Mexico Corruption Conditions CP
1NC
Text: The United States Federal Government will <do the plan> if and only if
Mexico agrees to:
- Enhance transparency by protecting the free flow of information,
- Expand targeted performance-based funding to the Mexican states,
- Allow monitoring and reporting of crimes directly to a federal body,
- And increase police wages, training, and equipment.
Conditioning aid on transparency and police reform works—creates a police
force independent of political pressures
Velez-Green, Reyes, and Ramicone Sep-12 (Alex, Robin, and Anthony, The Institute of
Politics is a non-profit organization located in the John F. Kennedy School of Government at
Harvard University, “GOVERNMENTAL, JUDICIAL AND POLICE CORRUPTION,”
http://www.iop.harvard.edu/sites/default/files_new/research-policypapers/TheWarOnMexicanCartels.pdf)
Thirdly, recognizing that functioning police forces are essential to ensure the safety of
noncorrupt officials as well as to maintain public safety and order, the U.S. should target aid
to ¶ specific communities at the local level, creating secure cities one at a time and then
exporting ¶ that model to other regions. Specifically, the Merida Initiative funding could be
used as an ¶ incentive mechanism to entice officials at the state and local level to sign off on
policies that ¶ would enhance transparency, allow for the overhaul of the local police forces,
and allow ¶ monitoring and reporting of crimes directly to a federal body. This would achieve
two ¶ objectives. First, it would overcome funding issues at the local levels. Second, it would
help ¶ create local police forces that are better trained, better paid, and better equipped, but
that ¶ remain independent of local political pressures by reporting directly to a federal
agency.
That’s key to solve corruption and security in Mexico
Sabet May-10 (Daniel, “Police Reform in Mexico: Advances and Persistent Obstacles,”
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Mexico Institute, University of San Diego
Trans-Border Institute, Daniel Sabet is a visiting professor at Georgetown University’s Edmund A.
Walsh School of Foreign Service,
http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/dms76/policefiles/Sabet_police_reform.pdf)
At no time in Mexico’s history has there been a greater need for professional police forces.
The ¶ current security crisis, which resulted in an estimated 6,587 organized crime related
killings in ¶ 2009, has brought police reform to the top of the national agenda.1¶ While law
enforcement ¶ should be the primary tool to address the country’s crime problems, the police
are viewed as part ¶ of the problem rather than part of the solution. A brief review of the daily
newspapers reveals ¶ problems such as (1) corruption and collusion with organized crime, (2)
abuses of human rights ¶ in the form of torture, unwarranted search and seizure, violations to
due process, and inversion of ¶ the presumption of innocence, and (3) ineffectiveness
exemplified by the inability to stem the ¶ violence, poor investigation and intelligence gathering
capabilities, and high rates of impunity. ¶ Evidence of these three problems has produced a
deep seeded lack of confidence in the police, ¶ which ironically makes the police even less
effective and further perpetuates corruption and ¶ abuse. ¶ Addressing Mexico’s security crisis
will require creating an effective police force operating ¶ within the confines of the law.
Failing to fix corruption in Mexico undermines Mexico’s ability to fight the drug
cartels
Morris (Stephen D. Professor, Middle Tennessee State University3, The brown journal of world
affairs, “Corruption, Drug Tra!cking, and Violence in Mexico,”
http://www.mtsu.edu/politicalscience/faculty/documents/Corruption%20Brown%20article%20
Morris.pdf)
To reiterate, the prevailing patterns of corruption associated with drug ¶ trafficking and
organized crime not only facilitate the illicit businesses of these ¶ organizations, but also
effectively handicap official state efforts to control or contain them. Part and parcel of the
weaknesses of Mexico’s institutions of justice, ¶ corruption strips the state of its capacity to
enforce the rule of law, gather and ¶ effectively use intelligence, carry out investigative and
forensic work, make arrests, and prosecute members of criminal organizations or corrupt
state officials: ¶ in short, to employ the justice system to provide security and accountability. ¶
Furthermore, corruption undermines the public’s trust in the government and ¶ thus prevents
the state from receiving the level of cooperation needed from society for effective law
enforcement. Thus, because of corruption, when fighting ¶ criminals, the state must also fight
parts of itself.30 Understanding the prevailing ¶ corrupt bargain is a critical point in
understanding both the tools at Calderón’s ¶ disposal when he launched the 2006 war and the
dynamics that war unleashed.33
Mexican drug cartels threaten Latin American stability
Amies 11 (Nick Amies, Deutsche Welle news from Germany in the international media
landscape. “Mexican drug cartels exploit Central America's problems” September 5, 2011.
http://www.dw.de/mexican-drug-cartels-exploit-central-americas-problems/a-15061349) VP
The Mexicans have been looking for new routes into the US and have found going south into
Central America and then out through the Caribbean very appealing," Professor Victor Bulmer-Thomas, a Latin America expert
at Chatham House, told Deutsche Welle.¶ "Central America has always been a transit route for drugs from South America, but the
success of the Colombian government against drug trafficking in that country has led to a 'balloon' effect. Part of the trade - coca
growing and paste production - has gone south while cocaine production has gone north to Central America."¶ "Thus, Central
America has been caught in a double squeeze and the governments of the region, including Belize,
are finding it very difficult to cope," Bulmer-Thomas added.¶ Ted Leggett from the United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime believes geography, a lack of law enforcement capacity, corruption, and the legacies of the civil wars that ended in the 1990s
make Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador attractive to the Mexican drug cartels.¶ Leggett said that the Mexican
drug
gangs make use of local street gangs and high-level connections in the government and
military to subvert the rule of law. In Guatemala and Honduras in particular, he said, the risks are
grave.¶ "These countries are already in much worse shape than Mexico," he told Deutsche Welle.
"Murder rates are at least four times higher in all of these countries than in Mexico. High-level
penetration by cartels is equally problematic. And because these countries are much smaller and poorer than
Mexico, they are much less capable of fighting back."¶ The likely effect of cartel infiltration will be that social
and political problems within a number of Central American countries will exacerbate, leading
to increased destabilization which in turn could threaten their regional neighbors. The arrival of the
Zetas and other Mexican drug cartels may turn out to be disastrous for Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador but the shockwaves
won't stop at their own southern borders.¶ Threat to regional stability¶ Countries like Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama may start
to feel the effects should the northern triangle become the next front in the fighting as Mexico's
drug war becomes a
Central American conflict.¶ Relatively stable Central American countries which rely on heavily
on tourism will soon find their economies suffering should the brutality of the conflict seen in Mexico start to
infect their cities and resorts. Remove tourism income from the economic equation and the kind of social problems
experienced by poorer neighbors may not be far behind - with the drug cartels following soon after.
Latin America instability causes extinction
Manwaring 5 (Max G., Retired U.S. Army colonel and an Adjunct Professor of International
Politics at Dickinson College, venezuela’s hugo chávez, bolivarian socialism, and asymmetric
warfare, October 2005, pg. PUB628.pdf)
President Chávez also understands that the process leading to state failure is the most dangerous long-term
security challenge facing the global community today. The argument in general is that failing and failed state
status is the breeding ground for instability, criminality, insurgency, regional conflict, and
terrorism. These conditions breed massive humanitarian disasters and major refugee flows. They can host “evil”
networks of all kinds, whether they involve criminal business enterprise, narco-trafficking, or
some form of ideological crusade such as Bolivarianismo. More specifically, these conditions spawn all kinds of things
people in general do not like such as murder, kidnapping, corruption, intimidation, and destruction of infrastructure. These
means of coercion and persuasion can spawn further human rights violations, torture, poverty,
starvation, disease, the recruitment and use of child soldiers, trafficking in women and body parts, trafficking and
proliferation of conventional weapons systems and WMD, genocide, ethnic cleansing,
warlordism, and criminal anarchy. At the same time, these actions are usually unconfined and spill
over into regional syndromes of poverty, destabilization, and conflict.62 Peru’s Sendero Luminoso calls
violent and destructive activities that facilitate the processes of state failure “armed propaganda.” Drug cartels operating
throughout the Andean Ridge of South America and elsewhere call these activities “business incentives.” Chávez
considers
these actions to be steps that must be taken to bring about the political conditions necessary to
establish Latin American socialism for the 21st century.63 Thus, in addition to helping to provide wider latitude
to further their tactical and operational objectives, state and nonstate actors’ strategic efforts are aimed at progressively lessening a
targeted regime’s credibility and capability in terms of its ability and willingness to govern and develop its national territory and
society. Chávez’s
intent is to focus his primary attack politically and psychologically on selected
Latin American governments’ ability and right to govern. In that context, he understands that popular
perceptions of corruption, disenfranchisement, poverty, and lack of upward mobility limit the right and the ability of a given regime
to conduct the business of the state. Until a given populace generally perceives that its government is dealing with these and other
basic issues of political, economic, and social injustice fairly and effectively, instability
and the threat of subverting or
destroying such a government are real.64 But failing and failed states simply do not go away. Virtually anyone can
take advantage of such an unstable situation. The tendency is that the best motivated and best armed organization on the scene will
control that instability. As a consequence, failing
and failed states become dysfunctional states, rogue
states, criminal states, narco-states, or new people’s democracies. In connection with the creation of new people’s
democracies, one can rest assured that Chávez and his Bolivarian populist allies will be available to provide money, arms, and
leadership at any given opportunity. And, of course, the
longer dysfunctional, rogue, criminal, and narco-states
and people’s democracies persist, the more they and their associated problems endanger global
security, peace, and prosperity.65
Uniqueness
Aid Fails Now
Current aid to Mexico fails because of a lack of strictly enforced conditions
GE 11 (Global Exchange, “Human Rights, Labor, and Religious Groups Call on Obama
Administration and Congress to Uphold Human Rights, Halt Drug War Aid to Mexican Security
Forces,” Global Exchange is an international human rights organization,
http://salsa.democracyinaction.org/o/703/p/dia/action/public/?action_KEY=5074)
Existing U.S. aid to Mexico under the Merida Initiative, amounting to more than $1.3 billion,
does not include necessary safeguards to ensure that it does not contribute to systematic
human rights violations. Only fifteen percent of the funding may be withheld pending a State
Department report on Mexico’s progress toward meeting the human rights conditions of the
bill. Furthermore, the Merida Initiative (also called “Plan Mexico”) includes no benchmarks for
effective evaluation. ¶ The Merida Initiative supports a reckless strategy that has led to massive
bloodshed in Mexico and failed to achieve goals to reduce illicit drug flows, assure public safety
or significantly weaken cartels. With 45,000 troops in the streets as the core feature of this
militarization strategy, the Mexican armed forces have been implicated in murders, rapes and
violations of human rights—the vast majority of which have never been prosecuted. ¶ We are
concerned that the State Department has ignored human rights abuses stemming from the
Merida Initiative aid and continued impunity and corruption within Mexico, in favor of
supporting a militarized approach in the "war on drugs" that has verifiably increased those
abuses. The so-called human rights conditions included in the Merida Initiative provide no
guarantee whatsoever of progress, and have merely served as lip service to serious concerns
while permitting support of the overall strategy. There are no indications of a sustained
reduction in the availability of illegal narcotics on the U.S. market that can even be used to
justify the heightened violence caused by this strategy.
Corruption and violence are rampant but the US is key
Althaus 10-18-10 (Dudley, GlobalPost senior correspondent for Mexico and Central America,
based in Mexico City, “Despite millions in U.S. aid, police corruption plagues Mexico,”
http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Despite-millions-in-U-S-aid-policecorruption-1710872.php)
MEXICO CITY — City cops killing their own mayors; state jailers helping inmates escape;
federal agents mutinying against corrupt commanders; outgunned officers cut down in
ambushes or assassinated because they work for gangster rivals.¶ Always precariously frayed,
Mexico's thin blue line seems ready to snap.¶ Six prison guards were killed Wednesday as they
left their night shift in Chihuahua City, 200 miles south of El Paso. On Tuesday, the head of a
police commander supposedly investigating the death of an American on the Texas border was
packed into a suitcase and sent to a local army base.¶ Mexicans justifiably have long considered
their police suspect. But today many of those wearing the badge are even more brazenly bad:
either unwilling or unable to squelch the lawless terror that's claimed nearly 30,000 lives in
less than four years.¶ State and local forces, which employ 90 percent of Mexico's 430,000
officers, find themselves outgunned, overwhelmed and often purchased outright by
gangsters.¶ Despite some dramatic improvements — aided by U.S. dollars and training under
the $1.6 billion Merida Initiative — Mexico's 32,000 federal police remain spread thin and
hobbled by graft. And many in Mexico consider the American investment little help so far
against the bloody tide wrought by drug gangs.
Aid to Mexico fails now but the US is key
McGovern May-10-12 (Hon. James P. McGovern, Massachusetts, TOM LANTOS HUMAN
RIGHTS COMMISSION, “HEARING BEFORE THE TOM LANTOS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION:
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: ONE HUNDRED AND TWELTH CONGRESS: SECOND SESSION,”
http://tlhrc.house.gov/docs/transcripts/05_10_2012_Human_Rights_in_Mexico.pdf)
These are encouraging steps, but much more needs to be done to ensure that these ¶ reforms
are fully implemented, to establish a more effective and transparent Mexican ¶ judicial
system, and to address the pervasive problems of corruption and impunity. ¶ Accountability
for abuses is particularly important so that the Mexican people believe ¶ that the era of
impunity is starting to come to an end. For its part, the United States ¶ should continue to
provide Mexico with assistance to strengthen the rule of law in ¶ Mexico and advance respect
for human rights.
Abuses are widespread and the police and military aren’t held accountable—
the problem is the judicial system
HRW MAY-18-10 (Human Rights Watch, “Mexico/US: Obama-Calderón Meeting Questions
and Answers: Drug Violence, Military Abuse and US Aid,”
http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/05/18/mexicous-obama-calder-n-meeting-questions-andanswers)
1. Are military abuses widespread?¶ Mexico's official National Human Rights Commission has
issued comprehensive reports on more than 50 cases involving egregious army abuses,
including killings, rape, and torture, since Calderón took office in 2006. The commission has
reported receiving nearly 4,000 additional complaints during this period.¶ The numbers of both
complaints and comprehensive reports of abuses have increased significantly with each year of
the military's deployment. In 2006, the commission did not issue a single comprehensive report
on abuses by the military; in 2009, it issued 30. And from 2006 to 2009 the number of
complaints of military abuse registered with the commission grew ten-fold. Local and
international nongovernmental organizations have documented widespread abuses by
Mexico's security forces under Calderón, a fact acknowledged by the UN Human Rights
Committee.¶ 2. When military officers commit abuses, are they held accountable?¶ No.
Virtually all military abuses of civilians go unpunished. A major reason for this is that they are
investigated and prosecuted by the military itself, and the military justice system is not
structured to address human rights violations independently and impartially. The system is
extremely opaque and secretive; the defense secretary controls both the armed forces and
the military justice system; military judges lack security of tenure; and there is virtually no
civilian review of military court decisions. What's more, victims and their families cannot
effectively challenge the decision that their allegations of human rights abuses be heard in a
military tribunal rather than a civilian court.¶ Proof of the military justice system's failure to
hold soldiers accountable is in the numbers. According to information provided the Mexican
government - made available only after Human Rights Watch repeatedly requested evidence
that the military justice system was in fact prosecuting abuses - only three soldiers have been
found guilty of human rights crimes committed during the Calderón administration. However,
one of those convictions resulted from an automobile accident, which does not constitute a
human rights violation, and another was overturned on appeal. Therefore, only one case
qualifies as a conviction for a human rights abuse, in which a soldier was sentenced to 9 months
in prison for killing a civilian by opening fire at a military checkpoint.
Foreign aid fails now because it’s not targeted
Shleifer, ’10 [November 2010, Andrei Shleifer is a Russian American economist. He served as
project director of the Harvard Institute for International Development's Russian aid project
from its inauguration in 1992 until it was shut down in 1997, “Peter Bauer and the Failure of
Foreign Aid”, http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/catojournal/2010/11/cj29n3-1.pdf]
The bottom line is that perhaps a
few pennies of the original Western taxpayer’s dollar are actually
spent as might be designed and implemented by a benevolent and effective social planner.
The rest is wasted or diverted. Easterly suggests that a trillion dollars has been spent on foreign aid since World War II.
But how much has actually been delivered wisely to the intended recipients of that aid? Viewed
from the perspective of a dollar traveling from the Western taxpayer’s pocket to the intended ultimate recipient, the failure of
foreign aid is not all that puzzling
Mexico Doesn’t Meet Conditions
Mexico doesn’t meet human rights conditions now—but the State Department
is giving funds anyway
Meyer 26-May-10 (Maureen, Associate for Mexico and Central America at the Washington
Office on Latin America, “Conditioned funds for Mexico under the Merida Initiative should not
be released unless concrete progress is made on human rights requirements,”
http://www.wola.org/news/conditioned_funds_for_mexico_under_the_merida_initiative_shoul
d_not_be_released_unless_concrete)
In August 2009, the State Department issued its first “Mexico-Merida Initiative Report” to the
U.S. Congress, triggering the release of the funds conditioned for the first two years of
assistance. Our organizations found the August 2009 report lacked the information necessary
to support the claim that the Mexican government had made significant progress in key areas
of human rights to justify the release of the full amount of Merida funds.¶ The memo sent to
the State Department today assesses the Merida Initiative’s human rights requirements and
includes some of the cases currently being documented and handled by our organizations.
