groupon’s business model; the context of their innovation, how they executed their vision, how their strategy has changed, and what they need to do in the future. There are three important conclusions from Groupon’s short history: 1) They have been very successful at developing a simple, effective product leveraging social media and online advertising that created genuine value for an underserved market segment (smallmedium businesses); 2) They grew at an impressive pace by developing a repeatable model for market entry, and leveraging a strong sales force and very directed leadership; 3) There are almost no barriers to entry (despite Groupon’s claim that ‘scale’ and ‘best product’ will keep competition at bay) and they will face extreme competitive threats in the near future. While the company has done well against smaller players by relying on its scale, this strategy will not work against players such as Amazon and Google. Although Groupon could continue to develop their value proposition, the lack of repeat merchants makes building customer stickiness based barrier to entry nearly impossible. For now, the company should focus on gaining as much market share as possible, and look for potential partnerships or exit opportunities, as the future erosion of this market share and an erosion of profitability for the company is a near certainty. 1 http://apps2.shareholder.com/tearsheet/generate.aspx?id=251847&CompanyID=AMDAE2NTR&s=1494945303 Contents Context of the Innovation .............................................................................................................................. 3 The relevant markets and industries that it affects .................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. Local advertisement Industry: ................................................................................................................... 4 The technological and organizational issues that it raises ........................................................................ 5 Groupon’s Strategy ....................................................................................................................................... 5 Market Entry .............................................................................................................................................. 6 Company strategy ..................................................................................................................................... 6 Construction of the business model .......................................................................................................... 8 Value Intended to be Created by Groupon................................................................................................ 9 Risk .......................................................................................................................................................... 10 Competition ............................................................................................................................................. 13 Approaches to market definition and segmentation; ............................................................................... 11 Expectations for market growth ............................................................................................................... 12 Exit Strategies ......................................................................................................................................... 13 LOOKING FORWARD ................................................................................................................................ 15 Strategic Vision ........................................................................................................................................ 17 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................... 20 Context of the Innovation Introduction Groupon was founded in November of 2008 in Chicago with the goal of using “daily deals” to offer bargains to consumers and drive sales with local merchants. Three years after its first sale, they continue to grow at 50% per month, with a revenue run rate of over $2B per year in January 2011. In the process, they have become an internet company darling and are touted as one of the fastest growing companies in the world. In Groupon’s words, their value proposition is to “use collective buying power to offer unbeatable prices and provide a win-win for business and consumers, delivering more than 650 daily deals globally”.2 An examination of the dynamics of Groupon’s business model; the context of their innovation, the way they executed their vision, and the changes made to their strategy over time, will provide insights into what they need to do in the future. The relevant markets and industries that it affects Groupon’s target market is small and medium-sized businesses (SMBs) in urban centers. Their industry is online advertising. Initially, Groupon had no direct competition in their small niche market. Businesses used Groupon’s services to drive immediate sales, and increase awareness through social marketing and ‘hype’. Substitutes (and complements) for these services – i.e. competition for share of advertising wallet of small and medium businesses - included paper coupons, local advertising (TV, radio, billboards, etc), and online advertising media (e.g. Google adwords, email, etc). In its early days, Groupon was targeted at local businesses in Chicago, and did not directly threaten any existing markets or industries. Instead, Groupon provided a unique value proposition to businesses that wanted to increase sales and awareness with a low risk 