Round 4 - Liberty
1nc
OFF
They lead to the McDonaldization of weed: corporate capture on a grand scale
Crawford ‘13
(Seth S., Assoc. Prof. of Sociology @ Oregon State U., “The Political Economy of Medical Marijuana” pp. 144-151)
In the time between starting this study and preparing to defend it, marijuana
November 2012 election, Washington
laws in the United States took an unexpectedly radical turn. In the
and Colorado voters passed the first initiatives legalizing recreational use and
possession of up to an ounce of marijuana for adults 21 and over. Both have stopped arresting and prosecuting individuals for possessing small amounts of the drug,
though no official system of supply or distribution has been established yet. Government committees in both states are investigating possible avenues for commercialization,
but the structure of the new marijuana marketplace will be strongly influenced by the federal response . The
electoral wins were strong; Washington’s I-502 passed with 55% of the vote 33, and Colorado’s Amendment 64 garnered 54.8% (more than re-elected
President Obama)34. The newfound support for legalization has forced elected officials to seriously consider a topic that, historically, was easily derided; for example, in 2009,
during an online “town hall” meeting, the most popular questions (voted on by participants) directed at President Obama dealt with marijuana reform—his response was telling
(Sarno 2009): Three point five million people voted. I have to say that there was one question that was voted on that ranked fairly high and that was whether legalizing
marijuana would improve the economy—(laughter)—and job creation. And I don't know what this says about the online audience -- (laughter)—but I just want—I don't want
people to think that—this was a fairly popular question; we want to make sure that it was answered. The answer is, no, I don't think that is a good strategy—(laughter)—to
grow our economy. (Applause.) The president and federal agencies now confront a situation where laughter will not resolve or clarify the federal position. If
the reaction
is a retrenchment of previous policies, marijuana producers following state law will be targeted by arrest and
asset forfeiture just like medical growers in recent years (Crombie 2012); however, if the federal policy allows this experiment to go
forward uninterrupted, a new, legitimate market will supplant the current quasi-illegal one. At least one legal scholar (Mikos
2009) argues that the Supreme Court’s anti-commandeering rulings prevent the federal government from forcing their state and local counterparts to enforce the prohibition,
so long as they “do not actively assist marijuana users, growers, and so on—they may continue to look the other way when their citizens defy federal law” (1424). What
dynamics can we expect from a newly legitimated marijuana market? With an opportunity to shape the market for decades to come, what
policy path should states follow? The case of alcohol re-legalization in America is illustrative in many ways and problematic in others. In
pre-prohibition years (1865-1920), the brewing industry was dichotomized between large, national shippers of beer
(e.g. Pabst, Schlitz, Blatz, Anheuser-Busch, Lemp, and Christian Moerlein) and a diverse population of local producers (Stack 2000). During this time,
beer was distributed in kegs and consumed primarily in saloons, which were often controlled by local breweries (Stack 2000). Between 1865 and 1895, national shippers grew
in prominence through vertical and horizontal integration, technological advances (i.e. pasteurization, refrigerated rail cars, automated bottling machines), advertising, and a
five-fold increase in per capita consumer demand (Stack 2000). From 1895 to 1920, however, local producers—who widely varied in their productive capacity—began
Local prohibition laws also played a
role in this process; by 1910, 17% of US lived in dry states and 48% lived in states, counties, or municipalities that strictly regulated or prohibited the sale of alcohol
undercutting the profits of national shippers with their cheaper product (due to lower transportation costs) (Stack 2000).
(Brewers Almanac 1979). These market closures placed national shippers under duress, as a significant source of their profits were cut off by the emerging prohibition regime;
however, local
breweries in wet states prospered in these times, increasing their market share to 72% of the US
production total by 1905 (Stack 2000). The tide turned with national prohibition (1920-1933), forcing most local producers
into liquidating their production facilities; the national shippers turned to producing bottles of 0.5% alcohol “near beer” (which did not generate much
profit, but allowed the large firms to maintain their productive capacity), canned malt extract (sold to quasi-illegal small-scale brewers), and “medicinal beer” licensed by the
Production of intoxicating liquors shifted to a cottage industry of small-scale producers
and resulted in higher-potency concoctions—the alcohol industry, for a short time, became a decentralized, democratic (albeit illegal) affair (Levine
and Reinarman 2004). When prohibition was finally lifted in 1933, the large breweries were strategically positioned to reenter the marketplace. New regulations prohibited alcohol manufacturers from owning saloons or bars, and individuals were banned from creating their own
federal government (Plavchan 1969).
alcohol (a change from pre-prohibition days); this had a dramatically negative effect on home production and sales of kegged beer, giving the large, shipping breweries a
distinct competitive advantage—bottled
beer sales skyrocketed and, with it, control over the beer marketplace was ceded to
large manufacturers (Cochran 1948). An inexorable march towards oligopolic control was carried out in the intervening
decades by the largest firms; by 1982, only 67 breweries produced beer in the US (Gisser 1999) and today, two firms—Anheuser-Busch InBev and
MillerCoors—control 80% of the domestic beer market (Rosenbaum et al. 2009). Despite concentrated control of the marketplace, craft
breweries—owing their origins to the re-legalization of home brewing in 1977—have exploded in recent years, leading to a diversity of small firms even under oligopolic
conditions (Carroll 2000). While this new diversity has not lead to a dramatic change in market share controlled by the top producers, it has tapped
states into the revenue stream of craft beer sales and helped re- democratize beer production in an important way (Carroll 2000). The data collected in this
study and others (Weisheit 1992; DeCorte 2010) suggest that the current marijuana market structure is populated by many
growers who produce and sell in small quantities, with a tiny minority of growers producing large amounts. This mirrors the known structure of
alcohol production during prohibition, with an important caveat: even with the rise of medical production in key states, industrial
producers of marijuana are not waiting in the wings to meet demand following the repeal of prohibition, even at the state level. The
lessons gleaned from the tradition of tight control in the alcohol industry suggest that restrictive rules—
especially at the outset of legalization—will have a profound influence on market structure, with oligopolic
control ceded to a handful of firms (through official licensure, firms’ ability to invest, and the early adoption of legalization by
particular states). The historically specific rate of consolidation will obviously vary, but the tendency of mature
capitalist economies is towards monopolization in key sectors (Sweezy 1942; Baran and Sweezy 1966; Veblen 1904, 1923; Heffernan
2000). Oligopolic control presents important ramifications for specific industries, workers within those industries,
consumers, and the underlying natural systems required to produce particular products—essential elements of these
problematics are addressed by the Treadmill of Production (ToP) theory. ToP was first proposed by Schnaiberg (1980) and focuses on the
consequences of the production of goods and services in the capitalist world economy. Schnaiberg posited that
capital-intensive producers create consumer goods (and manufacture buyers’ consent through advertising and political maneuvering) at
whatever rate is necessary to expand production and grow rates of profit. In a general sense, the theory is one of crisis; the necessity
for constant growth in production leads to unsustainable consumption of natural resources, which in turn undermines the foundations for all production (nature and labor). In
many ways, ToP is an empirical and ecologically-oriented explication of the underconsumption/overaccumulation school of Marxian crisis theory (Gould et al. (2004)). Buttel
calls ToP the “single most important contribution sociological concept and theory to have emerged within North American environmental sociology” because it is “based in
sociological reasoning and is not a biological or ecological analysis” (Buttel 2004: 323). ToP locates the roots of social and environmental exploitation within the capitalist
production process. This has been critiqued for its glossing over of the accumulation process as the motive social force within capitalism (Wright 2004)—some have even said
it should be renamed to the “Treadmill of Accumulation” (Foster 2004). However, by demonstrating that capitalism is a social system that deals with the contradictions it
generates through further expansion (in production, extraction, and exploitation of labor), the ToP school levies a lasting critique at any conception of “green capitalism,” while
bringing an ecological element to Marxian crisis theories. The
nature and history of capitalism, as developed through ToP theory,
suggests that the legalization of marijuana will wrest control from small artisan producers and turn it over to
large firms (Heffernan 2000; Baran and Sweezy 1966; Foster, McChesney, and Jonna 2011). The legalization of marijuana—in this lens—is both
an economic and social loss for many communities, but especially those with long traditions of illegal growing;
even if traditional “hot spots” of production (Northern California and Southern Oregon, for example) become legal cannabis
production centers, the economic benefits will disproportionately accrue in the hands of corporate owners and
politically disenfranchise small marijuana farmers (Lewontin 2000). ToP theory, in addition to highlighting the inevitable capture of surplus
generated from marijuana production by large firms, suggests that legalization will follow a path of profit maximization to the
detriment of nature; the loss of genomic diversity is of particular concern with marijuana, as a capitalist approach to its
production will focus on yield, maturation time, and ease of harvest (and Glenna 2006). Many scholars of marijuana
botany suggest that specific policy decisions during prohibition were already responsible for several radical
changes in this domesticated plant (Clarke 1993; Hillig and Mahlberg 2004; Hillig 2005). In particular, the tall, long-flowering, narrow leaf cannabis
indica varieties (known colloquially as “sativas”) were crossed with short, fast-flowering, broad leaf cannabis indica (“indicas”) to
facilitate indoor growing after US and Mexican authorities adulterated outdoor crops in Mexico with Paraquat in the late 1970s (Clarke 1993; Landrigan et al.
1983). In addition to altering the physical stature and maturation time, this selective breeding regime led to significant changes in the
chemical profile of commercially available marijuana; as predicted by the “iron law of drug prohibition,” THC concentrations and
overall potency increased (Thornton 1991). Similarly, the infusion of broad leaf genes into narrow leaf varieties produced plants with much higher cannabidiol
(CBD) ratios than previously seen in domestic marijuana (Clarke 1993). Other chemical changes—which, to this point, have been unelaborated—undoubtedly occurred, as
users’ accounts of shifting phenomenological experiences induced by marijuana was altered; older varieties of the drug tended to influence perception, whereas newer
varieties have a strong impact on motor coordination (Clarke 1993; King 2001). At this point, it is unknown whether or not legalization will have a more profound effect than
prohibition did, but the prohibition years helped to demonstrate how versatile marijuana can be when subjected to the whims of human ingenuity (Pollan 2001)—ToP
theory suggests that a legalized production regime will influence marijuana breeding efforts towards strictly
profit-oriented goals (Gould et al. 2004). Steps must be made to preserve the remaining genetic diversity of this species before capitalism casts nonprofitable traits and expressions on the funeral pyre of progress. Consumers also stand to lose in some troubling
ways. The modernization of marijuana production by industrial capitalism will—if it follows the rationalized developmental path
(Weber 2002) of other products—be conducted according to the principles of efficiency, calculability, predictability, and
control—or what Ritzer (1996) terms “McDonaldization”. “McDonaldized” marijuana and its production would adhere to the
following principles: (1) production will occur at very large scales and with the use of advanced technology (farming
combines, automated trimming machines, industrial vacuum-packing, genetically engineered seed, etc.) to achieve high efficiency in pursuit of maximum profitability (Ritzer
1996: 35); (2) production
and sales will be dictated by the quantitative aspects (calculability) of profits, costs, and total volume sold, as
opposed to qualitative considerations or for public benefit (Ritzer 1996: 59); (3) finished products will be predictable, both in physical consistency and, as
much as possible, in phenomenological experience (Ritzer 1996: 80; Merleau-Ponty 2002); and (4) control over the individuals participating in the
production process will be exercised to the point where their actions are vapidly machinelike (Ritzer 1996: 101).
Marijuana users will have little choice in the matter, since oligopolic markets sell their goods through advertising
rather than following actual consumer preference (Gould et al. 2004). After the dust has settled on the nationwide
marijuana legalization debate, future policy battles will be over non-commercial personal production (reminiscent of the
home brewers movement) and limited commercial production by small artisan growers, though , in all likelihood, this will be—
much like the microbrewery movement spawned by creative, entrepreneurial home brewers—relatively insignificant in terms of
corporate profits. Artisan growing will enable small producers to take advantage of the grape-like terroir
influences that induce positive manifestations of marijuana traits (Clarke 1993); it will also provide an outlet and expression for the art of
marijuana growing, allowing the continued cultural transmission of location and experiential-specific knowledge, which cannot be expressed through rationalized,
industrial production. Despite their limited financial impact, artisan cannabis producers—or, alternatively, “micro-weederies”—will fill an important niche in the market
(Swaminathan 1995), enable more local decisionmaking and economic benefit (Ostrom 2010), help protect cannabis’ genomic diversity (Clarke 1993), and provide users with
the peak expression of marijuana’s potential.
Capitalism causes extinction- resiliency has disappeared
Robinson, 14 -- UC-Santa Barbara sociology professor
(William I., Prof. of Sociology, Global and International Studies, and Latin American Studies, @ UC-Santa Barbara, “Global Capitalism: Crisis of
Humanity and the Specter of 21st Century Fascism” The World Financial Review)
Most commentators on the contemporary crisis refer to the “Great Recession” of 2008 and its aftermath. Yet the causal origins of global crisis are to be
found in over-accumulation and also in contradictions of state power, or in what Marxists call the internal contradictions of the capitalist system.
Moreover, because the system is now global, crisis in any one place tends to represent crisis for the system as a whole. The system cannot expand
because the marginalisation of a significant portion of humanity from direct productive participation, the downward pressure on wages and popular
consumption worldwide, and the polarisation of income, has reduced the ability of the world market to absorb world output. At the same time, given the
particular configuration of social and class forces and the correlation of these forces worldwide, national states are hard-pressed to regulate
transnational circuits of accumulation and offset the explosive contradictions built into the system. Is this crisis cyclical, structural, or systemic? Cyclical
crises are recurrent to capitalism about once every 10 years and involve recessions that act as self-correcting mechanisms without any major
restructuring of the system. The recessions of the early 1980s, the early 1990s, and of 2001 were cyclical crises. In contrast, the 2008 crisis signaled the
slide into a structural crisis. Structural crises reflect deeper contra- dictions that can only be resolved by a major restructuring of the system. The
structural crisis of the 1970s was resolved through capitalist globalisation. Prior to that, the structural crisis of the 1930s was resolved through the
creation of a new model of redistributive capitalism, and prior to that the struc- tural crisis of the 1870s resulted in the development of corpo- rate
capitalism. A systemic crisis involves the replacement of a system by an entirely new system or by an outright collapse. A structural crisis opens up the
possibility for a systemic crisis. But if it actually snowballs into a systemic crisis – in this case, if it gives way either to capitalism being superseded or to a
breakdown of global civilisation – is not predetermined and depends entirely on the response of social and political forces to the crisis and on historical
contingencies that are not easy to forecast. This is an historic moment of extreme uncertainty, in which collective responses from distinct social and
class forces to the crisis are in great flux. Hence my concept of global crisis is broader than financial. There are multiple and mutually constitutive
dimensions – economic, social, political, cultural, ideological and ecological, not to mention the existential crisis of our consciousness, values and very
being. There is a crisis of social polarisation, that is, of social reproduction. The system cannot meet the needs or assure the survival of
millions of people, perhaps a
National states
majority of humanity. There are crises of state legitimacy and political authority, or of hegemony and domination.
face spiraling crises of legitimacy as they fail to meet the social grievances of local working and popular
classes experiencing downward mobility, unemployment, heightened insecurity and greater hardships. The legitimacy of the system has increasingly
been called into question by millions, perhaps even billions, of people around the world, and is facing expanded counter-hegemonic challenges. Global
elites have been unable counter this erosion of the system’s authority in the face of worldwide pressures for a global moral economy. And a canopy that
envelops all these dimensions is a crisis of sustainability rooted in an ecological holocaust that has already begun, expressed in
climate change and the impending collapse of centralised agricultural systems in several regions of the world, among other indicators. By a crisis of
humanity I mean a crisis that is approaching systemic proportions, threatening the ability of billions of people to survive, and raising the specter of a
collapse of world civilisation and degeneration into a new “Dark Ages.”2 This crisis of humanity shares a number of aspects with earlier structural crises
but there are also several features unique to the present: 1. The system is fast reaching the ecological limits of its reproduction. Global capitalism now
couples human and natural history in such a way as to threaten to bring about what would be the sixth mass extinction in the known history of life on
earth.3 This mass extinction would be caused not by a natural catastrophe such as a meteor impact or by evolutionary changes such as the end of an
ice age but by purposive human activity. According to leading environmental scientists there are nine “planetary boundaries” crucial to
maintaining an earth system environment in which humans can exist, four of which are experiencing at this time the onset of irreversible environmental
degradation and three of which (climate change, the nitrogen cycle, and biodiversity loss) are at “tipping points,” meaning that these
processes have already crossed their planetary boundaries. 2. The magnitude of the means of violence and social control is unprecedented, as is the
concentration of the means of global communication and symbolic production and circulation in the hands of a very few powerful groups. Computerised
wars, drones, bunker-buster bombs, star wars, and so forth, have changed the face of warfare. Warfare has become normalised and sanitised for those
not directly at the receiving end of armed aggression. At the same time we have arrived at the panoptical surveillance society and the age of thought
control by those who control global flows of communication, images and symbolic production. The world of Edward Snowden is the world of George
Orwell; 1984 has arrived; 3. Capitalism is reaching apparent limits to its extensive expansion. There are no longer any new territories of significance that
can be integrated into world capitalism, de-ruralisation is now well advanced, and the commodification of the countryside and of pre- and non-capitalist
spaces has intensified, that is, converted in hot-house fashion into spaces of capital, so that intensive expansion is reaching depths never before seen.