Previously in 2009, a number of our organizations submitted three additional memos to the
State Department to inform their report regarding the human rights requirements in the Merida
Initiative. (1)
Mexico fails to meet human rights conditions now—that includes judicial
reform, police reform, and transparency
Meyer 26-May-10 (Maureen, Associate for Mexico and Central America at the Washington
Office on Latin America, “Conditioned funds for Mexico under the Merida Initiative should not
be released unless concrete progress is made on human rights requirements,”
http://www.wola.org/news/conditioned_funds_for_mexico_under_the_merida_initiative_shoul
d_not_be_released_unless_concrete)
Our organizations believe that the Mexican government has failed to make concrete and
measureable progress in the human rights priority areas identified in the Merida Initiative,
including: ¶ Ensuring that civilian prosecutors and judicial authorities investigate and
prosecute members of the federal police and military forces.¶ To date, only a single human
rights violation perpetrated since 2007 by a member of the military has resulted in a trial and
upheld conviction, according to the Mexican government. This case was tried in a military court,
contrary to the Merida Initiative condition and international law. None of the numerous
allegations of human rights violations perpetrated by the military during President Calderón’s
administration have been tried by civilian prosecutors and judicial authorities.¶ Improving the
transparency and accountability of federal police forces.¶ Recent reforms and public security
policies, such as the June 2009 law creating the new Federal Police, fail to incorporate effective
mechanisms for citizen participation and accountability. The annual reports of the Secretary of
Public Security characterize citizen participation as limited to the presentation of complaints. At
the same time, currently there are not adequate mechanisms to ensure citizen participation in
the design, implementation and evaluation of public security policies at any level. Likewise, the
federal government’s focus on strengthening municipal police, who are the forces who have the
closest and most regular contact with the population, is minimal. ¶ Enforcing the prohibition on
the use of testimony obtained through torture.¶ Security forces routinely use torture to obtain
testimonies. The State Department’s own 2009 Country Report on Human Rights Practice in
Mexico states “judges, particularly in areas that had not yet implemented the [judicial] reforms,
reportedly continued to allow statements coerced through torture to be used as evidence
against the accused, a practice particularly subject to abuse because confessions were often the
primary evidence in criminal conviction.Ӧ Establishing a mechanism for regular consultations
with human rights and civil society organizations to make recommendations concerning the
Merida Initiative. ¶ The “Mechanism for Dialogue with Civil Society Organizations” has not been
an effective consultation mechanism, as it has provided no real opportunities for Mexican
human rights and other civil society organizations to provide recommendations and evaluate
the Merida Initiative in a way that would result in concrete action and outcomes by the Mexican
government.
Despite Mexico failing to meet human rights conditions now including military
and judicial reform, the State Department is nevertheless allocating the funding
Bricker Sep-28-09 (Kristin, “US State Department's Merida Initiative Human Rights Report:
Unconvincing Whitewash: US Likely to Release Millions in Training and Military Hardware to
Mexico Despite Failure to Comply with Human Rights Conditions,” Kristin Bricker is a Mexicobased freelance journalist covering militarization, social movements, and the drug war in Latin
America. She is a NACLA research associate and the Security Sector Reform Resource Centre's
Latin America blogger. http://narcosphere.narconews.com/notebook/kristinbricker/2009/09/us-state-departments-merida-initiative-human-rights-report-unconvin)
The State Department's recently released "Mexico--Merida Initiative Report" aims to
demonstrate that Mexico has complied with the above conditions in order to justify the
release of $100 million in withheld funds. Sen. Patrick Leahy blocked the release of an earlier
version of the report because Mexico had obviously not complied with the conditions, but he
has not commented on the State Department's new attempt to push the report through. It is
currently unclear if the report will lead to the release of the conditioned funds, but an
anonymous State Department official told Bloomberg that the conditioned funds will be
released as soon as the State Department decides how to allocate the money. ¶ Due to the
uncertainty of whether the report will lead to the release of the funds, international and
Mexican human rights organizations are now focusing their energies on convincing Sen. Leahy,
an influential member of the Senate Appropriations Committee and Chairman of the State and
Foreign Operations Subcommittee, to reject the new report.¶ The human rights organizations
have focused their criticism on the most glaring omission in the report: civilian officials are still
not investigating and prosecuting allegations of human rights abuses committed by members
of the military. The military investigates and (rarely) prosecutes these cases under the legal
rubric of "military jurisdiction." This Narco News report will explain in-depth the problems with
military jurisdiction and the Mexican government's stubborn refusal to remedy its severe
shortcomings. However, this report will also demonstrate that the State Department has failed
to prove that Mexico has complied with any of the four human rights conditions laid out in the
Merida Initiative.
Despite a lack of military and police reform the State Department is increasing
funding for Mexico
Bricker Sep-28-09 (Kristin, “US State Department's Merida Initiative Human Rights Report:
Unconvincing Whitewash: US Likely to Release Millions in Training and Military Hardware to
Mexico Despite Failure to Comply with Human Rights Conditions,” Kristin Bricker is a Mexicobased freelance journalist covering militarization, social movements, and the drug war in Latin
America. She is a NACLA research associate and the Security Sector Reform Resource Centre's
Latin America blogger. http://narcosphere.narconews.com/notebook/kristinbricker/2009/09/us-state-departments-merida-initiative-human-rights-report-unconvin)
Military Human Rights Abuse Cases¶ As previously stated, the State Department must prove
that the Mexican government is "ensuring that civilian prosecutors and judicial authorities are
investigating and prosecuting, in accordance with Mexican and international law, members of
the federal police and military forces who have been credibly alleged to have committed
violations of human rights, and the federal police and military forces are fully cooperating with
the investigations."¶ The condition requires that civilian officials investigate and prosecute
alleged human rights abuses committed by members of the military, but the Mexican military
has stated its outright refusal to allow civilians to prosecute members of the military for any
alleged crime, including human rights abuses. The State Department report acknowledges that
the military continues to police itself when its members commit human rights abuses: "There
have been cases in which civil authorities prosecuted crimes committed by members of the
armed forces, but this is uncommon given that Mexican law generally allows for military
investigation/prosecution in these cases as discussed above." ¶ According to the State
Department report:¶ ¶ According to Articles 103, Section i and 107, Section v ( a) of the Federal
Constitution, once the military court issues a final sentence, the defendant can file an "amparo"
to a civil court for review. After reviewing the case, the civil court makes a determination to
either reject the request or accept and revoke or reduce the military court's sentencing. If the
request is rejected, the defendant can appeal up to the Supreme Court. Victims and their
relatives have no legal recourse to request prosecution or appeal the outcome of a military
court.¶ This means that a soldier that has been accused of human rights violations has legal
recourse in a civilian court if he believes justice has not been served in a military tribunal, but
that a civilian victim has no such right. If a civilian victim of human rights abuse does not obtain
justice in a military tribunal, there is absolutely no possibility of appealing to the civilian justice
system.¶ The State Department Report continues:¶ Some Mexican and international human
rights organizations argue that the military's assertion of near universal jurisdiction over its
personnel is unconstitutional and effectively undermines the transparency and impartiality of
the investigation and prosecution of military criminal human rights violations. In addition, some
international human rights bodies and rapporteurs have maintained that Mexico's use of
military jurisdiction in human rights cases conflicts with international law.¶ "Some" Mexican and
international human rights organizations have criticized military jurisdiction? This reporter
challenges the State Department to find one respected human rights organization--Mexican or
international--that hasn't criticized Mexico's military jurisdiction. Case in point: in May, 72
Mexican civil society organizations (over sixty of them human rights organizations) and a
Mexican Brigadier General wrote to the US Congress: “There is an almost complete absence of
transparency in cases of human rights violations committed by soldiers, due to the use of
military jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute members of the armed forces responsible for
such actions.” Furthermore, both the United Nations and the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights have called for an end to military jurisdiction over human rights abuse cases.¶
The State Department's implied argument that alleged human rights abuses are sufficiently
investigated and prosecuted is belied by its own statistics. The Merida Initiative Report states,
"During President Calderon's administration (through early May 2009), CNDH [Mexico's National
Human Rights Commission] has received a total of 2,050 complaints involving military
personnel." But not every human rights abuse results in an official complaint: three of Mexico's
most well-known human rights organizations argued in a joint press release that "the reports
filed with Mexico’s National Human Rights Commission or the cases reported in the media
represent only a percentage of actual human rights violations, since many victims do not report
abuses for fear of retaliation from the military."
Status quo military and police reform is nonexistent
Bricker Feb-25-09 (Kristin, “Mexican Defense Secretary Opposes Civilian Trials for Military
Human Rights Abusers: Military Leaders Are Against UN Recommendations and Plan Mexico
Human Rights Conditions,” Kristin Bricker is a Mexico-based freelance journalist covering
militarization, social movements, and the drug war in Latin America. She is a NACLA research
associate and the Security Sector Reform Resource Centre's Latin America blogger.
http://narcosphere.narconews.com/notebook/kristin-bricker/2009/02/mexican-defensesecretary-opposes-civilian-trials-military-human-ri)
Human rights organizations have actually cited several cases to prove their point that Military
Jurisdiction promotes impunity. In a press release issued in response to the military authorities'
defense of Military Jurisdiction, the "All Rights for Everyone" National Civil Organization
Network, the Mexican Commission for Defense and Promotion of Human Rights, the la
Montaña, Tlachinollan Human Rights Center, the Center for Justice and International Law, the
Fray Francisco de Vitoria Human Rights Center, the Miguel Agustin Pro Juarez Human Rights
Center, the Fray Bartolome de las Casas Human Rights Center, and the Fundar Center for
Analysis and Investigation cite the following cases, none of which have been brought to justice:¶
Guerrero activist and community leader Rosendo Radilla Pacheco disappeared in 1974 at a
military checkpoint during Mexico's Dirty War.¶ Ecologists Rodolfo Montiel and Teodoro Cabrera
were arrested in an unauthorized military raid in Guerrero in 1999 and severely tortured. They
remained imprisoned until November 2001.¶ In Guerrero in April 1999, Victoriana Vazquez
Sanchez, 50, and Francisca Santos Pablo, 33, stumbled upon a military camp while they were
searching for two male relatives, Antonio Mendoza Olivero, 10, and Evaristo Albino Tellez, 27.
The soldiers spotted the women and chased them. They raped the women until Santos Pablo
lost consciousness. A month later, the women learned the relatives they were searching for had
been killed by soldiers. There has never been an investigation into the rapes nor the murders.¶
In March 2002, soldiers raped Inés Fernández Ortega in Guerrero when she did not answer their
questions regarding meat they claimed had been stolen from them.¶ In February 2002, Valentina
Rosendo Cantú, 17, was raped by soldiers in Guerrero after the soldiers stopped her near her
home to ask her questions about insurgents.¶ In June 1994, a group of soldiers detained Ana,
Beatriz, and Celia Gonzalez Perez and their mother Delia Perez de Gonzalez to interrogate them.
The soldiers separated the girls from their mother, beat them, and raped them repeatedly.¶ In
March 2008, soldiers opened fire on a car, killing Edgar Geovany Araujo Alarcón, 25, Héctor
Zenón Medina López, 28, Manuel Medina Araujo, 25, and Irineo Medina Díaz, 50. The soldiers
injured two other people in the car. The occupants were doing nothing illegal and were not
armed.¶ In February 1995, during one of the most intense military offensives in Chiapas
following the Zapatista uprising, soldiers tied up and shot Gilberto Jimenez as he fled from the
military siege.
Merida Underfunded Now
Merida funds not being given to Mexico now
MGR Apr-18-13 (Mexico Gulf Reporter, “U.S. freezes Mérida Initiative funds promised to
Mexico, approved by Congress,” Devoted to the political, legal and cultural affairs of Mexico,
Cuba and states of the Gulf and Caribbean region. Reported from Guadalajara.
http://www.mexicogulfreporter.com/2013/02/us-freezes-merida-initiative-funds.html)
Guadalajara -¶ Exactly a year ago president Obama asked Congress to approve a $234 million
defense package for fiscal year 2013 under the Mérida Initiative, a 2007 agreement between
the United States and Mexico which provides for U.S. training and equipping of Mexican military
and police forces, plus intelligence gathering and sharing.¶ The package included another $10
million to be spent domestically on enhanced U.S. intelligence services.¶ In his transmittal
message to Congress Obama said, "A stable Mexico will enhance the national security of the
United States, promote economic development in the country and protect U.S. citizens,
especially along our shared border." The 2013 fiscal year began Oct. 1, and will soon be half
over. Obama asks Congress for $244 million towards Mexican drug war.¶ Last spring the
package was approved by both chambers of Congress, in almost the exact amount requested by
the president. But some members of Congress continue to resist releasing the funds, although
representatives authorized them after rather listless floor debates and perfunctory votes in the
House and Senate. ¶ According to reports carried in the Mexican press on this Sunday, virtually
none of the $234 million has yet been handed over to the new administration of Enrique Peña
Nieto. One specious argument after another has been presented in the Hallowed Halls of the
Capitol.
Merida funding to Mexico fails now because of flawed implementation
Abu-Hamdeh 11 (Sabrina, “The Merida Initiative: An Effective Way of Reducing Violence in
Mexico?” Pepperdine Policy Review, Sabrina Abu-Hamdeh is a second year student at SPP
graduating with concentrations in Economics and International Relations. She presented this
paper at the Pacific Coast Conference of Latin American Studies in November 2011.
http://publicpolicy.pepperdine.edu/policy-review/2011v4/content/merida-initiative.pdf)
The first objective of the ¶ initiative was to reduce drug violence and the second was to reduce
drug ¶ trafficking into the United States by aiding the Mexican government’s fight ¶ with the
drug cartels. An indirect goal of the Merida Initiative was to lessen ¶ the demand for drugs in
the United States through minimized supply. The ¶ unfortunate truth is that neither goal of the
initiative has yet been successful. ¶ There are multiple reasons, which include flawed
implementation yielding ¶ limited positive outcomes; the short duration and the small scope
of the ¶ aid program; the limited effects the policy has on domestic drug policy ¶ and demand
reduction; and the mounting drug-related violence prevalent ¶ in Mexico.
Solvency
Conditioning Solves
Conditioning funding on police and election reform solves corruption
Velez-Green, Reyes, and Ramicone Sep-12 (Alex, Robin, and Anthony, The Institute of
Politics is a non-profit organization located in the John F. Kennedy School of Government at
Harvard University, “GOVERNMENTAL, JUDICIAL AND POLICE CORRUPTION,”
http://www.iop.harvard.edu/sites/default/files_new/research-policypapers/TheWarOnMexicanCartels.pdf)
One way to reduce political corruption is to instate reelection procedures within the Mexican ¶
federal government. Within the current system, politicians are unable to seek a second term in
¶ office, and thus make decisions without fear of electoral repercussions. By giving politicians a ¶
chance at reelection, these procedures would make politicians more responsive to voters since ¶
voters can punish politicians whom they deem corrupt. Given Mexico’s history under the ¶
dictator Porfirio Diaz, it would be difficult to convince the Mexican public to support this kind of
¶ measure.30 Therefore, for this system to be effective, term limits would have to be established
¶ and enforced. Furthermore, Mexico would have to strengthen the independent electoral
system ¶ (IFE), standardize electoral practices at state and local levels, and implement other ¶
mechanisms—including an improved law enforcement system—to prevent electoral fraud and ¶
coercion. ¶ Altering the mechanisms of funding between the Mexican federal and state
governments ¶ would decrease corruption as well. Recently, the federal government has begun
to provide ¶ performance-based funding; money is allocated to states for a specific purpose,
and future ¶ funding depends on whether states have met said goals. The federal government
should ¶ attempt to expand this policy. It should prepare counter-drug policies—such as
restructuring ¶ municipal police forces—as goals for the state; as these goals are met, more
money would be ¶ allocated to sustain these efforts and accommodate state-chosen projects.
The federal ¶ government should make it clear that if the goals are met, then, more funding will
be provided ¶ to states for uses of their choosing as long as they are transparent with the use of
these funds. ¶ The above-mentioned proposals center upon steps to be taken by the Mexican
government. ¶ To encourage these changes within Mexico, the United States should use
American financial ¶ assistance , such as the Merida Initiative, as leverage over the Mexican
legislature. Specifically, ¶ the U.S. should attach conditions mandating progress towards the
above goals with assistance ¶ payments. To influence state and local policies in a more direct
way, the U.S. should apply ¶ targeted funding on a much more individualized and localized
basis. It can target funding, ¶ stipulating that as certain programs or policies are implemented
by municipalities, such as ¶ restructuring the local police system, they would receive
additional funding. These policies and ¶ programs should require independent oversight. This
type of direct pressure at a local level ¶ should be done, as it will require much less bureaucracy
and will produce more direct results.