2 http://apps2.shareholder.com/tearsheet/generate.aspx?id=251847&CompanyID=AMDAE2NTR&s=1494945303 promotion, whose success could easily be tracked To this end, Groupon competes directly or indirectly with online advertising sites and service providers (e.g. Google). Groupon also continues to exacerbate the threat to the traditional advertising services of the 90s such as the Yellow Pages. Local advertisement Industry Until the 90’s, the Yellow Pages, direct mail, flyers, paper coupons and local media were the main advertisement medium used by local businesses. The internet revolutionized the advertising industry for SMBs by providing low cost advertising means that helped them directly target their core customers. In 1994, the first Pay-per-click advertisement was introduced, beginning the transformation of the advertising industry. The first ads were sold on a cost per thousand impressions basis (CPM). In the late 90’s, Google evolved to target advertisements on its search engine based on user queries. After the internet bubble in the spring of 2000, Google started to sell advertisements on a pay per click basis (PPC – customer paid only if users enter in their web page clicking in the ad). Different from its competitors that use an auction that puts the highest bid on the top of the user search, Google introduced the concept of relevance, which ultimately differentiates its search engine from its competitors. The click through rate determined the ad relevance and it could give the preference over the bid value on the position of the ad on the search results. Finally the industry has evolved with Pay per Performance tools that enable businesses to track the revenue directly generated from an ad in terms of completed sales. The online advertisement industry’s attempt to become increasingly targeted, relevant, measurable, and effective has paid off. In 2010, paid search already counted for more than 50% of online spending among Small Businesses. The PPC model was more attractive to merchants than the CPM since it demanded payment one step further on the marketing funnel. From awareness only (CPM) to engagement (PPC). In 2008, Groupon capitalizes on the Pay per Performance models and launches a model that gives merchants direct visibility to how many direct sales a promotion has generated. With Groupon the client incurs costs only when a consumer acquires a coupon (CPA model – cost per acquisition). Printed Online CPM Yellow Pages PPC CPA Groupon The technological and organizational issues that it raises There were several key innovations and developments that were critical in enabling Groupon’s success. Groupon capitalized on the internet’s culture of hype, social media, and the trends in online advertising to launch its business. Internet users were already comfortable with social networks and internet sites as a forum for sharing their opinions about purchases; Facebook had already commercialized a culture of social networking; Google proved the value in online advertising; Amazon proved users were comfortable with making purchases large and small on the internet. All of these phenomena contributed to an environment that was primed for Groupon’s entry. Additionally, small and medium businesses were underserved by the major players in online advertising, and lacked access to the capital and revenues needed to use many of the existing products. Groupon’s local, targeted, low risk proposition came at a perfect time to capitalize on an under-served market. Groupon’s Strategy Market Entry The evolution of Groupon began in 2006 when entrepreneur, Andrew Mason set out to utilize people’s fixation with social media and combine it with the idea of creating a collective action that is centered on a tipping point. Mason’s inspiration was a problem he was encountering with a cell phone contract. Mason dubbed the web-based platform he created, The Point. The site’s goal was to allow anyone to campaign for people to do something or donate to a cause. The Point received funding from entrepreneur, Eric Lefkofsky but what quickly became apparent was The Point didn’t have a true profit model. Mason was forced to examine his business and figure out where revenues could be generated and honed in on collective buying as his path to business success “Definitely, collective buying seemed the most interesting,” he says, “because it was the most unknown.”3 Mason researched past online collective buying businesses and realized if he focused on selling service offers, as opposed to physical goods, he would remove most of the competition from the picture. He started Groupon in Chicago in 2008, as t that is where the founders’ were based and their networks were the strongest. Company strategy Groupon’s original strategy was very clear; they sought to leverage small and mediumsized business’s desire to increase awareness of their businesses and expand their customer bases. When Groupon first began, it was the first company of its kind to utilize a digital media strategy that relied on SMBs to generate revenue. Groupon’s daily deal email strategy relied upon consumers’ desire to save money, their use of email and the internet for shopping, and their adventurousness in trying new restaurants and stores in their neighborhood. Business to Consumer (B2C) acquisition occurred through both direct advertising and basic social media. From a business to business (B2B) perspective, Groupon had to find reputable businesses 3 (Coburn, 2010) willing to advertise via a coupon, structure an appealing deal, and then rely on the business to hold up its side of the deal. In return, Groupon provided an outlet that gave enormous exposure to new customers, a new potential