Capitalism must continually expand or collapse. How or where will it now expand? 4. There is the rise of a vast surplus population inhabiting a “planet of
slums,”4 alienated from the productive economy, thrown into the margins, and subject to sophisticated systems of social control and to destruction - to a
mortal cycle of dispossession-exploitation-exclusion. This includes prison-industrial and immigrant-detention complexes, omnipresent policing,
militarised gentrification, and so on; 5. There is a disjuncture between a globalising economy and a nation-state based system of political authority.
Transnational state apparatuses are incipient and have not been able to play the role of what social scientists refer to as a “hegemon,” or a leading
nation-state that has enough power and authority to organise and stabilise the system. The spread of weapons of mass destruction and the
unprecedented militarisation of social life and conflict across the globe makes it hard to imagine that the system can come under any stable political
authority that assures its reproduction. Global Police State How have social and political forces worldwide responded to crisis? The crisis has resulted in
a rapid political polarisation in global society. Both right and left-wing forces are ascendant. Three responses seem to be in dispute. One is what we
could call “reformism from above.” This elite reformism is aimed at stabilising the system, at saving the system from itself and from more radical responses from below. Nonetheless, in the years following the 2008 collapse of the global financial system it seems these reformers are unable (or
unwilling) to prevail over the power of transnational financial capital. A second response is popular, grassroots and leftist resistance from below. As
social and political conflict escalates around the world there appears to be a mounting global revolt. While such resistance appears insurgent in the wake
of 2008 it is spread very unevenly across countries and regions and facing many problems and challenges. Yet another response is that I term 21st
century fascism.5 The ultra-right is an insurgent force in many countries. In broad strokes, this project seeks to fuse reactionary political power with
transnational capital and to organise a mass base among historically privileged sectors of the global working class – such as white workers in the North
and middle layers in the South – that are now experiencing heightened insecurity and the specter of downward mobility. It involves militarism, extreme
masculinisation, homophobia, racism and racist mobilisations, including the search for scapegoats, such as immigrant workers and, in the West,
Muslims. Twenty-first century fascism evokes mystifying ideologies, often involving race/culture supremacy and xenophobia, embracing an idealised and
mythical past. Neo-fascist culture normalises and glamorises warfare and social violence, indeed, generates a fascination with domination that is
portrayed even as heroic.
Our alternative is to completely withdraw from the ideology of capital - this opens up the
space for authentic politics
Johnston, 4 (Adrian, interdisciplinary research fellow in psychoanalysis at Emory, The Cynic’s Fetish: Slavoj Zizek and the Dynamics of Belief,
Psychoanalysis, Culture and Society)
Perhaps the absence of a detailed political roadmap in Žižek’s recent writings isn’t a major shortcoming. Maybe, at
least for the time being, the most important task is simply the negativity of the critical struggle, the effort to cure an
intellectual constipation resulting from capitalist ideology and thereby to truly open up the space for imagining
authentic alternatives to the prevailing state of the situation. Another definition of materialism offered by Žižek is that it amounts to
accepting the internal inherence of what fantasmatically appears as an external deadlock or hindrance ( Žižek, 2001d, pp 22–23) (with fantasy itself
being defined as the false externalization of something within the subject, namely, the illusory projection of an inner obstacle, Žižek, 2000a, p 16).
From this perspective, seeing through ideological fantasies by learning how to think again outside the confines
of current restrictions has, in and of itself, the potential to operate as a form of real revolutionary practice (rather
than remaining merely an instance of negative/critical intellectual reflection). Why is this the case? Recalling the analysis of commodity
fetishism, the social efficacy of money as the universal medium of exchange (and the entire political economy grounded upon
it) ultimately relies upon nothing more than a kind of ‘‘magic,’’ that is, the belief in money’s social efficacy by
those using it in the processes of exchange. Since the value of currency is, at bottom, reducible to the belief that
it has the value attributed to it (and that everyone believes that everyone else believes this as well), derailing capitalism by
destroying its essential financial substance is, in a certain respect, as easy as dissolving the mere belief in this
substance’s powers. The ‘‘external’’ obstacle of the capitalist system exists exclusively on the condition that
subjects, whether consciously or unconsciously, ‘‘internally’’ believe in it – capitalism’s life-blood, money, is
simply a fetishistic crystallization of a belief in others’ belief in the socio-performative force emanating from this
same material. And yet, this point of capitalism’s frail vulnerability is simultaneously the source of its enormous strength: its vampiric symbiosis with
individual human desire, and the fact that the late-capitalist cynic’s fetishism enables the disavowal of his/her de facto belief in capitalism, makes it highly
unlikely that people can simply be persuaded to stop believing and start thinking (especially since, as Žižek claims, many of these people are convinced
that they already have ceased believing). Or, the more disquieting possibility to entertain is that some people today, even if
one succeeds in exposing them to the underlying logic of their position, might respond in a manner resembling
that of the Judas-like character Cypher in the film The Matrix (Cypher opts to embrace enslavement by illusion rather than cope with
the discomfort of dwelling in the ‘‘desert of the real’’): faced with the choice between living the capitalist lie or wrestling with
certain unpleasant truths, many individuals might very well deliberately decide to accept what they know full well
to be a false pseudo-reality, a deceptively comforting fiction (‘‘Capitalist commodity fetishism or the truth? I choose fetishism’’).
OFF
The United States should to prohibit marijuana in the United States in accordance with the
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.
The United States should propose an amendment to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs
that allows amendment parties to experiment with conditional marijuana legalization in
accordance with the ultimate aims of the treaty, to be made binding upon the U.S. in the event
of amendment acceptance.
In the event of the amendment’s rejection, the United States should maintain prohibitions on
marijuana necessary for compliance with the Convention.
Counterplan solves and alone is necessary to preserve the treaty system
Wells C. Bennett, fellow, Brookings Institution and John Walsh, Washington Office on Latin America, “Marijuana Legalization Is an Opportunity to
Modernize International Drug Treaties,” Center for Effective Public Management at Brookings, 10—14, p. 1.
Two U.S. states
have legalized recreational marijuana, and more may follow; the Obama administration has conditionally
accepted these experiments. Such actions are in obvious tension with three international treaties that together commit the United States to
punish and even criminalize activity related to recreational marijuana. • In essence, the administration asserts that its policy complies
with the treaties because they leave room for flexibility and prosecutorial discretion. That argument makes sense on a short-term ,
wait-and-see basis, but it will rapidly become implausible and unsustainable if legalization spreads and succeeds. •
To avoid a damaging collision between i nternational law and changing domestic and international consensus on
marijuana policy, the U nited S tates should seriously consider narrowly crafted treaty changes. It and other drug
treaty partners should begin now to discuss options for substantive alterations that create space within international
law for conditional legalization and for other policy experimentation that seeks to further the treaties’ ultimate aims of promoting
human health and welfare. • Making narrowly crafted treaty reforms, although certainly challenging, is not only possible but
also offers an opportunity to demonstrate flexibility that i nternational law—in more areas than just drug policy—
will need in a changing global landscape. By contrast, asserting compliance while letting treaties fall into
desuetude could set a risky precedent , one that—if domestic legalization proceeds—could harm i nternational law
and come back to bite the U nited S tates.
OFF
The aff guts the entire treaty system—reverses Obama progress
David Bewley-Taylor, senior lecturer, Department of Political and Cultura Studies, Swansea University, INTERNATIONAL DRUG CONTROL:
CONSENSUS FRACTURED, 2012, p. 315-316.
Another strategy would be for Parties to simply ignore the treaties or certain parts of them. In this way, they could institute any policies
deemed to be necessary at the national level, including for example the regulation of the cannabis market and the introduction of a
licensing system for domestic producers. Disregarding all or selected components of the treaties, however, raises serious issues
beyond the realm of drug control. The possibility of nations unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could
threaten the stability of the entire treaty system. As a consequence states may be wary of simply opting out. Drawing on provisions
within the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, some international lawyers argue that all treaties can naturally cease to be binding when a
fundamental change of circumstances has occurred since the time of signing or when an ‘error’ of fact or situation at the time of conclusion has later
been identified by a party.89 Both are lines of reasoning pursued in 1971 by Leinwand in relation to removing cannabis from the Single Convention.
Bearing in mind the dramatic changes in circumstances in the nature, extent and understanding of the ‘world drug problem’ since the 1960s, the
fundamental change of circumstances approach could be applied to the drug conventions or parts thereof. It has been noted how this doctrine of rebus
sic stantibus has largely fallen into misuse, probably due to the general availability of the option to denounce. That said, the case for both this and ‘error’
at time of founding may be useful rationales for reform-minded states to note when pursuing the denunciation option. Once again the selective
application of such principles alone would call into question the validity of many and varied treaties. This remains an
area of concern for many, particularly European, states that in general maintain a high regard for international law. This stands in
stark contrast to the selective approach towards international law displayed by the administration of George W. Bush, particularly during its first term.
Such disdain for multilateralism generated an atmosphere within which reformist states may have been able to defend a simple disregard for parts of the
drug control treaties. As the most capable and energetic supporter of the GDPR, the USA was still best placed to enhance the benevolent
appeal of the control system and where necessary dispense costs for defection beyond those of the reputational variety. Nonetheless, such a
position would have been difficult to sustain when defecting states could justify action on the grounds that they were merely emulating the habits of a
hegemony. The likelihood of any significant state simply disregarding the international legal framework for the control of drugs has always been slim. Yet
the election of Barack Obama and a resultant re-engagement with the UN made this possibility even slimmer. In an effort to rebuild bridges
with the organization, the Obama administration has in many ways attempted
to reverse the policies of its predecessor.90
Treaty abrogation breaks the foundations of international law and global norms
David A. Koplow, Professor, Law, Georgetown University, “Indisputable Violations: What Happens When the United States Unambiguously Breaches
a Treaty?” THE FLETCHER FORUM OF WORLD AFFAIRS, v. 37 n.1, Winter 2013, p. 69-70.
So what? Why
does it matter that the U nited S tates violates treaties, and occasionally does so without a shred of legal cover?
Perhaps that is the realpolitik privilege of the global hegemon: to be able to sustain hypocrisy, asserting that its unique international responsibilities and
its “exceptional” position in the world enable the United States explicitly to welch on its debts, fudge on its obligations, and adopt a “do as we say, not as
we do” approach with other countries.
However, there is a cost when the world’s strongest state behaves this way. One potential danger is that other countries may
mimic this disregard for legal commitments and justify their own cavalier attitudes toward i nternational law by citing
U.S. precedents. Reciprocity and mutuality are fundamental tenets of international practice; it is foolhardy to suppose
that other parties will indefinitely continue with treaty compliance if they feel that the U nited S tates is taking advantage of
them by unilateral avoidance of shared legal obligations. So far, there has not been significant erosion of the treaties discussed in the three
examples. The United States and Russia will fall years short of compliance with the CWC destruction obligations, but other parties, with the notable
exception of Iran, have reacted with aplomb, comfortable with the two giants’ unequivocal commitment to eventual compliance. Likewise, the VCCR is
not unraveling, even if other states lament the asymmetry in consular access to detained foreigners. And while many states pay their UN dues late and
build up substantial arrearages, that recalcitrance seems to stem more from penury than from a deliberate choice to follow the U.S. lead. But that
flouting undermines the treaties—and by extension, it jeopardizes the entire fabric of i nternational law. Chronic
noncompliance— especially ostentatious, unexcused, unjustified noncompliance— also sullies the nation’s reputation and
degrades U.S. diplomats’ ability to drive other states to better conform with their obligations under the full array of
treaties and other international law commitments from trade to human rights to the Law of the Sea. The United States depends upon the international
persistent
legal structure more than anyone else: Americans have the biggest interest in promoting a stable, robust, reliable system for international exchange. It is
shortsighted and self-defeating to publicly and unblushingly undercut the system that offers the United States so many benefits. It is especially damaging
when, following an indisputable violation, the United States acknowledges its default, participates in an international dispute resolution procedure, and
apologizes—but then continues to violate the treaty. The CWC implementation bodies, the International Court of Justice, and even the UN General
Assembly and Security Council are unable to effectively do much to sanction or penalize the mighty United States, but it is still terrible for U.S. interests
to disregard those mechanisms.
Norm-based coop key to great power peace—extinction otherwise
Graeme P. Herd, Head, International Security Programme, Geneva Center for Security Policy, “Great Powers: Toward a ‘Cooperative Competitive’
Future World Order Paradigm?” GREAT POWERS AND STRATEGIC STABILITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY, 2010, ed. G.P. Herd, p. 197-198.
Given the absence of immediate hegemonic challengers to the US (or a global strategic catastrophe that could trigger US precipitous decline), and the
need to cooperate to address pressing strategic threats - the real question is what will be the nature of relations between these Great
Powers? Will global order be characterized as a predictable interdependent one-world system, in which shared strategic threats
create interest-based incentives and functional benefits which drive cooperation between Great Powers? This pathway would be evidenced by
the emergence of a global security agenda based on nascent similarity across national policy agendas. In addition. Great Powers
would seek to cooperate by strengthening multilateral partnerships in institutions (such as the UN, G20 and regional variants),
regimes (e.g., arms control, climate and trade), and shared global norms, including international law. Alternatively, Great
Powers may rely less on institutions, regimes and shared norms, and more on increasing their order-producing managerial role through
geopolitical-bloc formation within their near neighborhoods. Under such circumstances, a re-division of the world into a
competing mercantilist nineteenth-century regional order emerges 17 World order would be characterized more by hierarchy and
balance of power and zero-sum principles than by interdependence. Relative power shifts that allow a return to multipolarity - with three or more
evenly matched powers - occur gradually. The transition from a bipolar in the Cold War to a unipolar moment in the post-Cold War has been crowned,
according to Haass, by an era of non-polarity, where power is diffuse — "a world dominated not by one or two or even several states but rather by
dozens of actors possessing and exercising various kinds of power"18 Multilateralism is on the rise, characterized by a combination of stales
and international organizations, both influential and talking shops, formal and informal ("multilateralism light"). A dual system of global governance has
evolved. An embryonic division of labor emerges, as groups with no formal rules or permanent structures coordinate policies and immediate reactions to
crises, while formal treaty-based institutions then legitimize the results.'9 As powerfully advocated by Wolfgang Schauble: Global cooperation is
the only way to master the new, asymmetric global challenges of the twenty-first century. No nation can manage these tasks on its
own, nor can the entire international community do so without the help of non-state, civil society actors. We must work together to find appropriate
security policy responses to the realities of the twenty-first century.20 Highlighting the emergence of what he terms an "interpolar" world - defined as
"multipolarity in an age of interdependence" — Grevi suggests that managing existential interdependence in an unstable multipolar world
is the key.21 Such complex interdependence generates shared interest in cooperative solutions, meanwhile driving convergence,
consensus and accommodation between Great Powers.22 As a result, the multilateral system is being adjusted to reflect the realities of a
global age - the rise of emerging powers and relative decline of the West: "The new priority is to maintain a complex balance between multiple states."23
The G20 meeting in London in April 2009 suggested that great and rising powers will reform global financial architecture so that it regulates and
supervises global markets in a more participative, transparent and responsive manner: all countries have contributed to the crisis; all will be involved in
the solution.24
OFF
Tax extenders pass in lame duck - but time and focus is key
Jeff Kummer 10-28-14, Director of Tax Policy at Deloitte Tax LLP, “Policy, politics, and the prospects for tax extenders”
http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/Tax/us_tax_TPG_Policy_politics_and_proscpects_102714.pdf
We cannot say exactly how the extenders process may unfold when lawmakers come bad: to Capitol Hill for the lame duck: session after the elections,
but it would appear right now that enactment of a large swath of permanent provisions is likely out of the question. Democrats understand the long-term
impact on the revenue baseline of what Camp is trying to achieve. Senate Democratic leaders have not taken up any of the House-approved
are likely to push for another short-term extension of these provisions instead. We do think it is
possible, however that we could see a permanent —or at least a long-term — extension of a few selected items as
part of a broader short-term package. For example, there may be enough support it Congress for a permanent
research credit and a longer-term (if not permanent) extension of section 179 expensing; but Senate Democrats are likely to
agree to those only if they receive other, as yet unspecified, concessions from House Republicans. It is an open question as to whether
there is sufficient common ground to build support for a package t hat gives a short-term extension to most of the nearly fivepermanent extenders bills and
dozen extenders but includes a longer (if not permanent) extension for a few select items. There are, however, obstacles that have to be overcome in
order for extenders to be addressed this year, including: • the apparent lack of any progress to date between the chambers in resolving their very
different approaches to extenders legislation. • The desire by many House Republicans to ensure that certain expired tax provisions are not renewed.