Conditioning funding on transparency solves drug trafficking and cartel violence
but cooperation is key
Velez-Green, Reyes, and Ramicone Sep-12 (Alex, Robin, and Anthony, The Institute of
Politics is a non-profit organization located in the John F. Kennedy School of Government at
Harvard University, “GOVERNMENTAL, JUDICIAL AND POLICE CORRUPTION,”
http://www.iop.harvard.edu/sites/default/files_new/research-policypapers/TheWarOnMexicanCartels.pdf)
Extensive corruption in the Mexican government, judicial system, and law enforcement is one
of ¶ most significant obstacles challenging the government’s ability to stop drug trafficking and
cartel ¶ violence in Mexico. As such, tackling this corruption must be a high priority for the
Mexican and ¶ American governments as they seek to end the destruction caused by the
Mexican drug cartels. ¶ In this section, we analyze the structural roots of corruption in the
Mexican government, judicial ¶ system, and law enforcement apparatus, respectively. We then
offer proposals for corruption reducing policies. To fight government corruption, we propose
that Mexico revise its federal ¶ reelection processes and implement a more transparent fund
flow between the federal and ¶ state governments. To protect the Mexican judiciary, the US
should wield its influence in the UN ¶ to establish specific anti-corruption requirements for the
judiciary, as well as tie Mérida ¶ Initiative funds to concrete Mexican efforts to protect reports
and the free flow of information. ¶ Finally, wage reform and improved training, resource
allocation, and accountability mechanisms ¶ are crucial steps towards reducing corruption in
the Mexican law enforcement apparatus. The ¶ above proposals consist of measures to be
implemented by the United States, and measures ¶ that the US government should encourage
the Mexican government to institute. We recognize ¶ that any effective strategy to reduce drug
trafficking and related violence will require an ¶ unprecedented level of cooperation between
governments on both sides of the border.
Conditioning aid on fund transparency and police reform solves structural
problems that lead to corruption
Velez-Green, Reyes, and Ramicone Sep-12 (Alex, Robin, and Anthony, The Institute of
Politics is a non-profit organization located in the John F. Kennedy School of Government at
Harvard University, “GOVERNMENTAL, JUDICIAL AND POLICE CORRUPTION,”
http://www.iop.harvard.edu/sites/default/files_new/research-policypapers/TheWarOnMexicanCartels.pdf)
Police corruption results from many interconnected and mutually-reinforcing factors. Key ¶
structural concerns such as low wages, low advancement potential and a lack of training and ¶
equipment, and poor accountability mechanisms increase incentives for police officers to ¶
engage in corruption. Furthermore, these structural problems perpetuate both the selection of
¶ unqualified individuals for policing positions and poor police performance. ¶ In combination
with the dangerous nature of policing in Mexico, low wages provide little ¶ incentive for
ethically and practically qualified individuals to join the police force. 39,40 More ¶ importantly,
they give those in the force little incentive to remain loyal. Higher wages will ¶ reduce police
officers’ legitimate needs for supplemental income from bribes, help attract ¶ better
applicants for police positions, and encourage superior service. Through the Mérida ¶ Initiative,
the U.S. has an opportunity to leverage its influence to encourage Mexico to reform ¶ this
system of police wages. Firstly, poor transparency makes it difficult to track how much of ¶
the funds given to the federal government are used to invest in local and state law
enforcement. ¶ A critical step would be increasing that transparency in order to better assess
these entities’ ¶ legitimate needs for more fiscal support. To help solve this problem, the U.S.
should require ¶ Mexican states and municipalities, under a federal directive, to reveal where
they are allocating ¶ the funds they receive as a condition for accepting the Mérida Initiative.
Second, again leveraging its military and economic support to Mexico, the U.S. should ¶
encourage the Mexican federal government to have Mexican municipalities maximize the ¶
efficiency of their law enforcement bodies by consolidating the functions of transit,
preventive, ¶ and investigative divisions. As per the American model, preventive police officers
can be ¶ assigned transit duties. Furthermore, preventive divisions’ functions should also be
expanded to ¶ include warrant enactment and certain investigative procedures. These steps will
help Mexican ¶ municipalities shrink the size of their police departments, thereby liberating
more funds to raise ¶ police wages.
Conditioning the plan on police reform and fund transparency is key to solve
corruption—unconditional aid doesn’t solve
Velez-Green, Reyes, and Ramicone Sep-12 (Alex, Robin, and Anthony, The Institute of
Politics is a non-profit organization located in the John F. Kennedy School of Government at
Harvard University, “GOVERNMENTAL, JUDICIAL AND POLICE CORRUPTION,”
http://www.iop.harvard.edu/sites/default/files_new/research-policypapers/TheWarOnMexicanCartels.pdf)
These recommendations to the USG either appropriate funds from the Mérida Initiative or ¶
rely on the U.S. leveraging other economic aid to facilitate the necessary changes in Mexico’s
¶ law enforcement system. Any funds issued through the Mérida Initiative for wage growth or ¶
additional training and resources must be traceable. Wage increase must be the highest
priority ¶ because it addresses a primary cause of corruption. Then, the U.S. government can
begin to ¶ increase its supply of training and equipment to Mexican law enforcement. Instead of
trying to ¶ implement a costly program too broadly, this model allows the construction of safe
¶ communities one at a time. That will ultimately help increase transparency in the function
of ¶ local governments in general and ensure that electoral participation is free of external ¶
pressures.
Conditioning current funding solves public security and human rights in the long
run
Meyer 26-May-10 (Maureen, Associate for Mexico and Central America at the Washington
Office on Latin America, “Conditioned funds for Mexico under the Merida Initiative should not
be released unless concrete progress is made on human rights requirements,”
http://www.wola.org/news/conditioned_funds_for_mexico_under_the_merida_initiative_shoul
d_not_be_released_unless_concrete)
Our organizations recognize the current challenges to public security confronted by Mexico.
However, withholding the conditioned funds under the Merida Initiative until concrete and
measurable advances have occurred recognizes that long-lasting improvements to public
security cannot be accomplished without ensuring advances in human rights.
Current aid fails but conditioning aid on reform solves
Fryklund Apr-11-13 (Inge, “Our Osmotic Border: Forget the border–what drives migration?”
Ms. Fryklund, JD, PhD has worked in the Balkans, Central Asia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Palestine.
http://fpif.org/our_osmotic_border/)
What can we do to support Mexico in becoming as attractive an environment as the United
States? We need to think broadly about eliminating problems that we create as well as
supporting internal Mexican initiatives. Planning should involve presidential-level leadership to
identify problems and devise comprehensive solutions. Random USAID-funded projects in
Mexico are not doing the trick.¶ The ineffectiveness of the Mexican education system is an
internal problem constraining Mexican productivity. The recent arrest on corruption charges of
Elba Esther Gordillo, the head of the Mexican national teachers’ union, shows that President
Enrique Peña Nieto may be serious about addressing this shortcoming. U.S. education policies
are not exactly a world model, but perhaps the United States can help with funding or training
if requested by the Mexican government.¶ How about economic liberalization? Besides
reducing the power of monopolies as the president may now be attempting, things as simple as
reducing the number of signatures needed for a business license might be huge. As Hernando
De Soto pointed out more than 20 years ago, individuals locked into the informal economy due
to inability to regularize their businesses and land holdings can never prosper. U.S. foreign aid
to Mexico might be conditioned on steps that remove such internal barriers to economic
productivity.
AT: Perm
AT: Perm Do Both
1. The Plan and the CP are mutually exclusive. You cannot both do the plan
and use it as prior leverage. Severance is illegitimate-in a world where
the affirmative can pick and choose which parts of the plan to advocate,
no counterplan would compete.
2. Severs “should” it means “must” and requires immediate legal effect
Summers 94 (Justice – Oklahoma Supreme Court, “Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food Warehouse of
Durant”, 1994 OK 123, 11-8,
http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn13)
¶4 The
legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should"13 in the May 18
order connotes futurity or may be deemed a ruling in praesenti.14 The answer to this query is not to be divined from
rules of grammar;15 it must be governed by the age-old practice culture of legal professionals and its immemorial language usage.
To determine if the omission (from the critical May 18 entry) of the turgid phrase, "and the same hereby is", (1) makes it an in futuro
ruling - i.e., an expression of what the judge will or would do at a later stage - or (2) constitutes an in in praesenti resolution of a
disputed law issue, the trial judge's intent must be garnered from the four corners of the entire record.16
[CONTINUES – TO FOOTNOTE]
13 "Should" not only is used as a "present indicative" synonymous with ought but also is the past tense of "shall" with various shades
of meaning not always easy to analyze. See 57 C.J. Shall § 9, Judgments § 121 (1932). O. JESPERSEN, GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1984); St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Brown, 45 Okl. 143, 144 P. 1075, 1080-81 (1914). For a more detailed
explanation, see the Partridge quotation infra note 15. Certain
contexts mandate a construction of the term
"should" as more than merely indicating preference or desirability. Brown, supra at 1080-81 (jury instructions
stating that jurors "should" reduce the amount of damages in proportion to the amount of contributory negligence of the plaintiff
was held to imply an obligation and to be more than advisory); Carrigan v. California Horse Racing Board, 60 Wash. App. 79, 802 P.2d
813 (1990) (one of the Rules of Appellate Procedure requiring that a party "should devote a section of the brief to the request for
the fee or expenses" was interpreted to mean that a party is under an obligation to include the requested segment); State v. Rack,
318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958) ("should"
would mean the same as "shall" or "must" when used in an instruction
to the jury which tells the triers they "should disregard false testimony"). 14 In praesenti means literally "at the
present time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990). In legal parlance the phrase denotes that which in law
is presently or immediately effective, as opposed to something that will or would become effective
in the future [in futurol]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, 106 U.S. 360, 365, 1 S.Ct. 336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201 (1882).
3. Severs ‘engagement’ – gotta be unconditional
Smith 5 (Karen E, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, London School of Economics,
“Engagement and conditionality: incompatible or mutually reinforcing?,” May 2005, Global
Europe: New Terms of Engagement, http://scholar.googleusercontent.com/scholar?q=cache:83RqE0TzFMJ:scholar.google.com/+engagement+positive+incentives+bilateral&hl=en&as_sdt=0,
14)
First, a few definitions. ‘Engagement’ is a foreign policy strategy of building close ties with the
government and/or civil society and/or business community of another state. The intention of
this strategy is to undermine illiberal political and economic practices, and socialise government
and other domestic actors into more liberal ways. Most cases of engagement entail primarily
building economic links, and encouraging trade and investment in particular. Some observers
have variously labeled this strategy one of interdependence, or of ‘oxygen’: economic activity
leads to positive political consequences.19‘ Conditionality’, in contrast, is the linking , by a state
or international organisation, of perceived benefits to another state(such as aid or trade
concessions) to the fulfilment of economic and/or political conditions . ‘Positive
conditionality’ entails promising benefits to a state if it fulfils the conditions; ‘negative
conditionality’ involves reducing, suspending, or terminating those benefits if the state
violates the conditions (in other words, applying sanctions, or a strategy of ‘asphyxiation’).20
To put it simply, engagement implies ties, but with no strings attached; conditionality
attaches the strings . In another way of looking at it, engagement is more of a bottom-up
strategy to induce change in another country, conditionality more of a top-down strategy
4. Their interpretation is inferior-prefer our definition. It is in the legal
context and more suitable to evaluating policy issues. Their
interpretation makes the plan conditional and would allow congressional
backlash to roll back the plan---plan stability is key to negative ground
and clash.
Strictly enforced conditions are key to effective human rights reforms in Mexico
Steinberg May-10-12 (STATEMENTS OF NIK STEINBERG, MEXICO RESEARCHER FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, “HEARING BEFORE THE TOM LANTOS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION: HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES: ONE HUNDRED AND TWELTH CONGRESS: SECOND SESSION,”
http://tlhrc.house.gov/docs/transcripts/05_10_2012_Human_Rights_in_Mexico.pdf)
So what can the U.S. Government do? As you mentioned, the U.S. has ¶ appropriated more
than $1.6 billion in security assistance to Mexico since 2007 as part of ¶ the Merida Initiative.
From the outset, Congress mandated that 15 percent of these funds ¶ would be withheld
annually until the State Department issued a report that affirmed ¶ Mexico was meeting basic
human rights requirements including investigating and ¶ prosecuting military abuses in civilian
jurisdiction and prohibiting the use of testimony ¶ obtained through torture. ¶ These
requirements provide a critical opportunity to measure Mexico's human ¶ rights progress and
to press the Mexican Government to rein in these abuses. Therefore it ¶ is first and foremost
crucial that the U.S. Congress keep these requirements in place in ¶ future installments of the
Merida Initiative. ¶ Second, in order to maximize the effectiveness of these requirements they
must be ¶ enforced. Yet despite clear evidence that the conditions have not met, and here I
would ¶ disagree with the testimony that proceeded mine, the U.S. has repeatedly released the
¶ conditioned funds. In the coming months, the State Department will produce another ¶ report
for Congress on Mexico's compliance with the Merida human rights conditions. ¶ Based on our
findings as well as those of Mexico's National Human Rights Commission, ¶ the U.N. Special
Investigators and Mexican human rights groups, there is no question that ¶ Mexico continues
to fail to meet these benchmarks. Therefore unlike past Merida ¶ reports, the State
Department should unequivocally conclude that Mexico is not meeting ¶ their requirements,
and upon delivery of this report the U.S. Congress should fulfill its ¶ duty to withhold the
select funds until the requirements are met.
Bypassing conditions limits their effectiveness
McGovern May-10-12 (Hon. James P. McGovern, Massachusetts, TOM LANTOS HUMAN
RIGHTS COMMISSION, “HEARING BEFORE THE TOM LANTOS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION:
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: ONE HUNDRED AND TWELTH CONGRESS: SECOND SESSION,”
http://tlhrc.house.gov/docs/transcripts/05_10_2012_Human_Rights_in_Mexico.pdf)
Well, thank you. I want to thank all of you for your very ¶ powerful testimony. And Mr. Steinberg
and Ms. Meyer, I tend to agree with you on the ¶ withholding of the 15 percent at this
particular time, because I think if we are going to ¶ have conditionality in our laws with regard
to human rights they ought to mean ¶ something. And every time we wave them, because we
don't want to get anybody angry ¶ or it is convenient, I think it diminishes the importance of
that conditionality. ¶ And to the Mexican Government I would just say that if we were to
withhold a ¶ certain portion of the aid at this particular point, they should use that as leverage
to try to ¶ push forward reform. Because ultimately you don't want any conditionality, you
don't ¶ want any aid withheld, so I mean we need to make it very clear that human rights is ¶
important. That it is the centerpiece of our policy, and it is so important that if certain ¶
conditions aren't met then we are prepared to hold some of the aid as provided for in law.
Unconditional aid necessarily prevents the fulfillment of human rights
conditions
Keenan 09 (Patrick J. Visiting Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School; Associate
Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law, “CURSE OR CURE? CHINA, AFRICA, AND
THE EFFECTS OF UNCONDITIONED WEALTH,”
https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#inbox/1402166f823859c7)
The second claim I make is that China’s recent investments in ¶ Africa amount to unconditioned
wealth, which raises a real risk that their ¶ effect on local populations will, in the end, be
negative. This is a ¶ stronger claim than the argument that unconditioned wealth will not
have ¶ positive effects. I show that unconditioned wealth, whether it comes in ¶ the form of
unencumbered investment from China or from the discovery ¶ of a valuable natural resource,
can create or exacerbate incentives that ¶ increase the prospect of human rights abuses.
Unconditioned wealth can ¶ lead governments to consolidate access to the resource; centralize
decision ¶ making regarding the distribution of rents; consume the resource too ¶ quickly; and
fail to respond to the concerns of citizens, choosing instead ¶ to purchase support by, for
example, expanding public sector ¶ employment.15
Giving funds to Mexico without reform first risks escalation of abuse
AI 5-Aug-09 (Amnesty International is a prestigious international human rights organization,
“Mexico: Merida funds must be frozen until human rights conditions are met,”
http://www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/mexico-merida-funds-must-be-frozenuntil-human-rights-conditions-are-met)
Amnesty International today urged the US Congress to honour its commitment to withhold
15% of funding of the Merida Initiative until the Mexican government fulfils its human rights
obligations. The organization said the Mexican government has failed to make sufficient
progress in the investigation and prosecution of human rights abuses by security forces.¶
“Giving money and equipment to the Mexican military without adequate controls on its use
risks contributing to an escalation of human rights abuses,” said Susan Lee, Americas Director
at Amnesty International. “Assistance should be focused on preventing abuses, improving
investigations and the delivery of justice.Ӧ The call comes as the US Department of State is
due to submit a report to the US Congress on Mexico's compliance with the human rights
requirements of the Merida Initiative for a final decision on the amount of funds that will be
transferred.
Not enforcing conditions on Mexican reform prevents them from being
effective
HRW MAY-18-10 (Human Rights Watch, “Mexico/US: Obama-Calderón Meeting Questions
and Answers: Drug Violence, Military Abuse and US Aid,”
http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/05/18/mexicous-obama-calder-n-meeting-questions-andanswers)
5. Have Merida's human rights requirements been effective at improving Mexico's human
rights practices?¶ No, the conditions have not been effective, in a large part because they have
not been enforced by the US government.¶ In August 2009, the State Department submitted a
report to Congress on the Merida Initiative that showed that Mexico was not meeting at least
two of the human rights requirements. For example, on the prohibition of torture, the report
said: "Since 2007, we are not aware that any official has ever been convicted of torture, giving
rise to concern about impunity. Despite the law's provisions to the contrary, police and
prosecutors have attempted to justify an arrest by forcibly securing a confession to a crime."
The State Department also reported that it is "uncommon" for civil authorities to prosecute
violations committed by soldiers, because such cases are usually handled by military prosecutors
and courts.¶ However, despite these findings, and in contravention of the law, the 15 percent of
select Merida funds were released by the US government following the State Department
report.
Aid to Mexico without conditions simply helps the corrupt officers
Ellingwood Nov-17-09 (Ken, “MEXICO UNDER SIEGE: Fixing Mexico police becomes a
priority: Reversing police corruption that has tainted whole departments, shattered faith in law
enforcement and compromised one of society's most basic institutions is proving difficult, but
not impossible.” Ken Ellingwood, a Times staff writer since 1992, is based in Mexico City, with
responsibility for covering Mexico and Central America.