for price discrimination with the new customer base, and a publicity factor that grew as consumers shared their deal acquisitions through social media outlets like Facebook, Twitter, and Yelp. The strategy utilized a combination of group interest and coupon-centered advertising. For any single deal to work, Groupon had to find a partner in the city of the deal willing to offer an enticing discount to its business, and then generate commitments from consumers that reached a certain volume threshold to make the deal valid. If the deal became valid, Groupon received a percentage, usually 50%, of the cost of the Groupon. Andrew Mason, founder and CEO, wanted to change the way people bought and interacted with local businesses. Groupon’s success was aided by the telesales expertise and capital of co-founders, Eric Lefkovsky and Brad Keywell. Both had extensive experience running big companies and they intensely studied how to bring a sales-dependent business to the internet. The business model was tailored for growth and Groupon has expanded from serving one market in Chicago in November 2008, to serving 150 markets in North America and 100 markets in Europe, Asia, and South America in October 2010. “Lee Brown, SVP National Sales for Groupon, commented that by early 2011, achieving the requisite tipping point was nearly a “forgone conclusion;” Groupon reported that less than 5% of all deals purchased in North America failed to reach the required quantity threshold.”4 While sales were at the core of Groupon’s strategy, the business benefitted from its payment model as well. Since Groupon received payment from its users right away upon their purchase of a deal and paid the businesses back later, they were able to cover their upfront distribution and advertising costs. 4 (Johnson & Marshall, 2011) Construction of the business model User acquisition Entice offer Direct advertisement Web social Client acquisition Sales force (Call centers) Coupon $ $/2 Groupon’s business model was constructed with an emphasis on the internet, email, and sales. As the above figure shows, by using the internet for its business platform, Groupon removes many risks from its business model. No product actually has to be physically sent at any point. Groupon is able to source the deals through its expert sales force, an email detailing the offer is generated and sent daily, consumers commit to the deal, and upon the breach of the tipping point a second email is generated notifying the consumers and the consumer is charged for the deal. Groupon’s expert sales force was critical in generating scale among businesses, although the sales force is also one of their largest expenses. On the B2B side, Groupon receives the money only upon completion of the deal and then pays the businesses their cut. Value Intended to be Created by Groupon Stakeholder Local Business Value creation Reach (acquire new Big retail chain User customers) discounts (group buying) Clear up inventory for new price Generate off-peak Pay only for sales (no Access to big before service Price discrimination sensitive customers Generate cash flow Get to know new demand products or services Low touch and effort in their community upfront costs) Flash sale Groupon claims that they ‘help the world’ because they “get people to try new things and get small businesses cash flow”. While merchants agree that Groupon provides awareness for their business as the above table indicates, A Rice University study surveying 150 local businesses in 19 American cities, and 13 product categories that utilized Groupon deals in 2009 and 2010 indicated that 42% of businesses would never use Groupon again. These results differ dramatically from the 97% reuse rate that Groupon touts. Many merchants found that consumers were so price sensitive that they wouldn’t spend much more than the value of the deal. The study also showed that of those Groupon deals that turned a profit less than 31% returned to use it again and of the unprofitable deals, less than 13% returned to use the product or service. The survey results call into question the perceived value creation versus the actual value captured by businesses partnering with Groupon. Monetary Value Captured per Deal 100% 90% 80% 50% 70% 60% 50% 40% 25% 30% 20% 25% 10% 0% Monetary Value Captured Groupon SMB's Customer The chart (above right) displays the monetary value gained at the time of a Groupon sale by Groupon (25%), the SMB (25%), and the customer (50%). However, over the long term, businesses are becoming increasingly concerned over how valuable Groupon’s coupon purchasers actually are. Studies have found that many Groupon consumers are either existing customers, or extremely price sensitive consumers with no intention of revisiting a merchant. In some cases, merchants have complained that Groupon deals have actually destroyed brand equity as the Groupon name becomes associated with cheap advertising for failing businesses. It is Groupon that is benefitting the most from its business model as its aggressive sales force seeks out new SMBs to partner with, and its customer continues to save money on the deals. Risk Groupon’s business model enabled them to transfer some perception of risk away from business customers. Instead of requiring businesses to pay an up-front fee for advertisements or coupons that may never be seen or used, Groupon only charges the customer when the consumer makes the purchase. This business model was critical in helping Groupon win new customers since they did not have to bear significant risk by committing their sales and advertising budget to a service without knowing how many customers they would receive. Approaches to market definition