The production tax credit for electricity produced by wind and other renewable energy sources is an example of an extender that has some
strong Republican opposition in the House but
remains a high priority for many members of both parties, especially in the
Senate. • Concern by Speaker Boehner that acting on a full extenders package that a substantial bloc of House Republicans may not support could
make it more difficult for him to win the necessary 218 votes to be re-elected as speaker in January. • Concern that if Republicans gain control of the
Senate in the November elections, Majority Leader Reid may allocate many of the few legislative days in the lame duck
session to voting on judicial and executive branch nominations. There is ample bipartisan support to address
many of the extenders for 2014 and 2015 prior to year-end, so we think the odds substantially favor passage of
an extenders package before the end of the year. But like much in Washington today, what may be possible for
policy reasons can be derailed for political reasons, making this an issue where sudden changes in fortune would not
be surprising
Plan costs capital, tradesoff with rest of agenda
David Downs, journalist, “What Obama and the Feds Will Do about Washington and Colorado Legalization—Expert Analysis,” SAN FRANCISCO
CHRONCILE, 11—13—12, http://blog.sfgate.com/smellthetruth/2012/11/13/what-obama-and-the-feds-will-do-about-washington-and-coloradolegalization-expert-analysis/
As much as he may want to reform drug laws on a personal level,
Obama is nonetheless hampered by the heritage of an ugly racial history entwined with those same laws since their
inception (see discussion above). Given this history, the president would risk an extraordinary level of political capital on
any proposed easing of federal law through legislative channels; and other issues, such as healthcare, the environment, and above all
jobs appear to rank higher on his list of legislative priorities.
Perhaps. But there are plenty of other caveats to consider.
Aff pushes off extenders - controversial votes in the lame duck trade off – no thumpers
Sunnunu 9-29 [John E. Sununu, a regular Globe contributor, is a former US senator from New Hampshire, 9-29-2014
http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/editorials/2014/09/28/lame-duck-congress-hype-aside-harm-will-done/qk7ogdNzSV4LbrSbDkCghI/story.html]
Regardless of the rhetoric, nothing
will happen on major initiatives like tax reform or immigration. There’s simply not enough
time , energy , or inclination — on either side of the aisle. These issues require a fresh Congress, hours of committee
work, and days of floor time to succeed . Even a resolution endorsing the recent air strikes against ISIS strongholds — something with
strong bipartisan support — will be held for the new Congress. History shows that the typical work product of lame ducks falls neatly into two
categories: the necessary and the noncontroversial. Atop the “necessary” list sits that which Congress does most easily: spending. At the moment, most
of the federal government is operating under the autopilot of a “continuing resolution.” It’s quite possible that the lame-duck session simply extends these
current spending levels through next year. The more likely outcome, however, will be an “omnibus” spending bill, combining all the annual spending
measures that were never addressed during the year — the legislative equivalent of unfinished homework. Lame-duck or not, big spending bills almost
always contain their share of pork, and subterfuge, but with a budget agreement in place, fixed caps on total spending will limit the damage to taxpayer
pocketbooks. Both sides also have incentives to get the work done as cleanly as possible. Democrats are all but certain to lose Senate seats; better to
act now from a position of strength. And with the prospect of improved numbers in both chambers, Republicans will want to start 2015 on clean footing
rather than spending February trying to deal with last year’s leftovers. The intense gridlock of the past year suggests that
“noncontroversial”
measures would be few and far between, but there are a couple to be found. Every two years,
Congress extends a collection of tax measures ranging from research tax credits to renewable fuel subsidies. The “extenders”
package moves more easily when no one is fighting over political credit for the popular provisions. Other typically bipartisan bills like
defense reauthorization, and terrorism risk insurance move more easily through the Capitol with the emotions of campaign season removed from the
equation. In
the end, it’s not much of a list; it rarely is. The days of a lame-duck president or Congress slipping things
past an unwary public are long gone. Like the survivors in “Walking Dead,” the weary who gather at the Capitol this November
will be tired , anxious , and looking for a safe haven in which to spend the holidays. That’s a reprieve the public will deserve even
more.
r&D Tax Credit is critical to the Life Sciences
Butcher 9 Managing Director, Duff & Phelps LLC, a biotech company, “Stimulating the Life Sciences Industry,”
http://www.areadevelopment.com/Biotech/bio09/stimulating-life-sciences007.shtml ac10-23
Over the past 25 years, one of the most important economic development incentives in the United States
for life sciences companies and research-intensive firms has been the Research and Development Tax Credit (R&D Tax Credit).
The R&D Tax Credit provides companies with an effective and proven incentive to increase their R&D spending
in the United States. Since the credit was established in 1981, investments in R&D have spurred unparalleled
economic growth in the life sciences industry. On October 3, 2008 the U.S. Congress passed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA). As part of
EESA, Congress extended the R&D Tax Credit through 2009. This extension applies to U.S. R&D activity for tax years 2008 and 2009. The R&D Tax Credit induces billions
of dollars of U.S. economic activity and keeps thousands of highly skilled and high-paying jobs in the United States.
The R&D Tax Credit
Extinction
NAS 8 (National Academy of Sciences, “The Role of the Life Sciences in Transforming America's Future Summary of a Workshop” December 3,
2008, Board on Life Sciences Division on Earth and Life Studies, National Research Council)
scientific research into how living
things function is producing new understanding of how living systems work and new ways of using biological
processes to meet human needs. If current opportunities are grasped, the life sciences can help produce enough food for a growing
population, cure chronic and acute diseases, meet fImportant segments of the life sciences are merging with the
physical sciences and engineering to create “transdisciplinary” scientific endeavors focused on pressing
A Critical Time for the Life Sciences Speaker after speaker at the Summit agreed: the life sciences are poised to usher in a period of unprecedented health and prosperity. Basic
global problems. This blending of d Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) President Susan Hockfield. They improve human health.
They foster potential of vaccines and antibiotics, among many other research results, have improved the lives of people
everywhere. The progress made in combating heart disease is a prime example of the payoffs from investment in the life sciences, said Hockfield. Over the past 30 years, the National Institutes of new knowledge in medicine.
Fostering Industries to Counter Global Problems The life sciences have applications in areas that range far beyond human health. Life-science based approaches could contribute to advances
in many industries, from energy production and pollution remediation, to clean manufacturing and the
production of new biologically inspired materials. In fact, biological systems could provide the basis for new
products, services and industries that we cannot yet imagine. Microbes are already producing biofuels and could, through further research,
provide a major component of future energy supplies . Marine and terrestrial organisms extract carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, which suggests that biological
systems could be used to help manage climate change . Study of the complex systems encountered in biology is
decade, it is really just the beginning .” Advances in the underlying science of plant and animal breeding have been just as dramatic as the advances in genetic can put down a band of
fertilizer, come back six months later, and plant seeds exactly on that row, reducing the need for fertilizer, pesticides, and other agricultural inputs. Fraley said that the global agricultural system needs to
adopt the goal of doubling the current yield of crops while reducing key inputs like pesticides, fertilizers, and
water by one third. “It is more important than putting a man on the moon,” he said. Doubling agricultural yields would “change the world.” Another billion
people will join the middle class over the next decade just in India and China as economies continue to grow.
And all people need and deserve secure access to food supplies. Continued progress will require both basic and applied
research, The evolution of life “put earth under new management,” Collins said. Understanding the future state of the planet will require understanding the
biological systems that have shaped the planet. Many of these biological systems are found in the oceans, which
cover 70 percent of the earth’s surface and have a crucial impact on weather, climate, and the composition of the
atmosphere. In the past decade, new tools have become available to explore the microbial processes that drive the
chemistry of the oceans, observed David Kingsbury, Chief Program Officer for Science at the Gordon and Betty
Moore Foundation. These technologies have revealed that a large proportion of the planet’s genetic diversity resides in the oceans. In
addition, many organisms in the oceans readily exchange genes, creating evolutionary forces that can have global effects. The oceans are
currently under great stress, Kingsbury pointed out. Nutrient runoff from agriculture is helping to create huge and expanding “dead zones”
where oxygen levels are too low to sustain life. Toxic algal blooms are occurring with higher frequency in areas where they have not been seen in the past. Exploitation of ocean resources is
disrupting ecological balances that have formed over many millions of years. Human-induced changes in the chemistry of the atmosphere are changing the chemistry of the oceans, with
potentially catastrophic consequences . “ If we are not careful, we are not going to have a sustainable planet to
live on ,” said Kingsbury . Only by understanding the basic biological processes at work in the oceans can humans live
sustainably on earth.
Small farms
Movements for small ag can’t solve without major structural change
Altieri 2k—Professor of agroecology, University of California, Berkeley“Modern Agriculture: Ecological impacts and the possibilities for truly
sustainable farming.”
The agroecological approach seeks the diversification and revitalization of medium size and small farms and the reshaping of the entire agricultural
policy and food system in ways that are economically viable to farmers and consumers. In fact, throughout the world there are hundreds
of movements that are pursuing a change toward ecologically sensitive farming systems from a variety of perspectives.
Some emphasize the production of organic products for lucrative markets, others land stewardship, while others the empowerment of peasant
communities. In general, however, the goals are usually the same: to secure food self-sufficiency, to preserve the natural resource base, and to ensure
social equity and economic viability. What happens is that some well-intentioned groups suffer from "technological determinism",
and emphasize as a key strategy only the development and dissemination of low-input or appropriate
technologies as if these technologies in themselves have the capability of initiating beneficial social changes.
The organic farming school that emphasizes input substitution (i.e. a toxic chemical substituted by a biological insecticide) but
leaving the monoculture structure untouched, epitomizes those groups that have a relatively benign view of
capitalist ag riculture. Such perspective has unfortunately prevented many groups from understanding the
structural roots of environmental degradation linked to monoculture farming (16). This narrow acceptance of the present
structure of agriculture as a given condition restricts the real possibility of implementing alternatives that challenge such a structure. Thus, options for a
diversified agriculture are inhibited among other factors by the present trends in farm size and mechanization. Implementation of such mixed agriculture
would only be possible as part of a broader program that includes, among other strategies, land reform and redesign of farm machinery adapted to
Merely introducing alternative agricultural designs will do little to change the underlying forces that
led to monoculture production, farm size expansion, and mechanization in the first place. Similarly, obstacles to
changing cropping systems has been created by the government commodity programs in place these last several
decades. In essence, these programs have rewarded those who maintained monocultures on their base feed grain
acres by assuring these producers a particular price for their product. Those who failed to plant the allotted acreage of corn and
other price-supported crops lost one deficit hectrage from their base. Consequently this created a competitive disadvantage for those
who used a crop rotation. Such a disadvantage, of course, exacerbated economic hardship for many producers (17). Obviously many
policy changes are necessary in order to create an economic scenario favorable to alternative cropping
practices. On the other hand, the large influence of multinational companies in promoting sales of agrochemicals cannot be ignored as a
barrier to sustainable farming. Most MNCs have taken advantage of existing policies that promote the enhanced
participation of the private sector in technology development and delivery, positioning themselves in a powerful
position to scale up promotion and marketing of pesticides. Realistically then the future of agriculture will be
determined by power relations, and there is no reason why farmers and the public in general, if sufficiently empowered, could not influence
polycultures.
the direction of agriculture along sustainability goals.
Small farms can’t solve – can only sustain a global population of 2 billion
Chris Rhodes 14 PhD, Sussex University, has a visiting position at the University of Reading and is Director of Fresh-lands Environmental Actions.
“Soil erosion, climate change and global food security: challenges and strategies” Science Progress. 97.2 (Summer 2014): p124. **Permaculture= low
impact method that uses perennial cultivation methods to produce food crops, working through principles that are in harmony with nature. i.e. small farm
model
It is claimed (78) that "a population density of 6-10 people per acre might be supported through permaculture,
and is greater than our current cereal-based food economy can sustain". Since our ability to grow cereals, in the
quantity we do, depends on industrialised agriculture, with its considerable inputs of oil- and gas-based fuels,
fertilisers and pesticides, the practice is not sustainable and so the comparison is not strictly valid . We are then left
with the question of how many people might be supported by the earth, if permaculture methods were widely introduced. If we assume the lower limit,
this means that 15 people can be fed per hectare. Thus, to feed the human population of 7 billion, we would need 467 million hectares of land, or 4.7
million [km.sup.2]. Since we have 150 million [km.sup.2] of dry land, and around 14 million [km.sup.2] of arable land, it would appear there is no problem
in sustaining the present global population, and that supporting even 9 billion by 2050, or 12 billion by 2100, is feasible. Toby Hemenway,
regarded as one of the gurus of permaculture, is less optimistic, and believes that the maximum carrying
capacity of the Earth is nearer 2 billion (79). [This is also the number arrived at by Pimentel et al. (80), on the basis of the limited
resources of energy, water and food available to us, and it seems most likely that it is failing supplies of these key inputs, particularly freshwater, that will
reduce and finally limit our population. One is reminded of the "four horsemen of the apocalypse": pestilence, war, famine and death, each rider being
perceivable in a guise of resource shortages. Since the consequence of consumption is pollution, this too must prove a determinant to the numbers of
humans that can live sustainably on "Spaceship Earth", as the visionary Buckminster Fuller termed (81) our existence]. Other permaculturists are far
more sanguine than Hemenway about what might be achieved, in terms of sustaining the global population, and point out that predictions of food
shortages are based on limits of the resources that are necessary for modern agriculture, whereas permaculture is based on the interacting and holistic
mechanisms of nature, where nothing is wasted and everything is recycled, all elements being returned to the ecosystem, by death, and from which new
life can flourish. David Blume claims to have fed up to 450 people on two acres (0.8 ha) of land for 9 years, by the end of which the soil contained 22%
SOM, with a CEC of >25 (a measure of its humus content). This amounts to ca 18 [m.sup.2]/person, which might be understood to imply that the current
world population of 7 billion could be fed on just 120,000 [km.sup.2] of land. The key to this success is polyculture, which benefits from the growth of
mycorrhizal fungi and less solar saturation (82) Blume has described this technique as "restorative agriculture", and he believes that there is,
correspondingly, no immediate limit to the number that can be fed on Planet Earth, and that ethanol fuel, produced on the local scale could meet all our
energy needs--including electricity production--and obviate the need for crude oil. Hemenway
has spoken (83) on the subject of: "How
permaculture can save humanity and the earth, but not civilisation," which may initially sound like an oxymoron. It is in fact a
rather more subtle proposition, to the effect that while permaculture cannot sustain the present global economy and global
civilisation with a population of 7 billion people, it might support a lesser number of up to 2 billion, but, of
necessity, its practices mean living in small communities. Thus, the civilisation that permaculture could sustain
is a globe of villages, not the global village. The principles of permaculture are central to the growing community-based Transition Town
movement (59).
Warming Timeframe is 200 years and adaptation solves
Mendelsohn 9 – Robert O. Mendelsohn 9, the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental
Studies, Yale University, June 2009, “Climate Change and Economic Growth,” online:
http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp060web.pdf
These statements are largely alarmist and misleading . Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves attention,
society’s immediate behavior has anextremely low probabilityof leading tocatastrophic consequences. The
science and economics of climate change is quite clear that emissions over the next few decades will lead to only
mild consequences. The severe impacts predicted by alarmists require a century (or two in the case of Stern 2006) of no
mitigation. Many of the predicted impacts assume there will be no or little adaptation. The net economic impacts from
climate change over the next 50 years will be small regardless. Most of the more severe impacts will take more than a
century or even a millennium to unfold and many of these “potential” impacts will never occur because
people will adapt. It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be developed to
thwart long‐range climate risks. What is needed are long‐run balanced responses.