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-mexico-police172009nov17,0,2236458.story?page=1)
States and municipalities have moved inconsistently to clean up their forces. In some places,
such as the northern city of Chihuahua, police are gradually adopting U.S.-style law enforcement
standards, such as those promoted by the private Commission on Accreditation for Law
Enforcement Agencies.¶ Many analysts are encouraged to see local agencies spending more to
improve training, equipment and wages, but see scant improvement on corruption.¶ "You can
train police all day long, but if they're still corrupt, then it doesn't really help," said Daniel
Sabet, who teaches at Georgetown University and studies Mexican law enforcement. "The
corruption and organized-crime infiltration has not changed."
Say Yes
Say Yes Cards
Nieto has already committed to reforms—but lack of US conditions prevents
them from going into effect
Singh 5-Aug-09 (Sharon, Media Relations Director at Amnesty International, a prestigious
international human rights organization, “Mexico: Merida funds must be frozen until human
rights conditions are met,” http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/press-releases/presidentsobama-and-pena-nieto-s-summit-golden-opportunity-to-tackle-human-rights-issues)
The Peña Nieto administration has made commitments to stop abuses, but so far has taken
few steps to end them or bring those responsible to justice. Meanwhile, the U.S. government
continues to provide largely unfettered support via the Merida Initiative, failing to effectively
raise credible reports of grave human rights violations or encourage remedial action with the
human rights parameters of the Initiative.¶ This visit coincides with 7th anniversary of the
emblematic case of the women of Atenco. In May 2006, approximately 47 women were
detained by Mexican police in Texcoco and San Salvador, Atenco. While in custody, at least 26
women suffered torture and ill-treatment, including rape and other sexual violence. To date,
those responsible have not been held to account. It is time for the victims to receive the justice
they have demanded for seven years.¶ "The commitments are already made and we know
many of the steps to be taken in order to improve the lives of thousands of people in both
countries," said Daniel Zapico, Amnesty International's Senior Representative in Mexico. "This
summit should be the beginning of this path because the individuals whose rights are violated
cannot wait anymore. The voices of those who work day-to-day to protect the human rights
under the most difficult and dangerous conditions should be listened to and taken into account
by Presidents Obama and Peña Nieto. If they do not work with those who defend human rights,
the advances will be very limited."
Mexico will cooperate with the US—the countries are simply too intertwined
Rosenblum Apr-11 (Marc R. Specialist in Immigration Policy, Congressional Research Service,
Marc R. Rosenblum is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of New
Orleans. His research interests include immigration and US immigration policymaking, U.S.-Latin
American relations, and Latin American politics; and he also teaches courses in comparative
politics and political research methods. He received his PhD at the University of California, San
Diego. “Obstacles and Opportunities for Regional Cooperation: The US-Mexico Case,”
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/usmexico-cooperation.pdf)
What are the prospects for cooperation at this time? On one hand, the underlying factors that
favored cooperation during the 1990s generally remain in place. Despite the intractability of
migration policy, the overall US-Mexican relationship has never been closer. With 75 million
trucks and passengers entering the United States from Mexico in 2009, $250 billion in legal
trade between the countries, and about 30 million Hispanics of Mexican origin living in the
United States, the two countries are simply too intertwined to leave any issue of mutual
concern off the bilateral agenda. Realistically, neither country can hope to accomplish its core
goals at the border—controlling crime and violence, countering terrorist threats, preventing
illegal entries, facilitating legal travel and cross-border trade—without close coordination and
cooperation with the other.
Nieto is committed to greater cooperation over human rights
Mexidata Jun-3-13 (MEXICAN INFORMATION AND RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, Presidency of the
Republic, Guatemala City, “Relations Between Mexico and Guatemala are being Strengthened,”
http://mexidata.info/id3633.html)
Regarding migration, President Peña Nieto noted that it was agreed to intensify cooperation to
strengthen respect for human rights, “And, in particular, those of women and children who are
neglected and cross our borders and are sometimes victims of abuse. We have therefore agreed
to make greater efforts within this cooperation and collaboration to prevent these conditions
from occurring and to provide more, unrestricted respect to the human rights of migrants.”
Nieto willing to work on human rights reforms
Boggs 2-Jul-13 (Washington Office on Latin America Program Officer Clay Boggs, “One Year
after Enrique Peña Nieto’s Election: Has there been a significant shift in Mexico’s security
strategy?” http://www.wola.org/commentary/one_year_after_enrique_pena_nieto_s_election)
What has the Peña Nieto administration done to address human rights violations in Mexico? ¶
While Peña Nieto has stated his commitment to ensuring that “rights established on paper
become reality,” the human rights situation in Mexico remains dire.
Nieto and the Mexican Congress willing to work for human rights—recent bill
proves
Boggs 2-Jul-13 (Washington Office on Latin America Program Officer Clay Boggs, “One Year
after Enrique Peña Nieto’s Election: Has there been a significant shift in Mexico’s security
strategy?” http://www.wola.org/commentary/one_year_after_enrique_pena_nieto_s_election)
In January 2013, President Peña Nieto signed a law that recognized the right of victims of
crimes and human rights violations to receive assistance, reparations, and access to justice. It
would also create several government institutions designed to deliver assistance and
information to victims. The law had been previously vetoed by President Calderón, and
President Peña Nieto’s reversal of this decision was a welcome change. Needed modifications
to the law were passed by Mexico’s congress in April and the law officially went into effect on
May 4, 2013.
US and Mexico are deeply intertwined—they’ll work with us but cooperation is
key to solve drug problems
Selee, Wilson, and Putnam Sep-10 (Andrew, Christopher, and Katie, Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars, “The United States and Mexico: More than Neighbors,”
Andrew Selee became the Wilson Center’s Vice President for Programs in April 2012. He was
the founding Director the Center’s Mexico Institute from 2003-12. He is an adjunct professor of
Government at Johns Hopkins University and of International Affairs at George Washington
University and has been a visiting professor at El Colegio de Mexico.
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/More%20Than%20Neighbors%20Compact%20
11.2.10.pdf)
No country in the world affects daily life in ¶ the United States more than Mexico. The two ¶
countries are deeply intertwined, and what ¶ happens on one side of the border necessarily ¶
has consequences on the other side. One in ten ¶ Americans is of Mexican descent, and a third ¶
of all immigrants in the United States today are ¶ from Mexico, while well over a half-million ¶
Americans live in Mexico. Mexico remains ¶ the second destination for U.S. exports after ¶
Canada, and millions of American jobs depend ¶ on this trade. From south to north the linkages
¶ are even greater: over three quarters of Mexico’s ¶ exports go to the United States and one in
ten ¶ Mexicans lives in the United States. ¶ The challenges the two countries face are ¶ also
deeply interconnected. An economic crisis in one country can wreak havoc on the ¶ other
country; an economic boom can give ¶ a significant boost to the other. Migration, ¶ though
probably a net benefit for both countries overall, creates significant dislocations for ¶ local
communities in both countries, thanks ¶ to outdated immigration laws in the United ¶ States and
insufficient employment opportunities in Mexico. The presence of the world’s ¶ largest
consumer market for illegal narcotics ¶ in the United States and weak law enforcement and
judicial systems in Mexico have ¶ created an unusually active and often violent ¶ drug trade
between the two countries that can ¶ only be addressed with coordinated efforts in ¶ both
countries. Air and water pollution spread ¶ easily from one side of the border to the other ¶
creating problems for both countries.¶ Indeed, it is the nearly two thousand mile ¶ border that
makes this relationship different ¶ from all others. While the U.S. has important relationships
with other countries — the ¶ United Kingdom, France, China, India, Japan, ¶ Israel, and Iraq, to
mention just a few — those ¶ countries are all separated from the United ¶ States by an ocean or
two. Mexico is an intense and complex relationship next door. This ¶ means that all the issues on
the table between ¶ the two countries are not merely questions of ¶ foreign policy to be dealt
with in the capital cities but highly local affairs that affect communities throughout the two
countries. Millions ¶ of Americans and millions of Mexicans are ¶ stakeholders in each other’s
future. Questions ¶ about manufacturing jobs, immigration, drug ¶ trafficking, and air quality are
local issues that ¶ states, cities, counties, and average citizens ¶ wrestle with on a daily
basis.30303030303030
Mexico willing to change but US policies there fail now
Ollstein 05-03-13 (Alice, Free Speech Radio News, “US support for Merida Initiative cited by
human rights groups in violence and displacement in Mexico,” http://fsrn.org/audio/us-supportmerida-initiative-cited-human-rights-groups-violence-and-displacement-mexico/11948)
Speaking to students at the Anthropology Museum in Mexico City today, President Barack
Obama said “a new Mexico is emerging,” in part because of its¶ “willingness to discard old
habits that aren’t working.” But during his visit to Latin America he has repeatedly voiced
support for several long-standing policies related to drugs and law enforcement that human
rights groups say cause violence and displacement in Mexico, and don’t reduce drug
trafficking.
Mexico will cooperate over human rights issues
HS 08-17-09 (Homeland Security Today, Homeland Security Today is the leading source of
homeland security insight and analysis for government decision makers, “Trilateral Talks In
Mexico Viewed As 'More Of The Same:’ the brief meeting was described in the Mexican national
press as 'a waste of time,'” http://www.hstoday.us/briefings/correspondents-watch/singlearticle/trilateral-talks-in-mexico-viewed-as-more-of-thesame/efeabdae5a64fb117f12277d9aa21e8c.html)
By law, the US must withhold 15 percent of the funds for equipment and training until the State
Department reports that Mexico meets human rights conditions, including the prosecution of
abuses by the Mexican Army. Some in the US Congress are concerned about such human rights
abuses.¶ At the press conference concluding the summit, the Obama praised the Calderon
administration’s courage in taking on the drug cartels. At least 11,000 Mexicans have died in
drug-related violence since Calderon launched his war on the increasingly powerful cartels in
December 2006. Obama expressed his confidence that the Mexican government will fight the
cartels in a way that is congruent with human rights.¶ Calderon defended his administration’s
efforts to protect human rights and challenged his critics “to show one case, a single case, in
which authorities have not acted, in which rights have been violated, in which the corresponding
authorities have not responded by punishing those who have abused their authority, whether
police, soldiers or any other authority.”
US and Mexico have too intertwined a relationship on security and trade—they
would have to say yes
EPATKO JUN-20-12 (LARISA, “U.S. and Mexico: Ties That Bind,” Larisa Epatko is a reporterproducer for the PBS NewsHour's foreign affairs beat, producing multimedia reports for the
Web site and contributing to the broadcast.
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2012/06/us-mexico-ties.html)
As Mexicans move to elect a new president on July 1, whoever wins the keys to the official
residence, or Los Pinos, will be tied to the United States in a number of ways: on border
security, as trading partners, and as a top energy supplier to its northern neighbor.¶ "There's
probably no other country in the world that's as intertwined with the United States. Our
economies are intertwined; Mexico is now the second destination for U.S. exports and the
third largest trading partner overall," said Shannon O'Neil, fellow for Latin American studies at
the Council on Foreign Relations.
Net Benefits
US/Mexico Politics
CP is popular in Mexico and the US—uniquely changes the political climate in
both countries—especially true regarding CIR
BARBASH 09 (SHEPARD, “Helping Mexico Help Itself: A more prosperous, democratic
southern neighbor would reduce crime and illegal immigration,” Shepard Barbash is former
bureau chief in Mexico City for the Houston Chronicle and author of three books about Mexico,
http://www.city-journal.org/2009/19_4_helping-mexico.html)
Beyond the virtues of any one deal, establishing the principle of linkage—immigration
liberalization in the U.S., conditioned on economic liberalization in Mexico—would change the
political conversations in both countries. Mexicans in the U.S. have influence back home, and
surveys show that they are more likely than the vested interests there to support policies that
lead to growth. Americans likewise might be more willing to accept as truly “comprehensive”
an immigration reform that took into account the key variable affecting migrant flows into the
U.S.: Mexico’s own behavior.
Immigration Reform
CIR can’t happen until corruption in Mexico is dealt with
Kirkwood Jul-15-13 (John J. “Ted Nugent Nails Immigration Reform; It Begins With Mexico,”
John Kirkwood is the pastor of Grace Gospel Fellowship in Bensenville, Arkansas. He is also the
host of "In the Arena." http://www.christianpost.com/news/ted-nugent-nails-immigrationreform-it-begins-with-mexico-100068/)
You will never have "Comprehensive Immigration Reform" without addressing the root
problem - Mexican corruption. No wall is sufficient to stem the tide of illegals if there is no
enforcement on either side of it. The wall will simply be another government works program, a
"Big-Dig- Paved with Good Intentions - Bridge to Nowhere" debacle that will be skirted as easy
as the cartels avoid our border police. Not addressing the corruption in Mexico and only
muting the corruption in D.C. is "tending to the symptoms while ignoring the disease;" it is
giving a dying man a placebo. No plan that doesn't start and end in Mexico is for real. Now
let's break down this whole situation logically.
US-Mexican relations helps immigration reform
Rosenblum Apr-11 (Marc R. Specialist in Immigration Policy, Congressional Research Service,
Marc R. Rosenblum is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of New
Orleans. His research interests include immigration and US immigration policymaking, U.S.-Latin
American relations, and Latin American politics; and he also teaches courses in comparative
politics and political research methods. He received his PhD at the University of California, San
Diego. “Obstacles and Opportunities for Regional Cooperation: The US-Mexico Case,”
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/usmexico-cooperation.pdf)
Broader questions about US immigration policy, including how to manage employment-based
migration and what to do about the 11 million unauthorized immigrants already in the United
States, are also easier to answer if policymakers draw from a cooperative toolkit. The United
States and Mexico have a great deal to gain long-term by working together to manage
migration policy as a tool for enhancing the region’s human capital, an engine for regional
economic growth and increased global competitiveness.
Mexican Credibility
Corruption undermines Mexico’s credibility on the world stage
SHELLEY Aug-01 (LOUISE, “Corruption and Organized Crime in Mexico in the Post-PRI
Transition,” American University, Louise Shelley is a professor at George Mason University in
Virginia. She is also founder and director of the Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption
Center, http://www.exlegi.ox.ac.uk/resources/documents/oc%20in%20mexico.pdf)
Drug-related corruption has also affected Mexico's image in the international arena. ¶ The
costs of this have been especially severe because many countries embraced ¶ President Salinas
as a reformer only to have their "new image" of Mexico visibly ¶ shattered by the high level
corruption of his administration. The ongoing international ¶ money laundering investigation
involving Raul Salinas and the self-exile of former ¶ President Salinas have undermined Mexico's
political standing in the world by showing ¶ that corruption and organized crime reached the
very top of the Mexican political ¶ structure (Smith, 1999).
Internal Links
Police Reform
Police reform key to solve corruption
Sabet May-10 (Daniel, “Police Reform in Mexico: Advances and Persistent Obstacles,”
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Mexico Institute, University of San Diego
Trans-Border Institute, Daniel Sabet is a visiting professor at Georgetown University’s Edmund A.
Walsh School of Foreign Service,
http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/dms76/policefiles/Sabet_police_reform.pdf)
Third, reform efforts have not been more successful because even with an increased emphasis
on ¶ vetting, they have not sufficiently confronted corruption. Whether by design or by default,
¶ reformers (particularly at the local level) have instead prioritized improving selection criteria, ¶
education and training and investing in equipment and technology over developing robust ¶
accountability mechanisms.40 As the latter entails confronting organized crime and the rank and
¶ file police who supplement their salary with daily bribe payments, state and municipal political
¶ and police leaders have opted for less threatening reforms.41 Such a strategy might provide a ¶
long term foundation for tackling corruption, but in the short term, existing reforms have
proven ¶ to be insufficient to improve police effectiveness. Creating accountability will also
require an ¶ effective mid-level command structure promoted based on their merits rather than
their personnel ¶ ties. Although a civil service type reform is central to the current package of
initiatives, it ¶ challenges the tradition of clientelism and confronts considerable opposition and
implementation ¶ hurdles.
Solving impunity key to solve corruption
Morris (Stephen D. Professor, Middle Tennessee State University37, The brown journal of world
affairs, “Corruption, Drug Tra!cking, and Violence in Mexico,”
http://www.mtsu.edu/politicalscience/faculty/documents/Corruption%20Brown%20article%20
Morris.pdf)
While it is difficult to determine corruption’s precise role in shaping impunity because Mexico’s
system of justice suffers from numerous inefficiencies, ¶ widespread impunity nonetheless
further undermines the efforts of law enforcement. Guillermo Zepeda’s extensive study found
that only 10 percent of reported ¶ crimes end with any formal charges being brought by the
public ministry before ¶ a judge (and fewer than half of crimes are reported due to lack of trust
in the ¶ institutions), and even fewer still result in a sentence, resulting in a roughly 97 ¶ percent
rate of impunity.26 A more recent report by Human Rights Watch (HRW) ¶ shows how the rise
in violence has failed to produce a corresponding increase ¶ in criminal prosecutions. Of the ¶
35,000 killings the government ¶ says were tied to organized crime ¶ from December 2007 to
January 2011, federal prosecutors opened somewhere ¶ between 997 and 1,687 investigations
(two different responses were given to ¶ HRW by Mexican officials), formally charged 343
suspects, and convicted just ¶ 22. HRW noted a similar trend at the state level. From 2009 to
2010 in the ¶ state of Chihuahua, there were over 5,000 deaths related to organized crime, ¶ but
only 212 people were found guilty.27 Such impunity prompts Bowden to ¶ rhetorically ponder:
“Imagine living in a place where you can kill anyone you ¶ wish and nothing happens except
that they fall dead.”28 Like other crimes, corruption goes ¶ largely undetected and
unpunished. Allegations or even arrests rarely ¶ result in prosecution.