and segmentation; As the concept of daily deals has evolved and gained a significant following. Groupon has been forced to evolve its strategy. Since the daily deals space has little to no barriers to entry, Groupon has had to turn to other strategies to segment its market and grow its business. Throughout 2011 Groupon has focused on growing its business through geographic expansion of the current product, international expansion via acquisition, increasing user sign-ups, and innovative marketing. The original Groupon model based on a standalone email generated the most marketing exposure for businesses, but required higher costs in the form of commission fees. Groupon introduced “Groupon Stores” to incorporate a degree of self-service to the business. Through this format consumers can tailor their Groupon experience and choose the merchants, brands, and services they were most interested in. Businesses are able to use the platform to design their own deals and push the offer to consumers in a more targeted manner. This new strategy removed the requirement of having a “tipping point” to validate the offer and also allowed consumers to set whatever discount level they felt was appropriate, and finally a change was made to the payment model so that merchants were only paid when the coupon was actually redeemed. Groupon has also introduced a Merchant Services platform, an e-commerce solution for merchants. The service moves past focusing solely just on marketing and also offers a variety of services including capacity planning, deal optimization, and editorial services. Businesses are able to use the service to figure out what kind of deal would work best for them and what kind of customer support they will need for the deal day. Finally, Groupon recently introduced Groupon Now, a mobile application created to help businesses manage their inventory more effectively. The application addresses the growing number of smart phone users and provides greater connectivity between businesses and consumers. The application is centered on providing consumers with deals immediately based on their location and preferences. Businesses can choose when and where they want their deals to be available. Groupon is in a unique position where it has to think about market definition in increasingly creative ways. Its original business model focused on SMBs has had to evolve to deal with the entrance of competitors like Living Social. Groupon has not only expanded its geographic presence, but has also explored linking deals in cities to other suburban zip codes to expand the customer base and target other interested consumers. Groupon has also moved away from solely targeting SMBs. In August of 2010, Groupon launched a nationwide deal with Gap that resulted in 441,000 deals sold and $11 million in revenues. Expectations for market growth Groupon announced its initial public offering on November 3, 2011, and began trading on Friday, November 4, 2011. The offering consisted of 35 million shares of Class A common stock at a price of $20. Groupon is trading on The NASDAQ Global Select Market under the ticker symbol "GRPN." Groupon finished up 30.55% on its first day of trading to close at $26.11 despite the fact that the company has never turned a profit and actually lost $389.6 million in 2010. The offering does give Groupon the flexibility to support and expand its business channels. The sales heavy business model requires a lot of staff at a hefty price and Groupon has already begun to cut marketing spending in an effort to reach profitability. As a public company, Groupon will now face greater scrutiny from the press on its operations and success rates in generating recurring business for merchants and also intense pressure from investors to turn a profit with its operations. Competition Groupon almost immediately faced copycat sites. While they have been able to leverage their scale, brand and effective sales force (and the occasional buy-out) to keep competition at bay, Groupon will face a much harsher competitive environment as the advertising market continues to mature. Groupon is used to competing with niche group discount sites such as TravelZoo and SavvyCircle that have more targeted industries, products and customer bases. While these sites cannot compete directly with Groupon’s scale, they will contribute to slowly chipping away at Groupon’s customer base. Groupon’s most significant competition comes from the behemoths whose own scale makes Groupon’s customer base look trivial. Amazon, Google and Facebook have all made plays to challenge Groupon’s business model. Most significantly, Amazon has contributed millions of funding to Groupon’s most significant competitor LivingSocial. (Gilbert, 2011) If Google can monetize GoogleOffers and integrate it into their existing suite of advertising products, Groupon will find it difficult to compete with Google’s more comprehensive suite of advertising products. Perhaps most significantly, all of these companies can leverage economies of scale to lower prices to local merchants, and possibly even offer superior products. Exit Strategies Groupon’s ecommerce business model does provide a flexible platform if it needs to exit a market. The longer Groupon operates and the more deals that it sells, the more data points the company has to analyze on what is working well and what isn’t succeeding. If the business model isn’t successful in certain city or one of its business platforms fails, Groupon has the ability to pull out of a city or cut a component of its business easily and move in another direction. However, Groupon can expect to continue to receive increased competition from Living Social, Amazon, Google, and