Food insecurity won’t cause war
Allouche 11 The sustainability and resilience of global water and food systems: Political analysis of the interplay between security,
resource scarcity, political systems and global trade ☆
online 22 January 2011.
Jeremy Allouche
Institute of Development Studies, Brighton, UK
Available
At sub-national scales (i.e. the intra-state level and the local level), the link between scarcity and conflict is more
complex. At the intra-state level, recent research on civil wars shows that countries suffering from environmental
degradation (soil degradation, deforestation and freshwater supply linked to high population density) were indeed more likely to
experiance civil war, but that the magnitude of the effects was secondary to political and economic factors
(see for example [Urdal, 2005] and [Hauge and Ellingsen, 1998]). The same is true for hunger and food insecurity as a
cause of conflict. The work of Collier and the US State Failure Task Force seems to suggest a possible correlation between food
insecurity and civil wars. Collier found a strong relationship between indicators of deprivation (such as low per capita income; economic
stagnation and decline; high income inequality; and slow growth in food production per capita) and violent civil strife (Collier, 1999). The US
State Failure Task Force found that infant mortality, a surrogate measure of food insecurity and standard of living, was one of three variables
most highly correlated with civil war (Goldstone et al., 2003). However, a number of specialists have challenged the notion
that food insecurity is a proximate cause of conflict and prefer to emphasize ethnic and political rivalry
(Paalberg, 1999). Nonetheless, most analysts would agree that structural conditions of inequality and hunger are among the underlying
causes of conflict. But again, ‘physical resource scarcity’ is not in most cases the result of insufficient production or
availability but is usually linked to the politics of inequality.
DTOs
Drug war violence declining
By Karla Zabludovsky covers Latin America for Newsweek. “Murders in Mexico Down From Height of the Drug War, But Violence Persists” Filed:
7/23/14 at 6:42 PM http://www.newsweek.com/murders-mexico-down-height-drug-war-violence-persists-260990
Some of the Mexican states where drug war–related violence has been most intense, like Coahuila, Guerrero and
Tamaulipas, showed a decreased homicide rate . In Durango, part of the Mexican “golden triangle,” an area
notorious for drug trafficking, homicides decreased by nearly half in 2013 as compared to the previous year.¶
ADVERTISEMENT¶ It is unclear what percentage of recorded homicides are related to organized crime since the government modified the classification
in October, doing away with a separate category for drug war–related deaths, instead lumping them all together.¶ Aware of the war weariness
felt among many in Mexico, Pena Nieto ran on the promise that, if elected, his government would shift the focus
from capturing drug kingpins, like Calderon had, to making daily life for ordinary Mexicans safer.¶ "With this new
strategy, I commit myself to significantly lowering the homicide rate, the number of kidnappings in the country, the extortions and the human trafficking,"
wrote Pena Nieto in a newspaper editorial during his presidential campaign.¶ Since taking office in December 2012, Pena Nieto has largely
eliminated talk of security from his agenda except when large outbreaks of violence have forced him otherwise,
focusing instead on the economy and his legislative reforms , including sweeping overhauls to education and energy. And while
the country appears to be less violent now than during Calderon’s war on drugs, the climate of press freedom, according to the Committee to Protect
Journalists, remains “perilous.”
Legalization destabilizes mexico- causes cartel lashout and diversification
Chad Murray et al 11, Ashlee Jackson Amanda C. Miralrío, Nicolas Eiden Elliott School of International Affairs/Inter-American Drug Abuse
Control Commission: Capstone Report April 26, 2011 “Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations and Marijuana: The Potential Effects of U.S. Legalization”
Mexican DTOs would likely branch into other avenues of crime . Perhaps the most obvious short-term effect of
marijuana legalization is that this would rob the Sinaloa and Tijuana cartels of up to half of their total revenue .117
The economic strain placed on the Sinaloa cartel and Tijuana cartel may not necessarily help Mexico in the
short term . The short-term effects of legalization could very well create chaos for Mexico. “The cartels
compensate for their loss of drug revenue by branching out into other criminal activities-- kidnapping , murderfor-hire, contraband , illegal ¶ 29 ¶ immigrant smuggling , extortion, theft of oil and other items, loan-sharking,
prostitution , selling protection, etc .”118 This means that if the social and economic environment remains the
same then “they are not going to return to the licit world .”119 If the Sinaloa cartel and the Tijuana cartel turn
towards activities like kidnapping, human trafficking and extortion, it could lead to a spike in violence that would
prove to be destabilizing in those organizations‟ areas of operation. ¶
The Sinaloa cartel and Tijuana cartel
might splinter into smaller groups. In addition, the loss of more than 40% of revenue would probably force them to
downsize their operations. Like any large business going through downsizing, employees will likely be shed first
in order to maintain profitability.120 These former DTO operatives will likely not return to earning a legitimate
income, but rather will independently find new revenue sources in a manner similar to their employers.
Therefore it is possible that the legalization of marijuana in the United States could cause territories currently
under the control of the Sinaloa cartel and Tijuana cartel to become more violent than they are today. This is
troubling, as Sinaloa, Baja California, Sonora, and Chihuahua states are already among the most violent areas of
Mexico.121
State capacity and institutional corruption are huge alt causes
Hope 14 (Alejandro, security policy analyst at IMCO, a Mexico City research organization, and former intelligence officer, 1-21-14, "Legal U.S. Pot
Won’t Bring Peace to Mexico" Bloomberg Review) www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-01-21/legal-u-s-pot-won-t-bring-peace-to-mexico
Whatever the legal status of marijuana, Mexico needs to tackle its many institutional malfunctions. Its police
forces are underpaid , undertrained , under motivated and deeply vulnerable to corruption and intimidation. Its
criminal justice system is painfully slow, notoriously inefficient and deeply unfair . Even with almost universal
impunity , prisons are overflowing and mostly ruled by the inmates themselves . Changing that reality will take
many years. Some reforms are under way, some are barely off the ground. As a result of a 2008 constitutional reform, criminal courts are being
transformed, but progress across states has been uneven. With a couple of local exceptions, police reform has yet to find political traction. The federal
Attorney General’s Office is set to become an independent body, but not before 2018. The reformist zeal that President Enrique Pena
Nieto has shown in other policy areas (education, energy, telecommunications) is absent in security and justice. Security
policy remains reactive, driven more by political considerations than by strategic design. And results have been mixed at best:
Homicides declined moderately in 2013, but both kidnapping and extortion reached record levels. Marijuana
legalization won’t alter that dynamic . In the final analysis, Mexico doesn’t have a drug problem, much less a marijuana
problem: It has a state capacity problem . That is, its institutions are too weak to protect the life, liberty and
property of its citizens. Even if drug trafficking might very well decline in the future, in the absence of stronger
institutions , something equally nefarious will replace it.
No threatening programs and current defenses solve bioweapons
Orent 9 [Wendy, Ph.D. in anthropology from the University of Michigan, leading freelance science writer, and author of Plague: The Mysterious
Past and Terrifying Future of the World's Most Dangerous Disease, "America's Bioterror Bugaboo." Los Angeles Times (Los Angeles, CA) 17 Jul
2009: A.29. SIRS Researcher. Web. 29 January 2010]
After the anthrax letter attacks of October 2001, the Bush administration pledged $57 billion to keep the nation safe from
bioterror. Since then, the government has created a vast network of laboratories and institutions to track down and
block every remotely conceivable form of bioterror threat. The Obama administration seems committed to continuing the
biodefense push, having just appointed a zealous bioterror researcher as undersecretary of science and technology in the Department of Homeland
Security. But is the threat really as great as we've been led to believe? Last summer, the FBI concluded that the anthrax letters that killed five
Americans came not from abroad but from an American laboratory, the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases.
Meanwhile, the Russian bioweapons program was officially shut down in 1992, and it's unlikely that anything remaining of it could
pose much of a threat.
Iraq, it has turned out, had no active program. And Al Qaeda's rudimentary explorations were interrupted,
by the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan.
according to an Army War College report,
No impact to failed states
Michael J. Mazarr 14, Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College, January/February 2014, “The Rise and Fall of the FailedState Paradigm,” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140347/michael-j-mazarr/the-rise-and-fall-of-the-failed-state-paradigm
The threat posed by weak and fragile states, for example, turned out to be both less urgent and more complex and diffuse
than was originally suggested. Foreign Policy’s Failed States Index for 2013 is not exactly a roster of national security priorities; of its top 20 weak
states, very few (Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan) boast geostrategic significance, and they do so mostly because of their connection to terrorism. But
even the threat of terrorism isn’t highly correlated with the current roster of weak states; only one of the top 20, Sudan,
appears on the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism, and
most other weak states have only a marginal connection to
terrorism at best .
A lack of definitional rigor posed a second problem. There has never been a coherent set of factors that define failed states : As
the political scientist Charles Call argued in a powerful 2008 corrective, the concept resulted in the “agglomeration of diverse criteria” that worked to
“throw a monolithic cloak over disparate problems that require tailored solutions.” This basic methodological flaw would distort state-building missions for
years, as outside powers forced generic, universal solutions onto very distinct contexts.
The specified dangers were never unique to weak states, moreover, nor would state-building campaigns necessarily
have mitigated them. Take terrorism. The most effective terrorists tend to be products of the middle class, often from
nations such as Saudi Arabia, Germany, and the United Kingdom, not impoverished citizens of failed states. And terrorist groups
operating in weak states can shift their bases of operations: if Afghanistan becomes too risky, they can uproot themselves and
move to Somalia, Yemen, or even Europe. As a result, “stabilizing” three or four sources of extremist violence would not
render the U nited S tates secure . The same could be said of threats such as organized crime , which finds comfortable homes
in functioning but troubled states in Asia, eastern Europe, and Latin America.
As the scholar Stewart Patrick noted in a 2006 examination of the purported threats issuing from weak states, “What is striking is how
little empirical evidence underpins these assertions and policy developments. Analysts and policymakers alike have simply
presumed the existence of a blanket connection between state weakness and threats to the national security of
developed countries and have begun to recommend and implement policy responses.”
And although interconnectedness and interdependence may create risks, the dangers in such a world are
more likely to come from
strong, well-governed states with imperfect regulations than weak ones with governance deficiencies . Financial
volatility that can shake the foundations of leading nations and cyberattacks that could destabilize energy or information networks pose more immediate
and persistent risks than, say, terrorism.
2nc
K
Zero impact to cyber-attacks --- overwhelming consensus of qualified authors goes neg
- No motivation---can’t be used for coercive leverage
- Defenses solve---benefits of offense are overstated
- Too difficult to execute/mistakes in code are inevitable
- AT: Infrastructure attacks
- Military networks are air-gapped/difficult to access
- Overwhelming consensus goes neg
Colin S. Gray 13, Prof. of International Politics and Strategic Studies @ the University of Reading and External Researcher @ the Strategic Studies
Institute @ the U.S. Army War College, April, “Making Strategic Sense of Cyber Power: Why the Sky Is Not Falling,” U.S. Army War College Press,
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1147.pdf
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
THE SKY IS NOT FALLING ¶ This analysis has sought to explore, identify, and explain the strategic meaning of
cyber power. The organizing and thematic question that has shaped and driven the inquiry has been “So what?” Today we all do cyber, but this behavior usually has not been
much informed by an understanding that reaches beyond the tactical and technical. I have endeavored to analyze in strategic terms what is on offer from the largely technical
and tactical literature on cyber. What can or might be done and how to go about doing it are vitally important bodies of knowledge. But at least as important is understanding
what cyber, as a fifth domain of warfare, brings to national security when it is considered strategically. Military history is stocked abundantly with examples of tactical behavior
un - guided by any credible semblance of strategy. This inquiry has not been a campaign to reveal what cy ber can and might do; a large literature already exists that claims
fairly convincingly to explain “how to . . .” But what does cyber power mean, and how does it fit strategically, if it does? These Conclusions and Rec ommendations offer some
understanding of this fifth geography of war in terms that make sense to this strategist, at least. ¶ 1. Cyber can only be an enabler of physical effort. Stand-alone
(popularly misnamed as “strategic”) cyber
action is inherently grossly limited by its immateriality.
The physicality of conflict with cyber’s
human participants and mechanical artifacts has not been a passing phase in our species’ strategic history. Cyber action, quite independent of action on land, at sea, in the
air, and in orbital space, certainly is possible. But the
strategic logic of such behavior, keyed to anticipated success in tactical achievement, is not
promising. To date, “What if . . .” speculation about strategic cyber attack usually is either contextually too light, or, more often,
unpersuasive . 49 However, this is not a great strategic truth, though it is a judgment advanced with considerable confidence. Although societies could, of
course, be hurt by cyber action, it is important not to lose touch with the fact, in Libicki’s apposite words, that “[ i]n the absence of physical combat, cyber
war cannot lead to the occupation of territory. It is almost inconceivable that a sufficiently vigorous cyber war
can overthrow the adversary’s government and replace it with a more pliable one.” 50 In the same way that the concepts of sea
contextually
war, air war, and space war are fundamentally unsound, so also the idea of cyber war is unpersuasive. ¶ It is not impossible, but then, neither is war conducted only at sea, or
in the air, or in space. On the one hand, cyber war may seem more probable than like environmentally independent action at sea or in the air. After all, cyber
warfare
would be very unlikely to harm human beings directly , let alone damage physically the machines on which they
depend. These near-facts (cyber attack might cause socially critical machines to behave in a rogue manner with damaging physical consequences) might seem to ren der cyber a safer zone of belligerent engagement than would physically violent action in other domains. But most likely there would be serious
uncertainties pertaining to the consequences of cyber action, which must include the possibility of escalation
into other domains of conflict. Despite popular assertions to the contrary, cyber is not likely to prove a precision weapon
anytime soon. 51 In addition, assuming that the political and strategic contexts for cyber war were as serious as surely they would need to be to trigger events
warranting plausible labeling as cyber war, the distinctly limited harm likely to follow from cyber assault would hardly appeal as
prospectively effective coercive moves. On balance, it is most probable that cyber’s strategic future in war will be as a contribut - ing enabler of
effectiveness of physical efforts in the other four geographies of conflict. Speculation about cyber war, defined strictly as hostile action by net - worked computers against
networked computers, is hugely unconvincing.¶ 2. Cyber
defense is difficult, but should be sufficiently effective.
The structural
advantages of the offense in cyber conflict are as obvious as they are easy to overstate. Penetration and exploitation, or
even attack, would need to be by surprise. It can be swift almost beyond the imagination of those encultured by the traditional demands of physical combat.