Transparency
Transparency key to solve education, health, and water
Transparency International Sep-10 (This report was produced by the Policy and Research
Department of the Transparency International Secretariat in Berlin. Every effort has been made
to verify the accuracy of the information contained in this report. “THE ANTI-CORRUPTION
CATALYST: REALISING THE MDGs BY 2015,” http://www.transparencyusa.org/documents/AntiCorruptionCatalystRealisingtheMDGby2015.pdf)
There is ample evidence of the value of designing MDG¶ action plans that adequately integrate
governance and¶ anti-corruption mechanisms. New analysis by Transparency¶ International
demonstrates a strong and positive correlation¶ between increased transparency,
accountability and ¶ integrity and better MDG outcomes on education, health ¶ and water in
more than 48 countries. In practice, countrylevel work shows how anti-corruption approaches
have ¶ an MDG payoff: examples are drawn from Bangladesh, ¶ Colombia, Georgia, Ghana,
Liberia and Mexico. ¶ If the MDGs are to be achieved by 2015, world leaders ¶ and national
policy-makers must finally link development ¶ and governance policies as part of the same
plan. Marrying ¶ the two supports not only the success of the MDGs, but ¶ also the fulfilment of
past global commitments. These ¶ include government pledges made to fight corruption, ¶
achieve aid effectiveness and improve development ¶ financing, as part of the UN Convention
against Corruption ¶ (2003), Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), ¶ Accra Agenda for
Action (2008) and the Doha Declaration ¶ on Financing for Development (2008).¶ To meet their
global obligations, countries must support ¶ MDG action plans that incorporate transparency,
¶ accountability and integrity measures. These same ¶ principles must also characterise
government-wide ¶ policies and actions to send the right message from ¶ the top. This shift
must occur in order to have real and ¶ sustainable progress beyond 2015. Let’s make certain ¶
the next five years make up for the last 10.
Impacts
Drugs
Corruption destroys Mexico’s law enforcement and undermines its ability to
handle the drug war
Torre Jun-08 (Luis V. de la, NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL, “DRUG TRAFFICKING AND
POLICE CORRUPTION: A COMPARISON OF COLOMBIA AND MEXICO,” Expert at Bircham
International University, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a483659.pdf)
In the past few decades, drug-related corruption has increasingly eroded the ¶ already crippled
Mexican law enforcement system. The drug cartels currently operating ¶ in Mexico are the
contemporary equivalent of the Cali Cartel and the Medellín Cartel in ¶ Colombia when the latter
were at the height of their power in the 1980s and the start of ¶ the 1990s. In this period
Mexican cartels began to grow rapidly and by the mid-1990s, ¶ just as the Colombian cartels
were spiraling out of control and then out of existence, the ¶ Mexican cartels had an annual
income of about ten billion dollars. By 1997 the Mexican ¶ cartels were estimated to be worth
more than forty billion dollars, which was equal to 10 ¶ percent of the country’s total gross
domestic product (GDP).33 The enormous profits ¶ earned from the illegal drug trade since the
1980s have provided Mexican drug cartels ¶ with the ability to buy protection from official
prosecution for smuggling drugs ¶ throughout Mexico and into the United States.
Solving Mexican corruption key to solve the global drug trade and secure
democratic governance
Torre Jun-08 (Luis V. de la, NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL, “DRUG TRAFFICKING AND
POLICE CORRUPTION: A COMPARISON OF COLOMBIA AND MEXICO,” Expert at Bircham
International University, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a483659.pdf)
IMPORTANCE ¶ Colombian and Mexican drug traffickers are responsible for the production and
¶ transportation of the vast majority of cocaine, heroin and methamphetamine that enters ¶
the United States today. Ninety percent of all street cocaine enters the United States ¶
through the porous two thousand-mile border with Mexico. At the present time, the ¶
international drug trade as a whole is thought to earn its operators a profit of three ¶ hundred to
five hundred billion dollars a year. Back in 1994, the earnings of the ¶ Colombia-based Cali Cartel
were estimated to be thirty billion dollars for that year alone; ¶ more recently, the Gulf Cartel in
Mexico is thought to make between ten and twenty ¶ billion dollars a year.4 The drug trade’s
ability to corrupt police officers and public ¶ officials generally continues to threaten
democratic governability and public security in ¶ both Mexico and Colombia.5
Stability
Drug cartels threaten Mexican stability
Hawley 10 (Chris Hawley, USA Today. “Drug cartels threaten Mexican stability” February 10,
2010. http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2010-02-10-mexico-cartels_N.htm?csp=34)
VP
Crime 'has become defiant,' president says, as police and politicians are forced to face 'the bribe or the bullet'¶
The drug cartels of Mexico have grown into such a massive criminal enterprise that they have
supplanted the government in whole regions and threaten to turn the country into a narco-state like
1990s-era Colombia, say law enforcement and criminal experts.¶ Attempts by the United States and Mexico's
federal government have failed to stem the power of the cartels, which economists say employ as much as one-fifth
of the people in some Mexican states.¶ "We are approaching that red zone," said Edgardo Buscaglia,
an expert on organized crime at the Autonomous Technological University of Mexico. "There are pockets of
ungovernability in the country, and they will expand."¶ For the past decade, large parts of Mexico
have been sliding toward the lawlessness Colombia experienced in which drug traffickers in league
with left-wing rebels controlled small towns and large parts of the interior through drug-funded bribery and gunbarrel intimidation, Buscaglia and others say.¶ Even President Felipe Calderón, who a year ago angrily rebutted
suggestions that Mexico was becoming a "failed state," is now describing his crackdown as a fight for territory
and "the very authority of the state."¶ "The crime has stopped being a low-profile activity and has become defiant. ...
Plainly visible and based on co-opting or intimidating the authorities," he told a group of Mexican ambassadors last month. "It's the
law of 'the bribe or the bullet.' "¶ In places such as Tancitaro, the battle may already be lost.¶ In the past year,
gunmen in this western town of 26,000 had killed seven police, murdered a town administrator and kidnapped others, said Martin
Urbina, a city official. Drug traffickers were apparently demanding the removal of certain officers, he said.
Mexican instability spills over and leads to broader instability in the region
Shirk Mar-11 (David A. “The Drug War in Mexico: Confronting a Shared Threat,” Council on
Foreign Relations, David A. Shirk is the director of the Trans-Border Institute and associate
professor of political science at the University of San Diego. He conducts research on Mexican
politics, U.S.-Mexico relations, and law enforcement and security along the U.S.-Mexico border.
https://docs.google.com/viewer?url=http%3A%2F%2Fi.cfr.org%2Fcontent%2Fpublications%2Fat
tachments%2FMexico_CSR60.pdf)
The United States has much to gain by helping strengthen its southern neighbor and even
more to lose if it does not. The cumulative effects¶ of an embattled Mexican state harm the
United States and a further ¶ reduction of Mexican state capacity is both unacceptable and a
clear ¶ motivation for U.S. preventive action. ¶ First, the weaker the Mexican state, the greater
difficulty the United ¶ States will have in controlling the nearly two-thousand-mile border. ¶
Spillover violence, in which DTOs bring their fight to U.S. soil, is a ¶ remote worst-case
scenario.¶ directly affects the United States. A weak Mexican government ¶ increases the flow of
both illegal immigrants and contraband (such as ¶ drugs, money, and weapons) into the United
States. As the dominant ¶ wholesale distributors of illegal drugs to U.S. consumers, Mexican ¶
traffickers are also the single greatest domestic organized crime threat ¶ within the United
States, operating in every state and hundreds of cities, ¶ selling uncontrolled substances that
directly endanger the health and ¶ safety of millions of ordinary citizens.¶ Second, economically,
Mexico is an important market for the United ¶ States. As a member of the North American
Free Trade Agreement ¶ (NAFTA), it is one of only seventeen states with which the United ¶
States has a free trade pact, outside the General Agreement on Tariffs ¶ and Trade (GATT). The
United States has placed nearly $100 billion of ¶ foreign direct investment in Mexico. Mexico is
also the United States’ ¶ third-largest trade partner, the third-largest source of U.S. imports,
and ¶ the second-largest exporter of U.S. goods and services—with potential ¶ for further
market growth as the country develops. Trade with Mexico ¶ benefits the U.S. economy, and
the market collapse that would likely ¶ accompany a deteriorated security situation could
hamper U.S. economic recovery. ¶ Third, Mexican stability serves as an important anchor for
the ¶ region. With networks stretching into Central America, the Caribbean, and the Andean
countries, Mexican DTOs undermine the security and reliability of other U.S. partners in the
hemisphere, corrupting ¶ high-level officials, military operatives, and law enforcement
personnel; undermining due process and human rights; reducing public support for counterdrug efforts; and even provoking hostility toward ¶ the United States. Given the fragility of
some Central American and ¶ Caribbean states, expansion of DTO operations and violence
into the ¶ region would have a gravely destabilizing effect.
Losing the drug war collapses legitimate government and the Mexican economy
Felbab and Williams 12 (Vanda Felbab-Brown, Fellow in the Latin America Initiative and in
the 21st Century Defense Initiative in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, and Phil
Williams, Wesley W. Posvar Professor and Director of the Matthew B. Ridgway Center for
International Security Studies at the University of Pittsburgh. “DRUG TRAFFICKING, VIOLENCE,
AND INSTABILITY” April 2012. mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/142849/.../pub1101.pdf)
VP
Apart from strengthening belligerents and even criminal groups in a multifaceted way, large-scale
illicit economies also
threaten the security and stability of the state. Politically, they provide an avenue for criminal
organizations to enter the political space, corrupting and undermining the legitimate
democratic process. These actors, who enjoy the financial resources and political capital
generated by sponsoring the illicit economy, frequently experience great success in politics. They are able to secure
official positions of power as well as wield influence from behind the scenes. The problem perpetuates itself as successful
politicians bankrolled with illicit money make it more difficult for would-be innocent actors to
resist participating in the illicit economy, leading to endemic corruption at both the local and national
levels. Guatemala, El Salvador, and Haiti are cases in point.17¶ Large illicit economies dominated by powerful
traffickers also have pernicious effects on a country’s law enforcement and judicial systems. As
the illicit economy grows, the investigative capacity of the law enforcement and judicial systems diminishes.
Impunity for criminal activity increases, undermining the credibility of law enforcement, the
judicial system, and the authority of the government.18 Powerful traffickers frequently turn to
violent means to deter and avoid prosecution, killing or bribing prosecutors, judges, and witnesses. Colombia in the late 1980s
and Mexico today are powerful reminders of the corruption and paralysis of law enforcement as a
result of extensive criminal networks and the devastating effects of high levels of violent
criminality on the judicial system.¶ In addition, illicit economies have large and complex economic
effects.19 Drug cultivation and processing, for example, generate employment for the poor rural
populations and might even facilitate upward mobility. As mentioned above, they can also have powerful macroeconomic
spillover effects in terms of boosting overall economic activity. But a burgeoning drug economy also contributes
to inflation and can hence harm legitimate, export-oriented, import-substituting industries. It encourages
real estate speculation and undermines currency stability. It also displaces legitimate production. Since
the drug economy is more profitable than legal production, requires less security and infrastructure, and imposes
smaller sunk and transaction costs, the local population is frequently uninterested in, or unable to participate in, other (legal) kinds
of economic activity. The illicit economy can thus lead to a form of so-called Dutch disease, where a boom in an
isolated sector of the economy causes, or is accompanied by, stagnation in other core sectors, since it gives rise to appreciation of
land and labor costs.
Laundry List
Solving corruption key to solve a laundry list of impacts
Seelke 3-18-13 (Clare Ribando, Specialist in Latin American Affairs, “Supporting Criminal
Justice System Reform in Mexico: The U.S. Role,” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43001.pdf)
Fostering security, stability, and democracy in neighboring Mexico is seen by analysts to be in
the ¶ U.S. national security and economic interest. Reforming Mexico’s often corrupt and
inefficient ¶ criminal justice system is widely regarded as crucial for combating criminality,
strengthening the ¶ rule of law, and better protecting citizen security and human rights in the
country.
Corruption undermines growth and education and leads to disease and poverty
Transparency International Sep-10 (This report was produced by the Policy and Research
Department of the Transparency International Secretariat in Berlin. Every effort has been made
to verify the accuracy of the information contained in this report. “THE ANTI-CORRUPTION
CATALYST: REALISING THE MDGs BY 2015,” http://www.transparencyusa.org/documents/AntiCorruptionCatalystRealisingtheMDGby2015.pdf)
2. THE COSTS OF CORRUPTION: ¶ THE IMPACTS ON EDUCATION, ¶ HEALTH AND WATER¶
Corruption – whether petty, grand or political – exacts ¶ a high cost on development. Abuses in
one sector do ¶ not spare the others from collateral damage. The bribe ¶ asked by a
schoolmaster to enrol a family’s daughter ¶ in the ‘free’ elementary school means a girl’s
education ¶ and opportunities may be irreversibly blocked. When ¶ newly elected
parliamentarians whose campaigns were ¶ supported by pharmaceutical companies pass
policies ¶ that increase the local cost of needed drugs, sick people ¶ face a lack of treatment,
which may lead to lost days of ¶ work and wages, and a cycle of poverty. Corruption can ¶ also
manifest in more subtle, ‘quiet’ forms2¶ that undermine ¶ public trust in government and the
services it provides.
Relations
Corruption is the major source of tension between the US and Mexico
SHELLEY Aug-01 (LOUISE, “Corruption and Organized Crime in Mexico in the Post-PRI
Transition,” American University, Louise Shelley is a professor at George Mason University in
Virginia. She is also founder and director of the Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption
Center, http://www.exlegi.ox.ac.uk/resources/documents/oc%20in%20mexico.pdf)
The political costs of corruption and organized crime are high for Mexico. Among ¶ these costs
is the negative impact on bilateral relations with the United States. In fact, ¶ the drug war has
become one of the major sources of tension between the two countries ¶ (del Alizal,1991;
Villegas, 1991). Increasingly, the U.S.-Mexico relationship is defined ¶ in terms of counternarcotics efforts, and much American reporting on Mexico in the ¶ press and television
concerns the drug trade and trafficking organizations.' The annual ¶ drug certification process,
in which Congress determines whether Mexico is paying ¶ enough heed to drug trafficking,
reduces the highly complex Mexican American ¶ relationship to a single dimension (GomezCespedes, 1999).
Economy
Corruption undermines the Mexican economy
Blankenheim, Bucheli, Doshi, Gudmundson, and Huynh 5-7-10 (Beth, Liseth, Arnav,
Abbie, Jim, “How does corruption affect economic growth in Mexico? A View on Drug Wars,”
Liseth Bucheli is a Graduate Intern, Marketing and Enrollment at University of St. Thomas,
http://www.econ.umn.edu/~schwe227/teaching.s10/files/material/group09Mexican%20Drug%20Cartels%20Final.pdf)
GENERAL ECONOMIC EFFECTS¶ Corruption can affect economic growth in a ¶ number of
different ways through:¶ Foreign direct investment¶ Tax revenues¶ Allocation of Public
services¶ The quality of goods and services¶ Rationality of transactions¶ According to World
Bank research, ¶ countries who fight corruption and ¶ improve the rule of law can increase ¶
national income as much as four ¶ times in the long run¶ Correlation between higher ¶ CPI
and GPA per capita:¶ Estimate for Colombia suggests that ¶ 1% of GDP is lost to corruption¶
Estimate for Brazil suggest that each ¶ citizen pays $6,000 annually due to ¶ corruption¶ Average
Mexican household spend ¶ 14% of income bribing ¶ government officials¶ Using CPI index as
a¶ measure of Corruption,¶ Research finds that ¶ less corrupt countries¶ receive more foreign¶
investments over a period¶ from 1999-2005 ¶ (European Physical Journal)¶ The findings of this
study are ¶ similar to the findings of other ¶ literature¶ Tax revenues is affected by corruption
in two ¶ ways:¶ Direct:¶ Sales Tax¶ Income Tax¶ Import/Export tax¶ Value Added Tax¶ Indirect:¶
The reduction of economic activity¶ Corruption can lead to higher prices for public ¶ services:¶
In Paraguay, the cost of roads in rural areas ¶ increased from $13 Million to $24 Million due to ¶
kickbacks¶ Additionally, corruption can lead to irrational ¶ investments (i.e. contracts not
awarded to those ¶ with best return) (Seligon)
Merida Advantage CP
Text: The United States federal government should increase funding and
support for the Merida Initiative in Mexico.
Solvency
Funding
Merida initiative needs more funding—solves justice and the rule of law
Chamber of Commerce 11 (“Steps to a 21st Century: U.S.-Mexico Border,” A U.S. Chamber
of Commerce Border Report,
http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/reports/2011_us_mexico_report.pdf)
There are a number of issues that need to be resolved to improve border ¶ relations between
the United States and Mexico. If we are serious about creating ¶ a 21st century border, both
governments and their private sector partners need to ¶ address the following key issues:¶ •
Investment in Border Security and the Merida Initiative: Increase ¶ and streamline funding for
the Merida Initiative and ensure that the ¶ United States and Mexico have the means to
promote justice and the rule ¶ of law at the border.
