Public Transit Security: Four Years After 9/11

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Public Transit Security:
Four Years After 9/11
Eva Lerner-Lam
Palisades Consulting Group, Inc.
Presented at the
NYU Wagner Rudin Center for
Transportation Policy & Management
6th Annual Tri-State Transit Symposium
Tuesday, October 18, 2005
Overview of Presentation
What’s happened, four years after 9/11?
 9/11 Commission Findings and “Common Sense”
Recommendations
 Congressional Action—and inaction
 Research and Development—big bang for a small buck
 Education, Training and Drills—win-win for everyone
 What we must overcome…
 Political Atrophy
 Process vs. technology (both are important, but technology is not
the “magic bullet”)
 “I can tell you, but then I’d have to shoot you…”
 Who’s going to pay for all this?
9/11 Commission Report:
Key Finding
 “Lack of Imagination”
by people and
organizations with
responsibility for
public safety and
security
9/11 Commission Report Findings
 “Fighting terrorism was not a high priority”
 Capabilities of Intelligence, Defense and
other agencies were constrained by
antiquated and ineffective policies and
processes
 Inefficient management of government:
“The enemy made mistakes; our
government wasn’t able to capitalize on
them.”
9/11 Commission Report
Recommendations—July 2004
 DHS should develop an integrated plan to
focus resources in a manner to best
protect all the transportation modes
 Seek improvements in technologies with
applications across transportation modes
 Standardize equipment, data, processes
9/11 Commission Report
 H.R. 5040[108]: 9/11
Commission Report
Implementation Act of
2004 – never became
law
 Non-profit
organization 9-11
Public Discourse
Project is trying to
carry on the efforts of
Commission
9-11 Commission’s Public Discourse Project
“Common Sense” Recommendations
1. Radio Spectrum for first Responders
2. Adoption of Incident Command System
3. Congressional Funding Based on Risk and
Vulnerability Assessments, not “pork”
4. Complete two critical reports recommended by the
Commission and required by the Intelligence
Reform Act.
 A National Strategy for Transportation Security (due April 1,

2005)
A report assessing the vulnerability of the national’s critical
infrastructure (due June 15, 2005)
What’s Been Done So Far…
A National Framework for Better Integrated
Incident Management
 March 2004: DHS
established a uniform
set of processes and
procedures that
emergency
responders at all
levels of government
will use to conduct
response operations.
A National Framework for Better Integrated
Planning
 December 2004: DHS
developed a National
Response Plan (NRP)
that consolidates and
reconciles multiple,
national-level incident
response plans into a
single, focused,
universally understood
strategy
Transit Vulnerability Assessments
 Bus, Rail and Ferry
Operators have
performed
vulnerability
assessments of
operations and
facilities
Frequent, Available, Affordable Security
Training for Transit Personnel
Administered through the National Transit Institute:
 Transit Explosives Incident Management
 Effectively Managing Transit Emergencies
 Transit System Security
 Transit System Security: Design Review
 Crime Prevention Through Environmental
Design
 Threat Management and Emergency Response
to Rail Hijackings
 Threat Management and Emergency Response
to Bus Hijackings
TOPOFF Exercises
 TOPOFF 1
CO/NH
May 2001
 TOPOFF 2
WA/IL/DC/Canada
May 2003
 TOPOFF 3
NY/NJ/CT
April 2005
Mixed Results from Research
Efforts
 Strong research program sponsored by
Transportation Research Board
 Updated Powerpoint slides summarizing
program:
http://www4.trb.org/trb/homepage.nsf/web/sec
urity#trbppmonth
 Lack of coordination and significant
progress by DHS or TSA research
programs:
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04890.pdf
FY 2005 Transit Security Grant
Program Allocations
1 Funding for the Ferry portion of the award is derived from the funds
provided for port security
FY 2005 Transit Security Grant Program
Allocation to NY-NJ-CT Region
Pending Congressional Legislation
 Placed on Calendar in Senate:
 Federal Public Transportation Act of 2005
[S.907]
 Introduced in House
 Rail Transit Security and Safety Act of 2005
[H.R.1109]
 Secure Trains Act [H.R.3270]
 Rail and Public Transportation Security Act of
2005 [H.R.153]
Challenge #1:
Political Atrophy
 Inability of US Congress to pass
meaningful legislation for public transit
security
 Funding appropriations based on political
influence instead of risks and
vulnerabilities
Challenge #2:
Over-Reliance on Technology
 Technology can only go so far; must also
address Process improvements, including:
 “Layered” security throughout the system
 Employee duties adapted for security
 Securing contractors and supply chains
 Lack of interoperability between systems
Challenge #3:
Reluctance to Share Information and Best
Practices
 Notion that security-related projects must be
kept secret, even among peers and colleagues,
for fear of information falling into the “wrong
hands” (or those of a competitor)
 Need to find a way to exchange knowledge or
we risk unnecessary duplication of effort--or
worse
 To “win the war” we need to find ways to
communicate with each other on the “battlefield”!
Challenge #4:
Who’s paying for all this security?
 Partnership between government, private sector
and users
In Summary
 For public transit, a lot less progress than we’d
all hoped for after 9/11
 Some high level national planning framework
documents
 Some good research by TRB
 Some useful training, exercises and drills
 Need to address some key challenges:
 Lack of national leadership and funding
 Difficulty in sharing knowledge and lessons learned
 Re-emphasize importance of Process, in addition to
Technology
We need to push ahead
aggressively
 For our First Responders…
We need to push ahead
aggressively
 And for our families…
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