Cyber attack may be so stealthy that it escapes notice for a long while, or it might wreak digital havoc by com - plete surprise. And need one emphasize, that at least for a
while, hostile cyber action is likely to be hard (though not quite impossible) to attribute with a cy - berized equivalent to a “smoking gun.” Once one is in the realm of the
catastrophic “What if . . . ,” the world is indeed a frightening place. On a personal note, this defense analyst was for some years exposed to highly speculative briefings that
hypothesized how unques - tionably cunning plans for nuclear attack could so promptly disable the United States as a functioning state that our nuclear retaliation would likely
be still - born. I should hardly need to add that the briefers of these Scary Scenarios were obliged to make a series of Heroic Assumptions. ¶ The
literature of cyber
scare is more than mildly reminiscent of the nuclear attack stories with which I was assailed in the 1970s and
1980s. As one may observe regarding what Winston Churchill wrote of the disaster that was the Gallipoli campaign of 1915, “[t]he terrible ‘Ifs’ accumulate.” 52 Of course,
there are dangers in the cyber domain. Not only are there cyber-competent competitors and enemies abroad; there are also Americans who make mistakes in cyber
operation. Furthermore, there are the manufacturers and constructors of the physical artifacts behind (or in, depending upon the preferred definition) cyber - space who
assuredly err in this and that detail. The
more sophisticated—usually meaning complex—the code for cyber, the more certain
must it be that mistakes both lurk in the program and will be made in digital communication.¶ What I have just outlined
minimally is not a reluc - tant admission of the fallibility of cyber, but rather a statement of what is obvious and should be anticipat - ed about people and material in a domain
of war. All human activities are more or less harassed by friction and carry with them some risk of failure, great or small. A strategist who has read Clausewitz, especially Book
One of On War , 53 will know this. Alternatively, anyone who skims my summary version of the general theory of strategy will note that Dictum 14 states explicitly that
“Strategy is more difficult to devise and execute than are policy, operations, and tactics: friction of all kinds comprise phenomena inseparable from the mak - ing and execution
of strategies.” 54 Because of its often widely distributed character, the physical infrastruc - ture of an enemy’s cyber power is typically, though not invariably, an impracticable
target set for physical assault. Happily, this probable fact should have only annoying consequences. The discretionary nature and therefore the variable possible characters
feasible for friendly cyberspace(s), mean that the more danger - ous potential vulnerabilities that in theory could be the condition of our cyber-dependency ought to be
avoidable at best, or bearable and survivable at worst. Libicki offers forthright advice on this aspect of the subject that deserves to be taken at face value: ¶ [T]here is no
inherent reason that improving informa - tion technologies should lead to a rise in the amount of critical information in existence (for example, the names of every secret
agent). Really critical information should never see a computer; if it sees a computer, it should not be one that is networked; and if the computer is networked, it should be airgapped.¶ Cyber
defense admittedly is difficult to do, but so is cyber offense. To quote Libicki yet again, “[i]n this medium [cyberspace] the best
defense is not necessarily a good offense; it is usually a good defense.” 56 Unlike the geostrategic context for nuclear-framed competition in U.S.–Soviet/Russian rivalry, the
geographical domain of cyberspace definitely is defensible. Even when the enemy is both clever and lucky, it will be our own design and
operating fault if he is able to do more than disrupt and irritate us temporarily.¶ When cyber is contextually regarded properly— which means first, in particular, when it is
viewed as but the latest military domain for defense planning—it should be plain to see that cyber performance needs to be good enough rather than perfect. 57 Our
Landpower, sea power, air power, and prospectively our space systems also will have to be capable of accepting combat
damage and loss, then recovering and carrying on. There is no fundamental reason that less should be
demanded of our cyber power. Second, given that cyber is not of a nature or potential character at all likely to parallel nuclear dangers in the menace it could
con - tain, we should anticipate international cyber rivalry to follow the competitive dynamic path already fol - lowed in the other domains in the past. Because the digital age is
so young, the pace of technical change and tactical invention can be startling. However, the mechanization RMA of the 1920s and 1930s recorded reaction to the new science
and technology of the time that is reminiscent of the cyber alarmism that has flour - ished of recent years. 58 We
can be confident that cyber defense
should be able to function well enough , given the strength of political, military, and commercial motivation for it
to do so.
MARK
The technical context here is a medium that is a constructed one, which provides air-gapping options for choice regarding the extent of networking. Naturally, a price is paid in
convenience for some closing off of possible cyberspace(s), but all important defense decisions involve choice, so what is novel about that? There is nothing new about
accepting some limitations on utility as a price worth paying for security.¶ 3. Intelligence is critically important, but informa - tion should not be overvalued. The strategic history
of cyber over the past decade confirms what we could know already from the science and technology of this new domain for conflict. Specifically,
cyber power is not
technically forgiving of user error. Cyber warriors seeking criminal or military benefit require precise information
if their intended exploits are to succeed. Lucky guesses should not stumble upon passwords, while efforts to disrupt electronic Supervisory
Con - trol and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems ought to be unable to achieve widespread harmful effects. But obviously there are
practical limits to the air-gap op - tion, given that control (and command) systems need to be networks for communication. However, Internet connection needs to be treated
as a potential source of serious danger.¶ It
is one thing to be able to be an electronic nuisance, to annoy, disrupt, and perhaps delay. But it is
quite another to be capable of inflicting real persisting harm on the fighting power of an enemy. Critically
important military computer networks are, of course, accessible neither to the inspired amateur outsider, nor to
the malignant political enemy. Easy passing reference to a hypothetical “cyber Pearl Harbor” reflects both poor
history and ignorance of contemporary military common sense. Critical potential military (and other) targets for
cyber attack are extremely hard to access and influence (I believe and certainly hope), and the technical knowledge, skills,
and effort required to do serious harm to national security is forbiddingly high.
absolutely could not secure near-catastrophic
This is not to claim, foolishly, that cyber means
results. However, it is to say that such a scenario is extremely improbable . Cyber defense
is advancing all the time, as is cyber offense, of course. But so discretionary in vital detail can one be in the making of cyberspace, that confidence—real confidence—in cyber
attack could not plausibly be high. It should be noted that I am confining this particular discussion to what rather idly tends to be called cyber war. In political and strategic
practice, it is unlikely that war would or, more importantly, ever could be restricted to the EMS. Somewhat rhetorically, one should pose the question: Is it likely (almost
anything, strictly, is possible) that cyber war with the potential to inflict catastrophic damage would be allowed to stand unsupported in and by action in the other four
geographical domains of war? I believe not.¶ Because we have told ourselves that ours uniquely is the Information Age, we have become unduly respectful of the potency of
this rather slippery catch-all term. As usual, it is helpful to contextualize the al - legedly magical ingredient, information, by locating it properly in strategic history as just one
important element contributing to net strategic effectiveness. This mild caveat is supported usefully by recognizing the general contemporary rule that information per se
harms nothing and nobody. The electrons in cyber - ized conflict have to be interpreted and acted upon by physical forces (including agency by physical human beings). As
one might say, intelligence (alone) sinks no ship; only men and machines can sink ships! That said, there is no doubt that if friendly cyber action can infiltrate and misinform
the electronic informa - tion on which advisory weaponry and other machines depend, considerable warfighting advantage could be gained. I do not intend to join Clausewitz
in his dis - dain for intelligence, but I will argue that in strategic affairs, intelligence usually is somewhat uncertain. 59 Detailed up-to-date intelligence literally is essential for
successful cyber offense, but it can be healthily sobering to appreciate that the strategic rewards of intelligence often are considerably exaggerated. The basic reason is not
hard to recognize. Strategic success is a complex endeavor that requires adequate perfor - mances by many necessary contributors at every level of conflict (from the political
to the tactical). ¶ When thoroughly reliable intelligence on the en - emy is in short supply, which usually is the case, the strategist finds ways to compensate as best he or she
can. The IT-led RMA of the past 2 decades was fueled in part by the prospect of a quality of military effec - tiveness that was believed to flow from “dominant battle space
knowledge,” to deploy a familiar con - cept. 60 While there is much to be said in praise of this idea, it is not unreasonable to ask why it has been that our ever-improving battle
space knowledge has been compatible with so troubled a course of events in the 2000s in Iraq and Afghanistan. What we might have misunderstood is not the value of
knowledge, or of the information from which knowledge is quarried, or even the merit in the IT that passed information and knowledge around. Instead, we may well have
failed to grasp and grip understanding of the whole context of war and strategy for which battle space knowledge unquestionably is vital. One must say “vital” rather than
strictly essential, because relatively ignorant armies can and have fought and won despite their ig - norance. History requires only that one’s net strategic performance is
superior to that of the enemy. One is not required to be deeply well informed about the en - emy. It is historically quite commonplace for armies to fight in a condition of morethan-marginal reciprocal and strategic cultural ignorance. Intelligence is king in electronic warfare, but such warfare is unlikely to be solely, or even close to solely, sovereign
in war and its warfare, considered overall as they should be.¶ 4. Why the sky will not fall. More accurately, one should say that the
sky will not fall because of
hostile action against us in cyberspace unless we are improb - ably careless and foolish. David J. Betz and Tim Ste vens strike the right note when they
conclude that “[i]f cyberspace is not quite the hoped-for Garden of Eden, it is also not quite the pestilential swamp of the imagination of the cyber-alarmists.” 61 Our
understanding of cyber is high at the technical and tactical level, but re - mains distinctly rudimentary as one ascends through operations to the more rarified altitudes of
strategy and policy. Nonetheless,
our scientific, technological, and tactical knowledge and understanding clearly
indicates that the sky is not falling and is unlikely to fall in the future as a result of hostile cyber action. This
analysis has weighed the more technical and tactical literature on cyber and concludes, not simply on balance ,
that cyber alarmism has little basis save in the imagination of the alarmists. There is military and civil peril in the hostile use of cyber, which is why we must
take cyber security seriously, even to the point of buying redundant capabilities for a range of command and control systems. 62 So seriously should we regard cyber danger
that it is only prudent to as - sume that we will be the target for hostile cyber action in future conflicts, and that some of that action will promote disruption and uncertainty in the
damage it will cause.¶ That granted, this analysis recommends strongly that the U.S. Army, and indeed the whole of the U.S. Government, should strive to comprehend cyber
in context. Approached in isolation as a new technol - ogy, it is not unduly hard to be over impressed with its potential both for good and harm. But if we see networked
computing as just the latest RMA in an episodic succession of revolutionary changes in the way information is packaged and communicated, the computer-led IT revolution is
set where it belongs, in historical context. In modern strategic history, there has been only one truly game-changing basket of tech - nologies, those pertaining to the creation
and deliv - ery of nuclear weapons. Everything else has altered the tools with which conflict has been supported and waged, but has not changed the game. The nuclear
revolution alone raised still-unanswered questions about the viability of interstate armed conflict. How - ever, it would be accurate to claim that since 1945, methods have been
found to pursue fairly traditional political ends in ways that accommodate nonuse of nuclear means, notwithstanding the permanent pres - ence of those means.¶ The light
cast by general strategic theory reveals what requires revealing strategically about networked computers. Once one sheds some of the sheer wonder at the seeming miracle
of cyber’s ubiquity, instanta - neity, and (near) anonymity, one realizes that cyber is just another operational domain, though certainly one very different from the others in its
nonphysi - cality in direct agency. Having placed cyber where it belongs, as a domain of war, next it is essential to recognize that its nonphysicality compels that cyber should
be treated as an enabler of joint action, rather than as an agent of military action capable of behav - ing independently for useful coercive strategic effect. There
are
stand-alone possibilities for cyber action, but they are not convincing as attractive options either for or in
opposition to a great power, let alone a superpower. No matter how intriguing the scenario design for cyber war
strictly or for cyber warfare, the logic of grand and military strategy and a common sense fueled by
understanding of the course of strategic history, require one so to contextualize cyber war that its independence
is seen as too close to absurd to merit much concern.
PTX
Mutating Diseases risks extinction
Greger 8 – M.D., is Director of Public Health and Animal Agriculture at The Humane Society of the United States (Michael Greger, , Bird Flu: A Virus
of Our Own Hatching, http://birdflubook.com/a.php?id=111)
Senate Majority Leader Frist describes the recent slew of emerging diseases in almost biblical terms: “All of these [new diseases] were advance patrols of a great army that is
preparing way out of sight.”3146 Scientists like Joshua Lederberg don’t think this is mere rhetoric. He should know. Lederberg won the Nobel Prize in medicine at age 33
for his discoveries in bacterial evolution. Lederberg went on to become president of Rockefeller University. “Some people think I am being hysterical,” he said, referring to
pandemic influenza, “but there are catastrophes ahead. We live in evolutionary competition with microbes—bacteria and viruses. There is no guarantee that we
will be the survivors.”3147 There is a concept in host-parasite evolutionary dynamics called the Red Queen hypothesis, which attempts to describe the unremitting struggle
between immune systems and the pathogens against which they fight, each constantly evolving to try to outsmart the other.3148 The name is taken from Lewis Carroll’s
Through the Looking Glass in which the Red Queen instructs Alice, “Now, here, you see, it takes all the running you can do to keep in the same place.”3149 Because the
pathogens keep evolving, our immune systems have to keep adapting as well just to keep up. According to the theory, animals who “stop running” go extinct. So far our
immune systems have largely retained the upper hand, but the fear is that given the current rate of disease emergence, the
human race is losing the
race .3150 In a Scientific American article titled, “Will We Survive?,” one of the world’s leading immunologists writes: Has the immune system, then, reached its apogee
after the few hundred million years it had taken to develop? Can it respond in time to the new evolutionary challenges? These perfectly proper questions lack sure answers
because we are in an utterly unprecedented situation [given the number of newly emerging infections].3151 The research team who wrote Beasts of the Earth conclude,
“Considering that bacteria, viruses, and protozoa had a more than two-billion-year head start in this war, a victory by recently arrived Homo sapiens would be
remarkable.”3152 Lederberg ardently believes that emerging viruses may imperil human society itself. Says NIH medical epidemiologist David Morens, When you
look at the relationship between bugs and humans, the more important thing to look at is the bug. When an enterovirus like polio goes through the human gastrointestinal tract
in three days, its genome mutates about two percent. That level of mutation—two percent of the genome—has taken the human species eight million years to accomplish. So
who’s going to adapt to whom? Pitted against that kind of competition, Lederberg concludes that the human evolutionary capacity to keep up “may be dismissed as almost
totally inconsequential.”3153 To help prevent the evolution of viruses as threatening as H5N1, the least we can do is take away a few billion feathered test tubes in which
viruses can experiment, a few billion fewer spins at pandemic roulette. The human species has existed in something like our present form for approximately 200,000 years.
“Such a long run should itself give us confidence that our species will continue to survive, at least insofar as the microbial world is concerned. Yet such optimism,” wrote the
Ehrlich prize-winning former chair of zoology at the University College of London, “might easily transmute into a tune whistled whilst passing a graveyard.”3154
Only the plan links – Congress has narrowed it’s focus and with limited time only the plan
trades off
Novogradac 10-1 [Michael J. Novogradac, CPA, 10-1-2014 http://www.novoco.com/journal/2014/10/news_ww_201410.php]
Most predictions about what Congress will accomplish during the remainder of the year are humble, to say the least. Among other issues, the
combined uncertainty about the outcome of November’s midterm elections and the financial pressure created by continued discussions about comprehensive tax reform have
reportedly narrowed Congress’s focus for the rest of 2014. Between Oct. 1 and Dec. 31, depending on who wins control of the Senate in the midterm elections,
the Senate could be in session for as few as eight days or as many as 20 days; the House is currently scheduled to be in session for just 15 days
during that time frame. Both the House and Senate will be in session after the election starting on Nov. 12, but only the House has set a target adjournment date of Dec. 12. Barring an
unforeseen , substantial political development, lawmakers are expected to concentrate the lame-duck session that
convenes after the midterm elections on passing another continuing resolution to fund the federal government, and a small handful of pressing issues. Appropriations The
fiscal year (FY) 2015 continuing resolution, H.J.Res.124, that Congress passed Sept. 18 will fund government operations at FY 2014 levels until Dec. 11. Reports indicate that House Appropriations Chair
Hal Rogers, R-Ky., and Senate Appropriations Chair Barbara Mikulski, D-Md., want to fashion a long-term omnibus spending bill, but it’s more probable that lawmakers will pass another continuing
resolution that runs until mid-February or early March. It’s doubtful Congress would set a longer timeline for temporary appropriations, because other fiscal deadlines will begin to pile up quickly in 2015.
For example, the debt ceiling suspension is expires March 15 and funding for the highway trust fund is currently due to run out May 31. Also influencing the fiscal outlook is the ongoing effect of
sequestration established by the Bipartisan Budget Control Act of 2013. Looking beyond the continuing resolution process to the prospect of the House and Senate passing an omnibus fiscal year (FY)
2015 appropriations bills, an August report from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) concluded that the neither the House and Senate’s currently-proposed FY 2015 spending bills would breach
the Budget Control Act-imposed nondefense spending caps and trigger sequestration. OMB’s analysis as of Aug. 20 determined that the House and Senate FY 2015 spending bills both adhere to the
revised discretionary caps for non-defense categories. This means the Treasury Department’s plans for sequestration of Section 1603 renewable energy cash grant funds will be unchanged; those funds
will still be cut by approximately 7 percent. It also means there would likely be no sequestration-imposed cuts to U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) or other community
development funding from the House or Senate proposed levels. In June, the Senate Appropriations Committee approved the FY 2015 bill Transportation-HUD (THUD) Appropriations bill. For HUD, the
Senate proposal would provide a total of $45.8 billion in FY 2015, $369 million more the FY 2014 enacted level, but $829 million below the president’s FY 2015 request. The House’s FY 2015 bill provides
HUD a total of $44.7 billion in FY 2015, a cut of $767 million from the FY 2014 enacted level and almost $2 billion below the FY 2015 request. A summary of how several housing and community
Tax Extenders
development programs would fare in the proposed FY 2015 THUD bill can be found in the June 6 post on the Notes from Novogradac blog.