Merida fails now because of underfunding—but a successful Merida is key to
solve a laundry list of impacts
Chamber of Commerce 11 (“Steps to a 21st Century: U.S.-Mexico Border,” A U.S. Chamber
of Commerce Border Report,
http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/reports/2011_us_mexico_report.pdf)
Over the last several years, major steps have been ¶ taken to improve security on the U.S.Mexico border, ¶ but more needs to be done. In 2008, more than ¶ 5,600 lives were lost in
Mexico related to drug cartel ¶ violence.¶ These circumstances cause both physical ¶ and
economic harm to the people of Mexico and the ¶ United States, especially those living along
our shared ¶ border. For companies, it raises concerns for personnel, ¶ supply chains, and
physical assets. U.S. and Mexican ¶ companies have taken appropriate steps to respond to ¶
these concerns while showing a strong commitment to ¶ the bilateral commercial partnership.¶
The Merida Initiative is a U.S.-sponsored ¶ $1.6 billion multiyear program to partner with ¶
Mexico and other countries to address criminal ¶ organizations that subvert public safety,
erode the ¶ rule of law, and threaten our collective security. The ¶ imminence of this threat
cannot be underestimated. ¶ Cooperation on trade and security is critical to the ¶ success of
both our countries. The Chamber supports ¶ the ongoing Merida Initiative and hopes to see ¶
funding continue and increase.¶ As the U.S. and Mexican governments have cracked ¶ down on
illegal drug activity, drug cartels have ¶ resorted to extreme criminal behavior in the short ¶ term.
But both governments must maintain their ¶ resolve and continue their missions. Ultimately, ¶
Merida’s success will be measured by the extent to ¶ which drug-related violence is once more
an issue ¶ for local law enforcement, rather than a matter of ¶ national security for both our
countries as it is today. ¶ Anything short of that goal perpetuates the risk to ¶ our mutual peace
and prosperity.
Merida needs more funding and focus to be successful
Abu-Hamdeh 11 (Sabrina, “The Merida Initiative: An Effective Way of Reducing Violence in
Mexico?” Pepperdine Policy Review, Sabrina Abu-Hamdeh is a second year student at SPP
graduating with concentrations in Economics and International Relations. She presented this
paper at the Pacific Coast Conference of Latin American Studies in November 2011.
http://publicpolicy.pepperdine.edu/policy-review/2011v4/content/merida-initiative.pdf)
Military assistance to Mexico in a sustained effort is ¶ necessary to eradicate cartel influence,
but as historical outcomes suggest, ¶ a broader policy focus is imperative for success. Programs
implemented in ¶ Mexico should focus on both local and national sustainability, and funding ¶
should be consistent for the duration. Plan Colombia was successful in ¶ some ways because of
the sheer quantity of funding by the US government. ¶ Mexico needs funding so that its
programs may be consistent, if nothing ¶ else. Consistent funding for institution building,
military assistance, and ¶ progressive programming to divert drug producers to other trades
would ¶ all serve to limit the supply of drugs flowing into the United States.
Support
Increasing training and screening through Merida solves corruption
Velez-Green, Reyes, and Ramicone Sep-12 (Alex, Robin, and Anthony, The Institute of
Politics is a non-profit organization located in the John F. Kennedy School of Government at
Harvard University, “GOVERNMENTAL, JUDICIAL AND POLICE CORRUPTION,”
http://www.iop.harvard.edu/sites/default/files_new/research-policypapers/TheWarOnMexicanCartels.pdf)
In addition to low wages, insufficient training and equipment are major obstacles to ¶
preventing corruption in Mexican police departments. The American military and the Drug ¶
Enforcement Administration (DEA) have already assisted in training Mexican law enforcement ¶
officers both in Mexico and through exchange programs with the U.S.41,42 This training must ¶
continue and should be expanded. It is crucial, however, that these programs be done in ¶
conjunction with improved candidate screening techniques on the Mexican side to ensure that ¶
they will not transfer their training to criminals in Mexico. Candidates for this training should be
¶ submitted to stringent screening mechanisms and qualification requirements.43,44 The U.S.
has ¶ also already taken steps through the Mérida Initiative to better arm Mexican police
officers, ¶ including financing the purchases of imaging technology, aircrafts, naval vessels, and
weapons.45¶ The American government should continue providing such necessary financing in
order to bring ¶ Mexican law enforcement to technological parity with the drug cartels. This
funding should be ¶ funneled specifically towards the PF and certain state police agencies which
have demonstrated ¶ both need and loyalty to the federal government.
Should continue supporting Merida
Keefe and Perez Sep-12 (Tyler and Valentina, The Institute of Politics is a non-profit
organization located in the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University,
“GOVERNMENTAL, JUDICIAL AND POLICE CORRUPTION,”
http://www.iop.harvard.edu/sites/default/files_new/research-policypapers/TheWarOnMexicanCartels.pdf)
Secondly, the U.S. should continue to support the Merida Initiative, with an increased ¶
emphasis on the training and advisement of Mexican law enforcement and military personnel.
¶ The cartel situation is one that is similar to that of an insurgency. The Mexican government is
at ¶ war with organizations seeking geographic control of the country. The counter-insurgency
¶ experience of American personnel in the civilian and military sector can be used to Mexican ¶
advantage. Counter-insurgency requires well-trained forces, which the U.S. can help provide
to ¶ the Mexican government, along with the equipment and technology allocated in the
Merida ¶ Initiative.
Commitment to Merida is key
Abu-Hamdeh 11 (Sabrina, “The Merida Initiative: An Effective Way of Reducing Violence in
Mexico?” Pepperdine Policy Review, Sabrina Abu-Hamdeh is a second year student at SPP
graduating with concentrations in Economics and International Relations. She presented this
paper at the Pacific Coast Conference of Latin American Studies in November 2011.
http://publicpolicy.pepperdine.edu/policy-review/2011v4/content/merida-initiative.pdf)
“Beyond Merida” should be used as a framework for a more ¶ progressive policy that will
incorporate a sustained, long term commitment ¶ to aid Mexico in its anti-drug efforts. To
truly eradicate the rampant supply ¶ of drugs and the ever-growing drug trafficking trade, the
United States and ¶ Mexico must cooperate and the United States must commit to
implementing ¶ aid programs properly. As GAO reports have shown, accountability has ¶ proven
difficult for the State Department. To truly affect the both supply ¶ and demand sides of the
drug problem, policies must be implemented ¶ properly, with measures in place to ensure
success and cohesion. US led programs should focus on local and national sustainability to
ensure ¶ lasting impacts.
Impacts
Relations
Merida improves US-Mexican relations
Abu-Hamdeh 11 (Sabrina, “The Merida Initiative: An Effective Way of Reducing Violence in
Mexico?” Pepperdine Policy Review, Sabrina Abu-Hamdeh is a second year student at SPP
graduating with concentrations in Economics and International Relations. She presented this
paper at the Pacific Coast Conference of Latin American Studies in November 2011.
http://publicpolicy.pepperdine.edu/policy-review/2011v4/content/merida-initiative.pdf)
The Merida Initiative came at an important moment for both the United ¶ States and Mexico. It
signified a much needed collaboration and acceptance ¶ between both countries, by the
acknowledgment of their mutual ¶ shortcomings and their pledge to aid one another. Both
countries realized ¶ that the futures of their societies were tied, and a significant yet
unintended ¶ consequence of the Initiative has been to improve relations between the ¶
governments of the United States and Mexico.
Merida key to cooperation
Seelke Apr-19-10 (Clare Ribando, Specialist in Latin American Affairs, “Mérida Initiative for
Mexico and Central America: Funding and Policy Issues,”
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43001.pdf)
U.S. officials also maintain that some of the most important results of Mérida thus far may be ¶
impossible to quantify, such as the increase in communication and cooperation that has
developed ¶ as a result of the initiative among U.S., Mexican, and Central American law
enforcement and ¶ security officials.53 There appears to be a particularly strong sense of coresponsibility and high ¶ level of cooperation in implementing the Mérida Initiative among
high-ranking U.S. and Mexican ¶ officials. This is in sharp contrast to the past, when mutual
mistrust hindered bilateral counterdrug ¶ efforts. The U.S. and Mexican governments have
designed a multi-level working group structure ¶ to design and implement bilateral security
efforts. By May 2010, U.S. policy-planners from the ¶ State Department’s Narcotics Affairs
Section (NAS), which oversees Mérida implementation, and ¶ Mexican officials from 16
partner agencies will be co-located in a new bilateral office, the first of ¶ its kind at any U.S.
Embassy.
Turtles Conditions CP
Text: The United States Federal Government will <do the plan> if and only if
Mexico agrees to curtail sea turtle bycatch under the Inter-American
Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles.
Inherency
Mexico is killing sea turtles at record levels in the status quo—only closing
fishing areas in Mexico solves
CBD Jul-15-13 (Center for Biological Diversity, “TELL MEXICO: STOP KILLING ENDANGERED SEA
TURTLES,” The Center for Biological Diversity based in Tucson, Arizona, is a nonprofit
membership organization known for its work protecting endangered species through legal
action and scientific petitions,
http://action.biologicaldiversity.org/o/2167/p/dia/action3/common/public/?action_KEY=13749)
Each year at least 2,000 endangered loggerhead sea turtles are caught by shark and halibut
fishermen off the southern peninsula of Mexico's Baja California. The turtles drown after being
accidentally hooked on longline gear or entangled in gillnets; then they're thrown back into the
sea, only to wash up dead on shore.¶ Sea turtle deaths reached record levels last year, and
alarmingly high stranding rates continued this spring. Scientists and conservationists have
urged Mexico to close fishing areas where sea turtle habitat and risky gear overlap -- but
Mexico has failed to take action.¶ The United States and Mexico share this loggerhead sea
turtle population, which is listed as endangered in both countries.
The US has already closed fishing areas but Mexico hasn’t—failure to do so
dooms the sea turtles to extinction
CBD Jul-15-13 (Center for Biological Diversity, “TELL MEXICO: STOP KILLING ENDANGERED SEA
TURTLES,” The Center for Biological Diversity based in Tucson, Arizona, is a nonprofit
membership organization known for its work protecting endangered species through legal
action and scientific petitions,
http://action.biologicaldiversity.org/o/2167/p/dia/action3/common/public/?action_KEY=13749)
I am writing to ask Mexico to act now and halt the ongoing loggerhead sea turtle bycatch off
Baja California Sur. As you know, for two decades scientists have documented turtles becoming
hooked or entangled in the Gulf of Ulloa's longline and gillnet fisheries. These fisheries kill an
estimated 2,000 loggerheads each year. Last July 483 loggerheads were found stranded on just
one stretch of beach -- a 600 percent increase over previous years' averages. And alarmingly
high stranding rates have continued this spring.¶ The United States and Mexico share the
North Pacific loggerhead sea turtle population, which is listed as endangered in both
countries. The United States has closed fishing areas where important sea turtle habitat and
risky gear overlap and also requires its fishermen to adopt more sea turtle-friendly gear.
Mexico can and must do the same -- or risk the population's extinction.
The sea turtles will go extinct if we don’t act now
STRP Apr-30-13 (Sea Turtle Restoration Project, “U.S. Trade Sanctions Sought Against Mexico
to Stop Mass Killing of Sea Turtles in Baja Fisheries: Endangered Loggerhead Sea Turtles Killed By
Thousands in Baja California Sur Bycatch Hotspot,” http://seaturtles.org/article.php?id=2465)
WASHINGTON— U.S. conservation groups formally requested trade sanctions against Mexico
today to stop the country’s massive loggerhead sea turtle bycatch. Each year Mexican
fisheries off the southern Baja California peninsula kill more than 2,000 endangered
loggerheads as they fish for halibut and sharks. Today’s petition filed by the Center for Biological
Diversity and Turtle Island Restoration Network initiates a legal process that could ban some
Mexican seafood imports until Mexico reduces its sea turtle mortality. Download petition
below.¶ “The Pacific loggerheads are going extinct now, so we must end these sea turtle
drownings now,” said Teri Shore, program director at Turtle Island Restoration Network
(SeaTurtles.org). “Any delay in halting excess bycatch in Mexico's fisheries spells doom for
these vulnerable and long-lived sea turtles.”
Mexico is the key hotspot for sea turtles
STRP Apr-30-13 (Sea Turtle Restoration Project, “U.S. Trade Sanctions Sought Against Mexico
to Stop Mass Killing of Sea Turtles in Baja Fisheries: Endangered Loggerhead Sea Turtles Killed By
Thousands in Baja California Sur Bycatch Hotspot,” http://seaturtles.org/article.php?id=2465)
For nearly a decade, scientists have documented high levels of sea turtle entanglement and
strandings on beaches in Baja California Sur. The area is considered a bycatch “hotspot,” as
Mexican fisheries overlap with key sea turtle feeding grounds. Just last summer, sea turtle
strandings reached a record high when 483 loggerhead sea turtles were found dead along a
single, 25-mile stretch of coast — a 600 percent increase over already-alarming average rates.
Scientists believe Baja California Sur has the highest concentration of sea turtle strandings
anywhere in the world.
Solvency
US trade conditions are key to solve
CBD Jul-15-13 (Center for Biological Diversity, “TELL MEXICO: STOP KILLING ENDANGERED SEA
TURTLES,” The Center for Biological Diversity based in Tucson, Arizona, is a nonprofit
membership organization known for its work protecting endangered species through legal
action and scientific petitions,
http://action.biologicaldiversity.org/o/2167/p/dia/action3/common/public/?action_KEY=13749)
If Mexico does not act, I fully support U.S. trade sanctions until Mexico reduces sea turtle
mortality and adopts "comparable" turtle protection measures, as required by international
treaty and U.S. law. Sea turtles need protection on both sides of the border, and I urge Mexico
to act now to save these ancient and vanishing animals.
Governmental action is uniquely key
STRP Apr-30-13 (Sea Turtle Restoration Project, “U.S. Trade Sanctions Sought Against Mexico
to Stop Mass Killing of Sea Turtles in Baja Fisheries: Endangered Loggerhead Sea Turtles Killed By
Thousands in Baja California Sur Bycatch Hotspot,” http://seaturtles.org/article.php?id=2465)
“Loggerhead sea turtles are in danger of going extinct, but Mexico’s government is letting its
fishermen entangle, hook and kill thousands of these amazing animals each year,” said Sarah
Uhlemann, a senior attorney with the Center. “Mexico needs to use common-sense measures
to prevent these thousands of unnecessary deaths. We need action on both sides of the
border to avoid extinction.” ¶ Loggerhead sea turtles in the North Pacific Ocean are listed as
endangered under both U.S. and Mexican law, but bycatch continues to threaten their
existence. Sea turtles often drown after becoming entangled in gillnet gear or getting hooked on
longlines that target finfish and sharks. The United States has required its fishermen to adopt
sea turtle bycatch prevention measures, including closing high-risk fishing areas. But Mexico
has not taken similar action to curb its loggerhead bycatch.
Convention Solvency
Convention will work—it’s key leverage
PaceBaja May-2-13 (Pacebaja is a production and research journal for Pace University,
“Conservation Groups Press U.S. to Sanction Mexico Over Sea Turtle Deaths,”
http://pacebaja.wordpress.com/2013/05/02/conservation-groups-press-u-s-to-sanctionmexico-over-sea-turtle-deaths/)
The groups say the United States has leverage through the Inter-American Convention for the
Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles. The decade-old agreement is designed to protect
both dwindling sea turtle populations and the habitat they rely on for feeding and breeding.
The “bycatch” of loggerhead sea turtles in gillnets is centered in ocean waters off Magdalena
Bay, Mexico, the focal point of our documentary, which will be released next week.¶ In an
interview earlier this week, Sarah Uhlemann, a senior attorney for the Center for Biological
Diversity, said the surge in deaths of loggerheads is enough to invoke the “Pelly Amendment,”
which allows the U.S. to sanction any country that violates the treaty. In the next several
years, a ban on imports of certain Mexican seafood products could be instituted by the U.S
Commerce Department if government agencies find that the loggerhead bycatch has not been
addressed.
USFG action solves—Obama can use the convention to push Mexico for reforms
STRP Apr-30-13 (Sea Turtle Restoration Project, “U.S. Trade Sanctions Sought Against Mexico
to Stop Mass Killing of Sea Turtles in Baja Fisheries: Endangered Loggerhead Sea Turtles Killed By
Thousands in Baja California Sur Bycatch Hotspot,” http://seaturtles.org/article.php?id=2465)
Under an American law referred to as the “Pelly Amendment,” the conservation groups’
petition asks the United States to officially recognize or “certify” that Mexico’s sea turtle
bycatch “diminishes the effectiveness” of the Inter-American Convention for the Protection
and Conservation of Sea Turtles. Under this treaty, Mexico, the United States and other
nations have committed to reduce bycatch to “greatest extent practicable,” yet loggerhead
bycatch remains substantially unregulated in Mexico. If the secretary of commerce agrees,
President Obama may then ban Mexican imports until sea turtle bycatch is reduced. ¶ In January,
the United States “identified” Mexico for its unsustainable loggerhead bycatch under a separate
U.S. law, the Protected Living Marine Resources statute, which requires nations to be formally
identified, certified and sanctioned for failing to adopt bycatch measures comparable to U.S.
protections.