Facebook. With the daily deal market reaching a saturation point in terms of offerings, Groupon will have to continue to focus on finding and creating new points of differentiation from their competitors to remain successful. Even more concerning though is the fact that Groupon’s core business, local daily deals, actually shrank in the US in the third quarter. LOOKING FORWARD …it is critical to understand exactly what Groupon’s key innovations and strategies were, what their primary weaknesses are, and how they can improve their business strategy. To date, Groupon has done a great job of building the market for online local group discounts, but unfortunately (for Groupon), their meteoric success has not come from an inimitable strategy, but from their ability to quickly capitalize on an innovative business model and their status of ‘first entrant’. As the market matures, they will find that scale and performance will no longer serve as effective barriers to entry. Their highly price sensitive customer base will quickly switch providers when they can buy the same service more cheaply, or a more sophisticated bundled product for the same price. Groupon’s impressive margins will be quickly eroded as they lower their price to compete. Unless they can find a significantly leaner operating model, their revenues could decline as quickly as they have grown. The Emergence-Extension S-Curve helps us visualize the problem Groupon is about to face. The company has extracted significant value from the emerging market of online coupons; the market is maturing into the ‘extension’ phase, meaning they will either need to change their business model to be able to compete on price, or they need to continue innovating products and building the market so they can extend the ‘emergence’ phase. Practically, this means innovating services for small to medium sized businesses that help them Groupon has relied on scale to protect their competitive advantage so far. The CEO describes the motivation behind their quick expansion: "We realized the main barrier to entry is going to be scale. So we wanted to get to as many cities as we can because we saw direct, outright, verbatim copies of what we were doing, popping up all over the place pretty quickly. We said we can either go chase them and beat them back and fight them legally, or race ahead and do what we do, as best we can. So the choice was to not look back, and try to be better and bigger." (Carlson, 2011) Being ‘better and bigger’ has protected Groupon’s position so far, but they now face competition from online behemoths that are bigger, and have the experience with online advertising and marketing products to be even better. Google, Facebook and Amazon are three very strong competitors who have already threatening Groupon’s model. Groupon has failed to develop long term relationships with their customers, and consumers face very low switching costs. Alternatively, Groupon can consider leveraging their scale and extensive customer base into a more developed, defensible value proposition. Groupon will find it nearly impossible to continue competing with their existing value proposition. They have successfully scaled their operations and built a strong customer base and brand name, although their value proposition can be considered limited compared with their biggest competitors (e.g. Google, Amazon). As a last consideration, it is worth considering Ron Adner’s 3 principles of ecosystem carryover: 1) Minimum viable footprint 2) Staged Expansion 3) Ecosystem carryover Groupon has developed their minimum viable footprint and successfully expanded to 250 markets and 50 million registered users. While Groupon continues to innovate only within their core competency of online group discounts, they should consider whether there are more sophisticated value propositions they can offer their customer base. Strategic Vision Much like Facebook and Google, Groupon will struggle to keep – or find - their identity as they grow from a visionary local start-up to a public multi-national corporation. The directed – and at times restricted – vision of the founder and CEO has kept Groupon on a clear and focused path to scale. While Groupon has had issues in their short history with straying from their core competency (they have dabbled with large national retailers (e.g. FTC (whose Groupon price was higher than the price actually available on the website), or the Gap), on the whole Groupon has been extremely directed. As they grow, Groupon will struggle to find their feet as a ‘local’ company that is now spread across 150 markets in North America and 100 markets in other countries. A SWOT analysis of Groupon follows that will afford the opportunity to understand some of the dynamics the company currently faces. Strengths Weaknesses Scale: Groupon has 56% of the market, over twice its next competitor Company faces extremely high levels of competition Strong management team Customer acquisition cost is rising steadily Diverse geographic revenue base Well capitalized Company’s repeat business is declining and it needs to find a way to increase customer and merchant satisfaction Opportunities Threats Productivity from the European sales force is lower than here in the US which signals an opportunity to increase revenue The company currently faces possible regulatory risk due to it being viewed as a gift card in some jurisdictions Huge $1.3 Trillion estimated market opportunity Traditional print media competitors are entering the space as well as companies such as Google and Amazon Multiple product expansion possibilities Changing payment terms from merchants could restrict the company’s cash flow Competition