Despite the expected principal focus
on appropriations, there are a number of other outstanding items that the tax credit community is hopeful could be addressed before the clock runs out on the 113th session of Congress. Many of them fall
under the umbrella of tax extenders, tax provisions that expired at the end of 2013, or will do so at the end of this year, and need to be renewed. Key lawmakers in both houses of Congress and both
parties have expressed interest in extending some expired or expiring tax provisions, which is promising. For example, House Majority Leader Kevin McCarthy, R-Calif., set an agenda for Congress’s
return to session in September that listed jobs legislation to make a number of expired tax provisions permanent, such as the tax credit for research and experimentation and bonus depreciation. These
are just two of the dozens of tax provisions that expired at the end of 2013. Earlier this year, Senate Finance Committee Chairman Ron Wyden, D-Ore., endorsed temporary extensions for expired
provisions as part of the Expiring Provisions Improvement Reform and Efficiency (EXPIRE) Act. Wyden, who favors comprehensive tax reform, specifically said that long-term or permanent extensions
should be considered only as part of a larger overhaul of the tax code. He said the EXPIRE Act is so named because it is meant to expire. The EXPIRE Act, as approved by the Senate Finance
Committee April 3, contains important provisions related to the low-income housing tax credit (LIHTC), new markets tax credit (NMTC) and renewable energy production tax credit (PTC) and investment
Wyden called on his colleagues to revive and pass the EXPIRE Act, with its two-year extensions of LIHTC, NMTC, PTC and
tax credit (ITC). On Sept. 15,
ITC, while Congress pushes ahead on comprehensive reform.
The aff is a huge Congressional fight
Flatow, 14 (4/22/2014, Nicole, “How Medical Marijuana Went From Political Poison To Popular Policy,”
http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2014/04/22/3423731/the-mainstreaming-of-medical-marijuana/, JMP)
***Note --- Tom Angell is now chairman of Marijuana Majority
Even the most prominent organization opposing recreational marijuana proposals, Smart Approaches to Marijuana, explicitly endorses greater research
on medical marijuana for “cannabis-based medicines.” (although it opposes smoked marijuana and moving the drug from Schedule I.)
And so medical marijuana has emerged as the moderate stance for politicians who feel pressured for the first time
to take a position. The Obama administration has taken a number of positions. The Department of Justice recently pledged once again to avert
prosecution of those individuals complying with state marijuana law. President Obama conceded that alcohol is more dangerous than
marijuana, but the administration has declined to take independent action to reschedule the drug under the
Controlled Substances Act. And after years of withholding a legal supply of marijuana for clinical research, a federal panel last month made a
potentially momentous shift in allowing access to marijuana for a double-blind study on marijuana and post-traumatic stress disorder.
Making A Hash Of The Law
Longtime marijuana advocates are heartened by what they perceive as a tangible shift. “There’s a lot of stuff on the table now that would’ve been
unthinkable two years ago,” Angell said.
But while public and political opinion are embracing medical marijuana, the law hasn’t . In fact, there are still people serving
five- and ten-year minimum prison sentences for distributing medical marijuana in states where it is legal.
“There still exists a very significant gap between the overwhelming public support and the willingness of
politicians to take action on it,” Angell said. “Even if you just look at the issue of just simply letting states set their own policy.”
Still links – politics is about tradeoffs
Fitts 96 [Michael A., Professor, Law, University of Pennsylvania, “The Paradox Of Power In The Modern State,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, January, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 827]
While the president's singularity may give him the formal ability to exercise agenda control, which public choice scholars see as an advantage of presidential power, his visibility and the
influence of the media may also make it more difficult for him to exercise it.
When public scrutiny is brought to bear on the White House, surrounding such
issues as gays in the military or affirmative action, the president must often take a position and act. 128 This can deprive him of the ability to choose when or
whether to address issues. Finally, the unitary president may be less able to rely on preexisting congressional or agency processes to resolve disputes. At least in theory, true unitariness
means that he has the authority to reverse the decisions or non-decisions of others - the buck stops [*866] with the president. 129 In this environment, "no politician can endure opposition
from a wide range of opponents in numerous contests without alienating a significant proportion of voters." 130 Two types of tactics illustrate this phenomenon. First, presidents in recent
years have often sought to deemphasize - at least politically - their unitariness by allocating responsibility for different agencies to different political constituencies. President Clinton, for
example, reportedly "gave" the Department of Justice to the liberal wing of the Democratic party and the Department of the Treasury and the OMB to the conservatives. 131 Presidents
Bush and Reagan tried a similar technique of giving control over different agencies to different political constituencies. 132Second, by invoking vague abstract principles or "talking out of
both sides of their mouth," presidents have attempted to create the division within their person. Eisenhower is widely reported to be the best exemplar of this "bumbling" technique. 133
Reagan's widely publicized verbal "incoherence" and detachment from government affairs probably served a similar function. 134Unfortunately, the visibility and singularity of the modern
presidency can undermine both informal techniques. To the extent that the modern president is subject to heightened visibility about what he says and does and is led to make increasingly
his ability to mediate conflict and control the agenda can be
undermined. The modern president is supposed to have a position [*867] on such matters as affirmative action, the war in Bosnia, the baseballstrike, and the newest EPA
specific statements about who should win and who should lose on an issue ,
regulations - the list is infinite. Perhapsin response to these pressures, each modern president has made more speeches and taken more positions than his predecessors, with Bill Clinton
the president is far less able to exercise agenda
control, refuse to take symbolic stands, or take inconsistent positions. The well-documented tendency of the press to emphasize the
strategic implications of politics exacerbates this process by turning issues into zero-sum games. 136 Thus, in
contrast to Congress, the modern president's attempt to avoid or mediate issues can often undermine him personally and
politically.
giving three times as many speeches as Reagan during the same period. 135 In such circumstances,
Small farms
Small Farms S/L
Small farms can’t replace modern ag and local production of food is inevitable
Chris Rhodes 14 PhD, Sussex University, has a visiting position at the University of Reading and is Director of Fresh-lands Environmental Actions.
“Soil erosion, climate change and global food security: challenges and strategies” Science Progress. 97.2 (Summer 2014): p124.
While, in principle, a permaculture approach can be applied on all scales (from the small plot to the full field), it cannot be
adopted as a substitute for industrialised modern monoculture crop production since it is implicitly holistic.
Accordingly it is not possible to separate our growing of food from other aspects of community, and so to adopt
the design principles of permaculture for our food production, we must adapt all other lifestyle elements as an
underpinning and simultaneous part of the process. As fuel prices rise, and actual shortages of fuel ensue, longdistance mass transportation of food will no longer be economic or feasible, further driving food production at
the local level, as a means to achieve food security and community resilience.
Small farms fail
McWilliams 09 (James, historian at Texas State University, 10/7, http://freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10/07/let-the-farmers-marketdebate-continue/?apage=2)
Some academic critics are starting to wonder. Writing in the Journal of Rural Studies, sociologist C. Clare Hinrichs warns that “[m]aking
‘local’ a
proxy for the ‘good’ and ‘global’ a proxy for the bad may overstate the value in proximity .” Building on this suspicion, she
acknowledges that many small farms are indeed more sustainable than larger ones, but then reminds us that “ Small scale, ‘local’ farmers are
not inherently better environmental stewards.” Personal experience certainly confirms my own inability to make such a distinction. Most
of us must admit that in many cases we really haven’t a clue if the local farmers we support run sustainable systems.
The possibility that, as Hinrichs writes, they “may lack the awareness or means to follow more sustainable production
practices” suggests that the mythical sense of community (which depends on the expectation of sound
agricultural practices) is being eroded. After all, if the unifying glue of sustainability turns out to have cracks, so then does the communal
cohesiveness that’s supposed to evolve from it. And this is not a big “If.” “[W]hile affect, trust, and regard can flourish under conditions of spatial
proximity,” concludes Hinrichs, “this is not automatically or necessarily the case.” At the least, those of us who value our local food
systems should probably take the time to tone down the Quixotic rhetoric and ask questions that make our
farmer friends a little uncomfortable.
Monocultures S/L
They can’t solve monocultures – the design of squo land leases require farmers to maximize
short-term profits in order to stay solvent – farmers won’t shift to polyculture because that
would involve massive risk to their financial security
Steve Savage 8-8-14 an agricultural scientist (plant pathology) with >30 years of experience in agricultural technology. He has worked for Colorado
State University, DuPont (fungicide development), Mycogen (biocontrol development), and for the past 13 years as an independent. “Do GMO crops
“foster monocultures?”” http://www.biofortified.org/2014/08/do-gmo-crops-foster-monocultures/
Do GMO crops “foster monoculture?” This is a frequent criticism of modern agriculture. I have three problems with it: “Monoculture” isn’t the right term to
use to describe the relevant issues – its really about a limited crop rotation History and economics are the drivers behind this phenomenon, not crop
biotechnology The solutions – to the extent that they are needed – are not what most critics seem to imagine The Corn Belt of the Midwestern
US, is a multi-million acre farming region almost entirely dominated by just two crops – corn and soybeans. This
phenomenon is often termed “monoculture,” but monoculture is merely the practical approach of growing a
single crop in a given field. The opposite of monoculture is “ polyculture ” and it is entirely impractical for even
minimally mechanized farming. The Corn Belt is more accurately described as an example of a “limited crop
rotation.” The typical pattern is an alternation between corn and soybeans in each field. There are also some fields where the growers plant
continuous corn or continuous soybeans. There are many reasons that a more “diverse crop rotation” could be a good idea. Mixing up crop types over
time can help build soil quality because of different rooting patterns or residue characteristics. Some plant pests can be more easily managed if their life
cycles are disrupted by cropping changes. All of this is well known, but for a variety of reasons that I’ll discuss below, the less diverse rotation persists.
Corn and soybeans happen to be crops which involve widespread use of biotech crop options, but there are many other farming areas with a narrow
crop rotation where “GMO” options have never been available. There are areas in Northern Europe where “continuous wheat” is the norm and many
premium wine regions where essentially only grapes are grown. If farmers somewhere are not using a diverse crop rotation – there is a rational
explanation involving history, economics, and risk management. Let’s start by looking at Iowa, which sits in the very heart of the “Corn Belt.” As you can
see from the graph to the left, corn has been the dominant Iowa crop for a very long time, because Iowa is just about the ideal place to grow that crop.
Most farmland in that part of the Midwest is “rain-fed” rather than irrigated. The amount of rain that typically falls in Iowa is
sufficient to produce a good corn crop without limiting yield by the number of cloudy days. The growing season is long enough and warm enough, but
usually does not involve the yield-limiting heat that is typical further south. Corn is heavily planted because it typically returns the
highest net profit with the least risk . The income potential from corn is what drives the cost of land for purchase
or rent. As the farming population shrank and farm size increased over the last century, the remaining growers
have expanded somewhat through land purchases, and more commonly through rentals. For a farmer to keep up
with a mortgage or lease typically requires growing a lot of corn. Back in the 1930s, the main crop that was rotated with corn
was oats - ironically much of that to be used as a “transportation biofuel” for horses. Starting in the 1940s, soybeans began to evolve into the favored
rotational crop – mostly as an animal feed with a co-product of oil for human consumption. Soybeans have much lower yield than corn, but they are able
to generate their own nitrogen fertilizer (with microbial help) and don’t require many other inputs. Thus, soy has also been a reliable way to generate
enough profit to cover land and operating costs. All other crops have only ever had niche status in Iowa. When biotech crops arrived they were simply
sold into that pre-existing market. Illinois and Indiana have also been mostly two crop states ever since soybeans filled in for declining oat demand in the
50s and 60s. There has always been a small, but significant wheat sector in both of these states, part of a “double cropping” system in which corn is
followed by winter wheat and then soy, producing three cash crop harvests in two years. Indiana now has a small alfalfa segment – a case of crop
diversification “fostered by a GMO crop.” Minnesota had a more diverse agriculture than its neighbors to the south, but like them, it replaced oats with
soybeans long before the biotech era. The expansion of soybeans has continued in the biotech era, partially because of the attractiveness of Roundup
Ready Soy, but also because cultivars better adapted to colder springs have also been introduced through conventional breeding. Barley, rye and flax
have declined in the biotech era as has wheat to some degree. The recent decline of wheat is even more pronounced in North Dakota as it went from
approximately 50% of all plantings to about 30%. As in Minnesota, the rapid increase in soybeans came from a combination of more cold tolerant lines
and the herbicide tolerance trait. Corn plantings have also increased in the biotech era. For both crops the expansion is mostly in the wetter Red River
Valley portion of the state. The expansion of corn and soy at the expense of cereals like wheat, barley and rye may seem like a case where biotech is
reducing rotational diversity, but the story is a bit more complex. There is a disease of wheat and barley called Fusarium Head Blight, which has been an
increasing issue in all five of these states since the 1980s (and again in 2014). Corn, and particularly the crop residue in no-till corn, serves as a source
of spores which can then infect the wheat or barley during their bloom period. Head blight is difficult to control and it can lead to significant yield losses.
Infection can also lead to contamination of the grain with a mycotoxin called DON- or more colorfully, “vomitoxin.” Throughout the Midwest,
wheat does not tend to have as much profit potential as corn or soy even in good years, but the risk of severe
yield or quality loss from Head Blight is really what makes wheat much less attractive. Biotech had the potential
to help wheat keep a place in the Corn Belt rotation, but that solution was thwarted by anti-GMO campaigning. There was a “GMO
wheat” in advanced development around 2002 which was much more resistant to Fusarium Head Scab. This product had the potential to reduce the risk
of growing wheat, both in the historic wheat growing states like ND and MN, but also in the “I States.” Unfortunately, the trait was never commercialized.
Major wheat importing companies in Europe and Japan put pressure on the US and Canadian wheat grower organizations, threatening to boycott all
North American wheat if any biotech wheat was commercialized. This was not because of any safety concern, but rather the fact that food companies in
those countries didn’t want to have to label wheat-based products as “GMO.” Reluctantly the growers asked Syngenta to stop the development of their
disease resistant wheat. Ironically, this is a case where a GMO opposition “fostered monoculture,” when biotechnology could have enhanced rotational
diversity. The wheat growers of the US, Canada and Australia have pledged to do a simultaneous release of biotech wheat in the future so that they can
avoid this sort of extra-regulatory blockage. How Could The Corn Belt Rotation Be Diversified? First of all, the corn/soy rotation in the corn
belt is a highly successful production system. It also includes enough genetic diversity within those species to
continue to perform. That said, some additional diversity would be a good thing. Scab-resistant wheat would both reduce risk and increase
private investment in that very important and highly traded crop while simultaneously diversifying the rotation. Another excellent way to get the soil
quality benefits of rotation is to add a winter cover crop (see Midwest Cover Crops Council). It is actually best for the soil to have something growing as
much of the year as possible, and cover crops can also include a legume to make nitrogen for the next season or a grass to scavenge any excess
fertilizer when that is an issue. Probably the best way to facilitate more rotational diversity would be through education
of
the absentee landlord community. Much of the land in the Midwest is held in trusts for the families who have long since migrated to the cities.
Typically all they do is collect the rent checks through a farm management company . If those families could be educated about
sustainable cropping practices, they might be willing to engage in re-designed leases designed around medium
to long-term economics rather than the typical annual, cash lease. What is needed is a way to give the
grower/renters the incentive to implement the practices that might not optimize income for each year, but which
lead to improved soil quality over time which in turn leads to higher income potential and more protection from
drought (e.g. no-till, cover cropping, controlled wheel traffic and more diverse rotations). The very real benefits of such a system would flow to the
land-owner – increasing the value of the asset. It would be far more constructive to find creative ways to share that value
between farmers and landowners rather than to worry about “monocultures.”
Impact D
Tech advances faster than feedbacks
Indur Goklany, PhD., “Misled on Climate change: How the UN IPCC (and others) Exaggerate the Impacts of Global Warming,” POLICY
STUDY n. 399, Reason Foundation, 12—11, 12.
The second major reason why future adaptive capacity has been underestimated (and the impacts of global
warming systematically overestimated) is
that few impact studies consider secular technological change .25 Most
assume that no new technologies will come on line, although some do assume greater adoption of existing technologies
with higher GDP per capita and, much less frequently, a modest generic improvement in productivity. Such an assumption may
have been appropriate during the Medieval Warm Period, when the pace of technological change was slow, but
nowadays technological change is fast (as indicated in Figures 1 through 5) and , arguably, accelerating . It is
unlikely that we will see a halt to technological change unless so-called precautionary policies are
instituted that count the costs of technology but ignore its benefits, as some governments have already
done for genetically modified crops and various pesticides.
Geoengineering solves
Kenny Hodgart, “Chop and Change,” SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, 5—13—12, p. 28+.