The convention uniquely solves
STRP Apr-30-13 (Sea Turtle Restoration Project, “U.S. Trade Sanctions Sought Against Mexico
to Stop Mass Killing of Sea Turtles in Baja Fisheries: Endangered Loggerhead Sea Turtles Killed By
Thousands in Baja California Sur Bycatch Hotspot,” http://seaturtles.org/article.php?id=2465)
Negotiated in 1996, the Inter-American Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea
Turtles requires range states to prohibit direct killing of sea turtles, reduce bycatch, and
protect key habitat areas. Nations will meet in Ecuador in June to discuss the treaty’s
implementation.¶ The United States has successfully used Pelly Amendment sanctions in the
past to enforce whaling quotas and stop rhino and tiger trade in Taiwan.
Impact
Sea turtles are a keystone species—function as floating reefs
STF No Date (Sea Turtle Foundation, Sea Turtle Foundation is a non-profit, non-government
group working to protect sea turtles through research, education and action, “Loggerhead Turtle
(Caretta caretta),” http://seaturtlefoundation.squarespace.com/loggerhead-turtle/)
Loggerhead turtles are named after their large head and powerful jaw that enables them to feed
on large shellfish. Loggerheads are keystone species playing a vital role in moving nutrients
around the reef and even onto beaches in the form of eggs. They are known as floating reefs,
being home to as many as 100 other species such as barnacles, shrimp, algae and even small
fish.
Sea turtles are a keystone species—key role in the food chain
Spotila Oct-26-04 (James R. “Sea Turtles: A Complete Guide to Their Biology, Behavior, and
Conservation,” American Institute of Biological Sciences and the Ecological Society of America,
http://books.google.com/books/about/Sea_Turtles.html?id=dpsJrFxVIvUC)
Keystone Species The loggerhead turtle is a keystone species in the world’s oceans. As a
carnivore it plays a central role in the food chain and is dependent upon the invertebrate
populations that form the vast majority of its food supply. Loggerheads process large numbers
of invertebrate prey, breaking up the shells of mollusks such as conchs, whelks, and clams. Some
of the broken shells pass through the turtle’s digestive system and some fall back to the bottom.
The small pieces of shell are thus available for other animals to eat as a source of calcium. By
digging around on the bottom, loggerheads change ocean bottom communities both in
physical structure and the living biological ecosystem. This may control the community
organization of the areas in which the turtles forage. Nesting females transfer substantial
amounts of nutrients—their eggs—to the terrestrial ecosystems around nesting breaches. For
example, up to 28 percent of the energy and 26 percent of the nitrogen placed into Florida egg
clutches are transferred to predators. A substantial number of hatchlings become food for fish
and birds as the hatchlings swim away form the nesting beach. Essentially, loggerheads are
swimming reefs. They support a large array of plants and animals that attach to their shells
and ride through the oceans with the turtles. More than 100 species of animals from 13 phyla
and 37 kinds of algae live on the backs of loggerheads. This baggage increases drag, requiring
extra energy to swim. It is not clear if there is any benefit to the turtle from this association,
though the varied community of plants an animals on the carapace may provide some
amouflage.
Sea turtles are a keystone species—the ultimate lesson of ecology—their
extinction spills over into multiple ecosystems and negatively impacts humans
Steiner 10 (Caribbean Conservation Corporation and Todd Steiner, Sea Turtle Restoration
Project, Executive Director at Turtle Island Restoration Network
San Francisco Bay Area | Environmental Services ,“Are Sea Turtles Worth Saving? In a world full
of problems and full of species, it’s a question worth asking. Are there good reasons to go to the
trouble of saving endangered sea turtles? Read on and see what you think.”
http://www.bonaireturtles.org/explore/are-sea-turtles-worth-saving/)
Sea turtles demonstrate the ultimate lesson of ecology – that everything is connected. ¶ Sea
turtles are part of two vital ecosystems, beaches and marine systems. If sea turtles become
extinct, both the marine and beach ecosystems will weaken. And since humans use the ocean
as an important source for food and use beaches for many kinds of activities, weakness in
these ecosystems would have harmful effects on humans.¶ ¶ Though sea turtles have been
living and thriving in the world’s oceans for 150 million years, they are now in danger of
extinction largely because of changes brought about by humans. If we alter the oceans and
beaches enough to wipe out sea turtles, will those changes make it difficult for us to survive?
And if we choose to do what’s necessary to save sea turtles, might we save our own future?¶ ¶
Beaches and dune systems do not get very many nutrients during the year, so very little
vegetation grows on the dunes and no vegetation grows on the beach itself. This is because
sand does not hold nutrients very well. Sea turtles use beaches and the lower dunes to nest and
lay their eggs. Sea turtles lay around 100 eggs in a nest and lay between 3 and 7 nests during the
summer nesting season. Not every nest will hatch, not every egg in a nest will hatch, and not all
of the hatchlings in a nest will make it out of the nest. All the unhatched nests, eggs and trapped
hatchlings are very good sources of nutrients for the dune vegetation. Even the left-over egg
shells from hatched eggs provide nutrients.¶ ¶ Dune plants use the nutrients from turtle eggs to
grow and become stronger. As the dune vegetation grows stronger and healthier, the health
of the entire beach/dune ecosystem becomes better. Healthy vegetation and strong root
systems hold the sand in the dunes and protect the beach from erosion. As the number of
turtles declines, fewer eggs are laid in the beaches, providing less nutrients. If sea turtles went
extinct, dune vegetation would lose a major source of nutrients and would not be healthy or
strong enough to maintain the dunes, allowing beaches to wash away.¶ ¶ Sea turtles eat
jellyfish, preventing the large “blooms” of jellyfish – including stinging jellyfish – that are
increasingly wreaking havoc on fisheries, recreation and other maritime activities throughout
the oceans.¶ ¶ Research has shown that sea turtles often act as keystone species. Sea grass beds
grazed by green sea turtles are more productive than those that aren’t. Hawksbill turtles eat
sponges, preventing them from out-competing slow-growing corals. Both of these grazing
activities maintain species diversity and the natural balance of fragile marine ecosystems. If
sea turtles go extinct, it will cause declines in all the species whose survival depends on
healthy seagrass beds and coral reefs. That means that many marine species that humans
harvest would be lost.¶ ¶ Sea turtles, and many species that are affected by their presence or
absence, are an important attraction for marine tourism, a major source of income for many
countries.¶ ¶ These are some of the roles that we know sea turtles play in the essential health
of ecosystems. Who knows what other roles we will discover as science reveals more about
sea turtles? While humans have the ability to tinker with the “clockwork” of life, we don’t
have the ability to know when it’s okay to lose a few of the working parts. ¶ If you disagree, try
to take apart a clock and just throw away one of the pieces that doesn’t look that important.
Put the clock back together and see if it still works.
AFF Answers
Say No
Mexico will refuse human rights conditions
AI 4-Jun-08 (Amnesty International is a prestigious international human rights organization,
“Mexico: Merida initiative can only deliver security with human rights,”
http://www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/mexico-merida-initiative-can-onlydeliver-security-human-rights-20080604)
Amnesty International today urged the US Congress to maintain human rights safeguards in the
Merida initiative – legislation to fund a security cooperation package between the US, Mexico
and Central America.¶ Amnesty International’s call comes as the US Congress has come under
increasing pressure not to include human rights safeguards in the proposed initiative. Mexican
government authorities said they would not proceed with the agreement unless human rights
safeguards were removed.
Mexico doesn’t want human rights conditions
WW4 06-07-08 (World War 4 Report provides concise, comprehensive daily reportage and
analysis on US military operations and the "War on Terrorism"; resource wars and autonomy
struggles; and dissident-left voices from the Middle East, Latin America and around the world. It
has been an ongoing news digest and commentary since the immediate aftermath of 9-11.
“Mexican lawmakers oppose Mérida Initiative rights conditions,”
http://ww4report.com/node/5609/taxonomy/term/32)
At the 47th US-Mexico Interparliamentary Commission, held June 6 in Monterrey, Nuevo León,
Mexican politicians from all of the three leading parties protested the imposition of human
rights conditions on aid recently approved by Washington under the Mérida Initiative, popularly
known as "Plan Mexico." Ruth Zavaleta of the left-opposition Party of the Democratic Revolution
(PRD), president of the Chamber of Deputies, joined with Sen. Santiago Creel Miranda of the
ruling conservative National Action Party (PAN) in decrying the conditions as patronizing and
hypocritical. They were joined by Nuevo León Gov. José Natividad González Parás of the
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), who also spoke out against construction of the border
fence. (El Universal, Mexico, June 7)
Corruption Conditions
Status Quo Solves
Police reforms solve now
Sabet 10 (Daniel Sabet, visiting professor at Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service,
“Police Reform in Mexico: ¶ Advances and Persistent Obstacles”
<http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/dms76/policefiles/Sabet_police_reform.pdf> May 2010)
Recognizing the failure of the limiting discretion approach, more recent reforms
have sought to ¶ produce police
forces deserving of the authority and discretion necessary to be effective. These ¶ include a wide range of
reforms, such as raising salaries and benefits, improving recruitment and ¶ selection criteria, elevating
training times and standards, offering specialized training, ¶ developing and certifying operational
procedures, offering a system of merit based promotion, ¶ vetting officers, and creating and
strengthening accountability mechanisms and oversight.
Domestic reforms solve by 2016
Seelke 13 (Clare Ribando Seelke, Specialist in Latin American Affairs, “Supporting Criminal Justice System Reform
¶ in
Mexico: The U.S. Role” <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43001.pdf> 3-18-13)
Under the judicial reforms, Mexico has until 2016 to replace its trial procedures at the federal
and ¶ state level, moving from a closed-door process based on written arguments to an adversarial ¶ public trial system with
oral arguments and the presumption of innocence until proven guilty. ¶ These changes should make the system
more transparent, participatory (including a greater role ¶ for victims, judges, and defense attorneys), and
impartial. In addition to oral trials, judicial ¶ systems are expected to adopt means of alternative
dispute resolution, which should help make ¶ them more flexible and efficient, thereby relieving backlogs and ensuring that
cases that go to ¶ trial are for serious crimes. In order to be successful, Mexico’s transition to this New Criminal ¶
Justice System (NCJS) will require structural, cultural, and systemic changes to Mexico’s law ¶
enforcement and judicial institutions, including fundamentally retraining justice sector operators. ¶ The transition
could take decades to fully take hold. The NCJS will have to be carefully adapted ¶ in states with indigenous populations that have
their own traditional justice systems.21¶ Mexico’s
judicial reforms seek to create a system that involves a
more equal balance of power ¶ between prosecutors and defense attorneys and a more active role for
judges. The reforms aim to ¶ check some of the discretionary power formerly held by public prosecutors. Under the NCJS, ¶
prosecutors are expected to present and defend the evidence they and the police whom they ¶ oversee have gathered at a public
trial where it may be challenged by the defense. Defense ¶ attorneys are given the opportunity to challenge the evidence presented
by the prosecution, crossexamine witnesses, and present evidence to support their client’s innocence. The
reforms also ¶
envision a more active and high-profile role for judges by, for example, requiring sentencing ¶ judges to
arbitrate trial proceedings and then render their decisions out in the open.
Mexican reforms solve crime
Shirk 11 (David A. Shirk, director of the Trans-Border Institute and associate professor of political science at the
University of San Diego. He conducts research on Mexican politics, U.S.-Mexico relations, and law enforcement and
security along the U.S.-Mexico border, “Justice Reform In Mexico:¶ Change & Challenges In ¶ The Judicial Sector”
<http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Chapter%207%20Justice%20Reform%20in%20Mexico,%20Change%20and%20Challenges%20in%20the%20Judicial%20Sector.pdf>
January 2011)
Finally, the 2008 reforms also significantly target organized crime , defined in accordance with the United
Nations Convention Against Organized Crime, signed in ¶ Palermo, Italy in 2000. That convention broadly defines an organized crime
syndicate as “a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time ¶ and acting in concert with the aim of
committing one or more serious crimes or ¶ offences [with a maximum sentence of four or more years in prison]… in order to ¶
obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit.” ¶ In cases involving organized crime, the
Mexican
constitution has now been amended ¶ to allow for the sequestering of suspects under
“arraigo” (literally, to “root” someone, ¶ i.e., to hold firmly) for up to 40 days without criminal charges (with possible extension ¶
of an additional 40 days, up to a total of 80 days).69 Under arraigo, prisoners may be held ¶ in solitary confinement and placed
under arrest in special detention centers created explicitly for this purpose. Furthermore,
in order to facilitate
extradition, the reforms also ¶ allow for the suspension of judicial proceedings in criminal
cases. Prosecutors may use ¶ the 40 day period to question the suspect and obtain evidence to build a case for prosecution.
Because formal charges have not been levied, they are not entitled to legal representation and they are not eligible to receive credit
for time served if convicted.¶ The arraigo procedure was first introduced in Mexico in 1983, as a measure to ¶ combat organized
crime. However, in 2006, the Supreme Court ruled that the procedure was unconstitutional, citing violations of the habeas corpus
rights of individuals ¶ held without charge. The
2008 reforms raised the arraigo procedure to the level of a
constitutional provision, thereby eliminating charges of unconstitutionality. Because ¶ arraigo applies to serious crimes,
and especially organized crime, it is used primarily ¶ by federal prosecutors. However, some states — like Nuevo León — have their
own ¶ provisions for the use of arraigo within their jurisdictions.70 Critics highlight the ¶ inherent tension of accepting such an
exceptional custody regime within a democratic society, and the potential abuses that it may bring. Meanwhile, how broadly, ¶
frequently, and effectively the procedure has been utilized since 2008 is not clear, in ¶ large part because access to information
about arraigo cases is difficult to obtain. ¶ In addition to special mechanisms for the detention of organized crime suspects, ¶ the
¶
2008 reforms also paved the way for new uses of wiretapping and other tools for ¶ fighting
organized crime. Also, following from the 2008 reforms, new supporting ¶ legislation on asset forfeiture (extinción de
dominio) was passed in 2009 to define ¶ the terms for seizing property in cases related to drug trafficking, human trafficking, ¶ and
auto theft.71 Under the new law, the Federal Attorney General’s office has discretion to determine when a particular suspect is
involved in organized crime, and ¶ whether or not assets related to those crimes are eligible for forfeiture.72¶ More recently, in
February 2010, President Felipe Calderón
proposed a new ¶ General Law to Prevent and Sanction
Crimes of Kidnappings, also known as the ¶ “Anti-Kidnapping Law” (Ley Anti-Secuestro).73 In addition to the use
of wiretapping, the bill also proposes the use of undercover operations to infiltrate
kidnapping ¶ organizations, anonymous informants, witness protection programs, and asset
forfeiture. If passed, the law would also apply higher penalties (30 years to life in prison) ¶ when the perpetrator poses as a
government official, or kidnaps especially vulnerable ¶ individuals (minors, pregnant women, elderly persons, or mentally disabled
persons); ¶ the minimum sentence for a kidnapping resulting in the victim’s death would be 40 ¶ years in prison.74 The reform also
proposes special prison facilities for kidnappers to ¶ serve their sentences, as well as requiring that electronic tracking devices be
placed ¶ on kidnappers released from prison after serving their sentence.
Reforms solve
Shirk 11 (David A. Shirk, director of the Trans-Border Institute and associate professor of political science at the
University of San Diego. He conducts research on Mexican politics, U.S.-Mexico relations, and law enforcement and
security along the U.S.-Mexico border, “Justice Reform In Mexico:¶ Change & Challenges In ¶ The Judicial Sector”
<http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Chapter%207%20Justice%20Reform%20in%20Mexico,%20Change%20and%20Challenges%20in%20the%20Judicial%20Sector.pdf>
January 2011)
There are certainly real prospects for the 2008 reforms to be successful. Proponents ¶ of Mexico’s
judicial sector reforms point to seemingly successful transitions from inquisitorial to accusatory systems
elsewhere in Latin America, most notably Chile.86¶ Indeed, the Mexican government has established
an international agreement with ¶ the government of Chile to share experiences and training in
order to facilitate ¶ Mexico’s transition to the adversarial model of criminal procedure. The experience of Chile appears to
suggest that the use of adversarial trial proceedings and ¶ alternative sentencing measures reduces
paperwork, increases efficiency, and helps to ¶ eliminate case backlogs by concentrating procedures in a
way that facilitates judicial ¶ decisions. Meanwhile, the emphasis on rights — for both the victim and the
accused ¶ — is believed to strengthen the rule of law, promoting not only “law and order” but ¶ also
governmental accountability and equal access to justice.
Alt Cause
Several alt causes to corruption that the CP can’t solve
Morris 09 (Stephen D. Morris, Professor, Middle Tennessee State University, “Political Corruption in Mexico: ¶
The Impact of Democratization” <https://www.rienner.com/uploads/4a0b19b1192c4.pdf> 2009)
Other scholars, by contrast, pinpoint the
continued weakness of political¶ institutions designed to
inhibit corruption, despite rather than because of democratization (Fabbri 2002; Fleischer 2002; Mainwaring and Welna
2003;¶ Santoro 2004; Rodrigues 2004; Subero 2004). In this second process involving, for lack of a better term, “old corruption,”
democratization can be seen as¶ incomplete or partial and indicate that the development of certain aspects of¶ democracy—like the
contestation of power and popular participation—may¶ advance at a pace far quicker than that for other aspects of democracy, like
the¶ rule of law or accountability (Fox 2007; Guerrero 2004). With
the lagging of¶ these key institutions,
including a lag in the development of a more democratic¶ political culture, a new democracy
may be unable to address both the traditional¶ (authoritarian holdover) as well as the newer forms of
corruption. Analyses in¶ this vein document a vast array of weak or nonexistent institutions in the
region designed to provide horizontal accountability across governmental institutions (e.g., few checks and balances in
executive legislative-relations, a¶ politicized or overwhelmed civil service, underfunded or nonexistent
oversight institutions, insufficient legal frameworks, a weak judiciary ). At the same¶ time,
mechanisms of vertical accountability between citizens and their governments remain weaker
than needed to effectively curb corruption (e.g., limited¶ press freedoms, weak civil society,
unrepresentative parties, and limited governmental transparency in which access to government activities is restricted¶ or
even kept secret).8 In their analysis of the continued high levels of corruption¶ in Latin America, Silvia
Colazingari and Susan Rose-Ackerman (1998) stress¶ the lack of constraints on government power,
an economic system dominated¶ by a small number of families and firms, the lack of
independent prosecutors,¶ the use of public ethics laws to help silence the press, and the lack of
administrative oversight. A critical shortcoming is the lack of prosecution for official¶
wrongdoing. Indeed, impunity—corruption’s evil twin—remains remarkably¶ high throughout Latin America. Despite the many
cases of exposed corruption¶ dominating media coverage, prosecutions remain rare (see Chapter 4 for data¶ on the Mexican case).