could drive down fees Groupon currently operates in a highly competitive industry with barriers to entry that are essentially non-existent. The company has gained an advantage by being an early mover in the space which has allowed it to gain scale quickly. Although the company currently holds the dominant market position, this position is under threat from companies such as Living Social, Google, Amazon, and now even traditional print publications such as magazines and newspapers. This competition has the possibility to drive down fees as the business becomes more commoditized. Groupon now has the ability to charge fees higher than its competitors, but this as well could become a thing of the past as competition increases. Essentially, Groupon faces the problem that it can’t keep competitors from entering and it needs a strategy of differentiation that will allow it to build stickiness from both its end consumers and the merchants it serves. Differentiation for Groupon can come from several different possible solutions which we will cover. Groupon currently has no form of customer segmentation. As a result of this, many customers have expressed dissatisfaction with their Groupon purchase experience as merchants are not incentivized to treat the customers well nor are there often times sufficient room in the participating businesses to cover the additional demand that the Groupon causes. This could be solved by segmenting customers and deals through a premium program. That is, Groupon creates different tiered experiences depending on price level and restricts quantity appropriately. The limited volume of the offerings would be offset by higher margins from a premium price point. Another way to solve the dissatisfaction problem would be to implement time constraints within the deal itself. As the model currently works, a customer purchases a Groupon which expires at some point in time in the future. By restricting the deal into month long windows or something similar, the merchant would be able to manage flow of customers, improving satisfaction and thereby hopefully building customer stickiness for Groupon. As Groupon looks for additional ways to grow the topline it has several options. One would be instituting a secondary market for the deals. A large majority of deals sold by Groupon go unused. This presents a problem from a customer retention standpoint in that if you buy something and don’t use it, you are less likely to repurchase in the future. A secondary market would create an additional revenue source for Groupon, and also possibly attract new customers who are not familiar with the site who could then be converted to regular buyers. To further differentiate the business Groupon has an opportunity to leverage its existing customer data and use it to create custom offers or partner with local businesses to target specific customer types which the company has been attempting to do: “However, Rob Solomon (COO) believes that, with the right strategy, the company can create competitive barriers to shore up its dominant position. One way it is doing so is to make better use of all the data it collects, for instance to personalize deals and help local businesses design their Groupon offers. Last year the firm hired as chief data officer an executive from Netflix, a filmrental business noted for its data-mining skills. In America Groupon already tailors some offers depending on the sex, location and buying history of a subscriber.” (Groupon Anxiety, 2011) Groupon has done an excellent job of diversifying its revenue base and moving to a more international footprint. The company now has twice as many merchants internationally as it does in North America. However, the company averages 25 merchants per sales person in North America versus 14 internationally, suggesting that there is ramp up to be had in international markets. Conclusion Groupon has done an excellent job in creating a simple, attractive product that is easy to use and has genuine value. The company is excellent at capitalizing on social marketing, has a good site design, a catchy theme and an aggressive large sales force which has been able to drive merchant signups. The company grew quickly with a model that was easily leverage-able. However, the company faces a very competitive market where barriers to entry are practically non-existent. While the company has done well against smaller players by relying on its scale, this strategy will not work against players such as Amazon and Google. Although we have suggestions on how the business can be improved, the lack of repeat merchants makes building a customer stickiness based barrier to entry nearly impossible. For now, the company should focus on gaining as much market share as possible as we see a future erosion of this market share and an erosion of profitability for the company a near certainty. Deconstructing the Groupon Phenomenon. (2011, July). Harvard Business Review. Groupon Anxiety. (2011, March 17). The Economist. The Dismal Scoop on Groupon. (2011, October 11). The Economist. Carlson, N. (2011, October). The Truth About The World's Most Controversial Company. Business Insider. Coburn, M. F. (2010, August). ” On Groupon and its founder, Andrew Mason”. Chicago Magazine. Duryee, T. (2011, November 7). Groupon Rolls Out Loyalty Program To Try To Make Merchants Happier. Entrepreneurship. Gilbert, J. (2011, November). Facebook, Google, Living Social: Groupon Competitors That Could Take Over. The Huffington Post. Johnson, E., & Marshall, J. F. (2011). "Groupon". Vincent L. Lacorte Case Series. https://www.capitaliq.com www.wikipedia.org Class notes (Entrepreneurship and Innovation Strategy with Ron Adner)