Research is already being carried out on the viability of geoengineering - a catch-all term for technologies that
sequester CO2 or other greenhouse gases from the atmosphere or cool the planet through solar
radiation management - while more resources can and, for reasons quite apart from rising sea levels, probably should
be invested in sea and flood defences around the world. After all, the Dutch mastered this aspect of hydraulics in the
16th century. Former British chancellor Nigel Lawson, who chairs the London-based sceptic think tank The Global Warming Policy
Foundation, has written that, "adaptation will enable us, if and when it is necessary, greatly to reduce the adverse
consequences of global warming, at far less cost than mitigation [emissions reduction], to the point where for the
world as a whole, these are unlikely greatly to outweigh (if indeed they outweigh at all) the customarily overlooked
benefits of global warming".
1nr
Damaged cartels more likely to lash-out
Beittel, 13 – Analyst in Latin American Affairs (June, "Mexico's Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of the Violence",
fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf)
As the DTOs have fractured and more organizations vie for control of trafficking routes, the level of inter- and
intra-cartel violence has spiked. Inter-DTO violence is used when the cartels fight one another to dominate
trafficking routes. Besides inter-DTO violence (between the different organizations), there has been widespread violence within
the organizations, as factions battle in succession struggles to replace fallen or arrested leaders. The succession battles are
hastened bythe drug war victories by the Mexican government. In describing the violence resulting from the elimination of a leader, one observer refers
to “internal vacancy chains” that result when an organization is squeezed by the government and there is great uncertainty about how the leader will be
replaced (either through internal succession or external replacement). In some cases, a weakened DTO will be attacked by other DTOs
in a “feeding frenzy” until the uncertainty of succession is resolved.109 Thus highly charged violence may result
from asymmetric weakening of competitive organizations .110 Intra-DTO violence is used to assert leadership
inside the cartel or to impose organizational discipline and loyalty. The violent response of the DTOs to the
government’s aggressive security strategy is a third key element leading to escalation . Gun battles between government
forces and the DTOs are regular occurrences. And with the expansion of democratic pluralism, DTOs are fighting the state to reassert their impunity
from the justice system.
Legalizing doesn’t solve violence
By Mark Kleiman 11 Professor of Public Policy at the Luskin School of Public Affairs at the University of California, Los Angeles. “Surgical Strikes in
the Drug Wars” Smarter Policies for Both Sides of the Border” Foreign Affairs, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2011 ISSUE,
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68131/mark-kleiman/surgical-strikes-in-the-drug-wars ac 6-24
Full commercial legalization of cannabis, or some alternative short of full commercialization, such as lawful production for personal use
or by user cooperatives,
would shrink the revenue of the Mexican trafficking organizations by approximately one-fifth ,
according to Beau Kilmer and his colleagues at the RAND Corporation:
not a dramatic gain but certainly not trivial. Whether
trafficking violence would be reduced by a comparable amount is a question for speculation, with no real
evidence either way. Mexican drug traffickers would be left with plenty to fight over and more than enough
money to finance their combat.
dispersal problems, tech barriers, risk fo back spread—experts agree
John Mueller, Professor, Political Science, Ohio State University, OVERBLOWN: HOW POLITICIANS AND THE TERRORISM
INDUSTRY INFLATE NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS, AND WHY WE BELIEVE THEM, 2009, p. 21-22.
For the most destructive results, biological weapons need to be dispersed in very low-altitude aerosol
clouds. Because aerosols do not appreciably settle, pathogens like anthrax (which is not easy to spread or catch and
is not contagious) would probably have to be sprayed near nose level. Moreover, 90 percent of the
microorganisms are likely to die during the process of aerosolization, and their effectiveness could be
reduced still further by sunlight, smog, humidity, and temperature changes. Explosive methods of
dispersion may destroy the organisms, and, except for anthrax spores, long-term storage of lethal organisms in bombs or
warheads is difficult: even if refrigerated, most of the organisms have a limited lifetime. The effects of such weapons can take
days or weeks to have full effect, during which time they can be countered with medical and civil
defense measures. And their impact is very difficult to predict; in combat situations they may spread back onto the
attacker. In the judgment of two careful analysts, delivering microbes and toxins over a wide area in the
form most suitable for inflicting mass casualties—as an aerosol that can be inhaled—requires a delivery system
whose development "would outstrip the technical capabilities of all but the most sophisticated terrorist"
Even then effective dispersal could easily be disrupted by unfavorable environmental and
meteorological conditions." After assessing, and stressing, the difficulties a nonstate entity would find
in obtaining, handling, growing, storing, processing, and dispersing lethal pathogens effectively,
biological weapons expert Milton Leitenberg compares his conclusions with glib pronouncements in the
press about how biological attacks can be pulled off by anyone with "a little training and a few glass
jars," or how it would be "about as difficult as producing beer." He sardonically concludes, "The less
the commentator seems to know about biological warfare the easier [they] he seems to think the task
is.""
Countermeasures and basic biology show how absurd this impact is
Coates 2009 – former adjunct professor at George Washington University, President of the Kanawha Institute for the Study of the Future and was
President of the International Association for Impact Assessment and was President of the Association for Science, Technology and Innovation, M.S.,
Hon D., FWAAS, FAAAS, (Joseph F., Futures 41, 694-705, "Risks and threats to civilization, humankind, and the earth”, ScienceDirect, WEA)
Could diseases in animals be converted in a laboratory into ones transmissible among people? The answer is yes, but it is
very unlikely that one could accomplish this easily and if one did have an organism that would transmit from animal to people, and then
people to people, it would only be significant if that animal was widely distributed in the target area. So birds would be ideal and
rats might be significant. There are few other animals around to transmit to people unless we consider pets and insects. We have pretty
good protection against insects and, in a crisis, we would be ready to use somewhat more dangerous materials like DDT
to fight a contaminated invasion until we developed other remedies. The serious limitation on self-propagating diseases generated for terrorists’
purposes is that it could be self-defeating because if it is effectively self-propagating, it will eventually bounce back to the
attacking country and, presumably, have similar effects there as it has in the target country.
Early detection of disease spread is fairly straightforward in terms of modern epidemiology in most parts of the world. The most dramatic
effects, aside from deaths, would be in the preventive measure to reduce the propagation of the disease from spreading by extremely severe reduction
in travel for both people and cargoes, domestically and internationally. This may extend for quite a time until a preventive measure or vaccine is
developed, tested and proven. Even assuming that an enemy initiated an attack, there would be the problem of where and what would happen as we
learned about the attack. Would it become self-limiting? Suppose they managed a release in ten cities. Those ten largest cities, perhaps, represent
10% of the population and we could
take internal measures, as suggested above, to contain it in those cities. Pandemics are a
credible catastrophic situation slowing and disrupting the economy and society but not threatening nationhood in the advanced nations.
A high death-rate pandemic is likely to create a greater setback in Worlds 2 and 3. The Black Death in Europe 1347–1352 killed an estimated third of the
population, 25 million people. The Spanish Flu in 1918 killed 20–50 million people and infected a billion. The latter had no lasting effects
comprising a threat to
stability.
Fragmentation and diversification collapse PEMEX reforms---that’s key to American energy
security
Jeremy Martin, Director of the Energy Program at the Institute of the Americas,
and Sylvia Longmire, Mexico Security Expert & President,
Longmire Consulting, “The Perilous Intersection of Mexico’s Drug War & Pemex,” 15 MARCH ’11,
http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=283:the-perilous-intersection-of-mexicos-drug-war-aamppemex&catid=114:content0211&Itemid=374
The drug war in Mexico is being fought on two fronts . First, roughly seven major drug trafficking organizations, or DTOs, are
fighting against each other for control of lucrative drug smuggling corridors, or plazas, into the United States. Second, they
are also fighting a massive military and law enforcement offensive under the direction of Mexican President Felipe
Calderón, who decided upon entering office in 2006 that existing levels of drug trafficking and associated violence would not be tolerated. The
DTO’s took exception to Calderón’s new mandate, and fought back with a vengeance. Their attacks against each other and against
government forces have included beheadings and dismemberments, targeted assassinations, mass murders, grenade attacks, public daylight shootings
with high-powered assault rifles, and even the occasional use of car bombs. The result has been the death of more than 34,000
people, including an increasing number of innocent bystanders who have nothing to do with the drug trade. Last
year, with over 15,000 deaths associated with the battle, was the deadliest yet. Despite the seemingly unending violence and
impenetrability of DTO defenses, their drug trafficking activities—and subsequently their drug-related profits—have been taking
a hit from the combination of Mexican and US law enforcement actions. The escalating violence is partly a result of increased
competition for more tightly guarded plazas and an increase in drug seizures on both sides of the border. For these reasons, DTO’s have
expanded their business to include kidnap-and-ransom operations, extortion, human smuggling, and oil theft. As will be discussed below, this has
brought an increasing overlap between DTO activity and Mexico’s oil industry. From politics to finance - oil’s continued hold on Mexico’s national psyche The interconnection of oil and nationalism in
Mexico is historic and constitutional. Indeed, the Mexican Constitution sets forth the basic facts that President Lázaro Cárdenas emphasized during the nationalization period of the 1930’s: “The nation is
the only owner of the all the hydrocarbons reserves and production”; that “licensing and concessions are prohibited”; and that “Pemex is the nation’s operator and controls the first-hand sales and must not
share revenues, production or reserves.” This fundamental political reality continues to affect development of the nation’s huge oil resource potential by restricting private—particularly foreign—investment.
It has been said that in Mexico, oil is not merely a chemical compound but rather a fundamental element of sovereignty—a part of the national DNA. The story is well known but worth repeating: Oil is an
essential part of the national treasury. Though diminished in relative terms for Mexico’s economy, oil still generates over 15 percent of current export earnings. Moreover, Pemex, due to its onerous fiscal
and tax regime, accounts for about 40 percent of the government’s budget. Oil long ago emerged as a significant form of hard currency and provided what amounted to an economic lifeline for a series of
Institutional Revolutionary Party, or PRI, governments. In some cases, oil earnings provided a last gasp to stave off financial crisis in the country, such as the 1994 peso crisis. In late 1994, as Mexico
neared default, the United States orchestrated an international bailout of roughly $50 billion. Mexican oil sales were used—quite successfully—as collateral for the roughly $20 billion in US loans to
Mexico. Leaders for years have depended upon and pointed to the windfall of the nation’s oil patch for its economic well-being and, during the good times, growth. Without broad tax and fiscal reform in
the nation, Pemex will remain a financial linchpin, albeit an increasingly tenuous one. From Cardenas to Cantarell’s golden age The Cardenas legacy is celebrated in textbooks and with a national holiday
on March 18 to celebrate the expropriation, but it was a fisherman’s discovery that really gave it legs. Aided by a prolific field in the shallow waters of the Bay of Campeche, Mexico entered what might be
termed a Golden Age of Oil in the 1970s with the discovery of the supergiant Cantarell field. Cantarell catapulted Mexico and Pemex into position as one of the world’s most important oil exporting nations,
particularly in the Western Hemisphere. Nowhere was this more evident than in the oil commerce between Mexico and its northern neighbor, the United States. Thanks to Cantarell, Mexico became, after
Canada, the United States’ most trusted supplier of foreign oil. The timing of the relationship’s maturation was perfect as our increasing dependency on oil took inescapable hold in the 1970s. Beyond
Cantarell? In hindsight, what seemed like a golden age for oil production and government coffers in Mexico instead foisted upon the nation a more ominous trend toward the first effects of Cantarell
disease and easy oil affliction. The myopic policies of the time, coupled with the seemingly infinite spoils of Cantarell, placed Pemex and the nation on a bumpy path toward the unkind decade of 20002010 that saw Cantarell’s production crash. True, Cantarell is not the only significant field in Mexico. But the steady production increase of Ku Maloob Zaap (KMZ) has barely offset Pemex’s overall
plummeting production. Worse, in 2010 Pemex indicated that KMZ production reached its peak and has about a three year horizon for the current optimum production of roughly 850,000 barrels per day
(bpd). And then there’s the Chicontopec field. A geologically challenging play, it has proved a major disappointment for Pemex, which long offered it as the key to offsetting both Cantarell and KMZ
decline. Chicontopec has only recently hit 40,000 bpd, far below earlier estimates of hundreds of thousands of barrels per day of production. The facts are unfortunate but fairly plain to see: Mexico’s oil
production is in serious decline. In 2004, Pemex oil production peaked just below 3.5 million barrels per day (mbd); in 2009, it dipped to roughly 2.7 mbd. And though some success at stabilization has
been made, production in 2010 still ended at just under 2.6 mbd. Figure 2 offers a stark picture of the issue at hand for Mexico, Pemex and the regional energy matrix. Simply put, the recent decade was
not kind to Pemex. To further answer the question of what happens in Mexico beyond Cantarell, the current predicament and context must be acknowledged. Indeed, estimates have pointed to oil
production average decline rates of about 5 percent per year, beginning in 2010. In the last few years, talk has emerged that Mexico will likely cease to be an oil exporter by the end of the current decade.
The Energy Information Administration, however, indicates that may be an optimistic premise: In its International Energy Outlook 2010, it estimated that Mexico could become a net importer by 2015, with
imports surpassing 1 mbd by 2035. It is also worth noting that Mexico’s stated plan to deal with the foregoing scenarios and its hope to reverse these ominous trends lie in the deep waters on Mexico’s
side of the Gulf. The touted “treasure at the bottom of the sea” bandied about during the 2008 energy reform debate remains the true “X factor” for any legitimate answers to what happens beyond
Pemex exposed and impacted As discussed previously, oil theft from Pemex
pipelines, money laundering by way of service stations, and, worst of all, provocative kidnappings of the company’s executives and
those of service companies working with the state firm, are all on the rise. Unofficial figures place thefts from the
Pemex network at roughly $2 billion annually. And security experts point to this as an important source of revenue for
drug cartels—especially as the Mexican government continues to crack down on them. Thefts from the Pemex network are not
new, but the increase and the strain it is placing on the already-taxed company is important. And the illegal tapping has
grown significantly in the areas where the drug war is the most pervasive. The spike in fuel thefts and illegal trading, as well as
Cantarell, and whether or not the EIA forecast for imports in 25 years holds true.
kidnappings, has led some to question whether Pemex is fully in charge of all its facilities across the nation. For some experts following the situation, the
answer is a resounding no. Indeed, many analysts indicate that the physical security and monitoring of pipelines belonging to Pemex are severely
lacking. According to Mexican daily El Universal, oil looting has occurred in almost every state in Mexico, while the Wall Street Journal, citing Pemex
statistics, indicated that between January and November 2010, Pemex discovered 614 illegal siphons—368 in liquid fuels pipelines, 196 in oil pipelines,
and 50 in liquefied petroleum gas ducts. Pemex has begun installing systems to detect declines in pressure in some oil product pipelines but the project
is expected to take years to complete. Kidnappings send shudders Kidnappings of Pemex executives and subcontractors, including
have taken place across the country but most notably in Tabasco, Tamaulipas and Nuevo Leon, sending
kidnappings have terrorized a community where, according to a Los Angeles
Times story, jobs on the oil rigs and at the gas wells are handed down, father to son, for generations. “How is it ,”
asked a relative of a kidnapped worker, “that Pemex, supposedly the backbone of the nation, can be made to bow down like this?”
workers from international firms,
shudders throughout the company and Mexico. The
One analysis, published by Grupo Reforma highlighted the oil town of Reforma, Chiapas, where at least 30 Pemex employees—ranging from executives
to laborers—have been kidnapped over the past year. Mexico Weekly has also reported on other forms of violence that have
flared in prime Pemex production zones, such as the Burgos Basin, site of Mexico's biggest natural gas field in
Tamaulipas. Last spring, gunmen seized the Gigante Uno gas plant and kidnapped five Pemex workers. Increasingly unsafe conditions are
severely hindering Pemex’s ability to produce natural gas in the Burgos Basin. The Burgos Basin stretches across the
northern border state of Tamaulipas, where the Gigante Uno plant is located, and spills into the states of Nuevo León and
Coahuila. All three states are experiencing extremely high levels of drug-related violence, especially along these states’ border with Texas. The
stretch from Nuevo Laredo to Matamoros is in the midst of a bloody conflict between the Gulf cartel and Los Zetas, former paramilitaries and enforcers
for the Gulf cartel who are now one of the more vicious DTOs in their own right. Los Zetas are viewed as largely responsible for the kidnapping of Pemex
employees in that region. “Once
Pemex … comes under regular attack from the cartels, rather than just random,
disorganized thugs, then you have far more serious national security problems – much worse in the government's eyes than a bunch of
homicides in the slums of Ciudad Juárez," said Malcolm Beith, author of The Last Narco, a book about the hunt for Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzmán Loera.