Erecting and perfecting the mechanisms of accountability—including an independent judiciary, a well-paid civil service, a media
able¶ and willing to investigate corruption, and interest groups dedicated to the reduction of corruption—thus remain serious
challenges standing in the way of democracy’s mature ability to control corruption.
Failed judicial system prevents effective reform
Corcoran 12 (Patrick Corcoran, writer for InSight Crime, “Mexico Judicial Reforms Go Easy on Corrupt Judges”
<http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/mexico-judicial-reforms-go-easy-on-corrupt-judges> 2-16-12)
A new report from Contralinea details the regularity with which judges
and magistrates in Mexico are sanctioned
for their misdeeds, pointing to the scores of bad apples in the judiciary.¶ As Contralinea reports,
Mexico’s Federal Judicial Council has received more than 22,000 complaints against different judicial
functionaries since 1995, with more than 1,000 of the cases resulting in sanctions against the offending official. In more than 600
of the cases resulting in a sanction, the target of the complaint were the judges and magistrates who issue rulings in criminal cases.¶
Many of the incidents were presumably more minor missteps, but included on the list were several cases involving some of the more
notorious capos to be arrested in recent years. In 1997, for instance, one judge dismissed drug trafficking charges against former
Sinaloa Cartel boss Hector Palma Salazar without justification, sending him to prison instead for weapons possession, which carried
with it a sentence of just six years.¶ Another judge twice dismissed charges of money laundering against the founder of the Sinaloalinked Colima Cartel, Adan Amezcua Contreras. The judge was suspended from his post for ten years as a result.¶ Overall, however,
the majority of the sanctions were simple reprimands, issued either publicly or privately. Just 156 of the cases in which sanctions
were handed out were deemed grave, and experts told Contralinea that Mexico lacks mechanisms to more easily remove dishonest
or incompetent judges from their posts.¶ These statistics and anecdotes are a reminder that, despite
the judicial reforms
passed in 2008, Mexico still lacks a way to effectively deal with corrupt judges. ¶ The 2008 reforms
have emerged as a pillar of Calderon’s response to Mexico’s public security dilemma, and an answer to critics who say that the
results of Calderon’s crime policies have been purely negative. According to this argument, despite the short-term spike in violence - some 17,000 killings last year were linked to organized crime, compared to roughly 2,700 in 2007 -- Calderon and his team have set
the stage for a long-term improvement in security by modernizing the judicial system.¶ This is not an implausible claim, though it
can’t be validated until long after Calderon is out of office. But if
the judicial reform was to result in speedier
trials, the burden on the prison system could be significantly reduced. And if the system
developed a greater capacity to process violent criminals with predictable regularity, Mexican criminals
would face a powerful reason to adopt a lower profile and rely less on violence.¶ Nonetheless,
fully implementing the reforms has faced obstacle after obstacle. One is a lack of money from
the federal government; a 2010 article from the Mexico City daily El Universal said that budget cuts had “killed” the reform.
Another more fundamental issue is the scale of the change and the timeline for
implementation. Regardless of the money allocated and the effort dedicated to training Mexican judges and lawyers -something that, as InSight Crime recently reported, American officials have been supporting through the Merida Initiative -Mexico’s previous legal system has centuries of tradition and culture behind it. Remaking the judiciary, especially without a mass
turnover of the officials responsible for corrupting the system, is a momentous undertaking in a mere eight years.¶ And, as the
Contralinea piece suggests, at the time of the reforms' passage, little
attention was given to the drivers of
corruption in the judicial branch. The reforms were essentially a top-down modification that did
little to alter the incentives of the men and women responsible for running the judicial system
at the most basic level. The oral system is theoretically a more effective way to make trials more transparent, but it doesn’t
substantially alter the calculus of a judge faced with the choice of silver or lead. Unless those incentives
are modified, it
is hard to envision the 2008 reforms as the leading catalyst of a safer Mexico.
Failing judicial system prevents solvency
Shirk 11 (David A. Shirk, director of the Trans-Border Institute and associate professor of political science at the
University of San Diego. He conducts research on Mexican politics, U.S.-Mexico relations, and law enforcement and
security along the U.S.-Mexico border, “Justice Reform In Mexico:¶ Change & Challenges In ¶ The Judicial Sector”
<http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Chapter%207%20Justice%20Reform%20in%20Mexico,%20Change%20and%20Challenges%20in%20the%20Judicial%20Sector.pdf>
January 2011)
Meanwhile, by many accounts, the
administration of justice through Mexico’s ¶ court system has also
proved woefully inadequate. As is common to other parts of ¶ Latin America, the problems faced by
Mexican judiciary are largely attributable to ¶ the historical neglect if not outright subversion of the
institution in the political ¶ system. Due to several factors that hindered democratic development in the 19th and ¶ 20th centuries,
Mexico’s judiciary has been far weaker than the legislature and (especially) the executive branch.9¶ In
Mexico and most Latin American countries, large ¶ majorities express a lack of confidence in judicial sector
institutions (Figure 1).10¶ In Mexico, these concerns owe partly to persistent and deeply engrained problems ¶ in the
functioning of courts and penal institutions, which suffer from significant ¶ resource limitations and
case backlogs. As a result, only about one in five reported ¶ crimes are fully investigated, and an
even smaller fraction of these result in trial and ¶ sentencing. The net result is widespread
criminal impunity, with perhaps one or two ¶ out of every 100 crimes resulting in a sentence (See Figure 2).11 For the victims
of ¶ crimes in Mexico, there is rarely any justice.
The judicial sector must be reformed as well
Shirk 11 (David A. Shirk, director of the Trans-Border Institute and associate professor of political science at the
University of San Diego. He conducts research on Mexican politics, U.S.-Mexico relations, and law enforcement and
security along the U.S.-Mexico border, “Justice Reform In Mexico:¶ Change & Challenges In ¶ The Judicial Sector”
<http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Chapter%207%20Justice%20Reform%20in%20Mexico,%20Change%20and%20Challenges%20in%20the%20Judicial%20Sector.pdf>
January 2011)
The ultimate legacy of these reforms
will depend largely on how they are implemented, and by whom.
There will need to be enormous investments in the training ¶ and professional oversight of the
estimated 40,000 practicing lawyers in Mexico, ¶ many of whom will operate within the criminal justice system’s new legal
framework.94 Enabling Mexico’s legal profession to meet these higher standards will re-quire a
significant revision of educational requirements, greater emphasis on vetting ¶ and continuing education
to practice law, better mechanisms to sanction dishonest ¶ and unscrupulous lawyers, and much
stronger and more active professional bar associations.95 At the same time, more than 400,000 federal,
state, and local law enforcement officers have been given a much larger role in promoting the administration ¶ of
justice. If they are to develop into a professional, democratic, and community oriented police force, they will need to be
properly vetted, held to higher standards ¶ of accountability, given the training and equipment
they need to do their jobs, and ¶ treated like the professionals they are expected to be.
Say No
Mexicans hate U.S. influence on reforms
Shirk 11 (David A. Shirk, director of the Trans-Border Institute and associate professor of political science at the
University of San Diego. He conducts research on Mexican politics, U.S.-Mexico relations, and law enforcement and
security along the U.S.-Mexico border, “Justice Reform In Mexico:¶ Change & Challenges In ¶ The Judicial Sector”
<http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Chapter%207%20Justice%20Reform%20in%20Mexico,%20Change%20and%20Challenges%20in%20the%20Judicial%20Sector.pdf>
January 2011)
Still, despite these much-touted
benefits, Mexico’s judicial reforms have faced ¶ serious and merited
criticism, both from traditionalists and from advocates of more ¶ substantial reform. Some initially bristled at the
perception that the reforms were ¶ being actively promoted by outside forces, particularly
from the United States.87 On ¶ a related note, given troubling gaps and inconsistencies riddled in the reforms themselves,
some critics expressed concerns that the reform constituted an ill-conceived, ¶ costly, and
potentially dangerous attempt to impose a new model without consideration of the intricacies, nuances, and
benefits of Mexico’s existing system. Indeed, ¶ even now, despite widespread agreement that massive investments in the judicial ¶
sector will be needed, there
is no concrete estimate of the reforms’ anticipated financial costs on which
to base budgetary allocations. In short, critics tend to fear that ¶ Mexico’s sweeping judicial reforms may be trying
to do too much, too fast, with too ¶ few resources, with too little preparation, and with little promise of success.88
AT: Drugs
Drug trade actually fuels the Mexican economy
Blankenheim, Bucheli, Doshi, Gudmundson, and Huynh 5-7-10 (Beth, Liseth, Arnav,
Abbie, Jim, “How does corruption affect economic growth in Mexico? A View on Drug Wars,”
Liseth Bucheli is a Graduate Intern, Marketing and Enrollment at University of St. Thomas,
http://www.econ.umn.edu/~schwe227/teaching.s10/files/material/group09Mexican%20Drug%20Cartels%20Final.pdf)
ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF CARTELS IN MEXICO¶ Some say that Mexico’s war on drugs is a war on
its¶ economy:¶ The loss of the drug business is estimated to shrink ¶ Mexico’s economy by
63% in the short run. (Global ¶ Envision)¶ Bank loans are expensive and hard to get, so traffickers
¶ have stepped in to provide small-business loans.¶ U.S. Treasury’s blacklist of businesses
(2006) suspected of ¶ drug relation: a day care, a gym, an electronics store, ¶ meatpacking
plants, dairies, hotels, horse stables, gas ¶ stations, and a mining company. (USATODAY)¶
Estimates say that cartels have laundered more than¶ $689 million in the banks of the state of
Sinaloa, and ¶ that drug money is driving nearly 20% of the state’s ¶ economy. (UNESCO)
Merida
Aid Bad
Merida fails – increases violence and human rights violations
Nieto 11 (Catalina Nieto, Witness for Peace's National Grassroots Organizer, “More U.S. Aid Won't End Mexico's
Drug War” <https://www.commondreams.org/view/2011/03/05-0> 3-5-11)
With all the astoundingly grisly incidents involving Mexico's armed forces these days, one thing is clear: the
drug war is
failing. The Mexican military shouldn't get another penny of U.S. military aid. However, the White
House's new budget proposal calls for pumping another $282 million into Mexico's drug war next year.¶ Known as the
"Mérida Initiative," this boondoggle supposedly combats illegal drug trafficking, coordinates law
enforcement efforts, and fights organized crime in Mexico and Central America. According to a Congressional Research Service
report, the U.S. Congress allotted $1.3 billion for Mexico from 2008 to 2010. President Barack Obama requested another $310
million for 2011. (Congress still hasn't agreed on what to budget for this or other line items, which is why a federal government
shutdown now looms.)¶ On the surface, it looks like the U.S. government wants to cut the Mérida Initiative's funding, but that's not
exactly the case. One reason behind the apparent budget cuts is that Mexico
has already invested in expensive
military and police equipment such as helicopters and surveillance aircraft. With that spending out of the way, Mexico's
military will continue receiving significant subsidies from the United States.¶ How is the money being spent? Let's begin
by taking a look at the plan's track record over the last four years. According to an official Mexican government
database, nearly 35,000 people have been killed in drug-related violence since late 2006. Drug
cartels are stronger, arms trafficking has boomed, and the very security forces the United
States is funding and training have been accused of shocking human rights violations.¶ The Obama
administration should acknowledge that the Mérida Initiative is a failed strategy and scrap it altogether.¶ It's a
reckless strategy that has only intensified Mexico's massive bloodshed. However, this failure can't be
official. A 2010 report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) explains that the Mérida Initiative never even
contained benchmarks for evaluating the program.¶ As a Colombian, I've seen first-hand the consequences of
the war on drugs. Since 2000, Washington has provided over $6 billion to the Colombian government to advance the drug war. I've
seen how militarization became a part of everyday life in my country. It deteriorated
living standards,
increased violence, forced displacement, and diverted budgetary priorities from the basic
needs of the population to weapons and espionage.¶ The result is widespread violations of
civil and human rights. Nearly 5 million Colombians have been displaced by violence, crop fumigation, and drug eradication
programs, and big businesses have absorbed more than 5 million hectares of land that belonged to campesinos, or small farmers.¶
On the bright side, Obama's 2012 Foreign Operations aid request would provide Colombia with more economic and social assistance
($201.7 million) than military and police assistance ($196 million).¶ That's a sign of the times. More
and more public
figures agree that the Drug War is a failure. During a meeting in Geneva last month, the Global Commission on Drug
Policies stated that "criminalization of consumption did not reduce drug traffic." Even former Mexican
President Vicente Fox has said that "prohibition isn't working" and that "violence against violence
doesn't work."¶ Why, after years of spending billions of dollars in Colombia and Mexico to fund a
strategy that has failed to stem the flow of drugs and dampen the associated violence, do
policymakers keep writing blank checks for it?¶ Military aid won't end drug violence. While there's
no easy fix to Mexico's violence, the U.S. government should ensure that our taxpayer dollars aren't used to violate human rights.
Instead, the United States should attack the root causes of drug trafficking: high demand for drugs in the U.S., increased rates of
poverty and unemployment, and the lack of opportunities for Latin American farmers and youth.¶ It's time that both the Obama
administration and Congress re-orient the drug war. The peaceful future that Mexican people seek can't be found in the barrel of a
gun, but in well-funded Mexican schools and well-stocked U.S. rehabilitation clinics.
Funding for the drug war only makes problems worse
Chacon 11 (Justin Akers Chacon, professor of U.S. History and Chicano Studies in San Diego, “U.S. intervention in
Mexico will make things worse” <http://progressive.org/mexico_drug_war.html> 8-19-11)
The increasing involvement of the United States in Mexico’s drug war is only going to make a
bad situation worse.¶ It will likely lead to more deaths. It will be a drain on our treasury. And it’s
unlikely to stem the flow of drugs. This is because the U.S. intervention ignores the root causes of
the drug trade and the spreading international character of the cartels.¶ U.S. involvement began with the “Merida Initiative,” a
$1.4 billion aid package signed by President Bush in 2007 to provide training and equipment to Mexican drug enforcement efforts. It
coincided with Mexican President Felipe Calderon’s initiation of a military offensive against the drug cartels.¶ President Obama then
expanded the scope of the Merida Initiative in 2009, emphasizing coordination and information sharing, including the establishment
of joint command and control centers in Mexico. This has led to the training of thousands of Mexican agents, the transfer of hightech weaponry, the deployment of unmanned drones within Mexico and now the direct involvement of Drug Enforcement
Administration and CIA agents, U.S. military personnel (from the Pentagon’s Northern Command) and private contractors.¶ Since
the launch of Calderon’s military operation, an estimated 35,000 people have been killed. And the death
rate has been increasing for each year of the conflict.¶ Mexico has now surpassed Colombia in
kidnappings and has seen a dramatic spike in assassinations of journalists and political figures.
Corruption has exploded, as drug money has been poured into politics to subvert the war effort from within. A study of
the Mexican Senate’s Commission of Municipal Development has found that six out of every 10 municipal
governments in the country are infiltrated by drug dealers. Mexico’s Department of Public Security estimates
that 62 percent of police nationwide have also been corrupted by drug money.¶ Rather than suppress the drug trade,
the war has driven it deeper into the social and political fabric of Mexico and has spread it to
other countries in Central America.
Aid Fails
Aid doesn’t reach Mexico – red tape and time
Ellingwood 09 (Ken Ellingwood, writer for Chicago Tribune, “Mexico's drug war: U.S. aid delayed by red tape,
GAO report says” <http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2009-12-04/news/0912040109_1_merida-aid-drug-cartelsdrug-gangs> 12-4-09)
MEXICO CITY — A
small fraction of U.S. aid for Mexico's drug war under the so-called Merida
Initiative has been delivered because of red tape and the time needed to order helicopters and other
equipment, a U.S. government report concluded Thursday.¶ An examination by the Government Accountability Office said just
$26 million was spent by the end of September, or 2 percent of the nearly $1.3 billion in
security aid that had been appropriated for Mexico under the multiyear program.¶ The GAO, Congress' investigative
arm, said delays also stemmed from congressional restrictions and the need to ready Mexican and U.S.
agencies for a big jump in the flow of bilateral assistance.¶ Because of the delays, "few programs have been
delivered and limited funding has been expended to date," the report said.¶ Mexican officials, locked
in a bloody three-year offensive against drug cartels, have complained that the promised U.S. help, including Bell
helicopters and scanners that detect contraband hidden in cargo trucks, has been too slow to reach them.