Regrettably, Burgos is becoming synonymous with the perilous intersection of Mexico’s raging drug war with Pemex’s
efforts to produce the critical energy supplies the nation and region demand. The Murphy Energy case One case of fuel theft from Pemex that’s
winding its way through the justice system provides a unique insight into that part of the problem the company is confronting. According to MarketWatch, federal documents released in August 2010
revealed a Texas chemical plant, owned by German chemical company BASF Corp., bought $2 million worth of petroleum products that had been stolen from Pemex and smuggled across the US border.
The documents also showed the stolen condensate passed through several companies' hands before arriving on a barge at the BASF facility in Port Arthur, Texas. The actual transport of stolen oil from
Mexican pipelines into US corporate hands is complicated at best. Donald Schroeder, former president of Trammo Corp., testified that in January 2009, two companies, Murphy Energy Corp. and
Continental Fuels, contacted him. Both wanted to sell him stolen condensate. Apparently he agreed to buy it, and the transfers began. “Unnamed import companies” would sell the condensate to
intermediary companies like Continental (which has since shuttered its headquarters in Houston). Those import companies would smuggle the condensate across the border and store it in Continental
facilities. No details were available on how those trucks managed to successfully cross the US Mexico border. These piecemeal transfers would continue until there was enough oil in the storage facility to
fill a barge and ship to BASF. Jim McAlister, an Assistant US Attorney, said he has no reason to believe that BASF has any involvement in the alleged wrongdoing. The President and founder of Murphy
Energy Corp., Matt Murphy, said the company did not know that the condensate was stolen. Josh Crescenzi, the vice president of Continental Fuels, has not been indicted in the case, nor has anyone
else from Continental. This particular case has been a success, resulting in the handover of $2.4 million by US customs authorities to the Mexican government. But the extent of corruption in Mexico—
within Pemex, in particular—and the ease with which oil can be stolen from pipelines makes the mitigation of oil looting an almost insurmountable challenge. Adding to the problem is the fact that Mexican
cartels are involved. According to Reuters, the Mexican government believes the cartels use stolen jet fuel in their aircraft to cover up any evidence of illicit flights. In August 2009, Mexico’s federal police
commissioner Rodrigo Esparza said Los Zetas used false import documents to smuggle at least $46 million worth of oil in tankers to unnamed US refineries. President Felipe Calderón has said that DTOs
in northern Mexico are responsible for most oil theft. On some levels Pemex is not just a victim of oil-thieving DTOs; sometimes, it’s directly involved. In February 2010, Mexican military units seized more
than four tons of marijuana at Pemex installations in Reynosa, Tamaulipas. The discovery was made after Pemex security alerted officials that armed men were removing Pemex employees from a fuel
supply station. In response, a Mexican Naval helicopter was dispatched to the scene but retreated after receiving heavy weapons fire from the ground. When military units arrived on the ground, they
found the marijuana loaded on trucks abandoned at the site. These alarming facts have led to perhaps the most ominous question of all: Is the company being infiltrated by the perpetrators of the nation’s
drug business? In light of the increasing number of incidents President Calderón has acknowledged, there may well be internal operatives at Pemex aiding and abetting the DTOs.
For its part,
Pemex is soliciting the help of the Mexican people to try to put a stop to oil looting . Last August, the Mexican
government posted a Pemex press release, in which exhorts that oil looting is not just an unpatriotic crime
against the company and the government, but against the Mexican people. It also offers the number of a hotline where
individuals can anonymously report pipeline breaches. Why the perilous intersection matters The relevance of what is happening in
Mexico matters on a variety of levels, but in particular, there are three broad reasons that bear discussion. First, and as best portrayed in Figure 2,
Pemex has seen its oil production drop precipitously since 2004. The firm has been struggling for the better part
of the last decade to deal with a burdensome tax straitjacket, poor planning at its largest field, a lack of new
discoveries of oil and production, and an inability to implement serious reform. Moreover, by the nature of being
dragged into—and becoming part of—Mexico’s massive drug war, Pemex is clearly suffering from the additional strain and
havoc wrought by the myriad elements of the conflict on its business. From huge financial losses to the increasing inability to control its network and
prevent theft to the more serious kidnapping threats, the evidence is only becoming clearer. The second reason concerns Mexico’s fiscal dependency on
oil and Pemex. As assorted struggles impact the company's and the nation’s fiscal well-being, broader and longer
term economic growth and employment discussions become ever more complicated for policy makers. These
issues are particularly critical as the nation appears far from passage of the necessary and far-reaching national
tax and fiscal reforms that could ameliorate some of the burden on Pemex and the nation’s oil dependency. Third, all
of the above leads to the real potential for further erosion of Mexico’s critical role as a secure and constant energy
supplier for the United States and the Western Hemisphere. As oil prices steadily rise in early 2011, it is quite rational to
revisit the significant energy security aspects of Mexico’s persistent energy woes, which are now clearly exacerbated by the
overflow of drug war violence and corruption. On the heels of yet another State of the Union address in the United States that
included elegant rhetoric about the country’s energy imbalance and energy security risks, a comprehensive, all of
the above approach and solution remains far from reach. Conclusion Clearly oil, and energy more broadly, is not a sector of the
economy where Mexico needs any further impediments. Pemex’s huge hurdles derive largely from its inability to
replace declining oil production and navigate a burdensome nationalistic legacy. What is now added to the combustible mix is an
increasing drain on the company’s finances and, worse, a sense of trepidation among executives in the field. Threats against its executives
and loss of its resources are surely not a useful element as the company makes efforts to reform itself. All of the above analysis
is of extreme relevance to Mexico for its financial and overall well-being—and especially for Pemex. It is also critical for North American
energy security as the United States, in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon incident, deals with offshore drilling restrictions and
slow downs in the formerly prolific Gulf of Mexico. Moreover, there are thorny issues surrounding increased production
from Canada’s oil sands for the US market. This was made abundantly clear during an early February visit by Canadian Prime Minister
Stephen Harper to the White House. More than 80 environmental groups used the occasion to send a letter of protest
to President Obama. These concerns do not appear to have any immediate or simple resolutions and make the
United States' need to count on Mexico greater than ever before.
Energy insecurity causes nuclear war
Neil King, global economics editor for the WSJ, Peak Oil: A Survey of Security Concerns, Center for a New American Security,
‘8,
http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Working%20Paper_PeakOil_King_Sept2008.pdf
soaring oil prices and market
volatility could spark an outright oil war between major powers —possibly ignited not by China or Russia, but by the U nited
Many commentators in the United States and abroad have begun to wrestle with the question of whether
S tates. In a particularly pointed speech on the topic in May, James Russell of the Naval Postgraduate School in California addressed
increasing militarization of international energy security. “Energy security is now deemed so central
to ‘national security’ that threats to the former are liable to be reflexively interpreted as threats to the latter,” he told a gathering at the James A.
Baker Institute for Public Policy at Houston’s Rice University.6 The possibility that a large-scale war could break out over access
what he called the
to dwindling energy resources, he wrote, “is one of the most alarming prospects facing the current world system.”7 Mr.
Russell figures among
a growing pool of analysts who worry in particular about the psychological readiness of the U nited
S tates to deal rationally with a sustained oil shock . Particularly troubling is the increasing perception within Congress that the financial
side of the oil markets no longer functions rationally. It has either been taken over by speculators or is being manipulated, on the supply side, by
producers who are holding back on pumping more oil in order to drive up the price.
analysts fear, could
A breakdown in trust for the oil markets , these
spur calls for government action—even military intervention . “The perceptive chasm in the United States between
new [oil] market realities and their impact on the global distribution of power will one day close,” Mr. Russell said. “And when it does, look out.”8 The
World at Peak: Taking the Dim View For years, skeptics scoffed at predictions that the United States would hit its own domestic oil production peak by
sometime in the late 1960s. With its oil fields pumping full out, the U.S. in 1969 was providing an astonishing 25 percent of the world’s oil supply—a role
no other country has ever come close to matching. U.S. production then peaked in December 1970, and has fallen steadily ever since, a shift that has
dramatically altered America’s own sense of vulnerability and reordered its military priorities. During World War II, when its allies found their own oil
supplies cut off by the war, the United States stepped in and made up the difference. Today it is able to meet less than a third of its own needs. A similar
peak in worldwide production would have far more sweeping consequences. It would, for one, spell the end of the world’s unparalleled economic boom
over the last century. It would also dramatically reorder the wobbly balance of power between nations as energy-challenged industrialized countries turn
their sights on the oil-rich nations of the Middle East and Africa. In a peak oil future, the small, flattened, globalized world that has awed recent
commentators would become decidedly round and very vast again. Oceans will reemerge as a hindrance to trade, instead of the conduit they have been
for so long. An energy-born jolt to the world economy would leave no corner of the globe untouched. Unable to pay their own fuel bills, the tiny
could sweep across many of the
smallest and poorest countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, reversing many of the tentative gains in those
regions and stirring deep social unrest . Large patches of the world rely almost entirely on diesel-powered generators for what skimpy
Marshall Islands this summer faced the possibility of going entirely without power. That is a reality that
electricity they now have. Those generators are the first to run empty as prices soar. A British parliamentary report released in June on “The Impact of
Peak Oil on International Development” concluded that “the deepening energy crisis has the potential to make poverty a permanent state for a growing
number of people, undoing the development efforts of a generation.”9 We are seeing some of the consequences already in Pakistan – a country of
its own stash of nuclear weapons – that is now in the grips of a severe energy crisis . By
crippling the country’s economy, battering the stock market, and spurring mass protests, Pakistan’s power shortages could end up
giving the country’s Islamic parties the leverage they have long needed to take power . It’s not hard to imagine similar
huge strategic importance, with
scenarios playing out in dozens of other developing countries. Deepening economic unrest will put an enormous strain on the United Nations and other
international aid agencies. Anyone who has ever visited a major UN relief hub knows that their fleets of Land Rovers, jumbo jets and prop planes have a
military size thirst for fuel. Aid agency budgets will come under unprecedented pressure just as the need for international aid skyrockets and donor
countries themselves feel pressed for cash. A peaking of oil supplies could also hasten the impact of global climate change by dramatically driving up
the use of coal for power generation in much of the world. A weakened world economy would also put in jeopardy the massively expensive projects,
such as carbon capture and storage, that many experts look to for a reduction in industrial emissions. So on top of the strains caused by scarce fossil
fuels, the world may also have to grapple with the destabilizing effects of more rapid desertification, dwindling fisheries, and strained food supplies. An
oil-constricted world will also stir perilous frictions between haves and have-nots. The vast majority of all the world’s known
oil reserves is now in the hands of national oil companies, largely in countries with corrupt and autocratic governments. Many of these governments—
Iran and Venezuela top the list—are now seen as antagonists of the U nited States. Tightened oil supplies will substantially
boost these countries’ political leverage , but that enhanced power will carry its own peril. Playing the oil card when nations are
scrambling for every barrel will be a far more serious matter that at any time in the past. The European continent could also undergo a profound shift as
its needs—and sources of energy—diverge all the more from those of the United States. A conservation-oriented Europe (oil demand is on the decline in
almost every EU country) will look all the more askance at what it sees as the gluttonous habits of the United States. At the same time, Europe’s
governments may have little choice but to shy from any political confrontations with its principal energy supplier, Russia. An energy-restricted future will
greatly enhance Russia’s clout within settings like the UN Security Council but also in its dealings with both Europe and China. Abundant oil and gas
have fueled Russia’s return to power over the last decade, giving it renewed standing within the UN and increasing sway over European capitals. The
peak oil threat is already sending shivers through the big developing countries of China and India, whose propulsive growth (and own internal stability)
requires massive doses of energy. For
Beijing, running low on fuel spells economic chaos and internal strife , which in turn
Slumping oil supplies will automatically pit the two largest
energy consumers—the U nited S tates and China—against one another in competition over supplies in South America, West
spawns images of insurrection and a breaking up of the continent sized country.
Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia. China
is already taking this competition very seriously . It doesn’t require much of a leap to
imagine a Cold War-style scramble between Washington and Beijing—not for like-minded allies this time but simply for reliable and tested suppliers of
oil. One region that offers promise and peril in almost equal measure is the Artic, which many in the oil industry consider the last big basin
the Artic remains an ungoverned ocean whose legal status couldn’t be less clear, especially so long
the ices there recede, the risk increases
that a scramble for assets in the Artic could turn nasty .
of untapped hydrocarbon riches. But
as the United States continues to remain outside the international Law of the Sea Treaty. A s
Cartels take over the informal economy- causes violence and icnrases power
Felbab-Brown No Date
[Vanda Felbab-Brown, senior fellow with the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings and expert on
international and internal conflicts and nontraditional security threats, including insurgency, organized crime, urban violence and illicit economies,
“Mexico’s Drug Wars: A Live Web Chat with Vanda Felbab-Brown,”
http://www.coveritlive.com/index2.php/option=com_altcaster/task=viewaltcast/template=/altcast_code=1a6bdab501/ipod=y // wyo-cjh]
1:08 Comment From Dale: What impact do you think the legalization of drugs, such as California's vote this November on marijuana, would have on drug violence in Mexico?
what if the
US/California legalizes, the second one is what if Mexico legalizes. And indeed, the voices for the legalization of marijuana in Mexico are growing, and include, for
example, former President Vicente Fox. 1:11 Vanda Felbab-Brown: Countries may have a good reason to legalize. These could include shifting the
Some people are saying it could drastically reduce violence in Mexico. 1:09 Vanda Felbab-Brown: The legalization question entails two different parts: one is
focus of law enforcement from users to organized crime or better using public health tools to deal with addiction rates (though legalization is likely to increase use to some
extent; how much is the big and difficult to estimate issue) or with secondary public health problems. 1:12 Vanda Felbab-Brown: But
there are good reasons to
be skeptical that legalization in either the US or Mexico would reduce the violence. In fact, it can make it worse. Indeed, Mexico's
legalization - if it were to take place -- would be more viable if increase of law enfrocement capacity and the suprpession of violence and capacity to corrupt or intimidate the
state and society took place. 1:12 Vanda Felbab-Brown: Why? 1:15 Vanda Felbab-Brown: There
are reasons to doubt that the DTOs would
simply go bankrupt or just take the loss of up to 60% of their income lying down. Instead, they would try to develop their own
marijuana fields in areas that the state in Mexico does not control or where its presence is limited & impose smaller taxes to undercut legal production in
Mexico or in the US. But if either place legalized, imposing strong taxes would be one way to mitigate the increase in consumption -- in the same way that
cigarettes are treated, example, thus setting an opportunity for a grey/illegal economy along side the legal one - just as we have w/ stolen cars or smuggled cigarettes. 1:17
Vanda Felbab-Brown: The
DTOs would also intensify their struggle -- often violent over the smuggling of other illegal
commodities, such as other drugs - cocaine and meth for example- and undocumented migrants. And very dangerously,
they'd be even more motivated than now to take over the informal economy, franchise it, and extort the legal
economy. All of which would keep their money flows and could greatly increase their political power while not reducing violence. 1:18
Vanda Felbab-Brown: Legalization is not a panacea. It is not an escape from the institutional development of its law enforcement that mexico needs to do, nor
from devising a social policies that integrates into the state and its formal institutions the vast segments of the population that still persists in poverty and its marginalized in its
social access and advancement, These mexicans need to come to see that hope and better future lies with the mexican state, not outside it.
Legalization decreases revenue from weed—causes increased violence from competition.
O.A.S 13
[Organization of American States, THE ECONOMICS OF DRUG TRAFFICKING, 2013,
http://www.cicad.oas.org/drogas/elinforme/informeDrogas2013/laEconomicaNarcotrafico_ENG.pdf]
The impact that the loss of marijuana revenues—in the event that they were large—would have on drug trade-related violence
in Mexico is even more uncertain. Empirical evidence on how violence changes with illicit drug profits is mixed and thus offers little guidance.78 In any case,
a large loss in marijuana revenues would affect some drug trafficking organizations more than others. For example,
Sinaloa revenues could fall by as much as 50 percent, whereas the Zetas would be less affected.79 This raises the possibility that Sinaloa’s rivals
would take advantage of its weakened position by attempting to seize control of some of its territory, generating
increased violence in the short to medium term. A large decline in marijuana revenues could also generate violence within
drug trafficking organizations by spurring members to compete over dwindling profits and a declining number of
jobs. On the other hand, a decline in profits could reduce violence in the long run, as the returns to entering and fighting over control of the drug trade would be lower. Even
if effects on violence are non-trivial, they may be difficult to distinguish against a backdrop of other changes. Any changes in cannabis markets will take time to develop and
may occur simultaneously with other changes that also affect violence rates in Mexico.